Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-102

A parent corporation does not automatically share its subsidiary’s status as an employer for workers compensation immunity; it must show a sufficient basis for treating the corporations as one.

Gaines v. Excel Industries, Inc. · filed 1987-07-20

The Court concludes that, if the Tennessee courts would recognize workers compensation identity of parent and subsidiary corporations under certain circumstances, Industries has failed to make a sufficient factual showing to warrant summary judgment on this issue.

A guarantor of a self-insured employer receives the same workers’ compensation immunity as an employer’s insurer.

Malkiewicz v. R.R. Donnelley & Sons Co. · filed 1989-01-05(a)(3)

A guarantor of a self-insured employer is entitled to the same immunity as an insurer under the Tennessee Workers’ Compensation Law.

Section 50-6-102(a)(9) determines employee status through factors including the right to control and terminate the work, provision of equipment, and scheduling of hours.

Brian Wolney and wife, Meliaa Wolney v. LIsa M. Emmons and Wells Fargo Armored Service Corporation · filed 1996-12-31(a)(9)

Therefore, analyzing the facts in light of the factors set forth in Tennessee Annotated Code § 50-6-102(a)(9), WFA had the right to control the conduct of Wolney’s work and the right to terminate him. Wolney was not free to hire helpers. WFA furnished the equipment to Wolney, the vehicle, and scheduled his working hours. These factors clearly weigh in favor of finding that Wolney was a statutory employee of WFA.

Section 50-6-102(a)(9) treats a worker as a statutory employee when factors such as the right to control the work and terminate the worker, provision of equipment, limits on hiring helpers, and control of hours outweigh contrary indicia.

Brian Wolney and wife, Melissa Wolney v. Lisa M. Emmons and Wells Fargo Armored Service Corporation · filed 1997-02-21(a)(9)

Therefore, analyzing the facts in light of the factors set forth in Tennessee Annotated Code § 50-6-102(a)(9), WFA had the right to control the conduct of Wolney’s work and the right to terminate him. Wolney was not free to hire helpers. WFA furnished the equipment to Wolney, the vehicle, and scheduled his working hours. These factors clearly weigh in favor of finding that Wolney was a statutory employee of WFA.

An employee under § 50-6-102(11)(A) must have a contract of hire, written or implied; the claimant must prove an employment relationship to recover benefits.

Vaughn, Billy v. Kenneth Parsons d/b/a Performance Mechanical · filed 2014-12-22(11)(A)

Tennessee Workers’ Compensation law defines “Employee” as “every person, including a minor, whether lawfully or unlawfully employed…under any contract of hire or apprenticeship, written or implied.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-102(11)(A) (2014). ... Vaughn has failed to carry his burden of proving that he was Parsons’ employee.

Section 50-6-102(10)(A) covers a worker who has accepted a job and is paid for required orientation before starting regular duties as an employee.

Hubble v. Dyer Nursing Home · filed 2006-04-12(10)(A)

We hold that the evidence does not preponderate against the trial court’s finding that the plaintiff was an employee of the defendant nursing home at the time of the accident.

Section 50-6-102(10)(D) defines employee status through factors including control of the work, termination rights, payment, scheduling, and freedom to serve other entities.

Dillon v. NICA, Inc. · filed 2011-12-14(10)(D)

The evidence does not preponderate against the trial court’s findings of fact and these facts support the determination that plaintiff was an employee as defined at Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-102(10)(D).

Section 50-6-102(11)(D) treats control of the work, hourly payment, and provision of tools and supplies as factors supporting employee status.

Jewell, Kevin v. Cobble Construction and Arcus Restoration · filed 2014-12-16(11)(D)

The facts in this case show that Mr. Cobble had control of the work that Mr. Jewell performed. He told Mr. Jewell where to go, and when to go there. Additionally, Mr. Jewell was paid on an hourly basis rather than based on the completion of a job or project. The facts further show that Mr. Cobble supplied Mr. Jewell with some tools and most, if not all, of the supplies necessary to complete the assigned work. Mr. Cobble also reimbursed Mr. Jewell for items Mr. Jewell purchased to complete the work. These facts indicate that Mr. Jewell was an employee of Cobble Construction.

Employee status under subsection (11)(A) requires an express or implied agreement that the alleged employer will pay for the worker’s services.

Beers, John v. Rajendra Bhakta, d/b/a Ram Construction · filed 2015-03-13(11)(A)

Tennessee Workers' Compensation law defines "Employee" as "every person, including a minor, whether lawfully or unlawfully employed ... under any contract of hire or apprenticeship, written or implied." Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-102(11)(A) (2014). ... The Court finds that Mr. Beers failed to carry his burden of proof. ... Importantly, and in consideration of the Tennessee Supreme Court's ruling in Black, both parties testified that Mr. Patel- not Mr. Bhakta-- paid Mr. Beers for work at the Trinity Inn. Further, by Mr. Beers' own admission, Mr. Patel told him to come to work on the date of the alleged injury, and Mr. Patel owns the Trinity Inn.

Section 50-6-102(11)(D) treats a worker as an employee when the employer controls and schedules the work, despite the worker’s ability to work for others and use some personal tools.

Orellana, Jose v. Vazquez Roofing and Five Points Roofing · filed 2015-09-01(11)(D)

Vazquez Roofing had ultimate control over the work. It maintained the work schedule. ... Upon consideration of these facts, the Court finds that Mr. Orellana was an employee of Vazquez Roofing, rather than an independent contractor, when he suffered an injury while working at the Fly Road home on March 30, 2015.

Under § 50-6-102(11)(D), employee status depends on the work relationship as a whole; a failure to withhold taxes does not by itself establish independent-contractor status.

Kleeberg, Monica v. Profit Line Services, Inc. · filed 2015-09-23(11)(D)

While it appears Profit Lines did not deduct withholding and Social Security taxes from Ms. Kleeberg's paychecks (T.R. 3 at 6, 7), all other information in the Court file indicates Ms. Kleeberg was an employee of Profit Line at the time she was injured. Accordingly, Profit Line has not met its burden of proving Ms. Kleeberg was an independent contractor.

Section 50-6-102(11)(B) requires an election by sole proprietors and partners outside the construction industry, but its election requirement does not apply to construction service providers.

Bennett, Christopher v. Thermal Corrosion Solutions · filed 2015-09-10(11)(B)

To give effect to the entire statute, this Court finds that Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-102(11)(B) only applies to sole proprietors and partners who are not involved in the construction industry.

A person whose employment relationship ended before an injury is not an employee under subsection (12)(A) at the time of the injury.

Duck, Melissa v. Cox Oil Company · filed 2016-01-21(12)(A)

Moreover, based on Employee's admission, she was not, in fact, an "employee" within the meaning of Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-102(12)(A) at the time of the fall.

Section 50-6-102(12)(A) defines an employee by service under a contract of hire or apprenticeship; a person who quit before the injury is not an employee at the time of injury.

Murray, Charles v. Straight Line Masonry · filed 2016-03-24(12)(A)

The legislature has defined an "employee" to mean "every person ... in the service of an employer ... under any contract of hire or apprenticeship, written or implied." Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-102(12)(A) (2015) (emphasis added.) ... The Court finds the evidence preponderates in favor of the conclusion that Mr. Murray was not Straightline's employee on December 26, 2014, because he quit his job on December 23, 2014.

A construction services provider who uses and pays for a worker’s services on a project qualifies as that worker’s employer.

Ramos, Rubiel v. Orona · filed 2016-04-06(13)

The Court finds the evidence preponderates in favor of the conclusion that Mr. Orona was Mr. Ramos' employer on the date of injury. Mr. Orona used Mr. Ramos' services for pay. He invited Mr. Ramos to work on one of his construction projects and agreed to pay him $170.00 for the day he worked. He personally paid Mr. Ramos for the work he performed on the day in question.

Section 50-6-102(11)(A) requires an express or implied agreement that the alleged employer will pay for the worker’s services to establish employee status.

Black, James v. Prestige Group, LLC · filed 2016-05-11(11)(A)

The Workers' Compensation Law defines "employee" as "every person, including a minor, whether lawfully or unlawfully employed . . . under any contract of hire or apprenticeship, written or implied." Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-102(11)(A) (2015). ... Per Black, the Court looks to evidence of an express or implied agreement that Mr. Hernandez would pay Mr. Black for his services.

Whether a worker is an employee under § 50-6-102(12)(D)(i) depends on factors including control of the work, termination rights, payment, provision of tools and equipment, and work hours.

Jones, Elizabeth Renee v. Black's Mobile Detailing Service · filed 2016-11-17(12)(D)(i)

Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-102(12)(D)(i) (2015). Both Ms. Jones and Ms. Paz provided testimony to establish: Mr. Black controlled the conduct of the work; retained the right to terminate them; paid them bi-weekly; provided the tools and equipment; and determined the hours they worked. ... Based on the testimony of Ms. Jones and Ms. Paz and the Bureau's report, the Court concludes Ms. Jones was an employee rather than an independent contractor.

Section 50-6-102(12)(D)(i) determines employee status from factors such as control of the work, method of payment, tools, scheduling, and freedom to work for others.

Davenport. Ted v. Advanced Remodeling and Floor Covering LLC · filed 2016-12-05(12)(D)(i)

Based upon Mr. Davenport's uncontroverted testimony at the Expedited Hearing, as well as the UEF investigator's findings, the Court holds he was an employee of Advanced Remodeling rather than a subcontractor or independent contractor.

Under the employee-status factors in § 50-6-102(12)(D)(i), a worker who may accept or decline jobs and freely work for others may fall outside the employee definition.

Price, Derrick v, Bobby Chambers d/b/a C&C Contractor · filed 2016-12-12(12)(D)(i)

It appears to the Court that Mr. Price was under no obligation to regularly and consistently offer his services to Mr. Chambers as an employee and he was free to work with whomever he chose for as long as he chose. Therefore, the Court finds that Mr. Price was not Mr. Chambers' employee.

An employer covered after using five or more regular employees remains liable for workers' compensation benefits if its workforce later falls below five, unless it completes the administrative process to withdraw from coverage.

