Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113

Section 36-1-113(c) requires clear and convincing proof of a statutory ground and the child’s best interest; placement with relatives is not a prerequisite to termination.

In Re Legion S. · filed 2022-11-22(c)

After a full hearing, the court determined that DCS established by clear and convincing evidence (1) at least one statutory ground for termination alleged by DCS in its petition and (2) that termination of Mother’s parental rights is in the best interest of Legion. See In re James W., No. E2020-01440-COA-R3-PT, 2021 WL 2800523, at *18 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 6, 2021) (citing Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(c); In re Kaliyah S., 455 S.W.3d at 552). The statutory framework required no more from DCS in proving its case or from the Juvenile Court in deciding whether to terminate Mother’s parental rights to Legion.

Although the pre-petition period is most relevant under subsection (g)(14), the trial court may also consider a parent’s actions after filing and through trial.

In Re Brooklyn M. · filed 2024-01-05(g)(14)

We discern no error in the trial court’s consideration of evidence after the petition date with respect to this ground for termination.

Subsection (g)(14) is established when a parent manifests neither ability nor willingness to assume custody or financial responsibility and placement would create a substantial risk of harm.

In Re M.E.N.J.Et AL. · filed 2017-12-27(g)(14)

Mother has failed to manifest an ability to personally assume legal and physical custody or financial responsibility of the children, as she was living in a tent with several other individuals at the time of trial and had only recently begun making child support payments. She has also failed to manifest a willingness to do so, considering that she has refused multiple attempts from her children’s case worker to help her apply for transitional or low-income housing.

Section 36-1-113(g)(14) requires clear and convincing proof that the parent failed to manifest ability and willingness to assume custody or financial responsibility and that placement with the parent would pose a substantial risk of harm.

In Re: Maya R. · filed 2018-04-04(g)(14)

Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(14). Essentially, this ground requires DCS to prove two elements by clear and convincing evidence. Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(c)(1), (g)(14). First, DCS must prove that Mother failed to manifest “an ability and willingness to personally assume legal and physical custody or financial responsibility of the child[ren].” Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(14). DCS must then prove that placing the children in Mother’s “legal and physical custody would pose a risk of substantial harm to the physical or psychological welfare of the child[ren].” Id. ... We, therefore, conclude that DCS proved by clear and convincing evidence that Mother failed to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody or financial responsibility of her children and that placing them in her care would pose a risk of substantial harm to their physical or psychological welfare.

Subsection (g)(14) requires clear and convincing proof both that the parent failed to manifest ability and willingness to assume custody or financial responsibility and that placement would pose a risk of substantial harm.

In Re Piper B. · filed 2018-08-17(g)(14)

This ground requires DCS to prove two elements by clear and convincing evidence. Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(c)(1), (g)(14). First, DCS must prove that Mother failed to manifest “an ability and willingness to personally assume legal and physical custody or financial responsibility of the child[ren].” Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(14). Then, DCS must prove that placing the children in Mother’s “legal and physical custody would pose a risk of substantial harm to the physical or psychological welfare of the child[ren].” Id.

Termination under subsection (g)(14) requires proof that the parent failed to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody or financial responsibility and that placement with the parent would risk substantial harm to the child.

In Re Alexis C. · filed 2018-08-28(g)(14)

We conclude that the evidence does not preponderate against the trial court’s findings by clear and convincing evidence that Mother failed to manifest an ability and willingness to personally assume legal and physical custody or financial responsibility of the Child and that placing the Child in Mother’s legal and physical custody would pose a risk of substantial harm to the physical or psychological welfare of the Child.

Ability and willingness to assume custody under subsection (g)(14) are evaluated at the time the termination petition is filed, and a parent’s later claimed improvements do not overcome an admitted present inability to assume custody.

In Re: Cynthia P. · filed 2019-03-22(g)(14)

And while she claimed at trial that she was drug free and employed, she also admitted that she was currently unable to assume custody of her children. See In re M.E.N.J., No. E2017-01074-COA-R3-PT, 2017 WL 6603658, at *7 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 27, 2017) (concluding that the proper focus is on the parent’s situation at the time the termination petition is filed); cf. In re Maya R., 2018 WL 1629930, at *7 (examining evidence of the mother’s conduct both before and after the petition was filed).

A parent’s single lie to law enforcement does not, standing alone, clearly establish subsection (g)(14)’s substantial risk of psychological harm.

In Re Alexis S. · filed 2019-10-29(g)(14)

While we share the trial court’s disapproval of Mother’s action during the May 2018 incident, we cannot conclude this action, standing alone, constitutes clear and convincing evidence that placing the Child in Mother’s custody poses a risk of substantial harm to the Child’s psychological welfare.

A parent’s professed willingness to assume custody does not defeat subsection (g)(14) when the parent fails to manifest the ability to do so.

In Re: Jayda H. · filed 2019-11-25(g)(14)

To put it another way, consistent with the discussion in the In re Amynn K. decision, we do not view a parent’s demonstration of “willingness” as fatal to this ground when accompanied by a failure to manifest the requisite “ability.”

Incarceration before the petition and prompt efforts toward employment, housing, services, and assessments after release may defeat proof that parents lacked both ability and willingness to assume custody.

In Re Kyland F. · filed 2020-02-27(g)(14)

Considering the foregoing, we have determined that the evidence is not sufficient to prove the ground of failure to manifest a willingness and ability to assume custody or financial responsibility for either parent.

A parent’s demonstrated willingness to assume custody does not defeat subsection (g)(14) when the parent has not manifested the ability to do so.

In Re H. S. · filed 2020-03-20(g)(14)

DCS asks us to follow the holding of In re Amynn K., in which this Court held that parental rights can be terminated if the petitioner shows that a parent has failed to manifest an ability to assume custody of a child, despite having a willingness to do so. 2018 WL 3058280, at *12-14. ... After careful consideration of the conflicting authorities, we accept DCS’s invitation to follow the holding of In re Amynn K.

Subsection (g)(14) is satisfied when a parent manifests neither willingness nor ability to assume custody or financial responsibility, regardless of the competing interpretations of its first element.

In Re Nevaeh B. · filed 2020-03-31(g)(14)

Father’s actions and omissions indicate that he is not willing or able to personally assume custody or financial responsibility for the children. Therefore, the first element of this ground for termination has been established under either approach.

Ability under subsection (g)(14) turns on the parent’s lifestyle and circumstances, while willingness requires efforts to overcome the obstacles preventing custody or financial responsibility, not mere words.

In Re Caydan T. · filed 2020-04-07(g)(14)

A parent’s willingness and ability to personally assume custody of his or her child requires more than mere words. In re Cynthia P., No. E2018-01937-COA-R3-PT, 2019 WL 1313237, at *8 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 22, 2019). When examining a parent’s ability, we focus on “the parent’s lifestyle and circumstances.” Id. When evaluating a parent’s willingness to assume custody, we look at the parent’s efforts “to overcome the obstacles that prevent [him or her] from assuming custody or financial responsibility for the child.” Id.

The critical period for subsection (g)(14) is before the termination petition is filed, but the court may also consider the parent’s conduct after filing through trial.

In Re Jeremiah S. · filed 2020-04-23(g)(14)

We note that the critical time period for this ground is the time preceding the filing of the petition to terminate parental rights, see In re M.E.N.J., No. E2017-01074-COA-R3- PT, 2017 WL 6603658, at *6 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 27, 2017), though this court will also consider the parent’s actions following the filing of the petition and up to the time of trial, see In re Maya R., No. E2017-01634-COA-R3-PT, 2018 WL 1629930, at *7 (Tenn. Ct. App. April 4, 2018).

A parent who rarely visited and left mental-health, substance-abuse, and domestic-violence issues unresolved failed to manifest ability and willingness to assume custody under subsection (g)(14).

In Re Boston G. · filed 2020-04-29(g)(14)

DCS established the first prong by showing by clear and convincing evidence that Mother did not exhibit an ability and willingness to personally assume legal and physical custody for Boston. Mother had only had two visits with Boston in the 15 months he was in foster care, one in March 2018 and one in October 2018. And her mental health assessment, drug and alcohol abuse, and domestic violence issues remained unaddressed. Her recent efforts at a long-term treatment facility notwithstanding, Mother remained unable to care for Boston without significant assistance.

Under subsection (g)(14), willingness to assume custody or financial responsibility is measured by a parent’s actions rather than a stated desire to parent.

In Re Eli H. · filed 2020-05-08(g)(14)

Moreover, Mother lacked the willingness to assume custody of or financial responsibility for the Child, as demonstrated by her actions. Despite Mother’s testimony that she desired to care for and have a relationship with the Child, her behavior during the time the Child was in Grandparents’ custody tells a different story.

Seeking unsupervised visitation does not by itself manifest willingness to assume custody under subsection (g)(14), because visitation differs materially from accepting custodial responsibilities.

