Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113

Termination is not clearly and convincingly in a child's best interest when the parent completes the permanency plan, maintains sobriety, employment, support and visitation, secures suitable housing, and forms a strong bond with the child.

In Re K.E.D.M. a/k/a/ K.E.D.S · filed 2008-08-27(c)(2), (i)

Considering the statutory factors in light of the record as a whole, we hold that the evidence preponderates against the trial court’s conclusion that DCS proved by clear and convincing evidence that termination of Mother’s parental rights was in Child’s best interest.

Termination may serve the children's best interests when the parent rarely visits, provides no support, remains unstable, and the children have materially improved in a stable pre-adoptive home.

In the Matter of: Michael C. M., Shania M. J., and Jania M. J. · filed 2010-11-05(c)(2)

The record reflects that Father visited the children three times in the two years prior to the termination hearing, that he failed to visit when scheduled, and that he did not provide any financial support. ... The record further reflects that, since coming into DCS custody in 2008, the children have resided continuously in a stable foster home that the trial court identified as a pre-adoptive home. ... We agree with the trial court that termination of Father’s parental rights is in the children’s best interest.

Regular supervised visitation, good mental health, and current support do not outweigh years without adequate housing, inability to care for all children, continued association with their abuser, and the children's bond with prospective adoptive parents.

In Re: Antywon B. · filed 2012-04-10(i)

We acknowledge that Mother took advantage of the opportunities for supervised visitation with the children, that her mental and emotional status does not appear to be detrimental to the children, and that she was current with her child support. ... However, we believe the above considerations overcome Mother’s positive mental emotional status and her compliance with visitation and child support. Mother was given more than an adequate amount of time to provide a home for her children and put herself in a position to adequately care for all of her children at the same time.

Termination serves a medically fragile child's best interests when the parent continues using drugs, lacks income and housing, provides no support, rarely visits, and the foster family safely meets the child's special needs and plans to adopt.

In Re: Payton A.D.L. · filed 2012-06-20(i)

Mother has not made such an adjustment of her circumstances that would warrant Payton’s return to her custody. Mother failed to appear for a scheduled drug screen just days before the termination hearing, which DCS considers a positive drug screen, and she continues to use drugs while pregnant with her current child. Mother has no legal source of income or appropriate housing in which to raise Payton. Mother did not provide any support for Payton. ... Despite all of Payton’s special needs, Ms. Parton and her family have accepted the responsibilities involved in caring for him, have formed a strong bond with him, and plan to adopt him at the conclusion of these proceedings. Accordingly, we conclude that Payton’s best interests strongly support termination of Mother’s parental rights.

Subsection (i) supports termination when the child needs specialized care, a change of environment would be detrimental, and the parent has no safe or stable home.

In Re Antonio C. F., Jr. · filed 2011-05-03(i)

Pursuant to the heightened burden of proof in proceedings under Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113, we further note that the evidence presented at trial reveals that the Child is in need of special care that is now being made available to him -- a change in environment would have a detrimental effect on his emotional, psychological, and medical condition. Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(i)(5). Additionally, Mother did not provide a home for the Child in the past and did not testify to having any current plans to obtain one; thus, it does not appear that the physical environment of her home will be safe and stable. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(i)(7).

Once a statutory ground establishes parental unfitness, the best-interest analysis must focus on the children rather than the parent's rights or preferences.

In Re: Taylor BW, and Ashley NW · filed 2011-10-28(i)

Further, that the Trial Judge in reversing her findings that it was in the best interest of the children to terminate the parental rights of the mother, focused on the rights of the mother rather than the rights of the children, as required by the statute and authorities. We reinstate the original Judgment of the Trial Court terminating the mother's parental rights.

A child's need for permanence can support termination when a parent's long incarceration prevents him from meeting basic needs or developing a meaningful presence and the child is thriving with prospective adoptive custodians.

In Re: Rebekah R. W. · filed 2012-02-24(c)(2), (i)

Looking at the situation from the Child’s perspective, as we must, the evidence preponderates overwhelmingly in favor of the court’s finding that she needs and deserves the permanency that the Grandparents intend to provide.

Even when a statutory ground exists, parental rights cannot be terminated unless the petitioners prove by clear and convincing evidence that termination is in the children's best interests.

In Re: Taylor B. W. · filed 2013-02-21(c)(2)

We reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and affirm the trial court’s amended order concluding that Father and Stepmother have not shown by clear and convincing evidence that terminating Mother’s parental rights is in the best interests of the children.

Termination may serve a child's best interest when a parent previously committed severe abuse, refuses to acknowledge it or continue counseling, and changing the child's bonded foster placement would be devastating.

In the Matter of Melanie T., Bailey T., and Miles R. · filed 2012-09-21(c)(2), (i)

The court’s findings are fully supported by the testimony of the DCS case manager, Miles’ counselor, Miles’ foster parent, and Jason R.

Long incarceration supports a best-interest finding when it prevents contact, a meaningful relationship, an immediate home, or adjustment of circumstances while the children thrive in a pre-adoptive home.

In the Matter of Christopher P., Kobey P., Blake H. and Myles H. · filed 2012-12-06(c)(2), (i)

The evidence clearly and convincingly shows that termination of Father’s parental rights is in Children’s best interest as set out in Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(i).

Termination may serve the children's best interests when repeated positive drug tests show no lasting adjustment and the parent remains incarcerated without a safe, stable home.

In Re Tony W. H. · filed 2012-12-12(i)(1)-(2), (i)(7)

We agree with the trial court that in the fifteen months since the children entered DCS custody, Mother has failed to make an adjustment of circumstances in order to make it safe for the children to be returned to her.

In applying subsection (i), courts assess all assistance available to the parent and the parent’s use of it to determine whether any adjustment is lasting; the inquiry is not limited to DCS efforts.

In Re: Dallas G. · filed 2013-04-17(i)

In contrast, Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(I) is a part of the termination statute and is directed at the progress the parent whose child has been removed has made in addressing the issues which led to removal and refers to “reasonable efforts by available social service agencies” in assisting the parent; it is directed toward assessing whether, in light of the quality of resources and efforts that have been made available to the parent from whatever source, any change in the parents’ situation will be “lasting.” Accordingly, when applying Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(i) we look at the entirety of the evidence, including all assistance given to the parent as well as the parent’s utilization of that assistance in determining whether the parent has made a lasting adjustment of circumstances.

Termination was overwhelmingly in the surviving children's best interests where the mother allowed their sibling to starve to death, would remain imprisoned for at least fifteen years, had no relationship with them, and the children were thriving together in a pre-adoptive home.

In the Matter of Ryan K.M. · filed 2014-04-23(i)

Based upon the overwhelming evidence before us, we affirm the trial court’s best interest finding, and thus, its termination of Mother’s parental rights.

The meaningful-relationship factor asks whether a parent and child actually have a meaningful relationship, not why the relationship exists or is absent.

In Re: Carrington H. · filed 2014-10-21(i)(4)

Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-1-113(i)(4) requires the court to determine whether parent and child have a meaningful relationship, not to analyze why such a relationship may or may not exist.

Incarceration may weigh against a parent under the best-interest factors concerning a safe home, visitation, a meaningful relationship, home conditions, and support.

In Re Brian M · filed 2015-01-06(i)

A number of the best interest factors weigh against Father due to his incarceration, namely he was unable to provide a stable home, he had not visited the Children, he had not maintained a meaningful relationship with the Children, and he had not paid child support consistent with the child support guidelines. Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(i)(1), (3), (4), (7), (9).

Termination may fail the subsection (i) best-interest test when a parent has made a lasting adjustment while maintaining a relationship with the children.

In Re: Liam S. · filed 2017-10-04(i)

We believe that this is simply one of the rare cases where the parent has made a lasting adjustment, while managing to maintain a relationship with her children. We note that Mother faithfully attended visitation before and after the relevant time period and that the Children still referred to her as “mom” at the time of the hearing.

Even when a termination ground exists, subsection (i) may not favor termination where the parents completed treatment and services, maintained regular visitation and support, formed a meaningful relationship, and provided a safe home.

In Re Zayne P. · filed 2018-04-30(i)

The proof shows that Parents maintained regular visitation with Zayne, that Parents provided financial support to him, that Parents established a meaningful relationship with Zayne, that both parents had been compliant with drug treatment, and that they provided a safe and appropriate environment. Therefore, we affirm the trial court.

Under subsection (i), a parent’s lack of a meaningful relationship with the child and the harm from changing caretakers may carry considerable weight in the best-interest analysis.

In Re Billy F. · filed 2018-12-14(i)(4)-(5)

Importantly, Father’s failure to be a part of this child’s life also means that Father and the child have no meaningful relationship and that a change in caretakers would have a detrimental effect on the child. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(i)(4), (5). We have previously held that this factor is generally given considerable weight in determining a child’s best interest.

The regular-contact and meaningful-relationship factors did not favor termination where an incarcerated parent had a meaningful pre-incarceration relationship, tried to maintain contact, and the petitioners repeatedly interfered.

