La. Stat. Ann. § 15:529.1

Section 15:529.1(C) uses the cleansing period in effect when the newest offense was committed and requires the State to prove discharge dates when the relevant convictions are more than that period apart; under the 1995 three-strikes provision, life imprisonment applies only if the current and both prior felonies meet the statute’s specified classifications.

State v. Lewis · filed 2001-03-07(C); (A)(2)(b)(ii); (A)(1)(b)(i)

The jurisprudence has consistently held that the cleansing period (beginning to run from the date the defendant is discharged from state custody and supervision) in effect at the time the newest offense was committed controls for purposes of La. R.S. 15:529.1. ... More than seven years elapsed between the 1981 and 1989 convictions. Therefore, it was necessary for the State to prove the discharge dates. ... The State did not carry its burden of proof, they did not produce the pen packs to show any discharge dates. ... Under the 1995 version of La. R.S. 15:529.1(A)(1)(b)(ii), the third felony and the two prior felonies had to fall under the statute in order for the defendant to be sentenced to life imprisonment. ... The trial court erred by using the "three strikes" provision to sentence the defendant to life imprisonment. ... These assignments of error have merit. The defendant's sentence must be vacated and the case remanded for resentencing under the 1995 version of La. R.S. 15:529.1(A)(1)(b)(i).

Section 15:529.1(B) requires multiple convictions obtained on the same day before October 19, 2004, to be counted as one conviction for habitual-offender adjudication, even when based on unrelated conduct.

State v. Spano · filed 2006-08-01(B)

Therefore, convictions obtained on the same day prior to October 19, 2004, are to be counted as one offense for purposes of habitual offender adjudications.

Section 15:529.1 treats convictions on more than one count entered on the same day as one conviction for habitual-offender enhancement, so multiple counts from one criminal episode cannot each support enhancement.

State of Louisiana v. Tommy Cloud · filed 2006-12-13

Only one count of a multi-count indictment/information can be used to enhance the penalty pursuant to La.R.S. 15:529.1 when the convictions were entered on the same day. ... Furthermore, because two of the counts arose from a single criminal episode, the defendant could not have been sentenced as a multiple offender on all counts. ... Convictions on more than one count entered on the same day should be treated as one conviction for purposes of the habitual offender statute. ... Therefore, the enhanced sentence imposed must be vacated and the case remanded to the trial court for resentencing.

Section 15:529.1(G) does not require a habitual-offender sentence to be imposed without benefit of parole.

State v. Gilbert · filed 2001-05-16(G)

Defendant correctly notes that subsection G of the habitual offender statute does not include the limitation that the sentence be imposed without benefit of parole. The State concedes this point. Further, the sentencing provisions of the obscenity statute do not require a restriction on parole privileges.

Section 15:529.1 requires the State in a habitual-offender proceeding to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the defendant’s prior felony conviction and identity, and failure to prove the prior conviction defeats the habitual-offender adjudication.

State v. McKissick · filed 2001-06-22(D)(1)(b), (D)(2)(a)

In light of the State’s failure to submit any proof of defendant’s prior conviction, we find the State failed to meet its burden of proof pursuant to La. R.S. 15:529.1.

Section 15:529.1 permits the State to prove prior convictions at a habitual-offender hearing with any competent evidence, and a certified docket master together with a waiver-of-rights form can suffice.

State v. Mims · filed 2001-12-26

The Louisiana Supreme Court has stated that LSA-R.S. 15:529.1 does not require the state to use a specific type of evidence to carry its burden at a habitual offender hearing and that prior convictions may be proved by any competent evidence. ... Based on the foregoing discussion, we find that the evidence introduced by the state, including the certified docket master and the waiver of rights form, was sufficient to prove defendant's predicate conviction in case number 398-690. Accordingly, this assigned error is without merit.

The Habitual Offender Law places the burden of proving factual issues on the district attorney beyond a reasonable doubt, with the presumption of regularity of a judgment sufficient to satisfy the initial burden.

State v. Coston · filed 2001-09-05(D)(1)(b)

Louisiana’s Habitual Offender Law charges the district attorney with the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt any issue of fact, and the presumption of regularity of judgment shall be sufficient to meet the original burden of proof. La.Rev.Stat. ANN. § 15:529(D)(l)(b). ... The trial court erred in finding the defendant a second felony offender. The State presented sufficient evidence to the find the defendant a third felony offender. Therefore, we vacate the multiple bill sentences on counts three and four and remand to the trial court for further sentencing proceedings consistent with this holding.

