La. Stat. Ann. § 15:529.1

Section 15:529.1(D)(1)(b) places on the district attorney the burden of proving habitual-offender factual allegations beyond a reasonable doubt, including the prior felony and the defendant’s identity as the person convicted.

State v. Moody · filed 2010-04-21D(1)(b)

La. R.S. 15:529.1 D(l)(b) states that the district attorney has the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt any issue of fact and that the presumption of regularity of judgment shall be sufficient to meet the original burden of proof. The State must establish the prior felony and that the defendant was the same person convicted of that felony. ... Based on the record, we do not find any error in the trial court’s determination that the defendant was a third felony offender.

Section 15:529.1 requires the State to prove by competent evidence, beyond a reasonable doubt, both a prior felony conviction and that the defendant is the person convicted.

State v. Collins · filed 2014-02-26

To prove that a defendant is a habitual offender, the state is required to establish, by competent evidence, that there is a prior felony conviction and that the defendant is the same person who was convicted of that prior felony. ... Because it is a question of fact, the state must prove that the defendant is the same person who committed the prior crimes it alleged beyond a reasonable doubt. La. R.S. 15:529.1; State v. Holmes, 12,351 (La.App. 5th Cir. 12/11/12), 106 So.3d 1076, writ denied, 2013-0086 (La.06/14/13), 118 So.3d 1080. The trial court’s determination of this question of fact will only be reversed if it is clearly wrong. Holmes, supra.

Section 15:529.1 requires the offense used for a later habitual-offender level to be committed after the conviction that establishes the prior level; an offense committed before the third-offense conviction cannot support fourth-offender status.

State v. Ball · filed 1999-12-15(B)

The same is true of the instant defendant. He committed the crime of first degree robbery in July 1995. A conviction for this offense, which was used as the third felony on the fourth offense habitual offender bill of information, was not obtained until March 1996. The instant offense of armed robbery, which was billed as the fourth felony offense, was committed on October 30, 1995, well before the conviction on the third offense was obtained. As such, the defendant could be billed only as a third offense felony offender in conjunction with his conviction for armed robbery. Thus, we are compelled to vacate his adjudication as a fourth felony offender. However, based upon the record before us, we enter an adjudication of the defendant as a third felony offender in this matter and remand to the trial court for re-sentencing in compliance with this opinion.

Section 15:529.1 permits a felony drug conviction carrying a sentence of less than ten years to be used as a predicate conviction for a third-felony habitual-offender adjudication under the law applicable in 2009.

State of Louisiana v. Carter · filed 2025-03-19

The sole issue raised in the defendant’s petition was the legality of using a felony drug conviction that carried a sentence of less than ten years as one of the prior convictions upon which his habitual offender adjudication was based. The applicable law in 2009 clearly provides that the complained-of conviction could be used. In addition to the issue being raised untimely, there is no legal merit to the defendant’s claim.

Section 15:529.1 does not require the sentencing judge to use particular words when imposing a habitual-offender sentence if the transcript clearly shows that the defendant was adjudicated and sentenced as a multiple offender in proceedings conducted for that purpose.

Canty v. Day · filed 1999-12-28(D)

We find nothing in the wording of LSR.S. 15:529.1 to require that the sentencing judge use any specific or particular words, such as "defendant is sentenced as a habitual offender" or "defendant is sentenced pursuant to LSA-R.S. 15:529.1" at the very moment the new sentence is imposed, where it is clear from the transcript of the sentencing hearing that the defendant was adjudicated and sentenced as a multiple offender in proceedings conducted for that very purpose.

Section 15:529.1(A)(1)(b)(ii) requires a mandatory life sentence for a third-felony offender when each of the three felonies fits the statutory definition of a crime of violence, even if the offenses are not among the enumerated crimes of violence.

State v. Smith · filed 2010-08-11(A)(1)(b)(ii)

The language of La. R.S. 15:529.1(A)(1)(b)(ii) provides for a mandatory life sentence of a third-felony offender when each of the defendant’s crimes is defined as a crime of violence under La. R.S. 14:2(B); it does not require that they be enumerated as a crime of violence. Accordingly, so long as battery of a correctional facility employee is a felony fitting the definition of a crime of violence, the court did not err in sentencing the defendant to a mandatory life sentence.

Section 15:529.1 A(1)(b)(ii) mandates a life sentence for a triple offender with a qualifying drug predicate, subject to departure when the offender is proven exceptional.

State v. Monroe · filed 2000-03-22(A)(1)(b)(ii)

However, the multiple bill of information and the hearings which preceded the multiple bill hearing indicate that La. R.S. 15:529.1 A(1)(b)(ii) mandated a life sentence for the appellant as a triple offender with one prior offense being a distribution of cocaine, a violation of the Controlled Dangerous Substances Law punishable by more than five years. ... Considering these facts, the appellant failed to show that he was "exceptional," and thus deserving of a departure from the life sentence prescribed by the statute. Accordingly, the appellant's sentence is not constitutionally excessive.

For a second felony offender, the Habitual Offender Statute requires a mandatory sentence of 49½ years at hard labor without benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence.

State v. Demease · filed 2000-04-05

The trial court did not order the mandatory sentence of 49½ years at hard labor, without benefit, as a second felony offender, as required under the Habitual Offender Statute, La. R.S. 15:529.1.

For a third felony offender, § 15:529.1(A)(1)(b)(ii) mandates imprisonment for life without parole, probation, or suspension of sentence when the present or a prior conviction is a crime of violence.

State v. Jones · filed 2000-08-23(A)(1)(b)(ii)

Pursuant to La. R.S. 15:529.1(A)(1)(b)(ii), if the present or previous conviction is defined as a crime of violence, a third felony offender shall be imprisoned for the remainder of his natural life without the benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence. Attempted carjacking is defined as a "crime of violence." La. R.S. 14:2(13)(dd). Therefore, for Jones, a life sentence without benefits is mandatory.

For a third felony offender with a violent predicate offense, § 15:529.1(A)(1)(b)(ii) mandates life imprisonment, subject to departure only upon clear and convincing evidence that the mandatory sentence is constitutionally excessive.

State v. Breaux · filed 2000-08-29(A)(1)(b)(ii)

However, upon finding the Defendant to be a third felony habitual offender, the trial judge vacated the twelve year sentence and sentenced Defendant to life imprisonment at hard labor, without benefit of probation or suspension of sentence, the mandatory sentence. La. R.S. 15:529.1(A)(1)(b)(ii). ... In Dorthey, the Louisiana Supreme Court held that the trial judge is empowered to deviate from a mandatory minimum sentence in a habitual offender proceeding. ... A sentencing judge must always start with the presumption that a mandatory minimum sentence under the Habitual Offender Law is constitutional. A court may depart from the minimum sentence if it finds that there is clear and convincing evidence in the particular case before it which would rebut the presumption of constitutionality. (Citations omitted). ... Considering those factors, coupled with the violent predicate offense, and the presumption of constitutionality of the mandatory sentencing provision, we do not find that the trial court erred in failing to state for the record the considerations taken into account and his factual basis for imposing sentence or in refusing to deviate from the statutorily mandated sentence in this case when sentencing Defendant to life in prison. We do not find that the sentence, given the facts of this case, is constitutionally excessive. This assignment of error has no merit.

Section 15:529.1 requires a qualifying third felony offender to serve a mandatory life sentence without parole, probation, or suspension of sentence.

State v. Dillion · filed 2000-09-06(G) and (A)(b)(ii)

La. R.S. 15:529.1(G) mandates that a sentence imposed under the Habitual Offender Law be served without benefit of parole, probation or suspension of sentence. By failing to restrict the defendant's sentence with denial of benefits, the court rendered an illegally lenient sentence. However, this court will not correct an error patent favorable to the defendant on appeal where not argued by the State or the defense. ... La. R.S. 15:529.1(A)(b)(ii) provides that if the third felony or either of the two prior felonies is a felony defined as a crime of violence under R.S. 14:2(13) or as a violation of the Uniform Controlled Dangerous Substances Law punishable by imprisonment for more than five years, or any other crime punishable by imprisonment for more than twelve years, the person shall be imprisoned for the remainder of his natural life, without benefit of parole, probation or suspension of sentence. The defendant in this case has a 1991 conviction for distribution of cocaine, La. R.S. 40:967, a violation of the Uniform Controlled Dangerous Substance Law and a 1992 conviction for sexual battery, a crime of violence under La. R.S. 14:2(13)(1). Moreover, the defendant presented no evidence during the habitual offender sentencing hearing to rebut the presumption of constitutionality. This assignment has no merit.

Section 15:529.1 A(1)(b)(ii) prescribes a mandatory life sentence for a qualifying third felony offender, and that minimum is presumed constitutional unless the defendant clearly and convincingly shows grounds for a downward departure.

State v. Simmons · filed 2000-12-06(A)(1)(b)(ii)

As a third felony offender, Mr. Simmons' sentence of life imprisonment was the prescribed minimum under La. R.S. 15:529.1 A(1)(b)(ii). Because the Habitual Offender Law has been held constitutional, the minimum sentences it imposes upon multiple offenders are also presumed to be constitutional.

Section 15:529.1(A)(1)(b)(ii) requires a natural-life sentence without parole, probation, or suspension of sentence when the qualifying third or prior felony is a crime of violence or punishable by more than twelve years, and the sentence is presumed constitutional absent clear and convincing gross disproportionality.

State v. Clark · filed 2000-12-06(A)(1)(b)(ii)

Therefore, since the Habitual Offender Statute has been found to be constitutional as a whole, the minimum sentences prescribed in the statute for multiple offenders is presumed to be constitutional.

When the third felony is a crime of violence, § 15:529.1(A)(1)(b)(ii) mandates imprisonment for the remainder of the defendant's natural life without benefits.

State v. Gay · filed 2001-04-04(A)(1)(b)(ii)

La. R.S. 15:529.1(A)(1)(b)(ii) provides in pertinent part that if the third felony is defined as a crime of violence, the defendant shall be imprisoned for the remainder of his natural life, without benefits. La. R.S. 14:2(13)(w) defines armed robbery as a crime of violence. Thus, the sentence the court imposed was statutorily mandated.

For a third-felony offender when one of the prior felonies is a crime of violence, § 15:529.1(A)(1)(b)(ii) mandates life imprisonment without benefits.

State v. Sewell · filed 2002-02-27(A)(1)(b)(ii)

Since the sentence imposed for the habitual offender adjudication is prescribed by statute, the trial court's compliance with La. C.Cr.P. art. 894.1 is not required. ... In this case, La. R.S. 15:529.1(A)(1)(b)(ii) mandated a life sentence without benefits for Defendant-he was a third-felony offender and one of the prior felonies (armed robbery) is defined in La. R.S. 14:2(13)(w) as a crime of violence.[1] ... Applying the above law to the case sub judice, we find no error in the sentence imposed by the trial court. Defendant was sentenced to the constitutional, mandatory term of imprisonment under La. R.S. 15:529.1(A)(1)(b)(ii); and, therefore, the trial court's compliance with La. C.Cr.P. art. 894.1 was not required. ... Defendant failed to meet his burden of rebutting the presumption that a mandatory minimum sentence is constitutional. That is, he failed to even allege, much less to clearly and convincingly show, that he is exceptional because he is a victim of the legislature's failure to assign sentences that are meaningfully tailored to his culpability, the gravity of the offense and the circumstances of the case.

For a third felony offender whose third felony or qualifying prior felony meets the statute’s specified violent-crime, controlled-substance, or imprisonment threshold, the statute mandates life imprisonment without parole, probation, or suspension of sentence, subject to a constitutionally justified downward departure.

State v. Decay · filed 2002-11-26(A)(1)(b)(ii)

We adopt the reasoning set forth in our first opinion and find, here as we did previously, that the minimum mandatory sentence imposed was not excessive.

Section 15:529.1(A)(2)(b)(ii) requires a third felony offender to serve life without parole, probation, or suspension when the triggering felony or either of two prior felonies is a crime of violence, a drug-law felony punishable by more than five years, or another felony punishable by more than twelve years.

State v. Howard · filed 2004-11-17(A)(2)(b)(ii)

He was sentenced on November 5, 2003, pursuant to La.R.S. 15:529.1(A)(2)(b)(ii), which, at the time of the underlying offense, in pertinent part, provided: ... If the third felony or the two prior felonies are felonies defined as a crime of violence under R.S. 14:2(13) or as a violation of the Uniform Controlled Dangerous Substances Law punishable by imprisonment for more than five, or any other crimes punishable by imprisonment for more than twelve years, the person shall be imprisoned for the remainder of his natural life, without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence.

Section 15:529.1(A)(1)(b)(ii) mandates a life sentence without benefits for a third felony offender whose two prior underlying felonies are crimes of violence.

State v. Grant · filed 2004-12-15(A)(1)(b)(ii)

In this case, La. R.S. 15:529.1(A)(1)(b)(ii) mandates a life sentence without benefits for defendant, adjudicated as a third felony offender. His two prior underlying felonies (aggravated burglary and simple robbery) are listed as crimes of violence.

