Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113

Section 36-1-113(c)'s heightened termination procedures must be followed before a court may permanently terminate visitation rights in a manner that effectively terminates parental rights.

Colbert v. White · filed 2000-04-26(c)

We find that since the Mother’s parental rights were not terminated under the termination proceedings of section 36-1-113(c) such that she did not receive the heightened protection afforded by the termination statute, a permanent termination of her visitation rights is a violation of her constitutional rights.

A termination petition's failure to allege abandonment as required by section 36-1-113(d)(2)(D) may be cured when abandonment is tried by implied consent without an objection that the issue falls outside the pleadings.

In re: Petition of John Weatherford · filed 2000-08-28(d)(2)(D)

We find that, although abandonment was not specifically mentioned in either the complaint or the amended complaint, due to the portion of the opening statement by Appellees’ counsel and the testimony of Mr. Sheffield quoted above, the issue of abandonment was tried by the implied consent of Mr. Sheffield pursuant to Rule 15.02 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure since Mr. Sheffield did not object to abandonment as being outside of the pleadings.

Although subsection (k) requires entry of findings and conclusions within thirty days after the hearing, a six-month delay may be harmless error under the circumstances.

Dept.of Children's Svcs. v. D.R. · filed 2001-09-25(k)

We agree that the Final Decree did not comply with the time element of Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(k) which provides that “[t]he court shall enter an order which makes specific findings of fact and conclusions of law within thirty (30) days of the conclusion of the hearing.” ... Finally, we hold that given the facts and circumstances presented to us in the record, the failure to have the final decree entered within thirty days of the conclusion of the hearing was harmless error. See Tenn. R. App. P. 36(b).

A termination petition satisfies subsection (d)(3)(C) without expressly citing it when the petition states the substance required by that provision.

State of Tennessee, Department of Children's Services v. Jennifer Lee Netherton Whited · filed 2001-11-08(d)(3)(C)

Again, appellant's contention is not supported by the record. While not explicitly citing the statute, the petition, in numbered paragraph 5, sets out the content of the legislation.

A circuit or chancery court's concurrent termination jurisdiction ends when it denies termination; subsection (m)'s dispositional authority applies only upon termination, and denial does not alter an existing juvenile-court custody order.

State v. R.S. and K.S. · filed 2003-04-10(a), (m)

There is no provision giving the court authority if the termination is denied. We agree with DCS that after the conclusion of a termination action denying termination, the termination case stands dismissed. Consequently, the authority of the court hearing only the termination matter ends. The denial of the termination does not change custody of the children.

Subsection (k) requires specific underlying facts as well as legal conclusions in the written termination order; merely reciting statutory grounds as findings requires vacatur and remand.

In re: K.N.R. · filed 2003-12-23(k)

An examination of the final order reveals the repetitious restatement of conclusions of law and the repetitious recitations of the statutory grounds; however, there are no findings of fact in the final order, as required by to Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(k), for our review. It must be understood that a recitation in a final order that a parent has “abandoned the child” is a conclusion of law, not a finding of fact. Moreover, placing the statement (abandoned the child) following the popular phrase “the Court therefore finds” does not transform a conclusion of law into a finding of fact. ... Accordingly, we vacate the Final Decree of Guardianship and the Amended Final Decree of Guardianship and remand the matter to the trial court to enter an order pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(k) which recites specific findings of fact in addition to conclusions of law.

Subsection (k) requires specific, individualized factual findings on the grounds and best interests for each differently situated parent and child.

State of Tennessee, Department of Children's Services v. David Michael McBee, Sr. · filed 2004-02-09(k)

The juvenile court also found that it was in the best interest of the children that the parental rights be terminated. However, the juvenile court failed to make any specific finding of fact regarding the best interest of the children either. See Tenn.Code Ann. § 36-1-113(k)(Supp.2003). ... As such, each of the grounds for termination, as well as the best interest of each child, should be dealt with individually.

Subsection (d)(4)(C) does not permit the Department to forum shop or circumvent the continuing jurisdiction of the juvenile court that first acquired and exercised jurisdiction over the child.

In Re: B.N.S. · filed 2004-04-26(d)(4)(C)

We have determined that Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1- 113(d)(4)(C) should not be interpreted to enable the Department to circumvent Tenn. Code Ann. § 37-1-103(c). There is no question that the Department has statutory authorization to file petitions to terminate parental rights or that the Marion County Juvenile Court has subject matter jurisdiction to hear and dispose of termination petitions. However, the flexibility written into Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(d)(4)(C) was not intended to allow the Department to forum shop or to avoid the clear, precise requirements of Tenn. Code Ann. § 37-1-103(c). The clear policy behind Tenn. Code Ann. § 37-1-103(c) is that once a juvenile court assumes and exercises jurisdiction over a child, it should continue to exercise jurisdiction over that child until the case is concluded unless, for good reason, it decides to transfer the case to another court.

A court with concurrent jurisdiction may address termination and adoption together, but if it denies termination it must dismiss the adoption petition, its authority ends, and jurisdiction over the prior custody order reverts to the juvenile court.

In re: DMD & JLA · filed 2004-06-17(a), (m)

When a petition for termination of parental rights is filed in a court with concurrent jurisdiction, the exclusive jurisdiction of juvenile court is superceded. Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1- 113(a). Under section 36-1-113(m), upon termination of parental rights, the court granting the termination petition also may place the child with prospective adoptive parents. However, if the court denies the termination petition, it has no option but to dismiss the adoption petition. Thus, its authority over the matter ends.

Section 36-1-113(k) requires specific findings of fact and conclusions of law on abandonment, and termination for persistent conditions must be supported by clear and convincing evidence.

State, Department of Children's Services v. C.H.K. · filed 2004-08-13(k), (g)(3)(A)

We have determined that the Trial Court’s judgment must be vacated and remanded because the Trial Court *574failed to make the specific findings of fact and conclusions of law on the issue of abandonment as required by Tenn.Code Ann. § 36-l-113(k). Further, we find that the Trial Court’s judgment must be reversed since there was not clear and convincing evidence for termination pursuant to Tenn.Code Ann. § 36-l-113(g)(3)(A).

Subsection (k) requires specific written findings and conclusions on the child’s best interests; when the termination order omits them, the appellate court must vacate and remand rather than supply them itself.

In Re Adoption of John A. Kleshinski and Kevin Kleshinski, Chirlena Kleshinski and John E. Kleshinski v. Elizabeth · filed 2005-04-04(k)

In view of the trial court’s failure to enter the required specific findings on whether terminating Mother’s parental rights was in the best interest of the children, we vacate the judgment terminating Mother’s parental rights and remand the cause to the trial court for written findings of fact and conclusions of law in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-1-113(k). The trial court may, in its discretion, determine whether additional proof on this issue is appropriate.

Subsection (k) requires specific written findings and conclusions on the child’s best interests; when the termination order omits them, the appellate court must vacate and remand rather than supply them itself.

In Re Adoption of John A. Kleshinski and Kevin na KleKleshinski, Chirleshinski and John E. Kleshinski v. Elizabeth · filed 2005-05-04(k)

In view of the trial court’s failure to enter the required specific findings on whether terminating Mother’s parental rights was in the best interest of the children, we vacate the judgment terminating Mother’s parental rights and remand the cause to the trial court for written findings of fact and conclusions of law in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-1-113(k). The trial court may, in its discretion, determine whether additional proof on this issue is appropriate.

Section 36-1-113(k) requires a termination court to enter written, specific findings of fact and conclusions of law even without a request, and noncompliance requires remand for the required findings.

In Re: M.W.M, W.W.M., S.M.M, & A.M.M. · filed 2005-08-01(k)

Accordingly, Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(k) explicitly requires courts terminating parental rights to “enter written orders containing specific findings of fact and conclusions of law” whether they have been requested to do so or not.

Due process forbids terminating parental rights under subsection (g)(3)(A) when persistent conditions were neither pleaded nor tried by consent, because the parent must have notice of the ground to prepare a defense.

In Re: W.B. IV · filed 2005-04-29(g)(3)(A)

Because the private interest at stake in this case is fundamental, i.e., the permanent severing of all parent-child ties; because the risk of an erroneous deprivation of those rights is created by a sua sponte ruling on a ground not alleged is great; and because the government has no compelling interest in such a procedure, due process compels reversal of the trial court’s holding that Mother’s parental rights could be termination on the basis of Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(3)(A).

Section 36-1-113(k) requires specific findings and conclusions in the court's entered written order, not in its oral ruling from the bench.

In the Matter of B.L.R., D.O.B. 10/14/02, a Child Under 18 Years of Age · filed 2005-08-04(k)

Thus, when this Court undertakes a review of a parental termination case, we are concerned with whether the trial court’s final written order, not its oral statements to the parties, satisfies the statute.

An indigent parent whose rights are terminated is entitled to a record sufficiently complete for effective appellate review of whether the statutory clear-and-convincing standard was met.

In the Matter of: A.L.N. and B.T.N. · filed 2005-08-24(c)

The determination of Father’s indigency not only entitled Father to appointed counsel, it also entitled him to a sufficient record on appeal.

Section 36-1-113(k) demands meticulous compliance, and a termination judgment must be vacated when its adopted findings are inconsistent with the court's written judgment.