Section 15:529.1(A)(1)(b)(ii) mandates life imprisonment without benefits for a qualifying third felony offender, but the sentence may be reduced if the defendant proves by clear and convincing evidence that it is constitutionally excessive as applied.

State v. Davis · filed 2001-11-07(A)(1)(b)(ii)

Following Stevenson and Briscoe, we find that the record suggests that the defendant might not be deserving of the minimum mandatory life sentence provided by La. R.S. 15:529.1(A)(1)(b)(ii). However, the record before us does not provide enough evidence about the defendant for a conclusion as to the constitutionality of the life sentence in this case. Therefore, we vacate the defendant’s sentence and remand this case for a hearing at which he may show by clear and convincing evidence that the mandatory sentence is unconstitutionally excessive as applied to him.

Section 15:529.1 makes the prescribed habitual-offender minimum sentence presumptively constitutional, permits departure when clear and convincing evidence shows the sentence is constitutionally excessive, and places on the State the burden to prove prior-conviction facts beyond a reasonable doubt, with the judgment's regularity presumption satisfying the initial burden.

State v. Wilson · filed 2001-11-14(A)(1)(b)(ii); (D)(1)(b)

The minimum sentences imposed on multiple offenders by the Habitual Offender Law are presumed to be constitutional. ... A court may only depart from the minimum sentence if it finds that there is clear and convincing evidence in the particular case before it that would rebut the presumption of constitutionality. ... La. R.S. 15:529.1(D)(1)(b) states that the district attorney has the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt any issue of fact and that the presumption of regularity of judgment shall be sufficient to meet the original burden of proof. The State must establish the prior felony and that the defendant was the same person convicted of that felony.

Section 15:529.1(D)(1)(b) requires a defendant challenging an alleged predicate conviction to state the constitutional and factual basis in a written response and prove factual issues raised by that response by a preponderance of the evidence, while barring challenges first made after sentencing.

State v. Porter · filed 2001-12-27(D)(1)(b)

Any challenge to a previous conviction or adjudication of delinquency which is not made before sentence is imposed may not thereafter be raised to attack the sentence.

Section 15:529.1(D)(1)(b) requires a defendant to make particularized, pre-sentence written objections to an allegedly invalid predicate conviction, while § 15:529.1(G) prohibits probation or suspension of sentence but does not authorize denial of parole.

State v. Hopson · filed 2001-12-28(D)(1)(b), (G)

Any sentence imposed under the provisions of this Section shall be without benefit of probation or suspension of sentence.

Section 15:529.1(A)(1)(b)(ii) subjects a qualifying third-felony habitual offender to life imprisonment at hard labor without parole, probation, or suspension of sentence.

State v. Rice · filed 2002-01-16(A)(1)(b)(ii)

The sentence further subjects the offender to life imprisonment at hard labor without benefit of parole, probation or suspension of sentence.

Section 15:529.1(G) permits enhanced sentences without probation and suspension of sentence, but does not authorize parole restrictions for second habitual offenders.

State v. Kennerson · filed 2002-02-06(G)

Additionally, the habitual offender statute (La. R.S.15:529.1) does not authorize parole restrictions on second habitual offenders. Section G of the habitual offender statute provides for sentences enhanced under that statute to be imposed without benefit of probation and suspension of sentence, but it does not provide for the restriction of parole.

Amendments to Section 15:529.1 apply prospectively, so the sentencing law in effect when the offense occurred governs.

State v. Moore · filed 2002-02-13(A)(l)(b)(ii)

In the case at bar, because the date of the offense, August 18, 2000, is prior to June 15, 2001, the effective date of the amendment to the statute, we find the trial court did not err in sentencing the defendant.

Section 15:529.1 permits habitual-offender enhancement of only one conviction when multiple convictions arise from the same criminal episode.

State v. Payne · filed 2002-03-20

The Habitual Offender Law, La. R.S. 15:529.1, may be used to enhance only one of the defendant’s convictions when both convictions arise out of the same criminal episode.

The habitual-offender statute uses the cleansing period in effect when the last offense used for enhancement was committed, and a predicate offense punishable by more than five years can support the mandatory-life provision.

