La. Stat. Ann. § 15:529.1

Subsection (D)(3) requires written reasons for the habitual-offender determination, and the court treated the trial court’s explanation that the sentence was mandatory as sufficient.

State of Louisiana v. Shepherd · filed 2024-02-21(D)(3)

Thus, considering the mandatory nature of the sentence, we find the trial court’s reasons were sufficient.

For habitual-offender sentencing enhancement, when the predicate offense is neither a crime of violence nor a sex offense, the five-year cleansing period in Paragraph (C)(1) applies instead of the ten-year period in Paragraph (C)(2), even if the current offense is a crime of violence.

State of Louisiana Versus Damon Stephney · filed 2024-02-28(C)(1), (C)(2)

As previously noted, defendant’s underlying crime is aggravated burglary. His two predicate convictions are possession of cocaine and obscenity; however, neither one of those offenses is a crime of violence as defined in La. R.S. 14:2(B), nor a sex offense as defined in La. R.S. 15:541. State v. Pike is the current state of the law in this Court, and therefore, is considered precedent in this Court. We respectfully decline the State’s invitation and urging for this Court to reconsider and abrogate this Court’s previous holding in Pike on this issue. As such, consistent with this Court’s holding in State v. Pike, we find that the five-year cleansing period set forth in La. R.S. 15:529.1(C)(1) applies to the instant case, rather than the ten-year cleansing period set forth in La. R.S. 15:529.1(C)(2).

Section 15:529.1(C)(1) generally imposes a five-year cleansing period, extended to ten years for prior crimes of violence under (C)(2), and excludes parole, probation, and incarceration from the interval calculation.

State of Louisiana v. Goudeau · filed 2024-04-24(C)(1), (C)(2)

In short, a review of the record shows that the cleansing period had not elapsed since Defendant was either actively incarcerated or on parole from his convictions of these previous felony offenses/convictions as of the date of the instant offense of carjacking. Accordingly, this assignment of error lacks merit.

Section 15.529.1(A)(4)(c) mandates a life sentence for a qualifying fourth-felony habitual offender when the current and specified prior offenses are crimes of violence, subject to a constitutionally required downward departure only upon clear and convincing proof of exceptional circumstances.

State Of Louisiana v. Christopher Bell, Jr. · filed 2024-05-31(A)(4)(c)

As the instant offense, second degree battery, and the defendant's prior convictions of aggravated battery in 2005 and 2014 are defined as crimes of violence under La. R.S. 14:2(B), the defendant's life sentence under the habitual offender bill of information was statutorily mandated. See La. R.S. 15:529.l(A)(4)(c). ... A sentencing court must always start with the presumption that a mandatory minimum sentence under the Habitual Offender Law is constitutional. A court may only depart from the mmimum sentence if it finds clear and convmcmg evidence rebutting this presumption of constitutionality. ... We find that the defendant has not proven by clear and convincing evidence that he is exceptional such that the minimum sentence under the Habitual Offender Law was not meaningfully tailored to the culpability of the offender, the gravity of the offense, and the circumstances of the case. Accordingly, no downward departure from the presumptively constitutional mandatory minimum sentence is warranted in this case.

For a fourth or subsequent felony punishable by less than life imprisonment on a first conviction, Section 15:529.1(A)(4) requires a sentence of at least twenty years and no more than life, but the multiple-offender statute does not authorize a restriction on parole.

State of Louisiana Versus Kevin Johnson · filed 2024-10-16(A)(4)

Pursuant to La. R.S. 15:529.1(A)(4), if the fourth or subsequent felony is such that, upon a first conviction the offender would be punishable by imprisonment for any term less than his natural life, then the offender shall be sentenced to a determinate term not less than the longest prescribed for a first conviction but in no event less than twenty years and not more than his natural life. ... The multiple offender statute, La. R.S. 15:529.1, however, does not provide for a restriction on parole.

Section 15:529.1(D)(1)(a) requires advising a defendant of the specific habitual-offender allegations and of the right to a formal hearing at which the state must prove its case; the right to remain silent is implicit in that requirement.

State of Louisiana v. Ronald Mark Leleaux, III · filed 2024-11-20(D)(1)(a)

La. R.S. 15:529.1(D)(1)(a) requires that the defendant be advised of the specific allegations contained in the habitual offender bill of information and his right to a formal hearing at which the state must prove its case. Implicit in this requirement is the additional requirement that the defendant be advised of his constitutional right to remain silent.

Section 15:529.1(A) requires the predicate conviction to precede the offense being enhanced, but an out-of-sequence predicate is harmless when the remaining predicates support the habitual-offender adjudication; under (A)(4)(a) and (G), the applicable range here was twenty years to life imprisonment.

State of Louisiana v. Courtland E. King · filed 2025-02-19(A), (A)(4)(a), and (G)

Because the conviction for the fifth prediction offense occurred after the commission of the instant offenses, the sequencing requirement of La.R.S. 15:529.1(A) was not complied with. ... Considering Cooper, 678 So.2d 59, and Lindsey, 189 So.3d 1104, we find that the sequencing error in the instant habitual offender bill of information was harmless error. Thus, this assignment of error is without merit.

Section 15:529.1(A)(4)(c) requires the fourth felony and two prior felonies to be crimes of violence for mandatory life imprisonment; otherwise, the applicable fourth-felony sentencing range under (A)(4)(a) is 20 years to life.

State of Louisiana v. Williams · filed 2025-02-26(A)(4)(a), (A)(4)(c)

As set forth in La. R.S. 15:529.1(A)(4)(c), two prior felonies, as well as the fourth felony, must be crimes of violence to subject a defendant to a mandatory life sentence as a fourth felony offender. While Williams’ fourth felony is defined as a crime of violence, only one of his prior three felonies, aggravated battery, meets that criterion, La. R.S. 14:2(5) and (39); therefore, his sentencing range was 20 years to life pursuant to La. R.S. 15:529.1(A)(4)(a).

Section 529.1(D)(1)(a) requires the trial court to advise a defendant of the habitual-offender bill's allegations, the right to a formal hearing, the right to require the State to prove identity, and the constitutional right to remain silent.

State of Louisiana v. Joe Butler, Jr. · filed 2025-02-26(D)(1)(a)

La. R.S. 15:529.1(D)(1)(a) requires the trial court to advise a defendant of the specific allegations contained in the habitual offender bill of information, his right to a formal hearing, and his right to require the State to prove his identity as a multiple offender. Implicit in this requirement is the additional requirement that the defendant be advised of his constitutional right to remain silent.

Section 15:529.1(D) requires advising a defendant of his rights before habitual-offender proceedings, but failure to do so is harmless when the State establishes habitual-offender status with competent evidence rather than by the defendant's admission.

State of Louisiana v. Chester L. Johnson, Jr. · filed 2025-10-01(D)

The record does not reflect that Johnson was properly advised of his rights prior to his habitual offender proceedings in accordance with La. R.S. 15:529.1(D). However, the failure to advise a defendant of his rights is considered harmless error when the defendant’s habitual offender status is established by competent evidence offered by the State at the hearing rather than by admission of the defendant. State v. Simpson, 55,304 (La. App. 2 Cir. 11/15/23), 374 So. 3d 1056, writ denied, 23-01641 (La. 5/29/24), 385 So. 3d 703. Here, Corporal John McCain of the Caddo Parish Sheriff’s Office testified regarding Johnson’s prior convictions. The State submitted competent evidence of Johnson’s habitual offender status. Therefore, the trial court’s failure to advise Johnson of his rights was harmless error.

Section 15:529.1(G) mandates that a habitual-offender sentence be served at hard labor without probation or suspension; an omission by the trial court is harmless and may be corrected on appeal.

State of Louisiana v. Patterson · filed 2025-02-26(G)

La. R.S. 15:529.1(G) requires a mandatory imposition of a sentence at hard labor without benefit of probation or suspension of sentence. ... A review of the record indicates that the trial court failed to impose the sentence without benefit of probation or suspension of sentence as required by La. R.S. 15:529.1(G). Although this is mandatory, the error is harmless and is self-correcting. ... We order that the minutes of the trial court be corrected to include the imposition of the sentence being served without benefit of probation or suspension and the instructions regarding post-conviction relief.

Section 15:529.1(A) bars using a conviction as a habitual-offender predicate when it was obtained after the current offense; § 15:529.1(C) requires the State to prove that the applicable cleansing period has not expired; and § 15:529.1(D)(3) requires vacatur of the underlying sentence replaced by an enhanced sentence.

State of Louisiana v. Lewis · filed 2025-07-16(A), (C)(1)-(2), (D)(3)

This statutory language must be given literal effect. The November 16, 2020, conviction cannot be counted as a predicate conviction because it was not obtained until after Lewis committed the instant offenses on May 17, 2020. ... Lewis’ 2014 conviction for unauthorized entry into an inhabited dwelling has not been proved to be unexpired. That is because: (1) the prosecution failed to introduce any evidence of when Lewis was unconditionally released from correctional custody and/or supervision; and (2) more than five years elapsed between this predicate conviction and the commission of the current offenses. ... Lewis is correct. The trial court failed to specify which initial sentence was enhanced, and the statutory language supports Lewis’ argument that the initial sentence serving as the basis of the enhancement must be vacated as it is required to be replaced by the enhanced sentence.

Section 529.1(D)(1)(a) requires the court to advise a defendant of the habitual-offender bill’s allegations and specified hearing, proof, and silence rights, but failure to give those advisements is harmless when the state proves habitual-offender status with competent evidence rather than the defendant’s admission.

State of Louisiana v. McKnight · filed 2025-07-16(D)(1)(a)

The trial court is required to advise a defendant of the specific allegations contained in the habitual offender bill of information, his right to a formal hearing, his right to require the state to prove his identity as a multiple offender, and his constitutional right to remain silent. ... However, the failure to advise a defendant of these rights is considered harmless error when the defendant’s habitual offender status is established by competent evidence offered by the state at the hearing rather than by admission of the defendant.

For a continuing offense spanning statutory amendments, either applicable habitual-offender sentencing provision may be used, but the sentencing court must specify which effective date and provision it applies; the pre-November 1, 2017 version of (A)(4)(b) could require mandatory life imprisonment, while post-November 1, 2017 (A)(4)(a) provides a 25-years-to-life range.

State of Louisiana v. Pipkin · filed 2025-08-27(A)(4)(a), (A)(4)(b)

A defendant adjudicated a habitual offender should be sentenced in accord with the version of the habitual offender law in effect at the time of the commission of the charged offense. ... Pipkin’s offense occurred between January 1, 2017, and June 6, 2019. The Habitual Offender Statute, La. R.S. 15:529.1, was revised multiple times during the range of time that the offense occurred. ... Therefore, if Pipkin were sentenced under the habitual offender statute prior to November 1, 2017, he would have been subject to a mandatory life sentence. Effective November 1, 2017, that provision was amended to remove violations of the Uniform Controlled Dangerous Substances Law punishable by imprisonment for ten years or more and any other crime punishable by imprisonment for 12 years or more. After November 1, 2017, Pipkin would have been sentenced under La. R.S. 15:529.1(A)(4)(a), and his sentencing range would be 25 years to life. ... Either habitual offender sentencing provision is appropriate because the crime occurred from 2017 through 2019. However, without knowing which habitual offender provision was used, we cannot properly analyze Pipkin’s sentence; he could have a mandatory life sentence or a sentencing range up to life imprisonment. Therefore, we do not reach the determination of whether Pipkin’s sentence was excessive. We vacate Pipkin’s sentence and remand for resentencing for the trial court to specify which habitual offender law effective date and provision is used during sentencing.

Section 15:529.1(K)(1) requires the court to apply the Habitual Offender Law provisions in effect on the date the defendant committed the instant offense, subject to Paragraph (2).

State of Louisiana Versus Tonka Haynes · filed 2025-09-17(K)(1)

In addition, at the time of relator’s October 18, 2021 resentencing, La. R.S. 15:529.1(K)(1), effective date effective August 18, 2018, was enacted, stating: “Except as provided in Paragraph (2) of this Subsection, notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary, the court shall apply the provisions of this Section that were in effect on the date that the defendant’s instant offense was committed.” ... We find relator was correctly sentenced under the habitual offender statute in effect at the time of the commission of his offense.

