Statute Annotations › Louisiana › La. Stat. Ann. § 14:30.1

La. Stat. Ann. § 14:30.1

Second degree murder: the cases that interpreted this section

Jurisdiction
Louisiana
Case notes
1,102
Cited in passing
1,285
Citing cases indexed
3,046
Case dates
1974–2026
Screened through
2026-06-29
Checked for later law changes
2026-10-02
Courts' treatment: live
No reviewed case has held this section invalid, preempted, superseded or repealed.
This reflects what the reviewed cases said, not legislative action: a later amendment or repeal by the legislature would not appear here unless a reviewed case discussed it.

2,387 citing cases reviewed of 3,046 in the citation index: 1,102 interpreted the section (annotated below), 1,285 cited it only in passing. Cases filed after 2026-06-29 may not have been reviewed yet.

Have a situation under La. Stat. Ann. § 14:30.1?

These notes show how courts have ruled. Ask about your specific facts and see which of these rulings apply, with citations you can check.

Later changes in law

Changes after the earliest notes below. A note stating a rule one of these changed is marked "Law changed since".

  • 1975-09-12 Acts 1975, No. 380 lengthened the no-parole portion of the life sentence from twenty to forty years for later offenses. source Source
  • 1976 Acts 1976, No. 657 removed the former specific-intent branch of second-degree murder while the 1976 scheme treated specific-intent killings as first-degree murder; the saving statute preserved liability for earlier offenses. Source
  • 1977 Acts 1977, No. 121 again covered unaggravated specific-intent killings in former § 14:30.1(B), alongside felony murder, with a forty-year no-parole period. source Source
  • 1978-09-08 Acts 1978, No. 796 deleted former subsection (B), temporarily returning unaggravated specific-intent killings to first-degree murder. source Source
  • 1979-06-29 Acts 1979, No. 74 restored specific-intent second-degree murder in subsection (A)(1) and replaced the forty-year parole bar with life imprisonment without parole, probation, or suspension for later offenses; current § 14:30(C) supplies the first-degree murder penalty. source source Source
  • 1997 Acts 1997, No. 563 added second-degree kidnapping as a felony-murder predicate. Source
  • 1997 Acts 1997, No. 899 added killings during cruelty to juveniles, without intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm, as former (A)(2)(b). Source
  • 2006-08-15 Acts 2006, No. 53 added second-degree robbery and terrorism to the felony-murder predicates and also placed cruelty to juveniles in the main predicate list. Source
  • 2008-06-25 Acts 2008, No. 451 deleted redundant cruelty-to-juveniles wording from (A)(2)(b) without removing cruelty to juveniles as a felony-murder predicate. Source
  • 2009-08-15 Acts 2009, No. 155 expanded the drug-death grounds in (A)(3) and (4) from Schedules I–II to Schedules I–V, including combinations. Source
  • 2012-06-25 Miller v. Alabama held mandatory life without parole unconstitutional for offenders under eighteen; juvenile homicide sentencing requires consideration of youth before a no-parole sentence. Source
  • 2013 Acts 2013, No. 239 added a juvenile parole-eligibility hearing under Code of Criminal Procedure art. 878.1 and eligibility after thirty-five years when the court granted parole eligibility. Source
  • 2015 Acts 2015, No. 184 updated the rape predicate names to first- and second-degree rape; the former aggravated and forcible rape references designate the same offenses. Source
  • 2017-08-01 Acts 2017, No. 277 made juveniles indicted for second-degree murder from August 1, 2017 through July 31, 2026 eligible for parole consideration after twenty-five years without an art. 878.1 hearing, while retaining a hearing route for earlier indictments. Source
  • 2017-11-01 Acts 2017, No. 280 codified a parole-consideration route after forty years for second-degree murders committed after July 2, 1973 and before June 29, 1979, subject to the statutory parole-panel vote. Source
  • 2025 Acts 2025, No. 343 added cruelty to the elderly and persons with infirmities as a felony-murder predicate. Source
  • 2025-06-08 Acts 2025, No. 169 added resisting a police officer with force or violence as a felony-murder predicate and added separate drug-death manslaughter grounds requiring a significant contribution to death. Source
  • 2026 Acts 2026, No. 120 added second-degree cruelty to the elderly and persons with infirmities as a felony-murder predicate and new (C), a rebuttable presumption of specific intent when a person points and fires a gun at another human being. Source
  • 2026-08-01 Acts 2026, No. 585 authorized an art. 878.1 hearing for juveniles indicted for second-degree murder on or after August 1, 2026 when the State timely seeks life without parole; without timely notice, their life sentence carries parole eligibility under § 15:574.4(G) after twenty-five years. Source

Constitutionality of enactment

Section 14:30.1(1) was validly enacted during the 1973 fiscal session because the session was extended by a three-fourths vote and the statute then received a majority vote for final passage.

State v. Reado · filed 1974-05-23(1)

Our decision in the instant case is that Act 111 of 1973 (La.R.S. 14:30.1(1)) is free of any constitutional infirmity although it did not receive a three-fourths vote on final passage. The procedure followed for its enactment was in full conformity with Article III, Sections 8 and 24, of the Constitution. It received a three-fourths vote to extend the session and a majority vote for final passage.
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Section 14:30.1 is constitutionally valid because it was enacted by a majority vote after the legislature properly extended the fiscal session to non-fiscal matters by a three-fourths vote.

State v. Wright · filed 1976-05-17

Defendant’s reliance upon Sullins is misplaced. In State v. Reado, 295 So.2d 440 (La.1974), we held that La.R.S. 14:30.1 was properly enacted into law in accordance with article 3, sections 8 and 24 of the 1921 Constitution. We stated in Reado that the 1921 Constitution, while it required a three-fourths vote of each house to extend a fiscal session to the consideration of non-fiscal matters, required only a majority vote for final passage of legislation. The 1973 legislative session extended the fiscal session to the consideration of non-fiscal matters by a three-fourths vote, and Act III received a majority vote in both houses. We therefore held in Reado that La.R.S. 14:30.1 was free of any constitutional infirmity.
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Section 14:30.1's authorization of life imprisonment at hard labor without parole, probation, or suspension of sentence does not violate equal protection merely because first-degree murder can carry the same penalty.

Parker v. Cain · filed 2006-08-09

Petitioner’s next claim is that his right to equal protection was violated because life imprisonment at hard labor without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence is a possible penalty for both second degree murder under La.Rev. Stat.Ann. § 14:30.1 and first degree murder under La.Rev.Stat.Ann. § 14:30. Petitioner’s equal protection argument simply makes no sense. The fact that the same penalty is a possibility under two different statutes in no way violates the Equal Protection Clause. Petitioner cites to no authority which holds otherwise, and this Court is aware of none.
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Mandatory life sentence and pardon eligibility

Law changed since Acts 1975, No. 380 (effective September 12, 1975) lengthened the former twenty-year no-parole period to forty years for later offenses; Acts 1979, No. 74 (effective June 29, 1979) ended ordinary parole eligibility for later second-degree murders. The earlier sentencing law remains relevant to offenses committed while it governed.

Section 14:30.1 requires a person convicted of second-degree murder to serve life imprisonment at hard labor, without eligibility for parole, probation, or suspension of sentence for twenty years, and this penalty does not encroach on the governor's pardon power.

State v. Ross · filed 1974-12-02

The argument of defendant is without merit for the reason that there is no encroachment on the power of the governor to pardon first offenders in the penalty provision of the second degree murder statute, La.R.S. 14:30.1, as amended in 1973. That statute mandates imprisonment "at hard labor for life" without the eligibility "for parole, probation or suspension of sentence for a period of twenty years." It makes no mention whatsoever of pardon; no restriction on the governor's powers as proscribed in article V, section 10 of the Louisiana Constitution in that regard is contained therein.
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Section 14:30.1's mandatory life sentence for second-degree murder does not violate the federal Constitution or the state constitutional prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment.

State v. Brooks · filed 1977-10-10

We find no merit in defendant's contention that the mandatory penalty prescribed by La.R.S. 14:30.1 violates the federal constitution. Nor are we persuaded that defendant's due process rights under our state constitution have been infringed. Furthermore, we note that this court has specifically upheld the penalty mandated in our second degree murder statute as not constituting cruel and unusual punishment. State v. Anderson, 315 So.2d 266 (La.1975).
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Section 14:30.1(B)'s mandatory life sentence is presumed constitutional, and a defendant must rebut that presumption to obtain relief as an excessive sentence.

State v. Jenkins · filed 2000-03-15(B)

When a trial judge determines a sentence from a carefully tailored penalty statute, such as La. R.S. 14:30.1(B), there is a strong presumption that the sentence is within constitutional parameters. Appellant has not succeeded in proving and the record does not clearly show that under the facts of this case the trial judge abused his sentencing discretion. ... In the present case, Louis Jenkins has not proven that the trial judge abused his discretion in imposing the mandatory life sentence. He has also not rebutted the presumption that the sentence is unconstitutionally excessive under the facts of this case. This assignment of error is without merit.
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Section 14:30.1 mandates a life sentence for a person convicted of second-degree murder.

State of Louisiana v. Dawn R. Hargrave · filed 2006-03-01

Defendant argues that her life sentence was excessive, despite the fact that it is statutorily mandated for second degree murder, pursuant to La.R.S. 14:30.1. ... Therefore, the sentence does not “shock the conscience,” and fits both the offender and the offense.
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Subsection (B) requires a mandatory life sentence without benefits for second degree murder, and that sentence is not unconstitutionally excessive.

State v. Brown · filed 2007-08-29(B)

Second degree murder requires a harsh mandatory sentence, but this is a harsh crime. La. R.S. 14:30.1(B). The argument that the mandatory life sentence for second degree murder is a violation of the prohibition against excessive punishment in the Louisiana Constitution has been repeatedly rejected. State v. Parker, 416 So.2d 545 (La.1982); State v. Roberson, 40,809 (La.App.2d Cir.4/19/06), 929 So.2d 789.
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Subsection (B) requires a second-degree-murder conviction to carry life imprisonment at hard labor without parole, probation, or suspension of sentence, subject to constitutional excessiveness review.

State v. Garner · filed 2010-08-18(B)

In addressing the mandatory sentence imposed by La. R.S. 14:30.1, this court has held that it is the legislature’s prerogative to determine the length of the sentence imposed for crimes classified as felonies, and the courts are charged with applying these punishments unless they are found to be unconstitutional. ... The claim that the mandatory life sentence for second degree murder is a violation of the prohibition against excessive punishment in the Louisiana Constitution has been repeatedly rejected. ... To rebut the presumption that the mandatory minimum sentence of La. R.S. 14:30.1 is constitutional, Garner must clearly and convincingly show that because of unusual circumstances this defendant is a victim of the legislature’s failure to assign sentences that are meaningfully tailored to the culpability of the offender, the gravity of the offense, and the circumstances of the case. ... Here, the jury found that Garner shot Chatman at the direction of his girlfriend after the two women squabbled over a vehicle. Thus, without provocation, he shot an unarmed victim three times. Garner’s impetuous actions demonstrate a callous disregard for human life. In these circumstances, Garner has failed to show clearly and convincingly that the imposed sentence is not meaningfully tailored to his culpability. Thus, assignment therefore has no merit.
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Subsection (B) mandates life imprisonment without parole, probation, or suspension of sentence for second-degree murder, while permitting constitutional-excessiveness review when unusual circumstances show the sentence is not meaningfully tailored.

State v. Vedol · filed 2013-03-13(B)

Defendant’s life sentence is mandatory under La. R.S. 14:30.1(B). It is presumed that a mandatory minimum sentence is constitutional. ... Nevertheless, even though defendant received the mandatory minimum sentence, that sentence may still be reviewed for constitutional excessiveness. ... To rebut the presumption of constitutionality, the defendant must show that: “[he] is exceptional, which in this context means that because of unusual circumstances this defendant is a victim of the legislature’s failure to assign sentences that are meaningfully tailored to the culpability of the offender, the gravity of the offense and the circumstances.”
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Subsection (B) requires a person convicted of second degree murder to serve life imprisonment without parole, probation, or suspension of sentence.

State of Louisiana v. Joseph Anton Chehardy, Jr. · filed 2013-05-01(B)

Regarding the life sentence imposed on the conviction for second degree murder, the conviction mandates a punishment of life imprisonment without the benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence. La.R.S. 14:30.1(B). ... In this case, Defendant makes no showing that he is exceptional and, therefore, entitled to a downward departure from the mandatory minimum sentence. The sentence is not illegal, grossly disproportionate to the severity of the offense, nor shocking to the sense of justice. This assignment of error is, therefore, without merit.
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Section 14:30.1(B) mandates a life sentence at hard labor without benefit of probation, parole, or suspension for second degree murder, subject to review for unconstitutional excessiveness.

State v. Bonilla · filed 2016-02-24(B)

First; we note that defendant’s life sentence is mandatory under La. R.S. 14:30.1(B).
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Section 14:30.1(B) requires a person convicted of second degree murder to receive life imprisonment at hard labor without parole, probation, or suspension of sentence.

State v. Farris · filed 2016-12-14(B)

The mandatory sentence for second degree murder is punishment by life imprisonment at hard labor without the benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence. La. R.S. 14:30.1(B). The argument that the mandatory life sentence for second degree murder is a violation of the prohibition against excessive punishment in the Louisiana Constitution has been repeatedly rejected.
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Subsection (B) requires a mandatory life sentence at hard labor for second degree murder.

State v. Magee · filed 2018-02-27(B)

Furthermore, the trial court lacked sentencing discretion in this case. The defendant received a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment at hard labor. See La. R.S. 14:30.1(B).
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Section 14:30.1 mandates life imprisonment at hard labor without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension for second-degree murder.

State v. Francois · filed 2018-03-14

The penalty for second degree murder is life imprisonment at hard labor, without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence. La. R.S. 14.30.1. ... Defendant fails to show by clear and convincing evidence that his particular circumstances are an exception to the constitutional application of the mandatory sentence. ... Accordingly, considering the totality of the facts and circumstances of this case, the record does not support the conclusion that the sentence makes no measurable contribution to acceptable goals of punishment.
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Subsection (B) requires a person convicted of second degree murder to receive life imprisonment at hard labor without the benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence.

State of Louisiana v. Rotrick Deon Ivory · filed 2023-01-11(B)

The mandatory sentence for second degree murder is punishment by life imprisonment at hard labor without the benefit of parole, probation or suspension of sentence. La. R.S. 14:30.1(B). Louisiana appellate courts have repeatedly rejected the argument that the mandatory life sentence for second degree murder is a violation of the prohibition against excessive punishment in the Louisiana Constitution. ... The mandatory sentence of life imprisonment for a conviction of second degree murder is presumed to be constitutional, and Defendant failed to demonstrate that he is an “exceptional” defendant for whom a downward departure from the statutory minimum sentence is required.
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Subsection (B) requires a person convicted of second degree murder to receive life imprisonment at hard labor without probation, parole, or suspension of sentence, subject to an exceptional-circumstances downward departure.

State of Louisiana v. Howard · filed 2026-01-08(B)

In Louisiana, offenders convicted of second degree murder “shall be punished by life imprisonment at hard labor without benefit of probation, parole or suspension of sentence.” La. R.S. 14:30.1(B). The life sentence imposed for second degree murder under this statute is mandatory. As such, the district court lacked any discretion to deviate below the mandatory minimum unless, under exceptional circumstances, Defendant is entitled to a downward departure.
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A defendant charged with second degree murder is entitled, upon request, to a jury instruction on its mandatory life sentence.

State v. Peddy · filed 1990-11-07

Because the defendant was entitled to have *1038the jurors informed of the penalty provision, and the trial court refused to do so, defendant’s conviction must be overturned.
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Section 14:30.1(B) mandates life imprisonment at hard labor without parole, probation, or suspension of sentence for second degree murder; a defendant seeking a departure must show exceptional circumstances.

State of Louisiana v. Sizemore · filed 2013-12-18(B)

The sentence for second degree murder is life imprisonment at hard labor without the benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence. ... Having offered no evidence that he is exceptional for the purposes of sentencing, we find no merit to his excessive sentence claim with regard to his conviction for second degree murder.
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Whether an unborn child is a “human being”

Section 14:30.1(1) does not make it murder to cause an unborn child to be born dead, because the statute's reference to a human being covers only a person born alive and existing independently of the mother.

State v. Gyles · filed 1975-05-29(1)

We reiterate that the narrow question before us is whether the crime of "murder," as defined by the Louisiana legislature, also proscribes conduct which causes an unborn child to be born dead. In accord with the uniform and undisputed authority, we hold that, until the legislature provides otherwise, the crime of "murder" enacted by our legislature does not proscribe such conduct.
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Second-degree murder—sentence restrictions

Section 14:30.1 requires a second-degree-murder sentence to deny parole, probation, and suspension of sentence for the specified statutory period.

State v. Sneed · filed 1975-06-23

A condition of the defendant's sentence is that, in accordance with La.R.S. 14:30.1, he is not eligible "for parole, probation, or suspension of sentence" for a specified period. Tr. 27. Despite the complaint in brief, the sentence is not subject to amendment as infringing on the executive's right to pardon, as was the sentence in State v. Spotville, 308 So.2d 763 (1975).
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Section 14:30.1(1) does not require the state to prove a motive for second-degree murder; it requires proof that the accused had the specific intent to commit the crime.

State v. Johnson · filed 1975-12-08(1)

"Motive" is not an element of second degree murder as defined in La.R.S. 14:30.1(1). The state is not obligated to prove that the accused had a cause or reason to commit the crime of second degree murder; it is required to prove that the accused had the "specific intent"[3] to commit the crime.
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Section 14:30.1's various statutory ways of committing second-degree murder need not all be set out in the jury charge when the defendant is charged using the specific indictment form; the charge should include the statute's full text.

State v. Progue · filed 1977-10-10

Defendant was charged under the specific indictment form for attempted second degree murder listed in La.Code Crim.P. art. 465; therefore, it was unnecessary to set forth the various ways in which the crime could be committed under the statute. The general charge properly included the full text of the crime of second degree murder as set forth in La.R.S. 14:30.1.
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Law changed since Acts 1978, No. 796 (effective September 8, 1978) deleted the former offense-defining subsection (B); current subsection (B) sets the life sentence, while current (A)(1) defines specific-intent second-degree murder.

Section 14:30.1(B) defines second degree murder as an unaggravated, specific-intent homicide that otherwise would be first degree murder, thereby removing that conduct from the first degree murder definition; only offense-based aggravating circumstances with which the killing is accomplished are incorporated.

State v. Payton · filed 1978-08-18(B)

As we construe the new statutory scheme, however, it may be applied constitutionally by strictly adhering to the statutory language and by severing one part which would allow the introduction of impermissibly prejudicial evidence prior to the jury's determination of guilt or innocence. ... By defining second degree murder as an unaggravated, specific intent homicide, the legislature clearly intended by implication to remove this type of conduct from the definition of first degree murder and to redefine the capital offense as a specific intent homicide accomplished with a statutorily prescribed aggravating circumstance.
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Law changed since Acts 1979, No. 74 restored specific-intent second-degree murder as an alternative to felony murder, ending the temporary felony-only definition.

Section 14:30.1 defined second-degree murder to include a killing committed while perpetrating or attempting an enumerated felony, even without an intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm.

State v. Booker · filed 1980-07-07

The problem of this case is that at the time of the offense in question first degree murder was defined as a homicide with specific intent to kill or to greatly harm, whereas second degree murder was defined exclusively as a killing when the offender is engaged in the perpetration of a major felony, even though he has no intent to kill or to greatly harm. ... Since the definition of the crime of attempted first degree murder did not include the element that the offender must be engaged in perpetration of a felony at the time of the offense, an essential element of second degree murder in this case, it is plain from the definitions of the two crimes that all elements of the lesser offense were not necessarily included in the greater offense.
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Section 14:30.1's specific-intent second-degree murder offense is a lesser and included offense of first-degree murder when the applicable definitions make all of its elements part of the first-degree offense.

State v. Davis · filed 1980-05-19

Under the applicable definitions above, first degree murder includes all the elements (killing with specific intent) of the first type of second degree murder. The amending of the indictment to charge the lesser offense of second degree murder did not prejudice the defendant's constitutional right to have the prosecution for that crime instituted by a grand jury. When the grand jury considered the evidence relevant to the elements of first degree murder and decided to indict defendant with that crime, it necessarily considered the evidence relevant to all the essential elements of specific intent second degree murder.
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Section 14:30.1 defines second degree murder to include a killing during the perpetration or attempted perpetration of listed felonies, even without intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm.

State v. Stewart · filed 1981-06-22

Through the combined charge of armed robbery and attempted second degree murder in the bill of information, the defendant was fully notified of every element of the crime of second degree murder, thus, his due process right to be informed of the charges against him was not violated.
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Section 14:30.1 defines second-degree murder as a homicide committed during the perpetration or attempted perpetration of an enumerated felony, even without specific intent to kill; its wording permits an attempted second-degree murder charge.