State v. Harbor · filed 2002-04-10(A)(1)(c)(ii); (D)(1)(b); (A)(2)(c)(ii)

In State v. Smith, 00-1935 (La.App. 5th Cir.5/30/01), 794 So.2d 41, we held that the applicable cleansing period is the one in effect when the defendant committed the last of the offenses used to enhance the sentence, because a habitual offender proceeding does not charge a new crime, but is merely a method of increasing the punishment of habitual offenders. ... Accordingly, we find that the trial court did not err in using the ten year cleansing period in effect in 1999, at the time of the instant offense, rather than the five-year cleansing period in effect at the time of the Defendant's first predicate conviction in 1987. ... In 1987, a conviction for possession with intent to distribute marijuana was "imprisonment at hard labor for not more than ten years and payment of a fine of not more than fifteen thousand dollars." Thus, it was "punishable for more than five years." Consequently, we find that the trial judge did not err in sentencing the Defendant to life imprisonment as a fourth offender under La.R.S. 15:529.1(A)(2)(c)(ii).

For a fourth felony offender whose prior distribution-of-cocaine conviction was punishable by more than five years, the statute in effect when the offense was committed required life imprisonment without benefits; a later amendment could not be applied retroactively.

State v. Houston · filed 2002-04-24(A)(1)(c)(ii)

Acts 2001, No. 403, § 2, effective June 15, 2001, amended La. R.S. 15:529.1(A)(1)(b)(ii) and (c)(ii). Section 6 of that Act 403 provides "[t]he provisions of this Act shall only have prospective effect." In this case, the trial court erroneously sentenced defendant under the 2001 amendment to R.S. 15:529.1, which was not in effect at the time of the defendant's offense. The defendant's sentence must be vacated and the case remanded for resentencing.

The version of § 15:529.1 in effect when the offense was committed governs, and a court may depart from its mandatory minimum only upon clear and convincing evidence that the sentence is constitutionally excessive.

State v. Ventress · filed 2002-04-30(A)(2)(b)(ii)

For the reasons discussed in Flagg, Sugasti, and Jordan, the pre-amendment version of the multiple offender statute was applicable to crimes committed prior to June 15, 2001 and LSA R.S. 15:529.1, as amended by 2001 La. Acts 403, applies to crimes committed after the effective date of the amendment. Accordingly, the defendant's argument is groundless.

Subsection (C) makes the Habitual Offender Law inapplicable only when more than ten years elapsed between the expiration of the sentence for the last previous felony conviction and commission of the underlying felony; otherwise, prior felony convictions are counted under subsection (A), even if the defendant could not earlier have been adjudicated a second offender.

State v. Everett · filed 2002-05-14(C)

Subsection (C), however, provides that "[t]his Section," i.e., the Habitual Offender Law, "shall not be applicable in cases where more than ten years have elapsed since the expiration of the maximum sentence or sentences of the previous conviction or convictions ... and the time of the commission of the last felony for which he has been convicted." We interpret this subsection to mean that in order to determine whether the Habitual Offender Law applies at all to enhance a defendant's sentence after conviction of a subsequent felony, we must look to that time period between defendant's discharge from being subject to penitentiary confinement for the previous conviction[3] and the commission of the underlying felony. If that time period encompasses more than ten years, then the Habitual Offender Law is inapplicable to defendant's case and he cannot be sentenced as anything other than a first offender. If, on the other hand, ten years or less have elapsed between the defendant's discharge from being subject to penitentiary confinement for the previous conviction and the commission of the underlying felony, then the Habitual Offender Law is applicable and subsection (A) is employed to determine the appropriate sentence. Under subsection (A), defendant's felony convictions are simply counted, either second, third, or fourth or subsequent, and the applicable penalty is imposed. As defendant himself correctly recognizes, subsection (C) is concerned only with that period of time between the expiration of the sentence for the last previous felony conviction and the commission of the last felony. It is only that time period which the legislature has made relevant to determine whether defendant will be sentenced under the Habitual Offender Law.

Section 15:529.1's enhanced-penalty proceedings need not be instituted by grand-jury indictment; the indictment requirement is determined by the penalty for the substantive offense initially charged.

State v. Delandro · filed 2002-05-10

The above constitutional provision and code article were not intended to, and do not, apply to the institution of enhanced-penalty proceedings, pursuant to La. R.S. 15:529.1. They apply only to the substantive crime with which an accused is initially charged.

Section 15:529.1 bars a challenge to a predicate conviction or adjudication raised after sentence is imposed, and subsection (G) requires only that a habitual-offender sentence exclude probation and suspension—not parole unless the underlying offense separately restricts parole.