When a sentence is enhanced under La. R.S. 15:529.1(A)(4)(a), the State need not establish that the predicate conviction satisfies the prerequisites in Subparagraph (b) of § 15:529.1(A)(4).

State Of Louisiana v. Jabari C. Smith · filed 2025-10-06(A)(4)(a)

The record shows that the district court enhanced relator’s sentence in accordance with La. R.S. 15:529.1(A) (4) (a). Therefore, the State was not required to show that the 1998 conviction for possession of cocaine met the prerequisites set forth in Subparagraph b of La. R.S. 15:529.1 (A) (4).

Section 15:529.1 does not require the predicate convictions to precede the offense being enhanced; the law in effect when the offense was committed governs habitual-offender punishment.

State Of Louisiana v. Eddie Matthews, III · filed 2025-10-06(B)

It is well-settled that the law in effect at the time of the offense is determinative of a defendant’s punishment, including for habitual offender proceedings. ... In State v. Johnson, 2003-2993 (La. 10/19/04), 884 So.2d 568, 578, superseded by statute on other grounds, Butler v. Cain, 327 Fed.Appx. 455 (5th Cir. 2009), the Louisiana Supreme Court expressly overruled its prior decision in Mims and held that Act 688 of 1982 removed the sequential requirement of La. R.S. 15:529.1. ... The record shows that the felony being enhanced in this 2014 case, which was possession of methamphetamine, was committed after the predicate convictions set forth in the multiple offender bill of information. See La. R.S. 15:529.1(B). ... Accordingly, the district court did not err by dismissing the motion to correct an illegal habitual offender sentence.

A challenge to a previous conviction that is not made before sentence is imposed may not later be raised to attack the sentence.

Jonathan Johnson Versus State of Louisiana · filed 2025-10-07(D)(1)

His APCR does not point to an illegal term in his sentence, and his claims about predicate offenses are untimely under La. R.S. 15:529.1(D)(1). ... That provision states, in part, “[a]ny challenge to a previous conviction which is not made before sentence is imposed may not thereafter be raised to attack the sentence.”

Section 15.529.1 permits a fourth-felony-offender adjudication upon proof of three or more prior felony convictions, applies the applicable five- or ten-year cleansing period between convictions, and under Subsection (A)(4)(a) authorizes a sentence ranging from the longest term prescribed for the fourth felony to life, with a minimum of twenty years.

State of Louisiana v. Dillion · filed 2026-03-19(D)(1)(b), (D)(2)(c), (C)(1), (A)(4)(a)

Pursuant to La. R.S. 15:529.1(D)(2)(c), Defendant could be found to be a fourth felony offender “upon proof of three or more prior felony convictions.” ... However, subsection (C)(2) of the statute provides a ten-year cleansing period following a conviction for a crime of violence as defined in La. R.S. 14:2(B). ... In sum, we find that the State presented sufficient evidence for the district court to find Defendant a fourth felony offender. ... La. R.S. 15:529.1(A)(4)(a) provides: ... [i]f the fourth or subsequent felony is such that, upon a first conviction the offender would be punishable by imprisonment for any term less than his natural life then . . . [t]he person shall be sentenced to imprisonment for the fourth or subsequent felony for a determinate term not less than the longest prescribed for a first conviction but in no event less than twenty years and not more than his natural life. ... Because the district court did not specify whether it found any of the felonies to be crimes of violence, and Defendant’s sentence falls within the boundaries of both subsections, the district court would have been within its discretion to impose the sentence under either provision.

A relator's failure to file a motion to quash the habitual offender bill and a motion to reconsider the sentence bars claims attacking the habitual offender adjudication.

State Of Louisiana v. Chester · filed 2026-06-15(D)(1)(b)

Relator failed to file a motion to quash the habitual offender bill of information and there is no indication that relator filed a motion to reconsider sentence after he was sentenced on September 15, 2025. Thus, any claims attacking the habitual offender adjudication are barred. La. R.S. 15:529.1(D) (1) (b); State v. Thompson, 2015-1983 (La. App. lst Cir. 9/16/16), 202 So.3d 998, 1002.

A mandatory minimum under the Habitual Offender Law is presumed constitutional, and a downward departure requires clear and convincing evidence rebutting that presumption.

State v. Stevenson · filed 2003-01-28(A)(1)(c)

It is presumed that a mandatory minimum sentence under the Habitual Offender Law is constitutional. ... A court may only depart from the mandatory sentence if it finds clear and convincing evidence that would rebut the presumption of constitutionality.

Section 529.1's mandatory minimum sentence remains subject to constitutional-excessiveness review, but is presumed constitutional and may be reduced only when the defendant clearly and convincingly shows that it is excessive as applied.

State v. Carter · filed 2000-11-15(A)(1)(b)(ii)

Defendant received the mandatory minimum sentence under La. R.S. 15:529.1(A)(1)(b)(ii), life imprisonment at hard labor. Even though a sentence under the Habitual Offender Law is the minimum provided by that statute, the sentence may still be unconstitutionally excessive if it makes no measurable contribution to acceptable goals of punishment, or is nothing more than the purposeful imposition of pain and suffering and is grossly out of proportion to the severity of the crime. ... A defendant must clearly and convincingly show that the mandatory minimum sentence under the Habitual Offender Law is unconstitutionally excessive.

The statute's mandatory minimum sentence is presumed constitutional, and a defendant can overcome that presumption only by clearly and convincingly showing that the sentence is grossly disproportionate to the crimes committed.

State v. Clark · filed 2000-12-06(A)(1)(b)(ii)

Therefore, since the Habitual Offender Statute has been found to be constitutional as a whole, the minimum sentences prescribed in the statute for multiple offenders is presumed to be constitutional. To rebut this presumption, the defendant must demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that the minimum sentence is grossly disproportionate to the severity of the crimes committed.

A mandatory life sentence under La. R.S. 15:529.1 is presumptively constitutional, and a defendant may overcome that presumption only by clearly and convincingly showing exceptional circumstances that make the sentence unconstitutionally excessive.

State v. Lee · filed 2002-01-23

Thus, the mandatory life sentence imposed by La. R.S. 15:529.1 is presumptively constitutional. Id. To rebut the presumption, the defendant must show clearly and convincingly that he is exceptional, i.e., that because of unusual circumstances, he is the victim of the legislature's failure to assign sentences that are meaningfully tailored to the culpability of the offender, gravity of the offense, and circumstances of the case. Id. Although a mandatory sentence may be found constitutionally excessive, the supreme court has made it clear that such a finding should be rare, not commonplace. State v. Dorthey, supra.

Subsection (A)(1)(c)(ii) mandates life imprisonment without benefits for a fourth felony offender when two predicate felonies and the instant offense are simple burglaries; the resulting mandatory sentence is presumptively constitutional unless the defendant clearly and convincingly shows exceptional circumstances.

State v. Warfield · filed 2003-10-29(A)(1)(c)(ii)

In this case, La. R.S. 15:529.1(A)(1)(c)(ii) mandated a life sentence without benefits for defendant: he is a fourth felony offender, two of the predicate felonies, as well as this instant crime, are for simple burglary. ... Since the habitual offender law in its entirety is constitutional, the minimum sentences it imposes upon multiple offenders are also presumed to be constitutional. ... The defendant's burden was to rebut the presumption that a mandatory minimum sentence is constitutional. He had to clearly and convincingly show that he is exceptional, i.e., because of unusual circumstances, he is a victim of the legislature's failure to assign sentences meaningfully tailored to the culpability of the offender, the gravity of the offense, and the circumstances of the case.

When the specified third-felony or prior-felony conditions are met, § 15:529.1(A)(2)(b)(ii) requires a natural-life sentence without parole, probation, or suspension, subject to constitutional excessiveness review.

State of Louisiana v. Jim Howard, Jr. · filed 2004-11-17(A)(2)(b)(ii)

Trial courts have authority to deviate from a mandatory minimum sentence, which the Habitual Offender Law proscribes; however, the trial court must be clearly and firmly convinced that the minimum sentence is excessive under the circumstances of the case. ... Accordingly, he failed to rebut the presumption that the mandatory sentence of life imprisonment is not constitutionally excessive. Thus, this assignment is without merit.

The statute's mandatory minimum sentence for a fourth offender is presumed constitutional, but a defendant may overcome that presumption by clearly and convincingly showing that the sentence is unconstitutional as applied in exceptional circumstances.

State v. Hall · filed 2007-01-12(A)(l)(e)(I)

... Granted. The record at sentencing does not show clearly and convincingly that the mandatory minimum sentence for a fourth offender required by La.R.S. 15:529.1(A)(l)(e)(I) is unconstitutional as applied to defendant in the present case. The trial court erred in failing to afford the presumption of constitutionality to the mandatory minimum sentence required by the Habitual Offender statute, and the court of appeal erred in deferring to the sentencing discretion of the judge on a record devoid of facts and circumstances demonstrating that defendant is an exceptional victim of the legislature’s failure to assign sentences that are meaningfully tailored to the culpability of the offender, the gravity of the offense, and the circumstances of the crime. See State v. Johnson, 97-1906 (La.3/4/98), 709 So.2d 672.

Section 15:529.1's mandatory minimum sentence is presumed constitutional, and a defendant may obtain a sentence below it only by clearly and convincingly showing that the defendant is exceptional.

State v. Douglas · filed 2007-02-14

It is presumed that a mandatory minimum sentence under the Habitual Offender Law is constitutional. State v. Johnson, 97-1906 (La.3/4/98), 709 So.2d 672, 676. A court may only depart from the mandatory sentence if it finds clear and convincing evidence in the present case that would rebut the presumption of constitutionality. Id. To merit a deviation below the mandatory minimum sentence, the defendant must clearly and convincingly show that he is exceptional. State v. Johnson, supra. Such downward departures should occur only in rare instances. Id.

For a third felony offender whose third and two prior felonies are among the listed serious offenses, § 15:529.1(A)(2)(b)(ii) mandates imprisonment for the remainder of the offender’s natural life without parole, probation, or suspension of sentence.

State v. Anderson · filed 2010-10-06(A)(2)(b)(ii)

Louisiana Revised Statutes 15:529.1(A)(b)(ii) provides only one penalty for one adjudicated a third felony offender under the circumstances of this case — that person “shall be imprisoned for the remainder of his natural life, without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence.” (Emphasis added.) ... As did the trial court, we find nothing in the record to warrant a finding that the defendant’s case is so exceptional that it warrants a downward departure from the statutory minimum sentence. We find that this assignment of error lacks merit.

Section 15:529.1(A)(c)(i) sets a fourth felony offender’s sentencing exposure at at least 20 years and up to life, and its minimum sentence is presumed constitutional.

State v. Materre · filed 2010-12-08(A)(c)(i)

The defendant was sentenced under Louisiana’s Habitual Offender Law as a fourth felony offender. As such, the sentencing exposure ranges from a term of not less than the longest period prescribed for a first conviction, but in no event less than twenty years and not more than natural life. La. R.S. 15:529.1 A(c)(i). Since the habitual offender law in its entirety is constitutional, the minimum sentences it imposes upon multiple offenders are also presumed to be constitutional.

Section 15:529.1 imposes a mandatory minimum habitual-offender sentence; a defendant seeking a downward departure must show exceptional circumstances, unless the sentence is constitutionally excessive.

State of Louisiana v. Brandon · filed 2013-11-06

However, as already noted, the sentence at issue was the mandatory minimum required by statute. ... The defendant makes no attempt to demonstrate that his case is so exceptional as to justify a downward departure from the mandatory minimum sentence. For the reasons discussed, this assignment lacks merit.

Section 15:529.1's mandatory-minimum habitual-offender sentence is presumed constitutional, but an exceptional defendant may obtain a downward departure by clearly and convincingly showing unusual circumstances.

State v. Robinson · filed 2016-02-24(A)(1) and (G)

The mandatory minimum sentence for a habitual offender set forth in La. R.S. 15:529.1 is presumed constitutional. ... In order to rebut the presumption of constitutionality, the defendant must clearly and convincingly show that he is “exceptional, which ... means that because of unusual circumstances this defendant is a victim of the legislature’s failure to assign sentences that are meaningfully tailored to the culpability of the offender, the gravity of the offense and the circumstances of the case.” ... Defendant received the mandatory minimum sentence set forth in La. R.S. 15:529.1(A)(1). Defendant failed to put forth any facts or arguments to support his conclusion that he is the exceptional defendant for whom downward departure from the mandatory minimum sentence is required. His sentence is presumed constitutional and he has failed to provide clear and convincing evidence to rebut that presumption.