State Ex Rel. Elaire v. Blackburn · filed 1982-11-29

La. R.S. 14:30.1 defined (and still defines) second degree murder as a homicide committed in the course of an enumerated felony, "even though" the offender had no specific intent to kill. Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that use of the words "even though" (rather than "when") signified a legislative intent for the statute to apply when the homicide was either intentional or nonintentional.
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Section 14:30.1(1) defines second degree murder as killing a human being with specific intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm.

State v. Noble · filed 1983-01-10(1)

Second degree murder is the killing of a human being when the offender has a specific intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm. La.R.S. 14:30.1(1). Specific criminal intent is that state of mind which exists when the circumstances indicate that the offender actively desired the prescribed criminal consequences to follow his act or failure to act. La.R.S. 14:10(1). Although intent is a question of fact, it need not be proven as a fact, it may be inferred from the circumstances of the transaction. La. R.S. 15:445.
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Section 14:30.1 defines second-degree murder as the killing of a human being with specific intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm.

State v. Thomas · filed 1983-02-23

Second degree murder is the killing of a human being "[w]hen the offender has a specific intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm." La. R.S. 14:30.1. Moreover, second degree murder is a legislatively authorized responsive verdict to first degree murder. La.Code Crim.P. art. 814(A)(1). We consider that in the instant case all the elements of the lesser and included offense of second degree murder have been proved beyond a reasonable doubt.
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Section 14:30.1 requires a person convicted of second-degree murder to receive life imprisonment at hard labor without benefit of probation, parole, or suspension.

State v. Trevathan · filed 1983-05-17

Defendant received the mandatory sentence under La. R.S. 14:30.1, life imprisonment at hard labor, without benefit of probation, parole, or suspension. ... The sentence meted out to defendant, i.e., life imprisonment without benefit of probation, suspension, or parole, is statutorily mandated and has been held not to constitute cruel and unusual punishment, State v. Graham, 422 So.2d 123 (La.1982), State v. Parker, 416 So.2d 545 (La.1982).
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Section 14:30.1(1) defines second-degree murder as killing a human being with specific intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm.

State v. MacK · filed 1983-06-28(1)

The elements of the offense the state must prove are: (1) a killing of a human being occurred; (2) the defendant did the killing; and (3) the defendant had a specific intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm.
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Section 14:30.1 defines second-degree murder as killing a human being with specific intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm, or while perpetrating or attempting specified felonies, including robbery.

State v. Wilkerson · filed 1984-03-26

The defendant was tried for second degree murder. La.R.S. 14:30.1 provides: ... Second degree murder is the killing of a human being: ... (1) When the offender has a specific intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm; or (2) When the offender is engaged in the perpetration or attempted perpetration of aggravated rape, aggravated arson, aggravated burglary, aggravated kidnapping, aggravated escape, armed robbery, or simply robbery, even though he has no intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm. ... Applying this sufficiency evaluation to the evidence in the instant case, we conclude that any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime of second degree murder proved beyond a reasonable doubt.
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Section 14:30.1(1) requires proof of a killing and specific intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm; when self-defense is raised, the State must also prove that the defendant did not act in self-defense, but it need not prove the absence of provocation.

State v. Willis · filed 1984-11-07(1)

Defendant herein was charged with second degree murder, a violation of La.R.S. 14:30.1: “Second degree murder is the killing of a human being: “(1) When the offender has a specific intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm; ...” Thus, the State was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Willis killed Stewart, and that he specifically intended to kill or do great bodily harm to Stewart. As the defendant raised the issue of self-defense the State was also required to prove that the defendant did not act in self-defense.
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Section 14:30.1 treats a killing as second-degree murder when it occurs while the offender is engaged in the perpetration or attempted perpetration of an enumerated felony, including aggravated kidnapping.

State v. James · filed 1984-11-20

Review of the record indicates that there was sufficient evidence from which the jury could have concluded that defendant was engaged in the perpetration or attempted perpetration of aggravated kidnapping at the time Theresa Caswell was shot and killed.
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Section 14:30.1(1) defines second-degree murder as killing a human being with a specific intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm.

State v. Stewart · filed 1984-11-26(1)

La.R.S. 14:30.1(1) defines second degree murder as "the killing of a human being ... [w]hen the offender has a specific intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm." This finding was essential to a conviction of first degree murder and necessarily was made in this case by the jury in reaching its verdict. The record clearly supports that finding and a conviction of second degree murder.
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Section 14:30.1 defines second-degree murder as killing a human being with the specific intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm, and that intent may be inferred from the circumstances and the defendant's actions.

State v. Arnold · filed 1985-03-06

Second degree murder is the killing of a human being where the offender has the specific intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm. La.R.S. 14:30.1. Since specific criminal intent is a state of mind, it need not be proved as a fact but may be inferred from the circumstances of the case and actions of the defendant. State v. Kahey, 436 So.2d 475 (La.1983). La.R.S. 15:445. From the record it appears that the state presented sufficient evidence to convince any rational trier of fact that every element of the crime of second-degree murder was proved beyond a reasonable doubt.
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Section 14:30.1(1) defines second degree murder to include killing a human being with specific intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm.

State v. Segura · filed 1985-03-06(1)

The defendant was charged with second degree murder, a violation of La.R.S. 14:30.1. "Second degree murder is the killing of a human being: (1) When the offender has a specific intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm;..." Thus the State was required to prove (1) that Jack Segura did in fact kill Todd Broussard; (2) that Segura acted with the specific intent to kill Broussard or to inflict great bodily harm upon him; and (3) that defendant did not act in self-defense.
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Section 14:30.1 defines second-degree murder as killing a human being with specific intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm, or during specified felonies, and prescribes life imprisonment without parole, probation, or suspension.

State v. Collier · filed 1985-08-12

La.R.S. 14:30.1 defines second degree murder as follows: "Second degree murder is the killing of a human being: (1) When the offender has a specific intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm; or (2) When the offender is engaged in the perpetration or attempted perpetration of aggravated rape, aggravated arson, aggravated burglary, aggravated kidnapping, aggravated escape, armed robbery, or simple robbery, even though he has no intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm. "Whoever commits the crime of second degree murder shall be punished by life imprisonment at hard labor without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence."
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Section 14:30.1(1) requires proof that the defendant killed a human being with specific intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm.

State v. Brunner · filed 1985-10-08(1)

The elements of second degree murder pertinent to this case are set forth as the killing of a human being when the offender has a specific intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm. ... After viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, we find any rational trier of fact could have found beyond a reasonable doubt the essential elements for the crime of second degree murder.
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Section 14:30.1 makes the penalty for second-degree murder a mandatory term of life imprisonment without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence.

State of Louisiana v. McLendon · filed 2023-11-22

The penalty for second degree murder is a mandatory term of life imprisonment without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence.
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Section 14:30.1 makes life imprisonment at hard labor without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence mandatory for a second-degree murder conviction.

State of Louisiana v. Reaux · filed 2024-03-14

For a conviction of second degree murder, the sentence of life imprisonment at hard labor without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence is mandatory. La. R.S. 14:30.1.
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Section 14:30.1(B) mandates life imprisonment at hard labor without parole, probation, or suspension of sentence for second degree murder, and a downward departure requires a clear and convincing showing that the defendant is exceptional.

State of Louisiana v. Traveon R. Cannon · filed 2024-10-02(B)

The mandatory sentence for second degree murder is punishment by life imprisonment at hard labor without the benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence. La. R.S. 14:30.1(B). Louisiana appellate courts have repeatedly rejected the argument that the mandatory life sentence for second degree murder is a violation of the prohibition against excessive punishment in the Louisiana Constitution.
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Section 14:30.1's mandatory life sentence for second-degree murder, as applied to this juvenile defendant with parole eligibility after twenty-five years, was not constitutionally excessive.

State of Louisiana v. Honore · filed 2025-05-21

The Louisiana Supreme Court has long held that the mandatory life sentence for second degree murder is not unconstitutionally excessive. See State v. Parker, 416 So.2d 545, 552 (La. 1982); State v. Cofer, 2016-871 (La. App. 3 Cir. 4/15/17), 216 So.3d 313. ... In the instant case, the record supports Appellant’s sentence of life imprisonment with the possibility of parole after twenty-five years. ... Accordingly, the record does not reflect that the trial court abused its broad discretion when failing to depart from the sentence prescribed by law.
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Section 14:30.1(B) requires a second-degree-murder sentence to be imposed without the benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence.

State of Louisiana Versus Viusqui J. Perez-Espinosa · filed 2025-09-24(B)

Neither the transcript, the sentencing minute entry, nor the uniform commitment order (“UCO”) reflects that the sentence was imposed with a restriction of benefits as required by La. R.S. 14:30.1(B). These restrictions are self-activating and require no corrective action, according to La. R.S. 15:301.1. Nevertheless, to ensure the accuracy of the record, we remand the matter for correction of the sentencing minute entry and UCO to show that the defendant’s sentence be without the benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence.
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Subsection (B) requires a person convicted of second-degree murder to serve life imprisonment at hard labor without parole, probation, or suspension of sentence.

State of Louisiana v. Cockerhem · filed 2026-02-25(B)

The mandatory sentence for second degree murder is punishment by life imprisonment at hard labor without the benefit of parole, probation or suspension of sentence. La. R.S. 14:30.1(B). Louisiana appellate courts have repeatedly rejected the argument that the mandatory life sentence for second degree murder is a violation of the prohibition against excessive punishment in the Louisiana Constitution.
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Subsection (B) requires a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment at hard labor without parole, probation, or suspension of sentence for second degree murder.

State of Louisiana v. Green · filed 2026-04-08(B)

The mandatory sentence for second degree murder is punishment by life imprisonment at hard labor without the benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence. La. R.S. 14:30.1(B).
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Subsection (B) requires a person convicted of second degree murder to receive life imprisonment at hard labor without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence.

State v. Kight · filed 2019-06-05(B)

Under La.R.S. 14:30.1, second degree murder has only one possible constitutional sentence-mandatory life imprisonment without the benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence. ... However, because Defendant herein was sentenced pursuant to La.R.S. 14:30.1 which requires a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment at hard labor, Defendant's sentence is determinate and the failure to state such is harmless error.
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Section 14:30.1(B) mandates life imprisonment at hard labor without parole, probation, or suspension of sentence for second-degree murder, and the mandatory sentence is not constitutionally excessive on this record.

State of Louisiana v. Coward · filed 2020-05-20(B)

Defendant was convicted of second degree murder, which carries a mandatory penalty of life imprisonment. La.R.S. 14:30.1(B). ... The supreme court and this court have previously held the mandatory life sentence for second degree murder is not unconstitutionally excessive. ... In light of the facts of the offense and the above-cited cases, we find the trial court did not abuse its discretion when imposing the maximum sentence. Thus, Defendant’s sentence is not excessive.
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Second-degree murder—elements and charging

Section 14:30.1(1) defines second-degree murder as killing a human being with specific intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm.

State v. Quinn · filed 1985-11-19(1)

Second degree murder is the killing of a human being when the offender has a specific intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm. ... The foregoing circumstances and the inferences arising therefrom are sufficient to support the conclusions that, beyond a reasonable doubt, the defendant possessed the specific intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm required for second degree murder, did not act in self-defense and did not act in heat of passion.
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Section 14:30.1 requires proof that a human being was killed and that the offender specifically intended to kill or inflict great bodily harm.

State v. Lambertus · filed 1986-01-15

In a second degree murder prosecution the state must prove there was a killing of a human being and the offender had a specific intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm. R.S. 14:30.1.
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Law changed since Acts 1978, No. 796 (effective September 8, 1978) deleted the former offense-defining subsection (B); current subsection (B) sets the life sentence, while current (A)(1) defines specific-intent second-degree murder.

Subsection (B) defines second-degree murder as an unaggravated specific-intent homicide.

State ex rel. Burnham v. Blackburn · filed 1986-03-07(B)

Nevertheless, the error in the trial court’s charge did not impair the reliability of the jury’s verdict that relator had committed an unprovoked specific intent homicide, not a manslaughter occasioned by the victim’s homosexual advances, as argued by counsel in his closing remarks. That determination was fully supported by the evidence at trial, and corresponds to one definition of murder applicable at the time of the offense and responsive to the indictment in this case: second degree murder, or an unaggravated specific intent homicide, La.R.S. 14:30.1(B) (1977).
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Section 14:30.1(1) defines second-degree murder as killing a human being with specific intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm.

State v. Rosiere · filed 1986-05-20(1)

Second degree murder is the killing of a human being when the offender has a specific intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm. La.R.S. 14:30.1(1).
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Section 14:30.1(2) makes a killing second-degree murder when the offender is engaged in the perpetration or attempted perpetration of armed robbery, even without intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm.

State v. Farris · filed 1986-06-25(2)

La.R.S. 14:30.1 defines second degree murder as follows: "§ 30.1 Second degree murder "Second degree murder is the killing of a human being: ... "(2) When the offender is engaged in the perpetration or attempted perpetration of aggravated rape, aggravated arson, aggravated burglary, aggravated kidnapping, aggravated escape, armed robbery, or simple robbery, even though he has no intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm." ... "A person who is a principal in an armed robbery is criminally responsible for any killing which results from its perpetration or attempted perpetration. See State v. Johnson, 365 So.2d 1267 (La.1978). ... "This evidence meets the Jackson standard of review."
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Section 14:30.1 defines second-degree murder to include a killing committed with specific intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm.

State v. Chevalier · filed 1984-09-26

La.R.S. 14:30.1 defines second degree murder, in pertinent part, as: "the killing of a human being when the offender has a specific intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm." ... Thus, we cannot question the credibility of Marshall's testimony that the defendant shouted his intention to kill Caliste, and viewing that direct evidence of specific intent in a light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational juror could have found that, beyond a reasonable doubt, the defendant had formed the requisite intent to commit second degree murder.
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Section 14:30.1(1) defines second degree murder as killing a human being with the specific intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm.

State v. Kennington · filed 1987-10-14(1)

Second degree murder is the killing of a human being when the offender has a specific intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm. La.R.S. 14:30.1(1).
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Section 14:30.1(2) treats a killing committed during the perpetration or attempted perpetration of armed robbery, first degree robbery, or simple robbery as second degree murder even without an intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm.

State v. Laird · filed 1989-09-01(2)

Second degree murder is the killing of a human being "when the offender is engaged in the perpetration or attempted perpetration of ... armed robbery, first degree robbery, or simple robbery, even though he has no intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm." LSA-R.S. 14:30.1(2).
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Section 14:30.1(A)(1) covers killings committed with specific intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm, which may be inferred from circumstances and conduct, and subsection (B) mandates life imprisonment without parole, probation, or suspension.

State v. Rose · filed 1992-09-23(A)(1), (B)

La.R.S. 14:30.1 A(1) provides that second degree murder is the killing of a human being when the offender has a specific intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm. Specific intent is a state of mind and need not be proved as a fact; it may be inferred from the circumstances of the transaction and the actions of the defendant. ... The penalty for second degree murder is a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment at hard labor without benefit of parole, probation or suspension of sentence. R.S. 14:30.1 B. The trial court exercises none of the wide sentencing discretion available in other cases. Instead, the Legislature has prescribed the penalty for this crime. It would be a useless act for the judge to articulate reasons for imposing sentence when he has no choice but to impose a statutorily-mandated maximum penalty. He does not abuse his discretion by declining to do so.
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Section 14:30.1(A)(1) defines second degree murder as killing a human being with the specific intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm.

State v. Williams · filed 1996-04-10(A)(1)

La.R.S. 14:30.1(A)(1) defines second degree murder as the killing of a human being when the offender has the specific intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm. While there was no eyewitness to the shooting, the defendant himself admitted he handled the gun. Only the defendant and the victim were in the bedroom at the time of the shooting. The coroner testified that the victim died of a single gunshot wound to the head. Dr. Newman, the coroner, and Officer Leary, an expert in firearms examination, stated that the stippling marks on the victim's head revealed that the gun was held approximately two and one-half feet to three and one-half feet from the defendant. The defendant's son, Milton, Jr., testified that his father admitted to shooting his mother, but claimed it was an accident. The defendant told Milton that he was turning the gun when it discharged and struck the victim. Milton, Jr. discounted the defendant's story, stating that the shooting was not an accident. The gun was not cocked when he had seen the gun earlier. The defendant had to cock the gun. Officer Leary's testimony that the weapon could not be discharged accidently because the gun has an internal hammer block supports Milton, Jr.'s statement. The only way to discharge the weapon is to pull the trigger.
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Section 14:30.1(A)(1) defines second-degree murder to include killing a human being when the offender has the specific intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm.

State v. Caldwell · filed 1996-08-21(A)(1)

Second degree murder, as applicable to these facts, is defined as the killing of a human being when the offender has the specific intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm or when the offender is engaged in the perpetration or attempted perpetration of armed robbery, even though he has no intent to kill or cause great bodily harm. La.R.S. 14:30.1(A)(1) & (2).
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Section 14:30.1(A)(1) covers killings with specific intent, while § 14:30.1(A)(2) covers killings during armed robbery or aggravated burglary even without intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm.

State v. Walker · filed 1996-10-04(A)(1), (A)(2)

Second degree murder, as it pertains to this case, is defined as the killing of a human being (1) when the offender has a specific intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm, or (2) when the offender is engaged in the perpetration or attempted perpetration of armed robbery or aggravated burglary, even though he has no intent to kill or cause great bodily harm. ... Because we find sufficient evidence to support the conviction on either felony murder theory, we pretermit discussion of the specific intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm.
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Section 14:30.1 defines second-degree murder as killing a human being with the specific intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm.

State v. Smith · filed 1996-03-27

Second degree murder is the killing of a human being when the perpetrator has the specific intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm. La. 14:30.1. Specific intent is the state of mind "when the circumstances indicate that the offender actively desired the prescribed criminal consequences to follow his act or failure to act."
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Section 14:30.1(B) requires a person convicted of second-degree murder to be sentenced to life imprisonment at hard labor without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence.

State v. Hart · filed 1997-03-07(B)

La.R.S. 14:30.1, in pertinent part, defines second degree murder as the killing of a human being when the offender is engaged in the perpetration of an aggravated burglary. ... Accordingly, we remand this case to the trial court for entry of judgment of guilty of second degree murder and sentencing of defendant to life imprisonment at hard labor without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence in accordance with La. R.S. 14:30.1(B).
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Section 14:30.1(A)(1) defines second-degree murder as killing a human being with the specific intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm.

State v. Reeves · filed 1997-06-04(A)(1)

To obtain a conviction, the State must prove the elements of the crime charged beyond a reasonable doubt. Defendant was convicted of second degree murder, which is defined as the lulling of a human being when the offender has a specific intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm. La.R.S. 14:30.1(A)(1). ... After reviewing the trial transcript, we do not find proof of provocation sufficient to reduce defendant’s conviction from second degree murder to manslaughter. Although some evidence supports the conclusion that Davis was a homosexual and may have had designs on defendant, there is scant evidence to support a determination that homosexual advances by Davis provoked defendant to shoot him. Defendant’s conflicting accounts of why he shot the victim make it difficult to determine his true motivation for the act. This assignment of error lacks merit.
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Section 14:30.1 mandates a life sentence for second-degree murder; because the court did not suspend the sentence, omission of the phrase “or suspension of sentence” did not require resentencing or correction of the record.

State v. Hampton · filed 1996-12-11

The omitted phrase is part of the mandatory sentencing language of La. R.S. 14:30.1. ... A correction of the record is unnecessary. The district court had the sole authority to suspend the sentence, but did not do so. La.Code Crim.P. art. 893. Therefore, there is no practical necessity for correction of the record.
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Section 14:30.1 defines second-degree murder as killing a human being with specific intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm.

State v. Pardon · filed 1997-10-15

Second-degree murder is defined in La. R.S. 14:30.1 as the killing of a human being when the offender has a specific intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm.
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Section 14:30.1 defines second-degree murder to include a killing committed while the offender is perpetrating an aggravated burglary, even without specific intent to kill.

State v. Ortiz · filed 1997-10-21

La. R.S. 14:30.1 in pertinent part defines second degree murder as the killing of a human being when the offender is engaged in the perpetration of an aggravated burglary, even though there was no specific intent to kill.
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Section 14:30.1(A)(1) defines second degree murder as killing a human being when the offender has the specific intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm.

State v. Tipton · filed 1997-12-29(A)(1)

The applicable definition of second degree murder in this case is the killing of a human being "[w]hen the offender has a specific intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm[.]" La. R.S. 14:30.1(A)(1).
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Section 14:30.1(A) defines second degree murder as killing a human being with specific intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm.

State v. McHenry · filed 1998-04-09(A)

La. R.S. 14:30.1(A) provides that second degree murder is the killing of a human being when the offender has a specific intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm.
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Section 14:30.1 defines second degree murder as the killing of a human being when the offender has a specific intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm.