Ice, Damione v. Dion Dave and Anita Dave (Neita Reel-Dave), d/b/a/ D&N Transportation, Inc. and/or DNT Transportation · filed 2017-03-22(13)

The Supreme Court went on to hold that, once coverage attaches, the employer may not negate its liability to pay workers' compensation benefits by simply reducing its workforce below five regular employees. Instead, the employer must comply with the administrative procedures to withdraw from coverage before it can avoid its obligation to pay workers' compensation benefits by employing fewer than five employees. ... Accordingly, the Court holds that, at a hearing on the merits, Mr. Ice will likely prevail in establishing that D & N cannot avoid paying him workers' compensation benefits because it employed fewer than five employees on the date of InJUry.

Section 50-6-102(12)(D)(i) directs courts deciding employee status to consider control of the work, termination rights, payment method, hiring of helpers, tools, scheduling, and freedom to serve other entities.

Galindo (Hurtado), Augustin v. Neto's Drywall, LLC · filed 2017-05-10(12)(D)(i)

The factors include: the right to control the conduct of the work, the right of termination, the method of payment, the freedom to select and hire helpers, the furnishing of tools and equipment, self-scheduling of working hours, and the freedom to offer services to other entities. Tenn. Code Ann.§ 50-6-102(12)(D)(i) (2016). ... Based on the Bureau's report, the Court concludes Mr. Galindo came forward with sufficient evidence demonstrating he is likely to prevail at a hearing on the merits in establishing he was an employee ofNeto's Drywall.

An employee under § 50-6-102(12)(A) must have a written or implied contract of hire, including an agreement for the alleged employer to pay for the worker’s services.

Buchanan, Joyce v. Powe, Inc. · filed 2017-06-02(12)(A)

The Court begins its analysis by noting the term "employee" means "every person ... in the service of an employer ... under any contract of hire ... written or implied." Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-102(12)(A) (2016). There was no written contract of employment between Powe and Ms. Buchanan. Thus, the Court considers whether there was an "implied" contract of employment. In Black v. Dance, 643 S.W.2d 654, 657 (Tenn. 1982), our Supreme Court held: "In order for one to be an employee of another for purposes of our Worker's Compensation Law, it is ... required that there be an express or implied agreement for the alleged employer to remunerate the alleged employee for his services in behalf of the former." Here, there was no "agreement" for Powe to remunerate Ms. Buchanan for driving the truck on the one occasion she drove it to Florida.

An implied contract of hire supports employee status when the alleged employer hires, directs, and pays the worker.

Carpenter. David v. Southern Transit, P&M Logistics, and · filed 2017-12-14(12)(A)

The Court begins its analysis by noting the term “employee” means “every person ... in the service of an employer .. . under any contract of hire . . . written or implied.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-102(12)(A) (2017). ... In view of the above evidence, the Court finds that P&M employed Mr. Carpenter at the time of his injury. P&M owned the truck Mr. Carpenter was driving to run P&M’s dedicated FedEx Ground route. P&M hired Mr. Carpenter through its driver manager, directed his work, and paid him to run its route.

Section 50-6-102(11)(D) makes employee status turn on the actual work relationship, not the parties’ agreement to characterize it as contract work.

Albright, Byron v. Hercules HVAC Pads, Inc. · filed 2018-08-17(11)(D)

In conclusion, the Court holds that, for workers’ compensation purposes, the parties’ agreements do not affect whether a particular work relationship is one of employment or contract.

Section 50-6-102(12)(D)(i) calls for assessing the whole working relationship to decide whether a worker is an employee, with particular weight given to the right to control the work.

Albright v. Hercules HVAC Pads, Inc. · filed 2018-12-20(12)(D)(i)

After noting the statutory factors listed in Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6- 102(12)(D)(i), we explained “[t]hese factors are not absolutes that preclude examination of each work relationship as a whole and are no more than a means of analysis.” ... Under these circumstances, we conclude the preponderance of the evidence supports the trial court’s determination that Claimant is likely to prevail at trial in proving he was an employee for workers’ compensation purposes.

Section 50-6-102(12)(D)(i) treats limited direction over an artisan’s work, without control over how the craft is performed, as supporting independent-contractor status.

Kent, Robert v. Delatorre Art Design, Inc. · filed 2019-10-04(12)(D)(i)

We agree with the trial court’s conclusion that the “right to control the conduct of the work” factor favors a finding that Claimant was an independent contractor.

Section 50-6-102(12)(D) provides factors for distinguishing employees from independent contractors; the factors guide consideration of the whole work relationship rather than conclusively deciding it.

Helton v. Lawson · filed 2019-12-18(12)(D)

The factors are not absolutes that preclude examination of each work relation as a whole and are no more than a means of analysis.

Section 50-6-102(12)(D)(i) treats a worker as an employee when the employer directs when and where he works, pays him hourly, and hires and fires his helpers.

Beeler, Bert v. Eric Corum d/b/a Gable to Stable Construction · filed 2020-01-31(12)(D)(i)

Mr. Beeler testified Mr. Corum told him when and where to work, paid him hourly rather than by the job, and hired and fired his help. Thus, the Court holds Mr. Beeler was Mr. Corum’s employee.

Section 50-6-102(13)(D) requires consideration of all relevant factors, including control, payment, tools, and scheduling, when deciding whether a worker is an employee.

Sheldon, Joe v. JASON USERY CONSTRUCTION · filed 2019-12-30(13)(D)

No single aspect of a work relationship is conclusive in making this determination, and in deciding whether a worker is an employee or independent contractor, “the trier of fact must examine all relevant factors and circumstances” of the relationship. ... Applying these principles to the facts of this case, the Court cannot find Mr. Sheldon presented sufficient evidence to prove he is likely to succeed in establishing he was Jason Usery/Jason Usery Construction’s employee on his injury date.

Section 50-6-102(12)(D) uses factors including control of work, payment, hiring, scheduling, and provision of tools to distinguish employees from independent contractors.

Wright, Tracy v. Joshua Cooper, d/b/a J&K Inprovements · filed 2021-01-29(12)(D)

Mr. Wright also offered undisputed testimony that Mr. Cooper paid him by the hour upon completion of each job and he transported him to and from the jobsite. In addition, he told the compliance specialist during his investigation that Mr. Cooper hired him as “lead carpenter,” which was corroborated by a co-worker. He also told the specialist that Mr. Cooper retained the right to control the work, scheduled the work hours, hired and fired workers, and provided tools and equipment. The only contrary evidence is Mr. Cooper’s statement to the specialist that he did not have any employees, and he did all the work himself. Under these facts, the Court holds Mr. Wright is likely to prove that he was Mr. Cooper’s employee rather than an independent contractor.

Section 50-6-102(12)(D)(i) uses factors including control of the work, termination, payment, hiring helpers, tools, scheduling, and work for others to distinguish an employee from an independent contractor.

Wright, Tracy v. Joshua Cooper, d/b/a J&K Improvements · filed 2021-12-21(12)(D)(i)

The first issue is whether Mr. Wright was an independent contractor or employee on the date of injury. Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-102(12)(D)(i) (2021) lists the following factors for making this determination: ... Under these facts, the Court holds Mr. Wright proved by a preponderance of the evidence that he was Mr. Cooper’s employee.

Section 50-6-102(12)(D) determines whether a worker is an employee or an independent contractor by weighing factors including control of the work, payment method, tools, scheduling, and freedom to serve others.

Soto, Victor v. DENNY PATTERSON, JR. d/b/a PATTERSON CONSTRUCTION · filed 2022-07-08(12)(D)

Considering all factors used to determine whether a worker is an employee or an independent contractor, the Court holds that Mr. Soto has not presented sufficient evidence from which this Court could conclude that he is likely to prevail in establishing he was an employee of Patterson Construction.

Section 50-6-102 defines an employee through service under a contract of hire and an employer through use of at least five people for pay; a benefits claimant must establish both statuses.

Di Yan, Jian v. Neng Yuan Lan, d/b/a China King · filed 2023-03-06

Under Workers’ Compensation Law, an employee is defined as someone “in the service of an employer, as employer is defined in subdivision (11), under any contract of hire or apprenticeship, written or implied.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-102(10)(A). An employer is defined as using “the services of not less than five (5) persons for pay[.]” Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-102(11). ... As the alleged employee, it is Mr. Yan’s burden to prove he was an employee, and that China King was an employer under Workers’ Compensation Law. However, he did not present sufficient evidence for the Court to find he is likely to prevail in proving that employment relationship at a final hearing. Therefore, his request for benefits is denied at this time.

Employee status is determined from the actual working relationship under the seven statutory factors, rather than a worker’s signed acknowledgment of independent contractor status.

Hernandez, Andres v. SMS, Inc., d/b/a Master Stucco · filed 2023-04-06(10)(D)(i)

Rather, the Court must view the evidence presented through the lens of the seven factors listed in the statute and case cited above. The Court applies each factor to determine – not what Mr. Hernandez agreed to be called – but the actual working relationship between him and Master Stucco. ... Given these factors, the Court finds Mr. Hernandez is likely to prevail in proving his status as an employee for Master Stucco rather than an independent contractor.

A worker’s lack of authority to hire helpers supports employee status under the statutory employee versus independent contractor factors.

Hernandez, Andres v. SMS, Inc., d/b/a Master Stucco · filed 2023-07-06(10)(D)(i)

With regard to this factor, we conclude the preponderance of the evidence indicates that Claimant had no authority to hire workers to assist him in his job duties as a general laborer, which further supports a finding that he is likely to prove he was an employee for worker’s compensation purposes, not an independent contractor.

Section 50-6-102(12)(D)(i) treats a worker as a subcontractor when the employment factors favor independent work, including control of the work, hiring helpers, providing tools, and freedom to take other jobs.

Martinez, Marcus Sosa v. Halloran Investment Properties, LLC · filed 2022-12-08(12)(D)(i)

The Court finds factors a, c, d, e, and g show that Mr. Sosa Martinez was a subcontractor, while only factor f suggested employment by Halloran. ... When considering all the factors, the Court holds Mr. Sosa Martinez is unlikely to prove he was a Halloran employee at a final hearing.

An agreement to pay a worker for services establishes the contract of hire required for employee status under section 50-6-102(10)(A).