In Re: MEI, dob 12/23/97, Jason Allen Ingle and Kerrie Michelle Ingle v. Ingle · filed 2005-09-26(k)

Meticulous compliance with the mandates of Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(k) are required by appellate courts.

A termination court may not rely on statutory grounds omitted from the petition without evidence that the parent was properly apprised that those grounds were at issue.

M.D. v. R.L.H. · filed 2005-11-22(g), (k)

Absent evidence showing that Father was properly apprised that these additional grounds for terminating his parental rights were at issue, we must vacate the Juvenile Court’s judgment insofar as it terminates Father’s parental rights pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 36-1-113(g)(1) and (g)(4).

Subsection (k)'s findings need not appear in a particular part of the order or cite the statutory ground, so long as the order is sufficiently specific to identify the factual and legal basis for termination.

In the Matter of: K.H., S.F., A.F., & W.F.,Tarra Howell and Dennis Lee Moody v. Tanya Dee Ballard and Johnny Freeman · filed 2009-05-15(k)

Mother cites no authority in support of this assertion, and we have found nothing which requires that the trial court’s findings of fact or conclusions of law be in a specific part of the order. ... Citation of the statutory provision would have been enormously helpful, but its omission is not fatal in and of itself if the remainder of the order is sufficiently specific.

Subsection (q)’s one-year statute of repose does not limit a timely direct appeal; the one-year period begins only after entry of a final order following exhaustion of direct appeals.

In Re Adoption of A.M.H. · filed 2007-01-23(q)

Because the one-year limitation under subsection 36-1-113(q) does not begin to run until the entry of a final order, we conclude the language used in the statute does not indicate an intent to affect a parent’s ability to timely pursue a direct appeal. Moreover, the legislature specifies that the “provision is intended as a statute of repose.” Id. § 36-1-113(q). A statute of repose does not limit the time for appellate courts to hear and rule on a case that has been appealed timely;5 a statute of repose limits the time within which an action may be filed. Calaway, 193 S.W.3d at 515; Penley v. Honda Motor Co., 31 S.W.3d 181, 184 (Tenn. 2000). Therefore, by designating subsection 36-1-113(q) “a statute of repose,” the legislature demonstrated an intent that the statute serve as an absolute limit on the time in which a challenge to a final order of termination may be filed, not a limit on the time for a direct appeal.

Section 36-1-113 does not require proof that an adoptive family is already prepared to adopt the child before parental rights may be terminated.

In the Matter of L.A.J., III State of Tennessee, Department of Children's Services v. Larry Jones, Jr. · filed 2007-11-15(d)(3)(C)(i), (h)(1)

Moreover, the termination statute does not require proof that an adoptive family stands ready to adopt the child at issue. See T.C.A. § 36-1-113(d)(3)(C)(i), (h)(1) (2005); see also In re Audrey S., 182 S.W .3d 838, 879-80 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005).

An omission of written findings from the original termination order may be cured nunc pro tunc under subsection (k) when the court actually made the findings earlier and the amended order merely corrects the record.

In Re: Adoption of M.P.J., DOB 1/29/02 · filed 2007-11-28(k)

It is clear from the transcript and the original order that the judge ruled in favor of Aunt, terminating Father’s rights and granting the adoption. Thus, this situation is different than if the court made no findings of fact at all, and a judge issued a nunc pro tunc order, for the first time making those required findings of fact. Sufficient findings of fact were included in the amended termination order, with a date relating back to the January 9, 2007 termination hearing. Thus, we believe it would serve no purpose to remand for the purpose of rewriting these same findings. See In re M.R.W., T.D.B., and A.N.B., No. M2005-02329-COA-R3-PT, 2006 WL 1184010, at *4 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 3, 2006) (“[W]here the trial court has made definite and detailed findings of fact and conclusions of law, remand on appeal . . . would serve no purpose.”). To avoid confusion in the future, it would be better practice for trial courts to enter their final orders with the finding of facts included in the order, and not attempt to incorporate a separate document containing the necessary findings.

Section 36-1-113(k) requires specific findings of fact supporting the court's conclusions on willful abandonment and the child's best interests.

Adoption Place, Inc. v. Doe · filed 2007-12-05(k)

The case must be remanded for the entry of specific findings of fact and conclusions of law as required by TenmCode Ann. § 36-1-113(k).

The advance-notice prerequisite to termination for abandonment is satisfied when DCS delivers permanency plans and abandonment criteria and the court later warns the represented parent that continued absence will lead to termination.

In the matter of: Amber M. S. and Stefanie L. S. · filed 2010-11-30(g)(1)

This is especially true when the court’s statements are coupled with the warnings contained in the Criteria and Procedures for Termination of Parental Rights and the undisputed fact that Mother did receive that document along with the permanency plans. ... We therefore affirm the trial court’s holding that DCS afforded Mother the statutory notice required in cases concerning termination on the grounds of abandonment.

Dismissal of an earlier termination petition does not bar a later abandonment petition based on the new four-month period immediately preceding the later filing.

In Re: The Adoption of Jeffrey T. · filed 2010-12-14(g)(1)

Thus, the previous petition was dismissed prior to the relevant four month time period upon which the instant petition is predicated. As such, the previous petition could not operate as res judicata upon the issues in the instant petition. To hold, as Father requests, that a petition to terminate parental rights once defeated operates as a bar to all future such petitions to terminate that parent’s parental rights would be ludicrous, and we expressly decline to so hold.

Subsection (k) does not require findings to appear in a particular section of the termination order; sufficiently specific findings relevant to best interests may appear in the section addressing grounds.

In Re Adoption of C.A.M. (d/o/b 11/30/96), James Keith Jones and Cari Lecklitner Jones v. Moore · filed 2009-11-09(k)

The specific findings of fact are set out in the portion of the trial court’s order relating to the grounds for termination, and they are not repeated in the section on C.A.M.’s best interest. While the termination statutes require that the trial court make specific findings of fact, there is no authority indicating that the findings must be in a particular section of the trial court’s order. See In re K.H., No. W2008-01144-COA-R3-PT, 2009 WL 1362314, at *7 n.6 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 15, 2009). Often the findings of fact supporting the grounds for termination are also relevant to the issue of whether termination is in the child’s best interest. So long as the trial court’s written order contains findings of requisite specificity that show that termination is in the child’s best interest, the fact that the findings are not set out in the “best interest” section of the order does not render the order insufficient. In this case, the trial court found that Father was convicted of a violent felony, was incarcerated for a period of ten years, and willfully failed to support C.A.M. The trial court also found that Stepfather is a fit person to care for C.A.M. and is able to financially support her. These factual findings relate to C.A.M.’s best interest as well as grounds, and the trial court was not required to repeat them in the best interest section of the order.

Compliance with subsection (k) is measured by the trial court’s final written order, not its oral bench ruling, because a court speaks through its entered judgments.

In the Matter of: Emily A., Megan A., and Lindsey A. · filed 2010-02-16(k)

when this Court undertakes a review of a parental termination case, we are concerned with whether the trial court’s final written order, not its oral statements to the parties, satisfies the statute.” Id. at *33(citations omitted). This is because of the well established principle “that a court speaks only through its written judgments, duly entered upon its minutes.”

Even an unopposed termination petition requires clear and convincing proof of statutory grounds and best interests, plus the written findings and conclusions mandated by subsections (c) and (k).

In Re Angela E. · filed 2010-02-16(c), (k)

The termination statute clearly and unequivocally requires the trial court to make the statutorily required findings and conclusions before granting a petition to terminate parental rights, regardless of whether that petition is opposed. Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113. In two places, subsections (c) and (k), the statute uses mandatory language to describe the trial court’s responsibility to make findings of fact and conclusions of law before terminating parental rights.

Subsection (k) requires the termination order to identify each ground found and connect specific facts and legal conclusions to that ground; an appellate court will not match scattered findings to possible grounds itself.

In Re: Maria B.S. and Anna J.S. · filed 2012-04-25(k)

The simple fact is, however, that the trial court never stated which facts in this case clearly and convincingly establish the elements required to terminate parental rights. We decline the appellees’ invitation to attempt to match factual findings to the numerous grounds alleged in this case. ... Because the order in this case fails to sufficiently identify which grounds for termination were found to exist, and fails to make sufficient conclusions of law in connection with those grounds, we are left with no choice but to remand the case with directions to make the required specific written findings of fact and conclusions of law.

Subsection (k)’s thirty-day deadline for entering the termination order is directory, so a late order does not require vacatur or reversal.

In Re: Zada M. · filed 2011-04-11(k)

DCS argues that while the delay in entering the order is “unfortunate”, it does not warrant reversal of the Trial Court’s decision. The precise issue was decided by this Court in the case of In re: M.R.W., 2006 WL 1184010 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 3, 2006). In that case, the trial court did not issue its order terminating parental rights and making specific fact findings for over 60 days. The appellant argued that the statutory provision cited above was mandatory, and was akin to a jurisdictional requirement. Id. We disagreed, stating that the statutory provision regarding the time frame was directory, and merely evidenced the legislature’s intent that parental termination cases be handled expeditiously. Id. That Court found that, where the trial court failed to enter the order within thirty days, the order did not have to be vacated, and the failure to comply with the time frame did not warrant reversal. We hold this issue is without merit.

