Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113

Subsection (f) requires actual notice rather than formal or official notice, and is satisfied when the incarcerated parent participates with appointed counsel knowing the hearing may terminate parental rights.

In Re Nevaeh K. · filed 2024-02-28(f)

As to Father’s main contention, we emphasize that a court may rely on whether a parent has actual notice, rather than “official notice.” Upon our review of the record, we note that Father participated in the trial hearings via Zoom, understanding that the proceeding would determine whether his parental rights would be terminated. Moreover, Father was appointed counsel who represented him throughout the proceedings. Under these circumstances, we conclude that Father had actual notice of the proceeding sufficient to satisfy Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-1-113(f).

An incarcerated parent may participate by telephone under subsection (f)(3), and the requirement is satisfied when connection problems are promptly corrected and counsel remains present.

In Re Bobby G., Jr. · filed 2022-07-25(f)(3)

It appears, therefore, that any issues with Appellant’s connection to the hearing were addressed and resolved immediately such that he was able to fully participate in the hearing. Furthermore, neither Appellant, nor his attorney, asked the trial court to continue the hearing or for any other relief. This fact, coupled with Appellant’s attorney’s presence at the hearing and the trial court’s adjustments throughout the hearing, fully satisfies the requirements of section 36-1-113(f), and there is no basis for reversal on this issue.

A child who was in utero when the parent received a ten-year sentence is under age eight for purposes of subsection (g)(6).

In Re LeAnn K. · filed 2021-08-09(g)(6)

Here, Father was sentenced to 10 years in prison after being convicted on three counts of aggravated statutory rape and one count of attempted aggravated statutory rape pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-13-506(c). At the time of the imposition of Father’s sentence, Alfred K. was five years old, Silas K. was one year old, and Cheryl K. was in utero and born three months after Father’s sentence was imposed. ... Therefore, we conclude that there existed clear and convincing evidence to support the finding that Father was convicted and confined in a correctional or detention facility under a ten-year sentence when three of the Children were under the age of eight.

An incarcerated parent’s participation right is satisfied by telephone when the parent can hear the proceedings, address the court, and confer privately with counsel, and no more advanced conferencing method is shown to be available.

In Re Elizabeth D. · filed 2016-09-23(f)(3)

There is no evidence in the record from which to conclude that the arrangements did not satisfy Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(f)(3). A personal appearance by Father, who was incarcerated out of state, was not feasible, and there is no indication that teleconferencing capabilities were available. The court and parties made the best use of the available technology, and Father’s right to participate in the hearing was not violated.

For the ten-year-sentence ground, a child includes a child in utero when the sentence is entered, and the parent’s knowledge of the pregnancy is irrelevant.

In re Adrianna S. · filed 2016-09-29(g)(6)

As can be seen from these cases, the term “child” has been interpreted as including the period of pregnancy for at least two other statutory grounds of termination. See In re Benjamin M., 310 S.W.3d at 847; In re Anthony R., 2015 WL 3611244, at *3. Reading Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(6) in pari materia with these statutes, we conclude that the term “child” in Section 36-1-113(g)(6) also includes a child in utero.

Section 36-1-113(f)(3) allows an incarcerated parent to participate in a termination hearing remotely, and meaningful telephone testimony with private access to counsel can satisfy the parent's right to be heard.

In Matter of Jo'Nise Perry · filed 2000-10-18(f)(3)

In this case, the record indicates that reasonable efforts were made to insure that Father’s participation was meaningful and that he had a fair opportunity to be heard. The order terminating parental rights notes that Father testified via telephone, that he conferred privately with his attorney, and that he “testified articulately in his own behalf.” The transcript of the proceedings also indicates that in several instances, exhibits were sent to him via facsimile during his testimony, and that the trial judge relaxed the rules of evidence in order to let Father answer leading questions from his attorney and also allowed him to testify as to hearsay. Under these circumstances, we cannot find that the juvenile trial court abused its discretion in refusing to permit Father to attend the hearing.

Consecutive criminal sentences may be aggregated to satisfy section 36-1-113(g)(6)'s ten-year incarceration ground when the child was under eight at sentencing.

H.M.R. v. J.K.F. · filed 2004-09-01(g)(6)

It is clear that Father was under a sentence of more than 10 years and that the child was under the age of eight at the time of the sentencing. Accordingly, we find that the evidence does not preponderate against the trial court’s finding of this ground for termination by clear and convincing evidence.

An incarcerated parent who claims indigency must receive a full indigency hearing before being denied subsection (f)(4)(A)'s right to appointed counsel in a contested termination proceeding.

State of Tennessee, Department of Children's Services v. RDV · filed 2005-03-17(f)(4)(A)

The statute requires a “full and complete hearing” regarding the indigency claim, which did not occur in this case. ... Since RDV was denied a proper hearing on the issue of his indigency and need for appointed counsel, the Judgment is vacated, and the cause remanded, and the Trial Court is directed to conduct a full hearing on RDV’s indigency, and a new trial on the propriety of the termination.

The possibility that a criminal conviction may later be reversed or a sentence reduced does not defeat the ten-year incarceration ground for termination.

In Re Audrey S. & Victoria L. · filed 2005-08-25(g)(6)

If the mere possibility that a conviction might be reversed, or a sentence reduced, at some point in the future were sufficient to defeat the application of this ground for termination of parental rights, then Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(6) would be a dead letter. We do not believe that the General Assembly intended this result.

The possibility that a criminal conviction may later be reversed or a sentence reduced does not defeat the ten-year incarceration ground for termination.

In Re Audrey S. · filed 2005-11-07(g)(6)

If the mere possibility that a conviction might be reversed, or a sentence reduced, at some point in the future were sufficient to defeat the application of this ground for termination of parental rights, then Tenn.Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(6) would be a dead letter. We do not believe that the General Assembly intended this result.

A parent waives a challenge to the applicability of section 36-1-113(g)(6) by failing to raise that challenge in the trial court.

In Re Marr · filed 2005-11-16(g)(6)

Accordingly, the trial court did not err in terminating Mr. Marr’s parental rights on the basis of Tenn.Code Ann. § 36-l-113(g)(6).

Subsection (g)(6) looks to the sentence imposed, so the possibility that sentence credits or parole may produce an early release does not create an exception to the ten-year-sentence ground.

In Re: M.H. · filed 2005-12-02(g)(6)

However, Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(6) speaks in terms of the sentence, and this court has declined to read into the statute any intent by the legislature to provide an exception for the mere possibility of an early release from prison. In Re Adoption of Copeland, 43 S.W.3d 483, 489 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000). Thus, a ground for termination of the father’s parental rights has been established by clear and convincing evidence.

A court errs by proceeding with a termination hearing in an incarcerated parent's absence when subsection (f)'s notice and participation requirements have not been followed.

State of Tennessee, Department of Children's Services v. Williams · filed 2009-07-28(f)

requirements set forth in Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(f) were not followed, we find that the trial court erred by proceeding in Mr. Williams’s absence.

Pending appeals and post-conviction proceedings do not prevent subsection (g)(6) from applying when the existing sentence exceeds ten years and the child was under eight at sentencing.

In Re MLP · filed 2007-01-30(g)(6)

We have consistently held that a trial court should not consider appeals and postconviction relief proceedings in deciding whether grounds for termination of parental rights exist pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-116(g)(6).

Subsection (g)(6) alone supports termination when clear and convincing evidence shows a sentence of ten years or more and the children were under eight when the sentence was imposed.

In Re J.C.J. and J.E.J. · filed 2007-04-25(g)(6)

It is well-settled that “the existence of any one of the statutory bases will support a termination of parental rights.” In re C.W.W., 37 S.W.3d 467, 473 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000) (abrogated on other grounds); see In re D.L.B., 118 S.W.3d 360, 367 (Tenn. 2003) (“The trial court is required to find only one statutory ground for termination of parental rights.”). The provisions of subsection (g)(6) are straightforward and are clearly implicated by the facts of this case. Father received a sentence of more than 10 years, and the children were under the age of eight at the time of the sentencing. We therefore find and hold that the trial court was correct in finding that clear and convincing evidence supports terminating Father’s parental rights under T.C.A. § 36-1-113(g)(6).

Subsection (g)(5) requires imposition of a sentence exceeding two years for severe abuse of a child, not actual service of more than two years in confinement.