In Re: Ava M. · filed 2020-05-20(g)(14)

With respect to willingness, Mother’s petition for unsupervised visitation filed two months before the filing of the petition seeking to terminate her parental rights does not equate to an expression of willingness to personally assume custody of the Children. There is, after all, a material difference between unsupervised visitation and personally assuming the responsibilities that accompany custody.

A parent who provides negative drug screens, obtains housing and employment, and takes steps to overcome obstacles to custody may manifest willingness under subsection (g)(14), and termination on that ground also requires proof that custody would pose a risk of substantial harm.

In Re Justin D. · filed 2020-08-04(g)(14)

Finding that the evidence is not clear and convincing that Mother was unable and unwilling to assume custody, or that her having custody would pose a risk of substantial harm to the Children, we reverse the court’s holding in this regard.

Subsection (g)(14)'s first prong is satisfied by proof that the parent failed to manifest either ability or willingness to assume custody or financial responsibility.

In Re Nakayia S. · filed 2020-08-07(g)(14)

Since then, this court has consistently interpreted § 113(g)(14) as requiring the petitioner to prove the parent failed to manifest an ability or failed to manifest a willingness to assume custody or financial responsibility.

Subsection (g)(14) is established when a parent manifests neither the ability nor willingness to assume custody or financial responsibility and placement with the parent would risk substantial harm.

In Re: Rosylyn W. · filed 2020-10-13(g)(14)

Petitioners presented clear and convincing evidence that Mother had not manifested either an ability or a willingness to assume custody or financial responsibility of the Child. By the same quantum of proof, the Trial Court further found that placing the Child in Mother’s custody would cause a risk of substantial harm to the Child due to Mother’s inability to care for the Child. We find and hold, as did the Trial Court, that Petitioners proved this ground by clear and convincing evidence.

Subsection (g)(14) requires a parent to manifest both ability and willingness, so clear and convincing proof that the parent failed to manifest either one satisfies the first prong.

In Re Neveah M. · filed 2020-12-10(g)(14)

Therefore, we conclude that section 36-1-113(g)(14) places a conjunctive obligation on a parent or guardian to manifest both an ability and willingness to personally assume legal and physical custody or financial responsibility for the child. If a person seeking to terminate parental rights proves by clear and convincing proof that a parent or guardian has failed to manifest either ability or willingness, then the first prong of the statute is satisfied. In re Amynn K., 2018 WL 3058280, at *13.

Custodians’ efforts to thwart a parent’s relationship, visitation, and support cannot establish the parent’s failure to manifest ability and willingness under subsection (g)(14).

In Re: Avagaline S. · filed 2020-12-11(g)(14)

Appellees’ efforts thwarting, not only Father’s bond with the Child, but also his attempts to visit and support her, cannot form the basis on which to terminate his parental rights.

Under subsection (g)(14), failure to manifest either ability or willingness satisfies the first prong, so incarceration that prevents assuming custody can suffice despite asserted willingness.

In Re Tavarius M. · filed 2020-12-18(g)(14)

Thus, “[i]f a person seeking to terminate parental rights proves by clear and convincing proof that a parent or guardian has failed to manifest either ability or willingness, then the first prong of the statute is satisfied.” Id. (citing In re Amynn K., 2018 WL 3058280, at *13). Because DCS proved by clear and convincing evidence that Father M. failed to manifest an ability to assume custody of his child due to Father M.’s incarceration, the first prong of the statute is satisfied.

Willingness under subsection (g)(14) is shown by consequential actions rather than words, and merely applying for disability benefits does not manifest willingness to assume custody.

In Re Ryan J. H. · filed 2020-12-22(g)(14)

While words are not necessarily meaningless, actions are more consequential than words in assessing a parent’s willingness to assume custody of or financial responsibility for a child under this ground. If this were not so, then merely saying “I want to assume custody of my child” could suffice to fulfill the willingness part of this prong of the ground. We are confident our General Assembly did not intend such a result as it would emasculate the statute. Even giving full measure to Mother’s health and financial problems, Mother has undertaken little significant action of substance toward assuming custody of the Child. Mother has, at least, attempted to get on disability benefits. Were she to succeed, that would be a positive thing, certainly. However, applying for disability is not, by itself, a manifestation of a willingness to assume custody of the Child, nor is it a cure-all for doing mostly nothing in the case otherwise.

Ability under subsection (g)(14) is determined from the parent’s actions or omissions before termination, not the potential for future improvement.

In Re Katelynn S. · filed 2021-01-08(g)(14)

Mother asks this Court to look at the potential for future improvement, but we must consider whether she has manifested an ability through her actions (or omissions) prior to termination to assume custody and financial responsibility of the Children. We conclude she has not.

Compliance with some permanency-plan requirements does not by itself establish ability or willingness under subsection (g)(14) when the parent fails to remedy the core obstacle to safe custody.

In Re: Brandon H. · filed 2021-02-01(g)(14)

While compliance with a permanency plan may provide proof of a parent’s actions, compliance does not, ipso facto, prove that a parent has manifested an ability or willingness to assume custody of a child. Indeed, this case presents an excellent example of why this is so. As discussed, infra, despite Father’s compliance with some permanency plan requirements (namely his participation in alcohol and drug treatment, domestic violence counseling, and a psychological evaluation), Father ultimately failed to acknowledge, let alone remedy, the core reason for the Child’s removal, i.e. Father’s abuse. Accordingly, despite completing some requirements under the plan, Father still failed to place himself in a position to provide the Child with a safe, stable, or appropriate home.

Subsection (g)(14) requires a parent to manifest both ability and willingness, so proof that the parent lacks either one satisfies the first prong.

In Re Lucas S. · filed 2021-02-24(g)(14)

The interpretation adopted by our Supreme Court places a conjunctive obligation on a parent or guardian to manifest both an ability and willingness to personally assume legal custody or financial responsibility for the child. If a parent seeking to terminate parental rights proves by clear and convincing evidence that a parent or guardian has failed to manifest either ability or willingness, then the first prong of the statute is satisfied.

Incarceration alone does not establish either failure to manifest ability and willingness or a substantial risk of harm under subsection (g)(14).

In Re Ahleigha C. · filed 2021-08-04(g)(14)

While the foregoing citations do not address section 36-1-113(g)(14), we see no reason why the failure to manifest ground should be treated differently. Indeed, the conclusion that section 36-1-113(g)(14) is not satisfied by the fact of incarceration alone dovetails with well-settled principles of termination law, specifically the heightened burden of proof and the maxim that “not all parental conduct is irredeemable.” In re Marr, 194 S.W.3d 490, 498 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005) (citation omitted); see also In re Adoption of W.J.P., No. E2007-01043-COA-R3-PT, 2008 WL 246015, at *11 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 30, 2008) (“The courts understand that persons are able to turn their lives around[.]” (citing In re Askew, 993 S.W.2d 1, 2 (Tenn. 1999))).

Under subsection (g)(14), a stated desire to retain parental rights does not show willingness when the parent has not taken meaningful steps to overcome the obstacles to custody.

In Re Addisyn P. · filed 2022-06-16(g)(14)

Father’s actions evinced that he was not willing to overcome major obstacles to regaining custody. We therefore determine that the evidence supported the trial court’s findings concerning Father’s failure to manifest an ability and willingness to personally assume legal and physical custody of or financial responsibility for the Children.

A parent’s continued drug activity and failure to address substance abuse may demonstrate both inability and unwillingness under subsection (g)(14), despite professed readiness at trial.

In Re Destiny C. · filed 2022-06-24(g)(14)

Nevertheless, we note that regardless of her efforts, or lack thereof, to achieve sobriety, Mother also engaged in criminal activity and incurred several charges against her related to drugs. Therefore, Mother’s lifestyle demonstrated that she lacked the ability to assume custody of the child and her actions demonstrated that she was unwilling to assume custody of the child.

Under subsection (g)(14), one parent’s disappearance and non-support may show unwillingness while the other parent’s repeated relapse and unstable housing may show inability to assume custody.

In Re Ellie G. · filed 2022-07-07(g)(14)

For these reasons and more, it is clear that Father has failed to demonstrate a willingness to assume custody, and Mother has failed to demonstrate an ability to assume custody.

A parent’s desire for reunification is insufficient under subsection (g)(14); ability and willingness must be demonstrated by efforts to overcome the obstacles to custody.

In Re Damium F. · filed 2022-08-04(g)(14)

Thus, a parent’s mere desire to reunite with his or her child is insufficient to demonstrate an ability or a willingness. In re Nicholas C., No. E2019-00165-COA-R3-PT, 2019 WL 3074070, at *17 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 15, 2019).

Post-petition conduct may be considered under subsection (g)(14), and meaningful recovery, stable employment, and suitable housing can establish ability and willingness despite the parent's condition when the petition was filed.

