La. Stat. Ann. § 15:529.1

When the third felony and two prior felonies are qualifying serious offenses, Section 15:529.1(A)(3)(b) mandates imprisonment for the remainder of the offender's natural life without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence.

State of Louisiana v. Jones · filed 2013-02-06(A)(3)(b)

As can be seen by reference to La.R.S. 15:529.1(A)(3)(b), 3 the defendant‟s life sentences are, in fact, mandatory.

Section 15:529.1(A)(3)(b) mandates life imprisonment when a third felony offender's third felony and two prior felonies charged in the multiple bill are defined as crimes of violence under La. R.S. 14:2(B).

State of Louisiana v. Theophile · filed 2019-12-11(A)(3)(b)

Thus, the Sims trial court, unlike the judge in the instant case, was not presented with applying 15:529.1A(3)(b), which provides that where a third felony and two prior felonies charged in the multiple bill are defined as crimes of violence under La. R.S. 14:2(B), the person shall be incarcerated to a term of life imprisonment. Contrary to Defendant’s suggestion, it was not left to the trial court’s discretion - a life sentence was indeed mandated.

Under subsection (G), sentencing conditions imposed under the habitual-offender law are additions to, rather than replacements for, the conditions required for the underlying felony.

State v. Robinson · filed 2011-02-18(G)

Although the “at hard labor” language was added to La. R.S. 15:529.1(G) by Act 69 of 2010, the addition of that condition to the habitual offender law did not modify the sentencing provisions of any underlying felony offense. A sentence enhanced under the habitual offender statute is computed by referring to the underlying offense. State v. Richard, 550 So.2d 300 (La.App. 2 Cir.1989). As this Court observed in Richard, the sentence conditions required by La. R.S. 15:529.1(G) are additions to, rather than replacements of, those conditions required by the sentencing provision for the underlying offense.

Section 15:529.1(G) requires a sentence imposed under the habitual-offender statute to be at hard labor and without benefit of probation or suspension of sentence.

State v. Stewart · filed 2011-05-10(G)

Additionally, it is noted that the Louisiana Legislature amended La. R.S. 15:529.1(G) in the 2010 Regular Session (Act No. 69), effective date, August 15, 2010, to provide that any sentence imposed under the provisions of this Section shall be at hard labor without benefit of probation or suspension of sentence. Therefore, none of the errors patent found on review require correction.

Section 15:529.1(G) requires a habitual-offender sentence to be at hard labor without probation or suspension of sentence, while the underlying felony’s sentencing provisions govern parole restrictions.

State v. Shoupe · filed 2011-06-22(G)

We note an error patent on the face of the record. La. R.S. 15:529.1(G) provides that any sentence imposed under the provisions of this section (Habitual Offender Law) shall be at hard labor without benefit of probation or suspension of sentence. Regarding the imposition of a sentence without benefit of parole, the conditions imposed on the sentence are those called for in the sentencing provisions for the underlying felony offense.

Subsection (G) requires a sentence imposed under the habitual-offender provisions to be at hard labor without benefit of probation or suspension of sentence, but it does not prohibit parole.

State v. Humphreys · filed 2013-05-15(G)

Neither statute denies the offender the benefit of parole. Therefore, we amend the defendant’s sentence to delete the prohibition against parole.

Section 15:529.1(G)'s hard-labor condition does not change the sentencing provisions for the underlying felony.

State v. Faggard · filed 2016-01-13(G)

Further, to the extent that defendant argues that the trial court erred in ordering his enhanced sentence to be served at hard labor, we note that although the -“at hard labor” language was added to. La. R.S. 15:529.1(G) in 2010, the |2naddition of that condition to the habitual offender law did not modify the sentencing provisions of any underlying felony offense.

Section 15:529.1(G) requires a multiple-offender sentence to be imposed without benefit of probation or suspension of sentence, while the fifteen-day delay in subsection (D)(1)(a) cannot be challenged when the defendant does not object and counsel is ready to proceed.

State of Louisiana v. George Jameson Gray, III · filed 2011-03-09(G); (D)(1)(a)

However, the sentencing transcript reveals that the judge imposed the Defendant’s sentence without benefit of probation or suspension of sentence, as required by La.R.S. 15:529.1(G). ... Defendant made no request to postpone the adjudication hearing, and he made no objection at the hearing pertaining to the trial court’s failure to observe the fifteen-day delay required by La.R.S. 15:529.1(D)(1)(a). Thus, any objection to an untimely hearing cannot be raised now, when no objection was made prior to or at the hearing and where counsel announced at the hearing that he was ready to proceed.

For a habitual offender convicted of a fourth or subsequent felony, the sentence must be at least the longest sentence prescribed for a first conviction, but never less than twenty years and no more than natural life.

State v. Ellison · filed 2015-01-25(A)(l)(c)(i)

However, because the State is correct in its assertion that defendant’s habitual offender sentence is illegally lenient, see La. R.S. 40:966(B)(1) (as amended by 2004 La. Acts. 345) (“shall be sentenced to imprisonment for not less than five nor more than fifty years at hard labor at least five years of which shall be served without benefit of probation, or' suspension of sentence, and may, in addition, be required to pay a fine of not more than fifty thousand dollars”); La. R.S. 15:529.1(A)(l)(c)(i) (as amended by 2005 La. Acts. 218) (“not less than the longest prescribed for a first conviction but in no event less than twenty years and not more than his natural life”), the matter is remanded to the District Court for resen-tencing.

Section 15:529.1 requires the state in a habitual-offender proceeding to prove a prior felony and that fewer than ten years elapsed between release from custody on that offense and the new offense.

State v. Martin · filed 2018-02-27(A)-(D)

In a habitual offender proceeding, the state has the burden of proving that the defendant was convicted of a prior felony and that the ten-year cleansing period has not elapsed between the defendant's release from custody on the prior offense and the commission of the new offense.

Section 15:529.1(A)(l)(c)(i) sets a fourth-offender sentence at no less than twenty years when the underlying offense carries a maximum term below life, subject to constitutional excessiveness review.

State v. Boutte · filed 2011-03-09(A)(l)(c)(i)

Because the maximum sentence is a term less than the defendant’s natural life, the penalty for his fourth offense adjudication is “a determinate term not less than the longest prescribed for a first conviction but in no event less than twenty years and not more than his natural life.” La.R.S. 15:529.1(A)(l)(c)(i).

Section 15:529.1(A)(4)(a) imposes a sentencing range of twenty years to life on a fourth felony offender, and a court may depart below the mandatory minimum only when clear and convincing evidence shows the offender is exceptional and the sentence is constitutionally excessive.

State v. Parker · filed 2013-03-20(A)(4)(a)

Under the Habitual Offender Law, the penalty for a fourth felony offender is imprisonment “for a determinate term not less than the longest prescribed for a first conviction but in no event less than twenty years and not more than his natural life.” La. R.S. 15:529.1(A)(4)(a). Pursuant to this statute, the defendant faced a sentencing range of twenty years to life. The trial court in this case imposed the mandatory minimum sentence. ... In this case, while a twenty year sentence for attempted simple burglary is harsh, the defendant has failed to make a showing by clear and convincing evidence that he is exceptional to require a downward departure from 117the mandatory minimum under the current facts and circumstances. Therefore, we do not find the sentence was unconstitutionally excessive.

Section 15:529.1(D)(3) does not require written reasons when the court gives oral reasons showing that it considered the State’s documents and found them sufficient to prove the prior convictions.

State of Louisiana v. Foster · filed 2011-03-16(D)(3)

Defendant argues the record does not contain written reasons for his adjudication in violation of La.R.S. 15:529.1(D)(3). “[W]ritten reasons are not required if the court presents oral reasons to show that it had considered the State’s documents and found them to be sufficient to prove the prior convictions.”

Section 15:529.1(D)(3) does not require written reasons for a habitual-offender adjudication when the court gives oral reasons showing that it considered the State’s documents and found them sufficient to prove the prior convictions.

State v. Foster · filed 2011-03-16(D)(3)

Defendant argues the record does not contain written reasons for his adjudication in violation of La.R.S. 15:529.1(D)(3). “[Wjritten reasons are not required if the court presents oral reasons to show that it had considered the State’s documents and found them to be sufficient to prove the prior convictions.”

Subsection (D)(3) requires reasons for a habitual-offender determination, but transcribed oral reasons that are part of the record satisfy the written-reasons requirement, and the failure to provide separate written reasons is harmless error.

State of Louisiana v. Papillion · filed 2011-05-04(D)(3)

Likewise, we find that the trial court’s oral reasons given for finding Defendant to be a third felony offender in the instant case, which were transcribed and form part of the record, satisfy the statutory requirement of providing written reasons for the trial court’s habitual offender determination and that the trial court’s failure to provide written reasons constituted harmless error. Accordingly, this assignment of error has no merit.

Section 15:529.1(D)(3) requires the trial court to provide written reasons for its habitual-offender determination, but failure to do so may be harmless when the record contains oral reasons and sufficient supporting evidence.

State v. Robinson · filed 2012-11-14(D)(3)

La. R.S. 15:529.1 D(3) requires a trial court to provide written reasons for its habitual offender determination.

Section 15:529.1(D)(3)'s written-reasons requirement does not require the trial court to articulate sentencing reasons when imposing the statute's mandatory sentence.

State of Louisiana v. William Chester Farry Jr. AKA William Chester Farry AKA William C. Farry AKA William Farry · filed 2016-11-16(D)(3)

In this case, the trial judge noted that he had no discretion in sentencing as there was one penalty, and he did not articulate reasons for the sentence. Following, the trial judge imposed the mandatory sentence of life imprisonment without the benefit of parole, probation or suspension of sentence. Pursuant to Williams, we find the trial court did not err in failing to articulate reasons for the mandatory sentence. This assignment lacks merit.

Section 15:529.1 requires advisement of a defendant's rights before accepting an admission in a habitual-offender proceeding, while subsection (D)(2) does not require the defendant's presence when the court renders its habitual-offender findings.

State v. Robinson · filed 2011-04-20(D)(1)(a), (D)(2)

The habitual offender statute provides that following a contradictory hearing, a defendant shall be adjudicated a second, third or fourth felony offender. The statute makes no requirement for presence of the defendant upon rendition of the court’s findings. La. R.S. 15:529.1(D)(2). ... Before accepting a defendant’s admission that he is a multiple offender, the trial judge must specifically advise the defendant of his right to a formal hearing, his right to require the state to prove his identity as a multiple offender, and his right to remain silent. La. R.S. 15:529.1(D); State v. Brown, 42,188 (La.App.2d Cir.9/26/07), 966 So.2d 727.

Section 15:529.1 does not require a defendant to be told that a guilty plea may later support a multiple-offender bill, and its no-benefits sentencing restriction operates automatically.

State v. Howard · filed 2011-04-26(A)(1)(c)(i), (G)

The State asserted that, even though the guilty pleas were taken on the same day, they constitute independent charges under La. R.S. 15:529.1. ... We find the State’s argument convincing. ... Finally, there is no requirement that a defendant be informed that a guilty plea and conviction may be used as the basis for the filing of a future multiple offender bill. ... Thus, the failure of a defendant to be advised of the sentencing exposure in the predicate offenses or that his guilty pleas could be later used to enhance future convictions does not render his predicate pleas invalid. ... However, because a statute’s requirement that a defendant be sentenced without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence is self-activating, no corrective action is required by this Court.

Section 15:529.1(G) requires a habitual-offender sentence to be served without benefit of probation or suspension of sentence.

State v. Cyrus · filed 2012-07-05(G)

Additionally, the trial court did not require that each sentence be served without the benefit of probation or suspension of sentence, as required by La. R.S. 15:529.1(G) of the Habitual Offender Law. ... Thus, both the original and third-felony habitual offender sentences imposed for both convictions for simple burglary of an inhabited dwelling were illegally lenient.