Carrillo, Miguel Garcia v. Carlos Sanchez Hurtado, a/k/a Carlos Ramirez Rios, Gilberto Cavazos, Kosinski Homes, Kosinski · filed 2023-05-25(10)(A)

An “employee” is a person in the service of an employer under a contract of hire either written or implied. Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-102(10)(A). ... The Court finds Mr. Carrillo was Mr. Rios’s employee.

Section 50-6-102(10) includes a worker paid under an assumed name in its definition of an employee, whether lawfully or unlawfully employed.

HERNANDEZ, RICARDO v. CARLOS LOPEZ, d/b/a EMMANUEL TREE SERVICE · filed 2025-03-19(10)

Despite Mr. Hernandez working under an assumed name, the statutory definition of an employee “includes every person . . . whether lawfully or unlawfully employed[.]” Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-102(10). Given this definition and the testimony of both parties, the Court finds an employment relationship existed.

Section 50-6-102(10)(D)(i) identifies factors bearing on employee status, including control of the work, authority to hire helpers, provision of equipment, and scheduling; those factors can support treating a temporary worker as the client’s borrowed employee.

King v. Dayco Incorporated · filed 2026-04-29(10)(D)(i)

Moreover, in his appellate brief, Mr. King expressly accepts that factors (a) (the “right to control the conduct of the work”), (d) (the “freedom to select and hire helpers”), (e) (the “furnishing of tools and equipment”), and (f) (the “[s]elf scheduling of working hours”) from section 50-6-102(10)(D)(i) “appear satisfied.” From all of these admissions, we find ample support for the conclusion that the work Mr. King was performing was “essentially that” of Dayco and Dayco had the right to control the details of this work.

Section 50-6-102(10)(A) includes a person who works for pay under a false identity within its definition of employee, even though the employment is unlawful.

Antunez, Christian Torres v. MG Dyess, Inc. · filed 2026-06-29(10)(A)

We conclude Employer has taken the statutory phrase “under any contract of hire” as used in subsection 102(10)(A) out of context. That phrase is part of a single sentence that also includes the phrase “every person . . . whether lawfully or unlawfully employed.” Moreover, the phrase “under any contract of hire” is modified by the phrase “written or implied,” indicating that a written agreement is not a critical element of the formation of an employment contract.

An entity with more than five paid workers qualifies as an employer, and a trainee serving it under an implied apprenticeship agreement can be its employee.

Jackson Housing Authority v. Auto-Owners Insurance Co. · filed 1984-12-18(a)(3)

T.C.A. § 50-6-102 (1983) defines an “employee” as “every person — in the service of an employer as defined in subdivision (a)3, under any contract of hire or apprenticeship written or implied.” (emphasis added). Subsection (a)3 defines an “employer” as any person or entity “using the services of not less than (5) persons for pay ...” ... It agreed to take on Wilson and to train him. It had an express contract with CADC to do so and an implied contract at the least with Wilson to do so. There is no dispute that JHA employs more than five persons for pay, so it qualifies as an employer under T.C.A. § 50-6-102(a)(3). ... Accordingly, we hold that Wilson was an employee of JHA.

A convict working for a county during imprisonment is not an employee under the contract-of-hire definition.

Howard v. Uselton · filed 1989-07-24(a)(2)(A)

We do not address these issues because as stated earlier, the general rule in Tennessee is that a convict performing work during the term of his imprisonment is not an employee within the meaning of workers’ compensation laws.

A partner who is no longer working under a contract of hire is not an employee under § 50-6-102(a)(2).

Roberts v. Lebanon Appliance Service Co. · filed 1989-11-06(a)(2)

Based upon all the evidence presented at trial, and the totality of circumstances surrounding Roberts’ relationship with Gibson and Manners, it is clear that Roberts was not acting as an “employee” at the time of his death. T.C.A. § 50-6-102(a)(2) defines employee as an individual “in the service of an employer ... under any contract of hire or apprenticeship, written or implied.” Roberts was not working under a traditional contract of hire at the time of his death.

The definition of employee excludes a person who provides services without receiving or expecting compensation.

Garner v. Reed · filed 1993-05-24(a)(3)(A)

By doing so, the Legislature apparently intended for the definition of employee, as that term is defined in T.C.A. § 50-6-102(a)(3)(A), to control for purposes of deciding the applicability of the workers’ compensation statutes. Thus, helpers or gratuitous workers, such as Dillard, Sr., are not to be counted.

Section 50-6-102(9) excludes subcontractors from the definition of employee; partners and sole proprietors are included if they elect employee status.

Presley v. Bennett · filed 1993-08-09(9)

Subcontractors, however, are not covered by the Act because they are not included in the broad statutory definition of “employee,” which includes corporate officers, as well as partners and sole proprietors who are included as employees if they so elect.

Section 50-6-102(11) lists factors for deciding whether a worker is an employee or an independent contractor, but the work relationship must be considered as a whole.

Lindsey v. Trinity Communications, Inc. · filed 2009-01-12(11)

When determining whether a plaintiff is an employee or an independent contractor, a court may consider many factors: “(A) The right to control the conduct of the work; (B) The right of termination; (C) The method of payment; (D) The freedom to select and hire helpers; (E) The furnishings of tools and equipment; (F) Self scheduling of working hours; and (G) The freedom to offer services to other entities.” Tenn.Code Ann. § 50-6-102(11) (2005); see also Galloway, 822 S.W.2d at 586 (quoting Bargery v. Obion Gram Co., 785 S.W.2d 118, 119-20 (Tenn.1990)). These factors do not preclude an examination of the work relationship as a whole but are merely a means of analysis.

Section 50-6-102(11) identifies seven factors for distinguishing employees from independent contractors, including the right to control the work; no single factor determines the classification.

Hartford Underwriters Insurance Co. v. Dale Penney, d/b/a DLP Construction Co. · filed 2010-06-17(11)

Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-102(11) (2005)5 sets forth seven primary factors to guide determinations as to whether an individual in a given work relationship is an “employee,” or a “subcontractor” or “independent contractor”: i) the right to control the conduct of the work; ii) the right of termination; iii) the method of payment; iv) the freedom to select and hire helpers; v) the furnishings of tools and equipment; vi) self scheduling of working hours; and vii) the freedom to offer services to other entities. ... Applying the required liberal construction, we find the preponderance of the evidence establishes that the workers were employees during the policy period.

Section 50-6-102(10)(D) classifies workers by factors that emphasize the hiring party’s right to control how the work is done; physical therapists subject to little such control were independent contractors.

Continental Casualty Company v. Theraco, Inc. · filed 2014-01-14(10)(D)

After applying the factors of Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-102(10)(D), we cannot say that the Department erred in concluding that the PTs are independent contractors rather than employees. Theraco possesses little control over the means by which the PTs provide therapy to each patient.

The factors for distinguishing an employee from an independent contractor are analytical guides; the whole work relationship must be examined.

Jewell, Kevin v. Cobble Construction & Arcus Restoration · filed 2015-01-12(11)(D)

These factors are not absolutes that preclude examination of each work relationship as a whole and are no more than a means of analysis.

Section 50-6-102(11)(D) uses the listed work-relationship factors to determine whether a worker is an employee or an independent contractor.

Thompsen, Jason v. Concrete Solutions · filed 2015-01-15(11)(D)

Virtually every statutory factor supports an employer-employee relationship. Accordingly, this Court concludes that Concrete Solutions failed to prove that Mr. Thompsen is an independent contractor.

Section 50-6-102(10)(D) calls for weighing the work-relationship factors to determine whether a worker is an employee or an independent contractor.

Thompsen, Jason v. Concrete Solutions · filed 2015-02-10(10)(D)

With respect to the specific statutory criteria set forth in Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-102(10)(D), the facts support the trial court's determination that the claimant was an employee.

Section 50-6-102(11)(D) governs whether a worker is an employee or independent contractor; employment forms identifying the worker as an employee supported employee status despite a W-9 form.

Gandy, Michael v. January Environmental Services 2015-05-0103 · filed 2015-07-10(11)(D)

All of the "Employment Forms" reference "Employee," and are not the types of forms typically utilized in an independent contractor situation. The Court finds that January Services failed to establish that Mr. Gandy was an independent contractor instead of an employee.

Section 50-6-102(11)(D) requires weighing the work relationship factors to distinguish an employee from an independent contractor; no single factor controls, though the right to control the work is especially important.

Wallace, Robert L. v. Mark Conard dba Marcon Builders · filed 2015-09-18(11)(D)

While no single factor is determinative when deciding whether a worker is an employee or an independent contractor, the Supreme Court has "repeatedly emphasized the importance of the right to control the work when distinguishing employees and independent contractors, the relevant inquiry being whether the right existed, not whether it was exercised." Galloway v. Memphis Drum Service, 822 S.W.2d 584, 586 (Tenn. 1991); Jewell v. Cobble Construction and Arcus Restoration, 2015 TN Wrk. Comp. App. Bd. LEXIS 1, at* 15 (Tenn. Workers' Comp. App. Bd. Jan. 12, 2015).

In deciding whether a worker is an employee or an independent contractor, scheduling of work hours is a separate factor that may also be considered as evidence of control over the work.

Peters, James v. A Clean Connection, LLC. · filed 2016-02-08(12)(D)(i)

Moreover, although section 50-6-102(12)(D)(i) identifies the scheduling of work hours as an independent factor, it can be considered in the context of whether an employer or contractor exercises control over the work.

Section 50-6-102(12)(D)(i) uses several factors to distinguish employees from independent contractors, with the right to control the work carrying the greatest weight.

Hartley, Kevin v. Allen Hammons (General Contractor) · filed 2016-03-18(12)(D)(i)

Of the factors identified in section 50-6-102(12)(D)(i), the right to control the conduct of the work has been characterized as the most significant in determining whether an injured worker is an employee or independent contractor.

Section 50-6-102(12)(D)(i) supplies factors for deciding whether a worker is an employee or an independent contractor, including control of work, pay method, hiring of helpers, tools, and scheduling.

