Tenn. Code Ann. § 67-6-102

An extended warranty contract is not itself the performance of repair services subject to sales tax.

Covington Pike Toyota, Inc. v. Cardwell · filed 1992-03-02(22)(F)(iv); (13)(F)

We conclude that the undertaking of contractual commitments by entering into an extended warranty contract does not constitute “the performing for a consideration of any repair services” within the meaning of Tenn.Code Ann. § 67-6-102(22)(F)(iv)

The installation-services provision requires a separate installation charge.

Eusco, Inc. v. Huddleston · filed 1992-06-08(22)(F)(vi)

Eusco made no separate charge for installation services as is required for the application of Tenn. Code Ann. § 67-6-102(22)(F)(vi).

Installation services were not taxable absent a separate installation charge, and a sale for resale was outside the ordinary retail-sale definition; the repair-services provision did not apply to non-repair work.

Colemill Enterprises, Inc. v. Huddleston · filed 1998-03-30(23)(F)(vi), (23)(A), (23)(F)(iv)

Colemill Enterprises, Inc.’s transaction with Bessemer Plywood Corporation was not taxable as “installation services” because (i) no separate charge was made for installation services, and (ii) it was a sale for resale.

Section 67-6-102(13)(F)(iv) covers repairs regardless of their extent, including rebuilding a customer’s motor with improvements and a new warranty.

LeTourneau Sales & Service, Inc. v. Olsen · filed 1985-05-28(13)(F)(iv)

There is no indication of any “degrees” of repair in T.C.A. § 67-6-102(13)(F)(iv) or in any of the rules interpreting that section.

Repair services under subsection (13)(F)(iv) have the same meaning when applying the exemption for barge repair services.

Warner-Tamble Co. v. Taylor · filed 1989-10-09(13)(F)(iv)

It appears that the Commissioner is advocating the position that he can tax a service as a “repair service” under T.C.A. § 67-6-102(13)(F)(iv), as within the definition in Regulation 1320-5-1-.54 and deny that the regulation has the same meaning when applied to an exemption of “repair services” in T.C.A. § 67-6-327. We reject the notion that the strict-liberal dichotomy of taxing-exemption statutes permits a different interpretation of the language defining a taxable activity for taxation purposes, from that defining the same taxable activity for exemption purposes.

The hotels’ transfer of food and beverages as part of a room package constituted a sale for consideration.

Nashville Clubhouse, Inn v. Johnson · filed 2000-03-16(24)(A), (25)(A)

In order for there to be a sale, there must be a transfer of title or possession and consideration.

A contractor did not resell raw materials after fabricating and installing them into realty because the materials became real property.

Wylie Steel Fabricators, Inc. v. Johnson · filed 2005-04-28(a)(27)(A)

After Wylie Steel performed its contract and installed the steel products it fabricated into the churches, the steel products became real property. Accordingly, Wylie Steel could not have resold the raw materials to the churches at this point either. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 67-6-102(a)(27)(A) (2003) (defining “sale” as the transfer of tangible personal property).

A nonexclusive lease may satisfy the sale-for-resale exemption when leasing is the property’s primary purpose and the statutory and regulatory requirements are met.

CAO Holdings, Inc. v. Loren L. Chumley, Commissioner of Revenue, State of Tennessee · filed 2009-05-27(25), (34)(A), (36)(A)

There is nothing in the statutory definition of a lease that indicates a legislative intent to require a lease to give exclusive possession or use in order to fall within the sale-for-resale exemption.

The sale-for-resale exemption requires leased property to be used exclusively for renting or leasing.

CAO Holdings, Inc. v. Trost · filed 2010-12-15(a)(28)(A)

The meaning of the phrase “used exclusively for renting or leasing” is clear and requires no construction.

For the sale-for-resale exemption, a bona fide sale includes a lease or rental made in good faith and for valuable consideration.

Niuklee, LLC v. Commissioner, TN Dept. of Revenue · filed 2015-11-09(75)(A), read with (78)(A)

Accordingly, a “bona fide sale” of tangible personal property consists of the lease or rental of the property in good faith and for valuable consideration.

Section 67-6-102(23)(A) defines a sale to include the transfer of possession of tangible personal property for consideration, including a lease or rental, even when the lease was executed outside Tennessee.