In Re Kendall K. · filed 2022-10-18(g)(14)

But we may also consider the parent’s actions after the petition was filed. ... Unlike Father and Stepmother, we do not view Mother’s efforts here as too little or too late.

A parent’s expressed love and desire to participate are insufficient to manifest willingness when the parent’s conduct shows continued drug use, inadequate support, and inability to provide a safe home.

In Re: Oriana Y. · filed 2023-11-13(g)(14)

At trial, Father shared his love for his child and his desire to be a part of her life. But desire alone is insufficient. In the court’s view, Father’s conduct did not reflect a true willingness to care for his child. He never stopped using illegal drugs. And he spent more on his marijuana habit than his child.

Repeated criminal conduct, incarceration, unemployment, and unstable housing may establish failure to manifest ability under subsection (g)(14), even before pending charges result in convictions.

In Re Pandora G. · filed 2024-02-21(g)(14)

Clear and convincing evidence supports the trial court’s determination that “[Father] does not have the ability to provide stable housing [] or [] basic necessities for the child in order to assure she is taken care of and provided for.” It also supports the trial court’s determination that Father “has repeatedly engaged in behaviors, resulting in his multiple incarcerations, that would place the child in unsafe situations if she were in his care.”

Proof that a parent lacks ability to assume custody satisfies subsection (g)(14)'s first prong even when the parent has manifested willingness.

In Re Treylynn T. · filed 2024-05-30(g)(14)

Mother manifested a willingness to assume custody. However, we affirm the Trial Court’s finding that Mother failed to manifest an ability to assume custody. Under In re Neveah M., that is enough to establish the first prong of this ground.

An incarcerated parent who has not addressed sex-offender treatment, housing, domestic violence, or income fails to manifest ability and willingness under subsection (g)(14).

In Re Lynell S. · filed 2024-08-15(g)(14)

Father has shown no ability to safely parent the Child. The evidence is clear and convincing that Father has manifested neither a willingness nor an ability to assume custody of the Child.

Failure to manifest either ability or willingness satisfies the first prong of subsection (g)(14), and unresolved instability may establish a substantial risk of harm.

In Re Metric D. · filed 2024-08-27(g)(14)

Evidence that a parent has failed to manifest either an ability or willingness is sufficient to satisfy the first element. Id. at 677.

A parent who makes no effort to parent or support a child for years fails to manifest ability and willingness under subsection (g)(14), and placement with a virtual stranger poses substantial harm.

In Re Keigen D. · filed 2024-09-24(g)(14)

Here, Father made no effort to parent his child in the last nine years and even when he did visit with the child, those visits lasted no more than twenty minutes each. Moreover, he has continued to engage in drug abuse and criminal conduct that has resulted in repeated incarcerations. And Father paid no child support of any kind after he and Mother separated. These facts establish that Father is neither willing nor able to care for the child, and he is also unwilling to provide her with financial support.

The first prong of subsection (g)(14) requires proof that the parent was either unable or unwilling to assume custody or financial responsibility, not both.

In Re Bobby B. · filed 2024-10-10(g)(14)

“the expressed legislative intent for section 36-1-113(g)(14) is to require clear and convincing proof that a parent or legal guardian was either unable or unwilling to personally assume legal and physical custody or financial responsibility of a child.”

A putative father's stable housing, employment, furnished room for the child, attendance at every scheduled visit, and motion to compel further visits can defeat failure-to-manifest grounds.

In Re Whisper B. · filed 2024-11-21(g)(14), (g)(9)(A)(iii)

In light of these efforts, we cannot conclude that the termination grounds under Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(14) and § 36-1-113(g)(9)(A)(iii) were proven by clear and convincing evidence.

A long-absent parent’s inability and unwillingness to assume custody, combined with the child’s bond to another caregiver, may establish subsection (g)(14).

In Re Cedrik C. · filed 2025-02-26(g)(14)

We conclude the record provides clear and convincing evidence to support the trial court’s determination that Father failed to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody of M.W.

Failure to manifest either ability or willingness satisfies the first element of subsection (g)(14).

In Re Dayson A. · filed 2025-06-09(g)(14)

Failure of the parent to manifest either ability or willingness will ... satisfy the first prong.

Subsection (g)(14) requires clear and convincing proof of both failure to manifest ability or willingness and a substantial risk of harm from placement with the parent.

In Re Taron H. · filed 2025-06-30(g)(14)

This ground contains two elements that must both be proven by clear ... and convincing evidence.

A parent who fails to remedy the barriers to custody and cannot presently provide safe care fails to manifest ability and willingness under subsection (g)(14).

In Re Krystopher C. · filed 2025-07-18(g)(14)

We determine that the evidence preponderates in favor of the trial court’s findings regarding (1) the Parents’ failure to manifest an ability or willingness to assume legal or physical custody of or financial responsibility for the Children and (2) the risk of substantial harm to the Children if they were returned to either parent’s custody. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s determination by clear and convincing evidence regarding this statutory ground for termination of Father’s and Mother’s parental rights.

Failure to follow assessment recommendations and establish safe, stable care may demonstrate lack of ability and willingness under subsection (g)(14).

IN RE DEZIRAY J. · filed 2025-08-08(g)(14)

Father failed to demonstrate a willingness based on his failure to follow through with assessment-recommended services, such as therapy, parenting assessment, or alcohol and drug classes. ... After two years, Father failed to demonstrate an ability and willingness to assume custody.

A parent cannot satisfy the personal-custody requirement by proposing that a grandparent care for the child until the parent is released from incarceration.

IN RE KATALEYA F. · filed 2025-08-20(g)(14)

Although Father notes his proposal for Kataleya to reside with Grandmother until his release, the statute requires examination of whether the parent has manifested the ability “to personally assume legal and physical custody or financial responsibility.”

Although the statute requires both ability and willingness from a parent, the first prong is satisfied if the petitioner proves that the parent lacks either one.

IN RE ZARIAH H.1 · filed 2025-10-07(g)(14)

Therefore, if a party seeking termination of parental rights establishes that a parent or guardian “failed to manifest either ability or willingness, then the first prong of the statute is satisfied.” Id.

Repeated criminal conduct, incarceration, ongoing drug use, and failure to meet children’s needs may establish failure to manifest ability and willingness to assume custody.

In Re Ka'Myiah M. · filed 2025-12-16(g)(14)

We conclude that the trial court did not err in finding that DCS proved by clear and convincing evidence that Father failed to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody of his children under Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-1-113(g)(14).

Subsection (g)(14) has no minimum waiting period before DCS may file a termination petition.

IN RE MAISYNN Y. · filed 2025-12-17(g)(14)

Nothing in the definition of this ground for termination requires DCS to wait a statutory period prior to filing a petition to terminate parental rights. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(14).

A stated desire for custody does not establish willingness under subsection (g)(14) when the parent’s actions and inactions do not match that desire.

In Re Hunter W. · filed 2026-03-25(g)(14)

These actions and inactions do not reflect a willingness on Mother’s part to assume custody of the Children. ... Mother’s deeds have not matched her stated willingness.

A parent's failure to progress to unsupervised visitation does not establish failure to manifest ability and willingness when the parent regularly attends visitation and medical appointments, improves caregiving, and maintains employment, housing, and transportation.

IN RE OLIVIA S. · filed 2026-06-01(g)(14)

Here, Father attended visitation and medical appointments regularly, engaged with the Child throughout visitation, and exhibited improvement in his care and feeding of the Child. Father had also maintained employment, suitable housing, and reliable transportation. While we agree that Father had not progressed to unsupervised visitation at the time of the hearing, the evidence presented was woefully deficient to establish the termination of his parental rights.

Because a parent must manifest both ability and willingness, the petitioner satisfies the first prong by proving that the parent lacks either ability or willingness.

In Re Violet L. · filed 2026-06-25(g)(14)

Mother’s argument misapprehends the statute. Because the law requires a parent to manifest both an ability and a willingness, DCS need only prove that Mother failed to manifest one or the other.

Section 36-1-113(g)(14) permits termination when clear and convincing evidence shows that a parent failed to manifest either the ability or the willingness to assume custody and that placing the child in the parent’s custody would pose a risk of substantial harm.

In Re James T. · filed 2020-12-16(g)(14)

In this case, clear and convincing evidence demonstrates that Mother has manifested neither the ability nor the willingness to assume either legal or physical custody of the children. Mother has refused to take action to remove Boyfriend from her residence even though she has been told repeatedly that his presence is a barrier to reunification. Mother has also failed to take advantage of the support necessary that would make her able to parent her children. And even if Mother’s low mental functioning contributes to this unwillingness, discussed supra, these issues render her unable to parent her children. Finally, the evidence, particularly the presence of a convicted child rapist in Mother’s home, indicates that placing the children in Mother’s custody would put them at significant risk for harm. The trial court’s decision as to this ground is therefore affirmed.