State v. Butler · filed 1998-06-24

Second degree murder is defined by La. R.S. 14:30.1 as "[t]he killing of a human being ... when the offender has a specific intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm." State v. Allen, 94-1941 (La.App. 1st Cir. 11/9/95), 664 So.2d 1264, writ denied 95-2946 (La.3/15/96), 669 So.2d 433.
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Section 14:30.1 defines second degree murder to include a killing committed during a drive-by shooting even without an intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm.

State v. Jordan · filed 1998-09-16

The trial court's jury instructions defining the possible verdicts were not erroneous as the instructions followed the definitions of the offenses provided in the statutes. ... Second degree murder is defined as "the killing of a human being ... [w]hen the offender has a specific intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm; or ... [w]hen the offender is engaged in the perpetration or attempted perpetration of ... drive-by shooting ... even though he has no intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm." La. R.S. 14:30.1.
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Section 14:30.1 defines second-degree murder to include a killing committed during the perpetration or attempted perpetration of armed robbery even without an intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm.

State v. DeSilva · filed 1998-12-09

The defendant was charged with second degree murder and convicted of manslaughter. Second degree murder is defined in part by La. R.S. 14:30.1 as “the killing of a human being: (1) When the offender has a specific intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm; or (2)(a) When the offender is engaged in the perpetration or the attempted perpetration of ... armed robbery ... even though he has no intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm.” ... Therefore, we conclude that hsthe State presented sufficient evidence to support the initial charge of second degree murder, and thus under Elaire and Bowman, the evidence supports the lesser included verdict of manslaughter.
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Section 14:30.1 treats a killing committed while the defendant is engaged in the perpetration or attempted perpetration of an armed robbery as second-degree murder, and the prosecution may establish liability by proving the defendant was an active participant as a principal.

State v. Ratcliff · filed 1999-02-23

In this case, defendant was convicted as a principal to the crime of second degree murder. Thus, in this case the state had to prove that the victim was killed while defendant was engaged in the perpetration or attempted perpetration of an armed robbery. ... Based on the entirety of the testimony and the evidence presented by the state a rational trier of fact could have found that defendant was an active participant to an attempted perpetration of an armed robbery at the time the victim was killed.
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Second-degree murder—felony-murder alternatives

Section 14:30.1(B) mandates life imprisonment at hard labor without parole, probation, or suspension of sentence for a second-degree murder conviction.

State v. Richardson · filed 1999-03-03(B)

La. R.S. 14:30.1(B) provides that a defendant convicted of second degree murder "shall be punished by life imprisonment at hard labor without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence." ... The trial court did not err by sentencing the defendant according to the statute. This assignment lacks merit.
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Section 14:30.1(A)(1) defines second-degree murder as killing a human being with specific intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm.

State v. Armstrong · filed 1999-09-22(A)(1)

Second degree murder, pursuant to La. R.S. 14:30.1(A)(1), is defined as the killing of a human being when the offender has a specific intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm.
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Section 14:30.1 requires proof that the defendant's conduct was a proximate, contributing cause or substantial factor in the victim's death, but not that it was the sole proximate cause, and it mandates life imprisonment without benefits for a second-degree-murder conviction.

State v. Stone · filed 2000-05-15(A)(1)

The state is not required to show that the defendant’s conduct was the sole proximate cause of the victim’s death in order to satisfy the causation element of this offense. ... Sufficient proof is presented where it is shown that the defendant’s actions were a “contributing cause” or a “substantial factor” in the resulting death of the victim. ... Whether the terms “substantial factor” or “clearly contributing cause” are used, these standards are used interchangeably and therefore, the basic determination is whether the defendant’s act was a proximate cause of the victim’s death.
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Section 14:30.1 makes second-degree murder punishable by mandatory life imprisonment at hard labor without parole, probation, or suspension of sentence.

State v. Clem · filed 2000-11-01

The defendant was convicted of second degree murder, a violation of La. *770 R.S. 14:30.1, which carries a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment at hard labor, without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence. ... The assertion that the mandatory life sentence for second degree murder is a violation of the prohibition against excessive punishment in the Louisiana Constitution has been repeatedly rejected. ... Further, failing to articulate reasons for sentence under La.C.Cr.P. art. 894.1 when imposing a mandatory life sentence is not error.
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Section 14:30.1 defines second-degree murder as a killing committed with specific intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm.

State v. Musgrove · filed 2000-12-15

Second degree murder is a killing that occurs when the offender has a specific intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm. La. R.S. 14:30.1. The gravamen of the crime of attempted murder, whether first or second degree, is the specific intent to kill and the commission of an overt act tending toward the accomplishment of that goal.
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Section 14:30.1 mandates a life sentence at hard labor without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence for second degree murder.

State v. Carter · filed 2001-02-21(B)

The defendant received a life sentence without benefits as mandated by La. R.S. 14:30.1(1). ... Similarly, in the case at bar, we find no indication that the trial court abused his discretion in imposing the mandated sentence under La. R.S. 14:30.1.
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Section 14:30.1 defines second-degree murder to include a killing committed with specific intent or during the perpetration or attempted perpetration of armed or simple robbery, and it requires a mandatory life sentence for the offense.

State v. McNeal · filed 2001-04-04(1), (A), (B)

La. R.S. 14:30.1 provides, in pertinent part, that second degree murder is the killing of a human being: (1) When the offender has a specific intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm; or (2)(a) When the offender is engaged in the perpetration or attempted perpetration of ... armed robbery, ... or simple robbery, even though he has no intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm. The record shows that the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, was sufficient to prove that Defendant committed the second degree murder of Mr. Smith under La. R.S. 14:30.1(1). Specific intent is defined as that state of mind which exists when the circumstances indicate that the offender actively desired the prescribed criminal consequences to follow his act or failure to act. ... In any event, a finding of intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm is unnecessary when the human being is killed and the offender is engaged in the perpetration or attempted perpetration of armed robbery or simple robbery. La. R.S. 14:30.1(A). ... Consequently, the evidence in the record is sufficient to support Defendant's conviction of second degree murder, even without a showing of specific intent to kill or cause great bodily harm. This assignment of error, therefore, is without merit.
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Section 14:30.1 defines second degree murder as killing a human being when the offender specifically intends to kill or inflict great bodily harm.

State v. Camese · filed 2001-07-11

Second degree murder is defined as the "killing of a human being ... [w]hen the offender has a specific intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm." La. R.S. 14:30.1. Thus, a conviction for attempted second degree murder requires a showing that the defendant had the specific intent to kill and committed an act tending to accomplish that purpose.
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Section 14:30.1 defines second-degree murder as a killing committed with specific intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm, or during the perpetration of an enumerated felony, and the court found the evidence sufficient under the specific-intent alternative.

State v. Johnson · filed 2001-12-07

Second degree murder is the killing of a human being when the offender has the specific intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm or when the offender is engaged in *361the perpetration of an enumerated felony. La. R.S. 14:30.1. ... The evidence supports the jury’s findings that the defendant knew that Powell intended to kill Coleman. ... Therefore, the evidence shows that the defendant had the specific intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm upon Coleman.
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Subsection (B) makes a second-degree-murder conviction punishable by mandatory life imprisonment at hard labor without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence.

State v. Bunley · filed 2001-12-12(B)

In this case, the defendant was convicted of second degree murder, a violation of La. R.S. 14:30.1, which carries a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment at hard labor without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence. ... When a trial judge determines a sentence from a carefully tailored penalty statute, such as La. R.S. 14:30.1(B), there is a strong presumption that the sentence is within constitutional parameters. ... Although the trial judge in this case did not articulate the basis for sentencing the defendant to life imprisonment, the record fully supports the sentence.
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Section 14:30.1(A)(1) defines second-degree murder as killing a human being when the offender has the specific intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm, and the court held the evidence proved those essential elements.

State v. Williams · filed 2001-12-28(A)(1)

Second degree murder is defined, in pertinent part, by La.R.S. 14:30.1 A(1) as "the killing of a human being ... `[w]hen the offender has a specific intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm....'" ... When all of the evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the state, we find any rational trier of fact could have concluded beyond a reasonable doubt, and to the exclusion of every reasonable hypothesis of innocence, that the state established each essential element of second degree murder and that defendant did not kill the victim in self-defense.
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Section 14:30.1 defines second-degree murder as killing a human being with specific intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm, and its mandatory life sentence is presumed constitutional absent a clear and convincing showing of exceptional circumstances.

State v. Robinson · filed 2002-04-17

Defendant was convicted of second degree murder, defined in pertinent part by La. R.S. 14:30.1 as the killing of a human being when the offender has a specific intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm. ... When a trial court imposes a sentence in accordance with a carefully tailored penalty statute, such as the statute applicable in the instant case, La. R.S. 14:30.1, there is a strong presumption that the sentence is constitutional. ... Defendant has failed to clearly and convincingly show that the mandatory life sentence for second degree murder provided by La. R.S. 14:30.1 was not meaningfully tailored to his culpability, the gravity of the offense and the circumstances of this case.
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Section 14:30.1 defines second-degree murder as a killing committed with specific intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm and requires life imprisonment at hard labor without parole, probation, or suspension of sentence.

State v. Nash · filed 2002-06-14

Second degree murder is the killing of a human being when the offender has a specific intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm. La. R.S. 14:30.1. ... The defendant was convicted of second degree murder, a violation of La. R.S. 14:30.1. This statute imposes a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment at hard labor, without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence. ... The argument that the mandatory life sentence for second degree murder is a violation of the prohibition against excessive punishment in the Louisiana Constitution has been repeatedly rejected.
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Section 14:30.1 permits a second-degree-murder conviction either for specific intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm or for a killing during the perpetration or attempted perpetration of an enumerated crime, even without that specific intent.

State v. Debrow · filed 2002-02-27

Thus, to convict the defendant of second degree murder, the jury must have determined either that he had specific intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm or that he was engaged in the perpetration or attempted perpetration of one of the enumerated crimes, even though he had no specific intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm.
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Section 14:30.1(B) requires a person convicted of second degree murder to receive life imprisonment at hard labor without benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence.

State v. Paddio · filed 2002-12-11(B)

After the Defendant was convicted of second degree murder, the trial court imposed the mandatory sentence of life imprisonment at hard labor, without the benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence as required by La.R.S. 14:30.1(B). ... A mandatory life sentence is not per se unconstitutional. ... Accordingly, the trial court did not err in denying Defendant's motion to reconsider sentence, and the sentence imposed upon the Defendant is not constitutionally excessive.
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Section 14:30.1(A)(1) defines second-degree murder in part as killing a human being with specific intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm, and that intent may be inferred from the defendant's actions.

State v. Finch · filed 2003-07-23(A)(1)

La. R.S. 14:30.1(A)(1) defines second-degree murder in part as the killing of a human being when the offender has a specific intent to kill or inflict great *683bodily harm. ... The defendant’s intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm can be inferred from the defendant’s actions. ... The evidence was clearly sufficient to support the verdict.
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Section 14:30.1 defines second-degree murder as the killing of a human being when the offender has a specific intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm.

State v. Fields · filed 2004-06-23

Second-degree murder is the killing of a human being when the offender has a specific intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm. La. R.S. 14:30.1.
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Section 14:30.1 makes the sentence for second-degree murder mandatory life imprisonment at hard labor, without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence.

State v. Bonner · filed 2004-12-22

The defendant was convicted of second degree murder, a violation of La. R.S. 14:30.1. This statute imposes a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment at hard labor, without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence.
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Section 14:30.1 includes a killing committed during the perpetration or attempted perpetration of an enumerated felony as second-degree murder even without specific intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm.

State v. Jenkins · filed 2005-03-17

This second degree murder conviction could have been proven in either of the following ways: 1. That Jenkins shot and killed the victim with specific intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm; or *12792. That JenMns shot and killed the victim while engaged in the perpetration or attempted perpetration of any one of a list of enumerated felonies (including armed robbery, first degree robbery, and simple robbery3), even though there is no proof of the specific intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm. La. R.S. 14:30.1.
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Section 14:30.1(A)(1) supports a conviction for specific-intent second-degree murder as a responsive lesser-included offense to first-degree murder, and Subsection (B) requires life imprisonment at hard labor without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence.

State v. Higgins · filed 2005-04-01(A)(1), (B)

Because we find that the evidence subjected to the Jackson standard supports a conviction for specific intent second degree murder as provided in La. R.S. 14:30.1(A)(1), which is responsive to a charge of first degree murder, we vacate the defendant's conviction for first degree murder and sentence of death. Since, as will be seen hereinafter, we find no other meritorious assignments of error, we modify the judgment of guilty of first degree murder, render a judgment of guilty of second degree murder, and remand the case to the district court for sentencing on the modified judgment as set forth in La. R.S. 14:30.1(B).
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Subsection (B) requires a mandatory life sentence at hard labor without parole, probation, or suspension of sentence for second-degree murder, subject to a clearly and convincingly demonstrated exceptional case warranting downward departure.

State v. Gill · filed 2006-05-17(B)

Even if the defendant had preserved these arguments for appeal, where there is a constitutional mandatory sentence, there is no need for the trial court to justify, under Article 894.1, a sentence it is legally required to impose. In addition, to rebut the presumption that the mandatory sentence is constitutional, the defendant must clearly and convincingly show that because of unusual circumstances this defendant is a victim of the legislature's failure to assign sentences that are meaningfully tailored to the culpability of the offender, the gravity of the offense, and the circumstances of the case. In this case, the defendant has not sufficiently demonstrated he is the "exceptional" defendant for which downward departure from the statutory minimum sentence is required.
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Section 14:30.1(A) defines second-degree murder to include a killing committed with specific intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm, or certain felony murders without that intent; the court held the evidence supported attempted second-degree murder where the defendant deliberately fired a gun at the victim from close range.

State v. Templet · filed 2006-08-16(A)(1), (A)(2)(a)

Louisiana Revised Statute 14:30.1(A) defines second degree murder, in pertinent part, as the killing of a human being: (1) when the offender has a specific intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm; or (2)(a) is engaged in the perpetration or attempted perpetration of . . . aggravated burglary . . . armed robbery . . . even though the offender has no intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm. ... Regardless of whether any of the shots fired by the defendant actually hit Byrd, it is well settled that "[a] specific intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm can be inferred from a shooting which occurs at a fairly close range." ... We are satisfied that the evidence presented, viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, proved beyond a reasonable doubt and to the exclusion of every reasonable hypothesis of innocence, all of the elements of attempted second degree murder and the defendant's identity as the perpetrator of that offense.
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Subsection B requires a mandatory life sentence at hard labor, without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence, for second degree murder.

State v. LAVIOLETTE · filed 2006-09-26(B)

La. R.S. 14:30.1 B requires that a sentence for second degree murder must be served at hard labor. The commitment indicates Defendant was sentenced to life imprisonment at hard labor. We note that in the transcript of the sentencing, the trial judge expressly stated that the sentence was mandatory as prescribed by law, but neglected to state that the sentence was to be served at "hard labor." If there were some discretion allowed by the applicable sentencing statute, such that some confusion arose over how the sentence was to be served, the failure to indicate whether the sentence was to be served at "hard labor" would be an impermissible indeterminate sentence. However, here, since Defendant was sentenced pursuant to La. R.S. 14:30.1, which requires a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment at hard labor, without the benefit of parole, probation or suspension, the sentence is determinate. The failure by the trial judge to state that the sentence be served at hard labor, where the commitment accurately reflects the sentence to be served, is not an error requiring corrective action. State v. Norman, 05-794, (La.App. 5th Cir.3/14/06), 926 So.2d 657.
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Section 14:30.1(1) defines second-degree murder as killing a human being when the offender has the specific intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm.

State v. Stringer · filed 2006-12-06(1)

The defendant was convicted of second degree murder, defined in pertinent part, by La.R.S. 14:30.1, which states that "[s]econd degree murder is the killing of a human being: (1)[w]hen the offender has a specific intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm."
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Section 14:30.1(A)(2) makes a killing second-degree murder when the offender is perpetrating or attempting one of the listed felonies, including assault by drive-by shooting, even without specific intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm.

State of Louisiana Versus Edwar Lopez AKA "Mantequilla" · filed 2024-08-21(A)(2)

Felony second degree murder is defined by La. R.S. 14:30.1(A)(2) as the killing of a human being when the offender is engaged in the perpetration or attempted perpetration of one of several enumerated felonies, including assault by drive-by shooting. One need not possess specific intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm to commit second degree felony murder. Rather, under the felony murder theory, the State need only prove the commission of the underlying felony or the attempt thereof. Id.
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Section 14:30.1(A)(2) defines second-degree felony murder as killing a human being during the perpetration or attempted perpetration of armed robbery, even without an intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm.

State of Louisiana v. Fruge · filed 2025-04-11(A)(2)

Under the theory of felony murder, second degree murder is defined as “the killing of a human being… [w]hen the offender is engaged in the perpetration or attempted perpetration of … armed robbery… even though he has no intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm.” La. R.S. 14:30.1(A)(2).
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Second-degree murder—sentencing requirements

Section 14:30.1(A)(1) defines second-degree murder as killing a human being with specific intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm.

State v. Richards · filed 2007-05-02(A)(1)

Second degree murder is the killing of a human being when the offender has specific intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm. La.R.S. 14:30.1(A)(1).
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Section 14:30.1 defines second-degree murder to include a homicide committed during the perpetration or attempted perpetration of a drive-by shooting, even without intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm.

State v. Ross · filed 2007-08-29

Relative to these facts, second degree murder is a homicide committed with the specific intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm, or when the offender is engaged in the "perpetration or attempted perpetration of . . . [a] drive-by shooting . . ., even though he has no intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm." La. R.S. 14:30.1. ... Viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, both the direct evidence and the conclusions that can reasonably be inferred from the circumstances are sufficient for a rational trier of fact to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant was guilty of every essential element of the crime of attempted second degree murder, including the specific intent to kill.
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Section 14:30.1 makes life imprisonment mandatory for second-degree murder, and that mandatory punishment is not cruel and unusual.

State v. Smith · filed 2007-10-31

The Defendant was convicted of second degree murder and sentenced to the mandatory term of life imprisonment. La.R.S. 14:30.1. Louisiana courts have consistently held that a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment for second degree murder does not constitute cruel and unusual punishment. ... Therefore, we find that the Defendant's life sentence is not excessive.
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Section 14:30.1(B) requires a person convicted of second-degree murder to receive life imprisonment at hard labor without parole, probation, or suspension of sentence, subject to constitutional challenge.

State v. Adams · filed 2007-11-02(B)

Under La. R.S. 14:30.1(B), a person convicted of second-degree murder shall be punished by life imprisonment at hard labor without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence. Courts are charged with applying a statutorily mandated punishment unless it is unconstitutional. State v. Dorthey, 623 So.2d 1276, 1278 (La. 1993). Indeed, it is incumbent on the defendant to rebut the presumption that a mandatory minimum sentence is constitutional by "clearly and convincingly" showing that: [he] is exceptional, which in this context means that because of unusual circumstances this defendant is a victim of the legislature's failure to assign sentences that are meaningfully tailored to the culpability of the offender, the gravity of the offense, and the circumstances of the case. State v. Johnson, 97-1906, p. 8 (La. 3/4/98), 709 So.2d 672, 676. ... The defendant's sentence of life imprisonment at hard labor is the mandatory minimum under the statute and, thus, is presumed constitutional. It is therefore incumbent upon the defendant to rebut this presumption. Based upon our review of the record in this case, we do not find that the defendant has clearly and convincingly shown that she is exceptional.
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Section 14:30.1(B) requires a person convicted of second degree murder to serve life imprisonment at hard labor without parole, probation, or suspension of sentence.

State v. Beaner · filed 2007-12-05(B)

Beaner was convicted on two counts of second degree murder. The mandatory sentence for second degree murder is punishment by life imprisonment at hard labor without benefit of parole, probation or suspension of sentence. La. R.S. 14:30.1(B). The argument that the mandatory life sentence for second degree murder is a violation of the prohibition against excessive punishment in the Louisiana Constitution has been repeatedly rejected.
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Section 14:30.1 defines second degree murder to include a killing committed with specific intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm.

State v. Jenkins · filed 2008-01-09

Second degree murder is "the killing of a human being: (1) When the offender has a specific intent' to kill or to inflict great bodily harm." La. R.S. 14:30.1. ... The evidence presented by the state, through the testimony of the two eyewitnesses, was sufficient to establish that the defendant's actions in driving the truck into the parking lot and striking the victim were intentional. The jury was provided with ample testimony and evidence from which it could infer that the defendant — by her actions of accelerating, swerving, and then hitting the victim — intended to kill or inflict great bodily harm against the victim.
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Law changed since Acts 1975, No. 380 (effective September 12, 1975) lengthened the former twenty-year no-parole period to forty years for later offenses; Acts 1979, No. 74 (effective June 29, 1979) ended ordinary parole eligibility for later second-degree murders. The earlier sentencing law remains relevant to offenses committed while it governed.