Subsection (A)(1)(b)(ii) mandates life imprisonment without benefits for a third felony offender when the third felony is a crime of violence and the prior felonies meet the specified penalty thresholds.

State v. Richardson · filed 2005-03-02(A)(1)(b)(ii)

In this case, La. R.S. 15:529.1(A)(1)(b)(ii) mandated a life sentence without benefits for Richardson for the following reasons: (1) he is a third felony offender; (2) the third felony (aggravated battery) is a crime of violence; (3) one of the two prior felonies (the simple burglary committed October 2, 1995) is punishable by imprisonment for 12 years or more; and, (4) one of the two prior felonies (the distribution of a Schedule II controlled dangerous substance, cocaine, committed October 19, 1993) is punishable by imprisonment for ten years or more.

For a third felony offender, subsection (A)(l)(b)(ii) mandates natural-life imprisonment without parole, probation, or suspension when the specified current or prior felony criteria are met.

State v. Scott · filed 2005-11-04(A)(l)(b)(ii)

The defendant in the instant matter was adjudicated a third felony habitual offender under La. R.S. 15:529.1(A)(l)(b)(ii), which stated at the time the offense was committed: ... If the third felony or either of the two prior felonies is a felony defined as a crime of violence under R.S. 14:2(13) or as a violation of the Uniform Controlled Dangerous Substances Law punishable by imprisonment for more than five years or any other crime punishable by imprisonment for more than twelve years, the person shall be imprisoned for the remainder of his natural life, without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence. Pursuant to the relevant version of LSA-R.S. 15:529.1(A)(l)(b)(ii), the trial court imposed the statutorily mandated sentence of life imprisonment.

Section 15:529.1(A)(1)(b)(ii) requires mandatory life imprisonment without parole, probation, or suspension of sentence when the third felony and two prior felonies are qualifying offenses, including controlled-substance offenses punishable by ten years or more.

State v. Zeigler · filed 2006-01-25(A)(1)(b)(ii)

Our error patent review shows that the trial court, in sentencing Zeigler as a habitual offender, failed to apply or even consider La. R.S. 15:529.1(A)(1)(b)(ii), which provides: ... If the third felony and the two prior felonies are felonies defined as a crime of violence under R.S. 14:2(13), a sex offense as defined in R.S. 15:540 et seq. when the victim is under the age of eighteen at the time of commission of the offense, or as a violation of the Uniform Controlled Dangerous Substances Law punishable by imprisonment for ten years or more, or any other crimes punishable by imprisonment for twelve years or more, or any combination of such crimes, the person shall be imprisoned for the remainder of his natural life, without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence. (Emphasis added). Zeigler's instant offense (distribution of cocaine committed on September 9, 2003) and two predicate offenses (distribution of cocaine in 1991 committed on June 24, 1991, and possession of cocaine with intent to distribute committed on October 15, 1998) are violations of the Uniform Controlled Dangerous Substances Law punishable by ten years imprisonment or more. La. R.S. 40:967(B)(4)(b). Therefore, under the habitual offender statute as it existed at the time of the commission of this offense (September 9, 2003), Zeigler was subject to an enhanced mandatory minimum sentence of life imprisonment at hard labor without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence. La. R.S. 15:529.1 A(1)(b)(ii). Hence, his enhanced sentence is illegally lenient.

For a third felony offender, subsection (A)(1)(b)(ii) mandates imprisonment for life without parole, probation, or suspension when the third and two prior felonies meet its listed offense categories.

State v. Thomas · filed 2007-01-16(A)(1)(b)(ii)

Therefore, the trial court was required by law to impose a life sentence.

Section 15:529.1(A)(l)(b)(ii) mandates life imprisonment without parole, probation, or suspension of sentence for a third felony offender when the third and two prior felonies fall within the subsection’s listed qualifying categories, including crimes punishable by twelve years’ imprisonment.

State v. Hayes · filed 2009-07-15(A)(l)(b)(ii)

In this case, La. R.S. 15:529.1(A)(l)(b)(ii) mandated a life sentence without benefits for defendant because he is a third felony offender and the two prior felonies (both simple burglary) are punishable by up to 12 years’ imprisonment at hard labor.

Section 15:529.1(A)(3)(b) mandates a life sentence for a qualifying third felony offender.

State v. Walker · filed 2011-05-10(A)(3)(b)

However, because Walker’s sentence is mandated by La. R.S. 15:529.1(A)(3)(b), and no argument has been made to this | |4Court regarding the sentence, we find it unnecessary to remand this matter to the trial court for consideration of the motion.

Under § 15:529.1(A)(l)(b)(ii), a third-felony habitual offender may receive a life sentence when the third felony and two prior felonies are crimes of violence or other crimes punishable by twelve years or more, and an offense punishable by exactly twelve years qualifies.

State v. Austin · filed 2011-06-10(A)(l)(b)(ii)

Louisiana Revised Statutes 15:529.1(A)(l)(b)(ii) (prior to the 2010 amendments) provided in pertinent part: If the third felony and the two prior felonies are felonies defined as a crime of violence under R.S. 14:2(B), ... or any other crimes punishable by imprisonment for twelve years or more, or any combination of such crimes, the person shall be imprisoned for the remainder of his natural life, without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence. ... Louisiana Revised Statutes 14:62.2 provides, “[wjhoever commits the crime of simple burglary of an inhabited dwelling shall be imprisoned at hard labor for not less than one year, without benefit of parole, probation or suspension of sentence, nor more than twelve years.” (Emphasis added). Thus, contrary to the defendant’s claims, the offense of simple burglary of an inhabited dwelling is clearly punishable by imprisonment for twelve years (which is the maximum sentence). Therefore, all three of the defendant’s prior convictions fall within the purview of La. R.S. 15:529.1(A)(l)(b)(ii). The sentence of life imprisonment at hard labor without benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence is not illegal.

When a third felony and two prior felonies satisfy the listed violent or serious-offense criteria, § 15:529.1(A)(3)(b) mandates imprisonment for the remainder of the offender's natural life without parole, probation, or suspension of sentence.

State v. Jones · filed 2012-07-25(A)(3)(b)

Here, because Jones’s instant felony is a crime of violence, and his two prior felony convictions included both an offense punishable by imprisonment for up to 12 years (simple burglary), and an offense also designated as a crime of violence (simple robbery), the requirements of La. R.S. 15:529.1(A)(3)(b) are met. The trial court properly sentenced him to the sentence mandated by statute. Jones did not appeal his adjudication as a third-felony offender, nor did he make any showing of exceptional circumstances to justify a downward departure from the mandatory life sentence.

Section 15:529.1(A)(3)(b) requires natural-life imprisonment without parole, probation, or suspension of sentence when the third and two prior felonies meet the subsection’s listed serious-offense criteria.

State of Louisiana v. Richards · filed 2013-06-05(A)(3)(b)

In the current case, Defendant was convicted of the underlying offense of second degree robbery, a violation of La.R.S. 14:64.4, which provides for a range of punishment of not less than three years and not more than forty years at hard labor and is a crime of violence as designated by La.R.S. 14:2(B)(35). He was also convicted of second degree battery, a violation of La.R.S 14:34.1, which is designated a crime of violence. La.R.S. 14:2(B)(6). Finally, Defendant was convicted of aggravated flight from an officer, a violation of La.R.S. 14:108.1, which is also designated as a crime of violence. La.R.S. 14:2(B)(39). ... However, we find that “[w]here there is a constitutional mandatory sentence, there is no need for the trial court to justify, under Article 894.1, a sentence it is legally required to impose.”

Section 15:529.1(A)(3)(b) requires a third felony offender to serve natural-life imprisonment without parole, probation, or suspension when the third and two prior felonies fall within the provision’s specified qualifying categories.

State v. Richards · filed 2013-06-05(A)(3)(b)

Defendant was sentenced as a third felony offender pursuant to La.R.S. 15:529.1(A)(3)(b), which provides: ... (3) If the third felony is such that upon a first conviction, the offender would be punishable by imprisonment for any term less than his natural life then: ... (b) If the third felony and the two prior felonies are felonies defined as a crime of violence under R.S. 14:2(B), a sex offense as defined in R.S. 15:540 et seq. when the victim is under the age of eighteen at the time of commission of the offense, or as a violations of the Uniform Controlled Dangerous Substances Law punishable by imprisonment for ten years or more, or any other crime punishable by imprisonment for twelve or more, or any combination of such crimes, the person shall be imprisoned for the remainder of his natural life, without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence.

Subsection (A)(4)(b) requires a fourth offender to serve the remainder of his natural life without parole, probation, or suspension when the fourth felony and two prior felonies fall within the statute’s listed qualifying categories.

State v. Harris · filed 2013-12-11(A)(4)(b)

Thus, La.R.S. 15:529.1(A)(4)(b) dictated that “the person shall be imprisoned for the remainder of his natural life, without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence.” ... In this case, the trial court imposed the mandatory life sentence as required by La.R.S. 15:529.1(A)(4)(b). ... Accordingly, we find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s imposition of the mandatory life sentence described therein. ... In this light, we do not find that the trial court was obligated to find that the circumstances of the defendant’s offense(s) were exceptional and supportive of a downward deviation from the mandatory life term of La.R.S. 15:529.1(A)(4)(b).

Section 15:529.1(A)(3)(b) mandates life imprisonment for a qualifying third felony offender, although a downward departure may be warranted in an exceptional or rare case.

State v. Durall · filed 2016-05-12(A)(3)(b)

The Washington court, did not disagree that the life sentence under La, R.S, 15:529,1 was mandatory, but rather determined the trial court imposed the sentence under the mistaken belief it could not deviate from the mandatory life sentence, Id, at 1241. This Court noted that while a sentencing judge must always start with the presumption that a mandatory -minimum sentence is constitutional, a trial court may depart from a mandatory sentence if clear and convincing evidence rebuts the presumption of constitutionality. Id. 'Furthermore, in order to rebut the presumption, the defendant must prove that “[h]e is exceptional, which in this context means that because of unusual circumstances the defendant is a victim of the legislature’s failure to assign sentences that are meaningfully tailored to the culpability of the offender, the gravity of the offense, and the circumstances of the case.” State v. Ross, 14-84 (La.App. 5 Cir. 10/15/14), 182 So.3d 983, 988. Downward departures from the minimum sentences mandated by La, R.S. 15:529.1 should only occur in rare situations.

Section 15:529.1(A)(3)(b) mandates a life sentence without benefits for a third-felony offender whose current felony is punishable by up to 12 years’ imprisonment.

State v. Bailey · filed 2017-09-27(A)(3)(b)

In this case, La. R.S. 15:529.1(A)(3)(b) mandates a life sentence without benefits for Bailey because he is a third-felony offender whose current offense of simple burglary is punishable by imprisonment, with or without hard labor, for a term not to exceed 12 years.

When the third felony and both prior felonies are crimes of violence, the habitual offender law mandates imprisonment for the remainder of the offender's natural life without parole, probation, or suspension of sentence.

State v. Jackson · filed 2019-04-10(A)(3)(b)

The sentence mandated under the version of La. R.S. 15:529.1(A)(3)(b) for a third-felony offender in effect at the time of the offense was: (3) If the third felony is such that upon a first conviction, the offender would be punishable by imprisonment for any term less than his natural life then: ..... (b) If the third felony and the two prior felonies are felonies defined as a crime of violence under R.S. 14:2(B)... the person shall be imprisoned for the remainder of his natural life, without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence. Jackson's underlying felony of aggravated flight from an officer and his predicate felonies of aggravated battery and aggravated burglary were all defined as crimes of violence under La. R.S. 14:2(B) at the time the crime of aggravated flight from an officer was committed. Thus, a life without benefits sentence was mandated under the habitual offender law.

Section 15:529.1 requires life imprisonment without parole, probation, or suspension of sentence for a third felony offender when the current or a prior felony meets the specified criteria.

State v. Bell · filed 1998-02-25(A)(1)(b)(ii)

La. R.S. 15:529.1 sets forth sentencing requirements for multiple offenders. ... Accordingly, the trial court was required to sentence the defendant to life imprisonment without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence.

Section 15:529.1 requires a life sentence for a third felony offender when any of the three felonies is a crime of violence; the third felony need not itself be violent.

State v. Bush · filed 1999-02-24(A)(1)(b)(ii)

Thus in the present case Bush was adjudicated a third felony offender pursuant to the statute and faced a mandatory life sentence because (i) the two prior offenses and the present offense were felonies and (ii) at least one of the three felonies was a crime of violence. The statute does not require that the third felony be a crime of violence, and in this instance, in both of the two predicate felony convictions, crimes of *57 violence were present.

Section 15:529.1(D)(3) requires the court to vacate the original sentence before imposing a sentence under the multiple-offender bill.

State v. Anderson · filed 2000-01-26(D)(3)

The trial court must vacate the original sentence before imposing sentence under the multiple bill. La. R.S. 15:529.1(D)(3). Such error requires that the defendant's sentence under the multiple bill be vacated and the matter remanded for resentencing.