In the Matter of Michael R.O., Jr. · filed 2012-05-24(g)(5)

Unless otherwise stated, for purposes of this subdivision (g)(5), “sentenced” shall not be construed to mean that the parent or guardian must have actually served more than two (2) years in confinement, but shall only be construed to mean that the court had imposed a sentence of two (2) or more years upon the parent or guardian; ... In the instant case, it is undisputed that Father was sentenced to eleven years imprisonment for attempted aggravated child abuse on this child. There is no counter evidence in the record; consequently, we can only conclude that the evidence clearly and convincingly establishes this ground for termination of Father’s parental rights.

An effective fifteen-year criminal sentence imposed before the child turns two establishes subsection (g)(6)'s ten-year-sentence ground.

In Re: Johnny J.E.M. · filed 2012-05-29(g)(6)

Again, that section provides for termination where the “parent has been confined in a correctional or detention facility of any type, by order of the court as a result of a criminal act, under a sentence of ten (10) or more years, and the child is under eight (8) years of age at the time the sentence is entered. . . .” ... As discussed in the previous section, Father received an effective fifteen-year sentence for his multiple felony convictions, and judgment was imposed before the Child turned two. ... The sentencing judgments for his 2008 convictions indisputably establish the existence of this ground.

An incarcerated parent’s subsection (f)(3) right to participate is violated when a failed telephone connection excludes him from the hearing and the court denies a continuance and proceeds in his absence.

In Re A’MARI B. · filed 2011-08-31(f)(3)

In this case, we conclude that Father’s right to due process was violated when the trial court denied his motion to continue and when it proceeded with the trial in his absence. Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court abused its discretion when it denied Father’s motion to continue.

The possibility of early release or good-time credits is immaterial to the ten-year-sentence termination ground.

In Re: London V.P. · filed 2011-09-09(g)(6)

As such, we find Father’s assertion that he will not have to serve his full sentence but instead will be eligible for an early release due to good behavior to be, at best, difficult to believe, and immaterial in any event.

An incarcerated parent has a right to participate meaningfully in a termination hearing but no absolute right to appear physically; the means of participation rests within the trial court's discretion.

In Re: Tiphani H. · filed 2011-10-06(f)(5)

To clarify, an incarcerated parent has the right to “participate” in a termination hearing. An incarcerated parent does not, however, have an absolute right to “appear” at a termination hearing.

Subsection (g)(6) turns on the sentence imposed and the child's age at sentencing, not how long the parent actually remains confined or whether the sentence is served in community corrections.

In The Matter Of: Caleb F.N.P, Jonathan S.F., Olivia B.F., and Chloe N.F. · filed 2013-10-25(g)(6)

It does not matter that Mother served less than ten years; we only look at the length of the sentence and age of the child at sentencing. ... It is undisputed that Chloe was under the age of eight when Mother received a twelve year sentence for theft. We therefore affirm the trial court’s ruling.

A pending direct appeal of the conviction does not defeat subsection (g)(6), because the mere possibility of later reversal or sentence reduction would nullify the ground.

In Re Kason C. · filed 2014-06-17(g)(6)

If the mere possibility that a conviction might be reversed, or a sentence reduced, at some point in the future were sufficient to defeat the application of this ground for termination of parental rights, then Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(6) would be a dead letter. ... Therefore, we affirm the juvenile court’s finding that the Department proved incarceration under a sentence of 10 years or more imposed when the child was less than 8 years old as a ground for termination of Father’s parental rights pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-1-113(g)(6).

A ten-year sentence imposed while the child is under eight and conviction for intentionally killing the child's other parent each independently establish a termination ground.

In Re: Taylor, A.B. · filed 2014-07-31(g)(6)-(7)

However, in an abundance of caution, we have reviewed the evidence submitted on grounds for termination and find that the record contains clear and convincing evidence to support the trial court’s holding under Tennessee Code Annotated §§ 36-1-113(g)(6) and (7).

The incarceration ground is established when the parent receives an aggregate sentence exceeding ten years and the child was younger than eight when the sentence was imposed.

In Re: Ty-Shawn H. · filed 2014-04-04(g)(6)

The clear and convincing evidence in the record on appeal shows that Father had received a sentence totaling over ten years and that the Child was under the age of eight at the time the sentence was entered.

A life sentence imposed when the child was under eight years old clearly and convincingly establishes termination based on long-term incarceration.

In Re: Kory W. A. · filed 2014-04-24(g)(6)

Indeed, Father received a life sentence when the Child was under eight years of age.

An incarcerated parent has a right to participate in a termination hearing but no absolute right to appear physically; meaningful telephone participation may satisfy due process.

In Re S.H. · filed 2014-04-29(f)(3)

An incarcerated parent does not, however, have an absolute right to ‘appear’ at a termination hearing.

The long-sentence ground is established when the parent receives a sentence exceeding ten years and the child is under eight when sentence is imposed.

In Re: Knox C. · filed 2016-11-03(g)(6)

The evidence in the record on appeal shows without question that Father was convicted of a crime under a sentence of more than ten years and the Child was under the age of eight at the time the sentence was ordered. As such, we find no error in the Juvenile Court‟s determination that grounds to terminate Father‟s parental rights to the Child pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(6) were proven by clear and convincing evidence.

A sentence exceeding ten years satisfies subsection (g)(6) when the child was under eight when the sentence was entered.

In Re: Maddox C. · filed 2016-11-09(g)(6)

From Father’s undisputed testimony and the record, we conclude that there is clear and convincing evidence to support the trial court’s termination of Father’s parental rights under Tennessee Code Annotated Section 36-1-113(g)(6).

A court applying subsection (g)(6)'s ten-year-sentence ground need not look beyond the criminal judgment and sentence.

In Re Lydia N.-S. · filed 2017-01-31(g)(6)

In interpreting this provision, this Court has held that “a court considering a petition for termination of parental rights based on Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(6) need not look beyond the judgment of conviction and the sentence imposed by the criminal court in order to determine whether this ground for termination applies.”

When the parent was incarcerated at filing and during part of the preceding four months, subsection (g)(1)'s incorporated incarcerated-parent definition governs instead of the ordinary four-month abandonment definition.

In re Colton R. · filed 2017-02-07(g)(1)

Having determined that Father was incarcerated at the time of the filing of the termination petition and for some of the four months preceding the filing of the petition, we conclude that the ground for termination found in section 36-1-102(1)(A)(iv) is applicable in this case, rather than the alternative ground under section 36-1-102(1)(A)(i).

A pending appeal from the conviction does not prevent subsection (g)(7) from applying because the termination court may presume the conviction for the other parent's intentional and wrongful death is correct.

In Re Christopher J. · filed 2017-12-04(g)(7)

The same reasoning applies to termination proceedings under Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-1-113(g)(7). At the time of the hearing, the juvenile court had clear and convincing evidence that Father was criminally convicted of the intentional and wrongful death of the children’s other parent. The court was entitled to presume that Father was correctly convicted even though Father had a pending appeal.

The long-sentence ground is established when a parent is serving more than ten years and the child was under eight when the sentence was imposed.

In Re Brianna B. · filed 2017-12-15(g)(6)

Father testified that he is currently serving an eleven-year prison sentence and that he received the sentence when Brianna B. was approximately twenty-months old. Moreover, the record contains Father’s criminal convictions, which clearly indicate that he has been sentenced to a prison term over ten years. Accordingly, we conclude that the record contains clear-and-convincing evidence to support the trial court’s finding that this ground for termination of Father’s parental rights has been established.

Courts determine the long-sentence ground from the criminal judgment and sentence, and the possibility of early parole does not defeat the ground.

In Re Ken'Bria B. · filed 2018-01-04(g)(6)

This Court, however, has stated previously that courts “need not look beyond the judgment of conviction and the sentence imposed by the criminal court in order to determine whether this ground for termination applies.” In re Audrey S., 182 S.W.3d 838, 876 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005). We also have stated: “[T]he possibility of early parole is not a sufficient basis to negate this statutorily-defined ground.”

Consecutive sentences totaling ten years satisfy subsection (g)(6) when the child was under eight at sentencing.

In Re Kandace D. · filed 2018-01-08(g)(6)

The record indicates that on October 31, 2014, Father was sentenced to a total of ten years of confinement in the Tennessee Department of Corrections after pleading guilty to multiple felonies. ... It is undisputed that the Child was approximately one-year old when Father was sentenced. Accordingly, we conclude that the record contains clear-and-convincing evidence to support the trial court’s termination of Father’s parental rights based upon this ground.