At the relevant time, § 14:30.1 required a person convicted of second degree murder to serve at least 20 years of a life sentence without eligibility for parole, probation, or suspension of sentence.

State v. Thomas · filed 2008-01-11

Although 1973 La. Acts 111, § 4 specifically provided that "[a]ll laws or parts of laws in conflict herewith are hereby repealed," the sentencing provisos in La. R.S. 14:30.1 and La.C.Cr.P. art. 893 did not, in fact, conflict but were complementary, the former providing that a defendant convicted of second degree murder would have to serve at least 20 years of his life sentence without eligibility for parole, probation, or suspension of sentence, and the latter providing that in any case he would have to serve the entire term of imprisonment without benefit of suspension of sentence or probation once his sentence became executory.
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Section 14:30.1(A) permits a second-degree murder conviction for a killing committed during a drive-by shooting even without intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm, and a principal may be convicted even when a companion fired the fatal shot.

State v. Stewart · filed 2008-05-07(A)

The crime of second degree murder is set forth in La. R.S. 14:30.1(A), which provides in pertinent part: Second degree murder is the killing of a human being (1) when the offender has a specific intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm; or (2) when the offender is engaged in the "perpetration or attempted perpetration of . . . [a] drive-by shooting . . ., even though he has no intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm." ... The Brown ruling therefore rests on the proposition that a defendant who is a principal in a drive-by shooting can be convicted of second degree felony murder even though the fatal shot was fired by a companion acting in concert with the defendant in the commission of the shooting. Moreover, in this case, even though none of the Suburban co-conspirators in the drive-by shooting intended to harm the victim, our felony murder statute allows for a conviction "even though he has no intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm." The elements of felony second degree murder having been sufficiently established, Stewart's first assignment of error is without merit.
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Section 14:30.1 defines second-degree murder to include a killing committed while the offender is perpetrating or attempting armed robbery.

State of Louisiana v. Jones · filed 2008-12-10(2)(a)

Second degree murder, in applicable part, is defined as the “killing of a human being: (1) When the offender has a specific intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm; or (2)(a) When the offender is engaged in the perpetration or attempted perpetration of . . . .armed robbery” La.R.S. 14:30.1. ... The evidence in this case was sufficient for the jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that Defendant robbed and shot to death Gregory Fontenot.
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Section 14:30.1(A)(1) defines second degree murder as killing a human being with specific intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm, and the court applied that definition to find the requisite intent and causation from the victim's injuries.

State v. McCray · filed 2009-05-13(A)(1)

Second degree murder as applicable to the present case is defined in La. R.S. 14:30.1(A)(1) as the killing of a human being when the offender has a specific intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm. ... Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, it is clear from the nature and extent of the injuries sustained by the victim that the state convincingly showed the requisite intent and that the multiple blows to the head caused the victim’s death.
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Section 14:30.1(A)(1) defines second-degree murder as killing a human being with specific intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm.

State v. Lewis · filed 2009-05-26(A)(1)

Second degree murder, as it pertains to this case, is defined as the killing of a human being “[w]hen the offender has the specific intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm[.]” La.R.S. 14:30.1(A)(1).
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Section 14:30.1(A)(1) defines second degree murder as killing a human being with the specific intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm.

State v. Morris · filed 2009-09-11(A)(1)

Second degree murder is the killing of a human being when the offender has a specific intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm. La. R.S. 14:30.1(A)(1).
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Section 14:30.1(A)(1) defines second-degree murder as killing a human being when the offender has the specific intent to kill or cause great bodily harm.

State v. Johnson · filed 2009-09-16(A)(1)

“the killing of a human being: l)[w]hen the offender has a specific intent to kill or cause great bodily harm.... ”
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Section 14:30.1(A) defines second-degree murder as killing a human being when the offender has the specific intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm.

State of Louisiana v. Malcolm James Simon AKA Malcolm Simon AKA Malcolm J. Simon · filed 2009-12-09(A)

Second degree murder, in pertinent part, is defined as “the killing of a human being: (1) When the offender has a specific intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm.” La.R.S. 14:30.1(A). We find that Defendant’s actions exhibited the specific intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm on the victim.
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Law changed since Miller v. Alabama (June 25, 2012) barred mandatory life without parole for offenders under eighteen; juvenile homicide sentencers must be able to consider youth before imposing that punishment.

Section 14:30.1 defines second-degree murder to include a killing with specific intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm, or a killing during listed felonies without that intent, and the court treated the resulting life-without-parole sentence as mandatory for a juvenile charged as an adult and convicted of the offense.

State v. Kelly · filed 2010-08-11(A)(1)-(2)

La. R.S. 14:30.1 states in pertinent part: A. Second degree murder is the killing of a human being: (1) When the offender has a specific intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm; or (2) When the offender is engaged in the perpetration or attempted perpetration of aggravated rape, forcible rape, aggravated arson, aggravated burglary, aggravated kidnapping, second degree kidnapping, aggravated escape, assault by drive-by shooting, armed robbery, first degree robbery, second degree robbery, simple robbery, cruelty to juveniles, second degree cruelty to juveniles, or terrorism, even though he has no intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm. ... Accordingly, we find that the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Defendant was guilty of second degree murder. ... The mandatory life sentence without parole for convictions under La. R.S. 14:30.1 has been repeatedly upheld against constitutional challenges. ... Louisiana statutory law requires the imposition of the mandatory life term, as specified by the legislature, for juveniles who are charged as adults and convicted of homicide. ... because the sentence imposed was mandatory under La. R.S. 14:30.1, the trial court was not required to articulate reasons for imposing the sentence.
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Section 14:30.1 defines second-degree murder as a killing with specific intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm and requires life imprisonment without parole, probation, or suspension of sentence.

State v. Jones · filed 2010-08-11B

Second degree murder is the killing of a human being when the offender has a specific intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm. La. R.S. 14:30.1. ... The mandatory sentence for second degree murder is punishment by life imprisonment at hard labor without benefit of parole, probation or suspension of sentence. La. R.S. 14:30.1 B. The argument that the mandatory life sentence for second degree murder is a violation of the prohibition against excessive punishment in the Louisiana Constitution has been repeatedly rejected.
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Section 14:30.1(A)(1) defines second-degree murder as killing a human being with specific intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm, and an elaborate scheme plus two close-range shots can support that finding.

State of Louisiana v. Marinello · filed 2010-10-06(A)(1)

The jury convicted the defendant of second degree murder, defined at La.R.S. 14:30.1(A)(1) as: “the killing of a human being . . . [w]hen the offender has a specific intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm[.]” ... With regard to the State’s burden of proof as to specific intent under La.R.S. 14:30.1, certainly the circumstances of the offense support the jury’s determination. Evidence was presented as to an elaborate scheme for the perpetration of the offense and two shots were fired at a close range.
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Section 14:30.1(B) requires a person convicted of second degree murder to receive life imprisonment at hard labor without parole, probation, or suspension of sentence; the trial court need not justify this mandatory sentence under the ordinary sentencing guidelines.

State v. Horn · filed 2010-11-03(B)

La. R.S. 14:30.1(B) provides: Whoever commits the crime of second degree murder shall be punished by life imprisonment at hard labor without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence.
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Section 14:30.1 does not require the State to produce the murder weapon to prove second degree murder.

State of Louisiana v. Sarpy · filed 2010-12-08

It is well settled that there is nothing in the second degree murder statute that requires the State to produce the murder weapon in order to meet its burden of proof at trial.
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Section 14:30.1(B) makes second-degree murder punishable by life imprisonment at hard labor without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence.

State of Louisiana v. Morris · filed 2011-05-04(B)

Under La.R.S. 14:30.1, the crime of second degree murder is punishable “by life imprisonment at hard labor without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence.” La.R.S. 14:30.1(B).
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Section 14:30.1(A)(1) defines second-degree murder to include killing a human being with specific intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm.

State of Louisiana v. Williams · filed 2011-06-01(A)(1)

Second degree murder is defined as “the killing of a human being: (1) When the offender has a specific intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm[.]” La.R.S. 14:30.1(A)(1). ... Defendant’s intent to inflict at least great bodily harm is exhibited by the severity of the injuries.
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Section 14:30.1 defines second-degree murder as killing a human being with specific intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm, or while perpetrating or attempting specified felonies even without that intent.

State v. Moore · filed 2011-05-18

La. R.S. 14:30.1 provides, in pertinent part: ... A. Second degree murder is the killing of a human being: ... (1) When the offender has a specific intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm; or ... |17(2) When the offender is engaged in the perpetration or attempted perpetration of ... armed robbery, first degree robbery ... [or] simple robbery ... even though he has no intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm. ... Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, the evidence presented at trial clearly supported Defendant’s second degree murder conviction.
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Section 14:30.1 defines second-degree murder as killing a human being with specific intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm.

State v. Hardy · filed 2011-10-05

Second degree murder is defined as the killing of a human being “[w]hen the offender has a specific intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm.” La.R.S. 14:30.1.
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Section 14:30.1(A) defines second-degree murder to include a killing committed with specific intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm, or a killing committed during the perpetration or attempted perpetration of an enumerated felony even without that intent.

State v. Turner · filed 2012-03-27(A)

Second Degree Murder, La. R.S. 14:30.1(A), is the killing of a human being when the offender (1) has specific intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm or (2) is engaged in the perpetration or attempted perpetration of armed robbery (and other listed felonies) even though he has no intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm.
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Section 14:30.1 treats attempted second degree murder under Paragraph (A)(1) as requiring specific intent to kill, while Paragraph (A)(2) defines a felony-murder theory; an attempted second degree murder conviction is not based on an underlying felony.

State v. Martin · filed 2012-05-02(A)(1), (A)(2)

The gravamen of attempted second degree murder is the specific intent to kill and the commission of an overt act tending toward the accomplishment of that goal. La. R.S. 14:27 and 14:30.1; See State v. Jarman, 445 So.2d 1184, 1189 (La.1984); State v. Barnett, 96-2050 (La.App. 1st Cir.9/23/97), 700 So.2d 1005, 1009. Although the statute for the completed crime of second degree murder allows for a conviction based on “specific intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm,” La. R.S. 14:30.1, attempted second degree murder requires specific intent to kill. State v. Bishop, 2001-2548 (La.1/14/03), 835 So.2d 434, 437. ... Inconsistent with the felony murder theory of La. R.S. 14:30.1(A)(2), the crime of attempted second degree murder requires the specific intent to kill. Bishop, 835 So.2d at 437; State v. Butler, 322 So.2d 189, 192 (La.1975). Thus, the crime of attempted second degree murder is not based on an underlying felony.
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Second-degree murder—constitutional sentencing limits

Section 14:30.1(A)(2) defines second degree felony murder to include a killing during the perpetration or attempted perpetration of an enumerated felony, and the State need prove the underlying felony rather than a specific intent to kill; subsection (B) requires the mandatory life sentence, subject to constitutional-excessiveness review.

State v. Cammatte · filed 2012-09-11(A)(2), (B)

Second degree murder is defined by La. R.S. 14:30.1(A)(2) as the killing of a human being when the offender is engaged in the perpetration or attempted perpetration of one of several enumerated felonies, including aggravated burglary. ... One need not possess specific intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm to be a principal to second degree felony murder. ... Rather, under the felony murder doctrine, the State need only prove the commission of the underlying felony or the attempt thereof. ... First, we note that defendant’s life sentence is mandatory under La. R.S. 14:30.1(B). ... Nevertheless, even though defendant received the mandatory minimum sentence, that sentence may still be reviewed for constitutional excessiveness.
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Section 14:30.1 defines second-degree murder as killing a human being when the offender has specific intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm.

State v. Bone · filed 2012-09-11

Defendant’s charge — second degree murder — is defined as the killing of a human being when the offender has specific intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm.
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Section 14:30.1(A)(1) defines second degree murder as killing a human being with the specific intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm.

State v. Madrid · filed 2012-12-11(A)(1)

Defendant was charged with and convicted of second degree murder in violation of La. R.S. 14:30.1. Second degree murder is defined as the killing of a |7human being when the offender has a specific intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm. La. R.S. 14:30.1(A)(1). Specific intent is that state of mind which exists when the circumstances indicate that the offender actively desired the prescribed criminal consequences to follow his act or failure to act.
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Section 14:30.1(A)(2) makes second-degree murder applicable when a killing occurs during the perpetration or attempted perpetration of aggravated arson, even without intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm.

State v. Grady · filed 2013-01-16(A)(2)

La. R.S. 14:30.1 provides: A. Second degree murder is the killing of a human being: (1) When the offender has a specific intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm; or (2) When the offender is engaged in the perpetration or attempted perpetration of ... aggravated arson ... even though he has no intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm. ... The evidence is thus sufficient to prove that defendant committed the second degree murder of both victims by virtue of his commission of aggravated arson.
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Subsection (B) requires a second-degree-murder sentence of life imprisonment without benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence.

State v. Gilmore · filed 2013-02-08(B)

Next, the mandatory life sentence imposed was illegally lenient. The sentence was to be served without benefit of probation, parole or suspension of sentence pursuant to La. R.S. 14:30.1(B). However, the sentencing transcript reflects that the sentences at hard labor were to be served without benefit of parole or suspension of sentence.
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Subsection (B) mandates life imprisonment at hard labor without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence for second degree murder.

State v. Parker · filed 2013-04-10(B)

The statutorily mandated sentence for second degree murder is punishment by |3life imprisonment at hard labor without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence. La. R.S. 14:30.1(B). Where there is a mandatory sentence there is no need for the trial court to justify a sentence it is legally required to impose.
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Under Subsection (A)(2), a killing during the attempted perpetration of armed robbery supports second-degree felony murder without specific intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm, and Subsection (B) requires a mandatory life sentence.

State of Louisiana v. Kato · filed 2013-05-15(A)(2), (B)

Attempted armed robbery will support a second degree murder conviction. La.R.S. 14:30.1(A)(2). ... In the present case, as the State notes in its brief and the trial court noted at sentencing, a conviction for second degree murder carries a mandatory life term. La.R.S 14:30.1(B).
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Section 14:30.1(B) mandates life imprisonment at hard labor without parole, probation, or suspension for second-degree murder, but that mandatory scheme cannot be applied to impose a juvenile life sentence without a Miller-specific sentencing review.

State v. Fletcher · filed 2013-04-10(B)

However, considering the fact that the trial court imposed the mandatory sentence pursuant to La. R.S. 14:30.1, we find that we must vacate the defendant’s sentence and remand this case so that the trial court may conduct a more specific and thorough review of the factors discussed in Miller, supra, in addition to the factors considered in La. C. Cr. P. art. 894.1.
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Section 14:30.1 requires a person convicted of second degree murder to receive life imprisonment at hard labor without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence.

State v. Wills · filed 2013-09-25

Defendant was convicted of second degree murder, a violation of La. R.S. 14:30.1. This statute requires a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment at hard labor, without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence.
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Section 14:30.1 requires a person convicted of second degree murder to receive life imprisonment at hard labor without parole, probation, or suspension of sentence.

State of Louisiana v. Perkins · filed 2013-11-06

Louisiana Revised Statutes 14:30.1 mandates a sentence of life imprisonment and provides, in pertinent part, “[w]hoever commits the crime of second degree murder shall be punished by life imprisonment at hard labor without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence.” ... The sentence is mandatory and not grossly disproportionate to the crime. Thus, the trial court did not abuse its vast discretion in sentencing Defendant to the mandatory sentence required by law.
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Section 14:30.1 requires a person convicted of second degree murder to receive life imprisonment at hard labor without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence.

State v. Perkins · filed 2013-11-06

RLouisiana Revised Statutes 14:30.1 mandates a sentence of life imprisonment and provides, in pertinent part, “[wjhoever commits the crime of second degree murder shall be punished by life imprisonment at hard labor without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence.”
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Section 14:30.1 mandates life imprisonment at hard labor without parole, probation, or suspension of sentence for a conviction of second degree murder.

State v. Stewart · filed 2014-01-31

For those offenders convicted of second degree murder in Louisiana, La. R.S. 14:30.1 mandates a sentence of life imprisonment at hard labor without the benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence.
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Section 14:30.1(A)(1) defines second-degree murder as a killing committed with specific intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm, and subsection (B) requires a mandatory life sentence at hard labor without parole, probation, or suspension of sentence.

State of Louisiana v. Diggs · filed 2014-02-12(A)(1) (B)

In this instance, “[s]econd degree murder is the killing of a human being . . . [w]hen the offender has a specific intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm[.]” La.R.S. 14:30.1. Defendant contends that the evidence was insufficient to prove the elements of second degree murder because Mr. Wright’s description of the shooter in his first statement as a “short black male” did not match the description of the six-feet-tall Defendant. ... Defendant’s arguments lack merit. ... The jury obviously found the testimony of three eyewitnesses to be credible. We agree with the jury’s findings. ... A conviction for second degree murder leads to a mandatory life sentence at hard labor without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of benefits. La.R.S. 14:30.1(B). ... Here, there is nothing “exceptional” about Defendant other than the brutality and intentionality with which he took a human life. ... Whether Defendant’s sentence was “tailored” for him, this court finds every reason to conclude that the punishment fits the crime.
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Section 14:30.1 makes second-degree murder punishable by mandatory life imprisonment at hard labor without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence.

State v. Williams · filed 2014-04-23

Mr. Williams was convicted of second degree murder, a violation of La. R.S. 14:30.1, which carries a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment at hard labor, without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence. ... The assertion that the mandatory life sentence for second degree murder is a violation of the prohibition against excessive punishment in the Louisiana Constitution has been rejected.
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Section 14:30.1(A)(2) includes a killing committed while the offender is perpetrating or attempting armed robbery as second degree murder, even without intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm.

State v. Bowman · filed 2014-04-23(A)(2)

La. R.S. 14:30.1 provides: A. Second degree murder is the killing of a human being: ... (2) When the offender is engaged in the perpetration or attempted perpetration of aggravated rape, forcible rape, aggravated arson, aggravated burglary, aggravated kidnapping, second degree kidnapping, aggravated escape, assault by drive-by shooting, armed robbery, first degree robbery, second degree robbery, simple robbery, cruelty to juveniles, second degree cruelty to juvenile, or terrorism, even though he has no intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm. (Emphasis added.) ... These testimonies sufficiently establish that the victim was killed during the perpetration of an armed robbery, which are necessary elements for a conviction of second degree murder.
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For purposes of the charged offense, § 14:30.1 requires proof that the defendant killed a human being with specific intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm.

State v. Adams · filed 2014-05-14

Second degree murder includes the killing of a human being when the offender has a specific intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm. La. R.S. 14:30.1.
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Section 14:30.1 mandates life imprisonment at hard labor without parole, probation, or suspension of sentence for a second-degree murder conviction.

State v. Griffin · filed 2014-06-25

For those offenders convicted of second degree murder in Louisiana, La. R.S. 14:30.1 mandates a sentence of life imprisonment at hard labor without the benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence.
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Section 14:30.1(A)(1) defines second degree murder as killing a human being with the specific intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm.

State v. Winzer · filed 2014-10-08(A)(1)

Winzer was charged with second degree murder, which is defined by La. R.S. 14:30.1 (A)(1) as the killing of a human being when the offender has a specific intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm.
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Section 14:30.1 B makes life imprisonment at hard labor without parole, probation, or suspension of sentence the exclusive penalty for second-degree murder, while allowing constitutional-excessiveness review under Louisiana law.

State v. Pernell · filed 2014-10-15B

Pursuant to this authority, the Legislature enacted La. R.S. 14:30.1, prohibiting certain types of killings of other human beings, statutorily-labeled “second degree murders.” “The exclusive punishment authorized by the [ ¿Legislature upon conviction of second degree murder is ‘life imprisonment at hard labor without the benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence.’ ” Pernell, 13-0180, p. 15; 127 So.3d at 29 (citing La. R.S. 14:30.1 B). “[D]ue to the absence of any range whatsoever in the penalty provision for second degree murder, this is not a case where the [Legislature intends for a sentencing judge to exercise his discretion and impose a sentence which is gradated according to the individualized circumstances of the offense and the offender.” Id., 13-0180, pp. 15-16; 127 So.3d at 29 (citing Sepulvado, 367 So.2d at 766).
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Section 14:30.1(A)(1) defines second degree murder to include killing a human being with the specific intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm.

State v. Thompson · filed 2015-01-28(A)(1)

In the instant case, defendant was charged with and convicted of second degree murder, a violation of La. R.S. 14:30.1. Second degree murder is defined, in pertinent part, as the killing of a human being when the offender has a specific intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm. See La. R.S. 14:30.1(A)(1). Specific intent is that state of mind which exists when the circumstances indicate that the offender actively desired the prescribed criminal consequences to follow his act or failure to act.
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Section 14:30.1(A)(1) defines second-degree murder as a killing committed with the specific intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm, and Section 14:30.1(B) mandates life imprisonment at hard labor without parole, probation, or suspension of sentence.