Section 15:529.1 permits an out-of-state conviction to support habitual-offender enhancement only when it is a valid conviction for a crime that would be a Louisiana felony.

State v. Sutton · filed 2016-12-14(A)

Though not exactly factually on point, these two cases hold that where it is shown that the predicate conviction is invalid for use for enhancement under La. R.S. 15:529.1, a court may, on appeal and pursuant to the authority found in La. C.Cr.P. art. 882, correct the illegal habitual offender sentence. In the instant case, we find that since the enhanced sentence was based on the invalid conviction from Texas used as a predicate in the habitual offender bill of information, the enhanced sentence is illegal and may be corrected under La. C.Cr.P. art. 882.

Subsection (G) requires the restrictions on parole, probation, and suspension of sentence for a habitual-offender sentence to follow those imposed by the reference statute.

State v. Brown · filed 2018-02-21(G)

Therefore, we find that La. R.S. 15:529.1(G) and La. R.S. 14:95.1(B) required that defendant's entire twenty-year enhanced sentence be imposed without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence.

A defendant must timely file a written response stating with particularity any challenge to an alleged predicate conviction or lose appellate review; for a fourth felony punishable below life, the enhanced term is at least twenty years and no more than life, subject to constitutional departure.

State of Louisiana v. Jones · filed 2011-04-27(D)(1)(b), (A)(4)(a)

The record is void of a written response to the habitual offender bill of information filed by Defendant as required by La.R.S. 15:529.1(D)(1)(b). ... Considering the record at hand, Defendant did not preserve the issue for review on appeal. Defendant did not file a written response to the habitual offender bill of information as required by La.R.S. 15:529.1(D)(1)(b). Although Defendant objected to the State’s description of what the documents proved and to the trial court’s ruling, he did not specifically address whether the State had established his conviction for the predicate offense. As such, Defendant did not set forth a claim and factual basis with particularity as required by La.R.S. 15:529.1(D)(1)(b). Briscoe, 779 So.2d 30. Without a contemporaneous objection to preserve the issue, Defendant waived the right to appellate review of that issue. ... Because the underlying conviction for unauthorized use of a motor vehicle is punishable by a term of imprisonment less than Defendant’s natural life, pursuant to La.R.S. 15:529.1(A)(4)(a), Defendant’s enhanced sentencing exposure is twenty years to life imprisonment. Defendant’s thirty-year sentence is in the lower range of possible sentences.

Section 15.529.1(D)(1) requires a defendant to file a written response setting forth with particularity a constitutional challenge to an alleged predicate conviction, and § 15.529.1(D)(1)(b) makes that response necessary to preserve the challenge.

State of Louisiana v. Morehead · filed 2018-02-15(D)(1), (D)(1)(b)

Furthermore, and to the extent the defendant contests the sufficiency of the evidence contained within State’s Exhibit-1, we note that the defendant did not file written objections to the habitual offender allegations, as required by La.R.S. 15:529.1(D)(1): ... Thus, La.R.S. 15:529.1(D)(1)(b) required the defendant to “set forth his claim” as now alleged in his response to the habitual offender bill of information.

Section 15.529.1(D)(1)(b) requires a defendant to state with particularity in a written response any constitutional challenge to a prior conviction alleged in a habitual-offender bill in order to preserve that challenge.

State v. Morehead · filed 2018-02-15(D)(1)(b)

Thus, La.R.S. 15.529.1(D)(1)(b) required the defendant to "set forth his claim" as now alleged in his response to the habitual offender bill of information. Neither do we find merit in the defendant's contention that La.R.S. 15.529.1(D)(1) requires a defendant only to complain of a defect in the bill. Rather, the plain language of the statute shows that such a response is required to preserve a claim that "a conviction alleged in the information" was obtained in violation of the state or federal constitutions.

Section 15:529.1(D)(1)(b) requires a defendant challenging an alleged predicate conviction to file a written response stating the claim and factual basis with particularity before sentence, or the challenge is waived.

State v. Jones · filed 2011-04-27(D)(1)(b)

Considering the record at hand, Defendant did not preserve the issue for review on appeal. Defendant did not file a written response to the habitual offender bill of information as required by La.R.S. 15:529.1(D)(l)(b). Although Defendant objected to the State’s description of what the documents proved and to the trial court’s ruling, he did not specifically address whether the State had established his conviction for the predicate offense. As such, Defendant did not set forth a claim and factual basis with particularity as required by La.R.S. 15:529.1(D)(l)(b). Briscoe, 779 So.2d 30. Without a contemporaneous objection to preserve the issue, Defendant waived the right to appellate review of that issue.

Section 15:529.1(D)(1)(b) requires a defendant challenging a predicate conviction in a multiple-bill proceeding to file a particularized written response before sentencing and prove factual issues by a preponderance of the evidence.

State v. Jones · filed 2011-10-19(D)(1)(b)

Following the Louisiana Supreme Court decision in Shelton the Louisiana Legislature amended La. R.S. 15:529.1(D)(l)(b) to place the burden of challenging a predicate conviction in a multiple bill proceeding on the defendant. ... In the present case, the defendant did not file a written response to the habitual offender bill of information complaining of any of the prior convictions with particularity. ... Accordingly, the defendant’s argument that the State did not produce sufficient proof of the prior convictions is not preserved for appellate review.

Section 15:529.1(D)(1)(b) requires a defendant challenging the validity of prior convictions in a habitual-offender proceeding to make an objection, or the challenge is barred on appeal.

State of Louisiana v. Harrell · filed 2012-02-01(D)(1)(b)

In State v. Lewis, 43,402, p. 12 (La.App. 2 Cir. 8/13/08), 990 So.2d 109, 117, the second circuit found: “[d]efendant did not make an objection under La. R.S. 15:529.1(D)(1)(b) to the validity of his prior convictions and is barred from raising that issue now.” Defendant failed to attack the validity of his prior guilty pleas in his Motion to Quash and did not object to the validity of those convictions at the habitual offender hearing. Therefore, he is barred from attacking the sufficiency of those convictions on appeal. Accordingly, we find no error in the finding that Defendant was a fourth felony offender.

Section 15:529.1 requires the sentencing court to provide written reasons, identify the defendant’s habitual-offender grade on the record, and articulate reasons under State v. Johnson for any downward departure from a mandatory minimum sentence.

State v. Thibodeaux · filed 2012-10-24(D)(3), (D)(2)(a)

The habitual offender statute, La. R.S. 15:529.1(D)(3)(emphasis added), provided: ... In addition to the mandate to provide reasons for its determination, the Habitual Offender Law also requires the trial court to state for the record whether a defendant is a second, third, or fourth felony offender. La.R.S. 15:529.1(D)(2)(a), (b), and (c). ... Consequently, we must vacate Defendant’s sentence and remand the matter to the trial court with instructions that when resentencing Defendant, the trial court is to comply with the mandated analysis set forth in State v. Johnson, 97-1906 (La.3/4/98), 709 So.2d 672, which requires the trial court to articulate reasons for imposing a downward departure from a mandatory minimum sentence in the case of a habitual offender.

Section 15:529.1(D)(1)(b) allows a defendant to preserve a challenge to predicate guilty pleas by filing a motion to quash that identifies the alleged defect.

State v. Scamardo · filed 1998-02-11(D)(1)(b)

In this case, the defendant did file a motion to quash the multiple bill, alleging that the bill contains insufficient evidence to show that the defendant voluntarily waived his rights when pleading guilty to the predicate offenses. We find that this is sufficient to preserve defendant's right to challenge the multiple bill on appeal.

Section 15:529.1(D)(1)(b) bars a defendant from first challenging a predicate conviction on appeal when the defendant filed no written response to the multiple offender bill and made no timely objection at the hearing.

State v. Noel · filed 1999-04-27(D)(1)(b)

Citing La. R.S. 15:529.1(D)(1)(b) and the Supreme Court’s holding in State v. Windham, 630 So.2d *171688 (La.1993), we have held that in the absence of a written response to the multiple bill or a contemporaneous objection at the multiple offender hearing to the state’s failure to produce the prior Boykin transcript, a defendant may not complain for the first time on appeal that the predicate offense conviction was somehow invalid.

Section 15:529.1 permits enhancement only for the conviction or convictions for which the State charged the defendant as a multiple offender.

State v. Pete · filed 2013-03-20

Because the State only charged the defendant as a multiple offender for one of his forcible rape convictions in the instant case, the trial court erred in enhancing the defendant’s sentences as to his convictions for the second forcible rape count and the count of second degree kidnapping.

Section 15:529.1 permits an enhanced sentence only when the State seeks that enhancement in the multiple-offender bill for the conviction being sentenced.

State v. Teno · filed 2012-11-07

He imposed the sentence on the charge of aggravated assault with a firearm, pursuant to the habitual offender statute, La.R.S. 15:529.1, without benefit of probation or suspension of sentence. ... The enhanced sentences for the offenses of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon and aggravated assault with a firearm are vacated because those enhancements were not sought in the multiple offender bill. We remand this case for resentencing on those convictions.

Section 15:529.1(A)(3)(b) permits a court to identify a defendant as a third-felony habitual offender by sentencing under that subsection, and subsection (G) requires a sentence imposed under the Habitual Offender Law to be served at hard labor.

State v. Thompson · filed 2016-09-16(A)(3)(b), (G)

Under the provisions of 15:529.1(3)(b), the Court finds that the appropriate penalty for [the defendant] is imprisonment for the remainder of his natural life, without benefit of parole, probation or suspension of sentence. ... In contrast, the district court in the instant case clearly stated that it was sentencing the defendant “[u]nder the provisions of 15:529.1 (3)(b),” which provide sentencing guidelines for third-felony offenders with certain predicates. ... This assignment of error is without merit'. ... Accordingly, because a sentence at hard labor was the only sentence that could have been imposed for the conviction on count 2, we correct the sentence on count 2 to provide that it be served at hard labor.

For a fourth felony offender, § 15:529.1(A)(4)(a) gives the trial court discretion to impose a life sentence, while § 15:529.1(G) requires service at hard labor and does not itself bar parole eligibility.

State v. Holmes · filed 2012-12-11(A)(4)(a), (G)

The trial court had the discretion to give defendant a sentence of this length under La. R.S. 15:529.1(A)(4)(a); it was not mandatory. ... Also, the applicable provisions of the Habitual Offender Act do not preclude eligibility for parole. La. R.S. 15:529.1(G); 15:529.1(A)(4)(a).

For a third-felony offender convicted of armed robbery committed February 18, 2017, § 15:529.1(A)(3)(a) required at least two-thirds of the maximum first-offense sentence, or 66 years, and § 15:529.1(G) required the habitual-offender sentence to be served at hard labor.

State of Louisiana v. Burns · filed 2020-01-15(A)(3)(a), (G)

Burns committed the armed robbery on February 18, 2017. Under the Habitual Offender Law in effect at that time, he faced a habitual offender sentence of “not less than two-thirds of the longest possible sentence for the conviction and not more than twice the longest possible sentence prescribed for a first conviction[.]” La. R.S. 15:529.1(A)(3)(a). A person who commits armed robbery shall be imprisoned at hard labor for not less than 10 years and for not more than 99 years, without benefits. La. R.S. 14:64(B). Thus, as a third-felony offender whose third felony conviction was for armed robbery, Burns faced a minimum habitual offender sentence of 66 years at hard labor. ... Second, the trial court failed to order that Burns’s habitual offender sentence be served at hard labor as required by La. R.S. 15:529.1(G). However, because La. R.S. 15:529.1 is a mandatory felony requiring any sentence to be served at hard labor, the error is harmless and self-correcting.

Section 15:529.1(A)(4)(a) sets a fifth felony offender’s sentence at no less than the longest term for a first conviction, with a minimum of twenty years and a maximum of life, while subsection (G) requires hard labor without probation or suspension of sentence.