Coitrone, Michael v. Robert Fulton dba Bob's Construction · filed 2017-06-21(12)(D)(i)

With regard to Mr. Coitrone's employment status with Mr. Fulton, the Court finds the undisputed evidence establishes Mr. Coitrone is likely to prove he was Mr. Fulton's employee, as opposed to an independent contractor, at the time of the injury on July 15, 2016. Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-102(12)(D)(i) (2016) sets forth the following factors for making this determination as follows: ... Mr. Coitrone testified he was Mr. Fulton's employee; he further testified he was to be paid on hourly basis and that he was driven to and from the jobsite by Mr. Fulton, who dictated his schedule. Furthermore, the UEF Investigation Report determined that Mr. Fulton found the job, controlled the hiring of helpers, and provided tools and equipment for the construction project. ... As a result, the Court finds at this stage that Mr. Coitrone provided sufficient evidence to show he is likely to prove he was an employee of Mr. Fulton at the time of his work-related injury.

Section 50-6-102(12)(D)(i) determines whether a worker is an employee or an independent contractor by considering factors including control of the work, payment, scheduling, tools, and freedom to work for others.

Armas, Juan v. Enamorado · filed 2017-08-22(12)(D)(i)

Finally, although Mr. Armas left briefly to work elsewhere, that was due to a lack of work for Mr. Enamorado and not because he was free to offer his services to other entities. In sum, the Court finds the evidence supports a holding that Mr. Armas was Mr. Enamorado's employee rather than an independent contractor.

Section 50-6-102(12)(D)(i) directs courts to consider seven work relationship factors when deciding whether a worker is an employee or a subcontractor.

Bland, Cody v. Chitwood · filed 2017-07-24(12)(D)(i)

Applying these factors to Mr. Bland's uncontroverted testimony and the UEF investigator's findings, the Court holds he was Mr. Chitwood's employee rather than a subcontractor.

Section 50-6-102(12)(D)(i) directs courts to assess the work relationship to distinguish an employee from an independent contractor, with the employer’s control over the work a key consideration.

Camacho, Yolanda v. Ricardo Allen, d/b/a Southern Standard Logistics, LLC · filed 2021-12-08(12)(D)(i)

These facts show that Mr. Allen controlled how Ms. Camacho performed her work, the key consideration in determining whether an employee-employer relationship existed.

Section 50-6-102(10)(D)(i) weighs the statutory relationship factors to determine whether a worker is an employee or an independent contractor; a 1099 and no tax withholding do not outweigh factors showing employment.

Lopez, Sergio v. Bud Archie Painting/N&S Cleaning · filed 2023-05-30(10)(D)(i)

In sum, almost all of the statutory factors favor a finding that Mr. Lopez was an employee. The Court holds that Mr. Lopez is likely to prevail at a hearing on the merits in showing that he was an employee.

The employment-relationship factors in section 50-6-102(10)(d)(i) support independent-contractor status when the worker controls his work, supplies his tools, directs helpers, and can work elsewhere, and the putative employer lacks a right of termination.

VA ZQUEZ ROJAS, MARTIN v. MARTIN CANTU MODESTO · filed 2025-04-29(10)(d)(i)

Based on the limited record, Mr. Cantu Modesto’s unrefuted testimony shows Mr. Vazquez Rojas was an independent contractor. First, he exerted control over his own work, working only occasionally and completing work assignments independently. Secondly, he brought his own tools. Third, he selected his own workers, hiring his brothers and directing their work. Fourth, he had the freedom to offer services elsewhere, as Mr. Cantu Modesto testified that he only used helpers occasionally for a few hours or days. Fifth, Mr. Cantu Modesto did not retain a right of termination if he used helpers only occasionally for certain projects. Sixth, only Mr. Cantu Modesto testified about the method of payment, saying it varied and that sometimes homeowners paid helpers separately.

Section 50-6-102(3) treats a workers’ compensation insurer as an employer under the Workers’ Compensation Act.

Leatherwood v. United Parcel Service · filed 1985-10-28(3)

The workers’ compensation insurer is deemed an employer under the Act.

Section 50-6-102(13) includes an employer’s insurer in the definition of “employer,” bringing claims against the workers’ compensation carrier within the Act’s exclusive remedy provision.

Terrell Biggs, Jr. v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Company · filed 2021-11-22(13)

Moreover, the Act defines “employer” to include the employer’s insurer. ... Therefore, an action against the employer’s compensation carrier does not fall outside the scope of the Act or the exclusive remedy provision.

Section 50-6-102(11)(A) includes unauthorized aliens working for employers within its definition of employee.

Torres v. Precision Industries, P.I., d/b/a Precision Industries, Terry Hedrick and Vicki Hedrick · filed 2014-08-05(11)(A)

Because of the broad all-inclusive definition of employee in the Tennessee Workers’ Compensation Act, we find that it is appropriate to include unauthorized aliens working for employers within the scope of this definition.

Section 50-6-102(11)(A) defines an employee as a person in an employer’s service under a contract of hire or apprenticeship; a job applicant is outside that definition.

YARDLEY v. HOSPITAL HOUSEKEEPING SYSTEMS, LLC · filed 2015-08-21(11)(A)

An employee is defined as a “person . . . in the service of an employer . . . under any contract of hire or apprenticeship, written or implied.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-102(11)(A). Under this definition, Ms. Yardley was not an employee, but merely a job applicant. As such, the Company had no obligation to her under the Act.

Section 50-6-102(12)(A) defines an employee through service for an employer under a written or implied contract of hire, requiring sufficient evidence of the alleged employment relationship.

Santiago, Manuel v. Wayne Johnson dba Omega Home Improvements · filed 2016-08-09(12)(A)

The Workers' Compensation Law defines an "employee" as "every person... in the service of an employer... under any contract of hire or apprenticeship, written or implied." See Duck v. Cox Oil Co., No. 2015-07-0089, 2016 TN Wrk. Comp. App. Bd. LEXIS 2, at *13-14 (Tenn. Workers' Comp. App. Bd. Jan. 21, 2016); Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-102(12)(A) (2015) (emphasis added). ... Therefore, as a matter of law, this Court holds Mr. Santiago failed to come forward with sufficient evidence from which this Court might conclude that he is likely to prevail at a -hearing on the merits.

Section 50-6-102(13) excludes an individual with only two employees from the definition of an employer.

Roque-Blanco, Carlos v. Manley · filed 2017-06-07(13)

Rather, the evidence establishes Mr. Manley had only two employees and thus does not meet the definition of employer according to the Workers' Compensation Law.

An employer with only four employees is outside the Workers' Compensation Law under subsection (13) and need not carry workers' compensation insurance for them.

Osborne, Darry v. Starrun, Inc., et al. · filed 2017-06-08(13)

The Bureau determined that Starrun had four employees and, thus, was not subject to the Workers' Compensation Law under Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-102(13) (2016). ... Initially, the Court adopts the findings of the Bureau's investigative report concerning Starrun's status under the Workers' Compensation Law. ... Consequently, Starrun was not required to carry workers' compensation insurance on its employees and bears no liability for any workers' compensation benefits Mr. Osborne may be entitled to as a result of his October 21, 2016 work accident.

Section 50-6-102(13) defines an employer as generally using at least five paid workers, but a construction service provider qualifies with fewer than five.

Holmes, Daryl v. Ellis Watkins d/b/a Watkins Lawn Care · filed 2017-12-01(13)

Therefore, the Tennessee Workers' Compensation Law only required Watkins to have one employee to meet the definition of "employer." Watkins confirmed he had more than one employee; so, he qualified as Mr. Holmes' employer.

An individual using the services of at least five people for pay is an employer under section 50-6-102(13); the worker’s credited testimony can establish that count.

Roque-Blanco, Carlos E. v. Manely · filed 2018-07-02(13)

An employer is defined as “any individual . . . using the services of not less than five (5) persons for pay[.]’” Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-102(13). To succeed, Mr. Blanco must first prove he was an employee in the service of an employer. Mr. Blanco satisfied this requirement by providing testimony that Mr. Manely employed five employees (including himself) whom he could name and more he could not name. The Court finds Mr. Blanco’s testimony outweighs the information the compliance specialist provided from his investigation.

Section 50-6-102(13) requires an employer to use the services of at least five persons for pay to be subject to the Workers’ Compensation Law.

Zhou, Qiao v. Yums Subs · filed 2018-12-10(13)

In addition the Court finds that Yums did not employ five persons for pay as required to be subject to the Workers’ Compensation Law.

An employer with at least five employees is covered by workers’ compensation, and its employees may receive benefits for injuries causally related to their employment.

Lee, Holden v. Hometown Moving Co., LLC · filed 2019-09-30(12), (13)

The uncontroverted evidence establishes that Mr. Lee is likely to prove at trial that Hometown employed him and at least four other employees on February 19, 2018. Based on this fact, Mr. Lee is entitled to workers’ compensation benefits from Hometown for any injury causally related to his employment. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 50-6-102(12) and (13).

An employer must use the services of at least five persons for pay to be subject to the workers’ compensation law.

SADEEKAH, KHALED v. ZAHER ABDELAZIZ, d/b/a HOME FURNITURE AND MORE · filed 2020-09-17(13)

As to whether Home Furniture meets the statutory definition of an employer, an employer must use “the services of not less than five (5) persons for pay” to be subject to the law. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 50-6-102(13), 50-6-106(5) (2019). Here, the evidence showed Home Furniture does not meet this definition.

Section 50-6-102(11) includes both the insured company and its workers’ compensation insurer in the term “employer.”

Nelson, Anvil v. QVS, Inc. · filed 2023-03-22(11)

Thus, in circumstances where a workers’ compensation insurer is contractually obligated to retain an attorney to defend an insured company in a workers’ compensation case, the attorney’s primary ethical duty is to the employer, but the term “employer” includes both the company and the insurer. Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-102(11).

Section 50-6-102(11) includes an employer’s insurer in the definition of “employer” while its workers’ compensation policy remains effective, even if the insurer is challenging the policy’s validity.

Perez, Oscar v. J&J Tovar Construction, LLC · filed 2023-12-04(11)

Thus, unless and until a court of competent jurisdiction determines the insurance contract is voidable under Tennessee Code Annotated section 56-7-103 or other applicable law, Northstone is subject to the jurisdiction and authority of the Court of Workers’ Compensation Claims as provided in Tennessee Code Annotated sections 50-6-102(11), 50-6-408(2) and (3), and 50-6-409.