State v. Smith · filed 2015-05-20(A)(1) (B)

Second degree murder is the killing of a human being when the offender has the specific intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm. La. R.S. 14:30.1(A)(1). ... The evidence presented at trial was sufficient to support Defendant’s conviction for second degree murder. His specific intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm was demonstrated by his act of deliberately pointing a gun at Mr. Britton and firing 16 shots into him. ... The mandatory sentence for second degree murder is punishment by life imprisonment at hard labor without the benefit of parole, probation or suspension of sentence. La. R.S. 14:30.1(B). ... The mandatory sentence of life imprisonment for a conviction of second degree murder is presumed to be constitutional, and Defendant failed to demonstrate that he is an “exceptional” defendant for whom a downward departure from the statutory minimum sentence is required.
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Section 14:30.1 defines second-degree murder as an intentional killing or a killing during specified felonies and provides for mandatory life imprisonment without benefits.

State v. Little · filed 2015-08-12

La. R.S. 14:30.1, Second degree murder, provides in pertinent part: A. Second degree murder is the killing of a human being: (1) When the offender has a specific intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm;' or (2) When the offender is engaged in the perpetration or attempted perpetration of aggravated rape, forcible rape, aggravated arson, aggravated burglary, aggravated kidnapping, second degree kidnapping, aggravated escape, assault by drive-by shooting, armed robbery, first degree robbery, second degree robbery, simple robbery, cruelty to juveniles, second degree cruelty to juveniles, or terrorism, even though he has no intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm. * * * B. Whoever commits the crime of second degree murder shall be punished by life imprisonment at hard labor -without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence; ... The totality of the evidence is sufficient for.a rational trier of fact to conclude [ T9beyond a reasonable doubt that Little was guilty of every essential element of second degree murder.
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Section 14:30.1 requires a person convicted of second degree murder to receive life imprisonment at hard labor without parole, probation, or suspension of sentence.

State v. Jones · filed 2015-09-23

LFor those offenders convicted of second degree murder in Louisiana, La. R.S. 14:30.1 mandates a sentence of life imprisonment at hard labor without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence.
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Section 14:30.1(A) defines second-degree murder as killing a human being with specific intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm, and Section 14:30.1(B) mandates life imprisonment at hard labor without parole, probation, or suspension of sentence.

State of Louisiana v. Ceasar James Williams -Aka- Ceaser James Williams · filed 2015-12-09(A), (B)

As relevant herein, the crime of second degree murder ―is the killing of a human being: (1) When the offender has a specific intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm[.]‖ La.R.S. 14:30.1(A). A finding of specific intent to kill may be supported by a determination that the perpetrator deliberately pointed and fired a weapon at the victim at close range. ... The mandatory sentencing provision for second degree murder is ―life imprisonment at hard labor without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence.‖ La.R.S. 14:30.1(B).
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Second-degree murder—juvenile and parole rules

Section 14:30.1 defines second-degree murder as killing a human being with specific intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm and mandates life imprisonment at hard labor without parole, probation, or suspension of sentence.

State v. Williams · filed 2015-12-09(A) (B)

As relevant herein, the crime of second degree murder “is the killing of a human being: (1) When the offender has a specific intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm[.]” La.R.S. 14:30.1(A). ... The mandatory sentencing provision for second degree murder is “life imprisonment at hard labor without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence.” La.R.S. 14:30.1(B).
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Law changed since Acts 2017, No. 277 made juveniles indicted for second-degree murder from August 1, 2017 through July 31, 2026 parole-eligible after twenty-five years without a hearing; Acts 2026, No. 585 allows a hearing for later indictments when the State timely seeks life without parole. The former hearing rule still governs qualifying earlier indictments.

Section 14:30.1(B) mandates life imprisonment at hard labor without parole, probation, or suspension for second-degree murder; for offenders who were juveniles, Miller and Louisiana's implementing provisions require individualized consideration of parole eligibility.

State v. Williams · filed 2016-01-20(B)

For those offenders convicted of .second degree murder in Louisiana, La. R.S. 14:30.1 mandates a sentence of life imprisonment at hard labor without the benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence. However, in 2012, the United States Supreme, Court, in Miller v. Alabama, - U.S. -, 132 S.Ct. 2455, 2460, 183 L.Ed.2d 407 (2012), held that a'state’s statutory sentencing scheme that mandates life imprisonment without parole, for those offenders under the age of eighteen years at the time they committed a homicide offense, violates the Eighth Amendment prohibition of. “cruel and unusual punishments.”
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Notes 1–150 of 1,102, oldest cases first.

1,285 more cases cited this section only in passing

These cases mention the section without interpreting it (a string cite, a footnote, background). Listed so you can see the full citation record, not just the annotated rulings.