Section 15:529.1’s minimum twenty-year sentence for a fourth felony offender convicted of obscenity is not unconstitutionally excessive.

State v. Waxter · filed 1991-02-28

La.R.S. 15:529.1 does not impose an unconstitutionally excessive punishment. The defendant’s argument that he should not receive more than the statutory maximum for a substantive crime would require this court to find that the trial court could not apply the habitual offender law at all. The defendant, by receiving a minimum sentence, was certainly not sentenced to a constitutionally excessive sentence as a fourth time felony offender.

Section 15:529.1(A)(1)(c)(ii) mandates life imprisonment without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence for a defendant convicted of distribution of cocaine as a fourth felony offender.

State v. Green · filed 2000-11-29(A)(1)(c)(ii)

The appellant's conviction for distribution of cocaine, as a fourth offender, carries a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence. La. R.S. 15:529.1(A)(1)(c)(ii). When the statute provides for a mandatory sentence, it is an exercise in futility for the trial court to enumerate its reasons for sentencing.

Section 15:529.1 requires a fourth-felony offender to be imprisoned for life without benefits when the present or a previous conviction is a crime of violence.

State v. Schleve · filed 2000-12-20(A)(1)(c)(ii)

Pursuant to the Habitual Offender Law, if the present or a previous conviction is defined as a crime of violence, a fourth-felony offender shall be imprisoned for the remainder of his natural life, without benefit of parole, probation or suspension of sentence. La. R.S. 15:529.1(A)(1)(c)(ii). Sexual battery, one of defendant's predicate convictions, is defined as a crime of violence. See La. R.S. 14:2(13)(1). Thus, a sentence of life imprisonment was mandatory in this case.

The habitual-offender statute mandated a life sentence for a defendant adjudicated a fourth felony offender under La. R.S. 15:529.1(A)(1)(c)(ii).

State v. Bryant · filed 2000-12-06(A)(1)(c)(ii)

In this case, La. R.S. 15:529.1 mandated a life sentence for defendant.

Section 15:529.1(A)(1)(c)(ii) mandates life imprisonment without benefits for a fourth felony offender convicted of a crime of violence, and that mandatory sentence remains applicable when the conviction is reduced to simple robbery.

State v. Wilson · filed 2001-08-22(A)(1)(c)(ii)

Simple robbery is a crime of violence. La. R.S. 14:2(13)(y). Defendant, as an adjudicated fourth felony offender convicted of a crime of violence, faced a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment without benefits. La.R.S. 15:529.1(A)(1)(c)(ii). ... Even with the reduced conviction of simple robbery, that still is a crime of violence and the mandatory life sentence is still valid. La. R.S. 15:529.1(A)(1)(c)(ii); La. R.S. 14:2(13)(y).

For a third felony offender, § 15:529.1(A)(1)(b)(ii) mandates life imprisonment without parole, probation, or suspension when the third felony or either prior felony is a crime of violence or a qualifying drug felony.

State v. Williams · filed 2002-02-26(A)(1)(b)(ii)

Here, the Defendant's underlying conviction was for armed robbery, a crime of violence. ... The judge was technically required to impose a mandatory life sentence.

Section 15:529.1(A)(1)(c)(ii) mandates a life sentence without benefits for a fourth felony offender when the fourth felony is a crime of violence, while the later amendment in Subsection (A)(b)(ii) does not apply to an offense committed before its effective date.

State v. Johnson · filed 2002-06-12(A)(1)(c)(ii); (A)(b)(ii)

In this case, La. R.S. 15:529.1(A)(1)(c)(ii) mandated a life sentence without benefits for Johnson because he was a fourth felony offender and his fourth felony (attempted armed robbery) is defined in La. R.S. 14:2(13)(w) as a crime of violence.[2] ... The recent amendment to La. R.S. 15:529.1(A)(b)(ii), which requires that the fourth felony and two of the prior felonies be defined as crimes of violence, is inapplicable to this case because the offense for which Johnson's sentence was enhanced was committed prior to the amendment's effective date of June 15, 2001.

Section 15:529.1(A)(1)(c)(ii) requires natural-life imprisonment without parole, probation, or suspension of sentence when the fourth felony and two prior felonies satisfy specified violent-crime, controlled-substance, or sentence-length criteria.

State v. Heard · filed 2002-07-17(A)(1)(c)(ii)

Since Defendant was convicted of two crimes of violence and one crime in violation of the Uniform Controlled Dangerous Substances Law, he was properly sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole, probation or suspension of sentence in accordance with La. R.S. 15:529.1(A)(1)(c)(ii).

Section 15:529.1(A)(1)(c)(ii) applies according to the version in effect when the underlying offense was committed; under the version then in force, a qualifying fourth-felony drug offender was subject to mandatory life imprisonment without benefits.

State v. Flagg · filed 2002-03-26(A)(1)(c)(ii)

In this case, the Defendant's underlying offense was punishable by more than five years. Therefore, under the habitual offender statute as it existed at the time of the commission of this offense (September 13, 2000), he was subject to life imprisonment at hard labor without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence.

Section 15:529.1(A)(2)(b)(ii) requires a third felony offender to receive life imprisonment without benefits when the third felony or either prior felony is punishable by more than 12 years, subject to a constitutionally excessive-sentence departure upon clear and convincing proof that the defendant is exceptional.

State v. Neal · filed 2002-10-23(A)(2)(b)(ii)

Under the habitual offender statute, the sentence imposed upon the defendant was statutorily mandated by La. R.S. 15:529.1(A)(2)(b)(ii), which provided, in pertinent part, that if the third felony is such that upon a first conviction, the offender would be punishable by imprisonment for any term less than his natural life then, if the third felony or either of the two prior felonies is a crime punishable by imprisonment for more than 12 years, the person shall be imprisoned for the remainder of his natural life, without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence.[1] ... Therefore, because the penalty for vehicular homicide includes imprisonment for more than 12 years, under the habitual offender statute, the applicable sentence is life imprisonment without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence.

Section 15:529.1(A)(1)(b)(ii) mandates life imprisonment without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence for a qualifying third felony offender when the relevant drug offenses are punishable by more than five years.

State v. Simmons · filed 2003-01-28(A)(1)(b)(ii)

Since the effective date of Act 403, this Court has held that the pre-amendment version of LA.R.S. 15:529.1 applies when the underlying offense is committed before the effective date of Act 403, even when the sentence is imposed after Act 403's effective date. ... Based on Sugasti, Flagg, and Ventress, the trial judge properly sentenced defendant pursuant to the version of La.R.S. 15:529.1 in effect before the 2001 amendment. Defendant correctly acknowledges that, under either version of La.R.S. 15:529.1, he is subject to a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment.

Section 15:529.1(A)(1)(c)(ii) requires a mandatory life sentence without parole, probation, or suspension of sentence for a fourth-felony offender with a prior conviction for a violent crime.

State v. Massey · filed 2003-02-11(A)(1)(c)(ii)

The negotiated sentence of fifteen years of imprisonment at hard labor imposed after defendant admitted to being a fourthfelony offender, appears to be illegally lenient under La. R.S.15:529.1(A)(1)(c)(ii). ... As a fourth-felony offender, with a prior conviction for a violent crime, defendant was subject to a mandatory life sentence without benefit of parole, probation or suspension of sentence under La. R.S. 15:529.1(A)(1)(c)(ii). ... Following that edict, we will not disturb defendant's sentence. Accordingly, we affirm defendant's conviction and sentence.

Section 15:529.1(A)(1)(c)(ii), as applicable here, mandated a life sentence without benefits for a fourth felony offender when the specified present or prior felony qualified under the statute, and later amendments did not apply to offenses committed before their effective date.

State v. Howard · filed 2003-10-31(A)(l)(c)(ii)

If the fourth or subsequent felony or any of the prior felonies is a felony defined as a crime of violence under R.S. 14:2(13) or as a violation of the Uniform Controlled Dangerous Substances Law punishable by imprisonment for more than five years or of any other crime punishable by imprisonment for more than twelve years, the person shall be imprisoned for the remainder of his natural life, without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence.

A qualifying fourth-felony mandatory-life sentence under § 15:529.1 is presumptively constitutional, and departure requires clear and convincing proof of exceptional circumstances.

State v. Ceasar · filed 2003-10-09(A)(1)(c)(ii)

Since the habitual offender law in its entirety is constitutional, the minimum sentences it imposes upon a Defendant with multiple offenses are also presumed to be constitutional. ... The mandatory life sentences the habitual offender law requires are presumptively constitutional and should be accorded great deference by the judiciary.

Section 15:529.1(A)(1)(b)(ii) mandates life imprisonment without benefits for a third felony offender with the specified prior convictions, subject to constitutional excessiveness review.

State v. Brewer · filed 2004-08-20(A)(1)(b)(ii)

In this case, La. R.S. 15:529.1(A)(1)(b)(ii) mandated a life sentence without benefits for defendant: he is a third felony offender with prior convictions for distribution of CDS and for aggravated battery, a crime of violence under La. R.S. 14:2(13)(e). ... The mandatory life sentence in this case, based on the totality of the facts and circumstances, is appropriate.

For the version applicable here, subsection (A)(1)(b)(ii) required a third-felony offender with a crime-of-violence felony to serve life imprisonment without parole, probation, or suspension of sentence, subject to constitutional-excessiveness review.

State v. Thomas · filed 2005-05-31(A)(1)(b)(ii)

Armed robbery is a crime of violence. La.R.S. 14:2(13). Accordingly, the defendant was subject to a *905 mandatory minimum habitual offender sentence of life imprisonment at hard labor without benefit of parole, probation or suspension of sentence.

For a third felony offender, subsection (A)(1)(b)(ii) mandates life imprisonment without benefits when the third felony and the two prior felonies meet its qualifying crime-of-violence or twelve-year-punishment requirements.

State v. Lee · filed 2005-08-17(A)(1)(b)(ii)

In this case, La. R.S. 15:529.1(A)(1)(b)(ii) mandated a life sentence without benefits for the defendant because he is a third felony offender. One prior felony, simple robbery, is a crime of violence under La. R.S. 14:2(13)(y), while the other prior felony, simple burglary, is punishable by imprisonment for 12 years under La. R.S. 14:62.2.

Section 15:529.1(A)(1)(c)(ii), as then in effect, required a fourth felony offender meeting the specified violent-felony or drug-offense conditions to serve life imprisonment without parole, probation, or suspension of sentence.

State v. Jefferson · filed 2005-12-21(A)(1)(c)(ii)

His original sentence was vacated, and he was re-sentenced under the Habitual Offender Law to life imprisonment at hard labor without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence. La. R.S. 15:529.1(A)(1)(c)(ii).[17] The life sentence imposed on Mr. Jefferson was the mandatory minimum sentence allowed under the Habitual Offender Law. Even though a sentence is the mandatory minimum sentence under the Habitual Offender Law, it may still be unconstitutionally excessive if it makes no measurable contribution to acceptable goals of punishment, or is nothing more than the purposeful imposition of pain and suffering and is grossly out of proportion to the severity of the crime. ... Thus, a defendant challenging such a sentence has the burden of rebutting the presumption that it is constitutional. ... To rebut the presumption that a mandatory minimum sentence is constitutional, a defendant must show by clear and convincing evidence that he is exceptional. ... This is not such a rare situation. Mr. Jefferson failed to rebut the presumption that the mandatory minimum sentence he received as a habitual offender is constitutional.

Section 15:529.1(A)(1)(c)(ii) requires a person adjudicated a fourth-felony habitual offender, with the fourth felony and two prior felonies defined as crimes of violence, to serve life imprisonment without parole, probation, or suspension of sentence.

State v. Lane · filed 2006-04-12(A)(1)(c)(ii)

Any person adjudicated a habitual offender when the fourth felony and two of the prior felonies are felonies defined as a crime of violence under R.S. 14:2(13), shall be imprisoned for the remainder of his natural life, without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence. La. R.S. 15:529.1(A.)(1)(c)(ii). ... The crimes of violence upon which this sentence was predicated include the present conviction of armed robbery entered on January 13, 2005, the conviction for simple robbery on April 23, 2001, and the conviction for aggravated battery on December 18, 1995. ... This assignment is without merit.