An employer’s filing fee cannot be assessed against a party without evidence or acknowledgment that it is an employer under the statutory definition.

Steel v. TForce Freight, Inc. · filed 2025-04-17(11)

We conclude it would be incongruous, in circumstances where there is no evidence or acknowledgment of an employer-employee relationship, to nevertheless tax costs against a party as “the employer.”

Section 50-6-102(11) counts whether the particular employer used the services of at least five persons for pay as of the date of injury, including workers supplied by related entities if their services were used for pay.

Green, Crystal v. 101 Vape & Smoke, LLC · filed 2025-10-03(11)

In other words, we conclude the relevant inquiry is not whether various business entities are to be “considered collectively,” but whether this particular employer can be considered to have “us[ed] the services of not less than five (5) persons for pay” as of the date of Employee’s accident.

An employer that has employed five regular workers remains subject to the Workers’ Compensation Law unless it withdraws from coverage.

Whitehead v. Watkins · filed 1987-12-07(a)(3)

In the present case the testimony showed that defendant employed five employees prior to the decedent’s accident. There is no evidence in the record that defendant took any steps to withdraw from coverage under the Tennessee Workers’ Compensation Law at any time prior to the accident. On this record we cannot say that there is not material evidence to support the trial court’s finding that defendant was subject to the worker’s compensation law at the time of the decedent’s accident.

Section 50-6-102’s definition of employer includes an approved guarantor that assumes responsibility for a self-insured employer’s workers’ compensation benefits, giving the guarantor exclusive-remedy protection.

Malkiewicz v. R.R. Donnelley & Sons Co. · filed 1990-08-13(a)(3)

We believe that inclusion of a guarantor within the definition of “employer” so as to afford it the benefit of the exclusive remedy provisions of the statutes is consistent with the legislative purpose of insuring to injured workers solvent and responsible sources of recovery under the compensation program.

A parent corporation can qualify as an employer when its subsidiary functions as a wholly subservient, integrated part of the parent.

Stigall v. Wickes MacHinery, a Division of the Wickes Corp. · filed 1990-11-19(a)(3)

There is nothing in this record to establish that Hunter Fan and Ventilating Company was anything other than totally subservient to its parent corporation, or that Robbins and Myers, Inc. was not, in fact defendant’s employer.

A worker coming to or going from the workplace on the employer’s premises is in the course of employment, and an employer-provided employee parking area counts as premises even if customers or the public may also use it.

Lollar v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. · filed 1989-02-21(a)(4)

We hold today that a worker who is on the employer’s premises coming to or going from the actual work place is acting in the course of employment. We further hold that if the employer has provided a parking area for its employees, that parking area is part of the employer’s premises regardless of whether the lot is also available to customers or the general public.

Section 50-6-102(a)(4) excludes a voluntary off-premises lunch trip from the course of employment when the employer did not direct the trip, even if the employee intended to retrieve a work form.

Stephens ex rel. Stephens v. Maxima Corp. · filed 1989-08-07(a)(4)

Our workers’ compensation law requires that an injury in order to be compensable must be one “arising out of and in the course of employment.” Tenn.Code Ann. § 50-6-102(a)(4). ... The general rule is that injuries received during lunch or dinner break and while *934employee is off the employer’s premises are not compensable. ... Upon review of the record the evidence does not establish that her employer had instructed, directed, required or even suggested that the employees return home to get the P.D.Q. forms. Such action was the decision of the deceased.

Union activity is in the course of employment when it provides sufficient mutual benefit to the employee and employer.

Jones v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. · filed 1991-05-20(a)(4)

We cannot say that the receipt and conveyance of this message to union officials served no purpose of or lacked benefit to the employer. Therefore, we hold that Jones’ activity was of mutual benefit to the union and to Jones’ employer, and thus, her injury was sustained in the course of her employment.

An injury on the employer’s premises during a break provided by the employer is generally compensable, even if the employee is off the clock.

McCormick v. Aabakus Inc. · filed 2000-10-05(12)

The rule applicable to the present case is that where an employee is injured on the employer’s premises during a break period provided by the employer, such injury is generally compensable.

An injury during travel to or from work generally falls outside the course of employment unless it occurs on the employer’s premises or a recognized exception applies.

Larry Howard, M.D. v. Cornerstone Medical Associates, P.C. · filed 2001-05-31(12)

A compensable workers’ compensation injury must arise out of and occur in the course of employment. Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-102(12); Cunningham v. Shelton Sec. Serv., Inc., 46 S.W.3d 131, 135 (Tenn. 2001). ... The general rule is that an employee is not acting within the course of employment when the employee is going to or coming from work unless the injury occurs on the employer’s premises.

Section 50-6-102(12) generally excludes injuries sustained while traveling to or from work from the course of employment, unless the injury occurs on the employer’s premises or a recognized exception applies.

Howard v. Cornerstone Medical Associates, P.C. · filed 2001-08-31(12)

A compensable workers’ compensation injury must arise out of and occur in the course of employment. ... The general rule is that an employee is not acting within the course of employment when the employee is going to or coming from work unless the injury occurs on the employer’s premises.

For a recreational injury to occur in the course of employment, whether the employee participated voluntarily is the touchstone; mere encouragement or a nominal cash prize does not make a voluntary activity part of the employment.

Young v. Taylor-White, LLC · filed 2005-10-20(13)

In our view, the voluntary nature of the activity, rather than the fact that the activity occurs on the employer’s premises or provided a benefit to the employer, is the touchstone for determining whether the injury occurred during the course of employment. ... Although the D.J. did encourage Young to participate in the race, neither mere encouragement nor the offer of a nominal cash prize is enough to transform what would otherwise be a voluntary activity into one within the course of employment.

Section 50-6-102(13) covers an injury occurring while an employee waits at the employer’s office to receive pay in accordance with the employer’s payment procedures as arising out of and in the course of employment.

Hurst v. Labor Ready · filed 2006-07-07(13)

In short, the evidence does not preponderate against a finding that the shooting occurred while Hurst was within the time and place of his employment and while he was following Labor Ready’s procedures for collecting his paycheck.

Section 50-6-102(13) excludes an injury from workers’ compensation when the employee was on the employer’s premises as a customer rather than acting in the course and scope of employment.

Higgins, Darrius v. Big K Food Market & Liquors, Inc. · filed 2014-11-14(13)

As such, Employee did not sustain an injury by accident which arose primarily in the course and scope of his employment and thus is not entitled to the workers' compensation benefits he seeks.

An employee acts within the course and scope of employment when attempting a task in response to the owner’s instruction and to further the employer’s interests, even if the task was not an assigned duty.

Scarbrough, Jeffrey v. Right Way Recycling, LLC · filed 2015-04-20(13)

The trial court's finding further supports a conclusion that Employee's efforts in attempting to move the trackhoe were within the scope of his employment, since his actions were in response to an instruction from the owner and were intended to further Employer's interests. The trial court concluded that Employee "acted in the course and scope of his employment when he attempted to move the trackhoe . . . ," and we find that the evidence does not preponderate against this determination.

An injury does not occur in the course of employment when the employee has left her work duties and is assaulted in a private dispute outside the workplace.

Sanders, Sarah v. Regis Corp. dba SmartStyle · filed 2015-05-11(13)

However, the assault itself did not occur while she was styling hair, and in fact she abandoned the workplace immediately prior to the assault. Therefore, the injury did not occur in the course of her employment.

An employee injured while aiding coemployees may be acting in the course and scope of employment when the aid benefits the employer.

Griffin, Douglas v. Al’s Liquor Store, D/B/A Frugal McDoogals · filed 2015-07-02(13)

Because Mr. Griffin went to aid co-employees, his actions benefited McDoogals. Accordingly, the Court finds that Mr. Griffin acted in the course and scope of this employment when he responded to Ms. Smith’s and Samantha’s cries for help and was subsequently injured by a fleeing shoplifter.

Section 50-6-102(13) covers an injury sustained while an employee leaves the employer’s premises within a reasonable time after quitting.

Duck, Melissa v. Cox Oil Co. · filed 2015-12-11(13)

In view of the above principle, this Court finds that an employee who is leaving the premises of an employer immediately after terminating her employment remains in the course and scope of her employment for a reasonable time thereafter.

Section 50-6-102(13)(A) can cover an injury during a permitted personal break on the employer’s premises when the employee’s activity is incidental to work.

Dennis, Jr., Robert v. Polymer Components · filed 2015-12-18(13)(A)

As discussed above, the Legislature added "in the course and scope of employment" to the definition of injury. Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-102(13)(A) (2014) (emphasis added.) The Court must determine whether Mr. Dennis sustained his injuries at a time and a place where he was expected to be and when he was doing something incidental or rationally-connected to his work. ... Therefore, the Court finds that Mr. Dennis sustained his injuries while performing an incidental act while in the course and scope of his employment with Polymer.

Section 50-6-102(14)(B) treats an injury as arising primarily out of and in the course and scope of employment when the employment contributed more than 50% to causing it; “scope” does not add a separate third prong.

Navyac, Laury v. Universal Health Services · filed 2016-03-31(14)(B)

Therefore, we find that while a trial court can consider the meaning and impact of each term in the definition of "injury" in any given case, the legislature has mandated that the phrase "arises primarily out of and in the course and scope of employment" is satisfied if the trial court determines that "it has been shown by a preponderance of the evidence that the employment contributed more than fifty percent (50%) in causing the injury, considering all causes." Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6- 102(14)(B). The three-pronged test suggested by Employer adds an element of rigidity that is simply not supported by the plain language of the statute.

Section 50-6-102(14) requires an injury to occur in the course and scope of employment; an injury occurring after employment ended does not satisfy that requirement.

Mathis, Valley v. The Kroger, Co. · filed 2016-04-12(14)

Under the Workers’ Compensation Law, an “injury” means “an injury by accident . . . arising primarily out of and in the course and scope of employment, that causes death, disablement, or the need for medical treatment of the employee[.]” Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-102(14) (2015). ... Because Kroger terminated Ms. Mathis employment on May 18, 2015, her June 11, 2015 injury could not have occurred during her employment for Kroger. Accordingly, the Court finds Ms. Mathis is unlikely to succeed at a hearing on the merits in proving she suffered injury in the course and scope of her employment for Kroger.