Itel Containers International Corp. v. Cardwell · filed 1991-04-22(23)(A)

No other authority is cited by Itel for its assertion, and we find that the statutory language quoted above is a clear declaration of the legislature’s intent to tax the transfer of possession of tangible personal property in Tennessee, pursuant to lease agreements executed outside of Tennessee.

A retail sale excludes a sale for resale, and “sale” and “resale” include leasing tangible personal property, so a purchaser’s acquisition of pagers for leasing to customers is a tax-exempt sale for resale.

Cape Fear Paging Co. v. Huddleston · filed 1996-08-26(23)(A), (24)(A)

“‘Retail sales’ or ‘sale at retail’ means a taxable sale of tangible personal property or specifically taxable services to a consumer or to any person for any purpose other than for resale.” Tenn.Code Ann. § 67-6-102(23)(A) (Supp.1995). The terms “sale” and “resale,” as used in the statute, include the lease of tangible personal property. Tenn.Code Ann. § 67-6-102(24)(A) (Supp.1995). ... Consequently, the sale of tangible personal property to a purchaser who, in turn, leases that property to another is exempt from the tax. Such sales are exempt as sales for resale.

Section 67-6-102(22)(A) treats a sale to a consumer or for any purpose other than resale as a retail sale, while excluding sales for resale.

Security Fire Protection Co. v. Huddleston · filed 2003-12-31(22)(A)

A retail sale under the statute is: a taxable sale of tangible personal property or specifically taxable services to a consumer or to any person for any purpose other than for resale. Tenn.Code Ann § 67-6-102(22)(A) (West, WESTLAW through 1993) (emphasis added). Thus the code excludes sales for resale from the definition of ordinary retail sales. The section further provides, “[a]ny sales for resale must, however, be in strict compliance with mies and regulations promulgated by the commissioner.” Id. (emphasis added).

Sales for resale qualify for exemption only when the dealer strictly complies with the applicable rules and regulations, including the resale certificate requirement.

Scholl, Inc. v. Jackson · filed 1987-05-26(13)(A)

The record does not disclose that Dis-playcraft ever received or required any sort of certificate of resale from Scholl, Inc. Displaycraft has not complied with the rules and regulations and clearly cannot claim the exemption contended for in this case.

Section 67-6-102(13)(F) excludes components acquired for resale from retail sales, but does not exclude components a purchaser uses in its own business.

NASCO, Inc. v. Jackson · filed 1988-03-21(13)(F)

Where goods or services do become component parts of “articles of tangible personal property for resale” or are used incidentally “to the sale of such property for resale,” their aquisitions from vendors are not included in the definition of “retail sales.” T.C.A. § 67-6-102(13)(F). There is no such exclusion or exemption, however, when a vendee such as appellant uses or consumes such components in its own business operations insofar as the issues in the present case are concerned.

Section 67-6-102(23)(A) exempts a sale for resale from tax only when the seller strictly complies with the Commissioner’s rules and regulations.

Upper East Tenn. v. Johnson · filed 1997-05-13(23)(A)

Our reading of T. C. A. § 67-6-102(23)(A) indicates, however, that the legislature clearly intended to limit the tax-exempt status of sales for resale to those sales which were in strict compliance with the rules and regulations promulgated by the Commissioner.

“Business” includes activity pursued for indirect gain, benefit, or advantage, and is broader than activity conducted for profit.

Trailer Conditioners, Inc. v. Huddleston · filed 1995-01-11(1)

But the concept of “gain, benefit, or advantage” is much broader than that of profit. ... TCI clearly meets the definition of a business found in Tenn.Code Ann. § 67-6-102(1).

The statutory definitions of “dealer” and “person” do not include an automobile dealer’s assignee for the bad-debt sales-tax credit.

Suntrust Bank v. Johnson · filed 1998-05-26(7)(C)

Accordingly, our sales tax statutes provide no basis for stretching the meaning of “dealer who has paid the tax imposed by this chapter” to include a dealer’s assignees.

The statutory definitions of “dealer” and “person” do not include a dealer’s assignee for the bad-debt sales-tax credit.

SunTrust Bank, Nashville v. Johnson · filed 2000-12-13(21)

The corresponding definitions of “dealer” and “person” in the Retailers Sales Tax Act are not similarly broad. Tenn.Code Ann. § 67-6-102(7)(C) (Supp.2000) (“dealer”); Tenn.Code Ann. § 67-6-102(21) (“person”). Accordingly, our sales tax statutes provide no basis for stretching the meaning of “dealer who has paid the tax imposed by this chapter” to include a dealer’s assignees.