A termination petition containing multiple omissions of mandatory statutory notices is defective and must be vacated, but the defects are curable on remand rather than jurisdictionally fatal.

In Re: Natalie R.C. · filed 2011-10-18(d)(3)(A)(i), (d)(3)(C)

However technical these omissions may seem, given the number of omissions considered in the context of a termination of parental rights, they may not be overlooked or excused. We, however, do not agree with Father that these defects are fatal and require the petition to be dismissed.

A petition alleging persistent conditions and failure to support during the four months before filing does not give adequate notice that termination is sought for pre-incarceration wanton disregard.

In Re Landon H. · filed 2012-01-11(g)(1)

Applying the same rationale to the case at bar, we find that the original petition, alleging persistence of conditions, as well as the supplemental petition, referencing failure to support in the four months prior to the filing of the supplemental petition, are insufficient to provide notice that termination of Chris’ parental rights was being sought on the basis of abandonment by wanton disregard.

A court cannot terminate parental rights for pre-incarceration wanton disregard when the termination petition did not plead that ground and therefore gave the parent no notice of it.

In Re Anthony R. · filed 2013-02-08(g)(1)

We conclude that Father did not receive proper notice of the ground on which his parental rights to Anthony were terminated. The trial court terminated Father’s parental rights based upon one ground–Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-102(1)(A)(iv)–and this ground was not pled in the petition.

A trial court may rely on an unpleaded subsection (g)(6) ground when evidence supporting it is introduced at the termination hearing and the issue is tried without objection.

In Re: Michael B.Q. · filed 2012-07-12(g)(6)

For all of the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the trial court did not err in relying upon a ground not specifically set out in the original petition as evidence supporting this ground was introduced at the hearing and tried without objection.

Subsection (k)’s thirty-day deadline is directory rather than mandatory, so a termination order entered after thirty days need not be set aside.

In the Matter of Robert B. · filed 2012-07-12(k)

Certainly Section 36-1-113(k) evidences the legislature’s intent that parental termination cases be handled expeditiously. It does not indicate, however, that a termination order entered over thirty days after the trial must be set aside. See In re M.R.W., No. M2005- 02329-COA-R3-PT, 2006 WL 1184010, at * 3; 2006 Tenn. App. LEXIS 297, at *9-10 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 3, 2006). The thirty-day time frame referenced in Section 36-1-113(k) is merely directory and not mandatory.

Section 36-1-113(k)'s thirty-day deadline for entering findings reflects a policy of expedition but is directory rather than mandatory, and delay alone supplies no reversal remedy.

In Re: Isobel v. O. and Bree'Ana J.A. · filed 2012-11-08(k)

We repeatedly have held that the time frame contained in the statute reflects the legislature’s intent that parental termination cases be handled in an expeditious manner and is not mandatory.

A court with subject-matter jurisdiction under subsection (a) may decide a termination action while a de novo appeal of the separate dependency-and-neglect action remains pending.

In Re Alyssa B. · filed 2012-07-25(a)

We note at the outset that this appeal is from the chancery court decision terminating Mother’s parental rights. The de novo appeal to circuit court of the juvenile court’s decision finding Alyssa to be dependent and neglected is not before this court.3 Pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(a), the trial court had subject matter jurisdiction in the parental termination action. Mother cites no authority to support her assertion that the trial court was required to postpone a decision on the termination proceeding because of the de novo appeal pending in circuit court concerning the juvenile court’s dependency and neglect determination.

Section 36-1-113(k) requires specific findings of fact and conclusions of law but prescribes no particular format; narrative findings may satisfy it.

In Re Emily C.R. · filed 2012-10-16(k)

There is no particular format required to comply with the statute and the court in this instance made its findings and conclusions in narrative fashion.

A parent has adequate notice that plan noncompliance and persistent conditions may terminate her rights when earlier proceedings and plans supplied that warning, even if a new plan was approved after the petition.

In Re: Sahara W. · filed 2013-09-24(g)(2)-(3)

Mother appeals the termination of her parental rights, arguing that she was not properly notified of being at risk of losing her parental rights because the new permanency plan was approved after the filing of the petition. We hold that Mother sufficiently was put on notice that her parental rights were subject to being terminated at trial.

A termination petition need not mirror section 36-1-113(d)(3)(C)'s exact language if its allegations sufficiently notify the parent that her rights will be terminated, adoption is intended, and custody will pass to others.

In the Matter of Levi D. · filed 2013-05-01(d)(3)(C)

Although the termination petition does not mirror the exact language of Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-1-113(d)(3)(C), it clearly provides that, if granted, Mother’s parental rights would be terminated, that Levi’s current custodians wanted to adopt him upon conclusion of the termination proceedings, and that Levi would be placed in the legal and physical custody of someone other than Mother.

When a termination petition in juvenile court has been voluntarily dismissed, failure to send that court further written notice under § 36-1-113(d)(4) does not divest a circuit court of concurrent jurisdiction.

In Re: Michaela v. · filed 2013-11-19(d)(4)

However, having determined that the petition for termination of Father’s parental rights was no longer pending in the Juvenile Court upon the State’s voluntary dismissal of the initial termination petition on January 7, 2011, we determine that a lack of further written notice to the Juvenile Court did not divest the Circuit Court of its concurrent jurisdiction. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 37-1-104(c) (“The juvenile, circuit and chancery courts have concurrent jurisdiction to terminate parental or guardian rights pursuant to the provisions of title 36, chapter 1; part 1.”). We conclude that the Circuit Court properly exercised subject matter jurisdiction in terminating Father’s parental rights to the Children.

A court may not terminate parental rights on an unpleaded abandonment ground unless the record clearly shows that the ground was tried by implied consent.

In re: Eimile A.M. · filed 2013-12-26(g)(1)

The strict application of procedural requirements in cases involving the termination of parental rights requires that before there can be a finding that a ground for termination not alleged in the petition was tried by implied consent, the record must be clear that such ground indeed was tried by implied consent. In order for a court to make such a finding, it must be clear from the record that the evidence presented relevant to the unpled ground had no relevance to any other issue being presented to the Trial Court. See In re: S.J.M., No. M2009-01080-COA-R3-PT, 2009 Tenn. App. LEXIS 777, at **9-10 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 20, 2009) (stating: “Implied consent, however, cannot occur when evidence claimed to be supporting an issue not raised in the pleadings is also relevant to an issue that is actually raised in the pleadings.”), no appl. perm. appeal filed. It must be clear from the record that the parent fully understood that this particular unpled ground for termination was being tried and that the parent impliedly consented to the trial of that ground even though it had not been pled. In the case now before us the evidence relevant to wanton disregard also was relevant to the ground of persistent conditions, which was properly pled. We are not convinced from the record before us that Father impliedly consented to the ground of abandonment by wanton disregard being tried. As such, Father’s parental rights may not be terminated upon this ground in this proceeding.

When a parent does not appeal an independently sufficient termination ground, that ground becomes final and the appellate court need not issue an advisory opinion on the other challenged grounds.

In Re: Alexis L. · filed 2014-04-30(g)(1)

Because the issue is waived, the trial court’s determination that this ground for termination of parental rights has been met is final.

A traditional surrogacy agreement cannot bypass statutory termination procedures; involuntary termination requires a statutory ground and a determination that termination is in the child’s best interests.

In Re Baby · filed 2014-09-18(c)

First, if there is a statutory ground for termination and the termination of the mother’s rights is in the best interests of the child, an involuntary termination may be warranted. Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(c). ... Like these courts, we conclude that the enforcement of a traditional surrogacy contract must occur within the confines of the statutes governing who qualifies as a legal parent and how parental rights may be terminated.

A court may not terminate for an incarcerated parent’s pre-incarceration abandonment period when the petition alleged only the four months before filing and the alternative ground was neither pleaded nor tried by consent.

In Re K.N.B. · filed 2014-09-30(g)(1)

As we see it, the trial court essentially took an “either/or” approach when it terminated Father’s rights to the child K.N.B. on the grounds of abandonment by willful failure to support and willful failure to visit during the four months immediately preceding the filing of the petition or in the four months prior to his incarceration. On the record before us, this was error. In short, there is evidence that Father was incarcerated during the four months before the petition was filed, and the ground of abandonment by an incarcerated parent was neither properly pleaded nor tried by consent.

An appellate court cannot treat an erroneous persistent-conditions ground as harmless by substituting an unpleaded long-sentence ground that the parties did not clearly consent to try.

In re Ariana S. · filed 2015-05-28(g)(3), (g)(6)

In the absence of clear consent to try this issue and in light of the heightened consideration we give to the protection of parents’ rights in termination cases, we cannot treat this as “harmless error” on the part of the trial court and proceed to determine the issue de novo. Rather, we must reverse the termination of Father’s rights on the ground of persistence of conditions.

Subsection (f) requires affirmative proof that an incarcerated parent received actual notice of the time and place of the termination hearing before parental rights may be terminated.

In Re C.J.A.H. · filed 2015-11-30(f)

Petitioners conceded at oral argument before this Court that Father had no notice and was not at fault in failing to appear at the hearing. The testimony at the ex parte hearing was not subject to cross-examination, not transcribed by a court reporter, and hence not reviewable.