The ten-year-sentence ground applies when a parent later becomes incarcerated after a probation violation; the actual confinement need not last ten years if the imposed sentence was ten years and the child was under eight at sentencing.

In Re: Hayden L. · filed 2018-08-31(g)(6)

It does not matter that Mother served less than ten years; we only look at the length of the sentence and age of the child at sentencing. See In re D.M., No. M2009-00340-COA-R3-PT, 2009 WL 2461199, at *3 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug.12, 2009) (terminating parental rights of father based on Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(6) even though he had completed his ten year sentence).

Subsection (g)(6) turns on the sentence imposed and the child’s age at sentencing, not whether the parent actually serves ten years.

In Re S.D. · filed 2018-11-15(g)(6)

It does not matter that Mother served less than ten years; we only look at the length of the sentence and age of the child at sentencing.

Presentence jail credits do not reduce a ten-year criminal sentence below subsection (g)(6)’s threshold because they affect time served, not the sentence imposed.

In Re Lailonnii J. · filed 2019-02-19(g)(6)

Therefore, the fact that Father received presentence jail credits does not alter the sentence Father received. He was still incarcerated under a criminal sentence of ten years. The only effect the presentence jail credits may have is on the length of time Father spends incarcerated.

Subsection (g)(6) requires clear and convincing proof that the parent received a sentence of at least ten years and that the particular child was under eight when the sentence was entered.

In Re Devin v. · filed 2019-03-06(g)(6)

Accordingly, the court must hold by clear and convincing evidence that (1) father is sentenced to detention for ten or more years, and (2) the child at issue was under eight years of age when the sentence was entered.

A consecutive probationary sentence does not count as confinement for subsection (g)(6)’s ten-year-sentence ground.

IN RE ELI S. · filed 2020-04-09(g)(6)

As to section 36-1-113(g)(6), which requires that the parent or guardian be “confined in a correctional or detention facility of any type . . . under a sentence of ten (10) or more years” and that the child be under eight years of age, the evidence shows that Father’s four-year sentence, while consecutive to his eight-year sentence, was to be served on probation. Accordingly, the evidence does not support termination of Father’s rights on this ground, as he was to be confined in a correctional facility for only eight years.

For the ten-year-sentence ground, the court need not look beyond the criminal judgment and sentence to determine whether the ground applies.

In Re K.L.E. · filed 2020-07-29(g)(6)

We have held that when a petition to parental termination is based on the ground set forth at Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(6), the trial court “need not look beyond the judgment of conviction and the sentence imposed by the criminal court in order to determine whether this ground for termination applies.”

Subsection (g)(6) is established when the criminal judgment shows a sentence exceeding ten years and the child was under eight when the sentence was entered.

In Re Jackson D. · filed 2020-08-17(g)(6)

The record establishes that Father had been sentenced by the Georgia court to incarceration of more than ten years and that the Child was less than eight years old when the sentence was entered. As such, we find and hold, as did the Trial Court, that Petitioners proved this ground by clear and convincing evidence.

For the ten-year-sentence ground, a court need not look beyond the judgment of conviction and sentence, even when the parent is pursuing post-conviction relief that might reduce the sentence.

In Re Navaiya R. · filed 2022-09-22(g)(6)

Father testified that he was seeking post-conviction relief at the time of the hearing and requested that this should be considered because he was likely to be re-sentenced to lesser time. However, we have held that this argument is meritless. ... “[A] court considering a petition for termination of parental rights based on Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(6) need not look beyond the judgment of conviction and the sentence imposed by the criminal court in order to determine whether this ground for termination applies.”

The ten-year-sentence ground does not require a finding that the parent's conduct showed wanton disregard; wanton disregard is a separate abandonment ground.

In Re Bentley J. · filed 2022-11-01(g)(6)

Here, Father conflates two separate grounds for termination and attempts to apply standards relevant to the ground set forth in section 36-1-102(1)(A)(iv) to the ground for termination actually established against him. ... This ground does not require a finding of wanton disregard.

Subsection (g)(6) requires a ten-year sentence and some confinement, but the parent need not actually remain confined for ten years.

In Re Kamyiah H. · filed 2022-11-02(g)(6)

While the statute requires some period of confinement, the legislature did not expressly provide that the actual period of confinement must amount to 10 or more years. ... Thus, it does not matter if Mother served less than ten years in prison.

Consecutive sentences may be combined to determine whether a parent is confined under a total effective sentence of ten or more years.

In Re Zayda C. · filed 2023-07-10(g)(6)

The same holds true in this matter when Father was confined under a total effective sentence of 16 or more years. Accordingly, we find no error in the trial court’s determination that there was clear and convincing evidence supporting the termination of Father’s parental rights based upon his incarceration under a period of confinement for ten or more years.

The ten-year-sentence ground turns on the sentence imposed, not the actual time served, and remains satisfied when prison confinement transitions into indefinite civil commitment.

In Re Charles B. · filed 2024-12-27(g)(6)

As Father was imprisoned under a sentence that exceeded ten years when Charles was less than eight years old, the statutory requirements needed to sustain this ground are met regardless of the fact that Father did not complete his ten-year sentence before entering indefinite civil commitment.

The ten-year incarceration ground turns on the sentence imposed, not the amount of time the parent will actually serve.

IN Re Zae'Alei R. · filed 2025-09-30(g)(6)(A)

The statute does not require that the parent actually serve the entire term, only that the sentence is for the requisite length.

The six-year-sentence ground requires some confinement but not six years of actual confinement, so a one-year confinement followed by supervised probation may satisfy the ground.

IN RE MAGNUS H. · filed 2026-03-31(g)(6)(B)

Consequently, while this ground “requires some period of confinement, the legislature did not expressly provide that the actual period of confinement must amount to” six or more years. Id. Therefore, because Father received a sentence of six years, it is of no consequence that he was only required to spend one year in confinement and allowed to serve the remainder of his sentence on supervised probation.

Section 36-1-113(g)(6) depends on the length of the sentence imposed and the child’s age when the parent was sentenced, rather than how long the parent will actually serve.

M.P.P.,al v. D.L.K. In Re: C.E.P. · filed 2002-02-13(g)(6)

The language of the statute, however, clearly shows that the statute’s applicability hinges not upon time served, but rather the length of sentence and the age of the minor child at the time of the parent’s sentence.

Section 36-1-113(g)(6) permits termination when a parent is confined under a sentence of at least ten years and the child was under eight when the sentence was entered.

In Re Scarlet W. · filed 2021-01-15(g)(6)

Only two findings are necessary relative to this statutory ground: (1) that the parent has been confined to a correction or detention facility of any type, by order of the court as a result of a criminal act, under a sentence of ten or more years, and (2) that the child at issue was under eight years of age at the time the sentence was entered by the court.

Release on parole before the termination petition is filed does not defeat the ground based on a sentence of ten or more years entered when the child was under eight.

In Re Logan F. · filed 2024-07-25(g)(6)

Father asks this Court to overrule its prior decisions and hold that this ground is inapplicable to a parent who has been released on parole by the time the termination petition is filed. We decline to adopt Father’s proposed limit on the applicability of this statutory ground. The statute clearly provides that a ground for termination exists if the parent has been confined in a facility of any type under a criminal sentence of ten years or more and the child is under eight years of age at the time of the sentence. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(6).

Section 36-1-113(g)(6) permits termination when a parent is confined under a sentence of at least ten years and the child was under eight when the sentence was entered.

Department of Human Serv.: In the Matter of Kubra Satterfield · filed 1999-09-15(g)(6)

Wilkerson adm itted that he was incarcerated f or a sentence of ten years for reckless killing and drug offences. The child was under the age of eight at the time of sentencing. Thus, the requirements of the section are met for terminating parenta l rights.

Section 36-1-113(g)(6) allows termination when a parent is sentenced to at least ten years in confinement while the child is under eight; possible parole does not change that ground.

In Re Adoption of Copeland · filed 2000-03-30(g)(6)

We agree with the petitioners that the trial court did not err in its application of T.C.A. § 36-1-113(g)(6). ... The statute is silent as to the possibility of parole, and we decline to read any intent on the part of the legislature to account for a mere possibility of early discharge from prison.

Section 36-1-113(g)(6) allows termination based on a sentence of ten or more years imposed when the child was under eight; possible parole does not alter that ground.