A termination order must make findings on both prongs of subsection (g)(14); omitting the substantial-harm prong requires vacatur of that ground.

In Re: Avalee W. · filed 2024-02-02(g)(14)

Specifically, the trial court did not make any finding as to the second prong concerning whether placing the children in Mother’s legal and physical custody would pose a risk of substantial harm to the physical or psychological welfare of the children. ... Thus, we vacate the trial court’s order with respect to the ground of failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody or financial responsibility as to Mother.

Both prongs of subsection (g)(14), including substantial harm, require an express clear-and-convincing finding; an appellate court may not supply a missing finding de novo.

In Re Rhyder C. · filed 2022-07-21(g)(14)

Notably, each of the two elements required to establish this ground “must be proven by clear and convincing evidence.” In re Maya R., 2018 WL 1629930, at *7. Here, however, the trial court did not make a specific finding that Petitioners had proven by clear and convincing evidence that placing the Child in Mother’s custody would pose a risk of substantial harm to the physical or psychological welfare of the Child. ... Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s finding that the ground codified at Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-1-113(g)(14) was established.

For subsection (g)(14), substantial harm must be a real, nontrivial danger that is more than theoretical and sufficiently probable to occur more likely than not.

In Re: Virgil W. · filed 2018-10-11(g)(14)

Second, it indicates that the harm must be more than a theoretical possibility. While the harm need not be inevitable, it must be sufficiently probable to prompt a reasonable person to believe that the harm will occur more likely than not.

Subsection (g)(14) requires willingness to be shown through attempts to overcome obstacles to assuming custody or financial responsibility, not mere words.

In Re: Jonathan M. · filed 2018-10-26(g)(14)

Parents must have demonstrated their willingness by attempting to overcome the obstacles that prevent them from assuming custody or financial responsibility for the child.

A parent who is able to work, has minimal expenses, and provides neither monetary nor nonmonetary support fails to manifest an ability and willingness to assume financial responsibility under subsection (g)(14).

In Re Gaberiel S. · filed 2018-12-11(g)(14)

Father also failed to manifest an ability and willingness to assume financial responsibility of the children. As discussed above, Father was capable of working and worked at several different places while this case was pending. Father did not have a house or car payment and admitted that his major monthly expenses consisted of food, because he was “a big boy” and “lik[ed] to eat.” Yet the evidence showed Father paid no child support whatsoever until July 2017, six months after DCS filed the termination petition, and moreover, he never provided any of the children with any nonmonetary support such as clothes, food, toiletries, books or toys.

Subsection (g)(14) requires findings on whether placement with the parent would pose a risk of substantial physical or psychological harm to the child.

In Re Brianna B. · filed 2018-12-19(g)(14)

Further, the court failed to issue any findings of fact or conclusions of law concerning whether placing the Children in Mother’s care would pose a risk of substantial harm to their physical or psychological welfare. Accordingly, we vacate the court’s finding on this ground and remand for additional findings of fact and conclusions of law for this ground of termination.

Subsection (g)(14)’s substantial-harm prong is not satisfied by a merely theoretical possibility of relapse when DCS does not prove relapse is reasonably probable.

In Re Serenity W. · filed 2019-02-08(g)(14)

While a relapse was a theoretical possibility, DCS failed to prove that it was a reasonable probability. So we conclude that terminating Mother’s parental rights on the ground of failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume legal and physical custody was also inappropriate.

A parent lacks the ability and willingness required by subsection (g)(14) when her conduct shows disregard for the children and returning them would risk psychological harm after their wellbeing improved without contact.

In Re: H. A. · filed 2019-02-12(g)(14)

Thus, Mother’s actions have shown that she had neither the ability nor the willingness to take the steps necessary to resume custody of her children. Likewise, given the marked improvement in the children’s wellbeing following the total removal of Mother from their lives, it appears that returning the children to her custody would pose a substantial risk of psychological harm to the children. As such, the trial court did not err in finding clear and convincing evidence to support this ground for termination.

A parent’s prolonged absence from a child’s life may create a sufficiently probable risk of substantial psychological harm if the parent suddenly obtains custody.

In Re Bentley Q. · filed 2020-03-11(g)(14)

Father’s lack of presence in the Child’s life posed a sufficient probable risk of substantial harm to the Child’s psychological welfare if Father were to suddenly obtain custody of the Child.

Repeated, willful violations of law can show both inability and unwillingness to assume custody and can make placement with the parent a substantial risk of harm.

In Re Brayden E. · filed 2020-12-04(g)(14)

As stated, Father’s willful disregard for authority frequently put him in a position where he was unable to care for the Children. Moreover, by manifesting an unwillingness to change his conduct, Father failed to manifest a willingness to assume custody of the Children. Naturally, placing the Children with a parent who has not shown the ability and willingness to abide by the law would put them at substantial risk for harm.

Subsection (g)(14)’s substantial-harm prong requires more than a theoretical possibility of harm, and concerns sufficient to limit visitation may not satisfy that standard.

In Re Brianna B. · filed 2021-01-29(g)(14)

Although the concerns raised by Stepmother and Father might be an appropriate basis to condition or limit Mother’s visitation, they failed to prove that there was more than a theoretical possibility of substantial psychological harm from continuing the parent-child relationship between Mother and Elizabeth. Because establishing a risk of substantial harm to the physical or psychological welfare of the child is a necessary element of the ground, we conclude that Stepmother and Father failed to prove the statutory ground of failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody or financial responsibility.

A finding that placing the child with the parent would pose a risk of substantial harm is a necessary component of subsection (g)(14), and omission of that finding requires reversal of the ground.

In Re Enrique F. · filed 2021-05-11(g)(14)

As evident by the language emphasized above, a finding that placing the child in the parent’s custody would pose a risk of substantial harm to the child is a necessary component of the statutory ground. The trial court’s order in the present case did not make this finding, and its reliance on this ground for termination was therefore in error.

Recent methamphetamine use, unsuitable or uncertain housing, and no demonstrated willingness to parent may establish both elements of failure to manifest ability and willingness.

In Re Brittany W. · filed 2021-06-08(g)(14)

These findings reflect a risk of substantial harm to the Children’s physical or psychological welfare were they to be placed with Mother. The evidence does not preponderate against the Juvenile Court’s findings relative to both prongs of this ground. We find, as did the Juvenile Court, that the ground of failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody was proven by clear and convincing evidence.

Substantial harm is not established when a supervised, gradual reunification process leaves serious doubt that the harm is more likely than not to occur.

In Re Manning H. · filed 2021-07-13(g)(14)

Having considered the relevant and material evidence pertinent to this issue, and recognizing that the court ordered that the reunification of Father and Manning be a slow process with supervision by psychological counselors, we find the evidence fails to eliminate any serious or substantial doubt that substantial harm would likely occur. Accordingly, the evidence fails to satisfy the clear and convincing standard.

Under subsection (g)(14), placing children with a virtual stranger may pose substantial psychological harm when they are bonded to the only stable family they have known.

In Re Kaisona B. · filed 2021-09-23(g)(14)

However, from the Children’s perspective, they have never lived with Mother or Father and have only known the home of their foster family. The evidence shows that the Children are bonded with their foster parents, who wish to adopt them. There is no question that removing the Children from this stable environment would pose the risk of substantial harm.

Returning a young child to a parent who has become a virtual stranger may create the substantial psychological harm required by subsection (g)(14).

In Re Amora S. · filed 2021-10-08(g)(14)

We agree with the Juvenile Court that returning the Child to Father’s legal or physical custody would create a risk of substantial harm to the Child.

Placing a child with a biological father who has never met the child and is effectively a complete stranger may pose the substantial psychological harm required by subsection (g)(14).

In Re Ni'Kaiya R. · filed 2021-12-15(g)(14)

In short, placing Ni’Kaiya in Father’s legal or physical custody would be paramount to placing her with a complete stranger, and such action likely would pose “a risk of substantial harm to the physical or psychological welfare of the [C]hild.”

Subsection (g)(14) requires specific findings on both failure to manifest ability or willingness and the risk of substantial harm; omitting the second prong requires vacatur.

In Re Grayson M. · filed 2022-09-12(g)(14)

As to this second prong requiring a finding a risk of substantial harm, we find no such specific determination in the trial court’s order, and neither Petitioners nor the guardian ad litem address this omission on appeal. Because the trial court failed to make sufficient findings of fact and conclusions of law as to this ground for termination, the ruling must be vacated.

Subsection (g)(14)’s substantial-harm prong is satisfied by a demonstrated likelihood that returning children to the parent would undo their educational and behavioral progress and recreate the conditions leading to removal.