Section 15:529.1(A)(1)(c)(ii) mandates a life sentence without benefits for a fourth felony offender whose current offense is punishable by 12 years at hard labor and who has two predicate offenses defined as crimes of violence.

State v. Thomas · filed 2007-01-24(A)(1)(c)(ii)

In this case, La. R.S. 15:529.1(A)(1)(c)(ii) mandated a life sentence without benefits for Thomas, because he is a fourth felony offender whose current offense is punishable by 12 years at hard labor and two of his predicate offenses (simple robberies) are defined as crimes of violence. La. R.S. 14:2(13)(y).

For a fourth felony, the Habitual Offender Law mandates life imprisonment without benefits when the fourth felony and two prior felonies are punishable by imprisonment for twelve years or more.

State v. Bell · filed 2007-12-05(A)(1)(c)(ii)

Therefore, a life sentence, without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence in the present case was mandatory.

For a fourth felony offender, the statute requires imprisonment for the remainder of the offender's natural life without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence when the fourth felony and two prior felonies are among the listed qualifying offenses, including crimes punishable by imprisonment for twelve years or more.

State v. Fontenberry · filed 2009-10-27(A)(l)(c)(ii)

The defendant should have accordingly received a mandatory life sentence of imprisonment without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence under La. R.S. 15:529.1(A)(l)(c)(ii).

Section 15:529.1(A)(1)(c)(ii) requires a fourth felony offender to serve life imprisonment without parole, probation, or suspension of sentence when the fourth felony and two prior felonies are among the subsection’s qualifying offenses, including crimes punishable by imprisonment for twelve years or more.

State v. Sopczak · filed 2009-12-23(A)(l)(c)(ii)

Thus, in accordance with La. R.S. 15:529.l(A)(l)(c)(ii), the defendant was subject to a mandatory life imprisonment sentence upon enhancement.

Section 15:529.1(A)(1)(c)(ii) mandates a life sentence without benefits for a fourth felony offender when the fourth felony and two prior felonies meet the statute’s specified punishment thresholds.

State v. Winslow · filed 2010-12-15(A)(1)(c)(ii)

La. R.S. 15:529.1(A)(l)(C)(ii) provides the following for sentencing a person adjudicated a fourth felony offender: ... If the fourth felony and two of the prior felonies are felonies defined as a ... violation of the Uniform Controlled Dangerous Substances Law punishable by imprisonment for ten years or more, or of any other crime punishable by imprisonment for twelve years or more, or any combination of such crimes, the person shall be imprisoned for the remainder of his natural life, without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence. Thus, La. R.S. 15:529.1(A)(l)(c)(ii) mandated a life sentence without benefits for the defendant because he is a fourth felony offender. Two of the prior felonies were simple burglaries, which are punishable by imprisonment for 12 years under La. R.S. 14:62, while the present offense of distribution of marijuana is punishable by imprisonment of 5 to 30 years under La. R.S. 40:966(B)(3).

Subparagraph (A)(1)(c)(ii) requires a fourth felony offender to serve life imprisonment when the current felony and two prior felonies are qualifying drug-law offenses punishable by at least 10 years' imprisonment.

State v. Dukes · filed 2011-01-26(A)(1)(c)(ii)

The present case clearly falls within the circumstances enumerated in former La. R.S. 15:529.1(A)(1)(c)(ii) which mandated a sentence of life imprisonment for a fourth felony offender when the defendant’s instant felony and two of his prior felonies are defined as a violation of the Uniform Controlled Dangerous Substances Law punishable by imprisonment for 10 years or more.

The statute mandates life imprisonment without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence for a qualifying fourth-felony offender, and the court upheld that mandatory sentence here.

State v. White · filed 2011-02-02(A)(1)(b)(ii)

The mandatory sentence of life imprisonment without the benefit of parole, probation or suspension of sentence imposed upon defendant was not excessive.

Section 15:529.1(A)(3)(b) requires a third felony offender to serve the remainder of his natural life without parole, probation, or suspension when the current felony and two prior felonies meet the statute’s listed violent-crime or serious-drug/crime sentencing criteria.

State v. Cummings · filed 2011-06-22(A)(3)(b)

A first conviction for possession of cocaine with intent to distribute carries a sentencing range of 2 to 30 years, a term that fits the criteria of the habitual offender statute as being less than Cummings’ natural life. La. R.S. 40:967(B)(4)(b); La. R.S. 15:529.1(A)(3). The two predicate offenses, second degree battery and aggravated battery, upon which the habitual offender imposition was based, are defined as crimes of violence under R.S. 14:2(B). The third and current felony of possession of cocaine with intent to distribute is a violation of the Uniform Controlled Dangerous Substances Law punishable by imprisonment for 10 years or more. La. R.S. 40:967(B)(4)(b). Thus, the habitual offender statute mandates that Cummings be imprisoned for the remainder of his natural life, without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence. La. R.S. 15:529.1(A)(3)(b).

Section 15:529.1(A)(1)(c)(ii) requires a fourth felony offender to serve life imprisonment without parole, probation, or suspension when the fourth felony and two prior felonies are qualifying offenses punishable by the statutory thresholds.

State of Louisiana v. Segura · filed 2012-05-02(A)(1)(c)(ii)

The defendant was sentenced as a fourth felony offender pursuant to La.R.S. 15:529.1(A)(1)(c)(ii), which, at the time of this offense, read in pertinent part as follows: If the fourth felony and two of the prior felonies are felonies defined as a . . . violation of the Uniform Controlled Dangerous Substances Law punishable by imprisonment for ten years or more, or of any other crime punishable by imprisonment for twelve years or more, or any combination of such crimes, the person shall be imprisoned for the remainder of his natural life, without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence. (Emphasis added.) ... Thus, the fourth felony and two of the prior convictions satisfy the requirements of La.R.S.15:529.1(A)(1)(c)(ii), and the trial court sentenced him to the sentence mandated by statute.

Section 15:529.1(A)(3)(b) requires a third felony offender whose third and two prior felonies fall within the listed serious-offense categories to serve natural life without parole, probation, or suspension of sentence.

State of Louisiana v. K.W. T. · filed 2012-05-16(A)(3)(b)

the person shall be imprisoned for the remainder of his natural life, without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence.

When its qualifying-offense conditions are met, § 15:529.1 requires a fourth felony offender to receive life imprisonment at hard labor without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence.

State v. Kondylis · filed 2014-10-03(A)(l)(c)(ii)

If no such agreement was reached among all parties, the court shall vacate defendant’s sentence and resentence him to the mandatory term of life imprisonment at hard labor without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence, as otherwise specified by La.R.S. 15:529.1(A)(l)(c)(ii) (now R.S. 15:529.1(A)(4)(b)).

Section 15:529.1(A)(4)(b) requires a fourth felony habitual offender meeting its listed prior-felony criteria to serve life imprisonment without parole, probation, or suspension of sentence.

State v. Byrd · filed 2014-06-25(A)(4)(b)

If the fourth felony and two of the prior felonies are felonies defined as a crime of violence under R.S. 14:2(B) ... or as a violation of the Uniform Controlled Dangerous Substances Law punishable by imprisonment for ten years or more, or of any other crime punishable by imprisonment for twelve years or more, or any combination of such crimes, the person shall be imprisoned for the remainder of his natural life, without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence.

Section 15:529.1(A)(3)(b) mandates life imprisonment without benefits for a third-felony offender when the third felony and two prior felonies meet the statute's listed violent-crime or 12-year-plus punishability criteria.

State v. Fisher · filed 2015-12-30(A)(3)(b)

In this case, La. R.S. 15:529.1(A)(3)(b) mandated a life sentence without benefits for the defendant, because he is a third-felony offender whose current offense of attempted forcible rape is punishable by imprisonment, with or without hard labor, for a term not to exceed 20 years. ... After a careful review of the record in its entirety, we find that the defendant failed to prove that his mandatory life sentence is unconstitutionally excessive.

Section 15:529.1(A)(3)(b) requires a third-felony offender convicted of three crimes of violence to receive life imprisonment without parole, probation, or suspension of sentence.

State v. Melancon · filed 2018-04-18(A)(3)(b)

Louisiana Revised Statutes 15:529.1(A)(3)(b) provides that a third felony offender "shall be imprisoned for the remainder of his natural life, without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence" when the three felonies are classified as crimes of violence pursuant to La.R.S. 14:2(B). Simple robbery and second degree battery are classified as crimes of violence. La.R.S. 14:2(B)(23) and (6). Thus, La.R.S. 15:529.1 requires Defendant to be sentenced to life imprisonment without benefits.

Subsection (A)(4)(b) mandates natural-life imprisonment without parole, probation, or suspension when the fourth felony and two prior felonies fall within specified qualifying categories.

State v. Kelly · filed 2018-05-23(A)(4)(b)

... (b) If the fourth felony and two of the prior felonies are felonies defined as a crime of violence under R.S. 14:2(B), a sex offense as defined in R.S. 15:540 et seq . when the victim is under the age of eighteen at the time of commission of the offense, or as a violation of the Uniform Controlled Dangerous Substances Law punishable by imprisonment for ten years or more, or of any other crime punishable by imprisonment for twelve years or more, or any combination of such crimes, the person shall be imprisoned for the remainder of his natural life, without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence.

Section 15:529.1(A)(4)(b) mandates life imprisonment without parole, probation, or suspension for a fourth offender when the fourth felony and two prior felonies are among the listed qualifying offenses, although a downward departure may be made in rare cases where the defendant clearly and convincingly shows the mandatory sentence is constitutionally excessive.

State of Louisiana v. Will Antonio Celestine · filed 2019-10-02(A)(4)(b)

There is nothing particularly unusual about Defendant’s circumstances that would justify a downward departure from the mandatory sentence under La.R.S. 15:529.1. Defendant’s entire argument is based on the 2017 amendments to La.R.S. 15:529.1 and La.R.S. 14:2 and a comparison of the sentence he received with what he could have been sentenced to had he committed the underlying offense after the effective dates of those amendments. We find that argument is insufficient to prove Defendant is exceptional.

For a fourth or subsequent felony, qualifying violent-felony and serious-penalty predicates require imprisonment for the remainder of the offender’s natural life without benefits.

State of Louisiana v. Broadway · filed 2020-01-15(A)

Broadway fails to articulate any reason why his circumstances justify a departure from the mandatory life sentence as a fifth-felony habitual offender as required by La. R.S. 15:529.1. His instant conviction for second degree battery and his prior convictions for simple robbery and attempted first degree robbery are crimes of violence. Furthermore, his two convictions for simple burglary both carry possible sentences of up to 12 years. Those facts require that he be sentenced to mandatory life.

Section 15:529.1 required life imprisonment without probation, parole, or suspension for the fourth felony offender in this case.

State v. Ash · filed 1999-02-10(A)(2)(c)(ii)

The trial court did not err in imposing the mandatory minimum sentence of life imprisonment at hard labor without benefit of probation, parole or suspension of sentence upon finding Ash to be a quadruple offender. Ash's sentence was not unconstitutionally excessive.

At the time of the offense, subsection (G) authorized a habitual-offender sentence without probation or suspension of sentence, but did not authorize denying parole.

State v. Charles · filed 2000-12-22(G)

The inclusion of the parole restriction rendered this sentence illegal. At the time of the offense, La. R.S. 15:529.1(G) [the habitual offender statute] did |fiprovide for the imposition of a sentence thereunder to be served without benefit of probation and suspension of sentence, but neither it nor La. R.S. 40:967(B)(1) [distribution of cocaine — the underlying conviction] provided for the imposition of a sentence without benefit of parole.

Subsection (G) requires habitual-offender sentences to be imposed without probation or suspension of sentence, but it does not authorize a restriction on parole eligibility.

State v. James · filed 2002-12-11(G)

La. R.S. 15:529.1(G) provides that sentences imposed under the habitual offender provisions are to be imposed “without benefit of probation or suspension of sentence.” As such, it was not within the trial court’s authority to impose the *1166sentence without benefit of parole, and the sentence is not legally correct.

Parole restrictions on a multiple-offender sentence are determined by the statute defining the underlying offense.

State v. Bordelon · filed 2010-05-05(G)

Accordingly, the defendant’s sentence should have been imposed without the benefit of parole.