Graham v. Copeland · filed 2000-03-30(g)(6)

We agree with the petitioners that the trial court did not err in its application of T.C.A. § 36 — 1—113(g)(6). The elements of the statute are clearly satisfied. Father has been confined to a correctional facility by order of a court for the murder of his wife. When he was sentenced to 29 years in prison, his children were both under the age of eight. The statute is silent as to the possibility of parole, and we decline to read any intent on the part of the legislature to account for a mere possibility of early discharge from prison.

Section 36-1-113(g)(6) permits termination when a parent is confined under a sentence of at least ten years and the child was under eight when the sentence was entered.

In Re: S.D., M.D., Sh.D., & Ma.S. · filed 2000-07-10(g)(6)

Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-1-113(g)(6) provides as a ground for termination for parental rights: The parent has been confined in a correctional or detention facility of any type, by order of the court as a result of a criminal act, under a sentence of ten (10) or more years, and the child is under eight (8) years of age at the time the sentence is entered by the court. ... The record in this case establishes, without dispute, this ground for terminating Father’s parental rights, and no amount of legal representation, “effective” or “ineffective,” can overcome conclusive proof.

Section 36-1-113(g)(6) does not account for the possibility of parole when applying its ten-year sentence ground for termination.

Department of Children's Services v. F.E.B. · filed 2002-11-12(g)(6)

However, as we noted in In re Copeland, 43 S.W.3d 483 (Tenn Ct. App. 2000), “[t]he statute is silent as to the possibility of parole, and we decline to read any intent on the part of the legislature to account for a mere possibility of early discharge from prison.” F.E.B.’s argument that the Court erred in neglecting to consider the probability of his parole is, accordingly, without merit.

Subsection (g)(6) provides a ground for termination when a parent is confined for a criminal act under a sentence of at least ten years and the child was under eight when the sentence was entered.

State, Department of Children's Services v. Butler · filed 2003-08-27(g)(6)

Father concedes that there is clear and convincing evidence to support termination of his parental rights pursuant to the grounds set forth in T.C.A. § 36-1-113(g)(6). To be precise, the record indicates that Father is currently serving a thirty-five year sentence for Accessory after the fact of Murder, Attempted Grand Larceny, and Arson. Father has been imprisoned on these charges since 1991, at a time when J.D.M.B. was under eight years of age. On this basis, and in recognition of Father’s stipulation, we conclude that grounds for termination of Father’s parental rights exist under T.C.A. § 36 — 1— 118(g)(6).

Section 36-1-113(g)(6) establishes a ground for termination when a parent receives a sentence of at least ten years while the child is under eight, even if the parent may be released early.

William Anthony Fisher and Shelby Lynn Hatter Fisher v. Young · filed 2006-04-19(g)(6)

At the time the statute was enacted, the legislature was certainly aware of parole and other means by which a prisoner could end up released from his or her incarceration prior to expiration of the full sentence, and did not include such circumstances in the language of the statute. ... Here, the statute states that grounds are established if the parent is confined to a correctional facility “under a sentence of ten (10) or more years” at a time when the child at issue is less than eight years old.

Section 36-1-113(g)(6) establishes a ground for termination when a parent is confined under a sentence of at least ten years and the child is under eight when the sentence is entered, even if the parent may be released early.

In Re Adoption of KBH · filed 2006-04-19(g)(6)

At the time the statute was enacted, the legislature was certainly aware of parole and other means by which a prisoner could end up released from his or her incarceration prior to expiration of the full sentence, and did not include such circumstances in the language of the statute. ... Here, the statute states that grounds are established if the parent is confined to a correctional facility "under a sentence of ten (10) or more years" at a time when the child at issue is less than eight years old.

Subsection (g)(5) applies to a qualifying sentence for severe abuse of a child who temporarily lived with the parent even if that child was not the subject child’s half-sibling.

In Re Brendan G. · filed 2019-10-09(g)(5)

While the trial court erroneously found that Father committed severe child abuse against the Child’s half-sibling, this ground was still properly applied because Father was sentenced to a term of eight years for severe child abuse committed against a child he lived with temporarily.

Subsection (g)(5) turns on the qualifying sentence imposed for severe child abuse even when only one year is to be served in jail or rehabilitation and the remainder is probation.

In Re B.A. · filed 2019-11-12(g)(5)

The trial court stated father testified that, as a result of the severe abuse of B.A., he received a jail sentence of eight years. He is to serve one year in either jail or rehab and the remainder on probation. We hold that the trial court did not err in holding that clear and convincing evidence exists to terminate father’s parental rights, pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(5).

Subsection (g)(5) permits termination when a parent receives more than a two-year sentence for severely abusing a child who lived in the same home as the parent’s children.

In Re O.W., Jr. · filed 2020-01-09(g)(5)

Following the termination hearing, the trial court found that the Father’s conviction of child rape constituted severe child abuse as defined by Tennessee Code Annotated section 37-1-102. As such, the trial court found clear and convincing evidence that Father had been sentenced to more than two years in prison for conduct against a child living in the home of his children. After reviewing the sentencing documents and evidence establishing that the rape victim lived with Father’s children, we affirm the trial court’s finding on this ground.

An incarcerated parent’s statutory participation right is satisfied despite claimed poor audio when the record shows that the parent interjected during testimony and testified personally.

In Re Trinity P. · filed 2020-03-02(f)

Father claims that his right to participate in the hearing pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-1-113(f)3 was thwarted due to the low audio quality provided by the court. The record belies Father’s assertion as evidenced by his interjections during Ms. Heck’s testimony and his participation as a witness.

Subsection (g)(5) permits termination when a parent is sentenced to more than two years for conduct against a sibling that qualifies as severe child abuse.

In Re C.S. · filed 2020-04-29(g)(5)

As discussed in the previous section, Mother was sentenced to more than two years’ imprisonment for conduct against C.S.’s sibling that meets the definition of severe child abuse set forth in Tennessee Code Annotated section 37-1-102. As such, this ground for termination was also sufficiently proven.

A final prior adjudicatory order finding severe child abuse makes that issue res judicata and may support termination under subsection (g)(4).

IN RE: KAMBRI P. · filed 2020-06-04(g)(4)

Accordingly, the issue of whether Father committed severe child abuse is res judicata, and the trial court properly relied on the prior adjudicatory order to terminate Father’s parental rights on this ground.

A final unappealed order adjudicating a parent as the perpetrator of severe child abuse makes that issue res judicata for termination under subsection (g)(4).

IN RE MICHAEL B. · filed 2020-06-04(g)(4)

Mother did not appeal the December 20, 2018 adjudicatory order, and it became final by operation of law. As such, the issue of whether Mother committed severe child abuse is res judicata.

A suspended sentence longer than two years for conduct found to be severe child abuse qualifies under subsection (g)(5) even when the parent serves no jail time.

In re Shyanne H. · filed 2020-06-25(g)(5)

The incident underlying Father’s conviction—E.H.’s obtaining a loaded and unsecured handgun and shooting himself in the arm—was found by the Davidson County Juvenile Court to constitute severe child abuse pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 37-1-102. The fact that Father did not serve any jail time does not preclude termination of his parental rights on this ground.

Subsection (g)(4) may be satisfied against a parent who should have recognized severe abuse by the other parent, based on medical evidence and credibility findings, even when the actual inflictor is unidentified.

In Re Walter B. · filed 2020-12-18(g)(4)

As in In re E.Z., those factual findings, including the medical evidence and the trial court’s credibility determinations, establish that, at a minimum, Father “could have and should have recognized that severe child abuse had occurred or that it was highly probable to occur and that the other parent was the abuser.” In re E.Z., 2019 WL 1380110, at *18. Dr. Copenhaver testified that Walter’s injuries would have caused noticeable effects including excessive fussiness, marked malalignment of the leg, swelling, and limited to no motion on the injured side of the body. Dr. Copenhaver testified that the rib fractures likely occurred at least seven days before the parents sought treatment for Walter. The combined weight of the facts provides clear and convincing evidence that Mother and/or Father subjected Walter to “severe child abuse and that the other parent covered for the other rather than protect [the child] from the severe child abuse.” Id.

Severe child abuse against any child supports termination under subsection (g)(4), without temporal proximity or a nexus between the prior abused child and the children in the termination proceeding.

In Re F.S. · filed 2021-02-02(g)(4)

Section 36-1-113(g)(4) clearly states that the commission of “severe child abuse” can serve as a ground for termination of parental rights when a parent has committed the act “against any child.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(4) (emphasis added). “The plain language of the statute does not require that the prior order have any specific temporal proximity or nexus to the current child at issue or the proceedings currently being adjudicated.” In re I.E.A., 511 S.W.3d at 516-17 (concluding that the severe abuse committed by the mother was sufficient to constitute a ground for termination as to all of the children at issue for purposes of section 36-1-113(g)(4)).