Section 67-6-102(11) includes a governmental utility in the definition of “person” when it sells taxable goods or services at retail.

Beare Co. v. Olsen · filed 1986-03-17(11)

As previously pointed out the definition of “person” under the statute expressly includes “any political subdivision or governmental agency ... to the extent that such agency sells at retail, rents or furnishes any of the things or services taxable under this chapter.”

Section 67-6-102(4) includes a seller within the definition of “dealer” when its subsidiary and representatives link it to goods used or consumed in Tennessee.

Pearle Health Services, Inc. v. Taylor · filed 1990-04-16(4)

Because of this link Pearle falls within the definition of a “dealer” as one who “causes tangible personal property ... to be used or consumed within this state;” and “maintains ... by a subsidiary....” Pearle, as a dealer under T.C.A. § 67-6-102(4), is engaged in taxable activity within the State of Tennessee.

Section 67-6-102 defines a dealer to include a company that causes catalogs to be imported into Tennessee from other states.

JC Penney Co., Inc. v. Olsen · filed 1990-09-10(4)

Appellant is undoubtedly a dealer as defined in T.C.A. § 67-6-102. The company caused tangible personal property to be imported into Tennessee from other states in the form of its catalogs.

An occasional and isolated sale falls outside the definition of business only when the seller does not hold itself out as engaged in business.

SC & T Properties v. Huddleston · filed 1992-01-06(1)

However, the exclusion from the statutory definition definition of “business” under T.C.A. § 67-6-102(1) does not apply to all “occasional and isolated sales” but only to “occasional and isolated sales or transactions by a person who does not hold himself out as engaged in business.”

Fee-based satellite television services can qualify as programs broadcast over the airwaves for public consumption and are therefore excluded from taxable telecommunications.

HBO Direct, Inc. v. Ruth E. Johnson, Commissioner of Revenue, State of Tennessee · filed 1999-07-01(30)(D)

Consequently, we conclude that HBO’s services must be deemed “broadcast over the airwaves for public consumption” and therefore are not taxable “telecommunications” under Tennessee Code Annotated § 67-6-102(30)(D).

Telecommunications used only to deliver check-guarantee information were not taxable telecommunication services because telecommunications were incidental to the underlying service.

Equifax v. Johnson · filed 2000-06-27(22)(F)(iii), (27), (27)(B)

We agree with the trial court’s interpretation of the foregoing provisions and, thus, conclude that Equifax was not providing taxable telecommunication services within the meaning of the Retailers’ Sales Tax Act.

The utility-services provision was not an independent exemption, and integral engineering services were part of the taxable sales price.

AT & T v. Johnson · filed 2001-01-30(13), (26), (28)

The engineering services in this case were an integral “part of the sale of tangible personal property,” and thus were subject to sales tax.

The bundled port modem management service was taxable telecommunications rather than exempt private line service.

AOL, Inc. (successor to America Online, Inc.), on its own behalf and as assignee of Sprint Communications Company, L.P., and Sprint Communications Company, L.P. v. Roberts · filed 2013-08-12(a)(32)(A)-(D); (a)(24) (2003)

we have determined that the service provided by Sprint did not constitute a private line service within the meaning of the statute.

Wholesale dial-up and broadband Internet access services were enhanced services and not taxable telecommunications under the statute.

Level 3 Communications, LLC v. Richard Roberts, Commissioner of Revenue, State of Tennessee · filed 2013-09-20(a)(32), including (a)(32)(C)

we decline to find that providing Internet access, or even a component of Internet access, falls within the definition of “telecommunications” for purposes of the tax statute at issue.

A service is not taxable as telecommunications merely because it transmits information; its primary purpose must be communication between users.

IBM Corporation v. Reagan Farr, Commissioner of Revenue, State of Tennessee · filed 2013-09-24(a)(32)

the issue of whether a service is taxable as a telecommunication service does not turn on whether or not a service provides the transmission of information, but whether communication between users of the service was the primary purpose of the service.

Section 67-6-102(31)(A)-(C) covers basic telecommunication transmission services but does not include enhanced information, conversion, computer, or Internet-access services.