State v. Selman, the statute appears only in a dissent's comparison of the penalties for homicide offenses while addressing the constitutionality of the death penalty for aggravated rape; the court did not construe or apply La. Stat. Ann. § 14:30.1. opinion →
State v. Weathers, the statute is cited only to identify the offense underlying the conviction; the court does not interpret, explain, or apply the elements or requirements of La. Stat. Ann. § 14:30.1. opinion →
State v. Triplett, the statute is mentioned only in a footnote as part of the historical description of the 1973 murder-law amendments. The court decided the defendant's case under the pre-1973 murder statute and did not construe or apply La.R.S. 14:30.1. opinion →
State v. Dixon, the statute is cited only to identify the offense of conviction in the procedural history. The court decided whether the evidence supported denial of a directed verdict, not what La. Stat. Ann. § 14:30.1 means, requires, or how it applies. opinion →
State v. Dupuy, the statute is cited only to identify the offense of conviction; the court does not interpret, explain, or apply § 14:30.1. opinion →
State v. Nicholas, the statute appears only in a footnote describing constitutional and legality challenges that the defendant abandoned; the court did not decide any issue about La. Stat. Ann. § 14:30.1. opinion →
State v. Zeno, the statute is cited only to identify the offense underlying the conviction; the opinion does not interpret, explain, or apply § 14:30.1. opinion →
State v. Bryant, the statute appears only in a concurring justice's comparison of penalties while arguing that the death penalty was excessive for the rape offense. The opinion does not construe or apply § 14:30.1 to decide an issue under that statute. opinion →
State v. Williams, the statute is mentioned only to identify the offense charged in the procedural history. The court decided the appeal on unpreserved trial errors and did not interpret or apply § 14:30.1. opinion →
State v. Lee, the statute is cited only to identify the offense of conviction. The court did not interpret or apply La. R.S. 14:30.1; its reversal rested on the exclusion of self-defense evidence under La. R.S. 15:482 and related evidentiary principles. opinion →
State v. Trahan, the statute is mentioned only to identify the offense of conviction. The court's holding concerns the admissibility of hospital records under La. R.S. 13:3714, not the meaning or application of La. Stat. Ann. § 14:30.1. opinion →
State v. Clark, the statute is mentioned only to identify the charge in the procedural history; the court decides the appeal based on unpreserved claims about the prosecutor's closing argument and does not interpret or apply § 14:30.1. opinion →
State v. Bell, the statute is mentioned only to identify the charge in the procedural history; the court did not interpret, apply, or decide any issue about § 14:30.1. opinion →
State v. Simmons, the statute is cited only to identify the offense charged in the procedural history; the court decides a discovery issue and does not interpret or apply the elements or requirements of La. Stat. Ann. § 14:30.1. opinion →
State v. Cooper, the statute is mentioned only to identify the offense charged in the procedural history; the court does not interpret or apply § 14:30.1. opinion →
State v. Miller, the statute is mentioned only to identify the charge in the procedural history. The court decided whether the jury should have received justification instructions, not what La. Stat. Ann. § 14:30.1 means or requires. opinion →
State v. Sharp, the statute is mentioned only to identify the offense charged in the procedural history; the court does not construe or decide anything about § 14:30.1. opinion →
State v. Hills, the statute is cited only to identify the offense underlying the conviction; the court does not construe, explain, or apply § 14:30.1. opinion →
State v. McDaniel, the statute is mentioned only to identify the mandatory sentence imposed in the procedural history; the court does not interpret or decide anything about what § 14:30.1 means, requires, or covers. opinion →
State v. Crosby, the court cited § 14:30.1 only to identify the lesser offense to which the defendants pleaded while rejecting a constitutional challenge to the separate first-degree murder statute; it did not interpret or apply § 14:30.1. opinion →
State v. Davis, the statute is cited only to identify the offense charged in the procedural history; the court does not interpret or apply the elements or requirements of La. Stat. Ann. § 14:30.1. opinion →
State v. Brown, the statute is cited only to identify the offense underlying the conviction. The court's analysis concerns evidentiary, Miranda, impeachment, hearsay, directed-verdict, and self-defense issues, and does not interpret or apply § 14:30.1. opinion →
State v. Calloway, the court cited § 14:30.1 only while recounting the sentencing rule adopted in State v. Jenkins and explaining why the defendant could not raise a Witherspoon challenge after the death sentence was set aside; it did not construe or independently apply the statute. opinion →
State v. Weedon, the statute appears only in the procedural opening to identify the offense charged; the court's actual rulings concern booking statements, Miranda and counsel rights, and hearsay, and do not interpret or apply La. Stat. Ann. § 14:30.1. opinion →
State v. Henderson, the opinion mentions § 14:30.1 only to identify the offense charged in the procedural history. The court decides which fund or governmental entity must pay indigent defendants' out-of-state witness expenses, relying on other provisions, and does not interpret or apply § 14:30.1. opinion →
State v. Nolan, the statute is cited only to identify the offense charged in the procedural background. The court's holdings concern juror disqualification and cross-examination for witness bias, not the meaning, requirements, coverage, or application of § 14:30.1. opinion →
State v. Karno, the statute is cited only in the procedural history to identify the charge; the court's decision concerns the standards governing a continuance based on the accused's physical condition, not the meaning or application of § 14:30.1. opinion →
State v. Young, the statute is cited only to identify the offense charged; the court does not interpret, explain, or apply § 14:30.1. opinion →
State v. Milby, the court used La.R.S. 14:30.1 to identify second-degree murder and its mandatory penalty, but did not construe or apply the statute itself. The ruling concerned whether the jury had to receive a penalty instruction under Blackwell and Prater, and was based on Prater's effective date and the trial date. opinion →
State v. Weeks, the statute appears only in the procedural history to identify the offense charged; the court decided issues about jury-trial waiver, Miranda warnings, voluntariness, and polygraph-related testimony, not the meaning or application of La. Stat. Ann. § 14:30.1. opinion →
State v. Hawthorne, the statute is cited only to identify the offense charged in the procedural history. The court decided the admissibility of a blood-stained towel and did not construe or apply § 14:30.1. opinion →
State v. Lovett, the statute is cited only to identify the offense of conviction; the court decides an evidentiary and self-incrimination issue concerning testimony about the voluntariness and weight of a confession, without interpreting or applying § 14:30.1. opinion →
State v. King, the statute is mentioned only to identify the offense charged. The court's holding concerns the admissibility of prior-threat and character evidence in a self-defense case under La.R.S. 15:482 and related law; it does not construe or apply La.R.S. 14:30.1. opinion →
State v. Serigne, the statute is mentioned only to identify the offense charged in the procedural history; the court did not interpret, explain, or apply La. Stat. Ann. § 14:30.1. opinion →
State v. Hatter, the court quoted § 14:30.1 only to identify the murder predicate within the manslaughter definition while reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence and self-defense claim; it did not construe or independently decide an issue under § 14:30.1. opinion →
State v. Dupar, section 14:30.1 appears only in the procedural description of the charge. The court decided an evidentiary impeachment issue under La. R.S. 15:495 and did not interpret or apply § 14:30.1. opinion →
State v. Gaines, the statute appears only in the procedural history identifying the charge in the amended indictment. The court did not interpret or apply § 14:30.1. opinion →
State v. Donahue, the court cited § 14:30.1 only to identify second degree murder as punishable by life imprisonment while deciding the separate procedural issue of whether the charge required a grand jury indictment; it did not interpret or otherwise decide the meaning, requirements, scope, or application of the statute itself. opinion →
State v. Nelson, the statute appears only in the opening description of the conviction; the court does not interpret, explain, or apply § 14:30.1. opinion →
State v. Beauvais, the statute is mentioned only in the procedural history to identify the offense charged; the court does not interpret, explain, or apply La. Stat. Ann. § 14:30.1. opinion →
State v. Thompson, the statute is cited only to identify the charge in the procedural history; the court did not interpret or apply its meaning or requirements, and affirmed on the basis that none of the assignments of error had merit. opinion →
State v. Dawson, the opinion mentions § 14:30.1 only to identify the offense charged; it does not interpret, apply, or decide anything about the statute. opinion →
State v. Wise, the statute is cited only to identify the offense of conviction in the procedural history; the opinion does not interpret or apply § 14:30.1. opinion →
State v. Shannon, the opinion merely identifies the statutes cited in the bill of information charging attempted second degree murder; it does not interpret or apply La. Stat. Ann. § 14:30.1. opinion →
State v. Henderson, the statute is mentioned only to identify the offense charged in the procedural history; the court decides evidentiary and trial-error issues without construing or applying § 14:30.1's meaning, requirements, coverage, or elements. opinion →
State v. Ford, the statute is cited only to identify the offense charged in the procedural history; the court does not interpret or apply § 14:30.1 and simply affirms the convictions. opinion →
State v. Monroe, the statute is cited to identify the charged offense and the State’s burden of proving specific intent, but the court’s actual decision concerns the admissibility of similar-offense evidence. It does not construe or decide the meaning, requirements, coverage, or application of La. Stat. Ann. § 14:30.1. opinion →
State v. Mallery, the statute appears only in the dissent's comparison of Louisiana penalties for other crimes; the court did not construe or apply § 14:30.1 to decide the case. opinion →
State v. Roper, the statute appears only in the procedural history to identify the charge. The court decided the appeal on the trial court's failure to comply with Code of Criminal Procedure Article 894.1 in sentencing, and did not interpret or apply § 14:30.1. opinion →
State v. Harrison, the statute is mentioned only to identify one offense of conviction in the procedural background. The court's decision concerned prosecutorial misconduct and mistrial, and did not interpret or apply La. Stat. Ann. § 14:30.1. opinion →
State v. Brown, the statute is mentioned only to identify the offense charged; the court's holding concerns the plain-view and automobile-emergency exceptions to the warrant requirement, not the meaning or application of La. Stat. Ann. § 14:30.1. opinion →
State v. Sheppard, the statute appears only in the dissent as a citation identifying second-degree murder as a possible non-capital offense; the majority did not construe or apply La. Stat. Ann. § 14:30.1. opinion →
State v. Fisher, the opinion only identifies La.R.S. 14:30.1 as the statute violated in the charging history; it does not interpret or apply the statute's meaning, requirements, coverage, or elements. opinion →
State v. Holmes, the statute appears only in Justice Dennis's dissent as a contrast to first-degree murder. The majority did not construe or apply La. Stat. Ann. § 14:30.1; Holmes was convicted under the first-degree murder statute. opinion →
State v. Stewart, the statute is cited only to identify the offense charged and in describing the procedural amendment of the indictment; the court does not interpret or apply the elements, requirements, or scope of La. Stat. Ann. § 14:30.1. opinion →
State v. Brumfield, the statute appears only in the procedural history as the statute allegedly violated in the original charge; the court decided the sentencing issue under La. C.Cr.P. Art. 894.1 and did not interpret or apply § 14:30.1. opinion →
State v. Motton, the reference to § 14:30.1 appears only in a footnote recounting statutory history. The court's decision addressed the elements of first-degree murder under the version of § 14:30 in effect when the offense occurred, not the meaning, requirements, or application of § 14:30.1. opinion →
Baldwin v. Blackburn, the court mentions § 14:30.1(B) only to identify the provision recited in the trial court’s jury charge while rejecting Baldwin’s constitutional challenge to the charge; it does not construe or independently apply the statute. opinion →
State v. Smith, the statute appears in the description of the charge and the sentence imposed, which are procedural facts; the court does not construe or decide what § 14:30.1 means, requires, or how it applies. opinion →
State v. Whitt, the court quoted § 14:30.1 only while recounting the earlier Booker decision and considering whether second-degree murder was a responsive verdict to the first-degree-murder charge. Whitt held that the absence of second-degree murder as a responsive verdict did not invalidate the first-degree-murder statute; it did not construe or apply § 14:30.1 itself. opinion →
State v. Martin, the statute is cited only to identify the charge in the procedural history; the court decides the separate issue of whether a surgical procedure may be ordered to recover evidence and does not interpret or apply § 14:30.1. opinion →
State v. Campbell, the statute is mentioned only to identify the offense in the procedural history. The court did not construe or apply La. Stat. Ann. § 14:30.1; it reviewed the manslaughter sentence and guilty-plea proceedings instead. opinion →
State v. Spooner, the statute is mentioned only to identify the amended murder charge in the procedural history; the court decided the appeal on the voluntariness and suppression of the inculpatory statement, without interpreting or applying § 14:30.1. opinion →
State v. Williams, the statute is cited only in the procedural history to identify the offense charged. Although the court later upheld the conviction, it did not construe or analyze the meaning, elements, or application of La. R.S. 14:30.1 itself. opinion →
State v. Matthews, the statute is mentioned only to identify the charges in the procedural history. The court does not interpret or apply La. Stat. Ann. § 14:30.1; its holding concerns constitutional rights during custodial interrogation and related provisions of the Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure. opinion →
State v. Coleman, the statute is mentioned only to identify the offense charged; the court does not interpret, explain, or apply the requirements of La. Stat. Ann. § 14:30.1. opinion →
State v. Crawford, the statute is cited only in the procedural history to identify the offense charged. The opinion does not construe § 14:30.1 or decide any issue about its meaning, requirements, coverage, or application. opinion →
State v. Davis, the statute is mentioned only to identify the offense charged in the procedural history; the court does not interpret or apply any element, requirement, or coverage of La. Stat. Ann. § 14:30.1. opinion →
State v. Lavigne, the statute appears only in the procedural history as one of the provisions cited in the bill of information. The court decided the appeal under the severance rules in La. C.Cr.P. arts. 842 and 704 and did not interpret or apply La. R.S. 14:30.1. opinion →
State v. Lowdins, the statute is mentioned only to identify the offense charged; the court does not construe § 14:30.1 or decide how its elements or requirements apply. opinion →
State v. Trevathan, the statute appears only in the procedural history to identify the charge in the indictment. The court decided whether the defendant's statements should be suppressed under the constitutional right to counsel, not the meaning or application of La. Stat. Ann. § 14:30.1. opinion →
State v. Ratcliff, the statute appears only in the procedural history as the provisions cited in the bill of information; the court did not interpret or apply La. Stat. Ann. § 14:30.1. opinion →
State v. Roussel, the court cited § 14:30.1(1) only to identify the definition and specific-intent element of second-degree murder while analyzing the separate evidentiary issue under La. Code Crim. P. art. 651. It did not construe or apply § 14:30.1 itself. opinion →
State v. Morris, the statute is mentioned only in the procedural history to identify the charge and sentence in the earlier trial; this opinion does not construe or apply § 14:30.1. opinion →
State v. Alexander, the statute is mentioned only to identify the offense charged in the procedural history; the court decided the appeal on evidentiary and jury-deliberation issues and did not construe or apply § 14:30.1. opinion →
State v. Oliver, the court merely reports the amended charge and, in a footnote, reproduces the statute's sentencing language; it does not decide what § 14:30.1 means, requires, or how it applies. opinion →
State v. Stokes, the statute is cited only to identify the second-degree-murder charge in the procedural history; the court does not interpret, explain, or apply § 14:30.1. opinion →
State v. Lott, the court cited § 14:30.1 to establish that second degree murder is punishable by life imprisonment, which supported its conclusion that the prosecution had to begin by grand-jury indictment rather than bill of information. It did not construe or otherwise decide the meaning or application of the statute itself. opinion →
State v. Cobbs, the opinion cites La. Stat. Ann. § 14:30.1 only in the procedural introduction to identify the offense and describe the sentence. It does not interpret or apply the statute; the court decides the appeal based on the admissibility of photographs and treats the other assignment as abandoned. opinion →
State v. Vessel, the statute is mentioned only to identify the charge in the procedural history; the court does not interpret or apply La. Stat. Ann. § 14:30.1. opinion →
State v. Smith, the statute is mentioned only to describe the charge in the procedural history. The court did not construe or apply La. Stat. Ann. § 14:30.1; it reviewed the defendant's conviction and sentence for manslaughter. opinion →
State v. West, the statute is cited only to identify the offense charged in the procedural history. The court does not interpret or apply the elements, requirements, scope, or meaning of La. Stat. Ann. § 14:30.1. opinion →
State v. Thom, the opinion merely identifies § 14:30.1 as the statute underlying the charge in the procedural history. The court dismissed the appeal, vacated the conviction, and did not interpret or decide anything about the statute. opinion →
State v. Jones, the statute is mentioned only to identify the offense charged in the procedural history. The court did not interpret or apply La. Stat. Ann. § 14:30.1. opinion →
State v. Glaze, the statute is cited to identify the offense charged in the procedural history; the court did not interpret, define, or otherwise decide a legal issue about La. Stat. Ann. § 14:30.1. opinion →
State v. Clay, the statute is cited only to identify the offense charged in the procedural history; the court does not interpret or otherwise decide anything about § 14:30.1. opinion →
State v. Roberts, the statute is mentioned only to identify the original indictment charge; the defendants pleaded guilty to manslaughter, and the court did not construe or apply § 14:30.1. opinion →
State v. Ferdinand, the statute is mentioned only to identify the offense charged; the court does not interpret, explain, or apply La. R.S. 14:30.1. opinion →
State v. Flowers, the statute is mentioned only to describe the charge in the procedural history; the court did not interpret or apply La. Stat. Ann. § 14:30.1. opinion →
State v. Allen, the statute is mentioned only to identify the offense originally charged, and it also appears as a cross-reference in the reproduced manslaughter statute. The court decided self-defense and sentencing issues, not the meaning or application of § 14:30.1. opinion →
State v. Sisk, the statute is mentioned only to identify the offense charged; the court does not interpret, apply, or decide any issue concerning La. Stat. Ann. § 14:30.1. opinion →
State v. Shields, the statute is cited only to identify the offense charged; the court does not interpret § 14:30.1 or decide how its requirements apply. Its later citation is likewise only to state the authorized sentence. opinion →
State v. Knowles, the statute is cited only to identify the offense of conviction in the procedural history. The court decided the admissibility of defendant's confession under Miranda and Edwards, without construing or applying the elements or requirements of La. Stat. Ann. § 14:30.1. opinion →
State v. Pickens, section 14:30.1 appears in the procedural history as the original charge and is reproduced in a footnote, but the court's holding concerns the excessiveness of the manslaughter sentence and does not decide anything about the meaning, requirements, coverage, or application of § 14:30.1. opinion →
State v. Scott, the opinion mentions La.R.S. 14:30.1 only in the procedural history to identify the statute under which Scott was sentenced; the court does not interpret, apply, or decide anything about the statute. opinion →
State v. Captville, the statute is mentioned only to identify the charge in the procedural history; the court decided sufficiency of the evidence for the manslaughter conviction without interpreting or applying La.R.S. 14:30.1. opinion →
State v. McKnight, the statute is mentioned only to identify the offense for which defendant was indicted. The court decided sentencing issues under other provisions and did not interpret or apply La.R.S. 14:30.1. opinion →
State v. Turner, the opinion mentions La.R.S. 14:30.1 only to identify the statute underlying Turner's conviction. The court decided whether the sentence was excessive and did not interpret or apply this statute's meaning, elements, scope, or requirements. opinion →
State v. Hayes, the statute is cited to identify the charge in the procedural history. The majority's legal analysis and disposition concern the circumstantial-evidence rule, manslaughter under La.R.S. 14:31, and constitutional sentence excessiveness; the separate dissent's reference to La.R.S. 14:30.1 was not adopted. opinion →
State v. Dorsey, the statute is cited only to identify the offenses charged in the procedural history; the court does not interpret or apply § 14:30.1. opinion →
State v. Baldwin, the statute is cited to identify the offense underlying the attempted-murder conviction and is reproduced in a footnote; the court did not construe or decide anything about the meaning, requirements, coverage, or application of La. Stat. Ann. § 14:30.1. opinion →
State v. Young, the statute is cited only to identify the offense of conviction. The court does not interpret or apply § 14:30.1; it decides issues concerning a witness's Fifth Amendment privilege and a mistrial under other provisions. opinion →
State v. Seymour, the statute is cited only to identify the offense of conviction; the court resolves insanity and confession-notice issues without interpreting or applying the elements or requirements of La. Stat. Ann. § 14:30.1. opinion →
State v. Silbey, the statute appears in the description of the charge and in a footnote setting out the statutory definition, but the court did not construe or apply § 14:30.1; it reviewed the manslaughter conviction and addressed other assignments of error. opinion →
State v. Matthews, the statute is mentioned only to identify the offense charged. The court does not interpret or apply any requirement of § 14:30.1; it resolves the appeal under general causation, intent, and sufficiency-of-the-evidence principles. opinion →
State v. Davis, the statute is cited only to identify the offense of conviction; the court does not interpret, apply, or decide anything about the meaning or requirements of La. Stat. Ann. § 14:30.1. opinion →
State v. Jackson, the statute is mentioned only to report the original charge and in a footnote reproducing the manslaughter definition; the court does not interpret, apply, or decide any issue about § 14:30.1. opinion →
State v. Owen, the statute is mentioned only in the procedural history as one of the statutes underlying the charges. The court decides standing and the admissibility of evidence from a warrantless search, and does not interpret or apply § 14:30.1. opinion →
State v. Jackson, the statute is mentioned only to identify the charge in the procedural history; the court did not interpret or apply La.R.S. 14:30.1. opinion →
State v. Segura, the statute is cited to identify the offense and briefly describe the charge, jury requirement, and sentence during the court's patent-error review. The court did not construe § 14:30.1 or decide a disputed question about its meaning or application. opinion →
State v. Johnson, the statute is cited to identify the offense charged, and the accompanying footnote reproduces its text; the court does not construe or independently apply § 14:30.1. opinion →
State v. Batiste, the statute is mentioned only to identify the offense underlying the conviction; the appellate court does not interpret or apply any requirement of La. Stat. Ann. § 14:30.1. opinion →
State v. Singletary, the statute is mentioned only to identify the offense charged; the court does not interpret, explain, or apply § 14:30.1. opinion →
State v. Kahey, the statute is cited only to identify the charge in the procedural history. The court decides the grand-jury selection and excessive-sentence issues and does not interpret or apply La. Stat. Ann. § 14:30.1. opinion →
State v. Price, the statute is cited only in the procedural history to identify the offense originally charged. The court's decision concerns the validity of the guilty pleas and the need to amend the information under La. C.Cr.P. art. 487; it does not interpret or apply La. R.S. 14:30.1. opinion →
State v. Johnson, the statute is cited only to identify the offense charged in the procedural history; the court does not interpret, define, or decide the application of La. Stat. Ann. § 14:30.1. opinion →
State v. Lewis, the statute is mentioned only to identify the charge in the procedural history. The court decides double-jeopardy and prosecutorial-vindictiveness issues, without interpreting or applying the elements or requirements of La. R.S. 14:30.1. opinion →
State v. Allen, the court mentioned La.R.S. 14:30.1 only as one of the alternative murder provisions in its general description of the manslaughter elements; it did not construe, apply, or decide anything specifically about this statute. opinion →
State v. Welch, the statute is cited only to identify the offense of conviction. The court does not interpret, explain, or apply any requirement of La. Stat. Ann. § 14:30.1; its actual ruling concerns the legality of the sentence under constitutional provisions and is therefore incidental to this statute. opinion →
Mattheson v. John T. King, Secretary of the Department of Corrections, the opinion does not construe or decide what La. Stat. Ann. § 14:30.1 means or requires. The statute is merely reproduced in a footnote, while the court reviews constitutional habeas claims and reports the defendant’s second-degree-murder defense. opinion →
State v. See, the court cites § 14:30.1 only as part of the statutory basis for the attempted-murder charge and its maximum sentence; it does not interpret or decide what the statute means or requires. opinion →
State v. Patterson, the statute is mentioned only to report the sentence imposed after the defendant's second-degree-murder conviction; the court's holding concerns the admissibility of pre-Miranda and post-Miranda statements, not the meaning or application of La. Stat. Ann. § 14:30.1. opinion →
State v. Smith, the statute is cited only to identify the offense in the opening description of the appeal. The court addresses the sufficiency of the evidence and other trial errors without construing or explaining La. Stat. Ann. § 14:30.1; the citation is therefore incidental. opinion →
State v. Garcia, the statute is cited only to identify the offense of conviction in the procedural background; the opinion does not interpret, explain, or apply any requirement of La. Stat. Ann. § 14:30.1. opinion →
State v. Miller, the opinion recites the statute's penalty while addressing the excessiveness of defendant's sentence and the sentencing court's discretion; it does not construe or independently decide how § 14:30.1 applies. opinion →
State v. Thomas, the statute is cited only to identify the offense charged in the procedural history; the court did not interpret or apply § 14:30.1. opinion →
State v. Collins, the opinion mentions § 14:30.1 only to identify the correct statute that should have been cited in the bill of information; it does not construe or apply the statute's substantive requirements. opinion →
State ex rel. Milby v. State, the opinion mentions La. Stat. Ann. § 14:30.1 as the statute governing the sentence imposed for second-degree murder and as background for the Governor's commutation analysis. The court's holding concerns the legal effect of the commutation and the Governor's constitutional power to restore parole and probation benefits, not the meaning, requirements, or application of § 14:30.1 itself. opinion →
State v. Williams, the statute is cited only to identify the offense charged in the procedural history; the court does not interpret or apply § 14:30.1. opinion →
State v. Breaux, the court mentions § 14:30.1 to identify the charged offense and to state that the sentence was within the statutory limits; it does not interpret, explain, or decide how § 14:30.1 applies. opinion →
State v. Huntley, the statute is mentioned only in the procedural history to identify the amended charge. The court did not interpret, explain, or apply La. Stat. Ann. § 14:30.1. opinion →
State v. Smith, the statute is mentioned only to report that the manslaughter charge resulted from an amendment of the original second degree murder charge; the court decides only whether the manslaughter sentence was constitutionally excessive and does not interpret or apply § 14:30.1. opinion →
State v. Hamilton, Incidental: the court quoted § 14:30.1 in a footnote to set out the second-degree-murder definition while contrasting the charged offense and discussing the jury-instruction issue. It did not construe or independently decide how § 14:30.1 applies. opinion →
State v. Mills, the statute is mentioned only to identify the offense charged in the procedural history; the court did not interpret or apply § 14:30.1 and decided the appeal on the absence of patent errors. opinion →