In Re Johnathan M. · filed 2019-01-08(i)(3), (4)

Considering Mother’s pre-incarceration relationship with the Children, the circumstances of her incarceration, Father’s agreement to the juvenile court’s custody modification, Mother’s attempts to contact the Children, and Petitioners’ active and repeated interference with Mother’s attempts, we hold that factors three and four do not favor termination of Mother’s parental rights.

The parental-adjustment best-interest factors ask whether lasting change has already been accomplished, so a recent uncorroborated attempt at sobriety does not outweigh a history of relapse and recidivism.

IN RE AUTUMN L. · filed 2019-02-08(i)(1), (2)

To put a finer point on it, best interest factors one and two are written as faits accomplis, i.e., things that have been accomplished and are presumably irreversible. Specifically, these statutory factors ask the court to consider whether the parent “has made such an adjustment. . .” and whether the adjustment is permanent.

Gifts and food shared during visits may constitute only token support under the current best-interest factors.

In Re Quentin G. · filed 2024-07-08(i)(1)(S)

Considering factor (S), Father has only provided Quentin with Christmas and birthday gifts and food from his plate during visitation. We find this support to be token at best. Therefore, we find that this factor weighs in favor of termination.

Even after a termination ground is established, a meaningful parent-child relationship and successful parental improvement may prevent clear and convincing proof that termination is in the child’s best interest.

In Re Liberty T. · filed 2025-02-25(i)

With particular consideration of the meaningful relationship between Mother and the Child found by the trial court, we agree with the trial court’s conclusion that Grandparents have failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that termination of Mother’s parental rights is in the Child’s best interest. See In re Jayda J., No. M2020-01309-COA-R3-PT, 2021 WL 3076770, at *30 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 21, 2021 (“Critically, the existence of a meaningful relationship often strongly weighs against termination.”).

When the record lacks evidence about a parent’s home environment, substance use, or criminal conduct, the seventh best-interest factor weighs against termination.

In Re Christopher L. · filed 2021-09-13(i)(7)

In the absence of evidence about the physical environment of his home and because there was no evidence to indicate he abused drugs, alcohol, or engaged in criminal activity, we must conclude that factor seven weighs against termination.

Section 36-1-113(i)(1) requires a court to consider every best interest factor and relevant proof, even when one factor determines the outcome.

In Re Raylon S. · filed 2023-12-04(i)(1)

However, this does not relieve a court of its duty to consider each factor and, even in cases where one factor is outcome determinative, the court must consider all factors and relevant proof that a party offers.

Section 36-1-113(i) requires courts to consider best-interest factors, but termination does not require every factor to favor it.

In Re Jordan L. · filed 2024-10-18(i)

Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-1-113(i) provides twenty enumerated factors for a court to consider, but the statute does not require that each factor favor termination.

Section 36-1-113’s best-interest factor concerning a parent’s use of available programs or services is inapplicable when the record contains no evidence that such assistance was available.

In Re John W. · filed 2026-02-23(i)(1)(K)

Because the record contains no evidence of programs, services, or community resources that were available to assist Mother in making a lasting adjustment of circumstances, conduct, or conditions, we find this factor is not applicable.

Under § 36-1-113(i)(1)(E), ten visits over eight years fall short of regular visitation or other contact in the best-interest analysis.

In Re Bentley R. · filed 2024-07-17(i)(1)(E)

However, even if Mother did visit the Child a total of ten times over the course of eight years, this falls far short of what could be considered “regular visitation or other contact.”

Termination does not require proof that adoption is immediately contemplated, and the risk that a child may not be adopted does not override evidence that return to the parent would remain unsafe.

In re Dustin L. · filed 2016-09-28(i)

This Court has previously rejected the argument that adoption must be immediately ... contemplated in order for termination to be appropriate. ... Furthermore, there has been no showing in this case that Patrick L. could be returned to the care of his parents at an early date.

In the best-interest analysis, a putative father’s token visitation, failure to establish paternity, and inability to offer permanency may favor termination despite appropriate conduct during the visits he attended.

In re Ayris R. · filed 2015-04-23(i)

However, he failed to take advantage of additional opportunities for visitation and never bothered to establish his paternity of the Child. The Child needs permanency and stability, which she can receive from the foster parents who have successfully parented her while Putative Father allowed her to languish in custody. With all of the above considerations in mind, we conclude that there was clear and convincing evidence to establish that termination of Putative Father’s parental rights was in the best interest of the Child. Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the trial court.

Expert testimony about psychological or emotional impact may help establish best interests but is not invariably required in every termination case.

In Re Adoption of J.A.K. & K.R.K. · filed 2006-01-26(i)

There was no expert testimony about the psychological or emotional impact such a change would have. While such evidence would have been helpful, we do not imply that parties seeking termination of a parent’s rights must always present such evidence.

Established termination grounds do not suffice when the record lacks clear and convincing evidence that termination is in the child's best interest.

In Re: J.R.P. · filed 2013-08-21(c)(2)

The mother now appeals only the best interest determination. We reverse, on the basis that the record does not contain clear and convincing evidence that termination of the mother’s parental rights is in the child’s best interest.

The subsection (i) best-interest analysis may favor freeing a child for adoption when the incarcerated parent remains unavailable and cannot presently build a stable parent-child relationship.

In Re E.T. P. · filed 2015-09-25(i)

Based on the foregoing, we conclude that there is clear and convincing evidence to support the trial court’s conclusion that the Child’s interest is best served by permanently severing Mother’s parental rights and thereby freeing the Child for adoption.

The subsection (i) best-interest analysis may consider whether the parent has a trained support person capable of meeting a medically fragile child's needs when the parent cannot provide care.

In re Jatavious M. · filed 2015-10-01(i)

The trial court and DCS also considered the fact that Mother had no “support person” who was trained to care for Jatavious‟s medical needs in the event that Mother was unable to care for him. Mother argues that this unfairly penalized her for not having a supportive family. We disagree. It is not unfair to Mother to consider this fact; it would be unfair to Jatavious to ignore it.

Termination may fail the subsection (i) best-interest test when it would sever an older child's meaningful parental relationship without realistic adoption prospects or a change in custody.

In Re Kendra P. · filed 2016-07-28(i)

The unique facts of this case demonstrate that severing Kendra’s relationship with Mother without any evidence of adoption prospects is not in her best interest. Based upon these facts, we conclude that the Department failed to clearly and convincingly establish that termination of Mother’s parental rights is in Kendra’s best interest.

Subsection (i)'s best-interest factors favored termination where the parent had not remedied substance abuse or housing problems and changing the child's lifelong foster placement would be harmful.

In Re Joshua C. · filed 2016-07-28(i)

Accordingly, we agree with the juvenile’s court’s conclusion that removing the child from this environment would be detrimental and harmful to the child. Based on these findings, we conclude the evidence clearly and convincingly supports the juvenile court’s ruling that termination of Mother’s parental rights is in the child’s best interests.

The subsection (i) best-interest analysis may recognize that requiring a young child to wait years for an incarcerated parent to remedy problems is unreasonable and contrary to the child's need for stability.

In Re: John J. · filed 2017-02-17(i)

As we consider Mother’s argument, we find instructive the reasoning in In re DNG, No. M2003-02810-COA-R3-PT, 2004 WL 2314534, at *3 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 13, 2004), that “[e]xpecting a young child to wait years on incarcerated parents to remedy their problems is neither reasonable nor in the best interests of the child” and that “stability is important to a child’s well-being.”

A parent’s recent progress does not control the child-centered best-interest analysis when the child’s stability is best served by remaining in the only home and family the child has known.

In Re Leah T. · filed 2024-07-08(i)

While the parent’s interests do not evaporate upon a finding of unfitness, the focus of the proceedings shifts to the best interests of the child.” White, 171 S.W.3d at 193. “The child’s best interest must be viewed from the child’s, rather than the parent’s, perspective.” Id. at 194. Here, despite Mother’s progress, the child’s best interests are best served by maintaining her in the only home and family that she has ever known.

A child's lack of a pre-adoptive placement does not require delaying termination when the current foster placement provides stability and the parent remains unable to care for the child.

In Re Brian Z. · filed 2024-12-04(i)

But this Court has held that even when the child has not been placed in a pre-adoptive home, “the trial court is not required to delay the possibility that the child[] could be integrated into safe, stable, and permanent home on the off chance that [the parent] will finally make improvements in [his or] her life.”

Section 36-1-113(i) requires courts deciding a child's best interests to consider the listed factors when determining whether to terminate parental rights.

In Re: The Adoption of Gabrielle N. N. · filed 2011-04-11(i)

The Trial Court carefully considered the factors listed in Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(i) and made specific findings by clear and convincing evidence with regard to those factors. The evidence in the record on appeal does not preponderate against these findings made under the clear and convincing standard.

Section 36-1-113 requires a finding that termination of parental rights is in the child’s best interest; a finding that adoption is in the child’s best interest is insufficient.

In Re: Maddox B.S. · filed 2011-08-26(c)

While the court found that the adoption was in the best interest of Children, such a finding is not sufficient pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-1-113.

Section 36-1-113(c)(2) requires clear and convincing evidence that termination is in the child's best interests.

