Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4-121

Section 36-4-121 requires an equitable division of marital property supported by the evidence.

Kelly v. Kelly · filed 1984-08-21

Based upon this record, we conclude that there is insufficient evidence to rebut the presumption of equal ownership of marital property and that the evidence preponderates against the manner in which the trial court divided the couple’s marital property. Therefore, the decision of the trial court with regard to the division of the marital property is vacated, and the case is remanded to the trial court for further consideration and entry of findings of fact and conclusions pursuant to Tenn.Code Ann. § 36-4-121.

Section 36-4-121 requires an equitable division of the entire marital estate, but each spouse need not receive an interest in every asset.

Thompson v. Thompson · filed 1990-10-01

While the courts must include all of the parties' marital property in the marital estate, they are not required to award both parties an interest in each piece of marital property. Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 36-4-121(a) and 36-4-121(f)(1) permit trial courts to divest and reinvest title to property and to make distributive awards in order to achieve equity. Thus, unless the facts require otherwise, the courts generally judge the fairness of a property division by its final results.

Section 36-4-121 calls for marital property to be valued and divided equitably under its criteria.

Tuttle v. Tuttle · filed 1995-12-01

On remand, the trial court should determine whether the parties accumulated any marital property during their marriage. If they did, the trial court should value it and then divide it in an equitable manner in accordance with the criteria for dividing marital property in Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4-121 (1996).

Section 36-4-121 allows a divorce court to exercise jurisdiction over marital real estate in another Tennessee county and over a creditor asserting a claim to that property.

Knobler v. Knobler · filed 1985-03-06

In summary, we hold that under the language of T.C.A. 36-4-121, the Court had authority to exercise personal jurisdiction over the Bank and subject-matter jurisdiction over the real estate located in Davidson County.

Section 36-4-121 requires courts to consider the overall fairness of a marital property division, including how an award of one asset affects the division of others.

James William Miller, Jr. v. Prentice-Miller · filed 1995-11-01(c)(6),(7)

If the agreement gave Mrs. Miller fifty percent of the benefits available to Mr. Miller at the date of the divorce, she would have had a larger asset on her side of the ledger, which should have been taken into account when the trial judge divided the rest of the marital property. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4-121(c)(6),(7). The acts of the trial judge in dealing with the individual items of property in a marital estate cannot be viewed in isolation.

Section 36-4-121(c) requires an equitable division of marital property, which need not be equal.

Word v. Word · filed 1996-08-19(c)

While the division of property does not appear to be equal, this observation begs the question. The test is whether the division is equitable, not whether it is equal.

Section 36-4-121(c) requires an equitable division of marital property, but it does not require an equal division or a share of every asset for each spouse.

Mayfield v. Mayfield · filed 1997-04-30(c)

Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4-121(c) requires an equitable rather than an equal division of marital property, Batson v. Batson, 769 S.W.2d 849, 859 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1988), and does not require that each party receive a share of each piece of marital property.

Section 36-4-121 provides the criteria for equitably dividing marital property after it is identified and valued.

Tuttle v. Tuttle · filed 1997-10-10

If they did, the trial court should value it and then divide it in an equitable manner in accordance with the criteria for dividing marital property in Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4-121 (1996).

Section 36-4-121 provides for division of marital property only.

Haren v. Haren · filed 1998-01-13

T.C.A. §36-4-121 provides only for the division of marital property.

Section 36-4-121 permits equal division of marital property when the relevant circumstances make that division equitable.

Susan Renee Wright Williamson v. Williamson · filed 1996-10-01(c)

Ta ki ng i nt o a c c ount r e l e va nt c i r c ums t na c e s s e t f or t h i n T. C. A. §36- 4- 121, C1- 10, we f i nd t ha t a s a ma t t e r of e q u i t y , t hi s ma r i t a l pr o pe r t y s houl d be e qua l l y di vi de d b e t we e n t he pa r t i e s .

Section 36-4-121(f)(1) permits a money award to effectuate an equitable division of marital property.

Loyd v. Loyd · filed 1993-03-24(f)(1)

We also find it necessary to make a distributive award of money to Wife to effectuate the distribution of the marital estate as provided in T.C.A. § 36-4 — 121(f)(1).

Section 36-4-121 requires an equitable distribution of the marital estate.

Smith v. Connie Sue Argo Smith · filed 1996-10-04

This court is satisfied that the distribution of marital estate to the wife was equitable as required by T.C.A. § 36-4-121.

Section 36-4-121(a)(1) permits a court to equitably divide marital property in a separate maintenance action.

Flanagan v. Flanagan · filed 1997-06-30(a)(1)

Turning our attention to the division of property, we note that the applicable statute permits a court to divide marital property in a case of separate maintenance: ... T.C.A. § 36-4-121(a)(1). ... We find that the trial court’s division of property in this case was equitable and otherwise appropriate.

Section 36-4-121(c) governs equitable division of marital property; appellate courts ordinarily defer to a trial court’s division if it is consistent with the section and supported by the evidence.

Curtis v. Curtis · filed 1997-07-16(c)

Accordingly, appellate courts ordinarily defer to the trial court’s decisions in these matters unless they are inconsistent with Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4-121(c) or are unsupported by a preponderance of the evidence.

Section 36-4-121 permits an equitable division of marital property without requiring equal shares.

Judith Ann Warren Taylor v. Taylor · filed 1998-06-08

Our courts have clearly stated that Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4-121 (1996), the statute which authorizes the division of marital assets, does not require the division of property to be equal in order to be equitable.

Section 36-4-121(c) requires an equitable distribution of marital assets based on its listed factors.

Johnson v. Johnson · filed 1998-09-30(c)

T.C.A. § 36-4-121(c) requires an equitable distribution of the marital assets, according to the factors identified therein.

Section 36-4-121 requires an equitable division of marital property, taking marital debts into account when assessing the parties’ net assets.

Robertson v. Lori Vanhooser Robertson - Concurring · filed 1998-11-09(a)(1)

A trial court’s task is to divide marital property in an equitable fashion, see T.C.A. § 36-4-121(a)(1), giving due regard to the factors set forth at T.C.A. § 36-4-121(c). ... The real issue is whether the trial court equitably divided the net assets of the parties, i.e., marital assets less marital debts. It is abundantly clear that the division of the net assets is fair and equitable to Wife.

Section 36-4-121(c) calls for an equitable division of marital property based on relevant factors; the division need not be exactly equal.

McManamay v. McManamay · filed 1998-11-09(c)

Exact equality of division of the marital estate is not required. Bookout v. Bookout, Tenn. App. 1997, 954 S.W.1997. See also, T.C.A. § 36-4-121(c).

Section 36-4-121 gives trial courts broad discretion to divide marital property equitably without regard to marital fault.

Vatter v. Vatter · filed 1998-12-28

Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-4-121 grants the trial court the power to “equitably divide, distribute or assign the marital property between the parties without regard to marital fault in proportions as the court deems just.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4-121 (1996). ... While the trial court awarded considerably less permanent alimony than requeasted by Wife, in reviewing the overall division of marital property, we cannot say that the evidence preponderates against the trial court’s decision on the Partnership interest.

Section 36-4-121 requires an equitable division of the marital estate as a whole; an award from one asset is assessed in light of the overall distribution.

McCormick v. McCormick · filed 1999-02-01(a)

Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4-121(a) provides that marital property should be divided equitably without regard to fault. ... What the trial court did was to take into account the overall property settlement in dividing the property and in awarding Wife the $76,000 as it was required to do.

Section 36-4-121(a) requires the overall division of marital property to be equitable to both spouses.