Prodigy Services Corp., Inc. v. Johnson · filed 2003-08-12(31)(A)-(C)

Thus, the distinction persists between “basic” telecommunication services of the type mentioned in the statute (telephone, telegraph, WATS, paging) and “enhanced” services (information services, conversion services, computer services and Internet access). We think the chancellor was correct in concluding that the Legislature did not intend for the services Prodigy provides to come within the statutory definition.

Landscaping is not a taxable service under subsection (24)(F).

Brown v. Ruth Johnson, Commissioner, TN Dept. of Revenue · filed 2001-09-19(24)(F)

since landscaping is not a taxable service under Tenn. Code Ann. § 67-6-102(24)(F), it was necessary to ensure that taxes are paid on all of the tangible personal property used in the landscaping business.

Section 67-6-102(94)(a) defines use to include exercising an ownership right or power over tangible personal property, including driving a motor home through Tennessee on trips to other states.

McCurry Expeditions, LLC v. Roberts · filed 2014-11-14(94)(a)

The term “used” is defined by statute as “the exercise of any right or power over tangible personal property incident to the ownership thereof, except that it does not include the sale at retail of that property in the regular course of business.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 67-6-102(94)(a). ... Thus, the Appellees, with Mr. McCurry as the agent or licensee of McCurry LLC, did “exercise any right or power” over the motor home in Tennessee by utilizing the motor home for out-of-state travel.

The broad definition of “use” includes storing aviation fuel in Tennessee and pumping it into aircraft there.

American Airlines, Inc. v. Johnson · filed 2000-08-16(30)(A)

We believe that this definition of the term “use” was broad enough to cover American Airlines’ acts of storing the aviation fuel in Tennessee, pumping the fuel into the tanks of its aircraft at the Nashville airport, and then using the fuel in the operation of its aircraft.

Machinery used to keep manufacturing rolls fit for production is equipment used for maintenance, so related supplies are taxable.

Norandal USA, Inc. v. Ruth E. Johnson, Commissioner of Revenue for the State of Tennessee · filed 2004-08-20(a)(14)(A), (a)(14)(F)

The roll grinders in this case clearly make the caster and mill rolls ready for production. Therefore, from our review of the plain language of the statute, the statutory purpose, and the meaning and context of the term under scrutiny, we must conclude that the roll grinders are encompassed in the term “equipment.”

Building materials purchased for resale were not taxable retail sales under subsection (22)(E).

Hearthstone, Inc. v. Moyers · filed 1991-04-08(22)(E)

Since we have held that Hearthstone’s purchases of building materials were “for resale,” we agree with Hearthstone that its purchases of materials were not taxable as retail sales.

Section 67-6-102(16) defines storage to include keeping property in Tennessee for use or consumption there, including equipment kept there for substantial periods.

Bean Dredging Corp. v. Olsen · filed 1987-12-14(16)

The term “storage” is defined in T.C.A. § 67-6-102(16) as: “... any keeping or retention in this state of tangible personal property for use or consumption in this state, or for any purpose other than sale at retail in the regular course of business....” In our opinion the facts of this case show that the equipment of appellee was stored in Tennessee, within the meaning of these statutes, for substantial periods of time during each of the tax years in question.

The exclusion for industrial materials used directly in manufacturing permits a requirement that the materials be consumed.

Quaker Oats Co. v. Jackson · filed 1988-01-11(13)(E)

We find merit in these arguments and we hold that the consumption requirement of Rule 40 is a reasonable interpretation of the statutory “used” in the exemption statute and the Rule does not go beyond the scope of the statute.

A transfer of title or possession for consideration is a sale; title passing in Tennessee makes the sale taxable there even if the goods are later exported.

Check Printers, Inc. v. Gerregano · filed 2019-06-28(80)(A)

Because the definition of “sale” includes a transfer of title or a transfer of possession, Check Printers’ argument is without merit. The transfer of title constitutes a taxable “sale” in Tennessee.

A transfer of title to tangible personal property for consideration is a sale for Tennessee sales tax purposes.

Jack Daniel Distillery, Lem Motlow, Prop. v. Jackson · filed 1987-11-16(14)(A)

This is significant in that for sales tax purposes, sale means “any transfer of title or possession, or both ... of tangible personal property for a consideration.” T.C.A. § 67-6-102(14)(A). ... Under the agreement, a sale of the merchandise was effected and title passed from “new Jack Daniel” to the appellant upon delivery of the merchandise at a location selected by appellant. The location selected was in Tennessee, making the sale subject to the Tennessee sales tax.