In Re: K. B. Ronald Lynn Brewer, Jr. v. Ronald Lynn Brewer, Sr. · filed 2012-07-31(c)(2)

Termination of parental rights is appropriate only if clear and convincing evidence establishes that eliminating those rights is in the best interests of the child named in the petition.

Section 36-1-113(i) requires courts to consider its statutory factors when deciding whether termination is in a child’s best interests.

In Re Evella S. · filed 2021-06-24(i)

Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-1-113(i) lists nine factors that courts must consider in making a best interest analysis. ... The combined weight of the proven facts amounts to clear and convincing evidence that termination of Father’s parental rights is in each child’s best interest.

Section 36-1-113(c)(2) requires a finding that termination is in the child’s best interests even when a ground for termination has been established.

Robert Leland Bryant, and wife Linda Kay Wolfson Bryant, Sandry Lynn Todd Bryant v. Bryant · filed 1999-02-01(c)(2)

Although this constitutes a ground for termination of parental rights, there must also be a finding by the court that termination of parental rights is in the best interests of the children. T.C.A. § 36-1-113 (c)(2). Since the trial court found no grounds for termination, the court did not make any determination concerning the best interests of the children. Accordingly, in view of our finding concerning abandonment, the case must be remanded for further proceedings to determine the best interests of the children.

Section 36-1-113(i)(1) does not require a finding of adequate adjustment to a parent's conduct or conditions merely because the parent has moved to a new home.

Bryant v. Bryant · filed 2000-06-14(i)(1)

However, the mere fact that a parent has moved to a new home does not mandate a finding that he has made adequate adjustments to conduct or conditions.

Section 36-1-113(i) requires courts to consider its listed factors when deciding whether termination is in a child’s best interest.

Jaleesa Davis · filed 2000-12-29(i)

Upon a review of the record and considering all the factors enumerated in the T.C.A. § 36-1-113(i)(1) - (9), we find clear and convincing evidence that termination of respondents’ parental rights is in the best interest of the child.

Section 36-1-113(c)(2) requires a specific finding by clear and convincing evidence that terminating parental rights is in the child’s best interest.

Carolyn Marie Leasure White v. Moody · filed 2001-05-18(c)(2)

We accordingly find the Trial Court was in error in terminating parental rights without a specific finding by clear and convincing evidence that termination of parental rights is in the best interest of the child.

Section 36-1-113 requires clear and convincing proof that terminating parental rights is in the children’s best interests; the children’s bond with foster parents and the parent’s failure to protect a child can support that finding.

State of Tn Dpt. of Children's Services v. Huffman · filed 2001-05-25

Given the fact that it is highly unlikely either child remembers the mother (almost certainly not the daughter), Ms. Huffman has conceded that the children have bonded with their foster parents, and Ms. Huffman’s history of not protecting the son, we find that the proof is clear and convincing that termination of the Mother’s parental rights is in the children’s best interest.

A termination court may award past child-support arrearages preserved by section 36-1-113(l)(1) only if the arrearage issue was pleaded or tried by consent.

In re H.E.J. · filed 2003-06-19(l)(1)

It appears to us, however, that the trial court can exercise its authority to award past child support in termination cases only if the issue has been tried.

An order terminating a biological parent's rights extinguishes both the parent-child relationship and the derivative legal relationship between the child and that parent's parents.

Skerrett v. The Association for Guidance · filed 2003-06-26(l)(1)

A grandparent’s interest in the care and custody of his or her grandchild stems from his or her relationship with the child’s parent.

A termination proceeding is moot when a prior final adjudication between the parties establishes that the defendant is not a legal parent and has no parental rights to terminate.

In Re: TKY · filed 2005-07-14(c)

Termination of parental rights proceedings, however, are wholly unnecessary when it has previously been adjudicated that the defendant, the one whose rights are to be terminated, has no parental rights to terminate.

An order terminating parental rights ends the parent’s prospective support obligation; if the rights are later reinstated, support resumes only on the reinstatement date.

In Re TKY · filed 2006-08-28(l)(1)

In view of the plain language of section 36-1-113(l)(1) and the well-reasoned decisions from a majority of our sister states, we hold that termination of parental rights also terminates that parent's prospective support obligation. If parental rights are reinstated, as in this case, the support obligation resumes upon the date that rights are reinstated.

Termination under subsection (l)(1) severs the parent’s legal relationship with the child, including the right to object to the child taking the adoptive parents’ surname.

In Re: Montana R.T. · filed 2012-06-29(l)(1)

When the parental rights of a biological parent are terminated, “all legal rights and obligations of the parent or guardian of the child against whom the order of termination is entered and of the child who is the subject of the petition to that parent or guardian” are forever severed. Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(l)(1) (2010). This includes the right to name the child. Thus, the biological parent whose rights have been terminated no longer has any “right to object to the child's adoption or thereafter to have any relationship, legal or otherwise, with the child.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(l)(1).

Termination severs the biological parent's support obligation, but participation in the termination proceeding does not impose support on a stepparent who never completed the contemplated adoption.

Charles Robert Braun, Jr. v. Braun · filed 2012-10-02(l)

Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court erred in imposing a statutory obligation upon Stepfather to submit child support for the care and maintenance of the Child when he was neither the biological nor adoptive parent of the Child.

A parent whose rights were properly terminated lacks standing to challenge defects confined to the later adoption petition.

IN RE Melinda N. · filed 2019-02-07(l)(1)

If Mother’s parental rights were terminated properly, Mother would lack standing to challenge a petition for adoption of the Child. As the alleged deficiencies in the petition concern only the adoption portion of the proceeding and not the parental termination portion, we first must consider whether Mother’s parental rights to the Child were terminated properly, which leads us to consideration of Mother’s remaining issues on appeal.

A prospective adoptive parent who has physical possession and care of the child under a court order has standing to file a termination petition, despite an earlier refusal to place the child with that person because of a criminal record.

IN RE ALEXANDER B. · filed 2026-06-03(b)(1)

Adoptive Father lived with and cared for the Child as a parental figure from August 2023 until July 2024, pursuant to an order of the juvenile court. Thus, Adoptive Father ... maintained “physical custody” of the Child during that period, as that term is understood and defined in In re Joseph F. See id. Therefore, in keeping with the determination set forth by the In re Joseph F. Court, we determine that Adoptive Father had standing to file the Termination Petition and to seek adoption of the Child. See id.

A pending termination petition filed by one authorized party does not preclude a different authorized party from filing and pursuing another termination petition.

In Re M.A.P. · filed 2016-01-29(b)

We hold that the GAL‟s petition to terminate did not “preclude a new petition by different parties who are authorized to seek termination under Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(b).”

Subsection (b)'s list of persons and entities authorized to seek termination is exclusive, and a petitioner outside that list lacks standing, depriving the court of subject-matter jurisdiction.

Osborn v. Marr · filed 2004-01-23(b)

In conclusion, absent statutory authorization under Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-1-113(b), a party has no standing to file a petition to terminate parental rights. Based upon the exclusive list of persons and entities contained in Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-1-113(b), it is clear that Mother does not have standing to file a petition seeking to terminate Father’s parental rights. She is not a member of any of the groups to whom the statute grants standing. Consequently, Mother is not a proper party to bring a petition to terminate Father’s parental rights, and the trial court was therefore without subject matter jurisdiction to hear Mother’s petition.

Section 36-1-113(b) restricts who may initiate a termination petition but does not govern intervention; intervention in a juvenile-court termination proceeding is analyzed under Civil Rule 24.

Gonzalez v. State Department of Children's Services · filed 2004-06-17(a), (b)

Because the Rules of Civil Procedure concerning intervention would apply in both chancery and circuit court proceedings to terminate parental rights, and because their application would not compromise the efficacy of juvenile proceedings, we find that standing to intervene in a termination proceeding in juvenile court should be analyzed under Rule 24 of the Rules of Civil Procedure. See Tenn. R. Civ. P. 1 (2003).7 Accordingly, we expressly overrule any holding to the contrary.

Extended family members caring for a related child have standing to seek termination only if they are prospective adoptive parents, while other prospective adoptive parents have standing under section 36-1-113(b).

In the Matter of M. L. P. · filed 2008-04-08(b)

Extended family members caring for related children are granted standing if they are prospective adoptive parents, and Great Aunt and Uncle are not.

Prospective adoptive parents have standing under subsection (b) to file a separate termination petition when they intend to adopt the child; they need not first file an adoption petition.

In Re: J.G.H.,Jr., dob 11/04/05, A Child Under 18 Years of Age James And Teri Wolfe v. Duckhorn · filed 2009-08-17(b)

The first sentence of section 36-1-113(b) provides, without limitation, that prospective adoptive parents have standing to file a termination petition. Although the second sentence states that prospective adoptive parents have standing to request termination in an adoption petition, it does not state that they have standing only in an adoption petition. In several previous cases, we have found that petitioners qualified as prospective adoptive parents with standing to file a termination petition, even though they had not yet filed an adoption petition, if they indicated that they intended to adopt the child in the future.

A “prospective adoptive parent” with standing under subsection (b) must have both an intent to adopt and the legal capacity to do so; filing a legally impossible adoption petition does not create standing.