Brown v. Brown · filed 1999-02-25(a)

T.C.A. § 36-4-121(a) mandates an equitable division of marital property. ... Rather, the law requires only that the overall division of all marital property be equitable to both parties.

Section 36-4-121(c) calls for equitable division of the marital estate as a whole, rather than an equal division of each asset.

Winfree v. Winfree · filed 1999-05-21(c)

She makes an error common to many divorce litigants by treating each asset individually when we are concerned with the equitable division of the overall marital estate. Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4-121(c).

Section 36-4-121(c) requires courts to consider relevant factors, including earning capacity and homemaking contributions, when equitably dividing marital property.

Oaks v. Oaks · filed 1999-09-22(c)

Given the length of the marriage, Ms. Oaks’s lower earning capacity, her contributions as a homemaker, and her inability to vest in a retirement system due to the couple’s moves, we find that the court erred in not dividing the pensions.

Section 36-4-121(c) directs trial courts to consider its listed factors when dividing marital property.

Eldridge v. Eldridge · filed 1999-09-29(c)

Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-4-121(c) directs the trial court to consider the following factors: ... Based on the statement of evidence and the record in this cause, we find that the evidence does not preponderate against the trial court’s overall division of marital property.

Section 36-4-121(c) requires courts to consider all relevant factors when dividing marital property.

Katheryn Griffin v. Griffin · filed 1999-10-30(c)

When dividing marital property upon divorce, the trial court must consider all relevant factors, including those set forth in section 36-4-121 of the Tennessee Code Annotated. ... After reviewing the entire record in the case at bar, we conclude that the evidence does not preponderate against the trial court’s distribution of the parties’ marital property.

Section 36-4-121(a) requires an equitable division of the marital estate without regard to fault.

Crumbley v. Crumbley · filed 1999-11-10(a)

Our divorce statutes require an equitable division of the marital estate without regard to fault. Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4-121(a).

Courts must consider the factors in subsection (c) when equitably dividing marital property.

Kincaid v. Kincaid · filed 1999-12-30(c)

When dividing marital property upon divorce, the trial court must consider all relevant factors, including those set forth in section 36-4-121 of the Tennessee Code Annotated. ... Upon consideration of the factors listed in section 36-4-121(c), we cannot agree.

An equitable division of marital property need not be equal; the court weighs the relevant factors in light of the parties’ circumstances.

Byrne v. Byrne · filed 2000-03-31(c)

From our review of the record, we find that the evidence does not preponderate against the trial court’s finding as to the division of marital property and debt. The trial court reached an equitable division of property with approximately 53% of the assets awarded to Wife and approximately 47% awarded to Husband. Further, the trial court ordered Wife responsible for $36,684.44 and Husband responsible for $37,944.81 of the marital debt. Given the fact that Husband’s income is $71,400.00 per year and Wife’s income is $26,728.00, we think the division is more than equitable.

Section 36-4-121 permits a range of equitable divisions of marital property within the trial court’s discretion.

Bunch v. Bunch · filed 1999-03-24(a)

In most cases, there is a range of equitable alternatives, any one of which would satisfy the prescriptions of T.C.A. § 36-4-121. It is only when the trial court strays from this range of permissible options that an appellate court is authorized to interfere with the discretionary role of the lower court.

Subsection (c)'s factors guide equitable distribution, and an unequal division can be equitable even when an equal division would also be appropriate.

Creswell v. Creswell · filed 1999-05-21(c)

In viewing the evidence and the factors set forth in T.C.A. §36-4-121(c), the factors a re either irreleva nt or ten d to fav or a nea r equal d ivision o f the m arital esta te. While an equal division of the marital estate could have been appropriate in this case, we hold the division reached by the Trial Court is an equitable distribution.

Section 36-4-121(c) requires courts to consider the applicable factors when dividing marital property equitably.

Phillips v. Phillips · filed 2000-07-27(c)

After considering the factors set forth in section 36-4- 121(c) that are applicable to the case at bar, we agree with Husband that the court’s division of the parties’ marital property is inequitable.

Section 36-4-121(c) guides courts to divide marital property equitably after considering its factors; an equitable division need not be equal.

Hunt v. Hunt · filed 2000-07-27(c)

Dividing a marital estate is not a mechanical process but, rather, is guided by considering the factors in Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4-121(c) (1996). The goal is to divide the marital property in an essentially equitable manner.

Section 36-4-121(c) permits an unequal division of marital property when the spouses’ contributions and relative ability to acquire future assets support it.

Bloom v. Bloom · filed 2000-09-14(c)

Guidelines for the equitable division of marital property are set forth in Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4-121 (c) (1996). ... Under these circumstances, we find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s division of the marital estate, including the award of the marital home to Wife.

Section 36-4-121(c) requires courts to consider all relevant factors when equitably dividing marital property.

Record v. Record · filed 2000-10-10(c)

The trial court’s division of marital assets adequately takes into consideration the factors listed in T.C.A. § 36-4-121 ( c) and appears to be an equitable division of assets in this case. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s division of marital assets.

In dividing marital property, a court may consider a spouse's separate property without requiring its immediate use to pay the other spouse's share.

Taylor v. Taylor · filed 2000-11-17(c)(5)

It is true that when dividing assets and liabilities, courts may consider a spouse's separate property. We find, however, that due to Wife's financial needs and circumstances, the Trial Court committed no error in not requiring Wife's inheritance be used to pay Husband immediately. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4-121 (c)(5).

A relatively short marriage may support an equitable division of marital property that accounts for the parties’ circumstances.

Hunter v. Hunter · filed 2000-11-30(a)(1)

We do not find that the evidence preponderates against the trial court’s division of the marital estate. Given the relatively short duration of the marriage, we find the division to be equitable.

Section 36-4-121 requires an equitable division of marital property based on statutory factors, but does not require an equal division.

Fontenot v. Fontenot · filed 2000-12-13

Additionally, Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4-121 does not mandate an equal division of the marital estate but requires an equitable division considering the factors in the statute.

An equitable division of marital property need not be equal.

Muirhead v. Muirhead · filed 2001-01-22

The trial court’s division need not be equal to be equitable.

Section 36-4-121(c) permits an equitable division of marital property without requiring every asset to be split equally.

Glenna Fink v. Fink · filed 2001-03-19(c)

The factors to be considered by a trial court in making an “equitable” distribution of property are set forth in Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4-121(c), many of which were explicitly relied upon by the Trial Court in its award discussed above. ... In our opinion, the Trial Court equitably divided the marital property, even if each particular asset was not divided exactly on a 50/50 basis.

Section 36-4-121(a) requires an essentially equitable division of the marital estate, which need not be precisely equal.

Robertson v. Robertson · filed 2001-05-02(a)

Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4-121(a) (Supp. 2000) directs the courts to divide the parties’ marital estate in an essentially equitable manner. ... We find that this division is essentially equitable in light of the facts of this case.

Section 36-4-121(c) calls for an equitable division of marital property based on factors including the parties’ health, employability, and homemaker contributions; the division need not be equal.

Paul v. Paul · filed 2001-05-10(c)

The many factors to be considered by a trial court in making an “equitable” distribution of property are set forth in Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4-121(c), and include age, physical and mental health, employability, the contribution of a party to the marriage as homemaker, etc. ... In our opinion, the Trial Court equitably divided the marital property, even if each particular asset was not divided exactly on a 50/50 basis or the overall distribution was not 50/50.

Section 36-4-121(c) requires courts to consider the relevant statutory factors when equitably dividing marital property, including the parties’ contributions and separate assets.