Under subsection (14)(B), “scope” means the extent of activity normally associated with work.

Navyac, Laura v. Universl Healthcare Servces · filed 2016-02-11(14)(B)

By applying this definition, the court finds that scope as used in the context of Tennessee Code Annotated section 50- 6-102(14)(B) means the extent of activity normally associated with work.

Section 50-6-102(14) does not treat an ordinary commute in an employee’s own vehicle as within the course of employment merely because the employer requires reliable transportation and imposes conditions on the vehicle’s use.

Dugger, Paula v. Home Health Care of Middle Tennessee, LLC, et al. · filed 2016-03-16(14)

A compensable workers' compensation injury must "arise[] primarily out of and occur in the course and scope of employment." Tenn. Code Ann. §50-6-102(14) (2015). ... Moreover, we have found nothing in the Reform Act that suggests an intent to depart from the longstanding "going and coming" rule in Tennessee or that creates an additional exception to the rule for employees who are required to furnish their own transportation for traveling to and from work with conditions or restrictions imposed on the use of the vehicle.

An injury is compensable under section 50-6-102(14) only if it arises primarily out of and in the course and scope of employment.

Lovette, Lawrence v. Titan Transfer, Inc. · filed 2016-04-28(14)

To be compensable, Mr. Lovette must show his alleged injury arose primarily out of and in the course and scope of his employment. Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-102(14) (2015). ... The Court determines that Mr. Brenton's testimony was more credible than that of Mr. Lovette, and Mr. Lovette has not come forward with sufficient evidence from which this Court might determine he is likely to prevail at a hearing on the merits.

An employee injured in a client’s parking lot while arriving for an assigned shift may have an injury arising primarily out of and in the course and scope of employment when the job requires her presence on the client’s premises.

Felter, Jessica v. MMR Senior Alliance Group · filed 2016-08-03(14)(A)

As a result, the Court holds Ms. Felter is likely to prevail at a hearing on the merits in establishing she sustained an injury arising primarily out of and in the course and scope of her employment on January 24, 2016.

An employer’s facilitation of a commute does not place travel within the course of employment unless the employer controls the transportation or deliberately and substantially pays for it.

Smith, LaShonda v. Macy's Corporate Services · filed 2018-11-05(14)

However, facilitating the transportation is not equivalent to furnishing the transportation. Further, inducing Ms. Smith’s employment by facilitating transportation without the employer exercising control over or deliberately, substantially paying for the transportation is not sufficient to make that transportation a part of her employment. Thus, the Court holds Ms. Smith is unlikely to prevail at a hearing on the merits in proving she sustained an injury during the course and scope of her employment with Macy’s.

An injury falls outside the course and scope of employment when the worker voluntarily performs an after-hours task unrelated to his job that does not benefit the employer.

Garrett, Jody v. Precision Piping and Plumbing · filed 2019-06-04(14)

Precision hired Mr. Garrett as a plumber. Therefore, any activity not directly or indirectly related to plumbing, including splitting logs for his supervisor, fell outside the scope of his work. Also, his injury occurred after the work day, when Mr. Garrett could have gone home but volunteered to help Mr. Underwood prepare for a church event. The Court finds no casual connection between Mr. Garrett’s job as a plumber and the work he performed chopping wood as an act of kindness for Mr. Underwood. The work did not benefit Precision. Therefore, the Court holds he is not likely to prevail at a hearing on the merits in proving compensability of his injury.

An injury occurs in the course of employment when it happens on the employer’s premises during activities incidental to employment, including a supervisor’s workplace assault or intimidation.

Brewster v. Swaggerty Sausage Co., Inc. · filed 2020-05-27(14)

In this case, Brewster’s alleged injuries resulting from Swaggerty’s alleged negligent retention of Burlingame occurred in the course of his employment because they all took place on Swaggerty’s premises while he was engaged in activities incidental to his employment.

Section 50-6-102(14) covers an injury arising primarily out of and in the course and scope of employment.

Bermudez, Bladimir v. Rick Messina d/b/a Messina Masonry & Construction, LLC · filed 2021-03-11(14)

Concerning permanent partial disability benefits, Mr. Bermudez proved he suffered an “injury... arising primarily out of and in the course and scope of employment.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-102(14).

Section 50-6-102(14)(A)-(B) covers injuries sustained in the course and scope of employment, including injuries from a fall at work.

Holder, Harley v. Nathan Marcum d/b/a Marcum Lumber · filed 2021-10-06(14)(A)-(B)

Turning first to medical benefits, based on Mr. Holder’s affidavit, he fell and sustained injuries in the course and scope of his employment. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 50- 6-102(14)(A)-(B).

Section 50-6-102(12) requires an injury to arise primarily out of and in the course and scope of employment; an after-hours errand for another worker outside the employee’s duties does not meet the course-and-scope requirement.

Dickerson, Gary v. Dominion Development Group, LLC · filed 2024-03-05(12)

We conclude the trial court did not err in determining that Employer had negated an essential element of Employee’s claim by proving the motor vehicle accident did not occur in the course and scope of Employee’s work.

An injury can arise out of and occur in the course of employment when an employee’s trip to get coworkers’ lunches benefits the employer and exposes the employee to a road hazard.

McCammon v. Neubert · filed 1983-05-31(a)(4)

Within the statutory requirement at issue, the phrases “arising out of” and “in the course of” are not synonymous concepts. ... From a review of the entire record in the instant case, we hold that there is material evidence to support the chancellor’s finding that plaintiff sustained a com-pensable injury both arising out of and in the course of his employment.

An injury must arise out of and in the course of employment to be compensable; rescuing a stranger is in the course of employment only if it benefits or furthers the employer’s interests or follows its instructions.

Hall v. Mason Dixon Lines, Inc. · filed 1987-12-21(a)(4)

The injury by accident must arise out of and in the course of employment for worker’s compensation liability to be imposed. T.C. A. § 50-6-102(a)(4). ... Our inquiry must focus upon whether at the time of the injury plaintiff was engaged in his employment duties, so that the accident may be found to have occurred “in the course of employment.” The guidelines for this inquiry for accidents caused by the rescue of third parties was established in Lennon. “[Cjompensation should not be permitted unless the employee acts in some way for the benefit of or in furtherance of the interests of his employer, or pursuant to instructions given by the employer.” Lennon Co., 219 Tenn. at 634, 412 S.W.2d at 644.

An injury may occur in the course of employment during a reasonable interval before or after working hours when the employee is on the employer’s premises doing preparatory or incidental acts.

Carter v. Volunteer Apparel, Inc. · filed 1992-04-20(a)(5)

We conclude that “in the course of employment,” for plant employees having a fixed time to clock in, embraces a reasonable interval before and after actual working hours while the employee is on the premises engaged in preparatory or incidental acts.

An injury caused by an uncontrolled force of nature arises primarily out of employment only if the employee faces an increased risk peculiar to the work rather than a danger common to the public.

Rosasco v. West Knoxville Painters, LLC · filed 2021-11-18(14)

"When an employee suffers an injury as the result ofan uncontrolled force of nature or an act of God, to satisfy the 'arising out of requirement, the employee must prove that the injury was caused by an increased risk peculiar to the nature of the employment and not a danger common to the general public at the time and place where it occurred." Id. at 537; see also Wait v. Travelers Indem. Co., 240 S.W.3d 220, 228 (Tenn. 2007). ... After reviewing the foregoing principles and the evidence in the record, we conclude that the Court of Workers' Compensation Claims properly determined that Mr. Rosasco's injuries did not arise primarily out of his employment.

An injury arises primarily out of employment only when medical proof shows to a reasonable degree of medical certainty that work contributed more than fifty percent to causing it, considering all causes.

Walker, Dionnie v. Clarksville Dep’t of Electricity · filed 2021-12-17(14)(A)-(C)

However, these statements do not say that the left-shoulder condition arose primarily out of and in the course and scope of employment, causing the need for medical treatment, and that, to a reasonable degree of medical certainty, the employment contributed more than fifty percent in causing the injury, considering all causes.

Section 50-6-102(14)(A) requires an employee to show that an injury arose primarily out of and in the course and scope of employment, including that the work injury was the primary cause of the need for treatment.

Wilhelm, Andrea v. Walgreen Co. · filed 2022-03-16(14)(A)

Ms. Wilhelm must show that her injuries arose primarily out of and in the course and scope of her employment. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-102(14)(A). ... For these reasons, the Court finds that Ms. Wilhelm met her burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that her need for knee replacement was primarily caused by the August 19, 2019 work injury.

An injury does not arise primarily out of employment merely because the employee was present at the place of injury; evidence connecting the injury to work is required.

The Estate of Raymond Gaters, Deceased Employee, by Kashia Gaters, Surviving Spouse v. Triyar Management, Inc. · filed 2022-08-18(14)

The Workers’ Compensation Law defines “injury” as one that arises primarily out of and in the course and scope of employment. Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-102(14). ... However, Ms. Gaters must present evidence showing more than his mere presence at the place of injury to satisfy the “arising out of” requirement.

Section 50-6-102(5) separately requires that an injury arise out of employment, which concerns its origin, and occur in the course of employment, which concerns its time, place, and circumstances.

Woods v. Harry B. Woods Plumbing Co. · filed 1998-04-06(5)

The phrases "arising out of" and "in the course of" employment comprise two separate requirements. The phrase "in the course of" refers to the time, place and circumstances under which the injury occurred. McAdams v. Canale, 294 S.W.2d 696, 699 (Tenn. 1956). The phrase "arising out of" refers to an injury's origin. Id.

Section 50-6-102(12) requires an employee seeking workers’ compensation benefits to prove that the injury arose out of and in the course of employment.

Richards v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. · filed 2002-03-26(12)

To be eligible for workers’ compensation benefits, an employee must establish that he or she suffered an injury arising out of and in the course of his or her employment.