In Re Stephen H. · filed 2022-12-22(g)(14)

Based upon the trial testimony, returning the Children to Father would be detrimental to the progress the Children had made educationally and behaviorally at the time of trial. In addition, the danger posed was not a “theoretical possibility,” but rather a likelihood that had previously been demonstrated when Father and the Children had contact. Considering all the evidence at trial, the Children would likely suffer from the same issues that led to their removal if returned to Father’s custody.

A parent who is little better than a stranger and repeatedly causes the child anxiety and distress through missed or belligerent visits may pose substantial harm under subsection (g)(14).

In Re Sebastian O. · filed 2024-01-10(g)(14)

In this case, Mother is not necessarily a stranger to the child, but she has put so little effort into her relationship with the child as to be little better. Here, Mother was granted limited visitation with the child, but often refused to appear for the visitation with no notice to the child. Mother’s actions meant the child was waiting for a parent who never appeared, causing the child considerable anxiety and distress.

Failure to visit, support, or inquire about children may establish both lack of ability or willingness and substantial risk of harm under subsection (g)(14).

In Re Daxleigh F. · filed 2024-02-29(g)(14)

However, based on the information that is contained in the record, including Mother’s failure to visit, support, or inquire about the Children, there is substantial doubt as to her ability to parent them. ... From the totality of the circumstances, there is sufficient evidence to support the trial court’s finding that placing custody with Mother would pose substantial risks of harm to the Children.

Removing children who are thriving and bonded in a long-term foster placement may create substantial physical and psychological harm supporting subsection (g)(14).

In Re Antonio P. · filed 2024-07-05(g)(14)

Under these circumstances, we readily agree with the trial court that removing the Children from their current setting poses a risk of substantial harm to their physical and psychological welfare. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s conclusion that DCS proved the elements of Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-1-113(g)(14) by clear and convincing evidence.

Recent drug use and failure to establish an ability to care for a child can show both unwillingness or inability to assume custody and a substantial risk of harm.

In Re Tad F. · filed 2024-07-23(g)(14)

From these facts, we agree with the trial court that Mother displayed an overall lack of an ability and willingness to assume legal and physical custody of the Child. The record further supports a finding that placing the Child with her would pose a risk of substantial physical or psychological harm to the Child’s welfare given her failure to establish her ability to care for him and her most current drug use. We affirm the trial court’s judgment terminating Mother’s parental rights on this ground.

A parent’s instability at trial and minimization of serious mental illness may support finding a substantial risk of harm under subsection (g)(14).

In Re Cartier H. · filed 2024-07-31(g)(14)

She further exhibited instability at trial, where she had numerous profanity-laden outbursts and where she minimized the severity of her illnesses.

A parent’s absence, lack of financial responsibility, and stranger relationship with a child who is bonded and thriving elsewhere may establish both elements of subsection (g)(14).

In Re Elizabeth Y. · filed 2024-08-09(g)(14)

We therefore affirm the trial court’s determination that clear and convincing evidence established that Father failed to manifest an ability and willingness to assume legal and physical custody of or financial responsibility for the Child and that returning the Child to his custody would pose a risk of substantial harm to her welfare.

Returning a child who is thriving in a bonded household to an estranged parent who is effectively a stranger may create the substantial psychological harm required by subsection (g)(14).

In Re Tayla R. · filed 2024-12-03(g)(14)

Effectively, Mother is a stranger to the Child. Meanwhile, the Child is deeply attached to her foster family, who attends to her special needs and provides her with a stable home life. To remove the Child from her present environment and place her in Mother’s custody would pose a risk of substantial harm to the physical or psychological welfare of the Child.

Removing a medically fragile child from an established routine and specific diet may pose substantial physical and psychological harm under subsection (g)(14).

In Re Willow B. · filed 2025-05-14(g)(14)

Again, the Child is medically fragile and requires a high degree of routine and consistency, as well as an incredibly specific diet. Removing her from a home in which this has been established would be not only difficult for the Child, but medically dangerous. Thus, we affirm the trial court’s ruling that Father’s parental rights should be terminated pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-1-113(g)(14).

Substantial harm cannot be based on delay caused by deficient termination orders and repeated remands, and removing a child from long-term bonded foster parents alone does not establish substantial harm.

In Re Dakari M. · filed 2025-10-09(g)(14)

We do not believe it would be appropriate to terminate Mother’s rights based upon the time that had passed during the pendency of this matter. ... A contrary decision would create a perverse incentive, whereby delays in proceedings after a remand could be used against parents. ... While we have previously found that returning a child to a near-stranger may make substantial harm sufficiently probable, see In re Brianna B., 2021 WL 306467, at *6, we have also held that “[r]emoval of a child from foster parents that the child has been living with for a long time and may have bonded with does not constitute substantial harm.”

A parent’s methamphetamine use, drug paraphernalia within children’s reach, and an unsafe home can establish substantial harm under subsection (g)(14).

In Re Doerrian K. · filed 2025-11-20(g)(14)

Most concerningly, Mother used methamphetamine and allowed drug paraphernalia to be within her home and within reach of the children. Mother’s drug use also caused four of the children to test positive for methamphetamine. Therefore, returning the children to Mother’s care would create a risk of substantial harm to them, and we affirm the juvenile court regarding this ground.

Criminal activity, unstable or unlawful housing, inconsistent visitation, and inviting strangers into the home for sexual activity may show unwillingness to assume custody and a substantial risk of harm.

In Re Corey M. · filed 2025-12-05(g)(14)

From these facts, we hold that Father displayed an overall lack of willingness to assume legal and physical custody of the Child. The record further supports a finding that placing the Child with him would pose a risk of substantial physical or psychological harm to his welfare given Father’s history of aggression and invitation of strangers into his home for sexual activity.

A parent’s inability to learn basic parenting skills or comprehend a child’s specific medical needs may create a real and significant risk of harm under subsection (g)(14).

In Re Kaylee B. · filed 2025-12-09(g)(14)

Father’s inability to learn basic parenting skills, including failure to comprehend Kaylee’s many and specific medical needs, poses a “real hazard or danger” to Kaylee that we find significant. See In re Maya R., 2018 WL 1629930, at *8.

The best-interest factors in subsection (i) are weighted according to the case’s unique facts rather than tallied, and one factor may control the outcome.

In Re: Braelyn S. · filed 2020-07-22(i)

Ascertaining a child’s best interests does not call for a rote examination of each of Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(i)’s nine factors and then a determination of whether the sum of the factors tips in favor of or against the parent. The relevancy and weight to be given each factor depends on the unique facts of each case. Thus, depending upon the circumstances of a particular child and a particular parent, the consideration of one factor may very well dictate the outcome of the analysis. ... Although more factors technically favor Father, they carry little weight in this case.

The expanded best-interest factors effective April 22, 2021, apply only to termination petitions filed on or after that date.

In Re Bralynn A. · filed 2022-07-20(i)

We note, however, that the termination petition in this case was filed on February 1, 2021, well before the effective date of this amendment. “[T]he amended statute applies only to petitions for termination filed on or after April 22, 2021.” In re Riley S., No. M2020-01602-COA-R3-PT, 2022 WL 128482, at *14 n.10 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 14, 2022) perm. app. denied (Tenn. Mar. 17, 2022); see also In re C.T., No. E2021-01336-COA-R3-PT, 2022 WL 2236147, at *8 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 22, 2022).

The expanded best-interest factors apply to a termination petition filed on April 22, 2021, the amendment’s effective date, and use of only the former factors requires remand for findings under the new factors.

In Re Alessa H. · filed 2022-08-12(i)

Here, the guardian ad litem filed the petition to terminate parental rights on the exact date that the amended statute went into effect. Therefore, the amended statute applies to this action. In making the best interest determination, the trial court applied the previous best interest factors. ... Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s finding that termination of Mother’s parental rights is in the child’s best interest and remand this case to the trial court for findings on the applicable, expanded new best interest factors.

Best-interest factors under subsection (i) are weighted according to the unique facts rather than tallied, and one factor may dictate the outcome.

In Re Jonah B. · filed 2023-12-05(i)

Accordingly, following our review, four factors favor terminating Father’s parental rights and five factors weigh against termination. However, “[a]scertaining a child’s best interests does not call for a rote examination of each of Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(i)’s nine factors and then a determination of whether the sum of the factors tips in favor of or against the parent.” In re Audrey S., 182 S.W.3d at 878. Instead, “[t]he relevancy and weight to be given each factor depends on the unique facts of each case. Thus, depending upon the circumstances of a particular child and a particular parent, the consideration of one factor may very well dictate the outcome of the analysis.” Id. (citing White, 171 S.W.3d at 194).

Best interests under subsection (i) depend on the weight of the child-centered factors, not a simple tally, and one factor may determine the outcome.