Clayton v. Clayton · filed 2001-05-30(c)

Such a division is to be effected upon consideration of the statutory factors found in T.C.A. § 36-4-121(c). ... Given the current state of the parties’ respective financial conditions and their contributions during the marriage, the evidence does not preponderate against the trial court’s division of the marital estate.

Section 36-4-121(a)(1) requires an equitable division of marital property in proportions the court deems just.

Vincent v. Vincent · filed 2001-08-30(a)(1)

On the issue of property settlement, Tenn. Code Ann. §36-4-121(a)(1) instructs that the trial court is to “equitably divide” the parties’ marital property “in proportions as the court deems just.” ... We conclude from all of the evidence and circumstances, that the property division was equitable.

Section 36-4-121(c) sets out factors for equitable distribution of marital property; an equitable division need not be mathematically equal.

Cantrell v. James Michael Cantrell, Jr. · filed 2001-10-16(c)

With regard to the Trial Court’s division of the marital assets, the many factors to be considered by a court in making an equitable distribution of property are set forth in Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4-121(c), and include age, physical and mental health, employability, the contribution of a party to the marriage as homemaker, tax consequences, etc. ... When the proper value assigned to these assets by the Trial Court is considered, we cannot conclude that the division of marital assets was inequitable.

Section 36-4-121(c) requires an equitable division based on the relevant statutory factors, but a spouse’s contribution of inherited property does not require a dollar-for-dollar award.

Mays v. Mays · filed 2001-11-27(c)

While the amount Mr. Mays received was not in exact accordance with the amount of the inherited property that he contributed to the marital property, Mr. Mays is only entitled to an equitable distribution of the marital property based upon the factors provided by the General Assembly. In this case, the trial court’s division of the marital property was equitable.

Section 36-4-121(c) guides a trial court’s equitable division of marital property while allowing it wide latitude.

Stubblefield v. Stubblefield · filed 2001-12-10(c)

Trial courts have wide latitude to adjust and adjudicate an equitable division of marital property, guided by the factors in Tenn. Code Ann. §36-4-121(c). ... We find no abuse of discretion in the Trial Court’s Judgment in its balancing of the equities between the parties.

Section 36-4-121(a)(1) directs courts to divide marital property equitably, in proportions they deem just, after classifying the parties’ property.

Thomas v. Thomas · filed 2001-12-11(a)(1)

After classification of the parties’ property as either marital or separate, the trial court is charged with equitably dividing, distributing, or assigning the marital property in “proportions as the court deems just.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4-121(a)(1).

Section 36-4-121(c) requires courts to consider statutory factors when equitably dividing marital property; the division need not be equal.

Teague v. Teague · filed 2002-02-11(c)

Such a division is to be effected upon consideration of the statutory factors found in T.C.A. § 36-4-121(c) (2001). ... We find that the evidence does not preponderate against this distribution.

Section 36-4-121(c) requires courts to consider the listed factors when dividing marital property; an equal division is permissible when equitable.

Noe v. Melissa Noe (Barnes) · filed 2002-02-14(c)

After careful examination of the record in this case, we cannot find that the evidence preponderates against the trial court’s division of the marital property or that it was inequitable in light of the relevant factors contained in Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-4-121(c).

Section 36-4-121(c) guides the division of marital property through statutory factors, and appellate courts ordinarily defer to a division consistent with those factors and supported by the evidence.

Dawn Larsen Niceley v. James Jacob Niceley, IV · filed 2002-03-21(c)

Appellate courts ordinarily defer to the trial judge’s decision unless it is inconsistent with the factors in Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4-121(c), or is not supported by a preponderance of the evidence.

Section 36-4-121 requires an equitable division of marital property, which need not be equal.

Robertson v. Robertson · filed 2002-04-04(a)(1)

Section 36-4-121 of the Tennessee Code Annotated does not require an equal division of marital property but an equitable division.

Section 36-4-121(c) requires an equitable division of marital property after consideration of all relevant factors; an equitable division need not be equal.

Melody Knowles v. Knowles · filed 2002-04-19(c)

Guidelines for the equitable division of marital property are set forth in T.C.A. § 36-4-121(c) (2001). ... Considering the record as a whole, we find this to be an inequitable division of martial property, and the final decree should be modified accordingly by reversing that part of the decree awarding alimony in solido of $4,000.00.

Section 36-4-121(c) requires courts to consider relevant factors when dividing marital property equitably; a lengthy separation does not shorten the duration of the marriage.

Alford v. Alford · filed 2002-06-27(c)

Based upon this analysis, we cannot say that the trial court’s equal division of marital property in this case is unsupported by the preponderance of the evidence, and we accordingly find no error in said division.

Section 36-4-121(c) guides equitable division of marital property through statutory factors.

Bolin v. Bolin · filed 2002-08-13(c)

After a thorough review of the record in light of the statutory factors listed in section 36-4- 121(c) of the Tennessee Code, we do not find that the evidence preponderates against the trial court’s distribution of the parties’ marital property.

Section 36-4-121 permits an unequal division of marital property when statutory factors such as the length of the marriage, homemaker contributions, and earning capacity support it.

Burdett v. Burdett · filed 2002-08-20

The Court identified and applied the pertinent statutory factors, the length of the marriage, the wife’s contribution as a homemaker and parent, and her absence from the workforce for many years.

Section 36-4-121(c) requires courts to consider its listed factors when equitably dividing marital property.

Sullivan v. Sullivan · filed 2002-09-05(c)

Upon review of the record, and in consideration of the foregoing statutory provisions, this Court is satisfied with the division of marital property in this case. We accordingly affirm on this issue.

Section 36-4-121(a)(1) bars a court from considering marital fault when dividing marital property.

Smith v. Riley Smith · filed 2002-11-20(a)(1)

Because we find that the trial court’s division of the phantom stock was based upon consideration of Mr. Smith’s marital fault, and that such consideration was in direct violation of T.C.A. § 36-4-121 (a)(1), we must hold that the division constitutes an abuse of discretion.

Section 36-4-121(c) permits a trial court to divide marital property equitably in the exercise of its discretion.

Seals v. Seals · filed 2002-11-26(c)

We defer to the Trial Court’s discretion on this issue and hold its division of marital property was not inconsistent with Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4-121(c) and was an equitable distribution.

Section 36-4-121(c) permits an unequal division of marital property when the statutory factors support a just and equitable result.

Dube v. Dube · filed 2002-12-09(c)

With regard to the Trial Court’s division of the marital assets, the many factors to be considered by a trial court in making an equitable distribution of property are set forth in Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4-121(c), and include age, physical and mental health, employability, the contribution of a party to the marriage as homemaker, tax consequences, etc. ... While the division of the assets certainly was not equal, this does not mean it is inequitable. From the record before us, we cannot conclude the Trial Court abused its discretion when it divided the marital property or that this division was not just and equitable.

Section 36-4-121(c) requires courts to consider all relevant factors when dividing marital property equitably; an equitable division need not be equal.

Saccomanno v. Saccomanno · filed 2003-04-24(c)

Guidelines for the equitable division of marital property are set forth in T.C.A. § 36-4-121(c)(Supp. 2001). ... From our review of the entire record in this case, we find that the evidence does not preponderate against the trial court’s findings nor does the evidence indicate that the trial court abused its discretion in making a division of the marital property.

Section 36-4-121(a)(1) requires courts to divide marital property equitably after classifying the parties’ property.