A termination order does not satisfy subsection (k) by attaching and adopting a transcript of oral findings; the trial court must enter written findings of fact supporting its legal conclusions.

In re K.J.G. · filed 2016-03-28(k)

In this case, the trial court made no written findings of fact in its final order.

A court cannot terminate for wanton disregard when an earlier order excluded that ground and the parent objected rather than impliedly consenting to try it.

In Re: Addison P. · filed 2016-05-20(g)(1)

Under these circumstances, we conclude it would be inappropriate to include the ground of wanton disregard where the trial court did not include such a ground in its order determining the grounds and where the ground was not tried by implied consent. ... As such, we reverse the trial court‟s finding that the ground of wanton disregard was proven against Mother.

A proceeding under Section 36-1-113 has the sole purpose of irrevocably severing the legal relationship between parents and children, so intervention is not a vehicle for grandparents to obtain custody or visitation.

In Re: C.H. · filed 2017-01-31

In the current appeal, the grandparents seek to intervene in a termination of parental rights proceeding, which has the “sole purpose” under Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113 of “sever[ing] irrevocably the legal relationship between biological parents and their children.” In re M.J.B., 140 S.W.3d at 651.

A ten-year-sentence ground need not be cited perfectly when the pleadings and proceedings give the parent adequate notice and an opportunity to defend, and the issue is tried by implied consent.

In Re Jeremiah N. · filed 2017-05-02(g)(6)

Upon our review of the record, we agree with the trial court that Warren A. was given adequate notice that his ten years of incarceration was being asserted as a ground for termination of his parental rights in accordance with section 36-1-113(g)(6). The record shows that he was provided with an adequate opportunity to present a defense to that ground if desired.

Missing subsection (k)'s six-month hearing target does not require dismissal of the termination petition; the remedy is to expedite the hearing.

In Re Preston L. · filed 2017-09-27(k)

As the petitioners point out, the statute does not contemplate dismissal of the termination petition for failure to comply with the six-month time period set forth in Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(k). Rather, the remedy is for the court to expedite the hearing of the case.

A termination order must reflect the trial court’s individualized, independent judgment; a skeletal oral ruling followed by an order copied nearly verbatim from the petition requires vacatur.

In Re Colton B. · filed 2017-12-22(k)

Because of the heightened protections afforded in termination of parental rights cases and the concomitant need for “individualized decision making”, Audrey S., 182 S.W.3d at 861, however, we cannot excuse the trial court from its obligation to render a decision that is “the product of the trial court’s independent judgment.” Smith, 439 S.W.3d at 315. Here, the record causes this Court grave concern and substantial doubt as to whether the trial court properly preformed its high judicial function. Id. at 313. As such, we must vacate and remand with instructions for the trial court to enter an order that is the product of its own judgment.

A bare legal conclusion that abandonment occurred does not satisfy subsection (k)’s requirement for specific factual findings, although remand is unnecessary when another valid ground supports termination.

In Re Noah S. · filed 2018-01-23(k)

Although the order contains a legal conclusion, it fails to support this conclusion with any factual findings. The requirement that the trial court make specific findings of fact and conclusions of law is not a mere technicality; rather, compliance with Section 36-1-113(k) serves an important purpose.

An order copied from the petition and containing only conclusory findings does not satisfy subsection (k) or permit meaningful appellate review.

In Re Atrivium K. · filed 2018-08-23(k)

In form and substance, the order does not comply with the applicable law and the high burden that is before the court in deciding to terminate a parent’s rights. ... Accordingly, we vacate the judgment terminating Mother’s parental rights and remand the case for the court to make specific findings of fact and conclusions of law in compliance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-1-113(k).

Missing subsection (k)’s thirty-day deadline does not by itself require vacating a termination judgment.

In Re: Mason C. · filed 2018-12-14(k)

This Court has previously determined that failure to comply with the thirty-day requirement of Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-1-113(k) “does not require nor contemplate vacating a trial court’s judgment based merely on the untimely filing of the trial court’s findings of fact and conclusions of law.”

Section 36-1-113(k)'s thirty-day deadline for entering findings does not require vacatur when a remand would only compound delay rather than promote a just and speedy resolution.

in Re Madison J. · filed 2020-07-24(k)

Despite the explicit policy of timely decisions in these cases, if a court fails to comply with the 30-day requirement, the case may proceed on appeal if remanding it to the trial court would not promote the just and speedy resolution of the case.

A trial court’s failure to enter a termination order within subsection (k)’s thirty-day deadline does not prevent appellate review when remand would not promote a just and speedy resolution.

In Re Malachi M. · filed 2020-11-20(k)

While this mandate is clearly outlined, a court’s failure to comply with the 30- day requirement does not limit this Court’s ability to review the case on appeal. In such instances, the case may proceed on appeal because remand would not promote the just and speedy resolution of the case.

When an indigent parent appeals a termination judgment, the trial court must ensure a record sufficiently complete to permit review of the grounds and best-interest evidence.

In Re Chance B. · filed 2021-07-21(c)

In termination of parental rights cases where the parent is indigent, this Court has held that the trial court must ensure that a sufficiently complete record is created and available on appeal for a parent seeking to appeal the termination of his or her parental rights. See In re Connor B., 603 S.W.3d 773, 785 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2020) (internal citations omitted); In re Adoption of J.D.W., No. M2000-00151-COA-R3- CV, 2000 WL 1156628, at *4 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 16, 2000).

Failure to enter a termination order within subsection (k)’s thirty-day deadline neither defeats subject-matter jurisdiction nor requires reversal by itself.

In Re Da'Moni J. · filed 2022-01-25(k)

This Court has previously determined that a trial court’s noncompliance with the thirty-day requirement in Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-1- 113(k) does not deprive the trial court of subject matter jurisdiction, nor does it require or contemplate this Court vacating a trial court’s termination judgment on that basis alone. See In re Jackson G., No. M2013-02577-COA-R3-PT, 2014 WL 3844793, at *4 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 4, 2014), no perm. app. filed.

Technical omissions from a termination petition may be cured by amendment before final judgment when the amendment causes no prejudice to the parent.

In Re Kailyn B. · filed 2022-10-17

Thus, the case stands for the exact opposite proposition as Mother would have us believe—in the face of multiple deficiencies, petitions for termination of parental rights may be amended rather than dismissed.

When a juvenile court has found severe child abuse, subsection (h)(1)(D) authorizes DCS to join an existing private-party termination petition.

In Re Lorelai E. · filed 2022-12-28(h)(1)(D)

We agree with Petitioners and DCS that Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-1- 113(h)(1)(D) is another avenue by which the trial court could have granted DCS’s intervention.

A termination judgment cannot sever parental rights to a child who attained the age of majority before the final judgment was entered.

In Re Destiney S. · filed 2024-06-20

For the reasons stated in their briefs, we agree with Mother and DCS. Accordingly, we vacate the ruling by the trial court that terminates Mother’s parental rights to the twins, Destiney S. and Serenity S.

A termination ground withdrawn by DCS at trial cannot support termination and must be reversed on appeal.

In Re Avyona P. · filed 2024-11-22(g)(2)

At trial, DCS withdrew noncompliance with the permanency plan as a ground for termination, and DCS states in its brief that it “does not defend this ground on appeal.” Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s termination of Father’s parental rights on this ground.

A termination court may not rely on abandonment by an incarcerated parent when the petition neither pleads that ground nor identifies the correct statutory four-month period and the issue was not tried by consent.

In Re Justine J. · filed 2019-10-10(d)

Appellees never pled abandonment by an incarcerated parent, and the ground was not tried by consent of the parties. Id. Furthermore, Appellees pled incorrect four month periods in both their original petition and the addendum. In re D.H.B., 2015 WL 1870303, *4-5. Because Father did not receive adequate notice to defend against the termination of his parental rights, we vacate the trial court’s order.

A court may terminate parental rights only on a statutory ground alleged in the petition, and pleading the wrong abandonment period deprives the parent of the notice needed to defend.

In Re A.V.N. · filed 2020-09-10(g)(1)

If an incorrect four-month period is pled, the petition is deficient as a result of the parent being left without the notice required to defend against the petition.

An unpleaded abandonment definition is tried by implied consent only when the relevant evidence had no bearing on another issue and the record clearly shows the parent understood and consented to trying that ground.

In Re Cortez P. · filed 2020-10-02(g)(1)

As this Court has explained in a previous decision, in order to make such a finding, “it must be clear from the record that the evidence presented relevant to the unpled ground had no relevance to any other issue being presented to the Trial Court.” ... Moreover, it must be “clear from the record that the parent fully understood that this particular unpled ground for termination was being tried and that the parent impliedly consented to the trial of that ground even though it had not been pled.”

A termination petition gives adequate notice despite imperfect statutory citations when it identifies the statutory ground and alleges the facts necessary to establish its elements.

In Re Rommie H. · filed 2020-10-30(g)(1), (g)(14)

While the petition is not perfect, the allegations were sufficient to put Mother on notice of the grounds at issue. So we turn to whether the paternal grandparents established, by clear and convincing evidence, at least one ground for termination of Mother’s parental rights.