State of Louisiana v. Ellender · filed 2019-06-05(A)(4)(a), (G)

However, Defendant was adjudicated a fifth felony offender under La.R.S. 15:529.1(A)(4)(a), which held “[t]he person shall be sentenced to imprisonment for the fourth or subsequent felony for a determinate term not less than the longest prescribed for a first conviction but in no event less than twenty years and not more than his natural life.” Furthermore, La.R.S. 15:529.1(G) specifically stated “[a]ny sentence imposed under the provisions of this Section shall be at hard labor without benefit of probation or suspension of sentence.” Under La.R.S. 15:529.1(A)(4)(a) as it stood at the time of Defendant’s offense, Defendant faced a sentencing range of thirty years to life. Accordingly, Defendant’s fifty-year sentence represents the relative low-end of his potential sentencing range.

Section 15:529.1(A) requires courts assessing a foreign conviction for habitual-offender enhancement to consider all available information from the foreign proceeding when determining whether the offense would be a Louisiana felony.

State v. Hamdan · filed 2013-03-19(A)

In summary, when, as in this matter, there is information from the foreign proceeding available in the record that clearly establishes that the crime for which the defendant was convicted in a foreign jurisdiction would be a felony if committed in this state, courts are required to consider all of the available information in the record in deciding whether the foreign “crime which, if committed in this state would be a felony.” See La. R.S. 15:529.1(A).

Section 15:529.1 requires a fourth felony offender to receive at least the applicable longest first-conviction sentence and no less than twenty years, but permits a below-minimum sentence only when constitutionally required and supported by specific reasons identifying the longest non-excessive sentence.

State of Louisiana v. Simcoe Cole AKA Simco W. Cole · filed 2013-04-24(A)(4)(b)

Louisiana Revised Statutes 15:529.1(A)(4)(b) provides “the person shall be sentenced to imprisonment for the fourth or subsequent felony for a determinate term not less than the longest prescribed for a first conviction but in no event less than twenty years and not more than his natural life.” ... For the foregoing reasons, we vacate Defendant‟s sentence and remand this case to the trial court with instructions that it comply with the Habitual Offender Law or that it articulate specific reasons why a sentence below the mandatory minimum is constitutionally required.

Section 15:529.1 does not permit a prior felony conviction used as an element of a firearm-possession conviction to be reused as a predicate for habitual-offender sentence enhancement.

State of Louisiana v. Guillory · filed 2013-06-19(A)(4)(b)

As established by the supreme court in Baker, this prior conviction could not also be used as a prior felony conviction for purposes of enhancement of Defendant’s sentence for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon pursuant to La.R.S. 15:529.1.

Section 15:529.1 permits a felony status offense, including third-offense marijuana possession, to be further enhanced under the habitual offender law when the predicate convictions used for the underlying offense are not also used in the multiple offender bill.

State v. Holloway · filed 2013-07-03(B)

Thus under Lewis, because La. R.S. 40:966(E)(3) does not distinguish between the type of offense (misdemeanor versus felony) needed to qualify as third offense marijuana possession and because La. R.S. 15:529.1 does not provide restrictions on the type of felony which may be enhanced by the habitual offender law, neither statute prohibits the defendant from being sentenced as a habitual offender in this case. Additionally, the Louisiana Supreme Court has determined that a status crime may be enhanced under the habitual offender law provided that the same convictions are not used to support both the underlying offense and the habitual offender bill.

Subsection (K) requires the court to apply the Habitual Offender Law provisions in effect on the date the defendant committed the instant offense.

State v. Bias · filed 2019-02-06(K)

We agree with the first and second circuits and find La.R.S. 15:529.1(K) applies retroactively to this case. In that event, the applicable sentencing range would be twenty-five to one hundred years.

The more lenient life-sentencing criteria in § 15:529.1(A)(3)(b) do not retroactively replace the version in effect when the last felony was committed.

State v. Surry · filed 2013-08-02(A)(1)(b)(ii) (A)(3)(b)

His sentence was prescribed by the habitual offender law in effect in January 2001, the date of the commission of his last felony offense. La. R.S. 15:529.1(A)(1)(b)(ii) then required a life sentence when any one of the offender’s three previous felony convictions: ... Today’s analogous provision of the habitual offender law, La. R.S. 15:529.1(A)(3)(b), mandates a life sentence without parole only for situations where all three prior felony convictions fall into at least one of these categories: ... Under current law, Surry would not have exposure for a life sentence without benefits, because one of his felony convictions, possession of cocaine, is punishable by no more than five years. This change in La. R.S. 15:529.1 alone provides applicant no relief.

A prior conviction must precede the principal felony to serve as a predicate under the habitual-offender statute; two convictions arising from the same criminal episode cannot enhance one another.

State v. Davis · filed 2013-08-07(A)(1)

This portion of the statute, and the jurisprudence interpreting it, require that the prior conviction must precede the principal offense in order to be used as a predicate to enhance a defendant’s status as a multiple offender. ... One of the two aggravated battery convictions now on appeal has enhanced the punishment for the other aggravated battery conviction. Nevertheless, recidivism or repeat offender misconduct can hardly be said to have occurred for these crimes arising out of the same criminal episode. From the quoted language of the act, one of the two present crimes is not a “subsequent felony” with the defendant “having been” previously convicted of the other. ... Accordingly, with the two aggravated convictions occurring together in this case and arising from the same event, we vacate Davis’ adjudication as a fourth felony offender.

A guilty plea counts as a conviction under the habitual offender law even if sentencing has not yet occurred, so a later felony can qualify as the next offense.

State v. Bindon · filed 1996-12-06

Johnson found 15:529.1 distinguishes between a conviction and a sentence. ... Johnson is controlling in this circuit, and though it was decided in 1995, it interprets statutory language and thus should be applied retroactively. ... Therefore, since defendant had three prior 15.529.1 convictions on his record at the December 3, 1993, hearing, the trial court correctly found he was a third felony offender for 15:529.1 purposes.

Section 15:529.1 does not require the State to use a specific type of evidence to prove habitual-offender status; prior convictions may be proved with competent evidence.

State v. Baskin · filed 2013-10-30(D)(1)(b)

The Habitual Offender Law, La. R.S. 15:529.1, does not require the State to use any specific type of evidence in order to carry its burden of proof.

For a fourth felony offender whose present and prior convictions do not meet the criteria in paragraph (b), paragraph (a) governs the sentence, while subsection (G) requires hard labor without probation or suspension of sentence and the underlying offense may add a parole restriction.

State v. Diggins · filed 2013-10-23(A)(4)(a), (A)(4)(b), (G)

Only one of defendant’s prior felony convictions and the instant conviction fall with the provisions of La. R.S. 15:529.1(A)(4)(b), but at the sentencing hearing, the trial court stated that defendant’s sentence was being imposed under that statutory subsection. A sentence imposed under paragraph (b) shall be a [7mandatory life sentence without parole, probation or suspension of sentence. We instead find La. R.S. 15:529.1(A)(4)(a) to be the applicable provision under which defendant’s sentence should be imposed. The sentencing hearing transcript, minutes, and order to the Department of Corrections reflect that the trial court imposed a sentence conforming to La. R.S. 15:529.1(A)(4)(a), despite referencing paragraph (b) during the sentencing hearing. The trial court also imposed defendant’s sentence in conformity with the restrictions required by the Habitual Offender Law under La. R.S. 15:529.1(G) which provides, “[a]ny sentence imposed under the provisions of this Section shall be at hard labor without benefit of probation or suspension of sentence.” However, the trial court still imposed an illegally lenient sentence by failing to specify the sentencing restrictions for the underlying offense of attempted second degree murder. As a fourth offender with a present conviction for attempted second degree murder, defendant was subject to a sentence of not less than fifty years without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence, and not more than his natural life without benefit of probation or suspension of sentence. Defendant’s sentence must therefore include a restriction on parole eligibility for the first fifty years of his sentence.

For a fourth or subsequent felony punishable on first conviction by less than life, the statute requires a determinate sentence no less than the longest term prescribed for the underlying offense and no more than natural life.

State v. Mosby · filed 2014-11-26(A)(4)(a)

This sentencing range was calculated by first examining the Habitual Offender Law, which provides in relevant part: “If the fourth or subsequent felony is such that, upon a first conviction the offender would be punishable by imprisonment for any term less than his natural life then ... [t]he person shall be sentenced to imprisonment ... for a determinate term not less than the longest prescribed for a first conviction [of the underlying, most recent offense] ... and not more than his natural life.... ” La. R.S. 15:529.1 A(4)(a). Thus, the sentencing judge’s imposition of a thirty-year sentence upon Ms. Mosby was, in fact, the minimum permitted as that sentence is the longest prescribed for a first conviction for distribution of cocaine.

Section 15:529.1 authorizes a 30-year minimum and life maximum for a fourth or subsequent felony offender convicted of the offenses at issue.

State v. Manning · filed 2015-11-18

15As stated, the statutory minimum sentence for each of Manning’s three felony convictions was 30 years at .hard labor without benefit of probation or suspension of sentence, and the maximum sentence available was life imprisonment. See La. R.S. 15:529.1; La. R.S. 40:966(A); and La. R.S. 40:967. Before sentencing Manning as a habitual offender, the trial court considered its prior sentencing, the PSI report, and specific factors regarding. Man-nings personal history. Though the trial court was informed through the PSI report of Manning’s criminal history at the 2014 sentencing, the trial court noted that the state had now proven beyond a reasonable doubt Manning’s habitual offender status. After observing that a near maximum sentence would be justified but that even a- near minimum sentence would result in Manning serving & significantly greater time than under his original sentence, the trial court imposed concurrent 33-year sentences for the three felony convictions.

Subsection (D)(1)(b) assigns the district attorney the initial burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, requires a particularized written response to a challenge to a prior conviction, shifts factual issues raised in that response to the defendant by a preponderance of the evidence, and bars challenges not made before sentencing from later attacking the sentence.

State v. Phillips · filed 2013-12-12(D)(1)(b)

(b) Except as otherwise provided in this Subsection, the district attorney shall have the burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt on any issue of fact. ... Any challenge to a previous conviction or adjudication of delinquency which is not made before sentence is imposed may not thereafter be raised to attack the sentence. ... Here, because defendant’s counsel did not file a written response or assert an objection to the issue of his lack of representation in the California guilty plea prior to imposition of his enhanced sentences, we find that defendant is precluded from raising this claim for the first time on appeal as it relates to the State’s ultimate burden under Shelton.

Section 15:529.1(D)(l)(b) requires the state to prove beyond a reasonable doubt both the alleged prior felony conviction and that the defendant is the person who was convicted.

State v. Broome · filed 2014-04-09(D)(l)(b)

Both the identity and the prior conviction alleged must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. La. R.S. 15:529.1(D)(l)(b); State v. Brown, 2011-1656 (La.2/10/12), 82 So.3d 1232. Various methods of proof establishing identity have been recognized as sufficient to sustain the state’s burden of proof including testimony of witnesses, expert opinion as to fingerprints, and photographs contained in duly authenticated records. ... The evidence presented by the state was sufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Broome was the same person who was convicted of each of the three predicate felony convictions.

Section 15:529.1 requires the State to prove both the defendant’s prior felony conviction and the defendant’s identity, and permits prima facie proof under subsection (F) or other competent evidence.

State v. Castillo · filed 2014-10-29(F)

La. R.S. 15:529.1 re*647quires tKe State to prove an accused’s prior felony conviction as well as his identity. ... While La. R.S. 15:529.1 permits the establishment of prima facie proof of a prior felony conviction by compliance with subsection (F),21 necessary facts that permit enhanced punishment may also or instead be proved by other competent evidence, including the testimony of witnesses, expert opinion as to the fingerprints of the accused when compared with those in the prison record introduced, or photographs contained in the duly authenticated record. Id. ... Upon review of the record, we conclude that the State adequately established defendant’s identity, for the purpose of La. R.S. 15:529.1, as the same person that had been previously convicted of attempted extortion.