Subsection (D) requires the trial court to vacate the original sentence before imposing the enhanced habitual-offender sentence.

State Ex Rel. Haisch v. State · filed 1991-03-22(D)

The trial court is ordered to vacate the twenty-one year sentence it first imposed.

Subsection (D) requires the trial court to vacate the original sentence before imposing the enhanced habitual-offender sentence.

State v. McElveen · filed 1992-01-10(D)

The trial court is ordered to vacate the six year sentence it first imposed.

Subsection (D)(3) requires the court to vacate a prior sentence before imposing a new habitual-offender sentence and to deduct time already served under the vacated sentence.

State v. Melbert · filed 2000-11-02(D)(3)

In the case sub judice, the transcript of the defendant’s sentencing after the trial court found him to be a habitual offender does not reflect that the defendant’s original sentence of four years at hard labor was vacated prior to his sentencing as a habitual offender. The trial court erred in failing to vacate the original sentence. Defendant’s subsequent sentence as a habitual offender is null and void.

Subsection (D)(3) requires the court to vacate the original sentence before imposing the agreed-upon habitual-offender sentence.

State v. Davis · filed 2003-11-12(D)(3)

Our review reveals that the trial judge, after advising the defendant of his rights and ascertaining his understanding of those rights, vacated defendant's sentence for distribution of cocaine before imposing the agreed-upon enhanced sentence. ... Defendant's claim that his underlying sentence was not vacated is unfounded.

Subsection (D)(3) requires the trial court to vacate the previously imposed sentence before imposing a habitual-offender sentence.

State of Louisiana v. Pitre · filed 2005-02-09(D)(3)

Louisiana Revised Statute 15:529.1(D)(3) requires the trial court to vacate the previously imposed sentence prior to imposing a habitual offender sentence. ... The present case is distinguishable since the minute entry does not indicate that the trial court vacated the originally imposed sentences before sentencing the Defendant as a habitual offender. To eliminate any possible confusion as to the terms of the Defendant’s confinement, this court will order the trial court to vacate the originally imposed sentences of seven years on each count.

Section 15:529.1(D)(3) requires the trial court to vacate the previously imposed sentence before imposing a habitual-offender sentence, while § 15:529.1(G) requires habitual-offender sentences to be served without benefit of probation or suspension of sentence.

State v. Collins · filed 2010-06-29(D)(3) (G)

La.R.S. 15:529.1(D)(3) requires the trial court to vacate a previously imposed sentence prior to imposing a habitual offender sentence. ... However, La.R.S. 15:529.1(G) requires that all habitual offender sentences be served without benefit of probation or suspension of sentence.

Section 15:529.1 requires a multiple-offender bill of information before a defendant’s sentence may be enhanced under the Habitual Offender Law.

State v. Reed · filed 2011-03-02

In this case, a review of the record shows no multiple offender bill of information was filed as required for enhancement of a sentence under La. |4R.S. 15:529.1, yet the appellant pled guilty and was sentenced as a second felony offender.

Before imposing a habitual-offender sentence, the trial court must vacate the defendant’s previously imposed sentence.

State v. Allen · filed 2011-12-07(D)(3)

Neither the court minutes nor the sentencing transcript indicate the trial court vacated the two originally-imposed sentences when it imposed the two habitu*1225al offender sentences as required by La. R.S. 15:529.1(D)(3). ... Consistent with Pitre, we order the trial court to vacate Defendant’s originally-imposed five-year sentences for his convictions of possession of cocaine and possession of hydrocodone prior to the imposition of the habitual offender sentences.

Section 15:529.1(D)(3) requires the original sentence to be vacated before an enhanced habitual-offender sentence is imposed; subsection (G)'s probation and suspension restrictions apply to the enhanced sentence, while parole restrictions come from the underlying offense and statutory benefits self-activate.

State of Louisiana Versus Hursen A. Patin · filed 2019-11-13(D)(3), (G)

First, the sentencing transcript fails to reflect that the trial court vacated defendant's original sentence on count one prior to imposing defendant's enhanced sentence as required by La. R.S. 15:529.1(D)(3). ... Second, in imposing defendant's enhanced sentence on count one of fifteen years at hard labor, the trial court failed to state the sentence was to be served without the benefit of probation or suspension of sentence pursuant to La. R.S. 15:529.1(G). ... However, no corrective action is required as to defendant's enhanced sentence because under La. R.S. 15:301.1 and State v. Williams, 00-1725 (La. 11/28/01), 800 So.2d 790, a statute's requirement that a defendant be sentenced without the benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence is self-activating.

Section 15:529.1(D)(3) requires the court to vacate the original sentence when sentencing a habitual offender; without vacatur, the habitual offender sentence is null and void.

State v. Henderson · filed 1994-12-14(D)(3)

Where the original sentence on the underlying offense has not been vacated at the time of sentencing defendant as an habitual offender, the original sentence remains in effect and the subsequent sentence as a multiple offender is null and void.

Subsection (F) does not require the state to individually certify every document in a penitentiary pack used to prove habitual-offender status.

State v. Johnson · filed 2000-01-26(F)

Moreover, Johnson's contention that La.R.S. 15:529.1(F) requires certification of each individual document has been specifically rejected by this court in State v. White, 28,095 (La.App.2d Cir.05/08/96), 674 So.2d 1018, writs denied, 96-1459 (La.11/15/96), 682 So.2d 760, 98-0282 (La.06/26/98), 719 So.2d 1048.

In a habitual-offender proceeding under § 15:529.1, the court must advise the defendant of the right to remain silent before the defendant admits the allegations in the multiple-offender bill.

State v. Jones · filed 2000-02-29

In a habitual offender proceeding, a trial court must advise a defendant not only of his rights to a hearing at which the State is required to prove the allegation of the multiple bill, but also of his right to remain silent. State v. Johnson, 432 So.2d 815 (La.1983). A defendant must be informed of his right to remain silent prior to admitting to the allegations contained in the multiple offender bill of information. State v. Hopson, 97-509 (La. App. 5 Cir. 11/25/97), 703 So.2d 767.

Section 15:529.1 requires that a defendant be advised of her right to remain silent at an arraignment on a multiple offender bill, but failure to give that advice does not warrant reversal when the defendant did not testify.

State v. Joseph · filed 2000-03-22(D)(1)(a) and (3)

Defendant correctly notes that there was an error patent in the multiple offender proceeding wherein the trial court failed to advise the defendant of her right to remain silent at an arraignment on the multiple offender bill. See, La. R.S. 15:529.1 D(1)(a) and (3). However, defendant further notes that she did not testify and, therefore, suffered no adverse effects warranting reversal, citing State v. McDonald, 562 So.2d 25, 26 (La.App. 5 Cir.1990).

Section 15:529.1(D) implicitly protects a defendant's right to remain silent before admitting habitual-offender status, but a failure to give that advice may be harmless when the proceeding as a whole was fundamentally fair and afforded due process.

State v. Fletcher · filed 2000-12-06(D)

While La.R.S. 15:529.1 does not specifically address the issue of a defendant's right to remain silent, in State v. Johnson, 432 So.2d 815 (La.1983), writ granted on other grounds, 438 So.2d 1113 (La.1983), appeal after remand, 457 So.2d 1251 (La.App. 1 Cir.1984), appeal after remand, 471 So.2d 1041 (La.App. 1 Cir. 1985), the supreme court concluded that the statute clearly recognizes that a defendant has the right to remain silent and thus implicitly provides that a defendant should be advised by the trial court of this right before he acknowledges or confesses his status as an habitual offender. Thus, the trial court erred in failing to advise the defendant of this right before accepting his admission that he was the person who was convicted of the predicate offenses. The question is whether or not this is harmless error. ... We find that the decisions in Harris and Payne are determinative of the issue in this assignment of error. In following those decisions, we conclude that the multiple offender procedure as a whole accorded the defendant a hearing which was fundamentally fair and which afforded him due process. Therefore, we find no merit in this assignment of error.

Section 15:529.1 requires that a defendant admitting the allegations in a habitual-offender bill be advised of the specific allegations, the right to a formal hearing, and the right to remain silent; failure to provide those advisements is reversible error.

State v. Payne · filed 2005-01-25(D)(1)(a)

La. R.S. 15:529.1(D)(1)(a) requires that a defendant be advised of the specific allegations contained in the habitual offender bill of information and his right to a formal hearing at which the State must prove its case. Implicit in this requirement is the additional requirement that the court advise the defendant of his right to remain silent. If the defendant admits to the allegations in the habitual offender bill without having been informed of his right to a hearing and his right to remain silent by either the trial court or his attorney, there is reversible error.

Section 15:529.1 recognizes a multiple offender defendant’s right to remain silent and requires the trial court to advise him of that right before accepting an admission to his habitual-offender status.

State of Louisiana v. Marcus Quinn, Sr. · filed 2007-02-07

While La.R.S. 15:529.1 does not specifically address the issue of a defendant’s right to remain silent, in State v. Johnson, 432 So.2d 815 (La.1983), writ granted on other grounds, 438 So.2d 1113 (La.1983), appeal after remand, 457 So.2d 1251 (La.App. 1 Cir.1984), appeal after remand, 471 So.2d 1041 (La.App. 1 Cir.1985), the supreme court concluded that the statute clearly recognizes that a defendant has the right to remain silent and thus implicitly provides that a defendant should be advised by the trial court of this right before he acknowledges or confesses his status as an habitual offender. Thus, the trial court erred in failing to advise the defendant of this right before accepting his admission that he was the person who was convicted of the predicate offenses. The question is whether or not this is harmless error.

Section 15:529.1 implicitly preserves a habitual offender defendant’s right to remain silent and requires the trial court to advise him of that right before he admits or confesses habitual-offender status.

State of Louisiana v. Thomas · filed 2011-02-02

While La.R.S. 15:529.1 does not specifically address the issue of a defendant’s right to remain silent, in State v. Johnson, 432 So.2d 815 (La.1983), writ granted on other grounds, 438 So.2d 1113 (La.1983), appeal after remand, 457 So.2d 1251 (La.App. 1 Cir. 1984), appeal after remand, 471 So.2d 1041 (La.App. 1 Cir. 1985), the supreme court concluded that the statute clearly recognizes that a defendant has the right to remain silent and thus implicitly provides that a defendant should be advised by the trial court of this right before he acknowledges or confesses his status as an habitual offender. Thus, the trial court erred in failing to advise the defendant of this right before accepting his admission that he was the person who was convicted of the predicate offenses. The question is whether or not this is harmless error. ... We concluded that it was. ... We find Defendant in this case, like the defendant in Fletcher, received a fundamentally fair hearing. Defendant was represented by capable counsel who explained the habitual offender procedure to him, and Defendant admitted his prior offenses in the presence of his attorney after being informed that the State would have to prove his prior convictions and identify him as a habitual offender. Consequently, this error patent is harmless.

Section 15:529.1(D)(3) requires the court to advise a defendant of the right to a hearing on the habitual-offender allegations and the right to remain silent before the defendant admits or stipulates to those allegations.

State v. Common · filed 2011-11-15(D)(3)

Louisiana jurisprudence has consistently held that, in a multiple offender proceeding, a trial court must advise a defendant of his right to a hearing at which the State is required to prove the allegations of the multiple offender bill of information, and of his right to remain silent. ... However, when the guilt of the defendant is proven by his own stipulation or admission to the habitual offender bill of information without having been informed of his right to a hearing or his right to remain silent, by either the trial court or his attorney, there is reversible error. ... Although the trial court informed the defendant of his right to a hearing, the trial judge did not inform defendant of his right to remain silent. ... Because there was no competent evidence introduced at the hearing that the defendant was the same person that was convicted of two previous felonies, defendant’s stipulation without prior advisement of his rights constitutes reversible error.

Section 15:529.1 requires a trial court to advise a defendant of the right to remain silent before accepting the defendant’s stipulation to the allegations of a multiple offender bill.

State v. Hubbard · filed 2012-10-30

La. R.S. 15:529.1 also implicitly requires that the trial court advise defendant of his right to remain silent before accepting the defendant’s stipulation to the allegations of the multiple bill.

Section 15:529.1 implicitly requires the trial court to advise a defendant of the right to remain silent before accepting an admission of habitual-offender status, although failure to do so may be harmless when identity is independently established.

State of Louisiana v. Bias · filed 2012-12-05

While La.R.S. 15:529.1 does not specifically address the issue of a defendant’s right to remain silent, in State v. Johnson, 432 So.2d 815 (La.1983), writ granted on other grounds, 438 So.2d 1113 (La.1983), appeal after remand, 457 So.2d 1251 (La.App. 1 Cir.1984), appeal after remand, 471 So.2d 1041 (La.App. 1 Cir.1985), the supreme court concluded that the statute clearly recognizes that a defendant has the right to remain silent and thus implicitly provides that a defendant should be advised by the trial court of this right before he acknowledges or confesses his status as an habitual offender. Thus, the trial court erred in failing to advise the defendant of this right before accepting his admission that he was the person who was convicted of the predicate offenses. The question is whether or not this is harmless error. ... We conclude that it is harmless error. The state introduced the record of the 2002 proceedings without objection from the defendant, and this exhibit establishes the accuracy of the defendant’s admission.