In Re Ryan B. · filed 2024-08-14(i)

Ascertaining a child’s best interests involves more than a “rote examination” of the statutory factors. In re Audrey S., 182 S.W.3d at 878. And the best interests analysis consists of more than tallying the number of statutory factors weighing in favor of or against termination. White v. Moody, 171 S.W.3d 187, 193-94 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2004). Rather, the facts and circumstances of each unique case dictate how weighty and relevant each statutory factor is in the context of the case.

The subsection (i) best-interest analysis requires weighing the factors from the child’s perspective rather than merely counting how many favor termination.

In Re Mia C. · filed 2024-08-30(i)

Although a majority of the factors weigh in favor of termination by our analysis, the inquiry does not involve simply tallying those factors that weigh for or against termination. Instead, we must consider the weight to be afforded each of the factors.

The best-interest analysis under subsection (i) must be child-centered, fact-intensive, and based on the weight rather than a tally of statutory factors.

In Re Jaylynn J. · filed 2025-06-24(i)

Ascertaining a child’s best interests involves more than a “rote examination” of the statutory factors. ... And the best interests analysis consists of more than tallying the number of statutory factors weighing in favor of or against termination.

Compliance with a permanency plan is relevant to best interests under subsection (i), but it is not dispositive and must be considered with the other factors.

In Re Aryana S. · filed 2020-05-21(i)

While relevant, a parent’s compliance with the requirements on a permanency plan is not the sole determinative factor when making a decision in a termination of parental rights case. Instead, the parent’s efforts are one of many factors to be considered by a trial court when making its decision concerning best interest.

Subsection (i)(3) requires specific factual findings for every applicable best-interest factor, including factors that are neutral or weigh against termination.

IN RE TAMIRIA M. · filed 2026-02-09(i)(3)

Thus, a court must make specific findings of fact to support all applicable factors, not just for those it finds weigh in favor of termination. If these eight factors do not weigh in favor of termination, they apply, and the court must make specific findings of fact to support why they do not favor termination.

Subsection (k)’s requirement for specific findings does not obligate the trial court to expressly reference every best-interest factor when the order states that all factors were considered and contains sufficient findings.

In Re Kaelyn R. · filed 2021-08-31(k)

We do not read the parental termination statute, in requiring specific factual findings and legal conclusions, to obligate a court to make a reference to ... every subsection of the statute in its best interest analysis. The statute does provide that the court “shall consider” the statutory best interest factors. Id. § 36-1-113(i). And our supreme court has held that “the court must consider all of the statutory [best interest] factors, as well as any other relevant proof any party offers.” In re Gabriella D., 531 S.W.3d at 682. But the court complied with that directive. The order provides that the court “carefully considered the factors as enumerated in Tenn. Code 36-1-113(i).”

A conclusory best-interest ruling without factual findings or reference to the individual statutory factors is insufficient under subsection (k) and requires vacatur and remand.

In Re Layton W. · filed 2021-09-28(k)

But the court’s order includes no factual findings specific to its best interest determination. The order also makes no reference to the individual statutory best interest factors. So we cannot discern whether all of the statutory factors were considered. Under the circumstances, we find it necessary to once again remand the case to the trial court to make appropriate findings relative to the child’s best interest.

Subsection (k) requires a termination order to state factual findings and legal conclusions supporting the best-interest determination; merely listing factors without analysis requires remand.

In Re Zoey L. · filed 2020-06-03(k)

Turning back to the trial court’s August 21, 2019 order, which is the sole basis of our review, as noted above, it contains no analysis or factual basis for the trial court’s legal conclusion that termination of Mother’s parental rights is in the child’s best interest. In short, the order wholly fails to comply with the requirements of Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-1-113(k). Accordingly, this Court “must remand the case to the trial court for the entry of written findings of fact and conclusions of law.” In re B.L.R., 2005 WL 1842502, at *15.

Subsection (k) requires specific written findings and conclusions, and merely stating that the court considered the statutory best-interest factors is insufficient.

In Re: A.W. · filed 2020-01-08(k)

If a lower court fails to comply with Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(k), the appellate court must remand the case with directions to prepare the required findings of fact and conclusions of law. See e.g., In re Audrey S., 182 S.W.3d 838, 861 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005) (holding that Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(k) requires courts terminating parental rights to enter an order that makes specific findings of fact and conclusions of law whether they have been asked to or not). In addition, merely stating that it considered the statutory factors regarding best interest enumerated in Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(i) is insufficient for the trial court to discharge its obligation to engage in the necessary inquiry as to whether or not termination of parental rights is in the child’s best interest.

A termination order must apply the statutory best-interest factors to each child; omitting one child prevents meaningful appellate review and requires vacatur and remand.

In Re Rukia B. · filed 2020-08-24(i), (k)

Because the mandates of Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-1-113(k) also apply to the best interests determination, this omission alone is grounds to vacate and remand this case.

Section 36-1-113(i)(3) requires a trial court to make specific findings on every applicable best interest factor; failure to do so requires remand for written findings.

In Re Cartier H. · filed 2023-10-31(i)(3)

Here, the Tennessee General Assembly has clearly directed courts to consider and make specific findings as to all applicable factors. The trial court did not comply with this mandate. As such, “we are left with no choice but to remand the case with directions to make the required specific written findings of fact and conclusions of law.” Id.

Subsection (g)(2) considers only noncompliance with responsibilities clearly identified in the permanency plan’s statement of responsibilities, so child support listed elsewhere cannot support termination.

In Re Jaylan J. · filed 2020-12-22(g)(2)

By including a designated “Statement of Responsibilities” and specifying that those steps constituted “the responsibilities of the parents . . . to achieve the permanency goals,” DCS did not clearly communicate to Father that he must also pay child support in order to gain custody of the child. See In re Askia K.B., 2011 WL 4634241, at *8-9 (concluding that a permanency plan section on visitation allowed for visits but that it did not clearly state that visiting was a “responsibility” of the parent under the plan). Thus, in analyzing this ground, we will not consider Father’s payment of child support when considering whether he was in substantial noncompliance “with the statement of responsibilities in a permanency plan[.]” Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(2).

Section 36-1-113(g)(3) permits termination when removal conditions persist, are unlikely to be remedied soon, and continued parent-child contact harms the child's integration into a stable home.

In Re: Mariah K. D. · filed 2012-07-30(g)(3)

We therefore agree with the trial court that all three elements of the ground of persistence of conditions have been proved by clear and convincing evidence.

Section 36-1-113(g)(3) permits termination when a child has been removed from a parent for six months and the conditions preventing safe return persist, are unlikely to be remedied soon, and continued relationship harms early integration into a permanent home.

In the Matter of: Justin K. C. · filed 2012-07-31(g)(3)

For these reasons, we affirm the trial court’s finding that DCS proved by clear and convincing evidence the “persistent conditions” ground under Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-1-113(g)(3) as to each parent.

Section 36-1-113(g)(3)(A) requires clear and convincing evidence that the conditions leading to a child’s removal are unlikely to be remedied at an early date.

Dept. of Children's Services v. D.S. · filed 1997-01-29(g)(3)(A)

We find that the record does not reflect clear and convincing evidence that there is little likelihood the conditions which justified R.’s removal will be unremediable at an early date, or that the best interests of R. require that the parental relationship should be terminated.

Section 36-1-113(g)(3) requires clear and convincing evidence of conditions preventing a child’s safe return; a parent’s receipt of government benefits alone does not establish likely neglect.

In the Matter of K.C. Jr. · filed 2005-10-04(g)(3)

We cannot hold that a parent’s eligibility for and receipt of government benefits creates the reasonable probability a child in the parent’s home will be neglected. ... We conclude Aunt failed to establish by clear and convincing evidence the ground of persistence of conditions as defined in Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(3).

Section 36-1-113(g)(3) permits termination when conditions preventing a child’s safe return persist, are unlikely to be remedied soon, and continued parental ties diminish the child’s chance of a safe, permanent home.

In Re: Shannon P. · filed 2013-07-16(g)(3)

Therefore, there is little likelihood that these conditions will be remedied at an early date so that the Children can be safely returned to Father in the near future. As stated above, there was also evidence that continuation of the parent-child relationship would diminish the chances of the Children making an early integration into a safe, stable, and permanent home. The evidence does not preponderate against the trial court’s determination, by clear and convincing evidence, that Father’s parental rights should be terminated upon the ground of persistent conditions.

Section 36-1-113(g)(3) permits termination when conditions preventing a child’s safe return are unlikely to be remedied soon and continuing the parental relationship greatly diminishes the child’s chances of a permanent home.

In Re Raidyn C. · filed 2025-03-25(g)(3)

Following our review of the record, we conclude that there is little likelihood that the conditions which led to removal will be remedied at an early date so that the Child can be safely returned in the near future and that the continuation of the parent’s relationship greatly diminishes his chances of early integration into a safe, stable, and permanent home. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court on this ground of termination.