A sale requires a transfer of title or possession of tangible personal property for consideration, and the Commissioner cannot expand that definition by regulation.

Volunteer Val-Pak v. Celauro · filed 1989-03-27(14)(A)

The elements necessary to constitute a sale are (1) transfer of title or possession, or both of (2) tangible personal property, for a (3) consideration. T.C.A. § 67-6-102(14)(A). ... It is fundamental that the Commissioner cannot, by regulation, enlarge the definition of a “sale” as defined in the statute itself. ... We conclude that the transactions of taxpayer were not Tennessee sales of tangible personal property, and the sales tax was wrongfully assessed.

Section 67-6-102(23)(A) defines a sale as a transfer of title or possession of tangible personal property for consideration.

Mast Advertising & Publishing, Inc. v. Moyers · filed 1993-11-08(23)(A)

Under the terms of T.C.A. § 67-6-102(23)(A) 1 the elements necessary to constitute a taxable sale are (1) transfer of title or possession, or both of (2) tangible personal property, for (3) consideration.

A parent corporation receives consideration for transferring vehicles to newly created subsidiaries when it accepts their stock or securities in exchange.

D. Canale & Co. v. Celauro · filed 1989-01-16(14)(A)

Following the transaction there was an entity to receive consideration, i.e., the parent corporation, which accepted stock or securities in the subsidiaries based, at least in part, on the transfer of ownership of the motor vehicles in question.

The court adopted the Supreme Court's interpretation of the component-part exemption language in Tenn. Code Ann. § 67-6-102(13)(E) and treated that interpretation as controlling for materially identical language.

Bearing Distributors, Inc. v. David Gerregano, Commissioner of Revenue, State of Tennessee · filed 2022-01-05(13)(E)

“[I]n order to qualify for the component part exemption, the materials must have actually gone into the finished product as an ingredient or component, either chemically or mechanically.”

Advertising design models that embody commissioned ideas are tangible personal property when they are crucial to reviewing and developing the advertising concepts.

Thomas Nelson, Inc. v. Olsen · filed 1987-01-19(17)

In conclusion, we hold that the advertising design models acquired by Taxpayer pursuant to contracts commissioning the creation of advertising concepts were tangible personal property within the purview of Tennessee’s Sales and Use Tax, thus subjecting the entire costs of these transactions to taxation.

Section 67-6-102(28)(A) treats fabrication of imported materials in Tennessee as a use because it exercises control over the materials.

Security Fire Protection v. Huddleston · filed 2003-05-19(28)(A)

The code defines use as “the exercise of any right or power over tangible personal property incident to the ownership thereof, except that it does not include the sale at retail of that property in the regular course of business.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 67-6-102(28)(A)(West, WESTLAW through 1993). ... We agree with Commissioner, however, that when Security Fire fabricated the materials, it exercised control over the materials such that the materials lost their character as articles in interstate commerce and became subject to use tax.

Section 67-6-102(97)(A) defines tangible personal property to include a coin collection whose coins can be seen, weighed, measured, felt, or touched.

In Re Estate of James A. Price · filed 2025-01-24(97)(A)

In the first instance, the coin collection is tangible personal property because it can be “seen, weighed, measured, felt, or touched[.]” Sanders, 923 S.W.2d at 542; see also Tenn. Code Ann. § 67-6-102 (97)(A).

The court explained that the statutory definition was amended to include prewritten computer software and held that Commerce Union was thereby abrogated as to sales and use tax.

SAP America, Inc. v. David Gerregano, Commissioner of Revenue, State of Tennessee · filed 2026-05-13(45)(A)

the General Assembly amended the sales and use tax statutory definition of “tangible personal property” to include “prewritten computer software.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 67-6-102(45)(A) (2007)

Section 67-6-102(12)(A) and (D)(i) treats machinery used to fabricate or process property for resale and machines used to generate, produce, or distribute electricity or steam as industrial machinery, but a building that merely houses machinery is not itself exempt.