Subsection (D)(1)(a) requires the court to advise a defendant of the allegations in the habitual-offender bill and the right to contest them at a hearing, including the correlative right to remain silent; technical noncompliance may be harmless when the defendant's interests are otherwise protected.

State of Louisiana v. Bishop Slade Dubroc · filed 2018-11-21(D)(1)(a)

The requirements of R.S. 15:529.1(D)(1)(a) that the court inform a defendant of the allegations in a habitual offender bill of information, and of his right “to be tried as to the truth thereof according to law,” should not serve as technical traps for an unwary but otherwise conscientious judge. . . . It therefore appears that defendant was fully informed of the allegations in the habitual offender bill and of his right to contest those allegations, with a correlative right to remain silent at the hearing, that he thereafter voluntarily stipulated to the habitual offender allegations after conferring with counsel, and that the trial court adjudicated him a habitual offender on the basis of not only his stipulation but also the documentary evidence introduced by the state at the hearing.

Subsection (D)(1)(a) requires advising a habitual-offender defendant of the specific allegations, the right to a formal hearing, and the constitutional right to remain silent.

State of Louisiana v. Bishop Slade Dubroc · filed 2018-11-21(D)(1)(a)

La. R.S. 15:529.1(D)(1)(a) requires that the defendant be advised of the specific allegations contained in the habitual offender bill of information and his right to a formal hearing at which the state must prove its case. Implicit in this requirement is the additional requirement that the defendant be advised of his constitutional right to remain silent.

At a habitual offender hearing, failure to advise the defendant of the right to remain silent is harmless if the defendant remains silent and the state presents competent evidence of identity.

State v. Spencer · filed 1996-11-06(D)

However, the trial court's failure to advise the defendant of his right to remain silent constitutes harmless error (rather than no error) where the defendant remained silent throughout his proceeding and the state put on competent evidence to prove defendant's identity. ... Accordingly, we conclude that the evidence introduced in the present case was sufficient to adjudicate defendant as a habitual offender, second offense and that the trial court's failure to advise defendant of his rights was harmless error.

Section 15:529.1(D) requires the court to advise a defendant of the right to remain silent before adjudicating the defendant a habitual offender; failure to do so invalidates the adjudication.

State v. Magee · filed 1987-12-22(D)

However, the record does not reflect that defendant was specifically advised that he had a right to remain silent and refuse to acknowledge the truth of the allegations contained in the enhancement charge. The adjudication is, therefore, invalid; and this matter must be remanded for another hearing on the habitual offender petition, and defendant must be resentenced accordingly.

A failure to advise a defendant of the privilege against self-incrimination before a habitual offender acknowledgment is harmless when documentary evidence independently establishes habitual offender status.

State v. Mallett · filed 1988-04-06(D)

Although the majority of the cases indicate that a defendant must be advised of his right against self-incrimination at an habitual offender hearing, we do not believe that the Trial Judge’s failure to advise this defendant amounts to reversible error. ... The State provided documentary evidence to establish the habitual offender status of appellant. Therefore, the failure to advise appellant of his privilege against self-incrimination was harmless.

Section 15:529.1 requires the court to advise a defendant of the right to remain silent before the defendant admits a prior conviction in a multiple offender proceeding.

State v. Causey · filed 1988-10-27(D)

Because he was not first advised of his rights under R.S. 15:529.1, including his right to remain silent, the defendant’s conviction and sentence on the multiple bill is invalid.

Section 15:529.1 permits enhancement of only one conviction arising from the same criminal episode and does not authorize the sentencing court to deny parole eligibility, although subsection (G) requires the enhanced sentence to be without benefit of probation or suspension.

State v. Wright · filed 2000-03-01(G) and (A)(1)(b)(i)

Although the Defendant was convicted of two offenses on the same date, aggravated battery and second degree battery, the habitual offender bill failed to specify which count was being enhanced under La.R.S. 15:529.1. Furthermore, in adjudicating and sentencing the Defendant as a third felony offender, the trial court also failed to specify to which of these two offenses the enhanced penalty was being applied. In fact, it appears the trial court enhanced the sentences on both counts. Because the convictions arose out of the same criminal episode and were entered on the same date, only one of the convictions should have been enhanced under La.R.S. 15:529.1. ... Additionally, the record reveals the trial court imposed the two sentences without benefit of parole, probation or suspension of sentence. Although La.R.S. 15:529.1(G) requires that any sentence imposed under that provision be without benefit of probation or suspension, it does not authorize the trial court to impose the sentence without benefit of parole. Moreover, the provision under which the trial court stated he was sentencing the Defendant, La.R.S. 15:529.1(A)(1)(b)(i), does not authorize the trial court to deny parole eligibility. Finally, neither the substantive penalty provision for aggravated battery nor second degree battery authorizes the trial court to impose the sentences without parole eligibility. Thus, the trial court erred in denying parole eligibility.

Subsection (G) requires habitual-offender sentences to be served at hard labor without probation or suspension of sentence, while parole eligibility is determined by the underlying offense's sentencing provisions.

State of Louisiana v. Williams · filed 2025-02-26(G)

Any sentence imposed under the habitual offender provisions shall be at hard labor without benefit of probation or suspension of sentence. The benefit of parole is determined by the sentencing provisions for the underlying offense. La. R.S. 15:529.1 (G).

Section 15:529.1 makes a habitual-offender sentence subject to the underlying offense's benefit restrictions, so the entire enhanced sentence for oral sexual battery is served without parole when the offense statute requires that result.

State v. McCurtis · filed 2000-09-27(G)

La. R.S. 15:529.1 G provides that, “Any sentence imposed under the provisions of this Section shall be without benefit of probation or suspension of sentence.” ... Further, the penalty provisions for oral sexual battery provide that the entire sentence shall be imposed without benefit of parole, probation or suspension of sentence, as distinguished from those for offenses which provide only that a minimum term of imprisonment is to be served without benefits. Accordingly, we find that the trial court did not err in ordering that the entirety of the defendant’s twenty-year hard labor sentence for oral sexual battery be served without the benefit of parole as well as probation and suspension of sentence.

Subsection (G) does not itself restrict parole eligibility; parole restrictions may apply only when provided by the underlying offense, so only the first five years of Hunter's sentence were without parole eligibility.

State v. Hunter · filed 2000-09-27(G)

However, La. R.S. 15:529.1(G) does not place any restrictions on parole eligibility. ... Thus, after adjudicating Hunter an habitual offender, the trial court was required to impose only five years of the fifteen-year sentence without benefit of parole.

Section 15:529.1 bars probation or suspension of sentence for a multiple-offender sentence but does not bar parole eligibility.

State v. Cojoe · filed 2001-03-21

Neither La.R.S. 14:62.3 nor La.R.S. 14:68.4 prohibit parole eligibility, and while La.R.S. 15:529.1 prohibits the eligibility for probation or suspension of sentence, it does not prohibit parole eligibility. Thus, the sentence is illegal. Accordingly, we hereby amend the single multiple bill sentence to delete the prohibition against parole and affirm the sentence as amended.

Section 15:529.1(A)(2)(a) sets the enhanced second-offender sentencing range, while subsection (G) requires imprisonment without probation or suspension of sentence but does not make the offender ineligible for parole.

State v. Mandosia · filed 2003-04-09(A)(2)(a) and (G)

Since Defendant was charged as a second felony habitual offender, however, La. R.S. 15:529.1(A)(2)(a) and (G) also apply in the instant case. ... La. R.S. 15:529.1(A)(2)(a) and (G) provide, in pertinent part, that: ... (a) If the second felony is such that upon a first conviction the offender would be punishable by imprisonment for any term less than his natural life, then the sentence to imprisonment shall be for a determinate term not less than one-half the longest term and not more than twice the longest term prescribed for a first conviction; ... (G) Any sentence imposed under the provisions of this Section shall be without the benefit of probation or suspension of sentence. (Emphasis Added.) ... Defendant's sentence was illegal in regard to the denial of parole eligibility. ... Defendant's sentence, therefore, should be amended to delete that portion which denies him eligibility for parole.

For a fourth or subsequent felony punishable by less than life on a first conviction, § 15:529.1(A)(1)(c)(i) requires a determinate term of at least twenty years but does not itself deny parole eligibility.

State v. Fleming · filed 2005-04-26(A)(1)(c)(i)

The trial court imposed an illegal sentence when it improperly imposed defendant's enhanced sentence without the benefit of parole. Neither La. R.S. 15:529.1(A)(1)(c)(i), nor La. R.S. 40:967(C) provide that defendant's enhanced sentence be served without the benefit of parole. Accordingly, we amend defendant's sentence to allow for the possibility of parole in accordance with the applicable sentencing provisions.

Section 15:529.1(A)(2)(a) subjects a second habitual offender convicted of manslaughter to a sentence of 20 to 80 years, and the statute did not authorize denial of parole for an offense committed when that version was in effect.

State v. Mincey · filed 2009-06-03(A)(2)(a)

Therefore, as a second habitual offender, La.R.S. 15:529.1(A)(2)(a) subjected him to a term between twenty and eighty years. Thus, his sentence falls in the middle of that range. ... At the time of the offense, La.R.S. 14:31 and La.R.S. 15:529.1 did not provide for denial of parole.

Restrictions on parole eligibility for a multiple-offender sentence under § 15:529.1 are those required by the statute defining the underlying offense.

State of Louisiana v. Bordelon · filed 2010-05-05

“[T]he restrictions on parole eligibility imposed on multiple offender sentences under La.R.S. 15:529.1 ‘are those called for in the reference statute.’”

Section 15:529.1(G) requires a habitual-offender sentence to exclude probation and suspension of sentence, but it does not exclude parole.

State v. Chaplain · filed 2013-05-29(G)

La. R.S. 15:529.1(G) provides that “[a]ny sentence imposed under the provisions of this section [the Habitual Offender Law] shall be at hard labor without the benefit of probation or suspension of sentence.” Accordingly, this Court amends the sentence to allow for the possibility of parole in accordance with the applicable sentencing provisions.

Section 15:529.1 calculates a habitual-offender sentence from the sentencing range for the current offense rather than the predicate offense, and subsection (G) does not impose a parole restriction.

State v. Robinson · filed 2015-09-30(A)(1), (G)

Further, Defendant’s interpretation of the habitual offender sentencing provision is incorrect. Under La. R.S. 15:529.1, the sentencing range for a habitual offender is computed by reference to the sentencing provision for the instant offense, not the predicate offense. Because his sentence for possession with intent to distribute heroin is being enhanced, the applicable sentencing range is 25 to 100 years. See La. R.S. 40:966(B)(1). Therefore, his 50-year sentence is not illegal. This assignment of error is without merit. ... In sentencing Defendant, the trial court ordered that the first five years of the sentence be served without the benefit of parole, probation or suspension of sentence. However, neither La. R.S. 15:529.1(G) nor La. R.S. 40:966(B)(1) contains any restrictions on parole eligibility. Therefore, the inclusion of the restriction on parole renders Defendant’s sentence illegal. Further, this court has previously instructed the trial court not to impose the sentence without the benefit of parole. See Robinson III and IV. Pursuant to La. C. Cr. P. art. 882(A), this court has the authority to correct an illegal sentence. Accordingly, Defendant’s sentence is hereby amended to delete the restriction on parole.

Subsection (G) requires a second or subsequent offender's sentence to be served at hard labor without probation or suspension of sentence, but it does not authorize restricting parole eligibility.

State v. Degregory · filed 2019-06-12(G)

However, La. R.S. 15:529.1(G), which is applicable to sentences imposed on second and subsequent offenders, provides that the sentence imposed "shall be at hard labor without benefit of probation or suspension of sentence." Here, the district court erred in *910restricting Defendant's parole eligibility. See State v. Falkins , 2012-1654, p. 29 (La. App. 4 Cir. 7/23/14), 146 So.3d 838, 856-57. Accordingly, we amend Defendant's sentence to remove the restriction of his parole eligibility.

For a third-felony habitual offender sentenced under § 15:529.1(A)(1)(b)(i), the applicable determinate range was 66 to 198 years, while § 15:529.1(G) required hard labor without probation or suspension and left parole eligibility to the underlying offense.

State of Louisiana v. Sewell · filed 2020-11-18(A)(1)(b)(i) and (G)

Any sentence imposed under the habitual offender provisions shall be at hard labor without benefit of probation or suspension of sentence; the benefit of parole is determined by the sentencing provisions for the underlying offense. La. R.S. 15:529.1(G); State v. Hopkins, 52,660 (La. App. 2 Cir. 4/10/19), 268 So. 3d 1226, 1230, writ denied, 19-00841 (La. 9/24/19), 278 So. 3d 978. The record shows that the trial court properly sentenced Sewell under La. R.S. 15:529.1(A)(1)(b)(i), as amended in 2001. His sentencing range was 66 to 198 years, so the imposed sentence of 75 years is statutorily appropriate.