An unpleaded abandonment ground is not tried by implied consent when the same evidence is relevant to pleaded grounds and the best-interest analysis and the parents lacked notice that the additional ground was at issue.

In Re Noah A. · filed 2020-11-06(g)(1)

In the absence of evidence that indicates that Parents fully understood failure to visit was being tried by implied consent and because evidence relevant to their failure to visit was relevant to other issues, we conclude that this ground was not tried by implied consent. As a result, we cannot consider it as a ground for termination in this case.

An amendment adding incarcerated-parent abandonment grounds based on post-petition events is a supplemental pleading requiring leave, but the grounds may nonetheless be tried by implied consent when the parent answers the pleading and does not object after receiving notice at trial.

In Re Anari E. · filed 2021-05-07(g)(1)

Father filed an answer to the amended petition. At the beginning of trial in this matter, Petitioner stated that he intended to rely upon the incarcerated parent ground, including wanton disregard, and Father did not object. Under these circumstances, we find the additional grounds were tried by implied consent.

Unpleaded abandonment grounds are not tried by implied consent when the same visitation and support evidence is relevant to a pleaded ability-and-willingness ground.

In Re Paisley J. · filed 2023-07-10(g)(1)

Therefore, we are unable to conclude that the unpled abandonment grounds were tried by implied consent. Ergo, we reverse the trial court’s finding of abandonment by failure to visit and abandonment by failure to support pursuant to § 36-1-102(1)(A)(i).

Section 36-1-113 permits an amended termination petition to be verified by a later-filed affidavit without depriving the trial court of subject-matter jurisdiction.

In Re Dezeray H. · filed 2024-05-14(a), (b)(1), (d)(1)

Similarly, we hold that the statute does not prohibit a ... party from filing an affidavit to verify an amended termination petition. We further conclude that the trial court maintained its subject matter jurisdiction over the amended petition that included the Rule 9A notice and was verified pursuant to the later-filed affidavit.

A termination court may not adjudicate grounds that were not properly pleaded, even when its order appears to find them.

In Re Traden R. · filed 2024-12-11(g)(1)

We also vacate the other grounds purportedly found by the trial court because they were not properly pled.

An unpleaded incarcerated-parent failure-to-visit ground cannot be tried by consent without a definitive agreement on the applicable four-month period and consent to litigate the issue.

In Re Gabriel F. · filed 2025-05-07(g)(1)

Here, we cannot say that Father implicitly or explicitly consented to trial of this unpled issue. Accordingly, we must vacate the trial court’s determination that Father abandoned Gabriel by incarceration through failure to visit pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated §§ 36-1-102(A)(iv)(a).

An unpleaded failure-to-manifest ground is not tried by implied consent when the record shows that the parent instead understood and presented evidence to defend against a pleaded mental-incompetence ground.

In Re Gracelyn H. · filed 2026-04-30(g)(14)

On our review, it appears that Father intended to try the mental incompetence ground, rather than the failure to manifest ground, i.e., Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-1-113(g)(14). As such, we cannot conclude that the failure to manifest ground was tried by consent, and Father’s parental rights cannot be terminated under it.

A circuit court that receives a combined termination-and-adoption petition may not separate the actions and transfer only the termination claim to a juvenile court in another county.

In Re Tyler G. · filed 2017-05-03(a)

Based on the foregoing, and the totality of the circumstances, we conclude that the trial court erred in separating Grandparents’ termination and adoption actions and transferring only the termination portion of the proceedings to the Lauderdale Juvenile Court. As such, we reverse the trial court’s order and remand for the trial court to adjudicate both the termination and the adoption requests contained in Grandparents’ petition.

A child’s attainment of majority during a termination appeal does not moot the action when it remains intertwined with an adoption request and other collateral consequences.

In Re Emmeline C. · filed 2025-03-18

We recognize that the Child has attained the age of majority during the pendency of this appeal. However, we find that this termination action still presents a justiciable controversy due to its entwinement with Petitioners’ adoption request and other “collateral consequences.”

Section 36-1-113(a) permits a separate proceeding to terminate parental rights even when no adoption is immediately contemplated.

In Re: Chloe R.P. · filed 2011-02-17(a)

Tenn. Code Ann. §36-1-113(a) explicitly states that, “[t]he chancery and circuit courts shall have concurrent jurisdiction with the juvenile court to terminate parental or guardianship rights to a child in a separate proceeding, or as a part of the adoption proceeding by utilizing any grounds for termination of parental or guardianship rights permitted in this part or in title 37, chapter 1, part 1 and title 37, chapter 2, part 4.”

A constitutional challenge to subsections (c)(2) and (g)(6) raised for the first time in closing argument is waived unless the provisions are clearly or blatantly unconstitutional.

In Re the Adoption of E.N.R. · filed 2001-04-06(c)(2), (g)(6)

Mr. Rose’s constitutional challenge, however, was raised for the first time in closing argument before the trial court. Accordingly, we hold that the constitutional challenge was not timely made and therefore has been waived except to the extent the challenged statutes are so clearly or blatantly unconstitutional as to obviate the necessity for any discussion. We hold that § 36-1-113(g)(6) and § 36-l-113(c)(2) are not clearly or blatantly unconstitutional.

A judicial finding of severe child abuse against any child creates an obvious presumption of parental unfitness, so subsection (g)(4) is not so obviously unconstitutional that an unpreserved constitutional challenge may be considered.

In Re CAF · filed 2003-02-20(g)(4)

While parents have a fundamental right to the care, custody and control of their children, this right is not absolute, and may be terminated upon a showing that the parent is unfit, or that substantial harm to the child will result if parental rights are not terminated. In re Swanson, 2 S.W.3d 180 (Tenn. 1999). We believe a judicial finding of severe child abuse against any child creates an obvious presumption of parental unfitness, and that the incorporation of this presumption into statutory law is not obviously or blatantly unconstitutional.

Subsection (g)(6) is constitutional against a due-process claim that it creates an irrebuttable presumption of parental unfitness.

In Re Tmg · filed 2008-11-25(g)(6)

In light of the several decisions discussed above by different sections of this Court holding that Tenn.Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(6) is constitutional, we reject Father's claim to the contrary.

Subsection (g)(8) is not facially unconstitutional merely because it permits termination for a persistent mental impairment that prevents adequate parenting without requiring willfulness.

In Re Dorothy A. · filed 2024-12-23(g)(8)

Regarding that issue, we further determine that § 36-1-113(g)(8), which allows for termination of a parent’s rights when clear and convincing evidence demonstrates that his or her “mental condition is presently so impaired and is so likely to remain so that it is unlikely that the parent or guardian will be able to assume or resume the care of and responsibility for the child in the near future” and that “termination . . . is in the best interest of the child,” is not “so obviously unconstitutional on its face” as to obviate the necessity for any discussion.

Section 36-1-113(g)(6) allows termination when a parent is sentenced to at least ten years and the child is under eight when the sentence is entered; the court held that this ground does not violate due process.

Worley v. State · filed 1998-02-10(g)(6)

For a parent who is unable or unwilling to care for the child’s best interest, a statute that enables the State to terminate parental rights on these grounds does n ot violat e the pro cess cla use of the Co nstitution s.

A full or partial guardianship order under subsection (n) supersedes prior custody or guardianship orders, not a custody petition that remained unadjudicated.

In Re: K.A.Y.and A.M.Y. · filed 2001-12-13(n)

The language of the statute, however, provides that an order of full or partial guardianship superced es “prior orders of custody or guardianship. . . .” The record on appeal shows that the Stuarts’ Custody Petition had not been adjudicated when DCS obtained the order granting it guardianship of the Children.

An order granting full or partial guardianship supersedes prior custody or guardianship orders under subsection (n), but it does not supersede a custody petition that had not yet been adjudicated.

In re K.A.Y · filed 2002-02-28(n)

The Youngs also contend on appeal that even before they filed their adoption petition, the Stuarts' pending custody matter was su-perceded by the Juvenile Court’s grant of full guardianship of the Children to DCS in October 1999, citing Tenn.Code Ann. § 36-1-113(n). The language of the statute, however, provides that an order of full or partial guardianship supercedes "prior orders of custody or guardianship....” The record on appeal shows that the Stuarts' Custody Petition had not been adjudicated when DCS obtained the order granting it guardianship of the Children.

Unless voluntarily relinquished, guardianship rights must be terminated under section 36-1-113 in the same manner as parental rights before another party may adopt without the guardian's consent.

In Re: Don Juan J.H. · filed 2011-09-07(a)

Accordingly, unless guardianship rights are voluntarily relinquished by the guardian, they must be terminated in the same manner as parental rights.

Section 36-1-113 applies to guardianship rights as well as parental rights, so prospective adopters must obtain the guardian’s consent or terminate its guardianship rights before proceeding.

In Re: Haily A. S. · filed 2012-07-30

In summary, the Child was under DCS guardianship, and DCS had the right to place the child for adoption. The Grandparents have not sought to terminate DCS’s guardianship rights, and DCS does not consent to an adoption of the Child by the Grandparents. In keeping with the rationale of our previous opinion, In re: Don Juan J.H., and as distinguished from the facts of In re: Sidney J., we hold that the Grandparents were not entitled to intervene in this matter, and their intervening petition properly was dismissed. The judgment of the Trial Court is affirmed.