Under the former subsection (g)(5), a severe-abuse prison sentence involving an unrelated child supported termination only if that child resided temporarily or permanently in the parent’s home.

In Re Miley D. · filed 2021-07-14(g)(5)

We again emphasize the governing statute’s language noting that, if the child abuse is committed against a child other than the child who is the subject of the petition, or the sibling or half-sibling of said child, the conduct must arise against a “child residing temporarily or permanently in the home of such parent.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(5) (emphasis added).

Postnatal exposure of a child to illegal drugs can constitute severe child abuse under subsection (g)(4).

In Re Mynajah S. · filed 2021-08-11(g)(4)

Given the trial court’s finding that Petitioners do not abuse drugs, it is far more likely that Mother, who was known to abuse drugs, was the person that exposed the child to drugs during this timeframe.

General citations to subsection (g)(4) and a statute containing several definitions of severe child abuse are insufficient when the trial court does not identify the exact definition relied upon.

In Re L.F. · filed 2021-08-26(g)(4)

The trial court only generally mentioned that Father “sexually abused” the child and that Mother “failed to protect” her, and it referenced only 36-1-113(g)(4) and 37-1-102(b)(27). Thus, it is not clear from the order whether the trial court relied on one of the many offenses listed in definition (C) or some other definition. ... Based on the foregoing discussion, we reverse the trial court’s finding that “severe child abuse” under Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-1-113(g)(4) served as a ground for termination of Mother’s parental rights.

An unappealed severe-abuse adjudication involving one child is res judicata and supports termination under subsection (g)(4) as to all the parent’s children because the statute applies to abuse against any child.

In Re Madylynn C. · filed 2021-09-30(g)(4)

Because neither Appellant challenged the finality or the validity of the adjudicatory dependency and neglect order, the issue of severe child abuse is res judicata. See In re Dakota C.R., 404 S.W.3d 484, 497 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2012); In re Heaven L.F., 311 S.W.3d 435, 439-40 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2010) (holding that the res judicata doctrine applies “to prevent a parent from re-litigating whether [ ]he committed severe child abuse in a later termination of parental rights proceeding when such a finding had been made in a previous dependency and neglect action”) (citing State v. Tate, No. 01-9409-CV-00444, 1995 WL 138858, at *5 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 31, 1995)). Finally, we note that, although only one of these four children was found to be the victim of severe child abuse, the statutory ground allows termination when a parent commits severe child abuse “against any child.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(4) (emphasis added); see In re Trinity H., 2020 WL 5110312, at * 3 (affirming ground based on order adjudicating child’s siblings as victims of severe child abuse). Thus, clear and convincing evidence supports the trial court’s termination of Appellants’ parental rights to all four children on the ground of severe child abuse.

The more-than-two-year severe-abuse-sentence ground depends on the sentence imposed, not on whether the parent actually serves the full sentence in confinement.

In Re C.N. · filed 2022-01-10(g)(5)

Further, as the statute explains, it is inapposite that Father was not required to serve his full twelve-year sentence.

A severe-abuse ruling that becomes final before entry of the termination order is res judicata under subsection (g)(4), even if its appeal was pending when the termination petition was filed.

In Re Hope H. · filed 2022-07-06(g)(4)

Although the appeal of that decision was pending when the petitions were filed in this matter, the appeal concluded in April 2021, prior to the entry of the final orders in these termination proceedings. Specifically, this court affirmed the 2018 finding of severe abuse in the dependency and neglect action, and our decision became final and non-appealable when the mandate was issued on September 25, 2020. ... As such, the finding of severe abuse in the dependency and neglect action became a final and non-appealable ruling prior to the entry of the final orders in the two termination cases now on appeal. Therefore, the issue of severe child abuse is res judicata and cannot be relitigated.

A final prior court order finding severe child abuse establishes subsection (g)(4) without additional proof at the termination trial.

In Re Rylee L. · filed 2023-12-14(g)(4)

Thus, a petitioner may establish this ground by showing that the parent was found to have committed severe child abuse in “any prior order of a court.” Nothing more need be proved.

An unappealed severe-abuse finding in a dependency-and-neglect proceeding conclusively establishes subsection (g)(4) through res judicata.

In Re William W. · filed 2023-12-27(g)(4)

In the context of severe child abuse, res judicata permits a trial court to treat a prior finding of severe child abuse in a dependency and neglect proceeding as conclusive evidence establishing the ground of severe child abuse during a subsequent termination of parental rights hearing.

Subsection (g)(4) permits reliance on a final prior severe-abuse order without relitigating abuse at the termination trial.

In Re Azalea B. · filed 2024-02-16(g)(4)

It is well settled that a trial court may rely on a prior court order finding severe child abuse and is not required to relitigate the issue of severe abuse at the trial to terminate parental rights.

A final severe-abuse adjudication supports termination under subsection (g)(4) without relitigating the abuse.

In Re Tucker R. · filed 2024-08-29(g)(4)

Nevertheless, evidence that Mother committed severe child abuse as defined under subsection (F) is sufficient to establish this ground for termination, and we accordingly affirm the Juvenile Court’s finding of this ground, as established by clear and convincing evidence.

A nonfinal dependency-and-neglect order that reserves further review is not res judicata and cannot establish severe child abuse under subsection (g)(4).

In Re Amiyah W. · filed 2024-09-04(g)(4)

Here, there is no indication that the trial court ever entered a final order in Novaah’s dependency-and-neglect case. As such, the initial finding of severe child abuse in Novaah’s case is not res judicata for purposes of the severe-child-abuse ground for termination of Mother’s parental rights in this case.

Severe child abuse against any child supports termination under subsection (g)(4), including termination as to siblings not directly abused.

In Re Kurt R. · filed 2024-09-04(g)(4)

Thus, clear and convincing evidence supports the trial court’s termination of Father’s parental rights to both children on the ground of severe child abuse.

A final unappealed severe-abuse adjudication is res judicata and establishes subsection (g)(4) without relitigation at the termination trial.

In Re Mitchell C. · filed 2024-10-22(g)(4)

Consequently, the issue of whether Father committed severe abuse as to the Child is res judicata from the dependency and neglect stage. Thus, DCS proved this ground for termination by clear and convincing evidence.

A failed attempt to abuse a child remains conduct against that child for purposes of the severe-abuse-sentence ground.

In Re Dawson S. · filed 2025-04-09(g)(5)

In addition, Father’s argument that an attempt to abuse a child is not conduct against that child for purposes of ground (g)(5) is unreasonable. A failed attempt to abuse a child is conduct against that child despite the failure.

A prior final severe-abuse finding conclusively establishes subsection (g)(4) through res judicata.

IN RE WALTER G. · filed 2025-07-08(g)(4)

As such, the finding of severe abuse is res judicata and may not be relitigated in this appeal.

Severe child abuse against a child who is not the parent’s own child may support termination under subsection (g)(4)’s “any child” language.

IN RE KENNA R. · filed 2025-07-23(g)(4)

Thus, it does not matter that Kenna was not Mother’s child.

An unappealed order finding a parent committed severe child abuse conclusively establishes subsection (g)(4) through res judicata.

In Re Lola-Rayne D. · filed 2025-07-30(g)(4)

Mother did not appeal the juvenile court’s order. ... On this basis alone, the trial court properly determined that Foster Parents proved by clear and convincing evidence the severe abuse ground for termination of Mother’s parental rights.

Subsection (g)(4) is not established merely because an abused child was in both parents’ custody; clear and convincing proof must show that the parent knowingly inflicted the abuse or knowingly failed to protect the child.

In Re Avery H. · filed 2026-01-20(g)(4)

The evidence in the record does not clearly and convincingly show either Mother’s knowing exposure of the child to abuse, her knowing failure to protect the child from abuse, or knowing use of force on the child. We reverse this ground for termination.

The “any prior order” language in subsection (g)(4) does not require a final order; an adjudicatory or dispositional order finding severe child abuse may suffice.

In Re Eden B. · filed 2026-03-11(g)(4)

Nothing in section 36-1-113(g)(4) provides that the prior order must be a final order. Use of the term “any prior order” in the statute suggests an adjudicatory or ... dispositional order will suffice.

A parent knowingly fails to protect under subsection (g)(4) when she is aware of facts that would alert a reasonable parent to danger yet continues exposing the child to that danger.