The habitual-offender penalty provision does not itself restrict parole eligibility, so parole eligibility remains governed by the underlying offense.

State v. Cheley · filed 2019-05-01(A)(3)(a)

However, we note that the habitual offender penalty provision being utilized by the State does not restrict parole eligibility. Accordingly, the parole restriction would be the same as the underlying offense. La.R.S. 15:529.1(A)(3)(a) ; State v. Esteen , 01-879, (La.App. 5 Cir. 5/15/02), 821 So.2d 60, writ denied , 02-1540 (La. 12/13/02), 831 So.2d 983.

Subsection (A)(3)(b)/(A)(4)(b) authorized life-without-parole sentences for listed “three strikes,” but applying that regime to a young nonviolent fourth offender was grossly disproportionate and unconstitutional as applied.

Matthews v. Cain · filed 2017-09-29(A)(3)(b), (A)(4)(b)

Louisiana's habitual offender law provides for life-without-parole sentences on a "three strikes" basis. ... (4) any other crimes punishable by imprisonment for 12 years or more. ... The undersigned therefore finds that an interjurisdictional comparative analysis likewise supports a conclusion that Matthews' sentence is unconstitutionally excessive.

A mandatory habitual-offender sentence is presumed constitutional, but the defendant may obtain a departure by presenting clear and convincing evidence that the sentence is constitutionally excessive as applied.

State v. Stevenson · filed 2000-03-15(A)(1)(b)(ii)

The minimum sentences imposed on multiple offenders by the Habitual Offender Law are presumed to be constitutional. ... A court may only depart from a minimum sentence if there is clear and convincing evidence before it that rebuts the presumption. Johnson, 97-1906 at p. 7, 709 So.2d at 676.

Section 15:529.1 imposes a mandatory minimum sentence on a defendant adjudicated a second felony offender, subject to constitutional-excessiveness review.

State v. Gillet · filed 2000-05-10

After adjudicating the defendant to be a second felony offender, the trial court vacated the original sentence and resentenced the defendant to fifteen years at hard labor with the first five years without the benefit of probation, parole or suspension of sentence. The sentence imposed was the minimum sentence possible under La. R.S. 15:529.1 and La. R.S. 40:967. ... The minimum sentences imposed on multiple offenders by the Habitual Offender Law are presumed to be constitutional. State v. Johnson, 97-1906 *730 (La.3/4/98), 709 So.2d 672. The defendant bears the burden of rebutting the presumption that the mandatory minimum sentence is constitutional. State v. Short, 96-2780 (La.App. 4th Cir. 11/18/98), 725 So.2d 23, writ denied, 99-0198 (La.5/14/99), 745 So.2d 11. A court may only depart from the minimum sentence if it finds that there is clear and convincing evidence in the particular case before it that would rebut the presumption of constitutionality. State v. Johnson, 97-1906 at p. 7, 709 So.2d at 676.

At the time of the offense, § 15:529.1(G) required a habitual-offender sentence to be served without benefit of probation or suspension of sentence, but not parole or good time.

State v. Mims · filed 2000-06-21(G)

In sentencing Mark Mims as a habitual offender pursuant to La. R.S. 15:529.1, the trial court also stipulated that his sentence be served without benefit of parole, suspension of sentence, or good time. La. R.S. 15:529.1(G), as in effect at the time of the offense, provided that a sentence under the Habitual Offender Law be without benefit of probation or suspension of sentence only. Therefore, the trial court properly stipulated that the sentence be without benefit of suspension of sentence. The failure to stipulate that the sentence be without parole, however, created an illegally lenient sentence. However, as the State has failed to appeal the issue, it may not be corrected on appeal. See State v. Webster, 98-0807, p. 3 (La.App. 4 Cir. 11/10/99), 746 So.2d 799, 801.

At the time of the 1994 offense, § 15:529.1(G) authorized a habitual-offender sentence without benefit of probation or suspension of sentence, but did not authorize denial of parole.

State v. Charles · filed 2000-12-22(G)

The trial court ordered defendant’s fifteen-year sentence be served without benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence. The inclusion of the parole restriction rendered this sentence illegal. At the time of the offense, La. R.S. 15:529.1(G) [the habitual offender statute] did |fiprovide for the imposition of a sentence thereunder to be served without benefit of probation and suspension of sentence, but neither it nor La. R.S. 40:967(B)(1) [distribution of cocaine — the underlying conviction] provided for the imposition of a sentence without benefit of parole. Pursuant to La.C.Cr.P. art. 882, which provides that an appellate court may correct an illegal sentence at any time, we amend the sentence to strike and delete the portion of the sentence that provides it shall be served without benefit of parole.

Section 15:529.1(b)(ii)'s mandatory habitual-offender sentence may be constitutionally excessive, allowing a lesser sentence when applying the statutory minimum would be cruel and unusual; a defendant may not be penalized for asserting his innocence.

State v. Johnson · filed 2002-05-29(b)(ii)

The district court articulated specific reasons for the thirty-year sentence imposed on Johnson, and why the statutory minimum sentence under the Habitual Offender Law was not constitutionally justifiable. We agree with the district court that Johnson-should not be penalized for exercising his constitutional right to assert his innocence.

Subsection (G) requires a habitual-offender sentence to be imposed without benefit of probation or suspension of sentence, but does not support adding a restriction barring parole.

State v. Muhammad · filed 2002-10-16(G)

The imposition of the sentence without benefit of parole was incorrect under La. R.S. 15:529.1(G).

Section 15:529.1 A(1)(c)(ii) mandates a life sentence without benefits for a qualifying fourth felony offender, and that mandatory sentence is presumptively constitutional absent clear and convincing proof of exceptional circumstances warranting departure.

State v. Thomas · filed 2003-04-09A(1)(c)(ii)

In this case, La. R.S. 15:529.1 A(1)(c)(ii) mandates a life sentence without benefits for Thomas as the instant conviction was predicated on Thomas’ violation of the Uniform Dangerous Substance Law punishable by imprisonment for more than 5 years. We have previously held that the mandatory life sentence imposed by the Habitual Offender Statute is presumptively constitutional and should be accorded great deference by the judiciary. State v. Wade, supra.

The minimum sentence imposed under the habitual-offender law is presumed constitutional, and a defendant challenging it must clearly and convincingly show exceptional circumstances demonstrating that the sentence is excessive.

State v. Walker · filed 2004-10-27(A)(l)(a)

In addition, La. R.S. 15:529.1(A)(l)(a), applicable to second felony offenders, provided a sentencing range for a determinate term of not less than 24 and 3/4 years to not more than 99 years. Since the habitual offender law is constitutional in its entirety, a minimum sentence imposed upon a recidivist is also presumed to be constitutional.

Section 15:529.1 permits enhanced punishment based on prior convictions without punishing drug-addiction status or violating the Eighth Amendment or Apprendi, and a mandatory minimum may be reduced only when clear and convincing evidence shows an exceptional case.

State v. Williams · filed 2006-05-03

In determining whether the minimum mandatory sentence under the Habitual Offender Law is excessive, the sentencing judge must always start with the presumption that the minimum mandatory sentence is constitutional. Id. Only if there is clear and convincing evidence in a particular case that rebuts the presumption of constitutionality may the court depart from the minimum sentence. Id. ... We find that the Habitual Offender Law is not unconstitutional under the provisions of the United States Constitution that prohibit cruel and unusual punishment. This assignment of error is without merit. ... The Apprendi case specifically rejected Mr. Williams’ position. The Supreme Court stated that “[ojther than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.” 530 U.S. at 490, 120 S.Ct. at 2362-63 (emphasis added). Therefore, we find that this assignment of error is without merit.

Section 15:529.1 permits enhanced punishment for recidivists based on the current offense and prior convictions, and is not unconstitutional as applied to a defendant whose predicate offenses resulted from drug addiction.

State v. Washington · filed 2006-05-10

Mr. Washington was not punished for being a drug addict, but for possessing cocaine in the instant case and for two prior convictions for possession of crack. The Habitual Offender Law has been held constitutional. State v. Johnson, 97-1906, pp. 5-6 (La.3/4/98), 709 So.2d 672, 675. The defendant has not shown that, as applied to him, La. R.S. 15:529.1 is unconstitutional.

Section 15:529.1(D)(1)(b) allocates the burdens in a multiple-offender hearing, while subsection (G) bars probation or suspension of sentence but not parole.

State v. McGee · filed 2000-03-15(D)(1)(b), (G)

The standards and procedures for multiple offender adjudications under R.S. § 15:529.1 D(1)(b) were set forth in State v. Shelton, supra, as follows: ... This evidence thus demonstrates that the State met its initial burden as to both of the prior convictions. ... Therefore, we find the appellate record sufficient to support Mr. McGee's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. Because the trial attorney committed prejudicial errors in his representation with regard to the multiple bill proceedings, a new hearing is required to afford Mr. McGee the opportunity to meet his burden of proof under Shelton. ... The statute under which he was convicted, La. R.S. § 40:967 C(2), does not require that sentence be imposed without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence, and La. R.S. § 15:529.1 G prohibits only probation or suspension of sentence. However, because we have vacated the multiple offender adjudication and sentence, this error is moot.

Section 15:529.1(D) gives a defendant fifteen days to file objections to a multiple bill, and § 15:529.1(D)(3) requires written reasons for the multiple-offender determination.

State v. Drummer · filed 2000-03-15D; D(3)

Appellant did not make a contemporaneous objection to this alleged error. It was therefore not preserved for appellate review. La.C.Cr.P. art. 841. In any event, the multiple bill of information was filed no later than 9 October 1998, the date of the first hearing on the issue. Defense counsel objected to the predicate offense, a federal offense for which there is no comparable state offense. The hearing was recessed until 23 October 1998, to give counsel an opportunity to research the issue. Thus, if there was any error in the court’s failure to grant fifteen days prior to the first hearing, the appellant was not prejudiced. This assignment is without merit. ... In addition, the court gave oral reasons for its determination as to the multiple offender proceeding, which reasons were transcribed and made a part of the record. Accordingly, as with the second assignment, if there was any error in the court’s failure to provide written reasons, the appellant was not prejudiced thereby. This assignment is without merit.

Section 15:529.1(D)(3) does not require written reasons for a multiple-offender adjudication when the court gives oral reasons showing that it considered the State's documents and found them sufficient to prove the prior convictions.

State v. Wilson · filed 2007-03-28(D)(3)

The appellant also points out that the trial court failed to file written reasons to support its finding that the appellant is a fourth offender as required by La. R.S. 15:529.1 D(3). However, as noted in Dozier, written reasons are not required if the court presents oral reasons to show that it had considered the State's documents and found them to be sufficient to prove the prior convictions.

For a fourth felony habitual offender, § 15:529.1(A)(1)(c)(i) provides a sentencing range of 20 years to life, while § 15:529.1(G) requires the sentence to be without probation or suspension; the violence provision in § 15:529.1(A)(1)(c)(ii) was not applied here.

State v. Brisco · filed 2000-04-05(A)(1)(c)(i) and G

Upon the adjudication of defendant as a fourth felony habitual offender under La. R.S. 15:529.1 A(1)(c)(i), defendant's possible prison sentence exposure was not less than 20 years and not more than his natural life. La. R.S. 15:529.1 G. requires that any sentence imposed under the provisions of that section be without benefit of probation or suspension of sentence. ... Defendant was sentenced according to the requirements and sentence ranges provided in La. R.S. 15:529.1 A(1)(c)(i) and G. The crimes of violence provision of La. R.S. 15:529.1 A(1)(c)(ii) was not applied in this case and did not factor into defendant's sentence as a fourth felony habitual offender.

Subsection (A)(4)(b) applies only when the current and prior felonies are all nonviolent or non-sex offenses; when the current felony is a crime of violence, subsection (A)(4)(a) governs.

State of Louisiana v. Batiste · filed 2025-03-26(A)(4)(a), (A)(4)(b)

After considering the jurisprudence, legislative history of the statute, and the Louisiana Department of Corrections’ (DOC) August 1, 2017 “Louisiana’s Justice Reinvestment Reforms Practitioners’ Guide” (Guide), we find that subsection (b) does not apply to Defendant. Subsection (a) was properly applied in this case, making the fifty-year sentence a legal sentence. Accordingly, this court declines to follow Riggs and Tyrney and, instead, finds that no error patent occurred in this case.

When a fourth or subsequent felony would be punishable by less than natural life, Subparagraph (A)(4)(a) provides a sentence ranging from at least 20 years to natural life, while Subparagraph (A)(4)(b) provides at least 20 years and no more than twice the maximum first-offense sentence when the fourth felony and no prior felony are defined as crimes of violence or sex offenses; the court resolved the provisions' inconsistency in the defendant's favor.