Section 36-1-113(m) makes a guardianship order supersede prior custody orders.

Dockery v. State · filed 1997-08-28(m)

Under T.C.A. § 36-1-113(m), the entry of the orders awarding permanent guardianship to the Department “supersed[ed]” the June 19, 1996, order of the Juvenile Court touching on the subject of the child’s custody.

Best-interest facts under subsection (i) are proven by a preponderance, but their combined weight must clearly and convincingly favor termination.

IN RE EMORY S. · filed 2025-05-20(i)

“Facts considered in the best interest analysis must be proven by ‘a preponderance of the evidence, not by clear and convincing evidence.’”

In determining best interest, the court considers whether the parent physically or sexually abused the child or another child or adult in the family or household.

In Re Martavious B. · filed 2015-12-30(i)(6)

One of the statutory factors to be considered is whether the parent has shown physical or sexual abuse toward the child, or another child or adult in the family or household. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(i)(6). Most significant to this factor is that in October 2013, with the advice of counsel, Father stipulated that he sexually abused Amiya and, in November 2014, the trial court entered the order finding that the children were victims of severe abuse by Father. This order has never been challenged.

The best-interest factor list is nonexclusive, and termination does not require every factor to be present.

In re Donna R. · filed 2016-01-29(i)

The list of factors in the statute is not ... exhaustive, and the statute does not require every factor to appear before a court can find that termination is in a child’s best interest.

The best-interest factors are nonexclusive, and a court need not find every listed factor before concluding that termination is in the child’s best interest.

In Re Miracle F.H. · filed 2015-04-01(i)

As we have noted previously, the list above “is not exhaustive, and the statute does not require a trial court to find the existence of each enumerated factor before it may conclude that terminating a parent’s parental rights is in the best interest of a child.” In re M.A.R., 183 S.W.3d 652, 667 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005).

Section 36-1-113(i)’s best-interest factors are nonexclusive, and a court need not find every factor before determining that termination is in a child’s best interests.

Dept of Children's Srvcs. v. Davidson · filed 1996-04-12(i)

The state argues correctly, “The listed factors are not exhaustive. The statute does not require every factor to appear before a court can find that termination is in a child’s best interest.”

The subsection (i) best-interest factors support termination where the child has long viewed the custodians as parents, the biological parent has provided no support or meaningful contact, and the custodians provide a stable home.

Penny Taylor v. Sowell · filed 2002-10-30(i)

S.P.S. has remained constantly in the custody of Mr. and Mrs. Taylor, and they have provided for his upkeep, preschool, and all of the necessities of life. S.P.S. does not know Christy Sowell and believes Mr. and Mrs. Taylor to be his father and mother. S.P.S. lives in the home of Mr. and Mrs. Taylor where the eldest son of Mrs. Taylor, 18 years of age at the time of the hearing, also resides. The relationship between the older son and S.P.S. is a good one, and the Taylor home is free of alcohol, drugs and criminal activity. ... Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(i) (1-9) (2001). The evidence in this case clearly establishes that the best interest of S.P.S. lies in the vesting of custody in Penny and Kenneth Taylor.

The loss of a child’s right to future support is a proper factor in deciding whether termination is in the child’s best interest and must be weighed with all other relevant factors.

C.J.H. v. A.K.G · filed 2002-03-20(i)

We hold that the loss of a child’s right to future support from a parent is an appropriate factor to consider in determining whether termination of that parent’s parental rights is in the child’s best interest. It must be weighed, along with all other relevant factors, in making that determination.

Under the best-interest analysis, DCS must make reasonable rather than herculean reunification efforts, and those efforts and their results are only one factor among many.

Children's Services v. SJMW, In The Matter of: DJL · filed 2003-10-17(i)(2)

The record establishes that DCS has made reasonable efforts toward reuniting the family in the past, and the Court found that DCS made reasonable efforts, based upon all that had been done in the past. The evidence does not preponderate against that finding. Tenn. R. App. P. 13(d). As this Court has previously recognized, DCS must make “reasonable” efforts, not “herculean” efforts. ... Thus, any efforts made by DCS and the results thereof, are only one factor of many ... which the Trial Court must consider.

Even after abandonment is established, termination is not warranted without clear and convincing proof of best interests, particularly when severing a meaningful and beneficial parent-child relationship would likely harm the child.

In Re: A.T.S. · filed 2005-01-28(c)(2), (i)

Though Petitioners have served lovingly and admirably as guardians for the child and would likely be excellent parents if the child was available for adoption, courts are not authorized to make this or any child available for adoption unless it is proven by clear and convincing evidence that it is in the best interest of the child to terminate the parental rights of the child’s parents. ... Though Mother is immature and irresponsible, it is apparent that a meaningful and beneficial relationship exists between Mother and the child, the termination of which would likely be detrimental to the child. ... Based on the foregoing, we find that the record fails to establish by clear and convincing evidence that terminating Mother’s parental rights would be in the best interests of the child.

Subsection (i)’s best-interest factors are nonexclusive, and termination may be supported by untreated personality disorders, violent relationships, no meaningful bond, and the children’s need for stable placement.

In Re. I.C.G., B.M.D., T.N.C., & T.L.C. · filed 2006-10-31(i)

Mother argues that the trial court “hardly carried the day on best interests of the children, much less by clear and convincing evidence.” We disagree. There is ample evidence in the record to support the trial court’s findings. Certainly the history of child abuse in Mother’s household would raise concerns about the health of these children, should they be returned to Mother. There was also a history of domestic violence between Mother and her partners. Mother testified that she had been in three abusive relationships in her lifetime, one of which is with her current husband, Tyrone Sr., who is also the father of three of the children at issue in this case. Mother was diagnosed with personality disorders by two mental health professionals, and the court stated that it witnessed symptoms of Mother’s antisocial personality disorder while she was testifying. Furthermore, there is evidence that Mother’s parenting ability will be impaired because of her mental health condition.

Even when termination grounds are stipulated, section 36-1-113 independently requires clear and convincing proof that termination serves the children's best interests under the relevant statutory factors.

In Re: Christopher M., Jr. · filed 2010-06-04(c)(2), (i)

After a careful and thorough review of the record on appeal in light of the relevant statutory factors, we hold that the Trial Court did not err in finding by clear and convincing evidence that it was in the best interest of the Children for Father’s parental rights to be terminated.

When visitation is conditioned on two clean drug screens, a parent's refusal to test is conduct within her control and weighs against her under the visitation and meaningful-relationship best-interest factors.

In Re: Dakota L.M. · filed 2012-05-31(i)(3)-(4)

All that was required of Mother was that she pass two drug screens in order to visit with the Child. Yet, she simply refused to comply and submit samples when requested and only visited the Child one time prior to the filing of the termination petition. ... Mother’s conduct of avoiding the drug screens and her conduct that led to her incarceration were directly under her control. Her refusal to submit to drug screens hindered her ability to maintain a meaningful relationship with the Child, who requested to end the visits early.

Termination may be in the children's best interests despite the parent not contesting the established grounds when the evidence clearly and convincingly supports the separate best-interest determination.

In Re: Eila L.G. · filed 2013-01-02(i)

The court also found, by clear and convincing evidence, that termination was in the Children’s best interest. Mother appeals. We affirm.

The best-interest requirement is independently satisfied when clear and convincing evidence supports termination even though both parents challenge that finding.

In Re: Austin L.A. · filed 2013-01-03(i)

With all of the above considerations in mind, we conclude that there was clear and convincing evidence to establish that termination of Mother and Father’s parental rights was in the best interest of the Child.

Proof of an abandonment ground does not permit termination unless clear and convincing evidence separately shows that termination is in the child's best interest.

In Re Madilene G. R. · filed 2013-01-10(c)(2)

We have determined that one ground for abandonment was established by clear and convincing evidence, however, we have also determined that the evidence does not clearly and convincingly demonstrate that termination of Father’s parental rights is in the child’s best interest. Accordingly, we reverse the termination of Father’s parental rights.

A single best-interest factor may be decisive depending on the case, including a child's need for permanence when a long-incarcerated parent has little relationship and the child is bonded to a foster family.

In the Matter of DOMINIQUE L.H. · filed 2012-10-11(i)

Depending on the circumstances of an individual case, the consideration of a single factor or other facts outside the enumerated, statutory factors may dictate the outcome of the best interest analysis.

The nonexclusive subsection (i) factors are assessed from the child’s perspective, and severe sibling abuse plus the children’s need for stability can clearly support termination.

In Re Spencer P. · filed 2013-03-05(i)

Every factor need not be applicable for the trial court to determine it is in the best interest of the child for a parent’s rights to be terminated. See In re Audrey S., 182 S.W.3d at 878. The best interest analysis is a fact-intensive inquiry requiring the court to consider the unique facts of the case “from the child’s, rather than the parent’s, perspective.” In re Giorgianna H., 205 S.W.3d 508, 523 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2006). The trial court found that six of these factors weighed against the parents.3 The trial court found that it was in the best interest of the children to terminate the parental rights of the parents. We have reviewed the record and find that the trial court’s conclusion is supported by clear and convincing evidence. We, therefore, concur in the trial court’s decision to terminate the parents’ parental rights.