Edmisten v. Edmisten · filed 2003-05-13(a)(1)

After classification of the parties’ property as either marital or separate, the trial court is charged with equitably dividing, distributing, or assigning the marital property in “proportions as the court deems just.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4-121(a)(1). ... We affirm the trial court’s division of marital property.

Section 36-4-121(c) directs courts to consider all relevant factors when dividing marital property equitably; an equitable division need not be equal.

Sheila Kay Brown Jones v. Jones · filed 2003-12-29(c)

Thus, an equitable division of marital property need not be an equal division of the property. Id. ... Guidelines for the equitable division of marital property are set forth in T.C.A. § 36-4-121(c)(Supp. 2003). ... From our review of the entire record in this case, we find that the evidence does not preponderate against the trial court’s findings nor does the evidence indicate that the trial court abused its discretion in making a division of the marital property.

Section 36-4-121(c) requires an equitable division of marital property, but the division need not be precisely equal.

Cox v. Cox · filed 2004-05-05(c)

Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4-121 governs the division and distribution of marital property. ... An equitable division of marital assets is not necessarily an equal one. ... Finding that the trial court’s distribution of assets and liabilities is supported by the evidence and that the trial court properly applied the statutory requirements, we affirm the trial court on this issue.

Section 36-4-121(c)(6) allows a court to consider a spouse’s separate property when dividing marital property, but separate property itself is not subject to division.

Whitley v. Whitley · filed 2004-06-14(c)(6)

Although it is appropriate for a trial court to consider the value of a party’s separate property in its division of the marital estate, see Tenn. Code. Ann. § 36-4-121(c)(6) (Supp. 2002), we find the manner in which the trial court included the total value of Husband’s separate property in its computation and division of the marital property to be error in this case. Husband’s separate property was not part of the marital estate and, therefore, was not subject to division.

Section 36-4-121(c) directs courts to consider the listed factors when dividing marital property equitably, including how to allocate marital debt.

Evans v. Evans · filed 2004-07-06(c)

We therefore modify the marital property division and place the liability of the mortgage solely with Appellee.

Section 36-4-121(c) requires courts to consider all relevant factors when dividing marital property equitably.

James R. Morrissett, Jr. v. Robbie Claire McKee Morrissett · filed 2004-07-23(c)

In dividing the marital property, the trial court must consider the factors set forth in Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-4-121(c): ... Based on the preponderance of the evidence submitted at trial, we find that the trial court did not err in its assignment of marital property and debt in this case.

Section 36-4-121(c) requires courts to consider all relevant factors when equitably dividing marital property.

Upright v. Upright · filed 2004-07-27(c)

Under the particular circumstances of this case, and in consideration of the factors prescribed in T.C.A. § 36-4-121©), we find the trial court’s division of marital property to be equitable.

Section 36-4-121(c) requires courts to consider its statutory factors when distributing marital property equitably; the division need not be mathematically equal.

Rogers v. Rogers · filed 2003-05-13(c)

Tenn. Code Ann. §36- 4-121(c) lists the statutory factors which must be considered. The trial court should make a distribution which is equitable, but it does not have to be mathematically equal. ... In this case, we find that the Trial Court made an equitable distribution of the marital assets, and the evidence does not preponderate against his determination.

Section 36-4-121(c) requires courts dividing marital property to consider each party’s contributions, employment, age, ability to replace assets, and separate estate.

Hydas v. Hydas · filed 2003-08-22(c)

The Trial Court properly considered all of the statutory factors, including the factor dealing with each party’s contribution to the marital estate. Pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. §36- 4-121(c), the trial court is required to consider any contributions by the parties, as well as other factors including their employment, age, ability to replace assets, value of separate estates of each, etc. ... On the evidence before us, the Trial Court’s division of marital property was equitable, and we affirm his Judgment.

Section 36-4-121(c) requires courts to consider relevant factors when dividing marital property; an unequal division may still be equitable.

Glanzman v. Glanzman · filed 2004-12-02(c)

Although Wife received the marital residence and many items of personal property, we cannot conclude that the trial court’s division of property was inequitable without evidence of the value of the personal property.

Section 36-4-121(c) requires courts to consider relevant factors, including the length of the marriage, when dividing marital property equitably.

Deborah B. Hall Byrd v. Byrd · filed 2004-12-21(c)

However, in reviewing the division of marital property and debt in the context of the relevant factors here and especially in light of the very short duration of this marriage, we find that the trial court’s holding results in an equitable division with the parties being closely restored to their pre-marital status.

Section 36-4-121 permits an unequal division of marital property when equitable, and trial courts have substantial discretion in making that division.

Patsy Hill Oakley v. Oakley · filed 2005-05-03(c)(11)

As noted above, the trial court is afforded substantial discretion in the division of marital assets pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-4-121(c)11, and the decision of the trial court is given great weight on appeal. Ford v. Ford, 952 S.W.2d 824, 825 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1996). After a careful review of the record, we cannot conclude that the division of marital assets in the trial court’s ruling on remand constitutes an abuse of discretion. Therefore, it must be affirmed.

Section 36-4-121(c) requires courts to consider all relevant factors, including each spouse’s contributions, when equitably dividing marital property; the division need not be equal.

Conley v. Conley · filed 2005-05-09(c)

Under the facts of the present case, while it is clear that “[t]he division of the estate is not rendered inequitable simply because it is not mathematically equal,” King v. King, 986 S.W.2d 216, 219 (Tenn. Ct. App.1998), we are of the opinion that a division somewhat closer to equality more appropriately and equitably takes into consideration Wife’s significant contributions to the marriage, including the fact that she was the sole wage-earner for nearly the entire marriage.

Section 36-4-121(c) requires courts to consider all relevant factors when equitably dividing marital property; a credit for payments on the marital home may be equitable in light of the overall distribution.

Kwasnik v. Susan Marie Gillman Kwasnik · filed 2005-07-08(c)

Guidelines for the equitable division of marital property are set forth in T.C.A. § 36-4- 121(c)(Supp.2004). ... From our review of the entire record, it appears that the trial court did make an equitable division of marital property. In light of the overall distribution of marital property in this case, the $500 “credit” awarded to Mr. Kwasnik is equitable.

Section 36-4-121(a)(1) calls for an equitable division of marital property without considering marital fault.

Woods v. Woods · filed 2005-07-12(a)(1)

We have determined, based on our evaluation of the evidence in light of the factors in Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4-121(c) and the admonition in Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4-121(a)(1) against considering fault when dividing a marital estate, that a more equitable division of the marital estate is in order.

Section 36-4-121(c) requires an equitable property division that considers the spouses’ earning capacities and economic circumstances; the division need not be equal.

Gordon E. Morrow, Jr. v. Tammy Lynn (Pugh) Morrow · filed 2005-07-14(c)

The court is charged with making an equitable division of marital property in divorce cases, without regard to fault and in accordance with the factors set out in Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4-121(c). ... In view of the Tennessee Supreme Court’s directive in Robertson, we conclude that the legislative policies are best furthered in this case by modifying the trial court’s property division to eliminate the $66,056 payment to Mr. Morrow.

Section 36-4-121(c) requires an equitable division of marital property, which need not be equal.

Ferrell v. Ferrell · filed 2005-07-22(c)

He claims the trial court erred because it did not make an "equal" division of the marital property; however, Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4-121(c) does not require an equal division, it requires an equitable division of marital property.

A spouse’s life estate in the marital home may make a property division inequitable when it significantly diminishes the other spouse’s interest in the home.