State of Louisiana v. Riggs · filed 2025-07-23(A)(4)(a) and (A)(4)(b)

La. R.S. 15:529.1(A)(4) contains three separate provisions for determining the applicable sentencing range; which provision (or provisions) applies depends on certain circumstances. The instant case falls under both La. R.S. 15:529.1(A)(4)(a) and La. R.S. 15:529.1(A)(4)(b). ... Therefore, subparagraph (b), by its terms, applies and dictates a sentence of twenty years while, simultaneously, subparagraph (a) applies and dictates a sentencing range of a minimum of 20 years to a maximum of the remainder of the defendant’s natural life. ... It strikes the court as quite odd that the legislature would (under subparagraph (b)) be more lenient toward a defendant whose instant offense is a crime of violence—i.e., more lenient than toward defendants with no crimes of violence (subparagraph (a)). However, we find no “express legislative intent” that resolves the inconsistency. To render subparagraph (b) inapplicable in this case, it would be necessary for us to, in effect, rewrite that provision of the legislation; moreover, if we did so, Riggs’s sentencing exposure would be severely increased. Such is not the province of the judiciary, with or without supposed “express legislative intent.” Newton, supra. Therefore, Riggs’s sentence of life imprisonment is illegal, regardless of whether it is constitutionally prohibited as “cruel or unusual.”

Section 15.529.1(A)(1) permits a foreign conviction to serve as a predicate when the underlying conduct would be a felony in Louisiana, and Section 15.529.1(A)(1)(c)(ii) mandates life imprisonment without benefits for a fourth-felony offender when the present or a prior conviction is a crime of violence.

State v. Schleve · filed 2000-12-20(A)(1), (A)(1)(c)(ii)

Moreover, our review of the state's exhibits, as well as the Colorado provisions under which defendant was convicted,[6] indicates defendant's conviction was for "a crime which, if committed in this state would be a felony." See La. R.S. 15:529.1(A)(1); ... Pursuant to the Habitual Offender Law, if the present or a previous conviction is defined as a crime of violence, a fourth-felony offender shall be imprisoned for the remainder of his natural life, without benefit of parole, probation or suspension of sentence. La. R.S. 15:529.1(A)(1)(c)(ii). Sexual battery, one of defendant's predicate convictions, is defined as a crime of violence. See La. R.S. 14:2(13)(1). Thus, a sentence of life imprisonment was mandatory in this case.

For a fourth or subsequent felony, when the new offense carries a first-conviction sentence of less than life, the habitual-offender sentence must be at least the longest first-conviction term, with a minimum of 20 years and a maximum of life.

State v. Collier · filed 2005-08-14(A)(1)(c)(i)

Under the Habitual Offender Law, if the fourth or subsequent felony is such that, upon a first conviction the offender would be punishable by imprisonment for any term less than his natural life then the person shall be sentenced to imprisonment for the fourth or subsequent felony for a determinate term not less than the longest prescribed for a first conviction but in no event less than 20 years and not more than his natural life. La. R.S. 15:529.1(A)(1)(c)(i). ... In this matter, we do not find the imposed sentence to be excessive. Collier faced a sentencing exposure of 40 years to life. The imposed sentence fell well within the statutory limits.

Section 15:529.1 sets the sentencing range for a third felony offender and requires a sentence imposed under the habitual-offender statute to be without benefit of probation or suspension of sentence.

State v. Sweat · filed 2006-04-12(G)

Our independent review disclosed no non-frivolous issues and no rulings which arguably support an appeal. However, our error patent review discloses that the sentence is illegally excessive. La. R.S. 14:62 provides that the person convicted of simple burglary shall be imprisoned, with or without hard labor, not more than 12 years. La. R.S. 15:529.1 provides that a third felony offender shall be imprisoned for a term not less than one-third the longest term and not more than twice the longest term for first conviction. Additionally, Subsection G provides that any sentence imposed under the habitual offender statute shall be without benefit of probation or suspension of sentence. The trial court did not err in disallowing the defendant benefits of probation and suspension of sentence. However, the trial court erred in ordering the defendant's sentence be served without the benefit of parole.[2] Accordingly, we amend the defendant's sentence to delete the prohibition against parole.

The habitual-offender statute does not permit a mandatory life sentence under Subsection (A)(1)(b)(ii) or (A)(1)(c)(ii) unless the required qualifying offenses meet the statutory penalty thresholds; when they do not, Subsection (A)(1)(c)(i) supplies the applicable fourth-offender range and Subsection (G) bars probation or suspension of sentence.

State v. Zeigler · filed 2006-12-20(A)(1)(b)(ii), (A)(1)(c)(ii), (A)(1)(c)(i), (G)

Because possession of cocaine is not an offense punishable by imprisonment for ten years or more, the sentence under La. R.S. 15:529.1(A)(1)(b)(ii) is inappropriate in this case because not all three of defendant's offenses under the Uniform Controlled Dangerous Substances Law were punishable by imprisonment of ten years or more. ... Although La. R.S. 15:529.1(A)(1)(c)(ii) removes the sentencing discretion from the trial court when the defendant is a fourth felony offender under certain circumstances, those circumstances do not apply to the defendant in this case: ... Defendant's conviction for possession of cocaine is not punishable by more than ten years and, therefore, does not qualify defendant for a life sentence under this subsection of La. R.S. 15:529.1. ... Therefore, the trial court should impose sentence on defendant as a fourth offender in accordance with La. R.S. 15:529.1(A)(1)(c)(i), which states that the defendant "shall be sentenced to imprisonment for the fourth or subsequent felony for a determined term not less than the longest prescribed for a first conviction but in no event less than twenty years and not more than his natural life." Applying this formula to the prescribed sentence for distribution of cocaine under La. R.S. 40:967(B)(4)(b), the sentencing range for defendant as a fourth felony offender is 30 years to life at hard labor, without benefit of probation or suspension of sentence.

For a fourth felony offender convicted of simple burglary, the habitual-offender statute provides a sentencing range of 20 years to life at hard labor, without benefit of probation or suspension of sentence.

State v. Cunningham · filed 2007-12-05(A)(1)(c)(i), (G)

As a fourth felony offender convicted of simple burglary, Cunningham faced a minimum sentence of 20 years and a maximum of life, at hard labor and without benefit of probation or suspension of sentence. La. R.S. 15:529.1 A(1)(c)(i), G. His sentence of 23 years, while long, is at the low end of this range.

For a qualifying fourth or subsequent felony, § 15:529.1(A)(1)(c)(i) requires a determinate sentence of at least twenty years and no more than life, while the statute does not eliminate parole eligibility.

State v. Jones · filed 2007-12-28(A)(1)(c)(i)

The person shall be sentenced to imprisonment for the fourth or subsequent felony for a determinate term not less than the longest prescribed for a first conviction but in no event less than twenty years and not more than his natural life.

For a fourth or subsequent felony punishable on a first conviction by imprisonment for any term less than life, the habitual-offender sentence must be a determinate term of at least the longest first-conviction term, but at least 20 years and no more than life.

State of Louisiana v. Carmouche · filed 2008-01-30(A)(1)(c)(i)

In the instant case, the sentencing range for Defendant is thirty years to life. Thus, Defendant’s thirty-five year sentence was certainly a lower range sentence, especially considering he could have received a life sentence.

Section 15:529.1(A)(1)(c)(i) sets a fourth felony offender’s sentencing range at 20 years to life imprisonment.

State v. Lemon · filed 2008-12-16(A)(1)(c)(i)

Defendant’s sentencing range as a fourth offender was 20 years to life imprisonment. La. R.S. 15:529.1 A(l)(c)(i).

For a fourth felony offender, Section 529.1(A)(1)(c)(i) sets a sentence of 20 years to life, without benefit of probation or suspension of sentence, and the habitual-offender sentence does not include a fine.

State v. Davidson · filed 2010-02-10(A)(1)(c)(i)

According to La. R.S. 15:529.1(A)(l)(c)(i), the sentence range is not less than 20 years at hard labor, without benefit of probation or suspension of sentence, and not more than life. ... The habitual offender statute does not provide for a fine, but does require that the hard labor sentence be served without benefit of probation or suspension of sentence.

For a fourth or subsequent felony punishable by less than life imprisonment on a first conviction, the statute requires a determinate sentence of at least the longest first-offense term, with a minimum of twenty years and a maximum of natural life.

State v. Turner · filed 2010-09-29(A)(l)(c)(i)

La. R.S. 15:529.1(A)(l)(c)(i) provides that if the fourth or subsequent felony is such that, upon a first conviction the offender would be punishable by imprisonment for any term less than his natural life then: (i) the person shall be sentenced to imprisonment for the fourth or subsequent felony for a determinate term not less than the longest prescribed for a first conviction but in no event less than twenty years and not more than his natural life. ... The court sentenced Defendant to serve thirty years at hard labor; however, the court could have imposed a life sentence pursuant to La.R.S. 15:529.1(A)(l)(c)(i).

Section 15:529.1 gives a fourth-felony offender in the covered category a sentencing range of twenty years to life, requires the sentence to be served without probation or suspension, and requires advisement of multiple-offender rights, but the court may deem an advisement failure harmless when the State proves the offender status with competent evidence rather than by admission.

State v. Bruce · filed 2012-10-30(A), (G), (D)(1)(a)

Defendant’s sentence is within the statutory limits provided by La. R.S. 15:529.1(A). However, the imposition of a sentence, although within the statutory limits, may still violate a defendant’s constitutional right against excessive punishment. ... The record also reflects that defendant’s enhanced sentence was illegally lenient as the trial court did not order his sentence to be served without benefit of probation or suspension of sentence in accordance with La. R.S. 15:529.1(G). However, this error does not require corrective action because under La. R.S. 15:301.1, the “without benefits” provision is self-activating. ... Generally, the failure of the trial court to advise a defendant of his right to a hearing and his right to remain silent does not constitute reversible error where the defendant’s multiple offender status is established by competent evidence offered by the State at hearing rather than by admission of the defendant. ... In this case, the trial court’s failure to advise defendant of his multiple offender rights does not constitute reversible error.

For a fourth or subsequent felony, the habitual-offender law requires a determinate sentence of at least twenty years and does not authorize adding a parole restriction to that enhanced sentence.

State v. Smith · filed 2015-09-18(A)(4)(a)

The sentence contains no parole restriction. Accordingly, Smith’s enhanced sentence as a habitual offender should have been without probation or suspension of sentence, but should not have contained a parole restriction. See La. R.S. 15:529.1(A)(4)(a) and 15:529.1(G); see also State v. Bruins, 407 So.2d 685, 687 (La.1981).

Subsection (A)(4)(a) requires a fourth-felony habitual offender whose fourth felony would carry less than life imprisonment on a first conviction to receive at least 20 years and no more than life imprisonment; a later reduction of that offense to a misdemeanor does not erase its felony status at the time of commission.

State v. Thompson · filed 2016-02-24(A)(4)(a)

In this case, the mandated sentence under La. R.S. 15:529.1(A)(4)(a) for a fourth-felony habitual offender is as follows: ... (4) If the fourth or subsequent felony is such that, upon a first conviction the offender would be punishable by imprisonment for any term less than his natural life then: (a) The person shall be.sentenced to imprisonment for the fourth or subsequent felony for a determinate term not less than the longest prescribed for a first conviction but in no event less than twenty years and not more than his natural life ... At the time the. defendant committed the theft from the Family Dollar store, La. R.S; 14:67 defined his conduct as felony theft. Therefore, pursuant to State v. Blackwell, supra, the trial court correctly utilized his most recent conviction to determine that the defendant was a fourth-felony habitual offender.

For a fourth-felony habitual offender whose new felony is punishable by less than life, Subsection (A)(4)(a) sets a minimum sentence of 20 years and allows a sentence up to life, while Subsection (G)'s required restrictions on probation and suspension apply automatically on review.

State v. Jackson · filed 2018-08-15(A)(4)(a) (G)

Considering Jackson faced a maximum sentence of life imprisonment as a fourth-felony habitual offender, his midrange sentence is not constitutionally excessive. Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by sentencing Jackson to serve 30 years at hard labor. ... Nevertheless, failure to include the required statutory restrictions of a sentence is self-correcting on review, eliminating the need to remand for a ministerial correction of the illegally lenient sentence. La. R.S. 15:301.1 ; State v. Bass , 51,411 (La. App. 2 Cir. 6/21/17), 223 So.3d 1242.

For a fourth-felony offender whose crimes no longer trigger a life sentence under the amended law, § 15:529.1(A)(1)(c)(i) provides a determinate term at least as long as the longest first-offense term, and the habitual-offender sentence inherits the underlying offense's parole restriction.

State v. Mathis · filed 2019-04-03(A)(1)(c)(i), (A)(1)(c)(ii), (G)

Under La. R.S. 15:529.1(A)(1)(c)(ii) in 1997, defendant was properly sentenced to life imprisonment as a fourth-felony offender; however, in 2001, after the amendment, defendant's underlying and predicate crimes no longer subjected him to a life sentence. Under La. R.S. 15:529.1(A)(1)(c)(i) in 1997 and in 2001, defendant's sentence as a fourth-felony offender with his predicate convictions would have been for a determinate term not less than the longest prescribed for a first conviction, which would have been 99 years, the maximum sentence for armed robbery. ... Because the underlying offense carried a disability against parole, the habitual offender sentence is likewise to be imposed without parole.