A best-interest analysis under § 36-1-113(i) must address termination rather than assume a custody change, and factors framed around custody may be inapplicable when custody is not at issue.

In Re: Trinity M. H. · filed 2013-12-05(i)

In reviewing the evidence introduced at trial, we find that the evidence preponderates against some of the trial court’s findings of fact regarding Trinity’s best interests. Moreover, the majority of the factors the court considered are not applicable because change of custody is not at issue.

Evidence establishing termination grounds may also support the best-interest factors; a mother's flight from the state without knowing what would become of her children independently weighed in favor of permanency through termination.

In Re J.B. Jr. · filed 2014-02-27(i)

Viewing the best interest issue from the Children’s perspective, as we must, we conclude that this fact alone weighs in favor of terminating Mother’s rights and allowing the Children an opportunity to achieve permanency in their lives.

The best-interest factors in subsection (i) are nonexclusive, and a court need not find every listed factor before concluding that termination serves a child’s best interest.

In Re Aireona H.W. · filed 2014-08-20(i)

This list is not exhaustive, and the statute does not require a trial court to find the existence of each enumerated factor before it may conclude that terminating a parent’s parental rights is in the best interest of a child.

The evidence concerning the statutory best-interest factors is considered as a whole to determine whether termination serves the child's best interest.

In Re: Kayla E. · filed 2015-01-09(i)

Taken as a whole, the testimony was clear and convincing that termination of Mother’s rights was in Shelby’s best interest and in accordance with the factors at Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(i).

Proof of severe abuse does not itself establish that termination is in a child’s best interest; the petitioner must separately eliminate serious or substantial doubt on best interests.

In Re Wesley P. · filed 2015-05-29(c), (i)

Considering the totality of the evidence both in favor and against termination of Parents‟ parental rights, we must conclude that DCS failed to “eliminate[] any serious or substantial doubt” in this Court that the termination of either Parents‟ parental rights is in the child‟s best interests. In re M.J.B., 140 S.W.3d at 653. Because a finding that termination is in the child‟s best interest is necessary to terminate a parent‟s parental rights, we must reverse the termination of both Mother‟s and Father‟s parental rights.

The subsection (i) factors must be weighed in light of the children's circumstances, including changes in foster placement during the case, to decide best interests by clear and convincing evidence.

In Re: Kelsey L. · filed 2015-09-09(i)

The evidence in the record on appeal does not preponderate against the Juvenile Court’s finding by clear and convincing evidence that it was in the Children’s best interest for Father’s parental rights to be terminated. We find no error in the Juvenile Court’s determination with regard to best interest.

The subsection (i) inquiry asks how legally severing the parent-child relationship would affect the child, not which of two current homes is preferable, and the petitioner bears the burden of proving best interests.

In re Aiden R. · filed 2016-06-23(i)

Because denial of a petition to terminate parental rights does not in and of itself affect the custody of a child, In re Valentine, 79 S.W.3d at 550, the court‟s task is not to choose between two home situations. Instead, the inquiry should address itself to the impact on the child of a decision that has the legal effect of reducing the parent to the role of a complete stranger.” In re C.B.W., 2006 WL 1749534, at *6. Ultimately, the burden of proof on this issue rests with DCS, not the parent opposing the petition.

The absence of a child-support order does not prevent considering nonpayment under the best-interest factor because an adult parent is presumed to know the duty to support.

In re M.E.T. · filed 2016-11-29(i)(9)

Father argues that Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(i)(9) “should not be considered in a best interest analysis since there is no order for child support consistent with Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-101.” We disagree.

The severity and extent of a parent’s abuse and neglect, including severe abuse of one child, can outweigh other factors and establish that termination serves another child’s best interest.

IN Re: Chance D. · filed 2016-11-30(i)

However, we cannot overlook the severity and the extent of Mother‘s abuse and neglect toward the Children and their siblings throughout the years and, most significantly, her severe child abuse of Chance. Based on our review of the evidence in light of the statutory factors, we conclude that the trial court erred in determining that Foster Parents failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that termination of Mother‘s parental rights was in the best interest of Chance.

The severity and extent of a parent’s abuse and neglect, including severe abuse of one child, can outweigh other factors and establish that termination serves another child’s best interest.

In re Jude D. · filed 2016-11-30(i)

However, we cannot overlook the severity and the extent of Mother‘s abuse and neglect toward the Children and their siblings throughout the years and, most significantly, her severe child abuse of Chance. Based on our review of the evidence in light of the statutory factors, we conclude that the trial court erred in determining that Foster Parents failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that termination of Mother‘s parental rights was in the best interest of Jude.

The severity and extent of a parent’s abuse and neglect, including severe abuse of one child, can outweigh other factors and establish that termination serves another child’s best interest.

In re Gabriella D. · filed 2016-11-30(i)

However, we cannot overlook the severity and the extent of Mother‘s abuse and neglect toward the Children and their siblings throughout the years and, most significantly, her severe child abuse of Chance. Based on our review of the evidence in light of the statutory factors, we conclude that the trial court erred in determining that Foster Parents failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that termination of Mother‘s parental rights was in the best interest of Gabriella.

The statutory best-interest factors are nonexclusive, and termination may be in a child’s best interest without every factor being present.

In Re: Kira G. · filed 2017-04-18(i)

The list of factors in the statute “is not exhaustive, and the statute does not require every factor to appear before a court can find that termination is in a child’s best interest.”

The best-interest inquiry turns on the child’s interests under all relevant factors, not on a parent’s possible future reform or a foster family’s possible future contact with the parent.

In Re: River C. · filed 2017-04-28(i)

Father has missed the point. The point to be considered is the best interest of the Child in light of all of the relevant factors, not what Father may or may not do at some point in time in the future. ... The fact that Father asserts that he wants to change in the future simply is insufficient. Whether the foster parents intend to raise the Child as part of the biological family or whether they intend to allow Father to have contact with the Child if Father does change his behavior is immaterial to the question of whether it is in the Child’s best interest for Father’s parental rights to be terminated.

Best interests may be established despite some factors favoring the parent when the totality clearly and convincingly favors permanency.

In Re E.C. · filed 2017-06-06(i)

From the totality of the circumstances, we conclude that clear and convincing evidence supports the trial court’s conclusion that termination of Father’s parental rights is in the child’s best interest.

The statutory best-interest factors are assessed collectively from the child’s perspective.

In Re P.T.F. · filed 2017-06-12(i)

Based on our analysis of these factors, we hold, as a matter of law, that termination of mother’s parental rights is in the best interest of the child.

Some best-interest factors may favor preservation yet be outweighed by untreated mental health, unsafe housing, continued drug use, and likely harm from changing caretakers.

In Re: Michael B., Jr. · filed 2017-08-11(i)

Other factors, however, strongly favor termination.

The subsection (i) best-interest determination must consider all statutory factors and other relevant proof, then ask whether the combined facts clearly and convincingly favor termination.

In Re Gabriella D. · filed 2017-09-29(i)

When conducting the best interests analysis, courts must consider nine statutory factors listed in Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-1-113(i). These statutory factors are illustrative, not exclusive, and any party to the termination proceeding is free to offer proof of any other factor relevant to the best interests analysis.

Section 36-1-113(i)'s nonexclusive best-interest factors permit a court to weigh a parent's meaningful relationship with the child and the fact that the other parent's rights remain intact.

In Re Addalyne S. · filed 2018-04-26(i)

As previously discussed, the list of factors contained in section 36-1-113(i) is non-exclusive. ... Reviewing all the factors applicable in this case, we cannot conclude that clear and convincing evidence supports a determination that the child’s best interests will be served by terminating Father’s parental rights. Clearly, the trial court was entitled to place particular weight on the meaningful relationship that had been maintained by Father with the child through visitation, as well as the fact that Mother’s parental rights had not been terminated.

The best-interest analysis protects the child rather than punishing parental misconduct and may preserve a meaningful biological relationship when termination’s asserted stability benefits are not clearly convincing.

In Re P.G. · filed 2018-08-17(i)

Yet, the purpose of the best interest analysis is to ensure that termination is ultimately focused on what is best for the child, rather than punishing the parent for his or her misconduct. ... Here, the particular facts of this case do not support a conclusion that the child’s interest in stability is outweighed by the interest of maintaining the child’s relationship with Mother and his siblings. Accordingly, Appellants have failed to meet their burden to submit clear and convincing evidence that the child’s best interests will be furthered by forever terminating the child’s relationship with Mother.

A parent’s present inability to assume custody is only one part of the individualized best-interest analysis and does not itself require termination.

In Re Jayda J. · filed 2021-07-21(i)

While we agree Mother may not be able to presently assume custody of the children, this fact must be considered as merely part of the constellation of factors analyzed in determining a child’s best interest, which is unique to each individual case.

Proof of a severe-abuse ground does not permit termination unless clear and convincing evidence also establishes that termination is in the child's best interest.

In Re Scarlett F. · filed 2022-09-16(c), (g)(4)

Because Foster Parents failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that termination was in the child’s best interest, we reverse the chancery court’s order terminating Mother’s parental rights.