Section 15:529.1(A)(1) requires an enhanced determinate sentence for a second felony, set between one-third and twice the longest term prescribed for a first conviction when that first-conviction term is less than life.

State v. Brown · filed 2017-12-20(A)(1)

To prove that a defendant is a multiple offender, the State must present competent evidence that (1) defendant has a prior felony conviction and (2) that defendant is the same person convicted of the prior felony. ... If the defendant pled guilty in the prior conviction, and the defendant denies the allegations in the bill of information, the State must show the existence of a guilty plea and the defendant was represented by counsel. ... Although we would prefer the State to introduce the transcript from defendant’s manslaughter conviction, we find, based on the evidence presented at the multiple bill hearing, the State sufficiently proved defendant pled guilty to a felony in St. Charles Parish on August 22, 2001 while represented by counsel. ... we find that the State produced sufficient evidence to prove that defendant Brown is the same individual convicted of manslaughter in St. Charles Parish in case 00-0461 in August, 2001, rendering him a second felony offender.

Section 15:529.1(D)(1)(b) requires the state to prove beyond a reasonable doubt both the alleged prior felony conviction and that the defendant is the person convicted of it.

State v. McGill · filed 2018-08-15(D)(1)(b)

To meet its burden under the Habitual Offender Act, the state must establish both the prior felony conviction and the defendant's identity as the same person who committed that prior felony. ... Both the identity and the prior conviction alleged must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. La. R.S. 15:529.1(D)(1)(b) ; State v. Brown , 2011-1656 (La. 2/10/12), 82 So.3d 1232 ; State v. Broome , supra .

Section 15:529.1 requires the State to prove the prior felony conviction and the defendant’s identity; subsection F provides a way to establish prima facie proof of the conviction.

State v. Johnson · filed 1984-10-09(F)

LSA-R.S. 15:529.1 permits the establishment of prima facie proof of a prior felony conviction by compliance with subsection F.1 However, the State did not meet the requisites of subsection F; nor did it seriously argue that it did. ... Accordingly, we find that the State has failed to meet its burden of proof under LSA-R.S. 15:529.1, and that this case miist be remanded.

Section 15:529.1(F) permits prima facie proof of a prior felony conviction through a pen pack, but other competent evidence may also establish the conviction.

State v. White · filed 1996-05-08(F)

Prima facie proof of a prior felony conviction may be established by compliance with La.R.S. 15:529.1(F) (the "pen pack" provision). However, this provision is not the exclusive method of proving a prior felony conviction; any other competent evidence may be used to establish such proof.

Under § 15.529.1, parole restrictions on a habitual-offender sentence come from the statute governing the underlying offense, so the enhanced sentence carries the same parole restriction.

State v. Gumms · filed 2018-04-18(G)

The restrictions on parole eligibility imposed on habitual offender sentences under La. R.S. 15:529.1"are those called for in the reference statute."

For a defendant sentenced as a multiple offender, Section 15:529.1(G) requires the sentence to be served without benefit of probation or suspension of sentence.

State v. Smith · filed 2014-05-21(G)

Under La. R.S. 15:529.1(G), however, Smith’s sentence as a multiple offender shall be served without benefit of probation or suspension of sentence.

Section 15:529.1(G) requires a second or subsequent felony offender sentenced under the habitual-offender statute to serve the sentence at hard labor without probation or suspension of sentence, and an enhanced sentence cannot be imposed without a habitual-offender bill of information.

State v. Hooter · filed 2015-02-26(G)

However, the record does not indicate that any habitual offender bill of information was filed in this case, and therefore, the court could not (and, in fact, did not) impose an enhanced sentence under the habitual offender law.

Section 15:529.1(A)(3)(a) raises a third-felony habitual offender's sentencing range to twenty through sixty years, while subsection (D)(1)(b) requires a timely written challenge to a predicate conviction before sentence is imposed.

State v. Dahlem · filed 2014-06-18(A)(3)(a) and (D)(1)(b)

As a third-felony habitual offender, his sentencing exposure increased to imprisonment at hard labor for not less than twenty nor more than sixty years, with at least three years of the sentence without benefit of suspension of sentence, probation, or parole. See La. R.S. 15:529.1(A)(3)(a); State v. Bruins, 407 So.2d 685, 687 (La.1981) (“It is not a crime to be an habitual offender. The statute increases the sentence for a recidivist. The penalty increase is computed by reference to the sentencing provisions of the underlying offense. Similarly, the conditions imposed on the sentence are those called for in the reference statute.”). ... In order to challenge the validity of a predicate offense listed in a habitual offender bill of information, the defendant must file a written response to the habitual offender bill, setting forth his claim, and the factual basis therefor, with particularity. The defendant has the burden of proof, by a preponderance of the evidence, on any issue of fact raised by the response. Any challenge to a previous conviction which is not made before sentence is imposed may not thereafter be raised to attack the sentence. See La. R.S. 15:529.1(D)(l)(b).

Section 15:529.1 authorized a life-without-parole sentence when the third felony or either prior felony was a controlled-substances felony punishable by more than five years, and required a constitutional challenge to a charged predicate conviction to be stated with particularity before the habitual-offender hearing.

State v. Mead · filed 2015-04-22(A)(1)(b)(ii), (D)(1)(b)

On October 5, 1997, the pertinent penalty provision of the Habitual Offender Law, in relevant part, read as follows: “If the third felony or either of the two prior felonies is a felony defined ... as a violation of the Uniform Controlled Dangerous Substances Law punishable by imprisonment for more than five years ..., the person shall be imprisoned for the remainder of his natural life, without benefit of parole, | (¡probation, or suspension of sentence.” La. R.S. 15:529.1 A(l)(b)(ii) (West 1997) (emphasis added). ... But, in making this claim, Mr. Mead overlooks the specific provision of the Habitual Offender Law in effect at the time of his sentencing: “A person claiming that a conviction ... alleged in the information was obtained in violation of the Constitutions of Louisiana or of the United States shall set forth his claim, and the factual basis therefor, with particularity in his response to the information.” La. R.S. 15:529.1 D(l)(b) (West 1997).

The Habitual Offender Law permits enhancement only on the count placed at issue by the multiple bill; when the bill seeks enhancement on one count, the court may not impose multiple-offender sentences on both counts.

State v. Small · filed 2014-08-27

First, the district judge shall identify which count of attempted first degree murder will the penalty be enhanced under Habitual Offender Law, codified as La. R.S. 15:529.1, and which count will the sentence originally imposed be reinstated.

For a second offender, § 15:529.1 allowed a maximum sentence twice the maximum for the underlying offense; that made a forty-year sentence possible for forcible rape in 1976.

Underwood v. Blackburn · filed 1983-05-17

However, Louisiana also has, and had in 1976, a multiple offender’s statute, La.R.S. 15:529.1, which provided that the maximum penalty for a second offender was not less than one-third nor more than twice the maximum for the offense. Petitioner was a second offender and, in the absence of any plea bargain, the maximum sentence which could be imposed upon him for the offense of forcible rape was forty years (twice twenty).

Section 15:529.1 authorizes enhancement of the term of imprisonment but does not authorize imposing a fine as part of the enhanced sentence.

State v. LeBlanc · filed 2014-11-25

The multiple offender statute does not authorize the imposition of a fine, but only provides for enhanced sentences relating to the term of imprisonment. ... Thus, the trial court did not have the authority to impose a fine on resentencing under La. R.S. 15:529.1, despite the provision for a fine in the underlying criminal reference statute.

For a third-felony offender under the 2001 version, § 15:529.1(A)(1)(b)(i) sets a term from two-thirds to twice the longest first-offense sentence, § 15:529.1(A)(1)(b)(ii) limits a life sentence to specified qualifying felonies, and § 15:529.1(G) makes the hard-labor and no-probation-or-suspension conditions self-implementing.

State v. Hopkins · filed 2019-04-10(A)(1)(b)(i), (A)(1)(b)(ii), (G)

In the matter sub judice , Hopkins, pro se, challenges the trial court's calculation of his sentencing range under the ameliorative sentencing provisions. ... Since all three of his felonies do not meet the statutory requirements for a life sentence, La. R.S. 15:529.1(A)(1)(b)(ii), the trial court properly sentenced Hopkins under La. R.S. 15:529.1(A)(1)(b)(i), the 2001 amended version. Two thirds of 40 years is 26.67 years; twice 40 years is 80 years. Thus, Hopkins' sentencing exposure under the more lenient provisions to which he was entitled was not less than 26 years, nor more than 80 years. His sentence imposed of 65 years falls mid-range. ... La. R.S. 15:529.1(G) states that any sentence imposed under the habitual offender provisions shall be at hard labor without benefit of probation or suspension of sentence. This provision is self-implementing and requires no action by this Court.

A third-felony offender whose current offense is punishable by less than life imprisonment must receive a sentence of at least two-thirds and no more than twice the longest sentence allowed for a first conviction.

State v. Wallace · filed 2003-11-26(A)(i)(b)

The defendant was sentenced as a third-felony habitual offender pursuant to La. R.S. 15:529.1(A)(i)(b), which provides that for a person convicted of an offense punishable by imprisonment for any term less than his natural life, the offender shall be sentenced to imprisonment for a determinate term not less than two-thirds of the longest possible sentence for the conviction and not more than twice the longest possible sentence prescribed for a first conviction.

For a third-felony habitual offender with Dunbar’s current and prior convictions, subsection A(1)(b)(i) provides a prison term of six years and four months to twenty years.

State v. Dunbar · filed 2008-03-19A(1)(b)(i)

Under La. R.S. 15:529.1 A(1)(b)(i), as a third-felony habitual offender with one prior felony conviction for accessory after the fact to carjacking and another for unauthorized entry of a place of business, Dunbar was subject to a sentence of imprisonment for a determinate term of not less than six years and four months, and not more than twenty years.

Section 15:529.1(A)(2)(a) allows a third felony offender to receive up to twice the maximum sentence prescribed for a first conviction when the third felony is punishable by less than life imprisonment.

State v. Michaels · filed 1987-11-17(A)(2)(a)

Thus, the maximum sentence defendant could receive as a third felony offender is sixty (60) years.

For a third felony punishable by less than life on a first conviction, the section sets a prison term between one-half and twice the longest sentence for a first conviction.

State v. Townley · filed 1989-06-28(A)(2)(a)

Considering the fact that the habitual offender statute would permit the imposition of a maximum of ten years for this conviction, the defendant’s sentence is quite lenient.

Section 15:529.1 permits enhanced habitual-offender sentences for multiple convictions arising from the same criminal episode and requires the trial court to apply the State’s selected enhancements; a downward departure requires clear and convincing proof that the mandatory minimum is unconstitutional as applied.

State of Louisiana v. McKartney Young · filed 2019-05-15(A)(1), (A)(4)(a), (3)(a)

Accordingly, there is no prohibition against imposing enhanced sentences for both of Defendant’s convictions of possession with intent to distribute, and the trial court erred in not sentencing Defendant as a third felony offender on each conviction. ... Simply stated, once the State selects the charges for which the sentence enhancements apply, the trial court has no discretion to ignore that selection if the defendant is, in fact, determined to be a habitual offender. ... However, the trial court cannot simply ignore the provisions of this law by picking and choosing which sentence to enhance. By doing so here, the trial court erred.

Subsection K requires the court to apply the version of the habitual-offender statute that was in effect when the defendant committed the instant offense.

State of Louisiana v. Adrian A. Dorsey A/K/A Adrian Anton Dorsey · filed 2019-09-04(K)

Accordingly, in keeping with the express wording of La.R.S. 15:529.1(K) and the interpreting jurisprudence, we find merit in the State’s assertion that the trial court erred in its sentencing of Defendant. We accordingly vacate Defendant’s sentences and remand for resentencing in accordance with the version of La.R.S. 15:529.1 in effect on the date that the defendant’s instant offense was committed.

The 2017 amendment to § 15:529.1(A)(4)(b) applies when the habitual-offender bill was filed before November 1, 2017, but the conviction became final after that date.