Section 36-1-113(g)(3)(A) supports termination when conditions that led to removal persist, threaten continued neglect, and are unlikely to be remedied soon.

Department of Children's, Services v. Stanfill · filed 1998-05-29(g)(3)(A)

In response to the appellant’s three issues, this Court has reviewed the record which contains clear and convincing evidence that the conditions which caused the subject children to be removed from the custody of appellant in November, 1995, have persisted to the date of the order of the Juvenile Court; that said conditions would subject said children to continued neglect; that there is little likelihood of early remediation of such conditions; that the appellant willingly abandoned said children; and that the termination of appellant’s parental rights in respect to said children is in the best interest of said children.

Section 36-1-113(g)(3)(A) requires clear and convincing evidence that persistent conditions would probably expose the child to abuse or neglect; sporadic parental employment alone does not establish that ground without proof of insufficient resources to provide for the child.

Dept. of Children's Services v. T.L.C. · filed 2000-07-13(g)(3)(A)

Nor has it been demonstrated that he has had insufficient resources otherwise to provide for R.L.P., Jr. We do not agree that the Department has presented clear and convincing evidence that the sporadic employment of the parents would in all reasonable probability cause R.L.P., Jr. to be subject to abuse or neglect.

Section 36-1-113(g)(3)(A) permits termination when conditions preventing a child’s safe return persist, are unlikely to be remedied soon, and the continued parental relationship diminishes the child’s chance of a stable home.

Dept. of Children's Svcs. v. Layne · filed 2001-11-16(g)(3)(A)

Thus, the factors involved in Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-1-113(g)(3)(A) have been established as “highly probable” under the statutory clear and convincing evidence rule.

Post-petition efforts may be considered when deciding substantial noncompliance under subsection (g)(2), although delayed compliance can still be too little and too late.

In Re Azariah R. · filed 2021-01-25(g)(2)

In its order, the Juvenile Court stated flatly that the only period of time that may be considered on this ground is the period of time before the petition is filed. While this Court has stated that a parent’s refusal to act on her permanency plan until after the filing of a petition to terminate parental rights can be ‘too little, too late,’ ... we have not put down an iron bar to consideration of a parent’s post-petition efforts to comply with her responsibilities under the permanency plan.

Proof that DCS made reasonable reunification efforts is not a precondition to termination for substantial noncompliance under subsection (g)(2); those efforts are weighed in the best-interest analysis.

In Re Isabella M. · filed 2021-09-29(g)(2)

This ground for termination does not require that DCS “expend reasonable efforts to assist a parent in complying with the permanency plan requirements.” In re Skylar P., No. E2016-02023-COA-R3-PT, 2017 WL 2684608, at *7 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 21, 2017); see also In re Kaliyah S., 455 S.W.3d 533, 555 (Tenn. 2015) (“[I]n a termination proceeding, the extent of [the Department’s] efforts to reunify the family is weighed in the court’s best-interest analysis, but proof of reasonable efforts is not a precondition to termination of the parental rights of the respondent parent.”).

An incarcerated parent’s failure to complete a permanency-plan task that cannot be performed until release does not establish substantial noncompliance under subsection (g)(2).

In Re Jackson H. · filed 2021-08-25(g)(2)

Considering the foregoing and based upon our review of the record, we have determined that the evidence is not sufficient to prove the ground of substantial noncompliance with the permanency plan. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the trial court terminating Father’s parental rights on the ground of substantial noncompliance with the permanency plan.

Before July 1, 2024, subsection (g)(9) applied only to putative fathers, so applying its grounds to a mother was error.

IN RE KANIEL Y. · filed 2025-07-11(g)(9)

This section was clearly applicable to putative fathers and only putative fathers prior to July 1, 2024. Consideration of these grounds of termination as applied to Mother was error.

Putative-father status under subsection (g)(9) is determined when the termination petition is filed, so later establishment of legal parentage does not prevent application of the additional grounds.

In Re C.T. · filed 2022-06-22(g)(9)

The statute that does apply here, Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-1-113(g)(9), requires a determination of whether the individual was a putative father “at the time of the filing of a petition to terminate the parental rights of such person[.]”

The additional grounds in subsection (g)(9) apply when the biological father has not become a legal parent before the termination petition is filed; biological status alone does not prevent putative-father treatment.

In Re Kierani C. · filed 2021-09-03(g)(9)

We conclude that Father was a putative father at the time of filing for both the First Petition and the Second Petition. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-102(28)(B) (2017) (“A man shall not be a legal parent of a child based solely on blood, genetic, or DNA testing determining that he is the biological parent of the child without either a court order or voluntary acknowledgement of paternity pursuant to § 24-7-113.”). The trial court properly applied the grounds for termination of parental rights provided in Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-1-113(g)(9)(A) to Father.

The additional putative-father grounds in subsection (g)(9) apply to a biological claimant who is not a legal parent under the statutory definitions.

In Re Grace F. · filed 2023-12-27(g)(9)

The trial court found that Ted is not the legal parent of Ransom and that he is the putative father. Ted does not meet any of the aforementioned statutory definitions for a legal parent. ... Therefore, we conclude that the trial court correctly determined that Ted is the putative father of Ransom.

Section 36-1-113(g)(9)(i)-(iii) provides grounds concerning putative fathers and does not apply to a father who does not deny paternity and has been treated as the child’s father.

In Re Liam M. · filed 2024-02-08(g)(9)(i)-(iii)

Grounds (B), (C) and (D) are copied from Tenn. Code Ann. §36-1-113(g)(9)(i)-(iii). These grounds deal with putative fathers. Father, although having suggested in text messages to Mother that he was not the father, did not deny at trial being Liam’s father and had always been treated as the father. Father is not a putative father, therefore, we deem Grounds (B), (C) and (D) to be inapplicable.

To prove persistence of conditions under subsection (g)(3), the prior dependency, neglect, or abuse removal order must be introduced into evidence; attaching it to the petition is insufficient.

IN RE A.W. · filed 2021-09-08(g)(3)

Parties relying on the ground of persistence of conditions should introduce a certified copy of the prior court order that made a finding of dependency, neglect, or abuse into evidence during the termination proceeding. ... Because the order was not entered into evidence, “the evidence presented at trial [wa]s insufficient to support a termination of Mother’s parental rights on the statutory ground of persistence of conditions.” ... So Mother’s parental rights could not be terminated on this ground.

Persistence of conditions under subsection (g)(3) is inapplicable when the record does not establish that the removal order was entered in a proceeding alleging dependency and neglect.

In Re: Freddy P. · filed 2024-02-16(g)(3)

Because there is no indication that the child was removed “from the home or the physical or legal custody of [Mother] for a period of six (6) months by a court order entered at any stage of proceedings in which a petition has been filed in the juvenile court alleging that a child is a dependent and neglected child,” the ground of persistent conditions is inapplicable to this case. Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(3)(A). Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s decision as to this ground.

A petitioner relying on subsection (g)(3) must place the child-removal order in the record; a court may not assume that the required order exists.

IN RE SHYENNE G. · filed 2026-02-12(g)(3)

The record before this court does not contain the order of removal. We have no doubt that the order exists; however, we cannot “assume the existence of facts which are not in the record.”

A lengthy delay in beginning the most important permanency-plan requirement may constitute substantial noncompliance under subsection (g)(2), even when the parent finally begins treatment before trial.

In Re Artemas A. · filed 2021-09-24(g)(2)

Mother’s fourteen-month delay in entering rehab necessarily means that there is a corresponding fourteen-month delay in completion of her rehab program. Unfortunately, as we have observed in similar cases, Mother’s efforts were “too little, too late.” ... Because these facts show that Mother was uncooperative with DCS, did not complete many of the action steps required by her permanency plan, and waited a significant period of time before entering rehab, Mother’s noncompliance was substantial.

Expert testimony is not required to prove or disprove a best-interest factor under subsection (i)(2).

In Re Danielle V. · filed 2024-01-30(i)(2)

While Mother argues that there was no expert proof as to the Children’s mental health or wellbeing, Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(i)(2) states that “[e]xpert testimony is not required to prove or disprove any factor by any party.”

Persistence under subsection (g)(3) may rest on other conditions that would probably cause further abuse or neglect even if the original removal conditions were remedied.

In Re Cedric G. · filed 2024-09-24(g)(3)

Thus, even if the initial reasons that the children were placed in DCS custody have been remedied, if other conditions continue to persist that make the home unsafe, this ground may still be shown.

Persistence of conditions under subsection (g)(3) may rest on unsafe conditions that arose after removal even if the initial reasons for removal have been remedied.

In Re Bella H. · filed 2026-02-04(g)(3)

Thus, even if the initial reasons that the children were placed in DCS custody have been remedied, if other conditions continue to persist that make the home unsafe, this ground may still be shown.