Christenberry v. Christenberry · filed 2005-08-19(c)

We find that the evidence presented at trial preponderates against the award of the life estate to Husband because it does not yield an equitable division of property. The marital residence appears to be the most valuable asset awarded to Wife. Its value is diminished significantly by the imposition of a life estate interest in Husband’s favor, which renders the home non-transferable without Husband’s consent. Removing the Husband’s life estate from the marital residence results in Wife having sole ownership of the property and this creates an equitable distribution of the marital assets.

Section 36-4-121 authorizes a trial court to divide marital property.

Ouyang v. Chen · filed 2005-08-26

A trial court is granted the authority to divide marital property under section 36-4-121 of the Tennessee Code Annotate. T.C.A. § 36-4-121 (2000). As noted above, the trial court’s division of marital property will be given great weight on appeal. After reviewing the record, we find no error in the trial court’s division of marital property and therefore affirm on this issue.

Section 36-4-121(c) directs courts to consider relevant factors when equitably dividing marital property, including appreciation in a marital residence.

Conn v. Conn · filed 2005-09-08(c)

From the record as a whole, and in light of the factors found at T.C.A. § 36-4-121(c) and set out above, we cannot say that the trial court erred in its calculation of the values of the Residence (both at the beginning of the marriage and at the time of the divorce), in its calculation of the appreciation in the Residence, or in its equally dividing the amount of appreciation between these parties.

Section 36-4-121(c) guides the equitable division of marital property through its listed factors, including the spouses’ financial contributions.

Davidson v. Davidson · filed 2005-10-31(c)

Based on the factors in Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4-121(c), we have determined that awarding Ms. Davidson approximately twenty percent of the net marital estate is not equitable.

Section 36-4-121(c)’s factors guide the division of marital property, and an equal division may stand within the trial court’s discretion even when a greater award to one spouse would also be reasonable.

Deane Elizabeth Church v. Thomas Neal Church · filed 2005-12-09(c)

Based on the statutory factors, Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4-121(c), we would have approved a greater award of the marital estate to the wife, but since trial courts have wide discretion in the manner in which marital property is divided, we defer to the Trial Court’s division. The evidence does not preponderate against an equal division, especially in light of the fact that the wife was given periodic alimony and the husband was onerated with a greater amount of the parties’ debt. The husband was also required to pay the wife’s health insurance, expenses, and attorney’s fees. We affirm the Trial Court’s Judgment on the issue of the property division.

Section 36-4-121(c) directs courts to consider statutory factors when dividing marital property; an unequal division can be equitable.

Brown v. Brown · filed 2005-12-14(c)

We defer to the Trial Court’s division of marital property unless it is inconsistent with the statutory factors set forth in Tenn. Code Ann. §36-4-121(c), or is not supported by the evidence. Kinard v. Kinard, 986 S.W.2d 220 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1998). We conclude the Trial Court made an equitable division of the parties’ marital property.

Section 36-4-121(c) guides the equitable division of marital property through statutory factors, including the parties’ dissipation of assets and debts.

Cantrell v. Cantrell · filed 2006-01-27(c)

Dividing a marital estate is not a mechanical process but rather is guided by considering the factors in Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4-121(c) (2005). ... In light of evidence in the record that both parties dissipated the martial assets and in light of their substantial debts, we have concluded that the trial court did not err in the way in which it divided the parties’ marital estate.

Section 36-4-121(c) gives trial courts wide latitude in equitably dividing marital property, with appellate courts generally deferring unless the division conflicts with the statutory factors or lacks evidentiary support.

Dunn v. Dunn · filed 2006-06-08(c)

Trial courts are given wide latitude in equitably dividing marital property and appellate courts will ordinarily defer to the trial court’s decision unless it is inconsistent with the statutory factors or not supported by a preponderance of the evidence.

Section 36-4-121(c) requires an equitable division of marital property based on the relevant statutory factors; the division need not be equal, and the court may give greater weight to factors particularly relevant to the case.

Dalton v. Linda Jane Faasen Dalton · filed 2006-12-28(c)

Even though the trial court did not specifically address each statutory factor in its final order, we believe the court considered the factors and weighed the most relevant ones in making its decision.

Section 36-4-121(c) directs courts to consider relevant factors when equitably dividing marital property; an equitable division need not be equal.

Marcrum v. Thomas T. Marcrum, Sr. · filed 2007-01-04(c)

Appellate courts ordinarily defer to the trial court’s decision unless it is inconsistent with the factors in Tenn. Code Ann. §36-4-121(c) or is not supported by a preponderance of the evidence.

Section 36-4-121(c) requires courts to consider the relevant statutory factors when dividing marital property equitably.

Jackson v. Jackson · filed 2007-02-22(c)

In reviewing the trial court’s decision on this issue, we are mindful that the division of marital property is not a mechanical process, but rather requires careful consideration of all the relevant statutory factors in Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-4-121(c).5 ... Accordingly, we find no error in the trial court’s division of the marital property and its allocation of the marital debt.

Section 36-4-121’s equitable distribution factors govern property division when the parties’ marriage is valid.

Terrie Lynn Hall Hankins v. Hankins · filed 2007-08-20

Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the trial court as to division of property,2 and we remand to the trial court for further proceedings as to the parties’ respective claims for divorce, to the extent necessary, as well as further proceedings regarding distribution of the parties’ property according to martial property equitable distribution principles, utilizing the factors set forth at Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4-121.

Section 36-4-121(c) requires courts dividing marital property to consider each spouse’s contributions or dissipation, economic circumstances, and available Social Security benefits.

Linda Mae (Edwards) Maloy v. Maloy · filed 2008-01-31(c)

In making an equitable division of property, the trial court is required to consider factors such as the contribution each party made to the acquisition or dissipation of marital property, the economic circumstances of each party at the time of the division of property, and the amount of Social Security benefits available to each spouse. T.C.A. § 36-4-121(c)(5), (8), (10) (2005).

Section 36-4-121 requires an equitable division of marital property after the court classifies property as marital or separate.

Slaugher v. Henry Slaughter, Jr. · filed 2008-05-08(c)

After classifying property as separate or marital, the trial court must divide the marital property equitably between the parties in consideration of the statutory provisions provided at Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-4-121.

Section 36-4-121(c) requires courts to consider relevant factors when dividing marital property equitably, including each spouse’s contribution to acquiring it.

Edwards v. Ronald Dell Edwards · filed 2008-08-08(c)

After a careful and thorough review of the record in light of the statutory factors, we are unable to conclude that the Trial Court abused its discretion when distributing the marital property. ... As the evidence does not preponderate against the Trial Court’s findings relative to this issue, and as we find no abuse of discretion, we affirm the Trial Court’s distribution of the marital property.

Section 36-4-121(c) requires courts to consider relevant factors, including each spouse’s contributions, when dividing marital property equitably.

Patsy Wicks Dawson v. Dawson · filed 2008-09-05(c)

We hold that given the evidence and the circumstances of this case in light of the relevant statutory factors, an equitable division of the marital estate would be 60% to Husband and 40% to Wife.

Section 36-4-121(c) requires courts to weigh the relevant factors when dividing marital property equitably.

Joyann E. Butler v. Butler · filed 2008-12-23(c)

Considering the short duration of the marriage, the contribution that each of the parties made to the Tracy Road property and Butler Outdoor Services, and the value of each party’s separate property, we find that the distribution of marital property awarded by the trial court weighs heavily in favor of the husband. After reviewing this record we have determined that awarding wife the entire amount of the $7,500.00 escrow account and the $5,000.00 awarded to Husband for the appreciation in Wife’s separate property results in a more equitable distribution.

Section 36-4-121(c) supplies the factors courts use to divide marital property equitably.