State of Louisiana v. Brian Michael Hughes A/K/A Brian Hughes · filed 2020-02-05(A)(4)(b)

The trial court’s application of the 2018 amendment to La.R.S. 15:529.1 was erroneous considering the supreme court’s decision in Lyles. The 2017 amendment, set out in 2017 La. Acts No. 282, applies to this case. Accordingly, we vacate the defendant’s sentence and remand this matter to the trial court for resentencing in accordance with 2017 La. Acts No. 282.

Section 15:529.1 does not create an independent offense; it prescribes the conditions under which the penalty for the current offense may be enhanced.

State of Louisiana Versus Dewayne A. Allen · filed 2020-04-30(A)(1)

With respect to defendant’s double jeopardy claim, the Habitual Offender Law creates no independent offense but rather prescribes the conditions under which there is an enhanced penalty for the current offense.

Section 15:529.1 permits habitual-offender enhancement of multiple sentences imposed on the same date when the convictions arise from a single criminal act or episode.

State v. Shaw · filed 2007-11-27

We therefore hold that the language of LSA-R.S. 15:529.1 contains no prohibition against enhancing multiple sentences obtained on the same date arising out of a single criminal act or episode. Unlike the Porter court, we find no legislative purpose or policy that is contradicted by failing to read such a prohibition into the statute's language. Nor does a plain reading of the statute generate absurd or unjust results. In clear and unambiguous terms, the statute exposes a person who has previously been convicted of a felony to enhanced penalties for any felony committed after the date of the prior felony conviction. There is no statutory bar to applying the habitual offender law in sentencing for more than one conviction obtained on the same date, whether the convictions result from separate felonies committed at separate times or arise out of a single criminal act or episode. To the extent that the opinions in Porter and Sherer are inconsistent with this conclusion, they are overruled.

Section 15:529.1 does not bar enhancing more than one conviction obtained on the same date from a single criminal episode or course of conduct, and that construction applies retroactively to non-final convictions.

State v. Robbins · filed 2008-06-04(B)

Three months after the habitual offender sentences were imposed, the Louisiana Supreme Court in State v. Shaw, 06-2467 (La.11/27/07), 969 So.2d 1233, held that the Habitual Offender Law did not bar enhancement of more than one conviction obtained on the same date and arising out of a single criminal episode or course of conduct, overruling State ex rel. Porter v. Butler, 573 So.2d 1106 (La.1991). The court also noted that the holding applied retroactively to all non-final convictions. ... Although counsel's lucid, well-reasoned arguments raise interesting and fundamental questions regarding retroactive application of the supreme court's construction of La. R.S. 15:529.1, we are constrained by the authority of its decision in State v. Shaw, supra, to apply that court's most recent expression of the law. Accordingly, we must conclude that this assignment is without merit.

Section 15:529.1(A)(3)(b) does not prohibit enhancing multiple sentences imposed on the same date for a single criminal episode, but the court must identify which sentence or sentences are being enhanced.

State of Louisiana v. Pierre · filed 2015-05-06(A)(3)(b)

Louisiana jurisprudence interprets the habitual offender statute as containing “no prohibition against enhancing multiple sentences obtained on the same date arising out of a single criminal act or episode.” State v. Shaw, 06-2467, p. 20 (La. 11/27/07), 969 So.2d 1233, 1245. ... We find that the trial court erred since the record fails to indicate which of Defendant’s two convictions were enhanced or whether both were enhanced.

Section 15:529.1 permits habitual offender enhancement of only one of multiple convictions obtained on the same day for offenses arising from one criminal episode.

State Ex Rel. Porter v. Butler · filed 1991-01-22

Multiple convictions obtained the same day for offenses arising out of one criminal episode should be considered as one conviction for purposes of applying the habitual offender law in sentencing.

Subsection (G) requires the entire habitual-offender sentence to be served without probation or suspension of sentence, and the statutory restriction is self-activating when omitted from the oral sentence.

State v. Hartford · filed 2015-03-18(G)

The defendants’ sentences are deemed to have been imposed with the restriction of benefits.

Section 15:529.1(A)(b)(i) limits a third-felony offender’s sentence to no more than twice the longest possible sentence for the current offense; here, that made 60 years the maximum.

State v. Every · filed 2010-03-24(A)(b)(i)

Pursuant to La. R.S. 15:529.1, Mr. Every was sentenced as a third-felony offender to sixty years at hard labor. Pursuant to La. R.S. 15:529.1(A)(b)(i), the sixty-year sentence that was imposed on him was the maximum sentence allowed by law.

For a third felony offender, Section 15:529.1 sets the enhancement at one-half of the longest sentence for the conviction to twice the longest sentence prescribed for a first conviction.

State of Louisiana Versus Shawn A. Clark · filed 2020-06-24(A)(3)(a)

As such, defendant faced a sentencing range of between five years imprisonment and twenty years imprisonment as a third felony offender.

For a third felony punishable on a first conviction by a term less than life, the 2005 version of the section required a sentence of at least two-thirds and no more than twice the maximum sentence for a first conviction.

State v. Denson · filed 2012-01-25(A)

In 2005, La. R.S. 15:529.1(A) provided that if the third felony is such that upon a first conviction, the offender would be punishable by imprisonment for any term less than his natural life, then the person shall be sentenced to imprisonment for a determinate term not less than two-thirds of the longest possible sentence for the conviction and not more than twice the longest possible sentence prescribed for a first conviction. The maximum sentence for distribution is thirty years; therefore, the appellant herein faced a sentencing range of between twenty and sixty years as a third felony offender.

Section 15:529.1(A)(2)(a) caps a third felony offender’s sentence at twice the maximum sentence prescribed for a first conviction.

State v. Lamison · filed 1997-01-29(A)(2)(a)

As a third felony offender, | (¡Relator was exposed to a sentence of “not less than two-thirds of the longest possible sentence for the conviction and not more than twice the longest possible sentence prescribed for a first conviction.” La.R.S. 15:529.1 A(2)(a). For a third felony offender in Relator’s situation (the last conviction was for a violation of La.R.S. 14:62, relative to simple burglary, carrying a maximum sentence of twelve years imprisonment), twenty-four years is the maximum sentence.

Section 15:529.1(D)(3) requires written reasons for a habitual-offender determination, but a failure to provide separate written reasons is harmless when the oral reasons are transcribed and in the record; subsection (G) requires the enhanced sentence to be without probation or suspension.

State v. Jenkins · filed 2008-01-22(D)(3) (G)

The defendant claims the trial judge erred by failing to provide reasons for determining his habitual offender status, as required by La.R.S. 15:529.1(D)(3), before imposing the enhanced sentence. However, the trial court gave oral reasons in support of its finding the defendant was a second felony offender. Although La. R.S. 15:529.1(D)(3) requires the trial court to provide written reasons for its determination that the defendant is a habitual offender, in this case the trial court's reasons were transcribed and are a part of the record. Therefore, any failure to supply written reasons is harmless error. State v. Neal, 00-41, pp. 3-4 (La.App. 5 Cir. 5/30/00), 762 So.2d 281, 283. ... In addition, the defendant's sentence was required by La.R.S. 15:529.1(G) to be imposed without benefit of probation or suspension of sentence. Id. Thus, the defendant received the maximum sentence.

Section 15:529.1(B) requires multiple convictions obtained on the same day before October 19, 2004, to be counted as one conviction for habitual-offender purposes, and the version in effect when the underlying offense was committed governs.

State v. Alexander · filed 2008-03-11(B)

La.R.S. 15:529.1(B) was amended by 2005 La. Acts No. 218, § 1 to provide that "[m]ultiple convictions obtained on the same day prior to October 19, 2004, shall be counted as one conviction for the purpose of this Section." The effective date of this amendment was August 15, 2005. The applicable habitual offender provisions are those in effect on the date the Defendant committed the underlying offense. State v. Parker, 03-0924, pp. 16-17 (La.4/14/04), 871 So.2d 317, 326-27. Here, the Defendant committed the underlying offense of attempted looting on August 31, 2005. Since the date of the underlying offense was after the effective date of the amendment, it is applicable to the present case.

Section 15:529.1(B) requires multiple convictions obtained on the same day before October 19, 2004, to be counted as one conviction when determining habitual-offender status.

State v. Fortenberry · filed 2009-10-23(B)

Defendant correctly points out that La. R.S. 15:529.1(B) provides in pertinent part that, "Multiple convictions obtained on the same day prior to October 19, 2004, shall be counted as one conviction for the purpose of this Section." Thus, defendant is correct in that the two convictions entered on December 5, 1990, can only count for one conviction in determining defendant's multiple offender status.

Section 15:529.1(B) requires multiple convictions obtained on the same day before October 19, 2004, to be counted as one conviction for habitual-offender sentencing.

State v. LeBlanc · filed 2015-01-09(B)

The legislature responded to our decision in Johnson in less than a year by amending La.R.S. 15:529.1(B) to express its unequivocal intent that “[mjultiple convictions obtained on the same day prior to October 19, 2004 [ie., the date Johnson was decided], shall be counted as one conviction for the purpose of this Section.” 2005 La. Acts 218. The amendment sharply curtailed the scope of our decision in Johnson.

Section 15:529.1 requires the State to prove that prior convictions fall within the cleansing period, and it counts multiple convictions obtained on the same day before October 19, 2004, as one conviction.

State v. Meadows · filed 2018-04-11(C) and (B)

The state bears the burden of proving that the predicate convictions fall within the "cleansing period" provided by La. R.S. 15:529.1(C). ... The last sentence of La. R.S. 15:529.1(B) states: "multiple convictions obtained on the same day prior to October 19, 2004, shall be counted as one conviction for the purpose of this Section."

Section 15.529.1 bars a challenge to a prior conviction or delinquency adjudication that was not made before sentencing.

State v. Odom · filed 2000-11-01(D)(1)(b)

Any challenge to a previous conviction or adjudication of delinquency which is not made before sentence is imposed may not thereafter be raised to attack the sentence.

Subsection (G) does not authorize a parole restriction beyond the restrictions imposed by the underlying offense.

State v. Callegari · filed 2000-11-02(G)

Thus, we choose to follow Gregrich, Yancy, Yarbrough, and Lee and simply amend the Defendant’s sentence by deleting the restriction on his parole eligibility.

Section 15.529.1(A)(1)(b)(ii)’s mandatory life sentence may be remanded for an as-applied constitutional-excessiveness hearing when the record suggests the defendant may not deserve it.

State v. Briscoe · filed 2001-01-17(A)(1)(b)(ii)

Following Stevenson, we find that the record suggests that the defendant is simply a drug addict who might not be deserving of the minimum mandatory life sentence provided by La. R.S. 15:529.1(A)(1)(b)(ii).

Section 15:529.1(C)(1) includes time spent incarcerated for a misdemeanor when calculating whether the five-year cleansing period has elapsed.

State of Louisiana v. Diano · filed 2025-03-21(C)(1)

this court holds that the time defendant spent incarcerated for a misdemeanor offense in 2018 and 2019 is included and counted when calculating whether the five-year cleansing period has elapsed.

Subsection (A)(4)(a) supplies the applicable sentencing range when the current fourth felony is not a crime of violence but the predicate felonies are.

State of Louisiana v. Jermaine J. Owens aka Jermaine Allen · filed 2025-08-27(A)(4)(a)

the sentencing range set forth in La. R.S. 15:529.1(A)(4)(a) applies in this case.

The violent-offender provision of La. Stat. Ann. § 15:529.1 A(2)(b)(ii) makes the predicate convictions relevant to the imposition of a life sentence, but the court need not use specified types of predicate convictions when sentencing under a different provision.