Section 15:529.1(A)(4)(a) sets a fifth-felony offender's sentencing range at thirty years to life under the version in effect when the offense was committed, while subsection (G) requires hard labor without probation or suspension.

State v. Ellender · filed 2019-06-05(A)(4)(a) (G)

Under La.R.S. 15:529.1(A)(4)(a) as it stood at the time of Defendant's offense, Defendant faced a sentencing range of thirty years to life.

Section 15:529.1(A)(1)(c)(i) provides a sentence of twenty years to life for a fourth felony offender whose current convictions are punishable by less than life imprisonment and who has no more than one qualifying predicate offense.

State of Louisiana v. S.L. D. · filed 2008-11-05(A)(1)(c)(i)

The defendant was adjudicated a fourth felony offender under the following circumstances: (1) his current convictions were punishable by less than life imprisonment and (2) no more than one of the predicate offenses were crimes of violence, sex offenses, or drug offenses. Thus, the applicable sentencing provision is La.R.S. 15:529.1(A)(1)(c)(i), which provides for a minimum sentence of twenty years and a maximum of life imprisonment.

Section 15:529.1(A)(1)(c)(i) sets a sentencing range of twenty years to life for a fourth felony offender when the current convictions are punishable by less than life and no more than one predicate offense is a crime of violence, sex offense, or drug offense.

State v. SLD · filed 2008-11-05(A)(1)(c)(i)

The defendant was adjudicated a fourth felony offender under the following circumstances: (1) his current convictions were punishable by less than life imprisonment and (2) no more than one of the predicate offenses were crimes of violence, sex offenses, or drug offenses. Thus, the applicable sentencing provision is La.R.S. 15:529.1(A)(1)(c)(i), which provides for a minimum sentence of twenty years and a maximum of life imprisonment.

Section 15:529.1 requires a predicate conviction used for habitual-offender sentencing to qualify as a felony under Louisiana law; using a misdemeanor predicate makes the resulting habitual-offender sentence illegal.

State v. Reed · filed 2011-11-30A

Because the habitual offender statute requires that a federal conviction be classified as a felony under Louisiana law to be used as a predicate offense, the Supreme Court held that the district court had erroneously considered the federal offense as a predicate offense. ... In this case, as in the Wilson case, Mr. Reed’s motion to correct an illegal sentence is based on the district court’s erroneous consideration of a misdemeanor offense as a predicate offense. As in the Wilson case, if the predicate offense is vacated, Mr. Reed’s sentence as a habitual offender is illegal.

Section 15:529.1(A)(1) requires a felony to be committed after conviction for the preceding felony before it can support the next level of habitual offender sentencing.

State v. Stokes · filed 2000-04-13(A)(1)

Therefore, defendant had not been through the required sequencing because the commission of the third offense (March 24, 1992), occurred before the conviction for the second predicate offense (November 16, 1992). As a result, defendant should not have been found to be and sentenced as a fourth felony offender.

When a defendant denies the habitual-offender allegations, subsection (D)(1)(a) gives him fifteen days to file particular objections to the bill.

State v. McCadney · filed 2000-04-19(D)(1)(a)

La. R.S. 15:529.1(D)(l)(a) provides that, if a defendant denies the allegations of the habitual offender bill of information, he shall be given fifteen days within which to file particular objections to the bill. ... Defendant cites no ^authority that any Louisiana court recognizes as an error patent a trial court’s failure to give a defendant fifteen days in which to file an objection to the habitual offender bill of information. Moreover, even assuming this is an error patent — being discoverable by the mere inspection of the pleadings and proceedings, La.C.Cr.P. art. 920(2) — defendant cites no prejudice as a result of any such error, failing to suggest any defects • relating to any of his prior convictions. Therefore, defendant would not be entitled to any relief based on such error.

Section 15:529.1(D) gives the district attorney broad discretion to file a habitual-offender bill.

State v. Hill · filed 2011-04-20(D)

Further, the district attorney has great discretionary power to file a habitual offender bill under La. R.S. 15:529.1(D), just as he has the initial power to prosecute “whom, when, and how” he chooses.

Section 15:529.1(D)(1)(a) permits the State to file a habitual-offender bill after a felony conviction or sentence, without a fixed prescriptive deadline, subject to filing within a reasonable time consistent with speedy-trial rights.

State v. Dukes · filed 2013-08-14(D)(1)(a)

A review of the statute reveals the absence of a prescriptive period for completion of the habitual offender proceeding. State v. Muhammad, 03-2991 (La.5/25/04), 875 So.2d 45. Although the statute sets no prescriptive time within which the bill must be filed, the supreme court has made a determination that the district attorney must file the habitual offender bill within a reasonable time after learning that the defendant had prior felony convictions. Id.; State v. Toney, 02-0992 (La.4/9/03), 842 So.2d 1083. The rationale is necessitated by the defendant’s constitutional right to a speedy trial. Muhammad, supra. A reasonable time is determined on a case-by-case basis. Id. ... Even though the trial court accidentally failed to sentence the defendant on the ecstasy charge, pursuant to La. R.S. 15:529.1, a habitual offender bill may be filed against a defendant who has been convicted of a felony at any time, either after conviction or sentence. In the instant case, the defendant was convicted of possession of ecstasy and distribution of cocaine. However, he was never sentenced on the possession of ecstasy conviction. Relying on this statute, the state was permitted to wait until he was sentenced for the possession of ecstasy conviction before filling the habitual offender bill.

Section 529.1(D)(1) requires a defendant to file particular objections to a habitual-offender bill within 15 days to preserve challenges to prior convictions for appellate review.

State v. Wise · filed 2013-11-19(D)(1)

A defendant has the right to challenge the constitutional sufficiency of previous convictions through a written response to the State’s filing of a habitual offender bill of information. See La. R.S. 15:529.1(D)(1). A defendant must make such a response in order to preserve challenges to previous convictions for appellate review. Id.; State v. Harris, 44,402 (La.App. 2 Cir. 6/24/09), 20 So.3d 1121, writ denied, 09-2303 (La.4/23/10), 34 So.3d 271. In addition, if a defendant does not concede the validity of previous convictions, he is entitled to a formal hearing. La. R.S. 15:529.1D(l)(b). A defendant’s response to the State’s filing of a habitual offender bill of information is often styled as a “motion to quash.” See, e.g. State v. Zachary, 08-634 (La.11/21/08), 995 So.2d 631. Pursuant to La. R.S. 15:529.1D(l)(a), a defendant is required to file particular objections to the bill within .15 days after the defendant denies the allegation of the information, refuses to answer, or remains silent. Here, defendant did not file his pro se motion to quash until a month after the habitual offender hearing and his adjudication as a fourth felony offender, and therefore the trial court did not err in denying defendant’s motion to quash as |suntimely. See Harris, supra. Defendant’s second pro se assignment of error is without merit.

Subsection (D) permits the district attorney to file an habitual offender bill at any time, even after conviction and sentence, and gives the prosecutor broad discretion to do so.

State v. Wesley · filed 2015-02-26(D)

The discretion to charge a defendant under the habitual offender law lies with the district attorney. ... A defendant may be charged as an habitual offender at any time, even after conviction and sentence. La. R.S. 15:529.1(D). Thus, a district attorney has great discretionary power to file a habitual offender bill under La. R.S. 15:529.1(D), just as he has the initial unlimited power to prosecute “whom, when, and how” he chooses.

Section 15:529.1 permits the State to file a multiple-offender bill after conviction or sentence, but the bill must be filed within a reasonable time after the necessary information becomes available, assessed case by case with speedy-trial considerations.

State v. Cureaux · filed 2015-04-01(D)(1)(a)

The Habitual Offender Law provides, in pertinent part: “If, at any time, either after conviction or sentence, it shall appear that a person convicted of a felony has previously been convicted of a felony under the laws of this state ... the district attorney of the parish in which subsequent conviction was had may file an information accusing the person of a previous conviction.” La. R.S. 15:529.1(D)(l)(a) (Emphasis added). The text of the statute does not provide a specific time limit within which a multiple bill must be filed. However, the Louisiana Supreme Court has held that in light of Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure article 874, which requires that criminal sentences be imposed “without unreasonable delay,” and the defendant’s constitutional right to a speedy trial, “the multiple offender bill must be filed within a reasonable time after the necessary information is available to the appropriate district attorney.”

Section 15:529.1(D)(1)(a)'s 15-day period for filing objections does not apply when the defendant admits the allegations in the multiple offender bill.

State v. Common · filed 2014-02-26(D)(1)(a)

As such, the 15-day time period to file objections to the multiple bill was inapplicable, and the trial court was not required to advise Defendant of the 15 days.

Section 15:529.1(D)(1)(a) gives a defendant who denies a habitual offender bill fifteen days to file particular objections, but a defendant who proceeds to the hearing without objecting waives review of the shortened response period.

State v. Lewis · filed 1998-03-06(D)(1)(a)

Our review of the record indicates that the trial court did not err. First, the defendant proceeded to the hearing immediately after he was arraigned on the habitual offender bill without objecting thereto. Any irregularity with arraignment is waived if the defendant proceeds to trial without such an objection. La.Code Crim.P. art. 555. Furthermore, the defendant waives review of an error without contemporaneously objecting to the error. La.Code Crim.P. art. 841. Finally, the defendant does not allege any particular objections he was not able to raise because of the failure to allow him fifteen days to respond. Additionally, the habitual offender bill of information was filed on May 29, 1997, with the arraignment and hearing being held on June 24, 1997. Thus, the defendant had twenty-six days to review the habitual offender bill and file any objections thereto.

Section 15:529.1 permits an oral objection to preserve a sufficiency challenge despite no written response to the multiple bill, and a failure to provide separate written reasons is harmless when the record contains sufficient oral reasons for the adjudication.

State v. Prater · filed 2000-04-26D(1)(b), D(3)

The defendant failed to file a written response to the multiple bill of information complaining of any irregularities pursuant to La.R.S. 15:529.1 D(1)(b). However, he orally objected to "the substantial nature of the documents inasmuch as there is no indication of a colloquy with the judge except a form document." His oral objection is sufficient to preserve the issue of sufficiency for appellate review. ... The defendant argues that the trial court failed to comply with La. R.S.15:529.1 D(3), which provides, in relevant part, that after adjudicating a defendant a multiple offender, "The court shall provide written reasons for its determination." ... Given the reasons orally given by the trial judge, any failure to provide written reasons for the multiple offender adjudication constitutes harmless error.

Section 15:529.1 does not require the State to provide its supporting documents before the multiple-bill hearing, and a trial court's failure to issue written reasons may be harmless when its oral reasons establish the prior convictions; discharge dates need not be proved when the convictions fall within the statutory time limit.

State v. Dozier · filed 2006-12-20(D)(3), (C)

However, as noted in State v. Williams, 2002-2189 (La.App. 4 Cir. 6/4/03), 849 So.2d 799, there is no requirement that the State submit its documentation to the defense prior to the multiple bill hearing. ... Although La. R.S. 15:529.1 D(3) requires the court to issue written reasons, this court has found harmless error when the trial court fails to file written reasons if its oral reasons showed that it had concluded that the State's documentation was sufficient to establish the prior convictions. ... Where less than the time limitation set forth in La. R.S. 15:529.1 elapsed between convictions, it is not necessary for the State to prove discharge dates. ... As such, the State was under no obligation to provide the discharge dates to show that they fit within the ten-year period for use envisioned by La. R.S. 15:529.1 C.

A defendant who does not file the written response required by subsection (D)(1)(b) cannot later raise the omitted challenge to attack the habitual-offender sentence on appeal.

State v. Moore · filed 2010-10-13(D)(l)(b)

The record indicates that Moore did not file a written response to the multiple bill as required by La. R.S. 15:529.1(D)(l)(b), and the only objection lodged during the multiple bill hearing concerned Moore’s identity as the person previously convicted.

Section 15:529.1(D)(1)(b) precludes appellate review of a defendant’s challenge to a multiple bill when the defendant neither files a written response nor objects at the multiple-bill hearing.

State v. Harris · filed 2000-05-03(D)(1)(b)

A review of the record reveals that the defendant did not file a written response to the multiple bill of information. Defendant's only objection at the multiple bill hearing went to the issue of chain of custody of the police records introduced into evidence. The defendant's failure to file such a written response or object at the hearing precludes appellate review of defendant's argument. La.R.S. 15:529.1 D(1)(b); State v. Cossee, 95-2218 (La.App. 4 Cir. 7/24/96), 678 So.2d 72.

Section 15.529.1(G) requires habitual-offender sentences to be served at hard labor without probation or suspension; parole restrictions come from the underlying offense statute, and failing to state hard labor is harmless because the statute gives the court no discretion.