State v. Sam, the statute is mentioned only as the offense charged in the procedural history; the court affirmed a manslaughter conviction and did not decide the meaning, requirements, coverage, or application of La. Stat. Ann. § 14:30.1. opinion →
State v. Hartman, the statute is mentioned only in the procedural history to identify the original charge. The court decided the appeal involving Hartman's manslaughter conviction and did not interpret or apply La. Stat. Ann. § 14:30.1. opinion →
State v. Johnson, the statute is mentioned only to identify the offense of conviction in the procedural background; the court does not interpret, explain, or apply § 14:30.1. opinion →
State v. Risen, the statute is cited only to identify the offense of conviction. The court decided the appeal on sufficiency of the evidence and errors patent, without construing or applying any requirement of La. Stat. Ann. § 14:30.1. opinion →
State v. Freeman, the statute is mentioned only to identify the offense charged; the court decided the defendant's competency to stand trial and did not interpret or apply La. Stat. Ann. § 14:30.1. opinion →
State v. Garcia, the statute is cited only to identify the offense charged in the procedural history. The court decides the sufficiency of the evidence and self-defense issue under the Jackson standard and La.R.S. 14:20, without construing or applying § 14:30.1. opinion →
State v. Lombard, the opinion decides that the evidence supported manslaughter under La. Stat. Ann. § 14:31(1), not what § 14:30.1 means or requires. Section 14:30.1 is only the charged offense and appears as part of § 14:31(1)'s cross-reference to second degree murder. opinion →
State v. Martin, the statute is mentioned only to identify the offense charged in the procedural history. The court did not construe or apply La. Stat. Ann. § 14:30.1; it addressed the manslaughter conviction and sentencing issues instead. opinion →
State v. Narcisse, the statute is mentioned only to identify the statute underlying the original charge in the procedural history. The court decided the case based on sentencing provisions under La.R.S. 14:95.2 and La.C.Cr.P. Article 893.1, without construing or applying La.R.S. 14:30.1. opinion →
State v. Kent, the statute is mentioned only in the procedural history to identify the charges; the court did not interpret or apply La. Stat. Ann. § 14:30.1. opinion →
State v. Thompson, the statute is cited only to identify the offense charged in the procedural history; the court does not interpret or apply § 14:30.1. opinion →
State v. Vampran, the opinion merely identifies the statute as the provision under which defendants were charged; it does not interpret, explain, or apply any requirement of La. Stat. Ann. § 14:30.1. opinion →
State v. Smith, the statute is cited only to identify the offense underlying the convictions in the procedural history; the court decided sufficiency of the evidence and a juror challenge, not the meaning, requirements, coverage, or application of § 14:30.1. opinion →
State v. Arabie, the statute is cited only to identify the offense charged in the procedural history. The court does not interpret, define, or decide how La. Stat. Ann. § 14:30.1 applies; its substantive analysis concerns manslaughter, self-defense, and sentencing under other statutes. opinion →
State v. Moore, the statute is cited only in the procedural history to identify the amended charge. The court did not construe or decide anything about the meaning, requirements, coverage, or application of § 14:30.1. opinion →
State v. Paul, the opinion cites § 14:30.1 only to identify the offense charged in the procedural history. The court does not interpret the statute, explain its elements, or decide how it applies. opinion →
State v. James, the opinion merely identifies the offense and reports the sentence imposed under the statute; it does not interpret, define, or decide how La. Stat. Ann. § 14:30.1 applies. opinion →
State v. Firstley, the statute is mentioned only to identify the offense of conviction in the procedural and factual background; the court did not interpret, explain, or apply La. Stat. Ann. § 14:30.1. opinion →
State v. Scott, the statute is mentioned only to describe the amended indictment in the procedural history; the court did not interpret or decide how La.R.S. 14:30.1 applies. opinion →
State v. Obney, the statute is mentioned only to identify the offense charged in the procedural history. The court decided issues concerning suppression of the defendant's statement and jury instructions, and did not interpret or apply the meaning, elements, or requirements of La. R.S. 14:30.1. opinion →
State v. Simpson, the statute is cited only to identify the offense charged; the court decided the motion to quash under La.Code Crim.P. arts. 578 and 580, not what La. Stat. Ann. § 14:30.1 means or how it applies. opinion →
State v. Balfa, the statute is mentioned only to identify the offense of conviction in the procedural and factual introduction; the court does not interpret, explain, or apply § 14:30.1. opinion →
State v. Lambert, the statute is mentioned only to identify the offense for which defendant was convicted in the procedural background; the opinion does not interpret or apply La. Stat. Ann. § 14:30.1. opinion →
State v. Ancar, the opinion cites La. R.S. 14:30.1 only to identify the offense underlying the conviction. It does not interpret, apply, or decide anything about the statute itself. opinion →
State v. Hereford, the court only identifies the offense of conviction and cites La.R.S. 14:30.1 in the procedural and factual background; it does not interpret, apply, or decide anything about the statute's meaning or requirements. opinion →
State v. Burge, the statute is cited only to identify the offense charged in the procedural history. The court did not construe or decide any issue specifically about La. Stat. Ann. § 14:30.1; its sufficiency analysis applied the Jackson standard and La. R.S. 15:438, and its discussion of principal liability cited La.R.S. 14:24. opinion →
State v. Ross, the statute is mentioned only to identify the charge in the procedural history; the court's sentencing analysis concerns manslaughter under La.R.S. 14:31 and does not construe or apply § 14:30.1. opinion →
State v. Sheehan, the statute is mentioned only to identify the charge in the procedural background; the court decided the admissibility of the defendant's statements and did not construe or apply the elements or requirements of La. R.S. 14:30.1. opinion →
State v. Clofer, the opinion merely identifies La. R.S. 14:30.1 as the statute violated by the conviction; it does not interpret the statute, discuss its elements, or decide how it applies. opinion →
State v. Franklin, the statute is mentioned only to identify the charge in the procedural history. The court decided evidentiary and mistrial issues concerning the aggravated-battery conviction; it did not interpret or decide what La. Stat. Ann. § 14:30.1 means, requires, or how it applies. opinion →
State v. Prejean, the statute is mentioned only to identify the original indictment and charge in the procedural history. The court decided the appeal based on the agreed manslaughter plea and sentence, without interpreting or applying La. Stat. Ann. § 14:30.1. opinion →
State v. Cheatham, the court quoted § 14:30.1 to state the charged offense, but it did not interpret or independently apply that statute. Its actual appellate analysis and ruling addressed whether provocation and the cooling period reduced the killing to manslaughter under La.R.S. 14:31. opinion →
State v. Brunet, the statute is mentioned only to identify the charge in the procedural history. The court decided an evidentiary and confrontation issue concerning redaction of the defendant’s statement, not the meaning, requirements, coverage, or application of La. Stat. Ann. § 14:30.1. opinion →
State v. Tarver, the statute is mentioned only to identify the offense charged. The court did not interpret or apply La. Stat. Ann. § 14:30.1; it reviewed a manslaughter conviction and sentence. opinion →
State v. Lambert, the statute is cited to identify the possible sentencing range while the court reviews whether the sentence was excessive; the opinion does not construe or decide what § 14:30.1 means, requires, or how it applies. opinion →
State v. Guillory, the statute is mentioned only to identify the offense of conviction in the procedural history; the court does not interpret, explain, or decide any issue about La. Stat. Ann. § 14:30.1. opinion →
State v. Thorne, the statute appears only in the procedural history as part of the charging description; the court does not interpret or apply La. Stat. Ann. § 14:30.1. opinion →
State v. Poche, the statute is mentioned only to identify the offense charged; the court decides the Miranda suppression issue and does not interpret or apply § 14:30.1. opinion →
State v. Richardson, the statute is cited only to identify the offense charged in the procedural background. The court does not interpret § 14:30.1 or decide how its elements or requirements apply; it resolves other trial-error issues. opinion →
State v. Everett, the statute appears only in the procedural history to identify the original charge. The court affirmed a conviction for aggravated battery and did not interpret or apply the elements or requirements of La. Stat. Ann. § 14:30.1. opinion →
State v. Grant, the opinion mentions La.R.S. 14:30.1 only to identify the offense of conviction and the sentence imposed; it does not interpret or apply the statute, and the sentencing statement is procedural history. opinion →
State v. Boothe, the statute is cited only to identify the offense charged in the procedural history; the court does not interpret or apply La. Stat. Ann. § 14:30.1. opinion →
State v. Clayton, the opinion cites § 14:30.1 only to identify the offense and the statutory maximum while reviewing whether the sentence was excessive; it does not construe or otherwise decide what the statute means, requires, or how it applies. opinion →
State v. Shepherd, the statute is mentioned only to identify the original second-degree-murder charge in the procedural history. The court decided the validity of the nolo contendere plea to manslaughter and did not interpret or apply La. Stat. Ann. § 14:30.1. opinion →
State v. Riley, the statute is mentioned only in the procedural history to identify the charged offense. The court decides the admissibility of hearsay evidence concerning the victim's state of mind and does not construe or apply § 14:30.1. opinion →
State v. Burnes, the opinion mentions § 14:30.1 only to identify the charge in the procedural history; the court does not interpret or apply the statute. opinion →
State v. Delahoussaye, the statute is mentioned only to identify the offense of conviction in the procedural history. The court does not interpret, explain, or apply La. R.S. 14:30.1. opinion →
State v. Warren, the statute appears only in the procedural history identifying the original charge. The court affirmed a manslaughter conviction and did not interpret, explain, or apply § 14:30.1. opinion →
State v. Williams, the statute is mentioned only to identify the offense charged in the procedural history. The court addressed the admissibility of the confession and remanded for completion of the record; it did not interpret or apply La. Stat. Ann. § 14:30.1. opinion →
State v. Vidrine, the statute is mentioned only to report the sentence imposed below; the court does not interpret, explain, or apply La. Stat. Ann. § 14:30.1. opinion →
State v. White, the opinion only identifies § 14:30.1 as the statute underlying the original charge; the court decides the plea-bargain issue and does not interpret or apply the statute. opinion →
State v. Johnson, the court recounts the pre-1978 statutory definition only as historical background in distinguishing Baldwin; it did not decide the meaning, requirements, or application of La. Stat. Ann. § 14:30.1(B) to this case. opinion →
State v. Harrison, the statute is cited only to identify the offense charged in the procedural history; the court does not interpret or apply La. Stat. Ann. § 14:30.1. opinion →
State v. Ward, the statute is mentioned only to identify the offense charged in the procedural history; the court does not interpret, explain, or apply La. Stat. Ann. § 14:30.1. opinion →
State v. Lindsey, the statute appears only in the defendant's alternative sufficiency argument. The court instead held that the evidence supported specific intent for first degree murder and did not construe or apply La. Stat. Ann. § 14:30.1(A)(2). opinion →
State v. Matthews, the statute is cited to identify the charged offenses and convictions. The court did not interpret or apply any element or requirement of La. Stat. Ann. § 14:30.1; its discussion concerned custodial statements, trial procedure, and the general sufficiency-of-the-evidence standard. opinion →
State v. Bridges, the statute appears only in the procedural history as the charge in the indictment; the opinion states that the charge was later dismissed and does not construe or apply § 14:30.1. opinion →
State v. Brumfield, the statute is cited only to identify the offense charged in the procedural history. The court did not interpret or apply La. R.S. 14:30.1; it reversed on the separate issue of restricting cross-examination under La. R.S. 15:492. opinion →
State v. Murray, the statute is cited only to identify the offense of conviction; the court does not interpret, define, or apply any requirement of La. Stat. Ann. § 14:30.1. opinion →
State v. Nicholas, the statute is mentioned only to identify the offense of conviction in the procedural history; the court does not interpret, define, or otherwise decide anything about La. Stat. Ann. § 14:30.1. opinion →
State v. Bennett, the statute appears only in the procedural history as the offense charged. The court decides the admissibility of hearsay under the res gestae exception and does not construe or decide anything about La. Stat. Ann. § 14:30.1. opinion →
State v. Holmes, the statute is cited only to identify the offense charged in the procedural history; the court does not interpret, explain, or apply any requirement of La. Stat. Ann. § 14:30.1. opinion →
State v. Daniels, the statute is cited only to identify the offense charged and the procedural history; the court does not interpret, explain, or apply the requirements or scope of La. R.S. 14:30.1. opinion →
State v. Knapper, the statute is mentioned only to identify the offense of conviction in the procedural and factual history; the court decided the motion for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence and did not interpret or apply La. Stat. Ann. § 14:30.1. opinion →
State v. Clark, the statute is mentioned only to identify the offense charged in the procedural history; the court does not interpret, explain, or apply La. Stat. Ann. § 14:30.1. opinion →
State v. Hunter, the statute is cited only to identify the offense charged in the procedural history; the court does not interpret or apply § 14:30.1. opinion →
State v. Daughtery, the statute is mentioned only to identify the amended charge in the procedural history; the court does not interpret or apply La. Stat. Ann. § 14:30.1. opinion →
State v. King, section 14:30.1 is mentioned only to identify the charge in the procedural history; it is also merely cross-referenced in the quoted definition of manslaughter. The court did not construe or decide how § 14:30.1 applies. opinion →
State v. Meshell, the statute is cited only to identify the offense of conviction in the procedural background; the court does not interpret, explain, or apply any requirement of La. Stat. Ann. § 14:30.1. opinion →
State v. Owens, the statute is cited only in the procedural history to identify the offense for which defendant was convicted; the court does not construe or apply La. Stat. Ann. § 14:30.1. opinion →
State v. Tauzier, the opinion mentions § 14:30.1 only in the procedural history as the statute underlying the original attempted-murder charge, and later repeats it as part of the quoted manslaughter definition. The court decided only whether the evidence supported the attempted manslaughter conviction; it did not construe or apply § 14:30.1. opinion →
State Ex Rel. Lawrence v. Smith, the statute is cited only in the dissent to state the definition of second degree murder. The majority did not construe or apply § 14:30.1; its decision concerned whether the evidence required reduction to manslaughter under the manslaughter provisions. opinion →
State v. Kimmel, the statute appears only in the opinion's introductory description of the offense underlying the conviction; the court decided the appeal on the district attorney's case-assignment procedure and harmless error, without interpreting or applying § 14:30.1. opinion →
State v. Lott, the statute is cited only to identify the offense in the procedural history. The court does not interpret or apply La. Stat. Ann. § 14:30.1; its discussion concerns other issues, including intoxication and competency. opinion →
State v. Flowers, the statute is cited only to identify the charge in the procedural history; the court did not interpret or apply § 14:30.1. opinion →
State v. Trahan, the statute is mentioned only to identify the offense charged in the procedural and factual background; the court does not interpret or apply § 14:30.1. opinion →
State v. Marco, the statute is cited only to identify the offense underlying the conviction. The appellate court's decision addresses discovery of witness statements and Brady material, not the meaning, requirements, scope, or application of La. Stat. Ann. § 14:30.1. opinion →
State v. Makar, the court cited La.R.S. 14:30.1 to identify the charged offense and state that its intent elements were present, but it did not interpret or otherwise decide a question about the statute; the reversal rested on the state's failure to disprove self-defense. opinion →
State v. Lewis, the opinion mentions La.R.S. 14:30.1 only to identify the offense underlying the conviction and sentence. The court's decision concerns whether undisclosed witness statements required a new trial; it does not interpret or apply the elements or requirements of § 14:30.1. opinion →
State v. Minor, the opinion identifies § 14:30.1 as the statute underlying the original charge, but the defendant was convicted of manslaughter and the court did not interpret or apply the elements or requirements of second-degree murder under § 14:30.1. opinion →
State v. Nugent, the statute is cited in the procedural history to identify the offense of conviction and is mentioned again only within the quoted definition of manslaughter. The court's analysis and holding concerned the sudden-passion/heat-of-blood mitigation and the manslaughter verdict, not the meaning, elements, or independent application of La. Stat. Ann. § 14:30.1. opinion →
State v. Ondek, the statute is mentioned only in the procedural history to identify the charge. The court does not interpret, define, or decide any issue about La. Stat. Ann. § 14:30.1. opinion →
State v. Renney, the statute is mentioned to identify the charge in the procedural history; the court affirmed a manslaughter conviction without construing or deciding what § 14:30.1 means or requires. opinion →
State v. Velez, the statute appears only in the decree as the authority for resentencing Vasquez after the court reduced his conviction to second degree murder; the opinion does not interpret or apply any substantive requirement of § 14:30.1. opinion →
State v. Brown, the statute is mentioned only to identify the offense charged in the procedural history. The court does not interpret or apply La. Stat. Ann. § 14:30.1; it addresses suppression issues, harmless error, and habitual-offender sentencing. opinion →
State v. Jenkins, the opinion merely identifies § 14:30.1 as the statute under which the defendant was convicted. The court does not interpret, explain, or apply the statute; its analysis addresses other appellate assignments and whether the evidence supported a manslaughter verdict. opinion →
State v. Boudreaux, the statute is mentioned only to identify the offense charged; the court does not interpret or apply § 14:30.1, and its analysis concerns the admissibility of the defendant's confession and invocation of counsel. opinion →
State v. Murphy, the statute is mentioned only to identify the original charge in the procedural history; the court decided the appeal of the manslaughter sentence and did not interpret or apply La. Stat. Ann. § 14:30.1. opinion →
State v. Jones, the statute is cited only to identify the charge in the procedural history. The court does not interpret or apply the meaning, requirements, or coverage of La. Stat. Ann. § 14:30.1. opinion →
State v. Tucker, the statute is mentioned only to identify the reduced charge in the procedural history; the court does not interpret, explain, or apply § 14:30.1. opinion →
State v. Brewington, the statute is mentioned only to identify the offense for which the defendant was tried. The court decided the admissibility of other-crimes evidence under La. Code Evid. art. 404(B)(1), without interpreting or applying La. Stat. Ann. § 14:30.1. opinion →
State v. Williams, the opinion mentions § 14:30.1 only to identify the offense charged in the procedural history; the court decided the sufficiency of the evidence for manslaughter and the excessiveness of the manslaughter sentence, without construing or applying § 14:30.1. opinion →
State v. Williams, the statute is mentioned only to identify the charges in the procedural history. The court decided whether the defendant's confessions were freely and voluntarily given, not what La. Stat. Ann. § 14:30.1 means or requires. opinion →
State v. Hill, the statute is cited only to identify the offense charged in the procedural history. Although the court recites the general elements of second degree murder while reviewing sufficiency of the evidence, it does not interpret or specifically apply La. Stat. Ann. § 14:30.1; its substantive discussion instead concerns the evidence and principal liability under La.R.S. 14:24. opinion →
State v. Riley, the statute is cited only to identify the offense charged in the procedural history. The court does not interpret, define, or decide how La. Stat. Ann. § 14:30.1 applies; it resolves the appeal on other evidentiary, confession, jury-instruction, and sentencing issues. opinion →
State v. Potter, the statute is cited only to identify the offense underlying the conviction; the court does not interpret, explain, or apply any requirement of La. Stat. Ann. § 14:30.1. opinion →
State v. Ducote, the statute is mentioned only to identify the offense charged in the procedural history; the court does not interpret or apply § 14:30.1. opinion →
State v. Ducote, the opinion cites La.R.S. 14:30.1 only to identify the offense charged. The court decided issues concerning an unsolicited reference to other crimes, mistrial, and credit for time served, without construing or applying this statute. opinion →
State v. Hunter, the statute is cited only to identify the offense charged; the court does not interpret, explain, or apply any requirement of La. Stat. Ann. § 14:30.1. opinion →
State v. Pierre, the statute is mentioned only in the procedural history to identify the offense charged; the court did not interpret or apply La. R.S. 14:30.1. opinion →
State v. Williams, the statute is cited only to identify the charge in the procedural history; the court does not interpret, explain, or apply La.R.S. 14:30.1. opinion →
State v. Williams, the statute is mentioned only in the procedural history to identify the charge in the indictment; the court decided the appeal on sentencing procedure and did not interpret or apply La. Stat. Ann. § 14:30.1. opinion →
State v. Strange, the statute is mentioned only to identify the second-degree-murder charge in the procedural history; the court decided the appeal on limitations to voir dire and did not interpret or apply § 14:30.1. opinion →
State v. Kelly, the statute is mentioned only to identify the charge in the procedural history; the court decided the appeal based on sentencing guidelines and credit for time served, not on the meaning or application of La. R.S. 14:30.1. opinion →
State v. Claiborne, the court merely reports in the procedural history that the charges were amended to second degree murder under La.R.S. 14:30.1; it does not construe, explain, or decide anything about the statute. opinion →
State v. Berniard, the statute is mentioned only to identify the offense of conviction in the procedural history; the court decides an issue concerning the reasonable-doubt jury instruction and preservation of that issue, not the meaning or application of La. Stat. Ann. § 14:30.1. opinion →
State v. Pipkins, the statute is cited only in the procedural history to identify the offense charged. The court did not construe or decide anything about the meaning, requirements, coverage, or application of La. Stat. Ann. § 14:30.1. opinion →
State v. Walters, the statute is mentioned only to identify the offense for which Walters was indicted; the court decided the appeal based on his manslaughter conviction, evidentiary issues, and sentencing, without interpreting or applying La. Stat. Ann. § 14:30.1. opinion →
State v. Copeland, the statute is cited to identify the offense underlying the conviction and indictment. The court did not interpret or apply the elements of La. Stat. Ann. § 14:30.1; its sufficiency discussion focused on whether the manslaughter mitigatory factors of sudden passion or heat of blood were proved. opinion →
State v. Johnson, the statute is cited only to identify the offense underlying one of the defendant's convictions. The court does not interpret, explain, or apply La. Stat. Ann. § 14:30.1; the reversal is based on the admission of other-crimes evidence under evidentiary and mistrial rules. opinion →
State v. Robinson, the statute appears only in the procedural description of the charge in the indictment; the court did not interpret, explain, or apply the requirements of La. Stat. Ann. § 14:30.1. opinion →
State v. Williams, the statute is mentioned only to identify the offense charged in the procedural history. The court decides whether the evidence was sufficient under the Due Process Clause and does not construe or otherwise decide what § 14:30.1 means, requires, or covers. opinion →
State v. Palmer, the statute is mentioned only to identify the amended charge in the procedural history. The court decided the multiple-offender hearing and did not interpret or apply the elements or requirements of La. Stat. Ann. § 14:30.1. opinion →
State v. Smiley, the statute is mentioned only to describe the charge and indictment in the procedural history; the court does not interpret, define, or decide how La.R.S. 14:30.1 applies. opinion →
State v. Gaudet, the statute is cited only to identify the offense of conviction; the court does not construe or apply La. Stat. Ann. § 14:30.1. opinion →
State v. Smith, the court recites the statute's definition while comparing the elements of second degree murder and manslaughter in its double-jeopardy analysis; it does not construe or decide an issue about § 14:30.1 itself. opinion →
State v. Jordan, the statute appears in the procedural history identifying the offense charged, and its definition is quoted only while recounting the trial judge's reasoning. The appellate court affirmed a manslaughter conviction and did not decide what § 14:30.1 means or requires. opinion →
State v. Rubin, the opinion quotes and references La. Stat. Ann. § 14:30.1 to identify the charged offense and discuss possible theories of conviction, but it does not interpret or decide any disputed requirement of the statute. The reversal rests on the admission of informant hearsay and the resulting confrontation and harmless-error analysis. opinion →
State v. Perkins, section 14:30.1 appears only within the defendant's proposed jury instruction. The court did not adopt or construe that statement; it resolved the issue under La. C.Cr.P. art. 807 and the manslaughter statute, La. R.S. 14:31. opinion →
State v. Campbell, the statute is cited only to identify the offense of conviction; the court decides a constitutional challenge to the grand jury selection process and does not interpret or apply § 14:30.1. opinion →
State v. Stracener, the statute is cited only to identify the offense charged. The court decides Miranda admissibility, discovery, and sentencing-credit issues, and does not construe or apply the meaning or requirements of La. Stat. Ann. § 14:30.1. opinion →
State v. Lutcher, the statute is cited only to identify the offense charged in the procedural history; the court's decision concerns juror challenges and does not interpret or apply § 14:30.1. opinion →
State v. Crossley, the statute is mentioned only to identify the offense charged in the procedural history; the court does not interpret or apply La. Stat. Ann. § 14:30.1. opinion →
State v. Pierre, the statute is cited to identify the charged offense, and its definition is recited as background while the court decides whether the evidence disproved self-defense. The court does not interpret or independently hold what § 14:30.1 means or requires. opinion →
State v. Darjean, the statute is mentioned only to identify the offense charged in the procedural history. The court did not interpret, explain, or apply La. R.S. 14:30.1. opinion →
State v. Manuel, the statute is mentioned only to identify the defendant's original charge in the procedural facts; the court decided the appeal based on sentencing and ineffective-assistance issues and did not interpret or apply § 14:30.1. opinion →
State v. Dunbar, the court merely identified the correct statute citation while addressing an indictment-citation error under La. Code Crim.P. art. 464; it did not interpret or apply La. Stat. Ann. § 14:30.1. opinion →
State v. Rice, the statute is mentioned only to identify the offenses charged in the procedural history; the court does not interpret, explain, or apply La. Stat. Ann. § 14:30.1. opinion →
State v. Van Winkle, the opinion cites La.R.S. 14:30.1 only to identify the charge in the procedural and factual background. The court does not interpret, apply, or decide any issue concerning the statute. opinion →
State v. Johnson, the statute is mentioned only to identify the charge in the procedural history. The court did not construe or apply § 14:30.1; its decision addressed the sentence for manslaughter under La.R.S. 14:31 and sentencing law. opinion →
State v. Coates, the court cited § 14:30.1 only as one possible statutory basis for the prior manslaughter theory while resolving the double-jeopardy issue. It did not construe the statute or decide its requirements or application. opinion →
State v. Henry, the statute is mentioned only to report that the indictment was amended before trial. The defendant was convicted of manslaughter under La.R.S. 14:31, and the appellate court addressed only the sufficiency of the evidence for that conviction; it did not construe or apply § 14:30.1. opinion →
State v. Badon, the statute is mentioned only to identify the offense charged in the procedural history; the court does not construe or apply § 14:30.1. opinion →
State v. Clements, the statute is cited only to identify the offense charged; the court decided the resentencing and excessiveness issue for manslaughter, without interpreting or applying La. Stat. Ann. § 14:30.1. opinion →
State v. James, the statute is mentioned only to identify the offense charged in the procedural history. The court's actual analysis concerns the jury instruction and specific intent for attempted manslaughter, not the meaning, requirements, coverage, or application of La. Stat. Ann. § 14:30.1. opinion →