State v. Johnson · filed 2000-09-22A(2)(b)(ii)

In Johnson, the specification of the underlying predicate convictions was pertinent to the imposition of a life sentence under the “violent offender” provision of the Habitual Offender Law. Therein the record was not clear which one of two predicates was being used. In that case if the judge intended to base his adjudication of defendant as a third offender on the aggravated battery and armed robbery convictions, then the life sentence under the “violent offender” provision could have been upheld. Because the appellate court could not determine which predicate offenses the trial judge used in adjudicating defendant as a third offender, the sentence was vacated and the matter remanded for resentencing. Herein, however, it is clear from the transcript of the habitual offender and sentencing proceedings that the court was not sentencing defendant under the violent offenses portion of La. R.S. 15:529.1 A(2)(b)(ii). Thus, there was no need to use certain types of predicate convictions for the adjudication.

Section 15:529.1 permits a felony conviction whose penalty was already enhanced, including DWI Third Offense, to serve as a predicate felony for a habitual-offender enhancement; under subsection (G), the resulting sentence excludes probation and suspension but not parole.

State v. Garner · filed 2005-11-17(G)

La. R.S. 15:529.1 refers generally to "a felony." It contains no restriction as to the type of felony. ... The 1994 conviction for DWI, Third Offense is "a felony" under the Habitual Offender Act. It can be used to support the defendant's status as a second felony offender. ... Under La. R.S. 15:529.1(G), such a sentence is to be imposed "without benefit of probation or suspension of sentence." La. R.S. 14:31 does not require the imposition of a manslaughter sentence without benefit of parole. Accordingly, we amend the defendant's sentence to delete the restriction on parole eligibility.

Section 15:529.1 presumes a mandatory minimum sentence constitutional, and downward departures should occur only in rare situations.

State v. Yrle · filed 2005-10-06(A)(1)(c)(i)

It is presumed that a mandatory minimum sentence under the Habitual Offender Law is constitutional. ... Nevertheless, downward departures from a mandatory minimum sentence should occur only in rare situations.

Section 15:529.1 makes habitual-offender minimum sentences presumptively constitutional, but permits a downward departure only upon clear and convincing evidence that the minimum is constitutionally excessive; any departure must be the longest non-excessive sentence.

State v. Stewart · filed 2002-10-09(c)(i)

Even though a sentence under the habitual offender law is the minimum provided by that statute, the sentence may still be unconstitutionally excessive if it makes no measurable contribution to acceptable goals of punishment, or is nothing more than the purposeful imposition of pain and suffering and is grossly out of proportion to the severity of the crime. ... A court may only depart from the minimum sentence if it finds that there is clear and convincing evidence in the particular case to rebut the presumption of constitutionality. ... If a sentencing judge finds clear and convincing evidence which justifies a downward departure from the minimum sentence under La. R.S. 15:529.1, he is not free to sentence a defendant to whatever sentence he feels is Inappropriate under the circumstances. The judge must sentence the defendant to the longest sentence which is not constitutionally excessive. This requires that a sentencing judge articulate specific reasons why the sentence he imposes instead of the statutory mandatory minimum is the longest sentence, which is not excessive under the Louisiana Constitution. Id. ... In the instant case the sentencing range for the defendant as a fourth felony offender was twenty years to life. The defendant’s twenty-two and one half years sentence fell within the lower range of the sentencing scale. Given the defendant’s criminal history the sentence imposed was not grossly out of proportion under the circumstances of the case.

Section 15:529.1's minimum sentence is presumed constitutional, but a court may depart downward when clear and convincing evidence shows exceptional circumstances; such departures are rare.

State v. Everidge · filed 2002-12-11(A)(1)(a)

Even though a sentence under the Habitual Offender Law is the minimum provided by that statute, the sentence may still be unconstitutionally excessive if it makes no measurable contribution to acceptable goals of punishment, or is nothing more than the purposeful imposition of pain and suffering and is grossly out of proportion to the severity of the crime. ... Departures downward from the minimum sentence under the Habitual Offender Law should occur only in rare situations.

Section 15:529.1(G) requires a habitual-offender sentence to be served without probation or suspension of sentence, but it does not authorize denying parole eligibility.

State v. Brown · filed 2004-03-12(G)

La. R.S. 15:529.1(G) provides that a sentence imposed under the habitual offender statute is to be served without benefit of probation or suspension of sentence. The statute does not specify that the sentence be served without benefit of parole.

Section 15:529.1's mandatory habitual-offender sentence remains subject to constitutional-excessiveness review, and resentencing must account for the applicable sentencing factors and legislative intent.

State v. Robert · filed 2006-05-31

A mandatory minimum sentence under the Habitual Offender Law may be reviewed for constitutional excessiveness. ... In this particular instance the trial court found the defendant to be a second offender pursuant to La. R.S. 15:529.1, and sentenced him to 15 years which is in the statutory limitation. ... Accordingly, we find that the sentence imposed by the trial court on January 10, 2005, was done so in error. Therefore, we instruct the trial court to consider the following: La.C.Cr. Pro. art. 894.1, if it has not previously done so, the legislative intent of Acts 2001, No. 403 and possibly review the matter for Dorthey factors, if any, in its resentencing determination. We therefore, vacate the sentence and remand the matter for resen-tencing.

A mandatory minimum sentence under the Habitual Offender Law is presumed constitutional, and a court may depart from it only upon clear and convincing evidence rebutting that presumption in the particular case.

State v. Davis · filed 2007-12-27(A)(1)(c)(i)

Since it is presumed that a mandatory minimum sentence under the Habitual Offender Law is constitutional, a court may only depart from the mandatory sentence if it finds clear and convincing evidence in the present case that would rebut the presumption of constitutionality.

Section 15:529.1 requires the statutory minimum sentence for a qualifying quadruple offender unless the defendant establishes that applying the minimum would be constitutionally excessive.

State v. Conner · filed 2010-02-03A(1)(c)(i)

The district court followed this court’s mandate to sentence Mr. Conner as a quadruple offender. Because Mr. Conner did not factually establish that the statutory minimum sentence of twenty years without the benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence was excessive when imposed upon him, the district judge did not err when he did not downwardly depart and impose a lesser sentence.

Section 15:529.1(D)(1)(b) requires a defendant to file a written response to a multiple bill, and failure to do so, together with failure to object to the adjudication, bars appellate review of an evidentiary sufficiency challenge.

State v. Weaver · filed 2000-09-27(D)(1)(b)

The lack of an objection to the adjudication and the failure to file a written response to the multiple bill as required by La.R.S. 15:529.1(D)(1)(b) precludes appellate review of defendant's claim that the documentary evidence was insufficient.

Section 15:529.1(D)(1)(a) requires advising a defendant of the habitual-offender allegations, the right to a hearing, and the right to remain silent before accepting a stipulation; an uninformed stipulation requires reversal of the habitual-offender adjudication and sentence.

State v. Reichard · filed 2004-07-27(D)(1)(a)

Our review reveals that the defendant was not advised of his multiple offender rights before defense counsel stipulated that defendant was a second felony offender as alleged in the multiple offender bill, as required by La. R.S. 15:529.1(D)(1)(a). ... However, when the defendant’s status as a multiple offender is established by his own stipulation or admission to the habitual offender bill of information without having been informed of his right to a hearing or his right to remain silent, by either the trial In court or his attorney, there is reversible error.

Subsection (D)(1)(b) allocates the burdens for proving and challenging prior convictions in a habitual-offender proceeding, while subsection (A)(1)(c)(ii) mandates natural-life imprisonment without benefits in the circumstances specified there.

State v. Burnett · filed 2000-10-04(D)(1)(b), (A)(1)(c)(ii)

Based upon the above offered evidence, we hold that the state met its burden of proving the existence of Burnett's 1980 guilty plea to armed robbery, and that Burnett was represented by counsel at the time of the plea. ... Thus, under the sentencing requirements of La. R.S. 15:529.1(A)(1)(c)(ii), Burnett's life sentence without benefit was mandatory.

Section 15:529.1 places the burden on the State to prove factual allegations beyond a reasonable doubt, places the burden on a defendant challenging prior convictions by a preponderance of the evidence, bars untimely challenges, and mandates a life sentence for this qualifying fourth-felony offender.

State v. Bryant · filed 2000-12-06(A)(1)(c)(ii) (D)(1)(b)

The person shall have the burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence, on any issue of fact raised by the response.

Subsection (D)(1)(b) places the burden on a defendant to prove factual challenges to an alleged prior conviction by a preponderance of the evidence, while subsection (G) makes parole eligibility for a habitual-offender sentence follow the reference statute.

State v. Hill · filed 2001-09-26(D)(1)(b) (G)

Louisiana's habitual offender law, La. R.S. 15:529.1(D)(1)(b), provides in pertinent part: ... Any challenge to a previous conviction or adjudication of delinquency which is not made before sentence is imposed may not thereafter be raised to attack the sentence. ... The state produced the minutes and transcript of the Boykin colloquy for the defendant's prior offense. They show that the court informed the defendant— who was represented by counsel—of his right to a jury trial, his right to confront his accusers and his privilege against self-incrimination. The evidence shows that the defendant waived those rights. Louisiana courts have not required the state to prove the further elements that the defendant raises. State v. Guzman, 99-1528 & 99-1753 (La.5/16/00), 769 So.2d 1158. Nothing about the plea colloquy suggests that the defendant did not understand the prior proceedings. This assignment is without merit. ... The trial court stated that since the sentence was under the habitual offender law, parole was not excluded, an apparent reference to La. R.S. 15:529.1(G). However, the restrictions on parole eligibility imposed on multiple offender sentences "are those called for in the reference statute." State v. Tate, 99-1483 (La.11/24/99), 747 So.2d 519; State v. McCurtis, 33,737 (La.App.2d Cir.9/27/00), 769 So.2d 150. See also State v. Richard, 550 So.2d 300 (La.App. 2d Cir.1989), and State v. Demouchet, 595 So.2d 389 (La.App. 3d Cir.1992). Since the defendant was convicted under La. R.S. 14:94(F), which provides for a sentencing range of 10 to 20 years, without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence, his sentence as a habitual offender should have excluded parole eligibility.

Section 15:529.1 allows a defendant challenging a habitual-offender bill to present affirmative evidence of a rights infringement or procedural irregularity through means other than an unavailable guilty-plea transcript, and requires that the defendant first produce such evidence before the burden shifts to the State.

State v. Barrett · filed 2007-08-15

A defendant can attempt to meet his burden to produce some affirmative evidence showing an infringement of his rights or a procedural irregularity in the taking of the plea with a transcript, with testimony regarding the taking of the plea, or with other affirmative evidence. Shelton, supra at 779. Only when this is accomplished will the state be required to establish the constitutionality of the previous conviction. State v. O'Neal, 34,814 (La.App. 2d Cir.10/12/01), 795 So.2d 1292. Pursuant to Shelton, the introduction of the guilty plea transcript was not the only means Barrett had to attack the habitual offender charges against him. Barrett could have testified regarding the taking of his guilty plea or presented other affirmative evidence, such as a guilty plea/waiver of rights form, showing some defect in the proceeding. Thus, he was not precluded from offering evidence other than the plea transcript that became permanently unavailable. Moreover, because Barrett failed to object to the introduction of the court minutes or offer any affirmative evidence, he failed to meet his burden. Thus, the trial court did not err in denying Barrett's motion to quash the multiple bill of information and adjudicating him a fourth felony offender.

In a habitual-offender proceeding, after the State proves the prior guilty plea and representation by counsel, the defendant must produce affirmative evidence of a rights infringement or procedural irregularity before the burden shifts back to the State to prove the plea's constitutionality.

State v. Fields · filed 2008-01-09

The state's burden of proof in habitual offender proceedings under La. R.S. 15:529.1 is stated in State v. Shelton, 621 So.2d 769 (La.1993): ... Applying the burden of proof set forth in Shelton to the facts of this case, we conclude that the state met its initial burden of proof. The minutes for the 1997 conviction show that the state proved the existence of the prior guilty plea and that Fields was represented by counsel when it was taken. Fields, however, has not met his subsequent burden to produce some affirmative evidence showing an infringement of his rights or a procedural irregularity in the taking of the plea. Because Fields did not meet his subsequent burden of proof, the inquiry stops there. The state was not required to prove the constitutionality of the plea by producing, a "perfect" transcript. Therefore, the trial court did not err in denying Fields' motion to quash the habitual offender bill on this ground.