Under the pre-2021 best-interest statute, an order may permit meaningful appellate review even if it does not explicitly connect every factual finding to a numbered best-interest factor.

In Re Estrella A. · filed 2022-11-21(i), (k)

Although we agree that the best practice is for the trial court to consider each and every factor explicitly, we conclude that the trial court’s order here is sufficient to meet the requirements of section 36-1-113(k) and to facilitate meaningful appellate review.

Use of the former best-interest factors may be harmless when those factors are contained within the current factors and the final order considers the most relevant factors.

In Re: Jaxson F. · filed 2023-11-01(i)

Nevertheless, we find no reversible error arising from this circumstance because the former best interest factors are contained within the new factors and because the final order reveals that the juvenile court considered the most relevant factors.

When a termination petition is governed by the current best-interest factors, use of the former factors requires reversal and reconsideration under the version in effect when the petition was filed.

In Re Justin N. · filed 2023-11-30(i)

Accordingly, when a trial court utilizes the old factors despite the timing of the termination petition requiring the use of the new factors, we have consistently reversed the findings related to best interest and remanded to allow for review of the updated statutory factors. ... We therefore reverse the trial court’s use of the old best interest factors, vacate its findings as to the children’s best interests and remand for reconsideration under the statutory factors in effect at the time the termination petition was filed.

A termination court must consider every relevant best-interest factor and detail its findings sufficiently for appellate review.

In Re Jaylynn J. · filed 2024-06-11(i)

Thus, we conclude that the trial court failed to properly perform its best interest analysis. Accordingly, we vacate the trial court’s order with respect to its best interest determination and remand with instructions to consider all of the relevant best interest factors and detail its findings.

The combined weight of the applicable best-interest factors must clearly and convincingly establish that termination serves the children’s best interests.

In Re Natae'ya M. · filed 2025-02-26(i)

We have conducted our own de novo review of the evidence in the record, and we agree that the combined weight of the factors provides clear and convincing evidence that termination of Mother’s parental rights is in the best interest of the children.

Even when termination grounds exist, termination is unwarranted unless the combined weight of the best-interest facts is clear and convincing; lasting rehabilitation and a positive parent-child bond may cause the factors to weigh against termination.

In Re Liam M. · filed 2026-06-03(c)(2), (i)

In sum, the circumstances precipitating the child’s removal from Mother’s custody were horrible, but Mother immediately began work on remedying those circumstances and has accomplished a rare feat in parental termination cases—she established that “[n]ot all parental misconduct is irredeemable.” ... The majority of the best interest factors weigh against terminating her parental rights. ... the combined weight of the proven facts does not amount to clear and convincing evidence that termination of Mother’s parental rights is the best interest of the child.

Section 36-1-113(i) requires courts to consider the statutory factors when deciding whether termination is in a child’s best interest.

In Re C.L. · filed 2014-05-28(i)

Our review is guided by the statutory factors as set forth in Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(i)(Supp. 2013). ... In short, we conclude that the trial court properly summarized and thoroughly considered the relevant evidence in light of the applicable factors. The evidence does not preponderate against the trial court’s findings.

Section 36-1-113(i) provides a nonexhaustive list of best interest factors; the court need not find every factor before terminating parental rights.

In re Benjamin A. · filed 2016-03-14(i)

Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-1-113(i) (Supp. 2015) provides a list of factors the trial court is to consider when determining if termination of parental rights is in the child‟s best interest. This list is not exhaustive, and the statute does not require the court to find the existence of every factor before concluding that termination is in a child‟s best interest.

Section 36-1-113(i)’s best interest factors are not exhaustive; depending on the circumstances, one factor or facts outside the list may determine the outcome.

In Re: Addison P. · filed 2017-05-08(i)

Depending on the circumstances of an individual case, the consideration of a single factor or other facts outside the enumerated, statutory factors may dictate the outcome of the best interest analysis.

Section 36-1-113(i) provides a nonexhaustive list of factors for deciding a child’s best interest; the court need not find every factor before terminating parental rights.

In Re Mariah H. · filed 2017-06-30(i)

Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-1-113(i) provides a list of factors the trial court is to consider when determining if termination of parental rights is in a child’s best interest. This list is not exhaustive, and the statute does not require the court to find the existence of every factor before concluding that termination is in a child’s best interest.

Section 36-1-113(c) requires a court that finds grounds for termination to also find by clear and convincing evidence that termination is in the child’s best interest.

In the Matter of Kelly Gooch · filed 1999-07-16(c)

The statute requires that a fter a Cou rt has determ ined grou nds to terminate parental rights, it must also find by clear and convincing evidence that the termination is in the child’s best interest.

Section 36-1-113(i) lists nonexhaustive best-interest factors; a court need not find every factor before terminating parental rights.

Burton v. McCary · filed 2006-02-10(i)

This list is not exhaustive, and the statute does not require the court to find the existence of every factor before concluding that termination is in a child's best interest.

Section 36-1-113(i) does not require a court to find every listed factor before determining that termination is in a child’s best interest.

State, Department of Children's Services v. Estes · filed 2008-12-30(i)

The trial court was not required to find the existence of each factor in order to determine that terminating Mother’s parental rights was in the best interest of her children.

Section 36-1-113(i)’s best interest inquiry focuses on whether completely severing the child’s relationship with the biological parent serves the child’s best interest.

In Re Noel B.F. The Department of Children's Services v. Veda L.M. · filed 2011-08-16(i)

In considering best interest, the focus of the court must be on whether complete severance of the child’s relationship with the biological parent is in the best interest of the child.

Section 36-1-113(i) provides nonexhaustive factors for deciding a child’s best interest; termination does not require every factor to be present.

In re: Amelia M. · filed 2013-08-30(i)

Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-1-113(i) (2010) provides a list of factors the trial court is to consider when determining if termination of parental rights is in the child’s best interest. This list is not exhaustive, and the statute does not require the court to find the existence of every factor before concluding that termination is in a child’s best interest.

Section 36-1-113(i) lists nonexhaustive factors for deciding a child’s best interest; every factor need not be present.

In Re: Jesse J. C. · filed 2013-11-27(i)

The list of factors is not exhaustive, and the statute does not require each factor ... be present before a court can find that termination is in a child’s best interest.

The best-interest analysis does not require a young child to wait a decade or more for an incarcerated parent's uncertain release and uncertain future ability to provide care when adoption by loving foster parents is available.

In Re: P.M. · filed 2004-09-17(i)

Further, the record clearly and convincingly establishes that it is not in the child's best interest to hold her future in abeyance awaiting the uncertain release of Father from prison in ten or twelve years -- when the child will be 12 or 14 years old -- and to await the uncertainty of whether Father will be willing or able to provide for the child at that time.

Termination is not in a child’s best interest when the child has a beneficial bond with the parent, lacks realistic adoption prospects, and the psychological effect of permanently severing the relationship has not been evaluated.

In the Matter of C.M.S.: State of Tennessee Department of Children's Services v. Howell · filed 2004-11-19(c)(2), (i)

However, given the grave and permanent nature of this proceeding, the fact that some level of bonding has occurred between C.M.S. and Howell, and the fact that the psychological effects of a permanent severance of the Mother/child relationship on this child have not been fully explored, we find that the evidence preponderates against the trial court's finding of clear and convincing evidence that termination is in the best interest of the child. This is not to say that termination of Howell's parental rights at some future time is foreclosed.

Subsection (i)’s best-interest inquiry supports termination where a child with significant therapeutic needs is strongly bonded to capable foster parents and changing caregivers would likely cause regression.

State of Tennessee, Department of Children's Services v. P.W.K., In Re: J.B.K. DOB: 11/25/02 · filed 2007-07-25(i)

The evidence establishes that the child was happy and well-adjusted in her foster home, that she was well-loved by her foster family and that she loved them in return, and that they had provided for her every need, including her need for therapy to help with her ADHD and sensory issues. The occupational therapist testified at great length regarding the child’s issues and the need for continual therapy, both in the office and at home, in order for her to overcome her disorder. The therapist corroborated that a change of caregivers and environment would be very detrimental to the child , and would likely cause regression. We conclude that the evidence was clear and convincing, as found by the Trial Court, that termination of the father’s parental rights was in the child’s best interest.

Termination is not in a child's best interest when the legal parent maintaining custody wants the child to have contact with the other legal parent and the record shows no danger or risk of harm from that parent.

Franklin v. Sherry A. B. Franklin · filed 2008-04-15(c)(2)

Given all this, it is not in J.A.F.’s best interest for Freeman’s parental rights to be terminated. We, therefore, reverse the termination of Freeman’s parental rights to J.A.F.

Termination may serve a child's best interest when the child has a significant bond with long-term foster parents, only a teacher-like bond with the biological parent, and removal from the foster home would be traumatic.

In Re the Adoption of D.P.E. · filed 2008-07-03(c)(2), (i)

After carefully reviewing all of the evidence in this case, we conclude that the evidence does not preponderate against the factual findings made by the Trial Court. We further conclude that the facts, as found by the Trial Court, establish clearly and convincingly that it is in the Child’s best interest for Mother’s parental rights to be terminated.