State of Louisiana Versus Galvin Marcus Bourgeois · filed 2023-04-26(G)

La. R.S. 15:529.1(G) states that any sentence imposed under the provisions of this section shall be at hard labor without benefit of probation or suspension of sentence. The restriction of parole eligibility imposed on multiple offender sentences under La. R.S. 15:529.1 are those called for in the referenced statute. ... When a district court does not mention the restriction of benefits, such conditions are deemed to exist by operation of law under La. R.S. 15:301.1. See State v. Williams, 00-1725 (La. 11/28/01), 800 So.2d 790, 799. Therefore, no correction action is required. ... Bourgeois was sentenced as a second-felony offender on count 4, and as a third-felony offender on counts 1 and 3, which are sentences required by statute to be served at hard labor. See La. R.S. 15:529.1(G). Because La. R.S. 15:529.1 affords no discretion, we find that the district court’s failure to state that the enhanced sentences were imposed at hard labor is harmless error, and the sentences are not impermissibly indeterminate.

Subsection (G) requires a sentence imposed under the habitual offender provisions to be at hard labor without benefit of probation or suspension of sentence; restrictions on parole are governed by the underlying offense's sentencing provisions.

State of Louisiana v. Dickerson · filed 2023-06-28(G)

La. R.S. 15:529.1(G) states that any sentence imposed under the habitual offender provisions shall be at hard labor without benefit of probation or suspension of sentence. The language is silent to parole eligibility. Parole eligibility under the habitual offender enhanced sentencing is determined by whether the prohibitive condition was imposed under the underlying offense.

Section 15.529.1 makes the parole restrictions on a multiple-offender sentence those required by the statute defining the underlying offense.

State of Louisiana v. Johnson · filed 2024-03-27

“[T]he restrictions on parole eligibility imposed on multiple offender sentences under La.R.S. 15:529.1 ‘are those called for in the reference statute.’” State v. Tate, 99-1483, pp. 1–2 (La. 11/24/99), 747 So.2d 519, 520. At the time Defendant committed the offenses at issue, the penalty provision for violation of a protective order, second offense, required at least fourteen days to be served without benefit of parole. La.R.S. 14:79(B)(2). Accordingly, we instruct the trial court that at least fourteen days of the sentences imposed upon Defendant, whether enhanced as a habitual offender or not, must be served without benefit of parole as well as without benefit of probation or suspension of sentence.

For a fourth or subsequent felony punishable on a first conviction by less than life imprisonment, § 15:529.1(A)(4) requires a sentence of at least twenty years and permits departure from that mandatory minimum only upon clear and convincing proof of exceptional circumstances making the sentence constitutionally excessive.

State of Louisiana Versus Kevin Johnson · filed 2023-08-09(A)(4)

Pursuant to La. R.S. 15:529.1 A(4), if the fourth or subsequent felony is such that, upon a first conviction the offender would be punishable by imprisonment for any term less than his natural life, then the offender shall be sentenced to a determinate term not less than the longest prescribed for a first conviction but in no event less than twenty years and not more than his natural life. Consequently, defendant was subject to an enhanced sentence of twenty years imprisonment to life imprisonment at hard labor without the benefit of probation or suspension of sentence. ... Accordingly, we find the trial court abused its discretion by deviating from the mandatory minimum sentence required by the Habitual Offender Law when sentencing defendant as a fourth-felony offender.

For a fourth felony offender, Section 15:529.1(A)(4)(a) mandates at least the longest sentence prescribed for a first conviction, so armed robbery requires a 99-year minimum and attempted first-degree murder a 50-year minimum; a downward departure requires evidence rebutting the presumption that the minimum is constitutional.

State of Louisiana v. Kevin Joseph Auguillard, Jr. · filed 2024-01-31(A)(4)(a)

Similarly, in this case, the Defendant presented no evidence to rebut the presumption of constitutionality given to La.R.S. 15:529.1(A)(4)(a). Because the record is devoid of any evidence to justify a departure from the minimum mandated sentences, and because the State proved Defendant was a fourth felony offender, La.R.S. 15:529.1(A)(4)(a) mandates Defendant receive the following minimum sentences: (1) for armed robbery, a sentence of ninety-nine years at hard labor, without the benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence, and (2) for attempted first degree murder conviction, a sentence of fifty years at hard labor, without the benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence.

Section 15:529.1 permits habitual-offender sentence enhancement for each felony committed after a prior felony conviction, including multiple convictions obtained on the same date even when they arise from one criminal act or episode.

State of Louisiana v. Williams · filed 2023-09-27(A)

[T]he language of La. R.S. 15:529.1 contains no prohibition against enhancing multiple sentences obtained on the same date arising out of a single criminal act or episode. In clear and unambiguous terms, the statute exposes a person who has previously been convicted of a felony to enhanced penalties for any felony committed after the date of the prior felony conviction. There is no statutory bar to apply the habitual offender law in sentencing for more than one conviction obtained on the same date, whether the convictions result from separate felonies committed at separate times or arise out of a single criminal act or episode.

Section 15:529.1(A)(4)(a) requires a sentence of 20 years to life for a defendant with four or more felony convictions, including at least one crime of violence.

State of Louisiana v. Grimsley · filed 2023-09-27(A)(4)(a)

Regarding a defendant with four or more felony convictions including at least one crime of violence, La. R.S. 15:529.1(A)(4)(a) commands that the sentence for the instant conviction be no less than 20 years and no more than life.

When the current fourth felony is a crime of violence but none of the predicate felonies are, both Subparagraphs (A)(4)(a) and (A)(4)(b) apply; their inconsistent sentencing ranges must be resolved in favor of the lesser penalty, so a life sentence is illegal.

State of Louisiana v. Riggs · filed 2024-10-02(A)(4)(a), (A)(4)(b)

La. R.S. 15:529.1(A)(4) contains three separate provisions for determining the applicable sentencing range; which provision (or provisions) applies depends on certain circumstances. The instant case falls under both La. R.S. 15:529.1(A)(4)(a) and La. R.S. 15:529.1(A)(4)(b). ... The instant offense, aggravated flight from an officer (La. R.S. 14:108.1), is a “crime of violence.” La. R.S. 14:2(B)(39). None of the predicate offenses are crimes of violence or sex offenses. Therefore, subparagraph (b), by its terms, applies and dictates a sentence of twenty years while, simultaneously, subparagraph (a) applies and dictates a sentencing range of a minimum of 20 years to a maximum of the remainder of the defendant’s natural life. ... It strikes the court as quite odd that the legislature would (under subparagraph (b)) be more lenient toward a defendant whose instant offense is a crime of violence—i.e., more lenient than toward defendants with no crimes of violence (subparagraph (a)). However, we find no “express legislative intent” that resolves the inconsistency. ... Therefore, Riggs’ sentence of life imprisonment is illegal, regardless of whether it is constitutionally prohibited as “cruel or unusual.”

Under § 15:529.1(G), a multiple-offender sentence is served at hard labor without probation or suspension of sentence, and parole restrictions follow the reference statute.

State of Louisiana Versus Oneil Gilbert, III · filed 2023-11-08(G)

La. R.S 15:529.1(G) provides that the multiple offender sentence was to be served “at hard labor without benefit of probation or suspension of sentence”. The restrictions on parole eligibility in multiple offender sentences under La. R.S. 15:529.1 “are those called for in the reference statute.” ... Pursuant to La. R.S. 14:95.1, defendant’s sentence as to count one was supposed to be imposed without the benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence.

Subsection (G) requires a multiple-offender sentence to be at hard labor without probation or suspension of sentence, while any parole restriction must come from the penalty provision for the underlying offense.

State of Louisiana Versus Raymond H Kimble III · filed 2024-05-08(G)

At the time of the underlying offense, La. R.S. 15:529.1(G) stated that any sentence imposed under the provisions of this section shall be at hard labor without the benefit of probation or suspension of sentence. When a defendant is sentenced as a multiple offender, it is the penalty provision for the underlying offense, La. R.S. 14:108.1 in this case, that imposes a parole restriction. ... In this case, the underlying offense does not provide for a restriction of parole.

Section 15:529.1(G) requires a habitual-offender sentence to be imposed without benefit of probation or suspension of sentence, but it does not itself impose a parole restriction.

State of Louisiana Versus Don Raines · filed 2024-12-18(G)

While La. R.S. 15:529.1(G) requires all enhanced sentences to be imposed without benefit of probation or suspension of sentence, it does not impose a parole restriction. Rather, when a defendant is sentenced as a habitual offender, it is the penalty provision of the underlying offense that imposes a parole restriction.

Section 15:529.1 requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt of prior felony convictions and the defendant’s identity, uses the law in effect when the offense was committed, and under subsection (C) applies a ten-year cleansing period.

State of Louisiana v. Smith · filed 2023-11-08(D)(1)(b), (A)(1), and (C)

It is well settled that the law in effect at the time of the offense is determinative of a defendant’s punishment, including for habitual offender proceedings. ... For the defendant to receive an enhanced penalty under La. R.S. 15:529.1, the State must prove prior felony convictions and then prove the defendant is the same person who committed the prior felonies. ... Both the identity and the prior conviction(s) must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. La. R.S. 15:529.1(D)(1)(b); ... La. R.S. 15:529.1(C), in effect in 2017, provided a ten-year cleansing period between the date of commission of the current offense (the attempted second degree murder offenses) and expiration of the maximum sentence or sentences of the previous conviction (aggravated battery), or between the expiration of the maximum sentences of each preceding conviction alleged in the bill and the date of commission of the following offenses. Additionally, “any period of parole, probation, or incarceration … shall not be included in the computation of any said ten-year periods [.]” ... In 2017, La. R.S. 15:529.1(A)(1) provided for imprisonment “for a determinate term no less than one-half the longest term and not more than twice the longest term prescribed for the first offense” where the second felony is one that would, as a first offense, be punishable by imprisonment for a term less than his natural life. Thus, the applicable sentencing range in 2017 was 25 to 100 years at hard labor without benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence.

Section 15:529.1(4)(b) supplies the applicable habitual-offender penalty provision, while subsection G requires hard labor without probation or suspension but does not itself eliminate parole when the reference statute does not do so.

State of Louisiana v. Swafford · filed 2024-04-03(4)(b); (G)

Additionally, the trial court is instructed to use the penalty provision set forth in La.R.S. 15:529.1(4)(b) for sentencing. ... Section G of La.R.S. 15:529.1 states that any habitual offender sentence must be served at “hard labor without benefit of probation or suspension[.]” The restriction of parole eligibility, however, is that which is provided for in the reference statute. None of the reference statutes for the underlying felonies at issue in the present case call for a restriction of parole benefits. Accordingly, when the case is remanded for resentencing, the trial court is instructed that it is not authorized to deny or restrict parole eligibility for any of the habitual offender sentences.

Subsection (A)(4)(a) requires a fourth-felony habitual offender whose underlying offense carries less than life imprisonment to receive a determinate sentence of at least 20 years and no more than natural life.

State of Louisiana v. Earnest Carr, III · filed 2024-05-22(A)(4)(a)

La. R.S. 15:529.1(A)(4)(a) sets forth the sentencing guidelines for a fourth-felony habitual offender when upon a first conviction the offender would be punishable by imprisonment for any term less than his natural life and states the person shall be sentenced to imprisonment for a determinate term not less than the longest prescribed for a first conviction but in no event less than 20 years and not more than his natural life.

Section 15:529.1(A)(1) sets the enhanced sentencing range for a second felony, subsection (G) requires the sentence to be without probation or suspension of sentence but does not bar parole, and subsection (D)(1)(a) requires advising the defendant of the habitual-offender allegations and hearing rights, with a failure potentially harmless when the State proves habitual-offender status by competent evidence.

State of Louisiana v. Smith · filed 2024-11-20(A)(1), (G), (D)(1)(a)

Although this is the maximum sentence allowed under La. R.S. 15:529.1(A)(1), considering the facts of this case, the sentence is not grossly out of proportion to the seriousness of the offense. The trial court did err in failing to impose this sentence without benefit of probation or suspension of sentence, as required by La. R.S. 15:529.1(G). ... La. R. S. 15:529.1(D)(1)(a) requires that the defendant be advised of the specific allegations contained in the habitual offender bill of information and his right to a formal hearing at which the State must prove its case. ... Although Defendant was not advised of his rights at the habitual offender hearing, this was harmless error. The state established Defendant’s habitual offender status by competent evidence, including the testimony of an expert in fingerprint identification and analysis, and Defendant did not testify at the hearing.

For a second habitual offender whose underlying felony carries a sentence of less than life, § 15.529.1(A)(1) sets imprisonment at one-third to twice the longest first-offense term, and § 15.529.1(G) requires the habitual-offender sentence to be served at hard labor.

State of Louisiana v. Dugar · filed 2024-11-27(G), (A)(1)

First, La.R.S. 15:529.1(G) required Defendant’s habitual offender sentences to be imposed at hard labor. Although the court minutes indicate the sentences were imposed to be served in the Louisiana Department of Corrections, the transcript does not so indicate. Thus, the sentences are illegally lenient. ... Additionally, Defendant was charged and sentenced as a habitual offender pursuant to La.R.S. 15:529.1(A)(1): ... Accordingly, the sentencing range for simple kidnapping when adjudicated as a second habitual offender is a minimum of 1.6 years and a maximum of 10. Defendant therefore received the maximum sentence.