In the Matter of Shelby L. B. · filed 2011-03-31(b)

We interpret the legislative scheme for termination and adoption, taken as a whole, as contemplating that a “prospective adoptive parent” is one who not only harbors the intention or desire to adopt, but who also has the legal capacity or ability to do so.7 Thus, when the face of a petition for termination of parental rights and adoption reveals that the petitioner does not have such legal capacity to adopt, it is appropriate to dismiss that petition.

Former foster parents lack standing as prospective adoptive parents when DCS has withdrawn its prior approval, removed the child from their care, and they have neither custody nor a right to receive custody by surrender.

In re Sonya M. · filed 2015-07-16(b)(1)

Thus, a person or persons filing for adoption must have physical custody of the child or the right to receive physical custody pursuant to a valid surrender. Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-111(d)(6); see In re Adoption of M.J.S., 44 S.W.3d 41, 49 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000) (discussing adoption statutes). In this case, when they filed their petition, the Hodgins did not have custody of Sonya, and they did not have the right to receive custody pursuant to a surrender. ... While we recognize the harsh consequences of this decision, we must agree with the trial court that the Hodgins lacked standing to bring an adoption or a parental termination action.

For standing in a termination-and-adoption proceeding, physical custody means physical possession of the child as granted by a parent, guardian, child-placing agency, or court.

In re Joseph F. · filed 2016-03-31(b)

Upon a careful review of the termination/adoption provisions found in Title 36 as a whole, along with applicable precedent, we conclude that “physical custody” means physical possession of a child, as granted by a parent, guardian, child-placing agency, or court.

Standing to seek termination is restricted to parties authorized by statute.

In Re: Francis P · filed 2017-06-26(b)

This petition sought to terminate the parental rights of the “unknown father” of a child for whom Tony P. had signed a voluntary acknowledgment of paternity (“VAP”).

A parent may seek to terminate another parent’s rights only in the limited statutory circumstances, but a prospective adoptive parent has standing to petition for termination.

In Re Paetyn M. · filed 2019-02-14(b)(1)

A child’s parent, such as Father, has standing to petition to terminate the parental rights of another alleged parent, such as Mother, but only in limited circumstances. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(b)(1), (g)(10)(A). At the time Father filed his original and amended petitions, a parent could only petition to terminate the parental rights of the other parent if the respondent “parent ha[d] been found to have committed severe child sexual abuse under any prior order of a criminal court” or if the respondent parent “ha[d] been convicted of aggravated rape pursuant to § 39-13-502, rape pursuant to § 39-13-503, or rape of a child pursuant to § 39-13-522, from which crime the child was conceived.”

A child’s parent lacks standing to seek termination on abandonment grounds because subsection (b) grants parental standing only for the specifically listed violent and sexual offenses.

In Re Blake V. · filed 2023-11-07(b)

Because Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113 does not give a child’s parent standing to file a termination petition based on these grounds, Mother lacked standing to file her termination petition seeking to terminate Father’s parental rights.

Section 36-1-113(a) permits the Tennessee Department of Children’s Services to file a petition in state court to terminate parental rights.

Annette v. Haslam · filed 2019-09-30(a)

In objecting to the Magistrate Judge’s Order, Plaintiff cites no authority or factual basis for this assertion, but the Court notes that DCS is permitted to file a petition in state court to terminate parental rights.

Under the 2001 version of § 36-1-113(b), Juvenile Rule 39 governed standing to file a termination petition when the two provisions conflicted.

In re: M.E.A. by: Elizabeth Joy Argo Exum v. Moody · filed 2004-02-19(b)

For the foregoing reasons, the conflict on the issue of standing that exists between T.C.A. § 36-1-113(b) and Tenn. R. Juv. P. 39 is properly resolved in favor of the Tennessee Rules of Juvenile Procedure.

Under subsection (i)(1)(L), DCS is not required to arrange treatment that was never recommended, particularly when it provided recommended resources that the parent declined.

In Re Toni S. · filed 2025-08-14(i)(1)(L)

Accordingly, DCS was not obligated to assist Mother in entering inpatient or outpatient treatment for her addiction.

Reasonable reunification efforts are not a precondition to the substantial-noncompliance or persistent-conditions grounds, but their adequacy is weighed in the best-interest analysis.

In re Kalob S. · filed 2015-06-12(g)(2), (g)(3), (i)(2)

Thus, in light of the supreme court‟s holding in In re: Kaliyah S., we find that the Father‟s argument with respect to the grounds of substantial non-compliance with the permanency plan and persistence of conditions is without merit. ... In accordance with In re Kaliyah S., we consider the adequacy of DCS‟s efforts in the context of the best interest analysis.

The State’s reasonable reunification efforts are weighed in the best-interest analysis but are not an essential element of a petition to terminate parental rights.

In re Marcell W. · filed 2015-07-23(i)(2)

Although Mother seems to suggest that the termination of her parental rights cannot occur absent sufficient proof of the State‟s efforts at reuniting her with her child, the decision in Kaliyah negates her argument.

When termination grounds under subsections (g)(1) through (3) implicate DCS’s reunification duty, reasonable efforts are an essential element that DCS must prove by clear and convincing evidence even if the parent did not challenge those efforts.

In Re: C.M.M. and S.D.M · filed 2004-03-09(c), (g)(1)-(3)

However, when the termination proceeding involves grounds that implicate the Department’s obligation, establishing that it made reasonable efforts to reunite the child with his or her parents is an essential ingredient of the Department’s case. In these cases, the Department has the burden of proving its reasonable efforts even when the parent has not questioned the adequacy of its efforts. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 37-1-166(b). When required, the Department must establish that it has made reasonable efforts to reunite the child with his or her parents by clear and convincing evidence. Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(c).

When termination is sought for persistent conditions under section 36-1-113(g)(3), the Department's reasonable reunification efforts are an essential part of its case and must be proven by clear and convincing evidence.

In the Matter of: M.E., M.E., R.B., M.B., S.B. · filed 2004-08-16(g)(3)

Nevertheless, termination proceedings based on the grounds in Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(3) require the Department to demonstrate that it has made reasonable efforts to reunite a child with his or her parent. Establishing that it has made reasonable efforts to reunite the child with his or her parents is an essential part of the Department's case, which the Department must prove by clear and convincing evidence.

When reasonable reunification efforts are required, DCS must prove them by clear and convincing evidence, and an appellate court will not presume such efforts from an inadequate record that omits the permanency plans and material case history.

State of Tennessee Department of Children's Services v. B.B.M. · filed 2004-11-17(c), (g)(1)-(3)

We conclude the record, such as it is, does not contain sufficient evidence to support the Juvenile Court’s conclusion that there was clear and convincing evidence that DCS had made a reasonable effort to assist Mother to reunite with her children. The judgment of the Juvenile Court is, therefore, reversed.

When reasonable reunification efforts are required for subsection (g)(2) or (g)(3), the Department must prove those efforts by clear and convincing evidence; filing early and failing to provide essential recommended therapy defeats those grounds.

In the Matter of J.L.E. · filed 2005-06-30(c), (g)(2)-(3)

Applying the clear and convincing standard required of us, we find that DCS did not meet its burden of proving that it made reasonable efforts to reunite Mother and Child. As a result, the juvenile court’s finding that DCS established the grounds of failure to substantially comply with the Permanency Plan under Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(2) and persistent conditions under Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(3) must be reversed.

DCS's reunification efforts may be reasonable despite limited services when a parent repeatedly moves out of state, withholds her location, and thereby prevents DCS from providing services.

In the Matter of L.F.B. and D.M.D. · filed 2005-11-07(g)(2), (g)(3)

DCS was not able to help Mother because she moved frequently and would go months without letting DCS know her location. Sometimes Mother would call Ms. Cunningham and flatly refuse to tell her where she was.

For grounds implicating reunification efforts, DCS must prove it reasonably assessed and addressed psychological conditions underlying plan noncompliance, and budget constraints do not excuse delay or failure to do so.

In re A.J.H. · filed 2005-11-28(g)(2), (g)(3)

However, DCS bears the burden of showing that it took reasonable steps to answer that question prior to proceeding with termination. Instead of satisfying that burden, the state simply cites budgetary concerns as an excuse for the incomplete assessment. Departmental funding concerns did not and should not prevent the initial emergency removal. They should not now be used as an excuse for the substantial delay and ultimate failure in assessing and treating what could be the root causes of the barriers to reunification. We find that DCS failed to meet its burden of showing by clear and convincing evidence that it took reasonable steps to address D.H.’s admitted inability to comply with the parenting plan without assessment or treatment for the conditions identified in the psychological evaluations conducted at the State’s behest.

For subsection (g)(3)(A), DCS must prove by clear and convincing evidence both every persistent-conditions element and reasonable reunification efforts; failing to offer treatment for the condition relied on makes termination premature.