Subsection (G) requires a habitual-offender sentence to be imposed without probation or suspension of sentence, while any parole restriction comes from the statute defining the underlying offense.

State of Louisiana v. Bryan Means · filed 2010-10-06(G)

Although La.R.S. 15:529.1(G) requires habitual offender sentences to be imposed without the benefit of probation or suspension of sentence, parole restrictions on habitual offender sentences are those required by the reference statute.

Subsection (G) bars probation and suspension of sentence for a habitual-offender sentence but does not authorize denying parole eligibility.

State v. Roland · filed 2003-06-05(G)

As such, it was simply not within the trial court's authority to impose the sentence without benefit of parole. There is no necessity to remand, as we hereby strike the prohibition against parole.

Section 15:529.1(G) requires a multiple-offender sentence to be imposed without benefit of probation or suspension of sentence, and the restriction is deemed included even when the trial court fails to state it.

State v. Taylor · filed 2004-04-27(G)

We also note defendant's multiple offender sentence is illegally lenient because the trial court failed to impose the sentence without benefit of probation or suspension of sentence as required by La. R.S. 15:529.1(G). However, the enhanced sentence is deemed to contain these restrictions. State v. Williams, 00-1725 (La. 11/28/01), 800 So.2d 790. Accordingly, no action is required by this court to address this error.

Subsection (G) requires the enhanced sentence to remain without probation or suspension and limits parole ineligibility to the statutory five-year period.

State v. Sanders · filed 2004-05-14(G)

The defendant's sentence of 15 years imprisonment at hard labor without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence is amended to provide that the defendant shall serve a term of 15 years imprisonment at hard labor without benefit of probation or suspension of sentence, and without benefit of parole for a period of five years. See La.R.S. 40:967(B)(4)(b) (1997 La. Acts 1284); La.R.S. 15:529.1(G).

Subsection (G) requires habitual-offender enhanced sentences to be imposed without benefit of probation or suspension of sentence, but it does not authorize the trial court to deny parole eligibility.

State of Louisiana v. Benedict · filed 2004-11-10(G)

Although Section G of the habitual offender statute requires all enhanced sentences to be imposed without benefit of probation or suspension of sentence, it does not authorize the trial court to impose enhanced sentences without benefit of parole. La.R.S. 15:529.1(G).

When the underlying offense carries a parole prohibition, a habitual-offender sentence under § 15:529.1 may likewise be imposed without parole.

State v. Smith · filed 2006-07-26(G)

Further, because the underlying offense here was armed robbery and, since the punishment for that crime includes a prohibition against parole, the trial court did not err in imposing the habitual offender sentence without the benefit of parole.

Section 529.1(G) requires enhanced sentences to exclude probation and suspension, but does not itself permit denying parole; parole restrictions come from the reference statute.

State v. Dossman · filed 2006-09-27(G)

Although Section G of the habitual offender statute requires all enhanced sentences to be imposed without benefit of probation or suspension of sentence, it does not authorize the trial court to impose enhanced sentences without benefit of parole. La.R.S. 15:529.1(G). "[T]he restrictions on parole eligibility imposed on multiple offender sentences under La.R.S. 15:529.1 `are those called for in the reference statute.'" State v. Tate, 99-1483, pp. 1-2 (La.11/24/99), 747 So.2d 519, 520 (citation omitted). The penalty provision for unauthorized entry of an inhabited dwelling, the reference statute in the present case, does not authorize the trial court to impose any portion of the sentence without benefit of parole. La.R.S. 14:62.3. Thus, the trial court improperly denied parole eligibility.

Section 15:529.1(G) requires a habitual-offender sentence to be imposed without benefit of probation or suspension, but parole eligibility is governed by the underlying reference statute.

State of Louisiana v. Hood · filed 2006-12-06(G)

Although Section G of the habitual offender statute requires all enhanced sentences to be imposed without benefit of probation or suspension of sentence, it does not authorize the trial court to impose enhanced sentences without benefit of parole. La.R.S. 15:529.1(G). “[T]he restrictions on parole eligibility imposed on multiple offender sentences under La.R.S. 15:529.1 ‘are those called for in the reference statute.’” State v. Tate, 99-1483, pp. 1-2 (La. 11/24/99), 747 So.2d 519, 520 (citation omitted). The penalty provision for simple escape, the reference statute in the present case, does not authorize the trial court to impose any portion of the sentence without benefit of parole. La.R.S. 14:110(B)(3). Thus, the trial court improperly denied parole eligibility. Accordingly, this court will amend the Defendant’s sentence for simple escape, fourth habitual offender, to delete the denial of parole eligibility. See State v. Gregrich, 99-178 (La.App. 3 Cir. 10/13/99), 745 So.2d 694, and State v. Buckley, 02-1288 (La.App. 3 Cir. 3/5/03), 839 So.2d 1193.

Subsection (G) does not make a habitual-offender sentence parole-eligible when the underlying offense independently requires imprisonment without benefit of parole.

State v. Thomas · filed 2007-08-15(G)

Since the underlying offense of armed robbery requires the sentence to be imposed without benefit of parole, the habitual offender sentence likewise is to be imposed without parole despite La. R.S. 15:529.1(G).

Section 15:529.1(G) does not prevent a habitual-offender sentence from being imposed without parole when the underlying offense independently requires that restriction.

State v. Davenport · filed 2008-03-19(G)

The minimum sentence for armed robbery for a second felony habitual offender is 49 1/2 years' imprisonment at hard labor. La. R.S. 15:529.1; State v. Roshell, 42,398 (La.App.2d Cir.9/26/07), 966 So.2d 770. Since the underlying offense of armed robbery requires the sentence to be imposed without benefit of parole, the habitual offender sentence likewise is to be imposed without parole, despite La. R.S. 15:529.1(G).[1]State v. Thomas, 42,322 (La. App.2d Cir.8/15/07), 962 So.2d 1119, citing State v. Hailey, 41,897 (La.App.2d Cir.2/28/07), 953 So.2d 979, writ denied, 07-1024 (La.11/16/07), 967 So.2d 522. Defendant's assertion that his sentence should not prohibit parole is incorrect.

Section 15:529.1(G) requires habitual-offender sentences to exclude probation and suspension of sentence, but—where the underlying simple-burglary penalty does not bar parole—it does not authorize denying parole.

State v. Mosely · filed 2008-06-06(G)

The Habitual Offender Law provides, "Any sentence imposed under the provisions of this Section shall be without benefit of probation or suspension of sentence." La. R.S. 15:529.1(G). We also note the penalty provision for simple burglary does not bar parole eligibility. See La. R.S. 14:62(B). Accordingly, the trial court was not authorized to impose any sentence under defendant's habitual offender adjudication without benefit of parole. The sentence imposed by the court pursuant to the Habitual Offender Law on Count 1 insofar as it denied the defendant to right to parole eligibility is illegal. Therefore, we amend the sentence on count lto provide that defendant is sentenced to eighteen years at hard labor without benefit of probation or suspension of sentence.

Section 15:529.1(G) makes a habitual-offender sentence unavailable for probation or suspension, while parole restrictions required by the underlying offense also apply to the enhanced sentence.

State v. Carter · filed 2008-06-18(G)

Upon error patent review, we note that the trial court imposed Carter's sentence without benefit of probation or suspension of sentence under La.R.S. 15:529.1(G), but noted that under the statute, Carter would be eligible for parole. Nevertheless, because the underlying offense of forcible rape requires that at least two years of the sentence be served without benefit of parole, the habitual offender sentence is to likewise be imposed without parole. State v. Davenport, 43,101 (La.App. 2d Cir.3/19/08), 978 So.2d 1189; State v. Thomas, 42,322 (La.App. 2d Cir.8/15/07), 962 So.2d 1119. Thus, Carter's sentence is illegally lenient.

Subsection (G) requires a sentence imposed under the habitual-offender statute to be without benefit of probation or suspension of sentence; additional parole restrictions may also be imposed when the underlying offense authorizes them.

State v. Platt · filed 2008-12-03(G)

Although La. R.S. 15:529.1(G) states that any sentence imposed under the provisions of this Section shall be without benefit of probation or suspension of sentence, the jurisprudence holds that additional restrictions, such as lack of parole eligibility, may be imposed, provided that those additional restrictions are provided in the underlying offense of conviction.

Section 15:529.1(G) requires a habitual-offender sentence to be served without benefit of probation or suspension of sentence, but it does not itself bar parole.

State v. Speed · filed 2009-01-14(G)

Speed correctly points out, however, that the trial court erroneously imposed the sentence without benefit of parole. La. R.S. 15:529.1 G provides that a sentence imposed under the habitual offender statute is to be served without benefit of probation or suspension of sentence only.

For a habitual-offender sentence under La. R.S. 15:529.1, restrictions on parole, probation, or suspension come from the statute underlying the conviction and apply automatically even if the sentencing court fails to state them.

State v. Johnson · filed 2009-04-28

Second, the restrictions on benefit eligibility imposed on habitual offender sentences under La. R.S. 15:529.1 “are those called for in the reference statute.” State v. Esteen, 01-879 (La.App. 5 Cir. 5/15/02), 821 So.2d 60, 79, writ denied, 02-1540 (La.12/13/02), 831 So.2d 983. In this case, the underlying armed robbery statute, La. R.S. 14:64(B), mandates that the sentence be served without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence. Again, it was error not to prohibit benefits on the enhanced sentence, but this error does not require remand because the provision is self-activating. La. R.S. 15:301.1; Payne, 945 So.2d at 752, n. 2; Ellington, 889 So.2d at 1150, n. 2; Esteen, 821 So.2d at 78.

Subsection (G) requires habitual-offender sentences to be served without benefit of probation or suspension of sentence.

State v. George · filed 2010-03-23(G)

La. R.S. 15:529.1(G) requires that all habitual offender sentences be served without benefit of probation or suspension of sentence.

Section 15:529.1(G) does not permit a habitual-offender sentence for simple robbery to deny parole eligibility when the underlying offense itself does not deny parole eligibility.

State v. SIGERS · filed 2010-06-23(G)

In brief, the state notes that in accordance with La. R.S. 15:529.1 G, defendant’s sentence should not have been imposed without benefit of parole, as the underlying offense, La. R.S. 14:65, does not deny parole eligibility. The correction of the defendant’s sentence would not involve the exercise of the trial court’s sentencing discretion, thus, this court may correct the sentence without remanding the matter to the trial court.

Section 15:529.1(G) requires enhanced sentences to exclude probation and suspension of sentence, but parole restrictions must be supplied by the referenced offense statute.

State of Louisiana v. Ballard · filed 2010-12-08(G)

Section G of La.R.S. 15:529.1, the habitual offender statute, requires all enhanced sentences to be imposed without benefit of probation or suspension of sentence; it does not authorize the trial court to impose enhanced sentences without the benefit of parole. The restrictions on parole eligibility imposed on multiple offender sentences under La.R.S. 15:529.1 are those called for in the referenced statute.

Subsection (G) requires an enhanced habitual-offender sentence to be without benefit of probation or suspension, while parole restrictions are limited to those in the underlying reference statute.

State v. Payne · filed 2011-01-25(G)

La. R.S. 15:529.1(G) provides that the enhanced sentence shall be without benefit of probation or suspension of sentence. The restrictions imposed on parole eligibility in multiple offender sentences under La. R.S. 15:529.1 “are those called for in the reference statute.” The underlying statute in the present case does not provide for the prohibition of parole. As such, Payne’s enhanced sentence should not have been imposed with the parole restriction.

Subsection (G) requires every sentence imposed under the habitual offender statute to be served without benefit of probation or suspension of sentence.

State v. Tillman · filed 2011-09-28(G)

However, La. R.S. 15:529.1(G) provides that all sentences imposed under the statute are to be served without benefit of probation or suspension of sentence.

Section 15:529.1(G) requires hard labor without probation or suspension, while parole restrictions for a habitual-offender sentence come from the reference offense and must be stated in a determinate number of years.

State v. Harris · filed 2011-12-28(G)

The habitual offender statute, La.R.S. 15:529.1(G), provides that any sentence imposed under its provisions “shall be at hard labor without benefit of probation or suspension of sentence.” Thus, the habitual offender statute does not impose a parole restriction. Nevertheless, the underlying offense in the reference statute, La.R.S. 14:42.1, imposes a parole restriction. It requires that at least two years of the sentence imposed shall be without benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence. “[T]he restrictions on parole eligibility imposed on multiple offender sentences under La.R.S. 15:529.1 ‘are those called for in the reference statute.’ ” ... Thus, in sentencing under the habitual offender statute, the trial judge was required to impose a minimum two-year parole restriction as called for in the reference statute.