An injury is compensable only if it arises out of and in the course of employment; arising out of employment concerns the injury’s cause, while in the course of employment concerns its time, place, and circumstances.

Crew v. First Source Furniture Group · filed 2008-06-24(13)

To be compensable under workers’ compensation law, an injury must “aris[e] out of and in the course of employment.” ... Upon our review of this record, we are persuaded that the Panel properly concluded that the evidence preponderates against the trial court’s finding that carpal tunnel syndrome arose out of Crew’s employment with Anderson Hickey.

Section 50-6-102(13)(B) requires a causal connection between employment and injury; a back condition with no proven connection to the employee’s work does not satisfy that requirement.

Covington, Timothy v. GCA Services · filed 2015-09-15(13)(B)

“An injury ‘arises primarily out of and in the course and scope of employment’ only if it has been shown by a preponderance of the evidence that the employment contributed more than fifty percent (50%) in causing the injury, considering all causes[.]” Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-102(13)(B) (2014). ... Lastly, with respect to the December 11, 2014 condition, the Court finds that Mr. Covington failed to prove a causal connection between the condition and his work for GCA.

Section 50-6-102(14) requires expert proof that employment more likely than not caused the injury, considering all causes; a possible connection is insufficient.

Manuel, Darrell v. A-1 Workforce, inc. · filed 2016-05-05(14)

An employee now has the burden of proving by expert testimony that "more likely than not considering all causes as opposed to speculation and possibility," his employment was the primary cause of his injury. Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-102(14) (20 15). The Court finds the medical evidence presented in Mr. Manuel's case failed to do so.

Section 50-6-102(13)(A) requires evidence that an injury was caused by a specific incident or set of incidents at work.

Gragg, Lisa v. Christian Care Center of Johnson City · filed 2016-07-27(13)(A)

Her evidence failed to meet the statutory requirement that her injury was caused by a specific incident or set of incidents at work.

An injury must result from a specific incident identifiable by time and place of occurrence; credible testimony of such an incident can establish likely success on that element at an expedited hearing.

Flora, Daniel v. NSK Steering Systems America, Inc. · filed 2016-08-01(14)(A)

Upon thorough consideration of the conflicting testimony in this case, the Court finds Mr. Flora came forward with sufficient proof of a specific incident, identifiable by time and place of occurrence, from which this Court may conclude he is likely to prevail at a hearing on the merits on this issue.

Section 50-6-102(14)(D) requires an expert opinion linking an injury to work to a reasonable degree of medical certainty, considering all causes; medical records that mention both the condition and work without affirmatively linking them do not satisfy that requirement.

Berry, Juwana v. Community Health Services · filed 2016-05-11(14)(D)

The statute requires the expert medical opinion be shown to a reasonable degree of medical certainty, considering all causes. Dr. Davis' records do not satisfY this requirement, and thus fail to rebut Dr. Abbey's opinion on causation.

An injury caused by tripping over a workplace hazard can qualify as an accidental injury arising out of employment when the employee credibly identifies the hazard as the cause of the fall.

McDade, Michael v. IGC Protection · filed 2016-07-25(14)(A)

Further, an injury is “accidental” only if the injury is caused by a specific incident, or set of incidents, arising primarily out of and in the course and scope of employment[.] Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-102(14)(A) (2015). ... Here, Mr. McDade testified he tripped over the poles and fell, unlike the employee in Byrom who provided no concrete proof of the mechanism of injury. IGC provided no countervailing testimony, and the Court finds Mr. McDade’s testimony credible despite IGC’s claims of inconsistency in his written statements. Accordingly, the Court finds IGC’s idiopathic defense unpersuasive.

Under § 50-6-102(14), when an idiopathic event leads to a work-related crash, the causal inquiry focuses on what caused the injury rather than what caused the idiopathic event.

Osborne, Jr, Alonzo v. Beacon Transport, LLC · filed 2016-08-08(14)

Thus, as in McCaffery, the cause of the crash is not determinative. Instead, there is a clear causal connection, apparent to the rational mind, between the accident and the injuries Mr. Osborne sustained in the crash.

Section 50-6-102(14) requires an injury to arise primarily out of employment; a workplace assault with no employment connection does not meet that requirement.

Lawrence, Robert v. STOP N' SHOP · filed 2016-09-13(14)

However, the injury for which the employee seeks benefits must arise "primarily" out of and in the course and scope ofthe employment. Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-102(14) (2015). ... The Court finds the incident stemmed from either an "inherently private dispute," the purported rejection of David by Mr. Lawrence's sister or, from some other unknown cause. In either circumstance, the employment bears no relation to the incident.

Section 50-6-102(13)(B) requires employment to contribute more than fifty percent to an injury for the injury to arise primarily out of and in the course and scope of employment; a medical opinion based on credible injury history can support a likely showing of that causal connection at an expedited hearing.

Buckner, Douglas A. v. Eaton Corporation · filed 2016-09-23(13)(B)

In consideration of Dr. Mazza's opinion and the fact Dr. Mazza based it on a history closely resembling Mr. Buckner's credible testimony, 10 the Court finds that, at a hearing on the merits, Mr. Buckner will likely prevail in establishing his spinal injury arose primarily out of and in the course and scope of employment.

An injury arises primarily out of and in the course and scope of employment when the employment contributed more than fifty percent to causing it, considering all causes.

Boutros, Nesreen v. Amazon · filed 2016-09-23(13)(B)

An injury arises primarily out of and in the course and scope of employment "only if it has been shown by a preponderance of the evidence that the employment contributed more than fifty percent (50%) in causing the injury, considering all causes." Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-102(13)(B) (2015). ... Therefore, based on these documents and the testimony of Ms. Boutros, as a matter of law, the Court holds that the Ms. Boutros is likely to prevail at a hearing on the merits that her injury arose primarily out of and in the course and scope of employment.

Section 50-6-102(13) requires an injury to arise primarily out of and in the course and scope of employment to support workers’ compensation benefits.

Lambert, Steven Kelly v. The Roberts Company · filed 2016-10-04(13)

The 2013 Workers' Compensation Reform Act requires that an injury for which an employee seeks benefits arise "primarily" out of and in the course and scope of employment. Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-102(13) (2015). ... Accordingly, the Court holds Mr. Lambert is unlikely to prevail at a hearing on the merits in establishing his alleged injuries arose primarily out of and in the course and scope of employment.

Section 50-6-102(14) requires a compensable injury to arise primarily out of and in the course and scope of employment; employment must contribute more than fifty percent to causing the injury, considering all causes.

Gray, Herman Lyn v. Page Spreading and Trucking · filed 2016-10-28(14)(A)-(C)

To be compensable, an injury occurring after July 1, 2014, must result from a "specific incident, or set of incidents, arising primarily out of and in the course and scope of employment." Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-102(14)(A) (2015). An injury "arises primarily out of and in the course and scope of employment" only if it contributed more than fifty percent in causing the injury, considering all causes, as shown to a reasonable degree of medical certainty. Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-102(14)(B) and (C) (2015). ... Taken in its totality, the Court finds Mr. Gray has not come forward with sufficient evidence to show he is likely to prevail at a hearing on the merits on the dispositive issue of whether he sustained an injury arising primarily out of and in the course and scope of his employment with Page Trucking.

An injury from a required work task can arise primarily out of employment when the task causes the injuring fall, even if the reason the employee’s knee gave way is unknown.

Panzarella, Samuel v. Amazon.com, Inc. · filed 2016-11-23(14)(A)

Here, the important inquiry is not what caused Mr. Panzarella's knee to give way. The pertinent question is what caused his knee injury. Mr. Panzarella's unrefuted testimony is that Amazon's policy required its employees to pick up paper lying on the floor and instructed them on the proper manner to do so. Those duties fall within the course and scope of Mr. Panzarella's employment. ... Therefore, the Court holds Mr. Panzarella is likely to prevail at a hearing on the merits in establishing that his injury arose primarily from a hazard incident to his employment at Amazon.

An injury arises primarily out of employment when it contributes more than fifty percent to the employee’s disablement or need for medical treatment, considering all causes.

Simmons, Patrick v. RHA/Trenton, Inc. · filed 2016-12-08(14)(C)

Turning to the “arising primarily out of” requirement, the Court finds Mr. Simmons has not, at this interlocutory stage of the proceedings, established that his injury contributed more than fifty percent to his disablement or need for medical treatment. Mr. Simmons submitted only one hospital record and an MRI report. Neither contains a causation opinion. Thus, the Court finds Mr. Simmons, at this time, has not established that he sustained an injury arising primarily out of his employment.

Section 50-6-102(14) requires medical proof that employment contributed more than 50 percent to causing the need for treatment, considering all causes, for an injury to qualify as work-related.

Brown, Linda v. Nissan North America · filed 2020-08-25(14)

The Workers’ Compensation Law defines an injury as “an injury by accident... arising primarily out of and in the course and scope of employment, that causes . . . the need for medical treatment.” She must also show “to a reasonable degree of medical certainty that [the employment] contributed more than fifty percent (50%) in causing the . . . need for medical treatment, considering all causes,” and that, “in the opinion of the physician, it is more likely than not, considering all causes, as opposed to speculation or possibility.” See generally Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-102(14) (2019). ... In sum, Ms. Brown did not satisfy her burden to prove medical causation by a preponderance of the evidence.

Section 50-6-102(14) requires a work injury to arise primarily out of and in the course and scope of employment and to be shown to a reasonable degree of medical certainty.

Davis, Shane M. v. Harvest Party Rentals · filed 2020-09-03(14)

Further, a work injury must arise primarily out of and in the course and scope of employment, and it must be shown to a reasonable degree of medical certainty. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-102(14). ... Importantly, Mr. Davis did not introduce any opinion from a medical doctor that causally relates his need for treatment to the work incident and confirms that the medical treatment was reasonable and necessary. At this time, the Court holds Mr. Davis did not show that he is likely to prevail at a hearing on the merits that he is entitled to payment of his medical bills.

Section 50-6-102(14) requires proof that an injury arose primarily out of and in the course and scope of employment.