Neamtu v. Neamtu · filed 2009-01-21(c)

Having examined the record, we find the trial court’s division of the marital property is consistent with the factors set forth in Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4-121(c) and is supported by a preponderance of the evidence.

Section 36-4-121(c) permits a disproportionate division of marital property when the statutory factors and overall equities support it.

Farnham v. Farnham · filed 2009-09-16(c)

In our view, the overall equities between the parties supports a disproportionate award of the marital property to Wife. In short, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in its division of the marital property.

Section 36-4-121(a)(1) requires an equitable division of marital property, but the division need not be equal.

Gonsewski v. Gonsewski · filed 2010-02-17(a)(1)

A division of marital property in an equitable manner does not require that the property be divided equally.

Section 36-4-121(c) guides equitable division of marital property through consideration of the relevant statutory factors, including each party’s contribution to the property.

Warren v. Warren · filed 2010-03-03(c)

Rather, the division of a marital estate is guided by consideration of the factors of Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4-121(c). ... Our consideration of the overall property division, guided by a consideration of the facts of this case in light of the relevant statutory factors, leads us to conclude that the trial court achieved its goal.

Section 36-4-121(c) permits a roughly equal division of net marital property when both spouses contributed to acquiring and preserving the assets.

Deborah Southern Antrican v. Antrican · filed 2010-03-22(c)

Both parties are receiving a substantially similar amount of net assets. In short, when considering the relevant factors set forth in Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4-121(c), we cannot conclude that the marital property distribution was inequitable, and we affirm that judgment with the sole modification as to the amount Wife is to receive as her share of the net farm income for 2005 - 2007.

Section 36-4-121(a)(1) requires a court to classify and value the parties’ assets before dividing the marital estate equitably.

Terrie Lynn Hall Hankins v. Hankins · filed 2010-03-26(a)(1)

After classifying and valuing the parties’ assets, the trial court must divide the marital estate equitably. Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4-121(a)(1); Batson v. Batson, 769 S.W.2d 849, 859 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1988). ... We find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s division of property. We accordingly affirm the trial court’s judgment on this issue.

Section 36-4-121(c) calls for an equitable division of the marital estate based on non-exclusive factors; the division need not be precisely equal.

Burris v. Burris · filed 2010-04-07(c)

Dividing a marital estate is not a mechanical process; the goal is to fashion an equitable division considering the non-exclusive factors set forth in Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-4-121(c).

Section 36-4-121(c) guides equitable division of marital property through listed factors and does not require an equal split.

Keyt v. Keyt · filed 2010-05-14(c)

After considering the relevant statutory factors and the evidence in the record, we have determined that the trial court’s division of the marital estate is not inconsistent with the factors in Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4-121(c) and that the evidence does not preponderate against the trial court’s division of the marital estate. Accordingly, the division of the marital estate is affirmed.

Section 36-4-121(c) permits an unequal division of marital property when its factors weigh more heavily in one spouse’s favor.

McKee v. McKee · filed 2010-08-17(c)

An equal division of marital property is appropriate when an evaluation of the factors in Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4-121(c) show that the parties are approximately equally situated. In this instance, it is difficult to imagine a marriage where the statutory factors weighed more heavily on one side.

Section 36-4-121(c) requires courts to consider the statutory factors when dividing marital property, and those factors may support awarding one spouse more than half the marital estate.

Hubbard v. Hubbard · filed 2010-09-28(c)

Almost every factor in Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4-121(c) heavily favors Wife. The marriage was of long duration, Husband is more employable and has a far greater earning capacity while Wife has unmet financial needs.

Section 36-4-121(c) guides the equitable division of marital property through statutory factors; an equitable division need not be equal.

Head v. Head · filed 2010-09-30(c)

Thus, we defer to the trial court’s division of the marital estate unless it is inconsistent with the factors in Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4-121(c) or is not supported by a preponderance of the evidence. ... Considering the relevant factors as the trial court obviously did, we find that the trial court’s division of the marital estate is consistent with the statutory factors and is supported by the evidence.

Section 36-4-121 requires an equitable division of marital property to consider the marriage’s duration, each spouse’s separate property, and each spouse’s estate at the time of marriage.

James v. James · filed 2010-10-25(c)

An equitable division of marital property must reflect consideration of the factors enumerated in the Tennessee Code, including the duration of the marriage, the value of the separate property held by each spouse, and the estate of each party at the time of the marriage. ... In light of the short duration of this marriage, the relative status of the parties prior to the marriage, and the totality of the division of property and debt, we cannot say the trial court abused its discretion in this case.

Section 36-4-121(c) permits an unequal division of marital property when the spouses’ financial needs, earning capacities, and economic circumstances support it.

Raper v. Raper · filed 2011-02-02(c)

In summary, the overall equities between the parties support a disproportionate award of the net marital estate to Wife. While many of the relevant factors do not favor one spouse over the other, a consideration of Wife’s need, Husband’s earning capacity, and both parties’ economic circumstances support a greater award to Wife.

Section 36-4-121(a)(1) requires an equitable division of marital property, which need not be equal.

Phelps v. Phelps · filed 2011-06-24(a)(1)

Although Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-4-121(a)(1) requires the court to order an equitable division of marital property, an equitable division is not necessarily an equal division.

Section 36-4-121 requires an equitable division of marital property based on a fair overall result.

Melvin v. Melvin · filed 2011-07-26(a)(1)

When dividing property, the trial court must divide the marital estate equitably. ... In light of the entirety of the property division, we cannot say amounts awarded to Ms. Melvin arising from the value of the real property resulted in an unequitable division of property. We affirm on this issue.

Section 36-4-121(a)(1) requires an equitable division of marital property, which need not be equal.

Diana (Schutts) Gilbert v. Gilbert · filed 2011-09-15(a)(1)

An equitable division of marital property is not necessarily an equal division, and § 36-4-121(a)(1) only requires an equitable division.

Section 36-4-121 calls for an equitable division of marital property and debt based on the relevant factors; a debt allocation that duplicates a spouse’s support obligation may be changed.

Wilkinson v. Wilkinson · filed 2011-11-29(c)

Courts must look to Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4-121 when determining how to distribute property in a divorce. ... Whether classified as part of the property division or as alimony in solido, the Trial Court erred in assigning this $75,000 debt to Husband. We modify the Trial Court’s judgment to hold that Wife is responsible for the $75,000 debt to her brother as this borrowed $75,000 was used by Wife, in addition to Wife’s alimony pendente lite, to maintain her standard of living at a level far beyond the income and assets then available to the parties.

Section 36-4-121(c) requires courts to consider all relevant factors when dividing marital property equitably, with fairness assessed across the overall division rather than any single asset or debt.

Jannerbo v. Jannerbo · filed 2012-03-09(c)

The question is whether the overall marital property division is equitable and not how a specific asset or debt is treated. Applying the evidence to the relevant statutory factors, we find no reversible error in the Trial Court’s marital property division as the evidence does not preponderate against the Trial Court’s findings relative to this issue.

Section 36-4-121(c) requires courts to consider its statutory factors when equitably dividing marital property.

Peterson v. Peterson · filed 2012-04-23(c)

Upon remand, the trial court is instructed to classify the parties’ property; determine the value of the parties’ marital and separate property; determine the amount of marital assets dissipated by Mr. Peterson; divide the parties’ marital property equitably in light of the statutory factors listed in Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-4-121(c); and award alimony, if any, separately from the division of property after consideration of the factors provided by Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-5-121(i).