Subsection (G) requires a habitual-offender sentence to exclude probation and suspension of sentence, but generally does not authorize excluding parole unless the underlying offense itself carries a parole denial.

State v. Hardy · filed 2012-05-16(G)

The state concedes that this argument has merit, and we agree that it was error to deny benefit of parole. This court recently stated that sentences under R.S. 15:529.1 G are to be imposed without benefit of probation or suspension of sentence, and not without benefit of parole; however, if the underlying offense carries a denial of parole, then the court may deny parole |sfor the enhanced sentence. State v. Bobo, 46,225 (La.App. 2 Cir. 6/8/11), 77 So.3d 1, writ denied, 2011-1524 (La.12/16/11), 76 So.3d 1202. The underlying statute, La. R.S. 14:402 G, provides no denial of parole. We therefore amend the sentence to delete the denial of parole.

Section 15:529.1(G) limits habitual-offender sentences to denial of probation or suspension of sentence, with parole denied only when the underlying offense itself carries a parole restriction.

State v. Glover · filed 2012-10-10(G)

La. R.S. 15:529.1(G) provides that a sentence imposed under the habitual offender statute shall be without benefit of probation or suspension of sentence only. There is no parole restriction. However if the underlying statute carries a denial of parole provision, the court may deny parole for the enhanced sentence. State v. Bobo, 46,225 (La.App.2d Cir.6/8/11), 77 So.3d 1, writ denied, 11-1524 (La.12/16/11), 76 So.3d 1202. However, when this crime was committed, the sentence for manslaughter provided no parole restriction. La. R.S. 14:31 Thus, the trial court erred in denying parole eligibility for Glover. We therefore amend his sentences to delete the denial of parole. In all other respects the sentences are affirmed.

Subsection (G) requires the restrictions on probation, parole, and suspension of sentence for a habitual-offender sentence, and those restrictions are self-activating.

State v. Williams · filed 2012-12-11(G)

With respect 11R to defendant’s enhanced sentence, La.R.S.15:529.1(G) and La. R.S. 14:95.1(B) required that the sen*1076tence be imposed without benefits. Under State v. Williams, 00-1725 (La.11/28/01); 800 So.2d 790, 799 and La. R.S. 15:801.1, however, the restrictions are self-activating and no corrective action is required regarding the restrictions.

Section G requires enhanced sentences to be imposed without benefit of probation or suspension, but does not authorize denial of parole when the reference statute does not do so.

State of Louisiana v. James Lee Burks, III · filed 2013-02-06(G)

Although Section G of La.R.S. 15:529.1 requires all enhanced sentences to be imposed without benefit of probation or suspension of sentence, it does not authorize the trial court to impose enhanced sentences without benefit of parole. “[T]he restrictions on parole eligibility imposed on multiple offender sentences under La.R.S. 15:529.1 „are those called for in the reference statute.‟” State v. Tate, 99-1483, pp. 1-2 (La. 11/24/99), 747 So.2d 519, 520 (citation omitted) (quoting State v. Bruins, 407 So.2d 685, 687 (La. 1981)). The penalty provision for assault by drive-by shooting, the reference statute, does not authorize the trial court to impose any portion of the sentence without benefit of parole. La.R.S.14:37.1.

Subsection (G) requires a habitual-offender sentence to be served without probation or suspension of sentence, but does not require that it be served without parole.

State v. Carey · filed 2013-02-27(G)

Therefore, the trial court imposed the sentence in accordance with La. R.S. 15:529.1(G), which provides that a sentence imposed under the habitual offender statute is to be served without the benefit of probation or suspension of sentence. That statute does not require that the sentence be served without the benefit of parole.

Section 15:529.1(G) requires every habitual-offender sentence to be served without benefit of probation or suspension of sentence.

State v. Ball · filed 2013-04-24(G)

The record reflects that defendant’s enhanced sentence was illegally lenient as the trial court failed to order his sentence to be served without benefit of parole. La. R.S. 15:529.1(G) requires that all habitual offender sentences be served without the benefit of probation or suspension of sentence. Further, any habitual offender sentence imposed under La. R.S. 15:529.1 following the offender’s conviction for first degree robbery must carry the parole disability provided by La. R.S. 14:64.1. State v. Bruins, 407 So.2d 685 (La.1981). Nevertheless, this error does not require corrective action because under La. R.S. 15:301.1, the “without benefits” provision is self-activating. State v. McKenzie, 09-893, p. 13 (La.App. 5 Cir. 2/15/11), 61 So.3d 54, 61.

Subsection G requires a sentence imposed under the Habitual Offender Law to be without benefit of probation or suspension of sentence, but it does not bar parole for a second-felony habitual offender convicted of simple robbery.

State v. Gordon · filed 2014-07-16(G)

In the second patent error, when sentencing the defendant as a second-felony habitual offender to fourteen years at hard labor on Count 4, the conviction for simple robbery, the trial court stipulated that the sentence be served without the benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence. However, La. R.S. 14:65, the simple robbery statute, does not provide for any of those sentencing restrictions. Subsection G of the Habitual Offender Law, La. R.S. 15:529.1, provides that any sentence imposed under that statute shall be without the benefit of probation or suspension of sentence, but contains no re*767striction as to parole. | i ¡/There is no authority for denying the benefit of parole to a defendant sentenced as a second-felony habitual offender on a conviction for simple robbery. Accordingly, the defendant’s sentence as to Count 4 is amended to delete that restriction.

For a fourth-felony habitual offender sentenced under § 15:529.1(A)(4)(a), § 15:529.1(G) requires hard labor without probation or suspension of sentence but does not itself bar parole.

State v. Falkins · filed 2014-07-23(A)(4)(a), (G)

The trial court properly sentenced defendant under subpart (a) of La. R.S. 15:529.1(A)(4) to thirty-five years at hard labor. This is because the defendant’s instant conviction, his fourth felony as contemplated by the statute, is for attempted unauthorized entry of an inhabited dwelling under La. R.S. 14:27 and La. R.S. 14:62.3, and was punishable by only up to three years at hard labor with no restrictions on parole eligibility. By virtue of these facts alone, his adjudication as a fourth-felony habitual offender falls outside of the parameters of subpart (b) of La. R.S. 15:529.1(A)(4).

Subsection (G) requires an enhanced habitual-offender sentence to be imposed without probation or suspension of sentence; any parole restriction required for the underlying felony must also be addressed in the enhanced sentence.

State v. Fairman · filed 2015-09-23(G)

La. R.S. 15:529.1(G) provides that the enhanced sentence shall be without the benefit of probation or suspension of sentence; *1293however, La. R.S. 14:34.2(B)(3), the underlying felony, provides that “at least thirty days of the sentence” imposed shall be served without benefit of parole. ... Because the underlying offense carries a parole restriction, the habitual offender sentence is to likewise be imposed without parole. ... Since the trial judge did not restrict parole in any way in imposing the enhanced sentence, and the statute requires an exercise of the trial court’s sentencing discretion in limiting parole eligibility, we find that defendant’s enhanced sentence should be vacated and the matter remanded for resen-tencing on count five in accordance with the underlying statute.

A habitual-offender sentence under § 15:529.1 must include the underlying offense’s required denial of parole, with the sentencing court determining the portion subject to that restriction.

State v. Moody · filed 2015-09-30(G)

However, because the underlying offense of forcible rape requires that at least, two years of the sentence be served without benefit of parole, the habitual offender sentence is to likewise be imposed without parole, State v. Garter, 48,304 (La.App.2d Cir.6/18/08), 987 So.2d 364. La. R.S. 14:42.1 requires an exercise of sentencing discretion; we, therefore, vacate the sentence and remand for resentencing, speeifi-cally for a determination of that portion of the sentence to be served without benefit of parole.

Section 15:529.1 requires habitual-offender sentences to be served without probation or suspension, while parole restrictions come from the statute defining the underlying offense.

State v. Mitchell · filed 2015-11-18

Although the multiple offender statute, La. R.S. 15:529.1, only calls for sentences to be served without benefit of probation or suspension of sentence, restrictions on parole eligibility imposed in multiple offender sentences are those called for in the referenced statute. State v. Hollingsworth, 42,317 (La.App.2d Cir.8/15/07), 962 So.2d 1183.

Subsection (G) requires an enhanced sentence to be served at hard labor without probation or suspension, but does not itself authorize denying parole for the entire enhanced term unless the underlying offense statute provides no parole eligibility.

State of Louisiana v. Asa Bentley AKA - Asa N. Bentley · filed 2016-02-03(G)

“[a]ny sentence imposed under the provisions of this Section [habitual offender law] shall be at hard labor without benefit of probation or suspension of sentence.”

Subsection (G) requires a habitual-offender sentence to be served at hard labor without probation or suspension of sentence, while parole restrictions are governed by the underlying felony and may not exceed the parole restriction authorized for that offense.

State v. Bentley · filed 2016-02-03(G)

Because La.R.S. 14:44.1 does not require that parole eligibility be denied in its entirety, Cain, 09-924, the parolé restriction in La.R.S. 14:44.1 is tantamount to those statutes providing' for parole eligibility, see, e.g., Young, 839 So.2d 186, and the rule of lenity’s application to penalties,- we conclude that the trial court erred in restricting paróle for Defendant’s entire' sentence. ^Consequently, we vacate Defendant’s sentence and remand to the trial court for resentencing.

Section 15:529.1(G) requires habitual offender sentences to be without probation or suspension of sentence, and parole restrictions come from the underlying reference statute.

State v. Girod · filed 2016-06-30(G)

La. R.S. 15:529.1(G) requires that all habitual offender sentences be served without benefit of probation or suspension of sentence. While defendant is correct that the habitual offender statute does not restrict parole, the restrictions on parole eligibility imposed on habitual offender sentences under La. R.S. 15:529.1 “are those called for in the reference statute.” State v. Esteen, 01-879 (La.App. 5 Cir. 5/15/02), 821 So.2d 60, 79 n. 24, writ denied, 02-1540 (La.12/13/02), 831 So.2d 983. In the present matter, the underlying offense of armed robbery with a firearm provides that the sentence be served without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence. See La. R.S. 14:64. Because the underlying offense carries a parole restriction, the habitual offender sentence is to likewise be imposed without parole. See State v. Smith, 09-100 (La.App. 5 Cir. 8/25/09), 20 So.3d 501, 509, writ denied, 09-2102 (La.4/5/10), 31 So.3d 357.

Section 15:529.1(G) requires a habitual-offender sentence to be served without probation or suspension of sentence; the restriction applies even when the sentencing court fails to state it expressly.

State v. Dowell · filed 2016-08-10(G)

In addition, the trial court failed to stipulate that each habitual offender sentence be served without the benefit of probation or suspension of sentence, as provided for by La. R.S. 15:529.1 G. ... As we held in Jones, in this case, Ms. Dowell’s sentence- “is *247deemed to have been imposed with the restrictions of benefits.... Therefore, this Court need not take any action to cure this error.” Id.

Section 15:529.1(G) requires enhanced sentences to be imposed without benefit of probation or suspension, but it does not itself authorize denying parole; parole restrictions come from the statute defining the underlying offense.

State of Louisiana v. Steve Duane Williams -Aka- Ayaz Sutaria · filed 2016-09-28(G)

Although Section G of the habitual offender statute requires all enhanced sentences to be imposed without benefit of probation or suspension of sentence, it does not authorize the trial court to impose enhanced sentences without benefit of parole. La.R.S. 15:529.1(G). “[T]he restrictions on parole eligibility imposed on multiple offender sentences under La.R.S. 15:529.1 ‘are those called for in the reference statute.’” State v. Tate, 99-1483, pp. 1-2 (La.11/24/99), 747 So.2d 519, 520 (citation omitted).

Subsection (G) does not authorize a parole restriction when the underlying offense does not authorize one.

State v. Johnson · filed 2016-10-26(G)

Further, the trial judge correctly placed no restriction on parole because La. R.S. 14:31 does not authorize a restriction on parole. See La. R.S. 15:529.1(G); see also State v. Bruins, 407 So.2d 685 (La. 1981) (where the supreme court determined that the conditions imposed on the sentence are those which the underlying offense calls for).