State of Tennessee, Department of Children's Services v. Daniel R. Howard in the Matter of W.A.H. & A.N.H. · filed 2006-08-08(g)(3)(A)

Likewise, Father has been diagnosed as having a narcissistic personality disorder. As stated earlier, nothing in the record indicates that DCS made any reasonable efforts to assist Father in obtaining appropriate medical care. Although Dr. Donelson noted in his evaluation of Father that Father’s attitude toward DCS and his overall demeanor would likely render any treatment’s success very poor, it does not excuse DCS from its statutory obligations to make reasonable efforts to reunite Father with his children. In addition to failing to provide services to Father to treat his personality disorder, nothing in the record indicates that DCS conducted a home study of the paternal grandparents’ home in Rosston, AR or a home study of the Father’s residence as required by the Shelby County Juvenile Court referee’s orders. As such, it appears to be premature to terminate Father’s parental rights. Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the chancery court.

DCS must make reasonable reunification efforts, but a permanency plan need not guarantee success when the parent remains unable or unwilling to overcome the conditions preventing a safe return.

In the Matter of: Q.D.B, A.R.P., A.T.P. and A.A.W. · filed 2009-05-15(g)(3)

DCS has made more than reasonable efforts in this case. No permanency plan can be devised to guarantee a parent’s successful completion. In this case, Mother is simply unwilling or unable to make the efforts needed to provide a safe home for her children.

DCS does not make reasonable reunification efforts when it leaves a seriously mentally ill parent to obtain treatment unaided and provides no services addressing the illness that underlies the conditions preventing reunification.

State Of Tennessee, Department Of Children's Services v. Ruth Sails, Sylvester Pollard, Kenny Jones, and Unknown Fathers · filed 2009-07-10(g)(3)

This is particularly true where the parent suffers from mental illness. The mental illness necessarily compromises the parent’s ability to address her own problems; a parent with serious mental illness cannot reasonably be expected to simply lift herself up by the bootstraps with no assistance. ... Here, the assistance provided by DCS was not simply inadequate; there was a complete failure to provide any assistance at all to Mother with her fundamental challenge, her mental illness. ... Under these circumstances, we must conclude that the State failed to carry its burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that it made reasonable efforts to reunify Mother with the children in this case.

DCS fails to make reasonable reunification efforts when it knows psychological services are essential to parents' ability to satisfy permanency plans and remedy persistent conditions but does not provide the specifically recommended services.

In Re: A. R. and J. R. · filed 2007-12-13(g)(2), (g)(3)

The record fails to establish that the Department provided the essential psychological services, without which the other services provided by the Department could not meet the needs of either parent or the family.

DCS's reunification efforts can be reasonable when an able parent receives service information and visitation but repeatedly becomes incarcerated, conceals his whereabouts, continues violence, and makes little effort on permanency-plan goals.

In the Matter of S.H. · filed 2008-04-30(g)(2), (g)(3)

Reviewing the factors discussed above including Father’s abilities, resources, lack of effort, repeated incarceration and violent behavior, we agree with the trial court that the Department’s efforts were reasonable under the circumstances.

DCS does not make reasonable efforts toward permanency-plan compliance for a mentally challenged parent by merely helping with one call, providing a resource list, and waiting for the parent to request further assistance.

In re R.L.F. · filed 2008-07-31(g)(2)

The Department must do more than merely provide a list of services to the parent, point them in the right direction, and rely on parents to facilitate their own rehabilitation.

DCS makes reasonable reunification efforts for a mentally ill parent by providing evaluation, transportation, medication, counseling, and assistance; it need not forcibly administer medication or compel attendance at appointments.

In the Matter of: Shanya A.A. (d.o.b. 2/17/07) A Child Under Eighteen Years of Age · filed 2010-10-06(g)(2)-(3)

DCS, recognizing this, attempted throughout these proceedings to provide Mother with the requisite evaluation, transportation, medication, counseling, and assistance to help her combat the progression of her disorder. Mother, however, consistently failed to take her medication on a regular basis, to attend appointments with her case managers on a regular basis, and to follow through on the recommendations of medical personnel. ... Quite clearly, DCS could not control the most important factors to the treatment of Mother’s disorder, and its duty to expend reasonable efforts did not encompass an obligation to administer medication by force or to compel physically her attendance at medical appointments.

DCS makes reasonable efforts to preserve visitation when it places mother and child together and transports the child for visits; lapses caused by the mother's repeated flight from foster care are not attributable to DCS.

In Re: Christopher M. - Tennessee Department of Children's Services v. Ebony M. · filed 2010-11-01(g)(1)

From our review of the record, DCS’s efforts in this regard were more than reasonable. Mother and Christopher were initially placed in the same foster home, until Christopher was removed due to concerns for his safety. It is undisputed that Mother and Christopher visited regularly while Mother was present in foster care. Even when she resided at Madison Oaks, Christopher was transported to Jackson for visits. The lapses in visitation occurred because Mother persistently ran away from her foster homes.

DCS must affirmatively help a drug-addicted parent obtain appropriate treatment even without a request, rather than merely document continuing drug use for a later termination case.

In the matter of: April F. (d.o.b. 11/20/98), Dylan F. (d.o.b. 3/30/00), and Devin F. (d.o.b. 7/24/06 · filed 2010-11-22(g)(2)-(3)

DCS’s duty extends beyond documenting the persistence of a parent’s drug abuse for use at trial; it must take reasonable steps to remedy the problem and prevent termination of the parent-child relationship if possible.

Before terminating for persistent conditions, the court must determine that DCS made reasonable efforts to help the parent remedy the conditions leading to removal.

In Re Arteria H. · filed 2010-08-04(g)(3)

However, before the trial court may terminate parental rights based upon a persistence of conditions, the trial court must determine that DCS made reasonable efforts to assist the parent in remedying the conditions which led to the removal of the child.

For substantial noncompliance and persistent conditions, DCS generally must prove by clear and convincing evidence that it made reasonable reunification efforts and that those efforts failed.

In Re Brandon T. · filed 2010-09-08(g)(2), (g)(3)

With respect to both termination grounds, substantial noncompliance under Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(2) and persistence of conditions under Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(3), DCS must generally prove by clear and convincing evidence that “it made reasonable efforts to reunite the family and that these efforts were to no avail.”

For subsection (g)(2), DCS must do more than provide a list of housing resources; standing aside and assuming other agencies will assist a mentally impaired parent is not a reasonable reunification effort.

In Re Shaolin P. · filed 2011-05-13(g)(2)

This court has previously stated that DCS “must do more than simply provide the parents with a list of services and send them on their way.” In re Giorgianna H., 205 S.W.3d at 519. The burden is on DCS to prove, by clear and convincing evidence, that it made reasonable efforts. In this case, involving a parent with mental impairments who is on the sex offender registry, the services documented by DCS hardly amount to reasonable efforts. Standing aside and assuming other agencies are assisting the parent is neither reasonable nor an effort.

For subsection (g)(2), DCS must affirmatively use its training to provide reasonable reunification assistance whether or not the parent requests help; simply providing a list of services is insufficient.

In Re: Tylon L.D. · filed 2011-05-18(g)(2)

This Court has acknowledged that “[t]he success of a parent’s remedial efforts generally depends on the Department’s assistance and support.” In re Giorgianna H., 205 S.W.3d 508, 518 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2006); In re C.M.M., No. M2003-01122-COA-R3-PT, 2004 WL 438326, at *7 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 9, 2004). Accordingly, “[b]efore a trial court can terminate parental rights on certain grounds, DCS has the additional burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that it exercised ‘reasonable efforts’ to make it possible for the child to return home” and that those efforts were to no avail. Tenn. Code Ann. § 37-1-166(a)(2); In re R.L.F., 278 S.W.3d 305, 315-16 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2008). “Reasonable efforts” is statutorily defined as “the exercise of reasonable care and diligence by the department to provide services related to meeting the needs of the child and the family.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 37-1-166(g)(1). “[DCS] employees have an affirmative duty to utilize their education and training to assist parents in a reasonable way to address the conditions that led to the child's removal….” In re R.L.F., 278 S.W.3d at 316. “The duty to exert reasonable efforts exists whether the parent asks for assistance or not.” Id. The efforts made need not be “Herculean.” In re Giorgianna H., 205 S.W.3d at 518 )(citing In Re C.M.M. & S.D.M., No. M2003-01122-COA-R3-PT, 2004 WL 438326 (Tenn. Ct. App. March 9, 2004)). However, DCS must do more than simply provide parents with a list of services. Id.

DCS has no statutory duty to make reasonable efforts to reunite children with extended family before terminating the parents’ rights.

In Re: Aiden R. B. · filed 2011-06-07(g)(1)-(3)

Moreover, we find no authority requiring DCS to make reasonable efforts to unite a child with members of that child’s extended family before terminating a parent’s parental rights. We note that such a requirement likely would be a severe strain on DCS’s limited resources were DCS required to make reasonable efforts to unite a child with his or her extended family. A child could have a multitude of extended family members. Identifying and contacting a child’s extended family and then making efforts to place the child with first one extended family member and then the next and then the next and so on would be immensely burdensome. In any event, DCS is not required under either statutory or case law to make reasonable efforts to reunite children with their extended family prior to terminating a parent’s parental rights.

DCS makes reasonable reunification efforts when it affirmatively offers services that the parent refuses and further assistance is frustrated by the parent’s repeated incarceration.