Subsection (g)(3) may be proven by either persistent conditions existing at removal or other later conditions that prevent the child’s safe return.

In Re Tristan J. · filed 2026-03-24(g)(3)

The statute provides that DCS can prove this ground by either showing that conditions that existed at the time of the Child’s removal persist or that other conditions exist that prevent the child’s safe return to the care of the parent. The Juvenile Court misapplied the law in its consideration of this ground.

Section 36-1-113(g)(3)(A)(i) allows termination based on other conditions that make further neglect reasonably probable, even if some conditions that led to removal have been remedied.

In matter of: S.Y., J.Y., and D.Y. · filed 2003-01-22(g)(3)(A)(i)

While it may be true that Young has remedied certain conditions that led to the children’s removal, our concern is with such “other conditions” that are present to necessitate a finding that a “reasonable probability” exists that the children would be subjected to further neglect if returned to the care of appellant Young.

Section 36-1-113(g)(3)(A)(i) covers conditions other than those that caused removal when they create a reasonable probability of further neglect.

In Re SY · filed 2003-02-18(g)(3)(A)(i)

While it may be true that Young has remedied certain conditions that led to the children's removal, our concern is with such "other conditions" that are present to necessitate a finding that a "reasonable probability" exists that the children would be subjected to further neglect if returned to the care of appellant Young. ... On the basis of the above cited facts, we find clear and convincing evidence that such other conditions exist so as to create a reasonable probability of continued neglect, thereby warranting termination of Young's parental rights to minor children.

The putative-father grounds in subsection (g)(9) may independently support termination when the father fails to manifest ability or willingness and placement would create substantial harm.

IN RE AZALAYA J. · filed 2025-07-11(g)(9)

We agree with the trial court that Father’s failure to pursue visitation was evidence of willful abandonment and indicative of his overall lack of an ability and willingness to assume custody. We affirm this ground of termination as applied to him. ... Our review indicates that placing Azalaya with him would pose a risk of substantial harm to her psychological welfare given the absence of any relationship between Father and Azalaya. ... We affirm this ground of termination as applied to him.

The six-month deadline for a termination hearing is a preferred deadline that permits an extension when an extension is in the child's best interest.

In Re Remington B. · filed 2025-09-26(k)

This was well within the statutorily preferred deadline for a final hearing. See id. § 36-1-113(k) (requiring a hearing on the petition to terminate parental rights “within six (6) months of the date that the petition is filed, unless . . . an extension is in the best interest of the child”).

Section 36-1-113(k) calls for a termination hearing within six months of the petition unless an extension serves the child’s best interests; that prompt-hearing policy bears on a request for a continuance.

State of Tennessee Department of Children's Services v. F.R.G. · filed 2007-02-16(k)

A prompt and expedited conclusion to termination proceedings is essential to the child’s welfare. See T.C.A. § 36- 1-113(k) (stating that the court shall ensure that the termination hearing takes place within six months of the date that the petition to terminate is filed, “unless the court determines an extension is in the best interests of the child.”); T.C.A. § 36-1-124 (2005) (providing that contested termination and adoption proceedings shall be expedited at trial and on appeal). ... Given the policy consideration that calls for a prompt conclusion to termination proceedings, and the determination that the choice to testify or not to testify in this situation is constitutionally permissible, we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion in denying Mother’s request for a continuance.

Under subsection (i)(1)(L), DCS’s failure to provide interpretation of critical termination criteria and permanency-plan requirements weighs against termination, though it does not bar termination when the other best-interest factors predominate.

In Re Juanita M. · filed 2026-01-16(i)(1)(L)

Cognizant of the due process and constitutional implications that are inherent to a parental termination action, we conclude that by failing to provide Father with a Spanish interpreter to (1) explain to Father the Criteria and Procedures document and (2) explain to Father what was expected of him to regain custody of the Child, including the requirements laid out in the permanency plans, DCS fell short of its responsibility to make reasonable efforts to assist Father in making lasting adjustments toward reunification with the Child. Accordingly, we conclude that factor (L) weighs against termination of Father’s parental rights.

The DCS reasonable-efforts factor in subsection (i)(1)(L) is inapplicable to a private termination case in which DCS was not involved.

In Re Bentley E. · filed 2026-01-16(i)(1)(L)

As DCS was not involved in this case, Factor (L) is wholly inapplicable.

Even when a termination ground is established, subsection (i) does not permit termination unless the combined best-interest proof is clear and convincing under the child’s unique circumstances.

In Re Daisy B. · filed 2026-02-27(i)

Under the unique facts of this case considered as to this child, we simply cannot say the termination of Mother’s parental rights is by clear and convincing evidence in Daisy’s best interest.

Section 36-1-113(c) requires clear and convincing proof of both a termination ground and that termination serves the child's best interests.

Dept of Children's Services v. C.H.H. In Re: A.N.R. · filed 2002-04-17(c)

Termination of parental or guardianship rights must be based upon a finding by the court by clear and convincing evidence that: (1) the grounds for termination of parental or guardianship rights have been established; and (2) termination of the parent’s or guardian’s rights is in the best interests of the child. Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(c).

Section 36-1-113(c)(1) requires clear and convincing proof of both a statutory ground for termination and that termination is in the child’s best interest.

In Re: D.L.L. & R. H. F. · filed 2004-07-22(c)(1)

To justify the termination of parental rights, the party seeking termination must prove both the grounds for termination and that termination is in the child’s best interest by clear and convincing evidence. Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(c)(1); In re Valentine, 79 S.W.3d 539, 546 (Tenn. 2002).

Termination requires clear and convincing evidence that ending parental rights is in the child’s best interest.

In the matter of: April F. (d.o.b. 11/20/98), Dylan F. (d.o.b. 3/30/00), and Devin F. (d.o.b. 7/24/06 · filed 2010-08-18(c)(2)

Thus, from the record as a whole, we find that the evidence does not support the trial court’s conclusion that DCS established by clear and convincing evidence that termination of Father’s parental rights is in C.A.C.’s best interest.

Section 36-1-113(c)(2) requires clear and convincing evidence that terminating parental rights is in the child’s best interest.

In Re: Adoption of Logan A.S. John W.W., Jr., Stephanie L. W., and Lindsey B. W. v. Glenn S. · filed 2010-10-12(c)(2)

To terminate the parental rights of a biological parent, the trial court must also find by clear and convincing evidence that termination is in the best interest of the child.

Section 36-1-113(g)(3)(A) permits termination when conditions likely to cause further abuse or neglect persist and prevent the child's safe return.

Dept. of Human Services v. Fineout · filed 1998-11-16(g)(3)(A)

This argument ignores the fact that the statute does not only permit termination of parental rights because of “the conditions that led to the child’s removal,” but also for the persistence of “other conditions which in all reasonable probability would cause the child to be subjected to further abuse or neglect and which, therefore, prevent the child's safe return to the care of the parent(s) or guardian(s) . . . .”

Section 36-1-113(g)(3) permits termination when clear and convincing evidence shows that conditions preventing a child’s safe return persist and are unlikely to be remedied soon.

Farmer v. Dept. of Children Svcs. · filed 1997-12-30(g)(3)

Clear and convincing evidence supports the action of the Trial Judge in terminating the parental rights’ of Theresa Farmer/Estes under T.C.A. §36-1-113(g)(3).

Section 36-1-113(g)(3)(A) requires clear and convincing evidence of all three statutory conditions in addition to the child's removal from the home for six months.

Dept.of Children's Svcs v. Whaley · filed 2001-12-11(g)(3)(A)

While there is no question that J.W. has been removed from Ms. Whaley’s home for a period of six months, the statute requires that the other three conditions be shown by clear and convincing evidence.

Section 36-1-113(g)(3)(A) permits termination when the conditions preventing a child’s safe return persist and are unlikely to be remedied soon.

In Re: A.B., T.B., E.B. and B.M. State of Tennessee Department of Children's Services v. Medlin · filed 2005-12-27(g)(3)(A)

Under these circumstances, we affirm the trial court’s conclusion that DCS has established by clear and convincing evidence the ground of persistent conditions for termination of Mother’s parental rights.

Section 36-1-113(g)(3)(A) permits termination when conditions preventing a child's safe return persist and are unlikely to be remedied soon.

In Re RMS · filed 2006-12-28(g)(3)(A)

Clearly the State has established by clear and convincing evidence that conditions persist which prevent the children's safe return to Mother at an early date.

Section 36-1-113(g)(3)(A) permits termination when persistent conditions prevent a child’s safe return and are unlikely to be remedied soon.

R.M.S. v. Orange · filed 2006-12-28(g)(3)(A)

Clearly the State has established by clear and convincing evidence that conditions persist which prevent the children’s safe return to Mother at an early date.