Section 15:529.1(G) requires an enhanced habitual-offender sentence to be imposed at hard labor without probation or suspension, while parole restrictions follow those required by the underlying reference statute.

State v. Duncan · filed 2017-02-08(G)

La. R.S. 15:529.1(G) provides that an enhanced sentence shall be at hard labor without benefit of probation or suspension of sentence. However, La. R.S. 40:967(B)(4)(b) requires that the first two years of the sentence shall be without the benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence. The restrictions on parole eligibility imposed on habitual offender sentences under La. R.S. 15:529.1 “are those called for in the reference statute.” State v. Esteen, 01-879 (La.App. 5 Cir. 5/15/02), 821 So.2d 60, 79, n.24, writ denied, 02-1540 (La. 12/13/02), 831 So.2d 983. Because the underlying offense carries a parole restriction, the habitual offender sentence is to likewise be imposed without parole. See State v. Smith, 09-100 (La.App. 5 Cir. 8/25/09), 20 So.3d 501, 509, writ denied, 09-2102 (La. 4/5/10), 31 So.3d 357.

Subsection (4)(a) sets a fourth or subsequent felony offender's sentencing range at no less than the longest first-conviction term and no more than natural life, while subsection (G) requires hard labor without probation or suspension; parole restrictions are governed by the underlying offense.

State v. Sullivan · filed 2017-02-15(4)(a), (G)

La. R.S. 15:529.1(G) states that any sentence imposed under the habitual offender provisions shall be at hard labor without benefit of probation or suspension of sentence. Regarding the imposition of a habitual offender sentence without benefit of parole, the conditions imposed on the sentence are those called for in the sentencing provisions for the underlying offense. State v. Thurman, 46,391 (La.App. 2d Cir. 6/22/11), 71 So.3d 468, writ denied, 2011-1868 (La. 2/3/12), 79 So.3d 1025. ... For the distribution of cocaine convictions, as a habitual offender, the trial court could have sentenced Sullivan to 30 years to life imprisonment, with the first two years to be served without benefit of parole. For the distribution of methamphetamine conviction, the trial court could have sentenced Sullivan to 30 years to life imprisonment. There is no requirement that any portion of the sentence for distribution of methamphetamine be served without benefit of parole. ... The trial court erred in ordering that the entire sentences be served without benefit of parole. We amend the sentences to provide that only the first two years of the 60-year sentences for distribution of cocaine be served without benefit of parole. Regarding the 60-year sentence for distribution of methamphetamine, we delete the requirement that the sentence be served without benefit of parole. As amended, the sentences are affirmed.

Section 15:529.1(G) requires habitual-offender sentences to exclude probation and suspension of sentence but does not itself authorize denying parole; parole restrictions are those in the underlying reference statute.

State of Louisiana v. Roman Ford · filed 2017-04-19(G); (D)(1)(a)

The trial court improperly denied parole eligibility on Defendant’s habitual offender sentence imposed for his conviction of introducing into or possessing contraband in any municipal or parish prison or jail, a violation of La.R.S. 14:402. Although Section G of La.R.S. 15:529.1 requires habitual offender sentences to be imposed without the benefit of probation or suspension of sentence, it does not authorize the trial court to deny parole eligibility. “[T]he restrictions on parole eligibility imposed on multiple offender sentences under La.R.S. 15:529.1 ‘are those called for in the reference statute.’”

Section 15:529.1(G) requires a habitual-offender sentence to be served without probation or suspension of sentence, but it does not prohibit parole.

State v. Hawkins · filed 2017-05-17(G)

That being the case, the multiple offender statute, La. R.S. 15:529.1 G provides that “[a]ny sentence imposed under the provisions of this Section shall be at hard labor without benefit of probation or suspension of sentence.” La. R.S. 15:529.1 G makes no mention of parole.

Under § 15:529.1(G), parole restrictions applicable to the underlying offense also apply to the habitual-offender sentence, and statutory restrictions omitted from the sentencing pronouncement remain effective.

State v. Davis · filed 2017-06-29(G)

Here, the trial judge imposed defendant’s enhanced sentence without the benefit of probation or suspension of sentence, pursuant to La. R.S. 15:529.1(G), but did not also restrict parole during the first two years of the sentence as required by La. R.S. 40:967(B)(4)(b). Thus, the trial court imposed an illegally lenient sentence.

Subsection (G) requires a habitual-offender sentence to be imposed without probation or suspension of sentence, and that restriction applies automatically.

State v. Williams · filed 2017-08-30(G)

Also, Defendant’s enhanced sentence on count one was imposed without restrictions in violation of La. R.S. 15:529.1(G), which requires an enhanced sentence under the habitual offender laws to be imposed without the benefit of probation or suspension of sentence. ... However, under La. R.S. 15:301.1(A) and the rationale in Williams, supra, the restrictive provision of La. R.S. 15:529.1(G) is self-activating, thus making corrective action unnecessary.

Section 15:529.1(G) requires a habitual-offender sentence to be at hard labor without probation or suspension, while parole restrictions come from the underlying reference statute.

State v. Harris · filed 2017-10-25(G)

The habitual offender statute, La, R.S. 15:529.1(G), provides that any sentence imposed under its provisions "shall be at hard labor without benefit of probation or suspension of sentence." Thus, the habitual offender statute does not impose a parole restriction. Nevertheless,, the underlying offense in the reference statute, La. R.S. 14:42.1, imposes a parole restriction. It requires that at least two years of the sentence imposed shall be without the benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence. The restrictions on parole eligibility imposed on habitual offender sentences under La. R.S. 15:529.1 "are those called for in the reference statute.” State v. Esteen, 01-879 (La. App. 5 Cir. 5/15/02), 821 So.2d 60, 79, n. 24, writ denied, 02-1540 (La. 12/13/02), 831 So.2d 983. Thus, in sentencing under the habitual offender statute, the trial judge did not err in imposing the entire thirty-year sentence without the benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence.

Section 15:529.1(G) requires multiple-offender sentences to be served without probation or suspension of sentence, but it does not itself impose a parole restriction; parole restrictions come from the statute defining the underlying offense.

State v. Deubler · filed 2017-12-27(G)

While La. R.S. 15:529.1(G) requires all multiple offender sentences to be served without the benefit of probation or suspension of sentence, the multiple offender statute does not impose a parole restriction. Rather, the restrictions imposed on parole eligibility in multiple offender sentences under La. R.S. 15:529.1"are those called for in the reference statute." State v. Esteen , 01-879 (La. App. 5 Cir. 5/15/02), 821 So.2d 60, 79, writ denied , 02-1540 (La. 12/13/02), 831 So.2d 983. Because defendant's underlying conviction for cruelty to the infirmed does not mandate a parole restriction, the trial judge erred in restricting parole eligibility when sentencing defendant as a multiple offender under La. R.S. 15:529.1.

Subsection (G) requires a multiple-offender sentence to be served without benefit of probation or suspension of sentence.

State v. Simmons · filed 2017-12-27(G)

At the time of the underlying offense on count three (November 15, 2014), La. R.S. 40:967(B)(4)(b) required the first two years of defendant's sentence to be without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence. And La. R.S. 15:529.1(G) required defendant's sentence to be without benefit of probation or suspension of sentence. Thus, parole benefits are to be restricted only during the first two years of defendant's enhanced sentence of fifteen years.

Subsection (G) requires a habitual-offender sentence to be at hard labor without probation or suspension of sentence, but it does not itself impose a parole restriction; parole restrictions come from the reference statute.

State v. Gros · filed 2018-02-21(G)

The habitual offender statute, La. R.S. 15:529.1(G), provides that any sentence imposed under its provisions "shall be at hard labor without benefit of probation or suspension of sentence." Thus, the habitual offender statute does not impose a parole restriction. However, the underlying offense in the reference statute, La. R.S. 14:81, imposes a parole restriction. It requires that at least two years of the sentence imposed shall be without the benefit of probation, parole , or suspension of sentence. The restrictions on parole eligibility imposed on habitual offender sentences under La. R.S. 15:529.1"are those called for in the reference statute." State v. Esteen , 01-879 (La. App. 5 Cir. 5/15/02), 821 So.2d 60, 79, n. 24, writ denied , 02-1540 (La. 12/13/02), 831 So.2d 983. Therefore, we find that the trial court erred by not restricting parole eligibility on defendant's enhanced sentence for at least two years.

Section 15:529.1 does not authorize a fine when a defendant is resentenced as a habitual offender.

State v. Chirlow · filed 2018-12-12

Since the original sentence as to count one was vacated, and La. C.Cr.P. art. 15:529.1 does not provide for the imposition of a fine on resentencing, we conclude that the district court's imposition of the $500 dollar fine was imposed on count two (possession with intent to distribute marijuana).

Subsection (G) requires habitual-offender sentences to be served at hard labor without probation or suspension of sentence, but it does not itself impose a parole restriction; parole limits come from the statute defining the underlying offense.

State of Louisiana Versus Howard Burl, Jr. · filed 2019-10-02(G)

The multiple offender statute, La. R.S. 15:529.1(G), provides that any sentence imposed under its provisions “shall be at hard labor without benefit of probation or suspension of sentence.” Thus, the multiple offender statute does not impose a parole restriction. Nevertheless, the restrictions on parole eligibility imposed on habitual offender sentences under La. R.S. 15:529.1 “are those called for in the reference statute.”

For a habitual offender, the enhanced penalty and sentence conditions are determined by the sentencing provisions of the underlying offense.

State of Louisiana v. Magrini · filed 2020-05-27(G)

After the multiple bill hearing, the district court vacated the sentence it previously imposed, and adjudicated Defendant a habitual offender pursuant to La. R.S. 15:529.1. The district court then sentenced Defendant to twenty-five years at hard labor, but failed to impose the sentence without the benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence as required by La. R.S. 14:32.1 (B) and (C). In Louisiana, a habitual offender’s “penalty increase is computed by reference to the sentencing provisions of the underlying offense.” State v. Bruins, 407 So.2d 685, 687 (La. 1981). “Similarly, the conditions imposed on the sentence are those called for in the reference statute.” Id. Thus, we remand to the district court with instructions to sentence Defendant pursuant to the conditions set forth in La. R.S. 14:32.1(B) and (C).

Subsection (G) requires a second-felony habitual-offender sentence to be at hard labor without probation or suspension, but it does not itself restrict parole.

State Of Louisiana v. Benbow · filed 2020-05-12(G)

Additionally, La. R.S. 15:529.1(G) provides that the sentence for a second felony habitual offender shall be at hard labor without benefit of probation ocr suspension of sentence; however, it does not restrict parole.

The violent-offender provision of the Habitual Offender Law applies only when the required types of predicate convictions support the enhanced sentence.

State v. Johnson · filed 2000-09-22(A)(2)(b)(ii)

Herein, however, it is clear from the transcript of the habitual offender and sentencing proceedings that the court was not sentencing defendant under the violent offenses portion of La. R.S. 15:529.1 A(2)(b)(ii). Thus, there was no need to use certain types of predicate convictions for the adjudication.

Subsection (D)(1)(b) requires a defendant to file a written response to a multiple bill; failure to do so precludes appellate review of a challenge to the documentary evidence.

State v. Weaver · filed 2000-09-27(D)(1)(b)

The lack of an objection to the adjudication and the failure to file a written response to the multiple bill as required by La.R.S. 15:529.1(D)(1)(b) precludes appellate review of defendant's claim that the documentary evidence was insufficient.

Section 15:529.1 increases a recidivist's sentence by reference to the underlying offense and carries over the underlying offense's sentencing restrictions, including parole restrictions, to the habitual-offender sentence.