In The Matter of: Jada T.L.P. and Joseph D.P. · filed 2011-08-19(g)(1)-(3)

We disagree. Having reviewed the record, we conclude DCS made reasonable efforts to assist Mother. DCS initially took affirmative steps to provide Mother with services which she refused to accept. Any further attempts to provide services were frustrated by Mother’s persistent incarceration. Although we consider this a close case in light of the clear and convincing standard, it was ultimately Mother who did not make reasonable efforts to rehabilitate herself and it was ultimately Mother’s actions that impeded DCS’s ability to provide services. Considering the unique facts of this case, we affirm the juvenile court’s finding on the issue of reasonable efforts.

Substantial noncompliance cannot support termination unless DCS proves by clear and convincing evidence that it made reasonable efforts to assist the parent with the permanency-plan responsibilities and reunification.

In Re: Askia K. B. · filed 2011-10-07(g)(2)

Under these circumstances, we must conclude that the State failed to carry its burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that it made reasonable efforts to assist Father and to reunify Father with his son.

DCS's reunification efforts may be reasonable when it diligently seeks a parent through relatives, attorneys, and other sources but the parent deliberately avoids being found and assisted.

In Re: Zeylon T.S. · filed 2011-10-24(g)(2)

In this case, the record shows that DCS made diligent efforts to locate Mother, through her relatives, her various attorneys, and other sources. Mother simply chose not to be found. DCS cannot be expected to work miracles in the face of such dogged resistance to being assisted.

Substantial noncompliance and persistent conditions may support termination when DCS proves that it made reasonable efforts to assist the parent while the children were in state custody.

In Re: Dacia S. · filed 2013-02-14(g)(2)-(3)

The Trial Court entered its order terminating Mother’s parental rights to the Children after finding and holding, inter alia, that DCS had proven by clear and convincing evidence that grounds existed to terminate Mother’s parental rights pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(2) and § 36-1-113(g)(3) and that the termination was in the Children’s best interest. Mother appeals to this Court. We affirm.

Reasonable efforts are established where DCS offers assistance directed to a suitable home and persistent conditions but the parent repeatedly refuses that help and denies needing it.

In Re: Zacharias T.M. · filed 2012-11-13(g)(1), (g)(3)

The evidence in the record on appeal, as already discussed in this Opinion, does not preponderate against the Juvenile Court’s findings made by clear and convincing evidence that grounds were proven to terminate Mother’s parental rights to the Children pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(1), § 36-1-113(g)(3), and § 36-1-102(1)(A)(ii).

When the asserted abandonment, substantial-noncompliance, and persistent-conditions grounds trigger DCS's reunification duty, DCS must prove reasonable efforts; merely providing referrals without meaningful assistance may be insufficient.

In Re: Josephine E.M.C. · filed 2014-04-17(g)(1), (g)(2), (g)(3)

Based on the totality of the circumstances in this case, we find that DCS failed to present clear and convincing evidence that it made reasonable efforts to assist Mother and to reunify her with Josephine.

DCS's reunification efforts are weighed in the best-interest analysis, but proof of reasonable efforts is not a precondition to termination and the underlying reasonable-efforts finding requires a preponderance of the evidence.

In Re: Kaliyah S. · filed 2015-01-22(i)(2)

For these reasons, we hold that, in a termination proceeding, the extent of DCS’s efforts to reunify the family is weighed in the court’s best-interest analysis, but proof of reasonable efforts is not a precondition to termination of the parental rights of the respondent parent. As with other factual findings made in connection with the best-interest analysis, reasonable efforts must be proven by a preponderance of the evidence, not by clear and convincing evidence.

DCS's reunification efforts are considered under one best-interest factor, and even a failure to make reasonable efforts is not an essential element that must be proved before parental rights may be terminated.

In Re: Lijah D. · filed 2020-10-05(i)(2)

Even if DCS still had a duty to provide reasonable efforts, its failure to do so does not undermine the trial court’s finding that several factors establish that termination of Parents’ parental rights is in the Children’s best interests.

Reasonable reunification efforts by DCS are not an element of the persistent-conditions ground and are considered instead in the best-interest analysis.

In Re Josie G. · filed 2022-09-15(g)(3)

Moreover, contrary to Mother’s argument, whether DCS made reasonable efforts to assist her in regaining custody of the Child and learning to care for the Child in her home is not a factor to be considered when analyzing this statutory ground.

Section 36-1-113(g)(8) permits termination for mental incompetence without a showing of reasonable efforts to reunite the family when clear and convincing evidence establishes that ground.

State, Department of Children's Services v. Mims · filed 2008-11-24(g)(8)

Under these circumstances, we find that a showing of reasonable efforts was unnecessary, and that the trial court did not err in finding that the ground of mental incompetence was proven by clear and convincing evidence.

A child over fourteen need not consent to termination of a parent's rights; the statutory consent required for adoption does not extend to the distinct termination proceeding.

In Re JCD · filed 2007-11-30(c)

It does not follow from the mere facts that termination of parental rights is a prerequisite to adoption and that consent of a child over fourteen is also a prerequisite to adoption that the consent of the child over fourteen is a prerequisite to termination.

Mental incompetence under subsection (g)(8) does not require an untreatable condition; the impairment must prevent adequate care and be likely to persist into the near future.

In Re Kamdyn H. · filed 2024-02-22(g)(8)

A finding of mental incompetence does not require a condition that is untreatable. In re Josie G., [No. E2021-01516-COA-R3-CV,] 2022 WL 4241987, at *10 [(Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 15, 2022)]. Instead, the statute requires impairment to the extent that the parent cannot adequately provide care and supervision of the child. Id. DCS must show (1) that the parent is presently unable to care for the child; and (2) that the parent is unlikely to be able to care for the child in the near future.

An intellectual disability alone is insufficient under subsection (g)(8); clear and convincing evidence must show impaired parenting function and that the inability to care for the child is likely to persist.

In Re Tyler A. · filed 2021-08-18(g)(8)

While her intellectual disability alone is not a sufficient ground of termination, her corresponding impaired functioning that resulted in the Child’s malnourished state, stunted growth, and unmet need for leg braces for proper development ... at the time of removal is indicative of her inability to properly care for the Child. Mother’s failure to cooperate with services or otherwise address her lack of proper care and supervision of the Child evidenced the likelihood that her inability to adequately care for the Child will persist. With these considerations in mind, we conclude that DCS proved by clear and convincing evidence that Mother is (1) presently incompetent to adequately provide for the care and supervision of the Child because of mental impairment and (2) such mental impairment is so likely to remain that it is unlikely that she will be able to resume care or responsibility for the Child in the near future.

Subsection (g)(8) requires competent evidence of the parent’s present mental condition, its effect on parenting, and its likely persistence; old clinical records without current expert proof are insufficient.

In Re PrinceKenyan F. · filed 2021-08-30(g)(8)

Moreover, and significantly, there is no expert testimony regarding Mother’s present mental condition as of the time of trial. This is significant because the statute requires clear and convincing evidence that the parent “is incompetent to adequately provide for the further care and supervision of the child because the parent’s . . . mental condition is presently so impaired and is so likely to remain so that it is unlikely that the parent . . . will be able to assume or resume the care of and responsibility for the child in the near future. . . .” Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(8)(B)(i) (emphasis added). The record before us fails to provide competent evidence of these essential facts.

Mental incompetence under subsection (g)(8) does not require willfulness; the inquiry is whether the parent’s lasting impairment prevents the children from living safely with the parent.

In Re Amber R. · filed 2020-12-29(g)(8)

While Mother’s failure to provide the Children with proper care and supervision is likely not willful, willfulness need not be shown under this ground. Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(8)(C). Rather, because “[t]he statute serves to protect children from harm caused by a parent who is incapable of safely caring for them,” our question is “whether the children would be able to safely live with the parent[].” In re Samuel R., No. W2017-01359-COA-R3-PT, 2018 WL 2203226, at *9 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 14, 2018), perm. app. denied (Aug. 13, 2018) (internal citations omitted). We conclude that it would be detrimental to the safety and welfare of the Children to be placed with Mother.

Mental incompetence requires clear and convincing proof that the parent’s impairment adversely affects parenting ability; an expert’s ambivalence on that link is insufficient.

In re C.C. · filed 2016-09-22(g)(8)

It is important to recognize that the issue is not whether B.D. has impaired cognitive functioning. He clearly does. However, the real issue is whether this impairment adversely affects his ability to parent his children. On this latter issue, we cannot say, clearly and convincingly, that it does. We hold, as a matter of law, that the evidence is not sufficient to, clearly and convincingly, show that B.D.’s parental rights should be terminated based upon mental incompetence.

Mental incompetence is not established merely by impaired cognitive functioning; clear and convincing evidence must connect the impairment to an adverse effect on the parent’s ability to care for the children.

In Re Quadayvon H · filed 2016-09-30(g)(8)

As in In re C.C., the issue in this case is not whether Father has impaired cognitive functioning. Rather, the issue is whether his impairment adversely affects his ability to parent his children. The record clearly demonstrates that Father has an adverse relationship with most, if not all, of the social workers representing his children in this case. The record demonstrates that Father has yelled at, pointed at, and perhaps even cursed at individuals with whom he has perceived issues. That said, outside of potentially failing to stop his children from standing on furniture or running with a sucker in their mouths, the record sheds little light on whether Father’s mental impairments adversely affect his ability to parent.