State v. Henry · filed 2002-08-14(D)(1)(b), (G)

Any challenge to a previous conviction or adjudication of delinquency which is not made before the sentence is imposed may not thereafter be raised to attack the sentence. La. R.S. 15:529.1(D)(1)(b); ... Therefore, we are precluded from addressing this issue on appeal. ... However, La. R.S. 15:529.1(G) requires that any sentence imposed under the habitual offender law be imposed without benefit of probation or suspension of sentence only. This statute does not place any restrictions on parole eligibility unless additional restrictions are provided in the underlying offense of conviction. ... Because, in this case, La. R.S. 14:34.7, the underlying statute of conviction, in no way denies a defendant the benefit of parole, the trial court erred in doing so.

The habitual-offender sentencing provision in § 15:529.1(A)(1)(b)(ii) is governed by amendments prospectively, so a 2001 amendment does not apply to an offense committed in 1999.

State v. Melancon · filed 2002-08-21(A)(1)(b)(ii)

The defendant contends that the trial court erroneously sentenced him under La. R.S. 15:529.1(A)(1)(b)(ii). ... The Louisiana Supreme Court and this Court have considered this issue previously and concluded that La. Acts 2001, No. 403 has prospective effect only and does not apply to persons who violated the statutes prior to the amendment. ... As the defendant allegedly committed the present crime in 1999, the amendments of La. Acts 2001, No. 403 do not apply in the case at bar.

The 2001 amendments to La. Stat. Ann. § 15:529.1 apply prospectively and do not govern offenses committed before their June 21, 2001 effective date.

State v. Hulbert · filed 2002-10-30

The effective date of the amendments to La. R.S. 15:529.1 was June 21, 2001. The offense occurred in this case on August 29, 2000. We find the amendments to La. R.S. 15:529.1 are not applicable to this case.

Section 15:529.1 applies unless more than ten years elapsed between discharge from the prior conviction and commission of the underlying felony; if it applies, prior felony convictions are counted under subsection (A), without a vested right to an earlier offender status.

State v. Woods · filed 2002-09-11(C)

Subsection (C), however, provides that "[t]his Section," i.e., the Habitual Offender Law, "shall not be applicable in cases where more than ten years have elapsed since the expiration of the maximum sentence or sentences of the previous conviction or convictions ... and the time of the commission of the last felony for which he has been convicted." We interpret this subsection to mean that in order to determine whether the Habitual Offender Law applies at all to enhance a defendant's sentence after conviction of a subsequent felony, we must look to that time period between defendant's discharge from being subject to penitentiary confinement for the previous conviction [footnote omitted] and the commission of the underlying felony. If that time period encompasses more than ten years, then the Habitual Offender Law is inapplicable to defendant's case and he cannot be sentenced as anything other than a first offender. If, on the other hand, ten years or less have elapsed between the defendant's discharge from being subject to penitentiary confinement for the previous conviction and the commission of the underlying felony, then the Habitual Offender Law is applicable and subsection (A) is employed to determine the appropriate sentence.

Section 15:529.1(A)(1)(b)(ii) requires natural-life imprisonment without parole, probation, or suspension when the third felony or either of the two prior felonies falls within the listed serious-offense categories.

State v. Allen · filed 2002-09-18(A)(1)(b)(ii)

The provisions of La. R.S. 15:529.1(A)(1)(b)(ii) stated: ... (ii) If the third felony or either of the two prior felonies is a felony defined as a crime of violence under R.S. 14:2(13) or as a violation of the Uniform Controlled Dangerous Substances Law punishable by imprisonment for more than five years or any other crime punishable by imprisonment for more than twelve years, the person shall be imprisoned for the remainder of his natural life, without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence. ... Under La. R.S. 14:2(13), armed robbery is a crime of violence. ... Consequently, we find that the trial court correctly adjudicated the defendant to be a third-felony offender under La. R.S. 15:529.1.

Subsection (C) requires the State to prove the defendant’s actual discharge date when more than ten years elapsed between an earlier predicate conviction and the commission of the next predicate offense.

State v. Mays · filed 2002-10-16(C)

Since more than ten years elapsed between the time of the conviction of the first offense and the commission of the second offense, used for enhancement purposes, it was incumbent upon the State to prove the defendant’s actual discharge date for the first offense. There is nothing in the record to show the date of the defendant’s discharge from state supervision on the first offense. Therefore, the State did not meet its burden of proof in this case in showing defendant was a third-felony offender.

Section 15:529.1 requires the State in a habitual-offender proceeding to prove the prior guilty pleas and counsel representation, and the penalty provision in effect when the offense was committed governs; the 2001 amendment applies prospectively only.