Section 15:529.1(D)(1)(b) places the initial burden on the district attorney to prove factual allegations beyond a reasonable doubt, while requiring a person challenging an alleged prior conviction to file a written response and prove factual issues raised by that response by a preponderance of the evidence.

State v. Green · filed 2010-11-17(D)(1)(b)

In sum, the State complied with the requirements of La. R.S. 15:529.1, and the trial court properly determined from the evidence presented that the defendant was a third felony offender.

Section 15:529.1(D)(1)(b) places the burden of proving factual issues in a habitual-offender proceeding beyond a reasonable doubt on the district attorney, subject to the subsection’s stated exceptions.

State v. Hickman · filed 2016-12-21(D)(1)(b)

The State bears the burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt at habitual offender proceedings. La. R.S. 15:529.1 D(l)(b) (“the district attorney shall have the burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt on any issue of fact”). ... Based on the record before us, we find that the weight and the totality of the evidence showed that Mr. Hickman was the same individual as the one involved in all three of the predicate prior convictions. We conclude, therefore, that the State presented sufficient evidence to prove Mr. Hickman’s status as a fourth felony offender; the trial court erred in holding otherwise.

Section 15:529.1 mandates life imprisonment without parole, probation, or suspension for a qualifying fourth felony offender, permits a downward departure only in the rare constitutional-excessiveness cases identified in Johnson, and does not require any particular kind of competent evidence to prove prior convictions at the habitual-offender hearing.

State v. Lindsey · filed 2000-10-17(A)(1)(c)(ii), (F)

However, Lindsey's prior criminal history does not put him on par with the offender in Solem, because his instant conviction for simple robbery was a crime of violence and because the victim suffered injuries to her person. ... We agree with the lower courts that Lindsey's sentence was not excessive. He has not carried his burden under Johnson. In fact, he is exactly the type of offender that the Habitual Offender Statute intends to punish so severely. ... The goals of the Habitual Offender Statute, to deter and punish recidivism, are satisfied by imposing a life sentence against such a person. Therefore, for all the above reasons, we affirm his conviction and sentence.

Section 15:529.1(A)(3)(b) requires a third felony offender to serve the remainder of his natural life without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence when the third felony and two prior felonies fall within the statute’s listed qualifying categories.

State v. Jones · filed 2013-02-06(A)(3)(b)

Accordingly, we find no abuse of the trial court’s discretion in imposing the mandatory life sentences required by the sentencing dictates of La. R.S. 15:529.1(A)(3)(b).

Section 15:529.1A(1)(c)(ii) requires life imprisonment without parole, probation, or suspension of sentence when the specified current and prior felony convictions meet its violent-felony or serious-drug-offense conditions.

State v. Sterling · filed 2013-12-12A(1)(c)(ii)

Thus, under the habitual offender statute, defendant was subject to an enhanced mandatory minimum sentence of life imprisonment at hard labor without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence. Accordingly, defendant’s 50-year enhanced sentence is illegally lenient.

Section 15:529.1(A)(3)(b) and (A)(4)(b) mandate life sentences without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence for the qualifying second degree kidnapping and armed robbery convictions described here.

State of Louisiana v. Monroe · filed 2014-02-12(A)(3)(b) and (A)(4)(b)

The evidence, however, shows that Defendant is in fact a third felony offender with a prior felony conviction for aggravated criminal damage to property, defined as a crime of violence pursuant to La.R.S. 14:2(B)(19), and another prior felony conviction for simple burglary, an offense with a maximum sentence of twelve years at hard labor. La.R.S. 14:62. Thus, a life sentence without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence is mandatory for the second degree kidnapping conviction, and another life sentence is mandatory for the armed robbery conviction. La.R.S. 15:529.1(A)(3)(b) and (A)(4)(b).

Section 15:529.1(A)(1) permits sentence enhancement only when the subsequent felony is committed after the defendant has been convicted of the predicate felony.

State v. Heine · filed 2014-04-23(A)(1)

Any person who, after having been convicted within this state of a felony ..., thereafter commits any subsequent felony within this state, upon conviction of said felony, shall be punished as follows[.]” ... The record before us indicates that defendant stipulated to a habitual offender bill of information in which the State alleged that defendant committed the underlying offenses before he was convicted of the predicate offense.

Section 15:529.1(A) requires proof of a qualifying predicate felony conviction before the current felony before the defendant may be adjudicated a habitual offender.

State v. Hunter · filed 2015-09-09A

See La. R.S. 15:529.1 A (the underlying felony . | ^conviction must have been committed “after” the predicate felony convicted to punish the offender under the habitual offender law). ... Conceding that the documentation introduced into evidence at the multiple bill hearing does not satisfactorily evidence that Mr. Hunter was ultimately adjudged guilty and thus that it did not carry its burden of proof, the prosecution confesses error. We accept the prosecution’s confession of error and vacate the trial judge’s adjudication of Mr. Hunter as a second-felony offender. We also vacate the forty-year sentence imposed under the habitual offender adjudication.

A prior felony conviction may enhance a defendant under § 15:529.1 only if it preceded the principal offense and was final.

State v. Lindsey · filed 2016-02-24(A)

This portion of the statute, and the jurisprudence interpreting it, requires that the prior conviction must precede the commission of the principal offense in order to be used as a predicate to enhance a defendant’s status as a multiple offender. Also, in order to be used as predicate offenses in habitual offender adjudications, prior convictions must be final.

Section 15:529.1 requires the predicate conviction to precede the offense whose sentence is enhanced; a defendant’s stipulation does not cure a bill based on a later conviction.

State v. London · filed 2009-11-24

... Defendant could not be a multiple offender under LSA-R.S. 15:529.1 based on the predicate offense alleged in the multiple bill.

The statute governs habitual-offender proceedings by requiring specified advisements and timely objections, permitting competent proof of prior convictions, fixing habitual-offender status when the subsequent offense is committed, and excluding periods of custody from the cleansing-period calculation.

State v. Odom · filed 2000-11-01(D), (D)(1)(b), (F), (C)

Before accepting a defendant's admission that he is a multiple offender, the trial judge must specifically advise the defendant of his right to a formal hearing, his right to require the state to prove his identity as a multiple offender, and his right to remain silent. ... In a habitual offender proceeding, the state is only required to establish a prior felony conviction and that the defendant is the person convicted of the earlier offense. ... Prima facie proof of a prior felony conviction may be established by compliance with La. R.S. 15:529.1(F) (the "pen pack" provision). However, this provision is not the exclusive method of proving a prior felony conviction; any other competent evidence may be used to establish such proof. ... Thus, under the rationale of Mims, supra, and Lewis, supra, a defendant's habitual offender status, under La. R.S. 15:529.1, is determined as of the time the subsequent offense is committed. ... Also, where less than ten years have elapsed between convictions, it is not necessary for the state to prove discharge dates on earlier convictions in a habitual offender proceeding for purposes of determining whether the cleansing period has expired. La. R.S. 15:529.1(C); State v. Martello, 98-2066 (La.App. 4th Cir.11/17/99), 748 So.2d 1192.

Subsection (D)(1)(a) requires the trial court to inform a defendant of the multiple-offender allegations and the right to have their truth determined, implicitly including the right to remain silent; a defendant waives an arraignment error by proceeding without objection.

State v. Chinn · filed 2012-03-27(D)(1)(a)

The Multiple Offender Statute directs the trial court to order the defendant to appear before it, inform the defendant of the allegations contained in the bill of information, of his right to be tried as to the truth, and to require the offender to comment on the truth of the allegations. La. R.S. 15:529.1(D)(l)(a). Implicit in the statute is the requirement of the court to advise the defendant of his right to remain silent. ... In this case, Mr. Chinn proceeded to the multiple offender hearing without objecting. He, therefore, waived any procedural irregularity or error in the failure to arraign. La.C.Cr.P. art. 555.

Section 15:529.1(D) permits the district attorney to file a habitual-offender bill alleging a prior conviction or adjudication and requires the trial judge to set a hearing to determine whether the offender has prior felonies.

State v. Hopkins · filed 2000-12-20(D)

Pursuant to La. R.S. 15:529.1(D), the district attorney of a parish, where a subsequent conviction occurred, may file a bill of information accusing the person of a previous conviction or adjudication of delinquency. Upon such filing, the trial judge shall fix a day to inquire whether the offender has been convicted of a prior felony or felonies. After contradictory hearing, there is a statutory mandate upon the finding of either the third-felony conviction or two previous felony convictions, constituting crimes of violence, that a third-felony offender be imprisoned for the remainder of his natural life, without benefit of parole, probation or suspension of sentence. La. R.S. 15:529.1A(1)(b)(ii).

Section 15:529.1(D) requires advising the defendant of the habitual-offender allegations and the right to contest them, but does not require repeating the rights advisement at every habitual-offender proceeding when the proceedings as a whole were fundamentally fair and afforded due process.

State v. Kennon · filed 2001-02-28(D)

The habitual offender statute under La. R.S. 15:529.1(D), provides that, “the court shall inform him of the allegation contained in the information and his right to be tried as to the truth thereof according to law and shall require the offender to say whether the allegations are true.” ... The law does not expressly state that the court is required to inform the defendant of his rights at each habitual offender proceeding. The law requires that the record demonstrate that the proceedings as a whole be fundamentally fair and accord the defendant due process. ... Thus, the habitual offender proceedings were valid.

Section 15:529.1 permits a nolo contendere plea to count as a prior conviction for habitual-offender sentencing and does not impose a prescriptive period, though the state must institute the proceeding within a reasonable time.

State v. Johnson · filed 2001-03-28

Under La.Code of Crim.P. art. 552(4), a plea of nolo contendere clearly is to be considered as a conviction within the meaning of the habitual offender statute, i.e. La.R.S. 15:529.1 [footnote omitted]. ... Based on the foregoing rationale, we find that the multiple offender bill was not defective and further that the trial judge did not err in finding defendant to be a second felony offender based on his plea of nolo contendere in a Florida court.[5] ... While the multiple offender statute, LSA-R.S. 15:529.1, does not impose a prescriptive period, our jurisprudence clearly indicates the state must file the information within a reasonable time after the prosecution knows that a defendant has a prior record. ... Considering the fact that defendant failed to appear in court for the multiple bill hearing on numerous occasions, we find that the eleven to eighteen month delay was justified and was not unreasonable.

Section 15:529.1(D)(1)(a) requires the court to advise a defendant who is admitting habitual-offender allegations of the allegations, the right to a formal hearing, and the right to remain silent; an admission without those advisements requires reversal of the habitual-offender finding.

State v. Bell · filed 2003-05-28(D)(1)(a)

La. R.S. 15:529.1(D)(1)(a) requires that the Defendant be advised of the specific allegations contained in the habitual offender bill of information and his right to a formal hearing at which the State must prove its case. Implicit in this requirement is the additional requirement that the Defendant be advised of his constitutional right to remain silent. ... However, when the guilt of the Defendant is proven by his own stipulation or admission to the habitual offender bill of information without having been informed of his right to a hearing or his right to remain silent, by either the trial court or his attorney, there is reversible error.

Section 15:529.1 requires timely written objections to prior-conviction allegations, permits a certified “pen pack” to establish identity, applies when fewer than ten years have elapsed from the prior sentence’s full-term expiration to the new felony, and does not require amendment of a sentence that was neither probated nor suspended.