Mental incompetence is established when an enduring cognitive impairment prevents the parent from learning to administer a medically fragile child’s essential care despite years of services.

In re Scott H. · filed 2016-09-30(g)(8)

Following a thorough review of the record, we conclude that the evidence does not preponderate against the trial court‟s finding by clear and convincing evidence that Mother was incompetent to adequately provide for the care and supervision of the Child. Mother‟s mental condition is presently and is likely to remain so impaired that it is unlikely Mother will be able to assume care of and responsibility for the Child in the near future. Therefore, we affirm the termination of Mother‟s parental rights based on the statutory ground of mental incompetence to adequately care for the Child.

Mental incompetence was established when a parent’s long-standing personality disorder impaired her ability to maintain employment and housing, address the removal conditions, or accept responsibility for them.

In Re Marterrio H. · filed 2017-04-12(g)(8)

The record established that Mother failed to maintain employment for almost four years and failed to obtain an adequate home for the Child. Furthermore, Mother failed to substantially comply with the goals in the permanency plans addressing the mental health issues that necessitated the Child’s removal from her home. Mother was unaware of the specifics of her mental health diagnosis and denied having mental health issues. She refused to accept responsibility for the conditions which caused the Child’s removal from her custody.

Mental incompetence alone is insufficient under subsection (g)(8); the impairment must adversely affect the parent's ability to care for the particular child and be unlikely to be remedied in the near future.

In Re: Katrina S. · filed 2020-09-03(g)(8)

Mental incompetence of a parent, standing alone, is not a ground for termination of parental rights. ... Rather, the appropriate inquiry, and the impetus of this entire case, is whether Mother’s intellectual disabilities “adversely affect [her] ability to parent” this particular Child in light of the Child’s special needs.

Mental incompetence requires clear and convincing proof that the impairment prevents adequate care and supervision and is unlikely to improve enough for the parent to resume care in the near future.

In Re Ashanti P. · filed 2021-11-29(g)(8)

A parent’s rights may be terminated on the ground of mental incompetence if the court determines, by clear and convincing evidence, that the parent’s mental condition is impaired to such a degree that the parent cannot adequately provide care and supervision to the child and it is unlikely that the parent will be able to do so in the near future.

Diagnoses of depression, anxiety, and personality disorders do not establish mental incompetence without clear and convincing proof that the parent is presently unable and unlikely in the near future to care for the child.

In Re Cyric W. · filed 2021-12-13(g)(8)

Thus, given Dr. Kay’s testimony, we hold that the record before us fails to provide clear and convincing evidence that Mother is incompetent to adequately provide for the child because her mental condition is presently so impaired and is so likely to remain so that it is unlikely that Mother will be able to assume care and responsibility for Cyric in the near future.

Mental incompetence requires proof that the impairment adversely affects the parent’s ability to parent, not merely proof that the parent has impaired cognitive functioning.

In Re Diamond F. · filed 2022-03-29(g)(8)

For this ground, it is insufficient to show only that a parent suffers from mental incompetence; rather, “the real issue is whether this impairment adversely affects [the] ability to parent[.]” In re C.C., No. E2016-00475-COA- R3-PT, 2016 WL 5266669, at *13 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 22, 2016); see also In re Quadayvon H., No. E2016-00445-COA-R3-PT, 2016 WL 7340427, at *8 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 30, 2016) (“The issue in this case is not whether Father has impaired cognitive functioning. Rather, the issue is whether his impairment adversely affects his ability to parent his children.”).

Mental disability alone is not mental incompetence because an impaired parent may be rehabilitated, but the ground applies when the condition is likely to remain and the parent has not taken needed steps to become able to care for the children.

In Re Miranda T. · filed 2022-05-05(g)(8)

However, mental disability is not an ipso facto basis for finding the ground of mental incompetence. The statute allows for the possibility that an impaired parent or guardian may yet be able to assume care of and responsibility for her child in the near future. An impaired parent, unable to adequately care for her child on account of her mental condition, potentially can be rehabilitated or adjust so as to successfully cope with her condition. However, the record reflects that Mother has never taken the steps necessary to address her condition so as to assume care for the Children.

Mental incompetence is not limited to conditions beyond all possible intervention, but the condition must impair the parent enough to prevent adequate care and supervision.

In Re Kenneth D. · filed 2023-06-29(g)(8)

This Court has rejected the argument that the ground of mental incompetence is reserved only for parents who have “a condition for which ‘no amount of intervention can assist.’” See In re S.M.R., No. M2008-01221-COA-R3-PT, 2008 WL 4949236, at *6 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 18, 2008). ... The parent’s mental condition, however, must impair the parent to an extent that he or she cannot adequately provide for the care and supervision of the child. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(8)(B)(i).

The mental-incompetence ground is not limited to parents who have an intellectual disability.

In Re Miriam T. · filed 2025-09-08(g)(8)(B)

Despite Mother’s suggestion otherwise, the mental incompetence ground is also not limited to cases where the parent suffers from an intellectual disability.

Mental incompetence is not reserved for conditions beyond all possible intervention, but the condition must impair the parent enough to prevent adequate care and supervision.

In Re Madison B. · filed 2025-12-09(g)(8)

Notably, this Court has rejected the argument that the ground of mental incompetence is reserved only for parents who have “a condition for which ‘no amount of intervention can assist.’” See In re S.M.R., No. M2008-01221-COA-R3-PT, 2008 WL 4949236, at *6 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 18, 2008). ... The parent’s mental condition, however, must impair the parent to an extent that he or she cannot adequately provide for the care and supervision of the child. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1- 113(g)(8)(B)(i).

Mental incompetence is not limited to conditions beyond all possible intervention, but the condition must impair the parent enough to prevent adequate care and supervision.

In Re: Ayzelee G. · filed 2025-12-12(g)(8)

Furthermore, this Court has noted that this statutory ground is not limited to a condition for which “no amount of intervention can assist.” In re S.M.R., No. M2008- 01221-COA-R3-PT, 2008 WL 4949236, at *6 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 18, 2008).

Section 36-1-113(g)(8)(B) permits termination when clear and convincing evidence establishes that a parent’s mental condition prevents adequate care and is unlikely to improve enough for the parent to care for the child in the near future, and termination is in the child’s best interest.

In re K.G.S. · filed 2015-05-19(g)(8)(B)

There is clear and convincing evidence to support the trial court’s finding that Mother is mentally incompetent to adequately parent the Child. The trial court did not err in finding grounds for termination pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(8)(B).

The mental incompetence ground does not require prior removal by DCS or a previous finding of dependency, neglect, or abuse.

In Re: Samuel R. · filed 2018-05-14(g)(8)(B)(i)

However, nothing in the statute requires removal by DCS or a previous finding of dependency and neglect or abuse, as suggested by Father and Grandparents.

A possibility that a parent may stop taking medication after regaining custody does not, by itself, establish the mental impairment required to terminate parental rights.

Dept of Children's Srvcs v. R.M.M., Sr. · filed 2002-04-18(g)(8)(B)(i)

Although R.M. may discontinue taking his medication if he regains custody of his son we do not find that that contingency alone is sufficient to warrant termination of his parental rights at this time.

A termination proceeding filed in circuit or chancery court must be served under the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure and the statutes governing substituted service.

IN RE ETHAN D. · filed 2025-09-18(e)

Where the termination proceeding is filed in circuit or, as here, chancery court, service of process must be “made pursuant to the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure and the statutes governing substituted service.” Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 36-1-117(m)(1), -113(e).

Even after default, termination requires proof of a statutory ground and the child’s best interest at an evidentiary hearing.

In Re Connor B. · filed 2020-03-20(c)

By contrast, a default judgment in a parental termination case requires the presentation of proof concerning grounds for termination of parental rights and best interest. See In re Savanna I., No. E2018-00392-COA-R3-PT, 2018 WL 6167386, at *6 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 26, 2018) (affirming the trial court’s grant of a default judgment against the respondent mother, following the presentation of sufficient proof of grounds and best interest during an evidentiary hearing, based on her failure to answer the termination petition or otherwise defend the action).

A default judgment cannot terminate parental rights without proof of both a statutory ground and the child’s best interest.

In Re Lillian W. · filed 2020-11-09(c)

A parent’s rights may be terminated by default judgment, but “proof must be presented as to legal grounds and best interest pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-117(n); see also In re Connor B., 603 S.W.3d 773, 782-83 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2020). Thus, proof regarding the grounds for termination alone is not enough to terminate a parent’s rights; proof must also be introduced regarding the best interest of the child at issue.

Even after default, termination requires clear and convincing proof of both a statutory ground and the child's best interest.

In Re Abigail J.J. · filed 2021-03-15(c)

However, “a court must determine that clear and convincing evidence proves not only that statutory grounds exist [for the termination] but also that termination is in the child’s best interest.”

A default judgment terminating parental rights still requires proof of statutory grounds and best interest rather than treating the petition's factual allegations as confessed.