Section 36-4-121(c) permits an unequal division of marital property when the relevant factors, including the parties’ earning capacities, support it.

Hattaway v. Hattaway · filed 2012-05-16(c)

In light of the absence of significant marital assets and Husband’s much greater earning capacity, the trial court did not err in awarding Wife the entire proceeds from the sale of the business assets as well as the proceeds from the sale of silver and stocks.

Section 36-4-121(c) supplies factors for distributing marital property; a trial court’s distribution receives great weight on appeal unless the evidence preponderates against it or it is inconsistent with those factors.

Duke v. Duke · filed 2012-06-01(c)

A trial court’s valuation and distribution of a marital asset will therefore be given great weight on appeal and will not be overturned unless the evidence preponderates against those findings or they are inconsistent with the factors outlined in Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4-121(c). ... After determining the value of ESN, the court divided the asset equally. We find no error in this regard.

Section 36-4-121(c) requires courts to weigh the statutory factors when dividing marital property equitably, but the process is not mechanical.

Edwards v. Edwards · filed 2012-06-19(c)

Applying the factors set forth in section 36-4-121(c) is not a mechanical process, and the trial court has wide discretion in dividing the marital estate.

Section 36-4-121(c) lists factors that guide an equitable division of marital property.

Hooberry v. Hooberry · filed 2012-06-20(c)

A trial court should use the factors listed in Tenn. ... Code Ann. § 36-4-121(c) as a guide when dividing a marital estate.

Section 36-4-121(c) requires courts to weigh the relevant factors when equitably dividing marital property.

Poindexter v. John M. Poindexter, Sr. · filed 2012-08-07(c)

The Trial Court’s division of the marital estate is not equitable, however, considering the factors set forth in the statute.

Section 36-4-121(a)(1) requires an equitable division of the marital estate as a whole; each individual asset or debt need not be divided equitably.

Bonnie Faith Rodgers v. Rodgers · filed 2012-09-10(a)(1)

We note initially that, in reviewing divisions of the marital estate, we fundamentally are interested in whether the overall marital property division is equitable and not whether the deposition of each individual asset or debt is equitable. Here, the division of the marital estate is relatively balanced and hews to the statutory factors.

Section 36-4-121(c) guides the equitable division of marital property; financial need may justify a larger share, but an extreme imbalance can be inequitable.

Hatfield v. Hatfield · filed 2013-02-07(c)

A trial court has a great deal of discretion in determining the manner in which it divides marital property, and an appellate court will generally defer to a trial court’s decision unless that decision is inconsistent with the factors set out in Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4-121(c) or the evidence preponderates against the decision. ... We disagree, however, with the extreme disproportion in the percentages awarded to the two spouses. We hereby modify the trial court’s property division to award the remaining value of the 401k to Husband.

Section 36-4-121(c) requires courts to consider its listed factors when equitably dividing marital property; the overall division need not give each spouse an equal share.

Cradic v. Cradic · filed 2013-02-22(c)

When the facts in this case are considered in light of the Tenn. Code Ann. §36-4- 121(c) factors, we cannot say that the evidence preponderates against the trial court’s distribution of the net marital estate. This being said, we find no abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court in its division of the net marital estate.

Section 36-4-121(c) guides the equitable division of marital property through its listed factors.

Jacobsen v. Jacobsen · filed 2013-04-05(c)

Thus, we defer to the trial court’s division of the marital estate unless it is inconsistent with the factors in Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-4-121(c) or is not supported by a preponderance of the evidence. ... Considering all of the above, we have concluded that the division of the marital estate is inequitable; therefore, we modify the division of the marital estate and remand with instructions to award Mother $97,200, which is 45% of the value of the marital residence, for her share of the marital residence, in addition to the personal property previously awarded to Mother.

Section 36-4-121(c)(6) requires courts to consider each spouse’s separate property when dividing marital property.

Kraus v. Thomas · filed 2013-06-07(c)(6)

Based upon our review of the record, we find the 60/40 division of the marital assets is not inequitable, particularly in light of Father’s separate assets. This is because the trial court’s decision is consistent with the factors set forth at Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-4- 121(c). Specifically, the trial court correctly considered the separate assets of the parties as set forth as a factor in Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-4-121(c)(6).

Section 36-4-121(a)(1) requires an equitable division of marital property, though the shares need not be equal.

Kelly v. Kelly · filed 2013-08-06(a)(1)

Divisions of marital estates are to be equitable, not necessarily equal. Nevertheless, we do not believe this gigantic imbalance is equitable.

Section 36-4-121(c) requires courts to consider relevant factors when dividing marital property equitably; one spouse’s greater contribution of separate property does not necessarily require a larger share.

Potter v. Christa Gilman Potter · filed 2013-08-19(c)

Therefore, considering all of the relevant factors, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in making its division of the parties’ marital property.

Section 36-4-121(c) permits an equal division of marital property when the statutory factors support it.

Ramsey v. Ramsey · filed 2013-10-29(c)

In the case at bar, the trial court determined that an equitable distribution should be a mathematically equal one. The evidence does not preponderate against this determination.

Section 36-4-121(a)(1) requires an equitable division of marital property, with alimony awards considered separately when assessing that division.

McCoy v. McCoy · filed 2013-11-04(a)(1)

Once the alimony awards are removed, the parties are in equitable positions. We find that a preponderance of the evidence supports the determination of the trial court.

Section 36-4-121(c)(5) permits a court to consider the effect of a spouse’s misconduct on the marital estate when dividing property, without treating the misconduct as marital fault.

Peterson v. Peterson · filed 2014-01-31(c)(5)

While we have taken into account Husband’s assault on Wife, we do so – not as a matter of “fault” – but rather because of the impact of the assault on the marital estate. But having said all of this, we hold that Wife’s receipt of 82.8% of the marital assets is not against the preponderance of the evidence. We reject Wife’s argument that she is entitled to more.

Section 36-4-121(a)(1) allows a court to consider separate property used for the marriage when equitably dividing marital property, even if that separate property no longer exists at divorce.

Walker v. Walker · filed 2014-04-16(a)(1)

In this case, the inheritance Husband received from his mother was no longer in existence at the time of the divorce. In such cases, the trial court may consider the use of separate property for the benefit of the marriage when equitably dividing the present marital property.

Section 36-4-121(c) requires courts to consider the relevant factors when dividing marital property equitably; the shares need not be equal.

Bonny Browne v. Alexander Lee Browne, Jr. · filed 2014-08-27(c)

Based upon the applicable statutory factors and the trial court’s broad discretion regarding this issue, we find no error in the trial court’s overall distribution of marital property.

Section 36-4-121(a)(1) requires courts to consider the entire marital estate when dividing marital property equitably, including assets covered by a partial settlement agreement.

Lynette Rooney (Pollan) v. Pollan · filed 2012-07-03(a)(1)

We have concluded that there is a hole in this argument, not to mention the bucket, because the courts are to divide the marital property in an equitable manner, Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4-121(a)(1); Miller, 81 S.W.3d at 775, and to do that the courts must have the benefit of the entire estate, or in this case, both buckets, to make an equitable distribution of the marital estate.

Section 36-4-121 calls for an equitable distribution of marital property based on the relevant statutory factors; the distribution need not be equal.

Tachek v. Tachek · filed 2012-08-15(c)

The Trial Court is to make an equitable distribution of the marital estate by weighing the relevant factors enumerated in Tenn. Code Ann. §36-4-121©), and an equitable distribution is not always an equal one. ... Taking into account the above factors and the economic situation of the parties, we hold the Trial Court did not err in ordering the mother to pay the father $34,142 to make the property/debt distribution fairly equal.