State v. Washington · filed 2005-03-02(D)(1), (F), (C), (G)

In order to challenge the validity of his prior conviction, the defendant was required to file, within 15 days of arraignment, a written response denying the allegations set forth in the bill of information. He neither filed a written response nor objected at the hearing to the introduction of the state’s exhibits. Since he failed to comply with the statute, he is barred from directly attacking the validity of the armed robbery conviction on appeal. ... The certified pen pack introduced as exhibit S-2 includes the defendant’s name, *695fingerprints, and photographs in compliance with the requirements of La. R.S. 15:529.1(F) for adequate proof of identity. ... Less than 10 years lapsed between the |7expiration of the full term of the sentence of the previous conviction and the time of the commission of the last felony for which he was convicted; therefore, under La. R.S. 15:529.1(C), the habitual offender statute is applicable. ... The trial court did not specify that the sentence was to be served without benefit of probation or suspension of sentence. La. R.S. 15:529.1(G); State v. Tate, 99-1483 (La.11/24/99), 747 So.2d 519. However, the sentence was neither probated nor suspended so amendment is unnecessary.

Section 15:529.1 requires the court, before accepting a defendant's admission as a multiple offender, to advise him of the bill's specific allegations and his rights to a formal hearing, to require the State to prove his identity, and to remain silent; failure to do so requires vacatur when the adjudication rests on the admission.

State v. Delaney · filed 2008-02-13(D)(1)(a)

Before accepting a defendant's admission that he is a multiple offender, the trial judge must specifically advise the defendant of his right to a formal hearing, his right to require the state to prove his identity as a multiple offender, and his right to remain silent. La. R.S. 15:529.1(D); State v. Brown, 42,188 (La. App. 2 Cir. 9/26/07), 966 So.2d 727. A trial court's failure to properly advise a defendant of his rights under the Habitual Offender Law constitutes patent error on the face of the record and requires that the habitual offender's adjudication and sentence be vacated. ... La. R.S. 15:529.1(D)(1)(a) requires that the Defendant be advised of the specific allegations contained in the habitual offender bill of information and his right to a formal hearing at which the State must prove its case. Implicit in this requirement is the additional requirement that the Defendant be advised of his constitutional right to remain silent.

The habitual-offender statute does not set a filing deadline, but the bill and proceeding must occur within a reasonable time judged from the facts and circumstances of the specific case, including responsibility for delay.

State v. Gauthier · filed 2008-03-12

Although the statute does not prescribe a time within which the bill must be filed, this court has made a determination that the district attorney must file the habitual offender bill "within a reasonable time." . . . The determination of whether the hearing is held within a reasonable time hinges on the facts and circumstances of the specific case. See Toney, [State v. Toney, 02-0992 (La.4/9/03), 842 So.2d 1083] 02-0992 at 5, 842 So.2d at 1086. ... We find no abuse of the trial court's discretion. ... There is nothing in the record to indicate that the State vindictively delayed filing the multiple bill or that the delays in holding the hearing were attributable to the State. This assignment of error lacks merit.

Section 15:529.1 permits habitual-offender proceedings by bill of information; neither a grand-jury indictment nor a jury trial is constitutionally required, and the district attorney may seek the enhancement in his discretion.

State of Louisiana v. Tassin · filed 2008-11-05

Booker, 543 U.S. 220, involved a departure from the sentencing range set out by the Federal Sentencing Guidelines and not a recidivism statute. We follow our decision in Colton, 968 So.2d 1239, wherein it was decided that the Louisiana Constitution does not require a grand jury indictment for habitual offender proceedings, and the other cases cited herein. Accordingly, the Defendant’s claim that habitual offender proceedings should have been instituted by indictment lacks merit. ... Based on Colton, 968 So.2d 1239, and the decisions rendered by the fourth circuit, we find the Defendant’s assertion that a jury should have determined whether he was an habitual offender lacks merit. ... The district attorney has the discretionary power to charge a defendant under the habitual offender law just as he has the initial unlimited power to prosecute “whom, when, and how” he chooses.

Section 15:529.1 requires a habitual offender bill to be filed within a reasonable time even though it sets no specific filing deadline.

State v. Rios · filed 2009-04-08

Although La. R.S. 15:529.1 does not prescribe a time within which a habitual offender bill must be filed, the supreme court has determined that the district attorney must file the habitual offender bill within a reasonable time. ... The bill was timely filed, and, under these circumstances, the delay for the adjudication hearing was not unreasonable.

Section 15:529.1(D)(l)(a) permits a multiple-offender bill to be filed after conviction or sentence, but the bill must be filed within a reasonable time after the necessary information becomes available.

State v. Cottonham · filed 2009-12-16(D)(l)(a)

La. R.S. 15:529.1, the statute governing habitual offender proceedings, expressly provides that “at any time, either after conviction or sentence,” a multiple bill may be filed against a defendant who has been convicted of a felony. La. R.S. 15:529.1(D)(l)(a); State v. Toney, 2002-0992 (La.4/9/03), 842 So.2d 1083. Although no specific time limit for filing is provided by the statute, the supreme court has held that the statute “does not allow an indefinite time in which the district attorney may file the multiple offender bill once the necessary information is available.” ... Rather, the district attorney must file the multiple offender bill “within a reasonable time after the necessary information is available.”

Section 15:529.1(D)(1)(a) requires advising a habitual-offender defendant of the specific allegations, the right to a formal hearing, and the constitutional right to remain silent.

State v. Allemand · filed 2009-12-29(D)(1)(a)

La. R.S. 15:529.1 D(l)(a) requires that the defendant be advised of the specific allegations contained in the habitual offender bill of information and his right to a formal hearing at which the State must prove its case. Implicit in this requirement is the additional requirement that the defendant be advised of his constitutional right to remain silent.

Section 15:529.1 permits the State to file multiple habitual-offender bills relying on previously alleged predicate offenses and to retry proof of a predicate offense after an earlier failure.

State of Louisiana v. Marcus Quinn, Sr. · filed 2010-05-12

Although the Defendant asserts there should be a limit on the number of attempts the State has to prove he is a habitual offender, there is nothing in La.R.S. 15:529.1 or jurisprudence to support the Defendant’s argument. Based on the ruling in Mays II, 929 So.2d 1231, and Denis, 692 So.2d 1055, the State may file multiple habitual offender bills and rely on previously asserted predicate offenses when filing same. Additionally, the State may, based on Kennerson, 695 So.2d 1367, and Martin, 599 So.2d 422, attempt to prove a predicate offense at a subsequent habitual offender hearing after a failed attempt to do so.

Section 15:529.1 permits a habitual offender proceeding to be completed after the defendant has served the original sentence, but the bill and proceeding must occur within a reasonable time.

State v. Davis · filed 2012-05-31(A)(1)

Habitual offender proceedings under La. R.S. 15:529.1 need not be completed prior to the time the defendant satisfies the original sentence imposed by the trial court. State v. Muhammad, 03-2991 (La.5/25/04), 875 So.2d 45, 54. Although La. R.S. 15:529.1 does not specify a time within which a habitual offender bill of information must be filed, the habitual offender bill must still be filed within a reasonable time. Id.

Section 15:529.1 does not set a statutory time limit for completing a multiple-offender proceeding, although the proceeding must be completed within a reasonable time under governing jurisprudence.

State of Louisiana v. Derryberry · filed 2013-02-06(D)(1)(a)

As noted above, La.R.S. 15:529.1 does not establish a time limitation for multiple offender proceedings, but jurisprudence holds that a multiple offender proceedings must be completed within a reasonable time after the State has learned of a prior felony conviction.

In a habitual-offender proceeding, the State may prove that the defendant is the person who committed the predicate offenses through witness testimony or other identity evidence; fingerprint comparison is only one possible method.

State of Louisiana v. Clark · filed 2014-11-05

As this Court has repeatedly held the expert fingerprint comparison is only one of many routes the State can take to meet its burden under the Habitual Offender Act. See [State v.] Payton, 00-2899 at p. 6, [(La.3/15/02)] 810 So.2d [1127] at 1130-31 (“In attempting [to meet its burden], the State may present: (1) testimony from witnesses; (2) expert opinion regarding the fingerprints of the defendant when compared with those in the prior record; (3) photographs in the duly authenticated record; or (4) evidence of identical driver[’]s license number, sex, race and date of birth.”) (emphasis added); State v. Lee, 364 So.2d 1024, 1031-32 (La.1978); [State v.] Curtis, 338 So.2d [662] at 664 [La.1976]. State v. White, 13-1525, pp. 4-5 (La. 11/8/13), 130 So.3d 298, 301. In the present case, the state presented testimony from Detective Quirk that the defendant was the same man who committed the two previous armed robberies referenced in the multiple offender bill, and that the defendant, who committed those armed robberies, was the same man who committed the first degree robbery which forms the basis for the multiple offender proceeding. Parole Officer Fontenot testified to the same effect. The testimony of Officer Aymond with regard to the motor-vehicle charge listed in the habitual offender bill reached the same result. Thus, the evidence presented by the state was sufficient to carry the burden on the multiple offender proceedings.

Section 15:529.1(D)(1)(a) requires notice of the habitual-offender allegations, advice of the right to a formal hearing, and advice of the constitutional right to remain silent.

State v. Roland · filed 2015-02-27(D)(1)(a)

La. R.S. 15:529.1(D)(l)(a) requires that the defendant be advised of the specific allegations contained in the habitual offender bill of information and his right to a formal hearing at which the state must prove its case. Implicit in this requirement is the additional requirement that the defendant be advised of his constitutional right to remain silent.

Section 15:529.1 does not entitle a defendant to a jury trial in a habitual-offender proceeding.

State v. Hall · filed 2015-05-13

Again, the argument that a defendant is entitled to a jury trial in connection with a multiple offender proceeding pursuant to La. R.S. 15:529.1 has been rejected multiple times, including by this Court in [State v.] Vincent, 2010-0764, pp. 10-11 [ (La.App. 4 Cir. 1/19/11) ], 56 So.3d [408,] at 415; State v. Juengain, 2009-0425, p. 11 (La.App. 4 Cir. 1/20/10), 41 So.3d 499, 506-07; and State v. Smith, 2005-0375, pp. 3-5 (La.App. 4 Cir. 7/20/05), 913 So.2d 836, 839-840.

Section 15:529.1(D)(1)(a) requires the court to inform a habitual-offender defendant of the allegations and the right to a hearing, and implicitly requires advising him of the right to remain silent.

State v. Cousin · filed 2017-12-21(D)(1)(a)

After a habitual offender bill of information is filed, the court in which the subsequent conviction was had shall cause the person to be brought before it and shall inform him of the allegation contained in the information and of his right to be tried as to the truth thereof according to law, and shall also require the offender to say whether the allegations are true. Id. The statute further implicitly provides that the court should advise the defendant of his right to remain silent. ... The language of the Habitual Offender Law must be strictly construed. In this regard, an implicit and integral aspect of the requirements of La. R.S. 15:529.1 is the court's duty to inform the defendant of his right to remain silent.

Section 15:529.1 requires the trial court to advise a defendant of the habitual-offender allegations, the right to a hearing, and the right to remain silent; an informed stipulation waives the hearing.

State v. Kelly · filed 2017-12-29

Turning to the habitual offender proceeding, La. R.S. 15:529.1 requires the trial court to advise a defendant of the allegations contained in the habitual offender bill of information, his right to a hearing, and his right to remain silent. State v. Jamison, 17-49 (La. App. 5 Cir. 05/17/17), 222 So.3d 908 ; State v. Oliver, 14-428 (La. App. 5 Cir. 11/25/14), 165 So.3d 970, 976, writ denied, 14-2693 (La. 10/09/15), 178 So.3d 1001. The failure of the trial court to advise a defendant of his right to a hearing and to remain silent is harmless error when the habitual offender status is established by competent evidence offered by the State at a hearing, rather than by the admission of the defendant. Id. However, there is reversible error when the defendant stipulates to the habitual offender bill of information without having been informed of his right to a hearing or his right to remain silent. Id. If the record reflects that the defendant was advised of his habitual offender rights by the trial judge and/or his attorney, then the defendant intelligently waived his rights. Jamison, supra ; Oliver, supra.