In Re Joshua M. · filed 2022-10-03(c)

A default judgment in a parental termination case . . . differs from a default judgment in other civil cases, wherein the typical civil defendant, ‘by suffering a default judgment to be entered against him, impliedly confesses all of the material allegations of fact contained in [the] complaint, except the amount of the plaintiff’s unliquidated damages.’ ... “[A] default judgment in a parental termination case requires the presentation of proof concerning grounds for termination of parental rights and best interest.”

In a default proceeding, an unproven petition allegation and admissions lacking the relevant four-month period do not clearly and convincingly establish abandonment.

In Re Christabell B. · filed 2023-11-22(g)(1)

The unproven averment in the petition does not constitute clear and convincing evidence of this failure. Consequently, we hold that Petitioners did not prove abandonment by failure to visit during the four-month period immediately preceding the filing of the petition.

Noncompliance with a permanency-plan requirement cannot support termination unless the requirement is reasonable and related to remedying the conditions that caused removal.

In Re D.R.S. · filed 2016-08-29(g)(2)

While we find all other responsibilities in the permanency plan are reasonable and related, we cannot conclude the same for the anger management requirement. “Noncompliance with requirements in a permanency plan that are neither reasonable nor related to remedying the conditions that led to the removal of the child from the parent’s custody is not substantial noncompliance for the purpose of Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(2).” In re Z.J.S., 2003 WL 21266854, at *12 (citing In re Valentine, 79 S.W.3d at 548-49).

A permanency-plan requirement is unreasonable if legal status makes compliance impossible, but requiring an undocumented parent to submit a transportation plan and proof of legal, verifiable income is reasonable.

In Re: Jose L. · filed 2016-10-31(g)(2)

While we agree that it would be unreasonable to impose permanency requirements that are impossible for an individual to perform based on his or her legal status, that is not the case here. The permanency plans in this case did not require Father to get a driver’s license, register a vehicle, or get automobile insurance. Rather, they required Father to develop and submit a transportation plan to DCS. Father’s ability to comply with that requirement was in no way affected by his legal status.

When the trial court omits a finding that permanency-plan requirements were reasonable and related to foster-care conditions, the appellate court reviews that issue de novo.

In Re Destiney J. · filed 2024-10-29(g)(2)

Here, the trial court made no findings regarding the reasonableness of Father’s responsibilities under the permanency plans. Thus, as Valentine instructs, our review of this issue is de novo.

A court-ordered, full-time rehabilitation program that severely limits a parent’s freedom is incarceration for selecting the four-month abandonment period.

In Re: Braxton R. · filed 2016-09-02(g)(1)

In similar situations, this Court has treated court-ordered, full-time rehabilitation programs as incarceration for the purposes of determining which four month period should be analyzed with respect to the ground of abandonment. See In re Destiny M., No. W2013-01802-COA-R3-PT, 2014 WL 712545 at *1 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 24, 2014) (“Consequently, Mother was incarcerated, either in jail or in court-ordered rehabilitation from July 7, 2012 through the date of the hearing, May 15, 2013); see also In re Kayden H., No. E2014-02360-COA-R3-PT, 2015 WL 3876365 at *5 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 23, 2015) (no perm. app. filed). We also conclude that Father was, in fact, incarcerated during the four months preceding the filing of the petition for termination and therefore look to whether Father willfully abandoned the Child during the four months prior to his incarceration.

When incarceration interrupts the relevant period, the court must aggregate the parent’s most recent nonincarceration periods rather than use the first consecutive four-month period before incarceration.

In Re Travis H. · filed 2017-05-05(g)(1)

Because this amendment was applicable at the time of the final hearing on this cause, we believe it should have been applied in this case. Accordingly, rather than look to the first consecutive four-month period in which Father was not incarcerated, the trial court was required to determine the four-month period by piecing together Father’s periods of non-incarceration prior to the filing of the termination petition. In failing to utilize this calculation, it therefore appears that the trial court utilized an inappropriate four-month period.

A supplemental petition adding incarcerated-parent wanton disregard based on incarceration occurring after the original petition does not relate back, so applicability is measured from the supplemental petition.

IN RE CHASE L. · filed 2018-06-29(g)(1)

Rule 15.03 therefore does not apply in this case where the condition precedent to the ground of wanton disregard alleged in DCS’s supplemental petition did not exist at the time of the filing of the initial petition. ... As such, we conclude that DCS’s supplemental petition alleging the ground of abandonment by wanton disregard does not relate back to the filing of the initial petition.

For an incarcerated parent whose nonincarceration intervals interrupt the usual lookback period, the court may aggregate those intervals to create the statutory four-month support period.

In Re Leilynn S. · filed 2021-03-16(g)(1)

In determining the relevant four-month period, the Trial Court aggregated Father’s nonincarceration time prior to the filing of the petition. ... The evidence presented does not preponderate against the Trial Court’s finding that Father had not financially supported the Child during the aggregated four-month period prior to the filing of the petition.

For an incarcerated parent, abandonment by failure to visit may be based on aggregated periods of non-incarceration immediately preceding incarceration.

In re Anna H. · filed 2021-06-09(g)(1)

Based on our foregoing discussion, we affirm the trial court’s conclusion that Mother abandoned the children under Tennessee Code Annotated sections 36-1- 102(1)(A)(iv) and -113(g)(1) by willfully failing to visit the children from September 24 to November 24, 2016, and from January 20 to March 20, 2017.

Using the wrong four-month abandonment period is harmless when the trial court's findings encompass the correct determinative period.

In Re Austin W. · filed 2021-11-03(g)(1)

However, a trial court’s identification of the wrong four-month period is not always reversible error. “[A] miscalculation of the relevant four-month period can be considered harmless when the trial court made sufficient findings of fact that encompassed the correct determinative period.”

A trial court's use of a slightly incorrect abandonment period may be harmless when its findings and the record contain enough evidence to evaluate the correct four-month period.

In Re Lauren F. · filed 2021-11-10(g)(1)

However, we have concluded that the trial court’s error in considering the incorrect ... period (which was a difference of only thirteen days) is harmless, because the record and the trial court’s findings of fact and conclusions of law contain sufficient evidence to examine whether Father visited and supported the child during the correct ... period.

For an incarcerated parent, failure to visit is measured over an aggregation of the first 120 days of nonincarceration immediately preceding the termination action.

In Re Bailey J. · filed 2021-11-30(g)(1)

Among other ways, an incarcerated parent abandons her child by failing to visit the child “during an aggregation of the first one hundred twenty (120) days of nonincarceration immediately preceding the filing of the action.”

The incarcerated-parent abandonment grounds do not apply unless the parent was incarcerated during the four months immediately preceding the termination petition.

In Re Jordyn H. · filed 2021-12-21(g)(1)

Because Mother was not incarcerated during the four months immediately preceding the filing of DCS’s petition, the ground of abandonment by wanton disregard is inapplicable; the Juvenile Court erred in finding it was proven by clear and convincing evidence.

Criminal conduct and drug abuse after a parent knows of the child’s existence may establish abandonment by wanton disregard.

In Re Madilyn B. · filed 2023-10-31(g)(1)

Under all of these circumstances, we conclude that there is clear and convincing evidence to support the trial court’s conclusion that Father engaged in wanton disregard for the child despite his knowledge of her existence prior to his current incarceration.

Wanton disregard has no fixed conduct window beyond the requirement that the conduct occur before, during, or after a qualifying incarceration with knowledge of the child's existence.

In Re Taiden B. · filed 2025-01-17(g)(1)

The relevant statutory language requires only that the parent’s conduct occurred “prior to, during, or after incarceration” and “exhibits a wanton disregard for the welfare of the child.” ... Therefore, the trial court was not required to name a specific time period for the conduct that exhibited a wanton disregard.

For an incarcerated parent of a child under four, the abandonment lookback aggregates the first ninety days of nonincarceration immediately before the termination petition.

In Re Lay'La R. · filed 2025-10-21(g)(1)

When DCS filed the petition to terminate Father’s parental rights on June 28, 2024, the Child was younger than four, and Father was incarcerated. As the trial court found, and the record supports, Father was incarcerated from April 1, 2024, through April 8, 2024, and again from May 2, 2024, through November 14, 2024. Accordingly, the relevant 90-day statutory time-period was from January 23, 2024, through March 31, 2024 (68 days) and April 9, 2024, through May 1, 2024 (22 days).

When an amended termination petition first alleges a separate and distinct abandonment ground whose facts did not exist when the original petition was filed, the statutory lookback period is calculated from the amended petition's filing date.

IN RE MICHAEL S. · filed 2026-05-28(g)(1)

Accordingly, the proper determinative period for calculating the ground of abandonment by failure to support was the three months prior to the filing of the Amended Termination Petition, or October 18, 2024 to January 17, 2025 (“Determinative Period”).

Failure to place a child with a relative is not a basis to reverse termination; less-drastic-placement arguments must be raised in dependency-and-neglect proceedings and are too late at the termination stage.

In re Alfonzo E. · filed 2016-10-26(c)

Moreover, the failure to place a child with a relative is not a basis for reversing a trial court‟s decision to terminate parental rights. ... By the time a court is considering whether to terminate a biological parent‟s rights, it is too late to bring a less drastic alternative before the court.