State v. McCurtis · filed 2000-09-27A(1)(a), G

The Louisiana Supreme Court in State v. Bruins, 407 So.2d 685 (La.1981), stated that it is not a crime to be a habitual offender. However, the statute increases the sentence for a recidivist. The penalty increase is computed by reference to the sentencing provisions of the underlying of*159fense. Similarly, the 1 uconditions imposed on the sentence are those called for in the reference statute. In Bruins, the court found that the defendant who was being sentenced as a second felony offender for armed robbery, could be sentenced without benefit of parole because that was provided for in the armed robbery statute. See also State v. Tate, 99-1483 (La.11/24/99), 747 So.2d 519. Bruins has been followed in State v. Richard, 550 So.2d 300 (La.App. 2d Cir.1989); State v. Demouchet, 595 So.2d 389 (La.App. 3d Cir.1992); and State v. Rowell, 98-780 (La.App. 5th Cir. 2/10/99), 729 So.2d 71. Further, the penalty provisions for oral sexual battery provide that the entire sentence shall be imposed without benefit of parole, probation or suspension of sentence, as distinguished from those for offenses which provide only that a minimum term of imprisonment is to be served without benefits. Accordingly, we find that the trial court did not err in ordering that the entirety of the defendant’s twenty-year hard labor sentence for oral sexual battery be served without the benefit of parole as well as probation and suspension of sentence.

Section 15:529.1(D)(1)(b) requires the State to prove the prior conviction and counsel representation beyond a reasonable doubt, shifts to the defendant the burden to prove a constitutional defect or procedural irregularity by a preponderance of the evidence, and § 15:529.1(A)(1)(c)(ii) mandates a natural-life sentence without benefits when the qualifying fourth or prior felony is a crime of violence.

State v. Burnett · filed 2000-10-04(D)(1)(b); (A)(1)(c)(ii)

Thus, under the sentencing requirements of La. R.S. 15:529.1(A)(1)(c)(ii), Burnett's life sentence without benefit was mandatory.

In a habitual-offender proceeding, a minute entry or docket master showing the defendant was represented by counsel, together with a properly executed waiver-of-rights/guilty-plea form, is sufficient to carry the State's burden of proving the prior guilty plea under § 15:529.1.

State v. Weaver · filed 2000-12-06

A minute entry showing that the defendant was attended by counsel at the time he pled guilty, along with a properly executed waiver of rights/guilty plea form is sufficient to carry the State's burden under La. R.S. 15:529.1.

Section 15:529.1 does not require a habitual offender bill to identify which underlying charge is being enhanced when a defendant has multiple separate felony convictions obtained on the same day.

State v. Freeman · filed 2000-10-11

Furthermore, La.R.S. 15:529.1 does not require that a habitual offender bill specify which underlying charge is being enhanced when the defendant has been convicted of multiple separate felonies on the same day.

Section 15:529.1 requires life imprisonment without parole, probation, or suspension for qualifying repeat offenders, permits downward departure only in rare cases supported by clear and convincing evidence of constitutional excessiveness, and allows prior convictions to be proved by any competent evidence.

State v. Lindsey · filed 2000-10-17(A)(1)(b)(ii), (F)

We held that "[a] court may only depart from the minimum sentence if it finds that there is clear and convincing evidence in the particular case before it which would rebut [the] presumption of constitutionality" and emphasized that "departures downward from the minimum sentence under the Habitual Offender Law should occur only in rare situations." ... In fact, he is exactly the type of offender that the Habitual Offender Statute intends to punish so severely. ... The goals of the Habitual Offender Statute, to deter and punish recidivism, are satisfied by imposing a life sentence against such a person. ... However, this Court has repeatedly held that La. R.S. 15:529.1(F) does not require the state to use a specific type of evidence to carry its burden at an habitual offender hearing and that prior convictions may be proved by any competent evidence.

Section 529.1(D)(1)(b) places the burden of proving factual issues in a multiple-offender proceeding on the district attorney, while § 529.1(A)(1)(b)(ii) mandates natural-life imprisonment without parole, probation, or suspension when the specified third-offender predicates are present.

State v. Smith · filed 2000-12-20(D)(1)(b); (A)(1)(b)(ii)

Therefore, defendant received the mandatory life sentence as a third felony habitual offender under La.R.S. 15:529.1(A)(1)(b)(ii).

Section 15:529.1(D)(3) requires the court to vacate a previously imposed sentence and credit time served when imposing a new habitual-offender sentence.

State v. Melbert · filed 2000-11-02(D)(3)

The trial court erred in failing to vacate the original sentence. Defendant’s subsequent sentence as a habitual offender is null and void.

After a habitual-offender information is filed, § 15.529.1(D)(1)(a) requires the court to bring the defendant before it, inform him of the allegations and his right to a trial on their truth, require him to say whether the allegations are true, and implicitly advise him of his right to remain silent.

State v. Scott · filed 2000-11-03(D)(1)(a)

After a habitual offender information is filed, the court in which the instant conviction was had shall cause the defendant to be brought before it, shall inform him of the allegation contained in the information, shall inform him of his right to be tried as to the truth thereof according to law, and shall require the defendant to say whether the allegations are true. La. R.S. 15:529.1(D)(1)(a).

Section 15:529.1 permits habitual-offender sentencing on more than one current conviction when the convictions arise from distinct criminal events, even if they were rendered on the same date.

State v. Hawthorne · filed 2000-11-08

In the case at bar, appellant was convicted of two distinct criminal events — an armed robbery of Kenneth Porter on December 31, 1994, and an attempted armed robbery of Joanna M. Anderson on January 8, 1995 — even though the two convictions occurred on the same date. Therefore, the trial court properly sentenced him as a habitual offender on both counts. State ex rel. Porter v. Butler, supra; Ward, 94-0490 at pp. 12-14, 670 So.2d at 568-69.

Section 15:529.1 requires a court to advise a defendant in a multiple-offender proceeding of the right to a formal hearing, to require the state to prove the defendant's identity, and to remain silent before accepting a guilty plea or stipulation.

State v. Musgrove · filed 2000-12-15(D)(1)(a), (D)

At a multiple offender hearing, an admission of identity is the equivalent of a plea of guilty. Because at most multiple offender hearings the only factual issue is whether the defendant is the same individual previously convicted of the felony alleged in the bill, it is error to accept a stipulation or a plea of guilty before advising the defendant of his right to a formal hearing, his right to require the state to prove his identity as a multiple offender, and his right to remain silent. La. R.S. 15:529.1(D); State v. Johnson, supra; State v. Manning, 30,809 (La.App.2d Cir.6/24/98), 715 So.2d 668; State v. Breaux, 599 So.2d 917 (La.App. 4th Cir. 1992).

Section 529.1(D)(1)(b) allocates the burdens for disputing a prior conviction and bars a challenge that is not made before sentence is imposed.

State v. English · filed 2000-12-20(D)(1)(b)

Any challenge to a previous conviction or adjudication of delinquency which is not made before sentence is imposed may not thereafter be raised to attack the sentence.

Section 15:529.1 permits enhancement of a first-offense obscenity sentence based on a prior obscenity conviction when the offense-specific statute did not itself enhance the sentence.

State v. Walker · filed 2000-12-22

Simply put, since defendant was convicted of first offense obscenity, he was not subjected to an enhanced sentence because of a previous obscenity conviction. It follows that enhancement of the penalty for first offense obscenity under the habitual offender statute does not amount to a multiple enhancement of the penalty for that offense. Although the rationale of Harrelson, Cox and Sanders may be applicable to multiple enhancement situations, it is inapplicable under these circumstances.

Section 15:529.1 requires the district attorney to prove the prior felony convictions and the defendant’s identity as the person previously convicted beyond a reasonable doubt, and it authorizes a mandatory life sentence without benefits when the statutory third-offender conditions are met.

State v. Chairs · filed 2001-02-07(D)(1)(b), (A)(1)(b)(ii), (A)(2)(b)(ii)

La. R.S. 15:529.1(D)(1)(b) states that the district attorney has the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt any issue of fact and that the presumption of regularity of judgment shall be sufficient to meet the original burden of proof. The State must establish the prior felony and that the defendant is the same person convicted of that felony. ... The State proved that defendant was a third felony offender. ... Therefore, the sentence imposed by the trial court pursuant to La. R.S. 15:529.1(A)(2)(b)(ii) is not excessive, and the trial court did not err in denying the motion for reconsideration of sentence.

Section 15:529.1 permits the State to prove habitual-offender identity by matching the defendant’s fingerprints to an arrest register and connecting that register to records of the prior conviction; the recidivist charge concerns punishment rather than a separate offense.

State v. Williams · filed 2001-05-09(A)(1)(b)(ii)

To prove a defendant is a habitual offender under La. R.S. 15:529.1, the State is required to establish the prior felony conviction and that the defendant is the same person convicted of that felony. ... It is sufficient to match fingerprints on an arrest register to a defendant, and then match the arrest register to a bill of information and other documents evidencing conviction and sentence; this can done through a date of birth, social security number, bureau of identification number, case number, specifics and details of the offense charged, etc. ... Because the fingerprints on the arrest register are sufficient, along with the other evidence, to establish defendant's identity as the person previously convicted, we reject appellate counsel's argument that La.C.Cr.P. art. 871, requiring that a law enforcement officer affix the fingerprints of the convicted defendant to the bill of information, "sets forth the requirements to prove the identity of the person convicted."

Section 15:529.1 requires proof of the defendant's alleged prior felony conviction and identity before habitual-offender sentencing enhancement may be imposed.

State v. Wallace · filed 2001-05-16

La.R.S. 15:529.1 requires proof of an accused's alleged prior felony conviction as well as his alleged identity.

In a habitual-offender proceeding, the district attorney must prove disputed issues of fact beyond a reasonable doubt, while the presumption of regularity of judgment satisfies the State's initial burden.

State v. Knight · filed 2001-05-23D(1)(b)

LSA-R.S. 15:529.1 D(1)(b) states that the district attorney has the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt any issue of fact and that the presumption of regularity of judgment shall be sufficient to meet the original burden of proof.

Section 15:529.1D(3) requires the sentencing court to vacate any previously imposed sentence when imposing a habitual offender sentence, deducting time already served under that sentence.

State v. Jackson · filed 2001-02-16D(3)

The habitual offender statute requires a sentencing court, when imposing a habitual offender sentence, to vacate any sentence already imposed: "When the judge finds that [the defendant] has been convicted of a prior felony ..., the court shall sentence him to the punishment prescribed in this Section, and shall vacate the previous sentence if already imposed, deducting from the new sentence the time actually served under the sentence so vacated." La. R.S. 15:529.1D(3) (emphasis added).

Under § 15:529.1(D)(1)(b), a defendant who raises a factual challenge to a prior conviction bears the burden of proving it by a preponderance of the evidence, and a challenge not made before sentencing cannot later be used to attack the habitual-offender sentence.

State v. Williams · filed 2001-02-28(D)(1)(b)

Regarding habitual offender hearings, La. R.S. 15:529.1(D)(1)(b) provides in pertinent part: ... The person shall have the burden of proof, by a preponderance of the evidence, on any issue of fact raised by the response. ... Any challenge to a previous conviction or adjudication of delinquency which is not made before sentence is imposed may not thereafter be raised to attack the sentence. [Emphasis added.] ... Since the defendant did not offer evidence of an infringement of his rights or other irregularity concerning the guilty plea, no further evidence was required. ... Therefore, the defendant may not now attack his adjudication and sentence as a second felony offender.

Subsection (D)(1)(b) places the initial burden on the district attorney, gives judgments a presumption of regularity, shifts factual challenges to the defendant by a preponderance of the evidence, and bars untimely challenges after sentencing.

State v. Robinson · filed 2001-02-28(D)(1)(b)

La.R.S. 15:529.1(D)(1) provides in pertinent part: ... The person shall have the burden of proof, by a preponderance of the evidence, on any issue of fact raised by the response. Any challenge to a previous conviction or adjudication of delinquency which is not made before sentence is imposed may not thereafter be raised to attack the sentence. (Emphasis added). ... The record in this case shows that defendant was represented by counsel at the time of his plea. Defendant made no affirmative showing that this was not the case. This conviction was properly used in the habitual offender proceeding.

Section 15:529.1(D)(1) places the initial burden on the state to prove the prior guilty plea and representation by counsel, then shifts the burden to the defendant to show an infringement of rights or procedural irregularity, with the burden returning to the state to prove the plea's constitutionality.

State v. Bugbee · filed 2001-02-28(D)(1)

In order to employ the habitual offender statute with a guilty plea predicate offense, the burden is on the state to prove two things. First, the state must prove the existence of the prior guilty plea. Second, the state must prove the defendant was represented by counsel when the plea was taken. If the state meets that burden, then the defendant must offer some affirmative evidence that his rights were infringed or there was a procedural irregularity. If the defendant is able to do this, then the burden of proving the constitutionality of the guilty plea shifts back to the state.