Lemons, Tina v. Ellwood Staffing Services, Inc. · filed 2021-01-21(14)

For Ms. Lemons to be successful in her claim, she must prove her injury arose primarily out of and in the course and scope of her employment. Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6- 102(14). Here, Elwood argued it negated an essential element of Ms. Lemons’s claim— causation. Specifically, the undisputed proof showed the panel physician stated her injury was not work-related, and Dr. Parsley did not state the alleged injury was primarily related to her work. The only medical evidence before the Court shows Ms. Lemons’s alleged injury was not primarily related to her work. Based on the undisputed facts and viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Ms. Lemons, the Court finds Elwood negated an essential element of her claim.

Section 50-6-102(14) requires proof of a work incident identifiable by time and place and medical evidence that employment was primarily responsible for the injury or need for treatment.

McGinnis, Barbara v. Range Line Discount Deli · filed 2021-03-26(14)(A)-(D)

Further, the proof showed that Ms. McGinnis’s work injury resulted in the need for treatment and that the employment activity, more likely than not, was primarily responsible for the injury and need for treatment. She reached maximum medical improvement on January 15, 2021, and her injury resulted in 50% permanent impairment. Thus, based on Dr. Jackson’s opinions, the Court holds Ms. McGinnis’s back injury arose primarily out of and in the course and scope of her employment and resulted in 50% permanent impairment to the whole person.

Section 50-6-102(14) requires proof to a reasonable degree of medical certainty that a work incident contributed more than 50% to the need for treatment, considering all causes.

Cunningham, Wendy v. Trustpoint Hospital, LLC · filed 2021-04-29(14)

Further, she must show, “to a reasonable degree of medical certainty that [the incident] contributed more than fifty percent (50%) in causing the . . . disablement or need for medical treatment, considering all causes.” “Shown to a reasonable degree of medical certainty” means that, in the opinion of the treating physician, it is more likely than not considering all causes as opposed to speculation or possibility. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-102(14). ... The Court therefore has no medical evidence regarding the cause of any of Ms. Cunningham’s alleged physical or mental injuries. Without that evidence, she has not proven “to a reasonable degree of medical certainty” that her work “contributed more than fifty percent (50%) in causing the . . . disablement or need for medical treatment, considering all causes.”

A compensable injury must arise primarily out of and in the course and scope of employment and involve a work-related incident identifiable by time and place.

Morton, Dustin v. Morsey Constructors, dba Harper Industries · filed 2021-07-15(14)

To prove a compensable injury, Mr. Morton must show that his alleged injuries arose primarily out of and in the course and scope of employment. This includes the requirement that he prove a work-related incident identifiable by time and place of occurrence. ... Therefore, the Court holds Mr. Morton is likely to prove a specific incident, identifiable by time and place, at a hearing on the merits.

An injury under § 50-6-102(14)(A)-(B) must result from a specific incident or set of incidents and arise primarily out of employment, meaning employment contributed more than fifty percent in causing it when all causes are considered.

SANTOS, JANSI CHAVEZ v. Barry Hooper, d/b/a Chick-Fil-A · filed 2021-07-21(14)(A)-(B)

Under Workers’ Compensation Law, Mr. Chavez Santos must prove he suffered an injury caused by a specific incident or set of incidents arising “primarily out of and in the course and scope of employment,” which means the employment contributed more than fifty percent in causing the injury, considering all causes.

An injury must arise primarily out of and in the course and scope of employment, meaning employment must contribute more than fifty percent to its cause, considering all causes.

Hobby, Sven v. Sumner County Ornamental · filed 2021-09-16(14)(A)-(B)

Under Workers’ Compensation Law, Mr. Hobby first must prove he suffered an injury caused by a specific incident or set of incidents arising “primarily out of and in the course and scope of employment.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-102(14)(A)-(B). This means he must prove that the employment contributed more than fifty percent in causing the injury, considering all causes, before any further inquiry need be made.

Section 50-6-102(14)(A) requires an employee to show an injury arose primarily out of employment and was caused by an incident identifiable by time and place of occurrence.

Lindsey, Willie Mae v. Kellogg Co. · filed 2021-11-17(14)(A)

To prevail she must show her injury arose primarily out of her employment and that it was caused by an incident identifiable by time and place of occurrence. Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-102(14)(A) (Emphasis added). ... The weaknesses of Ms. Lindsey’s evidence lead the Court to conclude that she likely would not prevail at trial in establishing a specific incident arising out of her employment.

An employee seeking medical benefits for an alleged injury must offer evidence that the condition arose primarily from work; after a long delay in requesting treatment, a mere allegation of a work-related injury is insufficient even at an expedited hearing.

Morton, Dustin v. Morsey Constructors d/b/a Harper Industries · filed 2021-10-04(14)(B)

An injury “arises primarily out of and in the course and scope of employment” only if it has been shown by a preponderance of the evidence that the employment contributed more than fifty percent (50%) in causing the injury, considering all causes. Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-102(14)(B). ... While Employee need not prove each and every element of his claim by a preponderance of the evidence to obtain medical benefits at an interlocutory stage of the case, given such a significant delay before his request for medical treatment, we conclude he must come forward with more than a mere allegation of alleged work-related injuries to support his claim for authorized medical treatment.

An employee seeking medical benefits must establish that the injury primarily arose out of and in the course and scope of employment, with reliable evidence connecting the injury to work.

Tedford, Daniel v. Energy Savers, LLC · filed 2021-10-19(14)

To be eligible for medical benefits, Mr. Tedford must prove that he suffered an injury that primarily arose out of and in the course and scope of his employment and that his need for medical treatment is related to that injury. Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-102(14). ... However, the Court at this time cannot hold that he is likely to succeed in proving entitlement to medical and temporary disability benefits at a hearing on the merits because he has not presented an accurate history to his providers so they can give correct causation opinions.

An injury arises primarily out of employment when it is shown to a reasonable degree of medical certainty that the injury contributed more than 50% to the need for medical treatment, considering all causes.

Shalabi, Mina v. Amazon.com Services, LLC · filed 2022-11-10(12)(C)

Specifically, an “injury” must arise “primarily out of employment,” meaning that it must be shown “to a reasonable degree of medical certainty that the injury contributed more than fifty percent” in causing the need for medical treatment, considering all causes.

Section 50-6-102(12) requires an employee injured after fainting from an idiopathic condition to show that a special employment hazard caused or exacerbated the injury.

BRDJANIN, DULKA v. HOSPITAL HOUSEKEEPING SYSTEMS, LLC · filed 2023-04-11(12)

For Ms. Brdjanin to prevail at a final hearing, she must prove her work presented a special hazard that caused or exacerbated her injuries when she fainted.

An injury must arise primarily out of and in the course and scope of employment; an accidental coworker shooting unrelated to the employer’s work does not arise out of employment.

Burke, Timothy v. Steve Towers Enterprises, LLC, a/k/a Steve Towers Holding, LLC · filed 2023-06-23(13)

The Workers’ Compensation Law defines “injury” as one that arises primarily out of and in the course and scope of employment. Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-102(13). ... Mr. Burke’s injury did not arise primarily out of his employment.

A knee condition must arise primarily out of employment to qualify as a work-related injury; unexplained pain while walking without a workplace hazard or medical proof of work-related exacerbation does not meet that requirement.

Crabtree, Lindsey v. Kelly Services Global, LLC · filed 2024-02-26

Ms. Crabtree must show she is likely to prevail at a hearing on the merits that her right knee condition arose primarily out of and in the course and scope of her employment. McCord v. Advantage Human Resourcing, 2015 TN Wrk. Comp. App. Bd. LEXIS 6, at *9 (Mar. 27, 2015); Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-102 (2023). ... Under these circumstances, the Court cannot find that Ms. Crabtree’s knee condition arose primarily out of her employment. She is not likely to prevail at a hearing on the merits at this time.

Section 50-6-102(12) requires proof to a reasonable degree of medical certainty that work contributed more than fifty percent to the need for medical treatment, considering all causes.

Qualls, Steven v. Federal Mogul · filed 2022-12-08(12)

To meet this burden, Mr. Qualls must show to a reasonable degree of medical ...certainty that lifting the box at work contributed more than fifty percent in causing the need for his medical treatment, considering all causes. Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-102(12).

Section 50-6-102(12) covers injuries that arise primarily out of and in the course and scope of employment; the worker must prove that connection by a preponderance of the evidence.

Dingus, Gary v. GRAND PIANO AND FURNITURE COMPANY · filed 2024-06-05(12)

At a compensation hearing, Mr. Dingus must show he suffered an injury that arose primarily out of and in the course and scope of employment by the preponderance of the evidence. ... For all these reasons, the Court rejects Grand Piano’s defense and holds that Mr. Dingus has shown that his injuries arose primarily out of and in the course and scope of his employment.

Section 50-6-102(12)(B) requires proof by a preponderance of the evidence that employment contributed more than fifty percent to an injury, considering all causes.

Darlene Taylor as surviving spouse of Darrell Taylor v. Dale's Recycling · filed 2026-05-21(12)(B)

However, under the current workers' compensation law, an injury is compensable only if it arises primarily out of and in the course and scope of employment, which requires a showing by a preponderance of the evidence that the employment contributed more than fifty percent in causing the injury, considering all causes.

Section 50-6-102(12)(A) requires proof of a work-related incident or set of incidents identifiable by time and place of occurrence to establish a compensable injury.

Smith, Shirley v. Walbridge Construction · filed 2024-03-08(12)(A)

Ms. Smith must first show that her injury arose primarily out of and in the course and scope of employment. To do so, she must prove a work-related incident or set of incidents to her neck, back, and upper body identifiable by time and place of occurrence. Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-102(12)(A). She has not done so.

Section 50-6-102(12) requires a physician’s opinion, to a reasonable degree of medical certainty, that employment contributed more than 50% to the need for treatment when an employee seeks medical benefits for an alleged work injury.

Richards, Edward v. INSURANCE COMPANY OF THE STATE OF PENNSYLVANIA · filed 2024-12-03(12)(A)-(D)

Thus, Mr. Richards was forced to seek treatment on his own, and if he wanted the Court to consider ordering CNS to offer medical benefits, he needed to submit a physician opinion stating that to a reasonable degree of medical certainty the employment contributed more than 50% in causing the need for medical treatment, considering all causes.