In Re Elijah S. · filed 2026-03-13(g)(4)

Here, it is clear that Mother was aware of facts, circumstances, or information that would alert a reasonable parent to take affirmative action to protect the [C]hild, and yet she failed to act. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s termination of her parental rights on the ground of severe child abuse.

Section 36-1-113(g)(5) permits termination when a parent is sentenced to more than two years in prison for conduct against the child found to be severe child abuse.

In re T.L.G. · filed 2015-05-26(g)(5)

The trial court did not err in terminating Father‟s parental rights pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(5) based on his sentence of more than two years for conduct against the Child deemed severe child abuse.

A final prior court order finding severe child abuse establishes a ground for termination of parental rights.

In Re Colten B. · filed 2025-01-21(g)(4)

Because the final orders of the juvenile court found that both parents committed severe child abuse under Tennessee Code Annotated section 37-1-102(b)(27), this ground for termination of their parental rights “is effectively established.”

Section 36-1-113(g)(4) permits termination of a parent’s rights based on a prior court finding that the parent severely abused the child’s sibling.

In the matter of: Joel Kristen Sipe, State of Tennessee, Dept. of Childrens Services v. Bruce Sipe and Laurel Sipe · filed 1998-03-06(g)(4)

We find the record to support the trial court’s finding that grounds for termination as to Father’s parental rights exist under § 36-1-113(g)(4).

Section 36-1-113(g)(4) permits termination based on severe child abuse of a sibling or half-sibling, even when the child named in the petition shows no physical signs of abuse.

State of Tennessee Department of Children Services v. Sangster · filed 2005-02-04(g)(4)

This fact is unpersuasive under the statute, which clearly states that the ground is met when the abuse is perpetrated upon “ the child who is the subject of the petition or against any sibling or half-sibling of such child.” T.C.A. § 36-1-113 (g)(4). That requirement is clearly met in this case.

Persistence of conditions under subsection (g)(3) focuses on whether the conditions have actually been remedied, not merely on the parent’s efforts to improve.

In Re Mykeena C. · filed 2025-07-22(g)(3)

Accordingly, “this termination ground is not dependent on a parent’s efforts to improve the circumstances that led to a child’s removal. Rather, the focus lies on the results of those efforts.”

Subsection (g)(3) is not established without clear and convincing proof that the conditions preventing return persist at the time of trial.

In Re Evandor C. · filed 2024-02-20(g)(3)

However, due to the absence of proof as to the parents’ current circumstances, DCS did not establish by clear and convincing evidence that the parents continued in their drug use, lack of a suitable home, and domestic violence at the time of trial.

Subsection (g)(3)’s persistent-conditions ground is satisfied when the children have been removed for six months, the conditions persist with little likelihood of timely remedy, and continuation of the parental relationship impedes permanent placement.

Timothy v. Potter, Dickson, Tennessee, For J.M.S. · filed 1997-09-12(g)(3)

Therefore, there is clear and convincing evidence that the conditions still persist. The requirements of this section are met in that the children were removed from the home by a court order for a period of six months, the conditions which caused the removal still exist, there is little likelihood that these conditions will be remedied in the near future, and continuation of the parent relationship will diminish the chance of integration into a permanent home.

Termination may be affirmed under subsection (g)(3)(A) when the conditions leading to removal persist, are unlikely to be remedied soon, and impede the children’s integration into a stable permanent home.

In Matter of: Tamika Baker, etc. · filed 1999-12-28(g)(3)(A)

Although there is evidence of noncompliance and the petition for termination alleged substantial noncompliance as a basis for termination, the trial court’s order of termination seems to rest on T.C.A.§ 36-1-113(g)(3)(A). Since we affirm the decision on that basis, we do not reach the question of substantial noncompliance as an independent basis for terminating the Austill’s parental rights.

Subsection (g)(3)(A) is not satisfied when the evidence shows that the conditions leading to removal have been remedied and the parent and children retain a strong bond.

Stokes v. Arnold · filed 2000-02-01(g)(3)(A)

Given the foregoing, we cannot conclude that there is clear and convincing evidence that all of the requirements of Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(3)(A) have been met.

Section 36-1-113(g)(3)(A) permits termination for persistent conditions when a child has been removed by court order for six months, the conditions persist and are unlikely to be remedied soon, and continuation of the relationship greatly diminishes the child's chance of early integration into a stable, permanent home.

In the Matter of C.D.B., S.S.B. & S.E.B. · filed 2000-06-15(g)(3)(A)

As pertinent in this case, T.C.A. § 36-1-113 allows the termination of parental rights if: (1) the child has been removed from the home of the parent by court order for six months and (2) the conditions which led to the removal or other similar conditions still persist, are unlikely to be remedied in the near future, and the continuation of the parent-child relationship greatly diminishes the child's chances of early integration into a stable and permanent home.

Post-judgment evidence of a parent’s recent improvement did not defeat termination under subsection (g)(3)(A) where clear and convincing evidence at the termination hearing showed years of failure to provide a safe and nurturing home.

In the matter of: S.M.L. (DOB 12/26/88), C.B.L. (DOB 4/14/92), D.K.J. (DOB 5/8/93) Children under the age of 18. · filed 1998-07-01(g)(3)(A)

We have carefully considered this proffered evidence just as we carefully considered the evidence in the record before us when we first decided this appeal. We neither discount nor hold for naught C.L.H.’s efforts to stop the tailspin that her life has been in. However, we must counterbalance her efforts with the hard reality that the three children involved in this proceeding were removed from her custody in July 1993. Between that time and the April 1997 juvenile court hearing, she completely failed to demonstrate that she would be able to provide her children with a safe and nurturing home environment. The Department of Children’s Services presented clear and convincing evidence at the April 1997 hearing warranting the termination of C.L.H.’s parental rights in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(3)(A) (Supp. 1997).

A parent's repeated refusal to take medication necessary for stability may constitute intentional noncompliance and support termination for both substantial noncompliance and persistent conditions despite brief compliance immediately before trial.

State v. Pruitt · filed 2000-06-27(g)(2), (g)(3)(A)

We cannot agree. Mother’s numerous decisions to refuse to take her medication were intentional acts. Her attorney, in providing able representation to Mother, proved that Mother is able to decide to take the medication by convincing Mother to take the medication for the two months immediately prior to trial. When Mother made the deliberate choice not to take the medication, and not to come for visits, during her Child’s three stays in foster care, she was choosing her personal freedom and desires over her Child’s welfare.

The diminished-chance-of-integration element is met when the parent cannot provide a stable home in the near future and termination is necessary to give the children a chance at permanency.

In re: L.S.W. · filed 2001-09-06(g)(3)(A)(iii)

The final element of the statute, “[t]he continuation of the parent or guardian and child relationship greatly diminishes the child's chances of early integration into a safe, stable and permanent home,” has also been met. Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(3)(A)(iii). These children need a permanent home where they can receive proper care and feel safe. The mother cannot provide a permanent stable home for the children and is unlikely to be able to do so in the near future. Absent termination of the mother’s rights, the children cannot hope for a permanent, stable home.

A parent's history of behavior is relevant to whether conditions are likely to persist and to predicting future parental behavior under section 36-1-113(g)(3)(A).

State of Tennessee, Department of Children's Services v. CBH, in re: SB · filed 2004-07-29(g)(3)(A)

Moreover, the history of past behavior is relevant to the issue of future behavior. We find no error on this issue.

Repeated relapse after numerous treatment opportunities and continued inability to promise sobriety can clearly and convincingly establish persistent conditions despite a parent's current assertion that she is approaching treatment differently.

In re: D.N.G., S.D.P., et ux, J.A.S.P. v. R.L.G. and K.S.R. · filed 2004-10-13(g)(3)(A)

In parental rights matters, the court does not look to the protestations of affections and expressed intentions of the parent, but rather the parent’s course of conduct.

Extreme poverty and dirty living conditions, without clear and convincing evidence of actual harm or that improving conditions prevent safe return and are unlikely to be remedied soon, do not establish persistent conditions.

In re: A.L.B., N.W.B. and C.B.B. · filed 2005-07-06(g)(3)(A)

This case only deals with extremely dirty living conditions and extreme poverty, with no evidence of actual harm to the children.

DCS cannot establish substantial noncompliance or persistent conditions by clear and convincing evidence when it gives a parent no meaningful guidance or assistance and relies on speculation or rumor about the alleged continuing condition.