Tibbals Flooring Co. v. Huddleston · filed 1994-12-12(12)(A), (12)(D)(i)

We hold that the dry kiln is not industrial machinery and, accordingly, the use tax assessment on the concrete floor, the metal walls and roof, and insulation which composed the dry kiln building was correct. Abatement of the use tax assessment for the spoils removal and dust piping system was also correct because the system is industrial machinery and exempt from use taxes. The Court of Appeals’ judgment is, therefore, affirmed in its entirety.

The industrial-machinery exemption covers components integral to manufacturing or processing, even when they do not fit the traditional concept of machinery.

Eastman Chemical Co. v. Johnson · filed 2004-11-24(13)(A)

In the case under submission, the trial court found that the catalysts used by Eastman were “part of the totality of means whereby the processes are accomplished and integral to the process,” and therefore fell within the definition of industrial machinery as set forth in AFG Indus. We agree. Tibbals II and AFG Indus, establish that all components integral to manufacturing or processing are exempt under the definition of industrial machinery, whether or not they fit the traditional concept or image of “machinery,” or the pre-1984 definition of machinery.

Section 67-6-102(12) includes molten tin used as an associated part and accessory of a glassmaking tin bath within the definition of industrial machinery.

AFG Industries, Inc. v. Cardwell · filed 1992-06-08(12)

We hold that the tin comes within this expanded definition. ... The molten tin is an integral part of the bath, performing several functions previously done by rollers and polishers. It is both an accessory to and an associated part of the tin bath apparatus.

Industrial machinery must be used during the manufacturing process; equipment used before raw materials enter the process or after finished products leave the site is excluded.

Nuclear Fuel Services, Inc. v. Huddleston · filed 1995-12-19(12)(F)

The effect of this construction is that “industrial machinery” includes only machinery, apparatus and equipment used during the manufacturing process, and not before raw materials are brought in to start the process, nor after the completed product has been shipped away from the manufacturing site.

Section 67-6-102(12) covers machinery necessary to and primarily used for fabricating or processing tangible personal property for resale and off-premises consumption, while § 67-6-102(23)(E)(i) excludes industrial materials and explosives used directly in that processing from taxable use when they become part of the finished product or are used in processing.

Rogers Group, Inc. v. Huddleston · filed 1995-01-06(12), (23)(E)(i)

The Commissioner argues that the key to the exemption is the phrase “for resale” in the definition of industrial machinery and that since less than fifty one percent of the goods processed at any of Rogers’ locations are sold to third parties the machinery is not used primarily for the fabrication of tangible personal property for resale. ... We think the Commissioner’s argument fails for two reasons. First, the legislative definition of fabricating or processing property for resale does not focus on the sale but focuses on the property’s use or consumption off the premises. That is how the Supreme Court interpreted the exemption in Southern Hospitality. ... Second, we think that the transfer of the property in a taxable transaction for use and consumption off the premises is identical to a sale—even though a major portion of the property does not change hands until it is *36installed by the processor or fabricator. ... When so viewed the Commissioner’s “fifty one percent” rule is satisfied since all of the property is transferred off the premises in a taxable transaction. ... The application of both of these sections depends on whether the taxpayer is fabricating or processing tangible personal property for resale. Since we have held that Rogers’ activities fit that definition, the issues raised with respect to these exemptions should be resolved in Rogers’ favor.

Section 67-6-102 allows qualifying industrial materials and machinery used before minerals are severed from the ground when the resulting product is tangible personal property for resale.

Jersey Miniere Zinc Co. v. Jackson · filed 1989-07-31(13)(E), (8)(A)

Section 67-6-102(13)(E) exempts industrial materials used in “processing, manufacturing or conversion into articles of tangible personal property for resale.” [Emphasis supplied]. That is, it requires only that the end product of the activity of processing, manufacturing or conversion be tangible personal property. Section 67-6-102(8) exempting machinery used in “fabricating or processing tangible personal property for *931resale” [emphasis supplied], similarly focuses on the character of the resulting product. In both statutes, the “tangible personal property” requirement is a limitation only on the end product which results from processing or manufacturing.

Section 67-6-102 treats a transfer or exchange of tangible personal property for consideration as a sale, and tangible personal property includes perceptible property such as gold and silver coins and bullion when valued for their intrinsic precious-metal value.