State v. Scott, the statute is mentioned only in the procedural history to identify the charge in the indictment; the court decided the excessiveness of Scott’s manslaughter sentence, not the meaning or application of § 14:30.1. opinion →
State v. Pyke, the court quoted the statute only to identify the sentencing provisions applicable to attempted second degree murder while reviewing whether the fifty-year sentence was excessive; it did not construe or decide what § 14:30.1 means or requires. opinion →
State v. Wiley, the statute appears in the procedural history and in the court's recitation of the manslaughter definition, but the court did not construe La. Stat. Ann. § 14:30.1 or decide its elements or application. The convictions were reversed because the evidence did not establish Wiley's specific intent. opinion →
State v. Johnese, the opinion cites La. R.S. 14:30.1 to identify the charged offense and refers to Article 30.1 within the manslaughter definition, but it does not construe or decide what § 14:30.1 means or requires. The holding concerns whether the trial judge could reduce the jury's second degree murder verdict to manslaughter. opinion →
State v. Hattaway, the statute is cited only in the procedural opening to identify the offense for which Hattaway was convicted. The opinion does not construe § 14:30.1, discuss its elements, or decide how it applies. opinion →
Clarke v. Cain & Ieyoub, the statute appears only in an explanatory footnote comparing second-degree murder and manslaughter while the court evaluates whether counsel's advice about a possible murder indictment was deficient; the court does not construe or decide the statute's application. opinion →
State v. Joe, the statute is cited only to identify the offense charged in the procedural history; the court does not interpret, explain, or apply La. Stat. Ann. § 14:30.1. opinion →
State v. Mitchell, the statute is cited only to identify the amended charge in the procedural history; the court did not interpret, explain, or apply La. Stat. Ann. § 14:30.1. opinion →
State v. Gallow, the opinion cites and quotes La.R.S. 14:30.1 to identify the charged offense, but the court's ruling concerns the sufficiency of circumstantial evidence under the Jackson standard and La.R.S. 15:438; it does not interpret or independently apply § 14:30.1. opinion →
State v. Thames, the court recited the statute's definition while reviewing whether the jury's rejection of manslaughter mitigation was irrational; it did not interpret or decide any issue about the meaning or application of § 14:30.1. opinion →
State v. Stacy, the statute is cited only to identify the offenses charged. The court's holding concerns the scope of voir dire and the exclusion of an accessory-after-the-fact definition from voir dire, not the meaning or application of § 14:30.1. opinion →
State v. Harris, the statute is mentioned only to identify the offense charged in the procedural history. The court’s analysis concerns evidentiary rulings, manslaughter, sentencing, and constitutional excessiveness; it does not interpret or apply La. R.S. 14:30.1. opinion →
State v. Tuckson, the court mentioned § 14:30.1 only to identify the lesser responsive offense after setting aside the first-degree-murder conviction; it did not interpret, construe, or decide any disputed issue about § 14:30.1. opinion →
State v. Leonard, the statute is cited only to identify the offense charged in the procedural history. The court does not interpret, define, or apply La. Stat. Ann. § 14:30.1. opinion →
State v. Foret, the statute is mentioned only to report the amendment of the indictment in the procedural history; the court does not interpret or apply La. R.S. 14:30.1. opinion →
State v. McClain, the statute appears only in the procedural history to identify the amended charge; the court did not interpret, explain, or apply La. R.S. 14:30.1. opinion →
State v. Johnson, the statute appears only in the procedural history to identify the original charge; the court did not interpret or apply La. Stat. Ann. § 14:30.1. opinion →
State v. Ethridge, the court merely recited § 14:30.1(B)'s life-imprisonment penalty while calculating the statutory maximum for an attempted second degree murder under § 14:27(D)(1). It did not interpret or decide any issue about § 14:30.1(B). opinion →
State v. Soraparu, the statute is mentioned only in the procedural history to identify the offense charged; the court does not interpret, apply, or decide anything about La. R.S. 14:30.1. opinion →
State v. Turner, the statute is cited only to identify the offense charged in the procedural history. The court decided the case on a juror challenge and did not interpret or apply La. Stat. Ann. § 14:30.1. opinion →
State v. Burmaster, the statute is mentioned only to identify the offense charged in the procedural history; the court does not interpret, apply, or decide any issue about § 14:30.1. opinion →
State v. Williams, the statute is mentioned only to identify the offense originally charged in the procedural history. The court did not interpret or apply the elements, requirements, or scope of La. R.S. 14:30.1; it reviewed a manslaughter conviction and addressed self-defense and sentencing. opinion →
State v. Humphrey, the statute is mentioned only to identify the charge in the procedural history. The court does not interpret, explain, or apply La. R.S. 14:30.1; it reviews the manslaughter conviction and habitual-offender adjudication. opinion →
State in Interest of DS, the court merely recited the statutory definition while addressing the juvenile's self-defense challenge and the sufficiency of the evidence; it did not construe or decide any issue about § 14:30.1. opinion →
State v. Rubin, the court quoted § 14:30.1 to identify the charged offense's elements, but did not interpret or otherwise decide an issue about the statute. The decision concerned whether the evidence was sufficient under Jackson, and the court expressly said the statutory occurrence of murder was not disputed. opinion →
State v. Johnson, the opinion mentions § 14:30.1 only to identify the offense after the charge was amended; it does not interpret or apply the statute. opinion →
State v. Schmidt, the statute is mentioned only to identify the offense charged; the court decides evidentiary issues concerning other-acts evidence and DNA analysis, without construing or applying La. R.S. 14:30.1. opinion →
State v. Jackson, the statute is mentioned only to identify the offense of conviction in the case background; the court does not interpret, apply, or decide any issue about La. R.S. 14:30.1. opinion →
United States v. Barnett, the court cites La.R.S. 14:30.1(B) only to compare the penalty for state second-degree murder with the defendants’ potential penalties and assess the likelihood of retaliation; it does not interpret or decide any issue about the statute. opinion →
State v. Mire, the opinion merely identifies the offense charged under La. R.S. 14:30.1; the court does not interpret, define, or apply the statute, and its decision concerns the denial of further neurological and neuropsychological testing. opinion →
State v. Duke, the statute is mentioned only to identify the original charge in the procedural history; the court does not interpret or apply La. R.S. 14:30.1. opinion →
State v. Hardy, the statute is mentioned only in the procedural history to identify the offense charged in the indictment; the court did not construe or decide anything about La. R.S. 14:30.1. opinion →
State v. Walker, the statute is mentioned only in the procedural history as the statute allegedly violated by the second degree murder conviction; the court decided an issue concerning the trial judge's comment to the jury under La.Code Crim.P. art. 772, not the meaning or application of La. Stat. Ann. § 14:30.1. opinion →
State v. Anderson, the statute appears in the procedural history as the State’s response to the bill of particulars. The court did not interpret or apply § 14:30.1; its holding concerned whether the indictment needed to charge the defendant as a principal, relying on the law governing principals to a crime. opinion →
State v. Eames, the statute is mentioned only in the procedural history to identify the charge; the court does not interpret, apply, or decide anything about La. R.S. 14:30.1. opinion →
State v. Lindsey, the court merely recites the statutory definition while discussing the materiality of allegedly suppressed intoxication evidence in a Brady claim; it does not construe or decide the application of § 14:30.1. opinion →
State v. Evans, the statute is cited only to identify the charge in the procedural history. The court decided a competency issue and did not interpret, apply, or otherwise hold anything about La. Stat. Ann. § 14:30.1. opinion →
State v. Adams, the statute is cited to identify the original charge, while the court affirmed a manslaughter conviction and addressed sufficiency of the evidence and jury instructions. It did not construe or apply the requirements of La. Stat. Ann. § 14:30.1. opinion →
State v. Webb, the court did not construe or independently decide an issue under § 14:30.1. It recited the statute's definition and punishment to explain the original charge and the benefit of the plea while reviewing whether the manslaughter sentence was excessive. opinion →
State v. Smith, the statute is cited only in the procedural history to identify the amended charge. The court does not interpret, define, or decide how La. Stat. Ann. § 14:30.1 applies; its holding concerns conflict-free counsel and reversal for a new trial. opinion →
State v. Hankton, the statute appears only in the procedural history to identify the offense of conviction; the court does not interpret, explain, or apply any requirement of La. Stat. Ann. § 14:30.1. opinion →
State v. LeBlanc, the statute is cited in a string of authorities during the court's analysis of an erroneous jury instruction for attempted first-degree murder. The court did not construe or decide what La. R.S. 14:30.1 means or requires; its ruling concerned the attempted-murder instruction, preservation, and harmless error. opinion →
State v. Singleton, the statute is mentioned only to identify the offense charged; the court does not interpret or apply La. Stat. Ann. § 14:30.1. opinion →
State v. Miller, the opinion cites and recites § 14:30.1 as the offense charged, but it does not interpret or establish a rule about the statute. The conviction was affirmed based on the sufficiency of the evidence concerning self-defense and manslaughter. opinion →
State v. Breland, the court mentions § 14:30.1 B only to identify the statutory maximum sentence for the conviction while reviewing whether the sentences were excessive; it does not interpret or otherwise decide what § 14:30.1 means or requires. opinion →
State v. McCullough, the statute is cited only to identify the charges against three defendants; the court does not interpret or apply La. Stat. Ann. § 14:30.1. The decision instead addresses suppression of testimony and the alleged illegality of plea-agreement promises under La.R.S. 14:118(A)(1)(d). opinion →
State v. Buffington, the statute is mentioned only in the procedural history to identify the offense charged. The court did not interpret or apply La. R.S. 14:30.1; its holdings addressed plea-discussion evidence, suppression of statements, and other-crimes evidence. opinion →
State v. Davis, the court cited § 14:30.1 only as one component of calculating the defendant’s asserted maximum sentencing exposure; it did not interpret the statute or decide a legal issue about its meaning or application. opinion →
State v. Brooks, the statute appears only in the procedural history to identify the offense charged. The court decided evidentiary issues concerning self-defense, victim character, prior threats, and expert testimony, but did not interpret or decide what La. R.S. 14:30.1 means, requires, or how it applies. opinion →
State v. Byes, the court merely recites the statute's definition while analyzing the sufficiency of the evidence and self-defense; it does not interpret § 14:30.1 or decide a dispute about its meaning, requirements, coverage, or application. opinion →
State v. Bannister, the court merely recited the statute's definition while reviewing whether the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction; it did not construe, interpret, or decide a disputed issue about La. Stat. Ann. § 14:30.1. opinion →
State v. Pickens, the statute is mentioned only in the procedural history to identify the original charge; the court did not interpret or apply La. Stat. Ann. § 14:30.1. opinion →
State v. Pickrom, La. R.S. 14:30.1 is mentioned only to identify the offense for which the defendant was tried; the opinion addresses the sufficiency of the evidence for the responsive manslaughter conviction and other trial errors, without interpreting or applying the second-degree-murder statute. opinion →
State v. Roberts, the court cited La. R.S. 14:30.1 B only to state the statutory maximum as background for evaluating the excessiveness of the defendant's attempted second-degree-murder sentence; it did not construe or decide anything about the statute itself. opinion →
State v. Revader, the statute is mentioned only in the procedural history to identify the offense charged; the court does not interpret, apply, or decide anything about La. R.S. 14:30.1. opinion →
State v. Alexis, the court recited the statutory definition as part of its Jackson sufficiency-of-the-evidence analysis; it did not construe § 14:30.1 or decide an independent question about the statute’s meaning, requirements, or scope. opinion →
State v. Adams, La.R.S. 14:30.1 appears in the charging history and in a footnote reproducing its definition, but the court did not interpret or apply that statute. The decision concerns La.R.S. 15:171 and whether its expedited-trial language creates an enforceable time limit. opinion →
State v. Bratton, the statute is mentioned only to identify the offense of conviction in the procedural history; the court does not interpret, construe, or apply La. R.S. 14:30.1. opinion →
State v. Miles, the statute is cited only to identify the second-degree-murder charge. The court does not interpret or apply La. R.S. 14:30.1; it decides evidentiary and trial-error issues. opinion →
State v. Brooks, the statute appears only in the procedural history to identify the charge; the court does not interpret or apply La. R.S. 14:30.1. opinion →
State v. Rogers, the statute is mentioned only to identify the offense charged; the court does not construe, explain, or decide any issue about La. R.S. 14:30.1. opinion →
State v. Etienne, the statute is mentioned only in the procedural history as the statute underlying the original second-degree-murder charge; the court decides the appeal based on the excessiveness of the manslaughter sentence and does not interpret or apply § 14:30.1. opinion →
State v. Owens, the opinion merely reports that the defendant's prior indictment charged second degree murder under La. R.S. 14:30.1, as part of the procedural history of the habitual-offender adjudication. The court does not interpret, apply, or decide anything about this statute. opinion →
State v. Isaac, the court merely recited the statutory definition of second degree murder while addressing whether the evidence supported Isaac's manslaughter conviction; it did not construe or decide any issue about La. R.S. 14:30.1. opinion →
State v. Gipson, the statute is mentioned only in the procedural history to identify the charge. The court's decision concerns the sufficiency of the identification evidence and does not construe or decide anything about La. R.S. 14:30.1. opinion →
State v. Dotson, the statute is mentioned only to identify the offense charged; the court does not interpret or apply § 14:30.1 and instead decides a Miranda/Edwards counsel-and-suppression issue. opinion →
State v. Birklett, the statute is mentioned only to identify the offense of conviction. The court decides issues concerning suppression, ineffective assistance of counsel, and other-crimes evidence, without interpreting or applying La. R.S. 14:30.1. opinion →
State v. LaCaze, the statute is cited only to identify the offense charged in the procedural background; the court does not construe or apply La. Stat. Ann. § 14:30.1. opinion →
State v. Duvall, the statute is cited only to identify the offense charged in the procedural history; the court does not interpret, explain, or apply La. R.S. 14:30.1. opinion →
State v. Sarkozy, the statute is mentioned only in the procedural history to identify the offense charged; the court decided the excessive-sentence issue under the manslaughter statute and did not construe or apply § 14:30.1. opinion →
State v. Holmes, the statute is mentioned only in the procedural history to identify the charges in the indictment. The court decided whether the sentences for the resulting manslaughter and attempted manslaughter convictions were constitutionally excessive, and did not interpret or decide anything about La. R.S. 14:30.1. opinion →
State v. Smith, the statute is mentioned only to identify the original charge in the procedural history. The court did not interpret, apply, or decide anything about the meaning or requirements of La. R.S. 14:30.1; it addressed whether the defendant could seek review of sentences imposed under a plea agreement. opinion →
State v. Porter, the statute is cited only to identify the offense of conviction in the procedural history; the court does not interpret or apply § 14:30.1. opinion →
State v. Hundley, the statute is mentioned only to identify the charge in the procedural history. The court does not interpret § 14:30.1, discuss its elements, or decide how it applies. opinion →
State v. Young, the opinion mentions La. R.S. 14:30.1 only as part of the original charge in the procedural history. The charge was later amended, and the court decided sufficiency of the evidence for attempted simple robbery and second degree battery, not the meaning or application of the second degree murder statute. opinion →
State v. James, the statute is mentioned only in the procedural history as the offense charged; the court did not interpret, explain, or apply La. Stat. Ann. § 14:30.1. opinion →
State v. Carter, the statute appears only in the procedural history as the statute underlying the original charge. The court affirmed a manslaughter conviction and did not construe or decide what La. R.S. 14:30.1 means, requires, or how it applies. opinion →
State v. Wesley, the statute is cited only to identify the offense of conviction in the procedural history. The court does not interpret, explain, or apply La. R.S. 14:30.1; its holdings concern other criminal-procedure provisions. opinion →
State v. Ventry, the court recites the statutory definition while reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence and self-defense claim; it does not interpret, develop, or independently decide an issue concerning La. Stat. Ann. § 14:30.1. opinion →
State v. Haynes, the court mentioned § 14:30.1 while resolving an ineffective-assistance claim about counsel's voir dire remarks. It did not construe the statute or decide a statute-specific issue; the statement about the required intent was background supporting its conclusion that counsel's brief misstatement was harmless. opinion →
State v. Guy, the statute is cited to identify the offense and sentencing range during the excessive-sentence discussion; the court does not interpret, construe, or decide a rule about § 14:30.1 itself. opinion →
State v. Derouselle, the court recited the statute's definition only to identify the offense and expressly stated that the defendant was not challenging the statutory elements; the decision concerned proof of identity, not the meaning or application of § 14:30.1. opinion →
State v. McGrew, the statute is cited only to identify the offense of conviction in the procedural history. Although the opinion reviews whether the evidence was sufficient to support the convictions, it does not construe, explain, or apply any requirement of § 14:30.1. opinion →
State v. George, the court mentions § 14:30.1 only to describe the original charge in the procedural history. It does not interpret or decide anything about the statute; the opinion instead concerns the insanity defense, expert testimony, closing argument, recusal, and sentencing. opinion →
State v. Sorina, the statute appears only in the procedural history to identify the offense charged. The court decides the appeal-turned-supervisory-writ under the insanity-acquittee conditional-release provisions of La. C.Cr.P. arts. 657 and 657.1, and does not interpret or apply La. R.S. 14:30.1. opinion →
State v. Hurst, the statute is cited only to identify the offense charged in the procedural history; the court decided the appeal on evidentiary, jury-instruction, plea, suppression, and sentencing issues and did not interpret or apply § 14:30.1. opinion →
State v. Clements, the statute is cited only to identify the original charge in the procedural history; the court did not interpret or apply § 14:30.1. opinion →
State v. Walker, the statute is mentioned only to identify the charge in the procedural history; the court affirmed a manslaughter conviction without interpreting or applying the elements or requirements of La. R.S. 14:30.1. opinion →
State v. Callegari, the statute is mentioned only as part of the procedural history identifying the original charge. The court affirmed a conviction for aggravated battery and did not interpret or decide anything about the meaning, requirements, coverage, or application of La. Stat. Ann. § 14:30.1. opinion →
State v. Bennett, the statute is mentioned only to identify the offense charged; the court does not interpret, explain, or apply La. R.S. 14:30.1. opinion →
State v. McBride, the statute is mentioned only to identify the original charge in the procedural history; the court did not interpret or apply § 14:30.1. opinion →
State v. McZeal, the court merely recited the statute's definition while reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence; it did not interpret or decide the meaning, requirements, scope, or application of § 14:30.1. opinion →
State v. Guss, the statute appears only in the indictment's procedural history and in a quoted statement of general law from State v. Girod. The court was deciding the sufficiency of the evidence for attempted first-degree murder, not construing or applying § 14:30.1. opinion →
State v. Clark, the statute is mentioned only to identify the offense charged in the procedural history; the court does not interpret or apply La. R.S. 14:30.1, and the appeal is resolved on the issue of the incomplete trial record. opinion →
State v. Goodley, the statute appears in the indictment, the State's theory, and the recited jury instruction, but the court does not construe or apply § 14:30.1. The reversal rests on the failure to instruct on manslaughter's felony-theft alternative and on the grades of theft. opinion →
State v. Johnson, the statute appears only in the procedural history to identify the offense of conviction; the court did not interpret, explain, or apply any requirement of La. R.S. 14:30.1. opinion →
State v. Williams, the statute is cited only to identify the offense charged in the procedural history; the court decided the appeal on the manslaughter conviction and did not interpret or apply La. R.S. 14:30.1. opinion →
State v. Barrois, the statute is cited only to identify the original charge in the procedural history. The conviction and sentence reviewed were for the reduced charge of manslaughter, and the court did not construe or apply § 14:30.1 as the basis for its decision. opinion →
State v. Sholes, the statute appears only in the procedural history to identify the charge. The court did not construe or explain § 14:30.1; its sufficiency discussion addressed the evidence and the defendant's identity, so the citation is incidental. opinion →
State v. Robichaux, the court mentions La. R.S. 14:30.1 to identify the offense and its sentencing range while reviewing whether the sentence was excessive; it does not interpret or otherwise decide an issue about the statute. opinion →
State v. Gibson, the court cited La. R.S. 14:30.1 only to explain that the defendant received a mandatory sentence and therefore was not prejudiced by the missing sentencing transcript. It did not interpret, apply, or decide any issue about what the statute means or requires. opinion →
State v. Hall, the court merely recited the felonies enumerated in § 14:30.1 as background while addressing whether the defendant understood the manslaughter charge and whether his guilty plea was voluntary. It did not construe, decide the scope of, or apply the second-degree-murder statute. opinion →
State v. Jones, section 14:30.1 is mentioned only to identify the offense charged. The court decided the admissibility of prior recorded testimony under La.C.E. art. 804(B)(1), not the meaning, requirements, coverage, or application of § 14:30.1. opinion →
State v. Sprinkle, the court quoted § 14:30.1 to identify the charged offense during its sufficiency review, but it did not construe the statute or decide a question about its meaning or requirements. Its holding concerned whether the evidence disproved self-defense and supported the conviction. opinion →
State v. Womack-Grey, the statute is cited only to identify the offense underlying the conviction; the court does not interpret, explain, or apply any requirement of La. Stat. Ann. § 14:30.1. opinion →
State v. Walker, the statute appears only in a footnote reporting the basis of the Defendant's original second degree murder conviction; the court did not interpret, apply, or decide anything about La. Stat. Ann. § 14:30.1. opinion →
State v. Mitchell, the majority cites La. Stat. Ann. § 14:30.1 only to identify the offenses originally charged and does not construe or decide the statute's requirements; the convictions affirmed were for manslaughter and aggravated battery. The dissent's separate discussion of the statute was not the court's holding. opinion →
State v. Currie, the statute is mentioned only in the procedural history to identify the offense charged. The court does not interpret or apply La. R.S. 14:30.1; its substantive holding concerns whether the defendant proved insanity under La. R.S. 14:14. opinion →
State v. Jones, the court mentions § 14:30.1 in describing the charge and reciting the definition of second-degree murder while explaining that the jury returned the responsive verdict of manslaughter. It does not construe or apply § 14:30.1; its sufficiency ruling concerns the manslaughter convictions and self-defense. opinion →
State v. Nightengale, the statute is cited only to identify the offense of conviction; the court does not interpret, explain, or apply any requirement of La. Stat. Ann. § 14:30.1. opinion →
State Ex Rel. Dj, the statute appears only in a citation identifying the offense underlying the juvenile delinquency charge. The court's holding concerns juveniles' constitutional right to a jury trial under the Children's Code, not the meaning, requirements, coverage, or application of La. Stat. Ann. § 14:30.1. opinion →
State ex rel. D.J., the court cited La. R.S. 14:30.1 only to identify the adult offense and compare its maximum penalty with juvenile detention; its holding concerned the constitutional right to a jury trial in juvenile proceedings, not the meaning or application of this statute. opinion →
State v. Pierre, the statute is mentioned only to identify the offenses in the amended indictment; the court decided the validity of the defendant’s jury-trial waiver, not the meaning, requirements, coverage, or application of La. Stat. Ann. § 14:30.1. opinion →
State v. Kemp, the opinion mentions La. Stat. Ann. § 14:30.1 only in describing the offenses charged and does not interpret, apply, or decide anything about the statute's meaning or requirements. opinion →
State v. Prudhomme, the statute is mentioned only in the procedural history as the charge in the indictment; the court did not construe or decide any issue about La. Stat. Ann. § 14:30.1. opinion →
State v. Woods, the statute appears only in the procedural history to identify the offense charged. The court did not interpret, apply, or decide any issue about the meaning or requirements of La. R.S. 14:30.1. opinion →
State v. Thornton, the court merely recited the statutory definition while applying Jackson sufficiency-of-the-evidence review; it did not interpret or otherwise decide a question about § 14:30.1. opinion →
State v. Wright, the statute is mentioned only to identify the offense charged in the procedural history. The court's discussion of sufficiency concerns the evidence and does not construe or otherwise make a holding about § 14:30.1. opinion →
State v. Gaddis, the court merely recited the statutory definition while discussing the sufficiency-of-the-evidence and self-defense issues; it did not construe § 14:30.1 or decide a question specifically about that statute. opinion →
State v. Lindsey, the court merely recites the statutory definition while explaining the relevance of the intoxication defense; it does not interpret, apply, or decide any issue concerning La. Stat. Ann. § 14:30.1. opinion →
State v. Harrison, the statute is mentioned only to identify the charge in the procedural history; the court did not interpret, explain, or apply La. Stat. Ann. § 14:30.1. opinion →
State v. Howard, the statute is mentioned only in the procedural history as part of the original attempted second degree murder charge. The court reviewed sentences for reduced aggravated battery and simple robbery convictions and did not construe or apply La. Stat. Ann. § 14:30.1. opinion →
State v. Simmons, the court mentions § 14:30.1(B) only while quoting a sentencing principle from State v. Guy; it did not construe or apply this statute to Simmons's convictions. opinion →
State v. Jean, the opinion merely identifies the statute as the offense underlying Jean's prior murder conviction. The court decides a Louisiana Public Records Law issue and does not interpret, apply, or otherwise decide anything about La. Stat. Ann. § 14:30.1. opinion →
State v. Hailey, the statute appears only in the statement of the case to identify the offense charged; the court did not interpret or apply the elements, requirements, scope, or meaning of La. R.S. 14:30.1. opinion →
State v. Sykes, the statute appears only in the procedural history to identify the charge in the amended bill. The court did not interpret, explain, or apply La. Stat. Ann. § 14:30.1. opinion →
State v. Kang, the statute is mentioned only in the procedural history to identify the charge; the court's holding concerns whether the trial judge properly denied a challenge for cause to a prospective juror, not the meaning or application of La. R.S. 14:30.1. opinion →
State v. Cheavious, the statute is mentioned in the procedural history to identify the charged offense and is not construed or applied in a ruling about what § 14:30.1 means or requires. opinion →
State v. Favorite, the court mentioned La.R.S. 14:30.1 only to describe the original charge and its sentencing consequence while reviewing the excessiveness challenge; it did not interpret or decide an issue about the statute. opinion →
State of Louisiana v. Sias, the statute is mentioned only in the procedural history to identify the offense charged; the court did not interpret or apply La. Stat. Ann. § 14:30.1. opinion →
State v. Sias, section 14:30.1 appears only in the procedural history as one of the statutes underlying the original attempted-murder charge; the court did not interpret, apply, or decide anything about the statute. opinion →
…and 885 more.

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