Section 36-4-121(c) does not require a court to credit voluntary payments made to a spouse during divorce proceedings when dividing marital property.

Irvin v. Ernest J. Irvin, II · filed 2012-11-30(c)

Voluntary payments made to Wife during the pendency of the proceedings are not listed as a factor that the trial court must consider in making an equitable division of marital property.

Section 36-4-121(c) calls for courts to weigh the relevant factors in light of the evidence when dividing marital property equitably.

McCarter v. Debra Lynn Walker McCarter · filed 2014-12-01(c)

The approach to dividing a marital estate should not be mechanical, but rather should entail carefully weighing the relevant factors in Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4-121(c) in light of the evidence that the parties have presented.

Section 36-4-121(c) requires courts to consider the relevant statutory factors when equitably dividing marital property.

Dunn v. William M. Dunn, Jr. · filed 2014-12-22(c)

We determine that the trial court gave appropriate weight and credence to the statutory factors listed in Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-4-121(c).

Section 36-4-121 requires equitable division of marital property without regard to fault, and marital debt is divided on the same basis.

Kibbe v. Kibbe · filed 2015-04-28(a)(1)

Marital property, once valued, must be divided equitably between the parties without regard to fault. Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4-121(a)(1); Miller v. Miller, 81 S.W.3d 771, 775 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001). ... Marital debt is subject to equitable division in the same manner as marital assets. ... Upon review of the record and in consideration of the relevant statutory provisions, we are satisfied that the court did not err in its ruling regarding the debt or the division of the 2013 tax refund.

Section 36-4-121(c) requires courts to consider relevant factors when dividing marital property; an unequal division can be equitable.

McCormick v. Stephanie Renee Crouch McCormick · filed 2015-07-16(c)

Thus, we defer to the trial court’s division of the marital estate unless it is inconsistent with the factors at Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4-121(c) or is not supported by a preponderance of the evidence. ... Considering the relevant factors and the character of the assets available for division, and affording the trial court the substantial deference we give to the division of marital property, the court did not abuse its discretion in the dividing the property and debt in the manner it did.

Section 36-4-121(c) guides equitable division of marital property through its listed factors and the circumstances of the case.

Heather Anne Gulish Gladwell v. Tony Neil Gladwell, Jr. · filed 2015-07-20(c)

Similarly, after reviewing this record in light of the factors contained in section 36-4-121(c), we cannot say the award of property is rendered inequitable even assuming some dissipation of marital assets by both parties and that Wife paid joint marital expenses during the pendency of this matter.

Section 36-4-121(c) permits an unequal division of marital property when the statutory factors, including the spouses’ earning capacities and contributions, make it equitable.

Waters v. Waters · filed 2015-08-20(c)

Our review of the evidence in this matter, considering the statutory factors delineated in Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-4-121(c), leads us to the conclusion that the trial court‟s division of marital property is equitable.

Section 36-4-121(c) permits a court to consider separate property when dividing marital property, but separate property does not become marital property to achieve an equitable division.

Draper v. Draper · filed 2015-11-12(c)

The ownership of separate property may be considered in the division of marital property; however, separate property is not deemed marital in order to equitably divide the estate. Instead, the distribution of marital property may be adjusted in accordance with the facts and circumstances of the case.

Section 36-4-121(c) permits an unequal division of marital property when the result is equitable under the statutory factors.

Neas v. Patricia Erskine Heffernan Neas · filed 2015-12-15(c)

When it comes to the division of a marital estate, we do not tweak or second guess trial courts. The evidence does not preponderate against the Trial Court’s finding that the division of the marital estate, while not equal, was equitable between these parties.

Section 36-4-121(c) permits an unequal division of marital assets when the statutory factors support an equitable result.

Jeronimus v. Jeronimus · filed 2016-04-15(c)

The division of the marital assets reflects a practical and appropriate application of the factors at Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4-121(c)(1), (2), (4), (8) and (11) to the facts presented.

Section 36-4-121(c) permits an unequal division of marital property when factors such as the marriage’s duration and the spouses’ earning capacities and separate property support it.

Sandra Zoe Jeanette Naylor v. Naylor · filed 2016-07-15(c)

Several factors contained in Tennessee Code Annotated Section 36-4-121(c) lead us to conclude that above property division was not inequitable, including the long duration of the marriage, see Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4-121(c)(1); Husband‟s substantially higher income, earning capacity, and level of training and education, see Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4-121(c)(2),(4); and Wife‟s lack of separate property, see Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4-121(c)(6). Under these circumstances, awarding Wife somewhat more marital property is not inequitable.

Section 36-4-121(c) guides equitable division of marital property; an agreed division may be upheld when the evidence supports its equity.

Penny Arvidson Richards v. Richards · filed 2016-09-26(c)

The trial court reviewed the terms of the MDA and found them to be equitable. The evidence does not preponderate against the equity in the division decreed by the trial court. Consequently, we affirm the trial court’s judgment pertaining to the division of the parties’ marital property.

Section 36-4-121 requires an equitable division of marital property and debt; the spouses’ ability to repay debt is a factor in its division.

Henson v. Henson · filed 2017-04-24(a)(1)

In making a property division in a divorce, the trial court must first classify property as marital or separate property then divide the marital property equitably. Miller v. Miller, 81 S.W.3d 771, 775 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001); Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4-121(a)(1). ... Accordingly, the record does not preponderate against the trial court’s division of the marital debt.

Section 36-4-121(c) requires courts to consider statutory factors when equitably dividing marital property.

Morelock v. Ruth Ellen Mick Morelock · filed 2017-08-18(c)

Bearing in mind the trial court’s “broad discretion,” Baggett v. Baggett, 422 S.W.3d 537, 543 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2013), and “wide latitude in fashioning an equitable division of property,” Rountree v. Rountree, 369 S.W.3d 122, 133 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2012) (internal quotation marks omitted), we find no abuse of discretion with the trial court’s division of marital property in the instant case.

Section 36-4-121(a)(1) requires an equitable distribution of marital property, which need not be equal.

Sibley v. Sibley · filed 2017-05-25(a)(1)

Although it is not clear whether the court’s division of assets and debt was exactly equal to each party, the goal is an equitable distribution of property, not equal. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4-121(a)(1). We conclude that the trial court’s distribution of marital property was not an abuse of discretion. We affirm the trial court’s award of the marital residence to Wife.

Section 36-4-121(c) requires an equitable division of the marital estate based on the relevant factors; the overall division matters more than the division of any particular asset.

Melody Crunk Telfer v.George Curtiss Telfer · filed 2018-03-05(c)

To emphasize, it does not matter how the court below divides a particular marital asset because ultimately it is the overall division of the entire marital estate that must be equitable, a fact seemingly lost in this drawn-out case.

Section 36-4-121(c) permits an unequal division of marital property when the relevant factors support it, including a spouse’s use of separate income to preserve marital assets.

Disterdick v. Disterdick · filed 2018-06-18(c)

The trial court found this statutory factor most significant, thereby awarding Wife a greater share of the net marital estate. We determine that the manner in which the trial court weighed the factors contained in Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-4-121(c) is consistent with logic and reason and that the result to these parties was equitable.

Section 36-4-121(c) directs courts to weigh the relevant statutory factors when dividing marital property.

Erika Louise (Brown) Dewald v. Dewald · filed 2018-09-17(c)

In considering the relevant factors as the trial court obviously did, we find that the trial court’s division of the marital estate is consistent with the statutory factors enumerated in Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4-121(c) and is supported by the evidence.