State v. Sanders · filed 1996-05-28(24)(A), (28)

“Sale” is defined by Tenn.Code Ann. § 67-6-102(24)(A) as “any transfer of title or possession, or both, exchange, barter, lease or rental, conditional, or otherwise, in any manner or by any means whatsoever of tangible personal property for a consideration.... ” The term “tangible personal property” is defined by Tenn.Code Ann. § 67-6-102(28) as follows: “Tangible personal property” means and includes personal property, which may be seen, weighed, measured, felt, or touched, or is in any other manner perceptible to the senses. “Tangible personal property” does not include stocks, bonds, notes, insurance, or other obligations or securities .... ... The evidence in this case establishes the State’s position that the transactions on which the defendant failed to collect and remit sales tax were based on the intrinsic value of the precious metals rather than their representative value as a medium of exchange. ... The sales made by the defendant were subject to sales tax, and the defendant’s failure to collect and remit tax on those sales violated Tenn.Code Ann. § 67-l-1440(d).

Section 67-6-102(14)(B) defines a sale to include computer software unless the user made it for personal use.

University Computing Co. v. Olsen · filed 1984-10-01(14)(B)

This conclusion is based upon a construction of T.C.A. § 67-6-102(14)(B) and T.C.A. § 67-6-210. T.C.A. § 67-6-102(14)(B) has already been quoted in this opinion. Essentially, it defined “Sale” so as to include all computer software, not made by the user for personal use.

Fabricating computer software for a client is a taxable sale even when the client supplies the computer and disks; fabrication for one's own use is excluded.

Creasy Systems Consultants, Inc. v. Olsen · filed 1986-09-08(14)(A), (14)(B)

Our reading of the above comprehensive definitions of “sale”, in light of the purpose of the Retailers’ Sales Tax Act, has convinced us that the legislature intended to tax the transfer or fabrication of computer programs whatever the means used, excepting only the fabrication of computer software by a person for his own use. Here the plaintiff took tangible materials, such as a disc and a computer of the client, and imputed information and directions onto the disc or into the computer, dictating different functions to be performed by the computer. By definition, the computer software thus fabricated is tangible personal property. Also by definition, the fabrication of tangible personal property, using materials of the consumer, is a “sale” for the purpose of the Retailers’ Sales Tax Act.

Section 67-6-102(14)(B) exempts computer software fabricated for the taxpayer’s own use or consumption, but not software fabricated for a third party.

Pan Am World Services, Inc. v. Jackson · filed 1988-07-18(14)(B)

Plaintiff does not qualify for this exemption because the software was not fabricated for its own use or consumption but for the USAF.

Software a contractor fabricates and uses to perform its own business obligations qualifies for the own-use exemption even when title belongs to the government.

Lockheed Martin Energy Systems, Inc. v. Johnson · filed 2002-01-31(25)(B)

In the instant case, the Taxpayer was both the fabricator and the user of the subject software. It did not fabricate the software for sale to another nor did it fabricate it for the use of another, either of which events would have rendered the exemption inapplicable. It seems clear to us that the Taxpayer used the subject software for its own use — to operate its business — and, in the process, to operate the extensive government facilities in Oak Ridge.

Packaging materials furnished incidentally with dry-cleaning services do not qualify for the packaging materials exemption from sales tax.

WALKER'S, INC. v. Farr · filed 2010-09-07(34)(E)(ii)

Thus, in contrast to the taxpayer in Evans, the furnishing of packaging materials was not the object of the transaction between Walker’s and Brasher’s; rather, any packaging materials furnished were at most incidental to the provision of laundering and dry-cleaning services. ... We must conclude that Walker’s has not shown that its sales to Brasher’s fit within the “packaging materials” exemption from sales tax under the Act.

Cost price includes the costs of designing and distributing advertising brochures subject to use tax.

Rivergate Toyota, Inc. v. Huddleston · filed 1998-02-27(5)

Our conclusion that the term “value” in Tenn. Code Ann. § 67-6-203(b) has the same meaning as “cost price” in Tenn. Code Ann. § 67-6-203(a) forecloses Rivergate Toyota’s argument that the “value” of the advertising publications taxable under Tenn. Code Ann. § 67-6-203(b) should not include the costs incurred to design and distribute its brochures. Tenn. Code Ann. § 67-6-102(5) (Supp. 1997) defines “cost price” as “the actual cost of articles of tangible personal property without any deductions therefrom on account of the cost of materials used, labor, or service costs, transportation charges, or any expenses whatsoever.”