In The Matter Of: C.M.C., C.L.C., and D.A.M. · filed 2005-08-03(g)(2), (g)(3)(A)

Speculation based on rumor clearly is not clear and convincing evidence. We reverse termination of Mother’s parental rights based on persistence of conditions.

Persistent conditions are judged from circumstances as they actually exist, not from what a parent says they could become at an unspecified future time.

In Re J.J.C., D.M.C., and S.J.K. a/k/a K State of Tennessee, Department of Children's Services v. Calabretta · filed 2006-04-19(g)(3)(A)

In reviewing the trial court’s decision, we find that the trial court rightly judged the circumstances as a whole and as they existed, rather than viewing them as Father said they could be at some undetermined time in the future. ... In sum, the children were removed because Father and Mother were unable to care properly for the children, and the evidence clearly and convincingly shows that Father continues to live with Mother, continues to have an unstable living situation, and is still unable to care properly for the children. Therefore, we find no error in the trial court’s decision to terminate Father’s parental rights based on persistent conditions that prevent the children’s safe return to him.

Persistent conditions may be established when a parent's own decisions move her away from the stability required for the child's safe return and those conditions remain at trial.

In the matter of: Nathan T. · filed 2010-06-07(g)(3)

The conditions cited by the court were the result of decisions made by Mother which moved her away from the stability that Nathan needed and which was the objective of DCS and the court; the conditions cited support the court’s finding that continuation of the relationship would reduce the chances of Nathan being placed in a safe and stable home.

Failure to remedy persistent conditions need not be willful to support termination.

In The Matter of: Dakota C.R. · filed 2012-12-07(g)(3)

The failure to remedy the conditions which led to the removal need not be willful.

Persistent conditions are established when a parent makes no material change to the removal conditions, those conditions are unlikely to improve soon, and continuation of the relationship diminishes the children's chance of a stable home.

In Re Timothy W. H. · filed 2012-12-07(g)(3)

The evidence in this record, which we summarized earlier in this opinion, clearly and convincingly established that Father made no material changes to the conditions that existed when the children were removed in 2010; that there is little likelihood that these conditions will be remedied at an early date so that the children may be safely returned to Father in the near future; and that the continuation of the parent and child relationship greatly diminishes the childrens’ chances of early integration into a safe, stable and permanent home.

Persistent conditions support termination when the record shows the parent will not be able to resume parenting in the near future.

In Re: Selena v. and Liliana V. · filed 2013-02-14(g)(3)

Based on the record before us, it is clear that Mother will not be in a position to take on the role of parent to the Children any time in the near future. ... The Juvenile Court did not err in finding and holding that clear and convincing evidence existed that grounds were proven to terminate Mother’s parental rights to the Children pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113 (g)(3).

Persistent conditions cannot support termination when the proof is not clear and convincing, and the judgment must be reversed on that ground.

In Re: Johnny K.F. · filed 2013-08-27(g)(3)

It is telling that the Petitioners in their brief do not argue that the termination of Mother’s parental rights pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(3) was found correctly by the Trial Court. We reverse the Trial Court as to this issue.

Termination for persistence of conditions under § 36-1-113(g)(3) requires clear and convincing proof of all three statutory elements.

In the Matter of: Candice S. · filed 2014-02-12(g)(3)

A termination proceeding based on the persistence of conditions ground requires a finding by clear and convincing evidence of all three statutory factors. In re Valentine, 79 S.W.3d at 549.

Persistence of conditions is established when the conditions leading to removal remain unremedied to a degree and for a duration that do not indicate permanent parental change.

In Re: Destiny M. · filed 2014-02-24(g)(3)

From the totality of the circumstances, we conclude that the evidence clearly and convincingly establishes that many of the same conditions that led to the child’s removal from Mother’s custody still exist, or have not been remedied to such a degree or for such length of time as to indicate a permanent change on Mother’s part.

A parent’s claimed sobriety while largely incarcerated does not show that a longstanding substance-abuse condition has been remedied when the parent has spent no appreciable time outside custody demonstrating sobriety.

In Re: Grace Y. · filed 2014-09-30(g)(3)

Despite Father’s protestation that he “quit everything” about two weeks prior to his incarceration in August 2012, he has not been out of jail or prison for any appreciable length of time since that date in order to demonstrate his commitment to sobriety.

Persistent conditions focuses on the results of a parent’s efforts, and continuing substance-abuse and anger issues after years of services can satisfy all three statutory elements.

In re: Bonnie L. · filed 2015-06-12(g)(3)

Because each of the elements of Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-1-113(g)(3) were established by clear and convincing evidence, the trial court did not err in concluding that termination of parental rights was justified on the ground of persistence of conditions.

Subsection (g)(3) is not established when the condition that caused removal has been remedied and alleged other conditions that might prevent a safe return are supported only by hearsay and speculation.

In Re Christopher M. · filed 2015-08-24(g)(3)

In sum, we cannot disagree with the trial court that there was no clear and convincing evidence that “[t]he conditions that led to [Christopher‟s] removal or other conditions…that, therefore, prevent the child‟s safe return to the care of the [Mother] still persist.” See Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(3).

Improvements compelled by incarceration did not remedy persistent substance-abuse conditions under subsection (g)(3) when the parent's prior opportunities for voluntary treatment had failed.

In re Thomas T. · filed 2015-11-16(g)(3)

However, the trial court‟s findings noted that “changes in [Father‟s] condition that have been made for the positive have been forced on [him] by prison,” rather than being a personal “adjustment of circumstances.” Finding no error with the juvenile court‟s determination that the conditions that led to Thomas‟s removal still persist, we affirm with respect to persistent conditions.

Persistent conditions remain when a parent’s unsupported promise of parole and future stability does not demonstrate stability and sobriety in an uncontrolled environment or permit an early safe return.

In re Tristan B. · filed 2016-05-02(g)(3)

Even if Father were to be granted parole, we agree with the trial court that more time would be required in order for him to “demonstrate stability and sobriety in an uncontrolled environment.”

A parent’s noncooperation does not relieve the petitioner of proving persistent conditions by clear and convincing evidence, even when the noncooperation makes obtaining that evidence difficult.

In re Jimmy B., Jr. · filed 2016-05-11(g)(3)

DCS failed to do so here. Accordingly, we hold that the juvenile court’s termination of Father’s parental rights based on the ground of persistence of conditions is not supported by clear and convincing evidence.

A recurring pattern of compliance followed by inability to parent after services end supports persistent conditions when the parent remains unable to care for herself and the children together.

In re Christian P. · filed 2016-06-06(g)(3)

A pattern of compliance with services followed by Mother‟s inability to parent once the Children are returned or services are discontinued has been evident since 2004. Additionally, the Children have adjusted to their placements and have bonded with their respective families. With all of the above considerations in mind, we conclude that the record supports termination on this statutory ground.

Permanency-plan noncompliance does not relieve the petitioner of proving by clear and convincing evidence that the condition relied on under subsection (g)(3) still persisted at the termination hearing.

In Re Destiny S. · filed 2016-08-04(g)(3)

While Mother‟s failure to complete those requirements was sufficient to support termination of her parental rights for substantial noncompliance with the permanency plan, it did not relieve DCS of its burden to prove that the condition still persisted by clear and convincing evidence.

Persistent conditions are assessed from the parent’s past actions rather than future aspirations, and untreated addiction may show little likelihood of early remediation.

In Re Casey C. · filed 2016-12-19(g)(3)

Based on the totality of the circumstances, we conclude that there is clear and convincing evidence in the record to support the trial court’s finding that the conditions that led to the Children’s removal from Mother’s custody still persist, and ―[t]here is little likelihood that these conditions will be remedied at an early date so that the [C]hild[ren] can be safely returned to the parent . . . in the near future.‖ Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(3)(B).

Satisfying a permanency plan does not automatically defeat the separate ground of persistent conditions.

In Re Ja'Miya T. · filed 2017-03-28(g)(3)

Therefore, apparent satisfaction of the requirements of the permanency plan does not, ipso facto, render the ground of persistence of conditions inapplicable.

Subsection (g)(3) was established where the parent refused responsibility for the harm that caused removal and conditions remained that would subject the children to further abuse or neglect.

In Re L.M.H. · filed 2017-09-28(g)(3)

He has failed to take responsibility for his actions leading to the removal of the children and refuses to acknowledge the harm that he has caused the children. Conditions persist that would subject the children to further neglect or abuse in the custody of father. We hold, as a matter of law, that the evidence does not preponderate against the trial court’s finding of clear and convincing evidence supporting termination of father’s parental rights on the ground of persistence of conditions.

Subsection (g)(3) was established where the parent's unresolved inability to protect the children from sexual abuse and unmet mental-health and specialized-training needs continued to prevent safe reunification.

In Re Da'Vante M. · filed 2017-12-12(g)(3)

Therefore, the conditions that led to the Children’s removal still exist, and Father does not appear able or willing to rectify those conditions in the near future. We find, as did the Juvenile Court, that the ground of persistent conditions has been established by clear and convincing evidence.

Whether unsafe conditions still persist under subsection (g)(3) is evaluated as of trial, not only during the six months after the child’s removal.

In Re Steevie A. · filed 2017-12-14(g)(3)

First, we note that the express language of section 36-1-113(g)(3) provides that the ground is met if unsafe conditions “still persist,” implying that the inquiry involves the circumstances as of the date of trial.

Section 36-1-113(g)(3) supported termination when clear and convincing evidence established persistent conditions.

In Re: Riley W. · filed 2018-03-12(g)(3)

The evidence in the record on appeal, as discussed more fully above, does not preponderate against these findings made by the Juvenile Court by clear and convincing evidence. We find no error in the Juvenile Court’s determination that grounds were proven by clear and convincing evidence to terminate Mother’s parental rights to the Child for persistent conditions pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(3).

Subsection (g)(3) was established where continuing the parental relationship hindered the children's integration into a safe, stable, permanent home and every statutory element was proven clearly and convincingly.

In Re Emily J. · filed 2018-05-09(g)(3)

Accordingly, we hold that there is clear and convincing evidence of each element of Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-1-113(g)(3), and we affirm the finding that Petitioners proved this ground.

Subsection (g)(3) supported termination where the parent made his best effort but the dangerous conditions nevertheless persisted.

In Re: D.T. · filed 2018-06-18(g)(3)

The trial court determined that father made his “best effort to address the issues preventing his home being a safe and caring environment for the child, unfortunately, he has failed.” After a careful review of the record, we hold that the evidence does not preponderate against the trial court’s determination.

Subsection (g)(3)’s persistent-conditions ground focuses on the results of parental improvement efforts rather than merely whether efforts were made.

In Re Michayla T. · filed 2018-12-07(g)(3)

The persistence of conditions ground focuses “on the results of the parent’s efforts at improvement rather than the mere fact that he or she had made them.”

Subsection (g)(3) does not require proof that the parent-child relationship cannot be salvaged or that the parent is currently harmful to the child.

In Re: Lesley A. · filed 2018-12-18(g)(3)

To prove the existence of this ground, it is not necessary for DCS “to prove that a parent-child relationship cannot be salvaged” or “to show that a parent is ‘currently harmful’ to a child’s safety or future emotional stability.”

A substance-abuse condition that has been rectified does not establish persistence of conditions under subsection (g)(3).

In Re: Kiara S. · filed 2018-12-20(g)(3)

Here, we cannot agree with the trial court that DCS proved persistence of conditions by clear and convincing evidence. First, one of the primary reasons the children were removed from the Father’s care was the fact that Father tested positive for marijuana. The trial court conceded that this condition has been rectified. DCS does not dispute that Father no longer has any issues with substance abuse, as there was no proof offered by DCS on this point at trial.

Persistence of conditions may rest on new conditions likely to cause further abuse or neglect, and the parent’s failure to remedy them need not be willful.

In Re Gabriella H. · filed 2019-01-08(g)(3)(A)

The statute does not require that only the original conditions leading to removal be used to establish grounds for termination. On the contrary, the statute specifically includes both “[t]he conditions that led to the child’s removal or other conditions that in a reasonable probability would cause the child to be subjected to further abuse or neglect.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(3)(A). Nor does the statute require that the parent’s failure to remedy the conditions be willful.

A parent’s history of mental-health and substance-abuse problems does not establish persistent conditions under subsection (g)(3) without clear evidence that those conditions remained at trial.

In Re Chivon G. · filed 2019-08-30(g)(3)

Although we understand and appreciate the trial court’s concerns in relation to Mother’s lengthy history of mental health and substance abuse issues, there was simply insufficient evidence demonstrating that these conditions persisted at the time of trial.

A parent’s request for a few more months does not defeat persistent conditions when a year and a half of little or no progress makes reunification in the near future unlikely.

In Re Emma S. · filed 2020-01-09(g)(3)

We further conclude that the evidence was clear and convincing that there was little likelihood that these conditions would be remedied in the near future. While Mother says that she needs just a few more months to get things on track, the fact that she had already had a year and a half and had made little to no progress makes reunification “in the near future” unlikely.

A parent’s inability to remedy persistent conditions need not be willful, so evidence disputing a claimed mental-health admission was immaterial to that ground.

In Re Benjamin P. · filed 2020-02-04(g)(3)

Whether she was admitted to a mental health institute has no bearing on her failure to remedy the conditions which led to removal when the statute does not require that the parent’s failure be willful.

Persistent conditions can rest on conditions other than those causing removal when they would probably expose the child to further abuse or neglect and are unlikely to be remedied early.

In Re Naomi B. · filed 2022-02-24(g)(3)

These constitute “other conditions” that, in all reasonable probability, would cause the Child to be subjected to further abuse or neglect. It is not dispositive that these conditions may not be the identical conditions that necessitated the Child’s removal. Based on this record, there is little likelihood that these conditions will be remedied at an early date so that the Child can be safely returned to Father in the near future.

Persistent conditions may rest on a parent's continued inability to provide fundamental care even when that inability is not willful.

In Re Masson S. · filed 2022-11-22(g)(3)

A parent’s continued inability to provide fundamental care to a child, even if not willful, . . . constitutes a condition which prevents the safe return of the child to the parent’s care. ... The failure to remedy the conditions which led to the removal need not be willful.

Persistent conditions is established when the removal conditions remain unlikely to be remedied soon and continuing the relationship diminishes the children's chances of early integration into a permanent home.

In Re Josclyn M. · filed 2024-12-16(g)(3)

Following our review, we conclude that there is little likelihood that the conditions which led to removal will be remedied at an early date so that the Children can be safely returned in the near future and that the continuation of the parent’s relationship greatly diminishes their chances of early integration into a safe, stable, and permanent home.

Domestic violence, incarceration, failure to acknowledge abuse, and failure to benefit from anger management may establish that conditions persist and are unlikely to be remedied early.

In Re Fred M. · filed 2025-12-29(g)(3)

Second, there was little likelihood these conditions would be remedied at all, much less at an early date in order that the Child can be reunited with Father. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(3)(A)(ii). Father had been incarcerated for nearly all the custodial episode, including at trial, and had only allegedly completed anger management classes to progress toward reunifying with the Child. Father has appeared to learn little, if anything, from his anger management classes, as his outbursts and tone in court revealed.

Recent entry into treatment does not defeat the persistent-conditions ground when the parent relapsed after prior treatment and remains unable to care for the children, making early remediation unlikely.

IN RE CHARLEE G. · filed 2026-03-27(g)(3)

While we acknowledge Mother’s progress in her current program and commend her for seeking rehabilitation, the evidence confirms that Mother was still not in a position to care for the Children. At the time of the hearing, Mother was only one month into her current treatment program in Kentucky after having relapsed following her attendance at another treatment program in Louisiana. Following our review of the record, we conclude that there is little likelihood that the conditions which led to removal will be remedied at an early date.

Persistent conditions turns on the results of a parent's efforts and whether the child can return in the near future, not merely the parent's intentions or attempts to improve.

In Re James K. · filed 2026-04-27(g)(3)

The persistent conditions ground focuses “on the results of the parent’s efforts at improvement rather than the mere fact that he or she had made them,” and analyzes whether the child could be returned to the parent in the near future.” ... Although Mother may have had the intention of creating a stable environment for the Child, she had not done so in the four years the Child was in foster care.

Remedying a child's acute physical symptoms does not defeat persistent conditions when the underlying condition—the parent's inability to care for the child's sensitive medical needs—remains unremedied.

In Re Heavenlee J. · filed 2026-05-26(g)(3)

It is true that the foster family has remedied the acute physical symptoms that the child was experiencing at the time of the removal. But the true condition that necessitated removal of the child was that her parents were not adequately caring for her sensitive medical needs. Absolutely nothing in the record indicates that Father can competently do so now.