State v. Wade · filed 2002-10-23A(1)(b)(ii)

The State's burden of proof in habitual offender proceedings under R.S. 15:529.1 is stated in State v. Shelton, 621 So.2d 769 (La.1993): ... If the defendant denies the allegations of the bill of information, the burden is on the State to prove the existence of the prior guilty pleas and that defendant was represented by counsel when they were taken. ... The State proved, beyond a reasonable doubt, every essential element of the habitual offender bill under R.S. 15:529.1. State v. Shelton, supra; State v. O'Neal, supra. This assignment lacks merit. ... At the time of this offense, the penalty for being a third felony offender, if the third or either of the prior felonies was a violation of the CDS law punishable by imprisonment for more than five years, was life without benefit of parole, probation or suspension of sentence. La. R.S. 15:529.1 A(1)(b)(ii). ... The amendment has prospective effect only. 2001 La. Acts No. 403, § 6. ... Wade correctly argues that Louisiana applies the penalty set forth in the statute at the time of the offense. ... Two appellate courts have explicitly held that the 2001 amendment to R.S. 15:529.1 is prospective only. State v. Houston, 02-0255 (La.App. 4 Cir. 4/24/02), 818 So.2d 253; State v. Flagg, 01-965 (La.App. 5 Cir. 3/26/02), 815 So.2d 208. Despite Wade's well-researched argument, we see no need to deviate from the uniform jurisprudence of Louisiana. This assignment lacks merit.

The version of § 15:529.1 in effect when the defendant committed his most recent offense governs, so a later amendment reducing the penalty does not apply retroactively.

State v. Lewis · filed 2002-11-26(A)(1)(b)(ii)

Because the amendments to La. R.S. 15:529.1 became effective after Lewis committed his most recent offense, we find the amendments do not apply to this case. Thus, the trial court erred in sentencing Lewis to the sixty-six year sentence rather than life imprisonment.

Subsection (D)(1)(b) requires a defendant to file a written response to a multiple bill, and an issue is not preserved for appellate review without that response unless the objection is made orally.

State v. Santee · filed 2002-12-04(D)(1)(b)

In State v. Cossee, 95-2218 (La.App. 4 Cir. 7/24/96), 678 So.2d 72, 73, this Court held that the failure to file a written response to the multiple bill as required by La. R.S. 15:529.1(D)(1)(b) precluded appellate review of the defendant's claim that the documentary evidence was not sufficient to support prior convictions set forth in the multiple bill. ... In this case, at his arraignment on the multiple bill, the defendant entered a plea of not guilty; however the record contains no written response to the multiple bill as required by La. R.S. 15:529.1(D)(1)(b). ... When the record does not contain the defendant's written response to the multiple bill, the issue will not be preserved for appellate review unless the objection is made orally.

For a third habitual offender, the version of § 15:529.1(A)(1)(b)(ii) in effect when the underlying offense was committed governs, and it required life imprisonment without benefits when the statutory prior-offense conditions were met.

State v. Wilson · filed 2002-12-18(A)(1)(b)(ii)

The trial court sentenced Defendant to twenty years at hard labor as a third habitual offender when the proper sentence should have been a mandatory life sentence under La.R.S. 15:529.1(A)(1)(b)(ii), as it read when the instant offense was committed in May of 1999. ... Because one of Defendant's prior felonies, distribution of cocaine, is a violation of the Uniform Controlled Dangerous Substance law punishable from five to thirty years at hard labor, however, Defendant should have been sentenced under subsection (b)(ii), which provided for a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment. ... Considering the above, we find that the amended penalty provision for a third habitual offender does not apply to the present case. Thus, the pre-amendment provision applies, and Defendant should have received a sentence of life imprisonment without benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence.

The version of La. Stat. Ann. § 15:529.1(A)(1)(c)(ii) in effect when the offense was committed governs sentencing, rather than a later amendment with more lenient sentencing provisions.

State v. Wilson · filed 2003-01-22(A)(1)(c)(ii)

The crux of this issue, however, has been decided by the Louisiana Supreme Court. In State v. Sugasti, XXXX-XXXX (La.6/21/02), 820 So.2d 518, the court reaffirmed its long held position that a defendant must be sentenced according to the sentencing provisions in effect at the time of the commission of the crime. ... Thus, Wilson was properly sentenced under the version of La. R.S. 15:529.1(A)(1)(c)(ii), in effect at the time of the commission of his crime. This assignment of error is without merit.

The version of La. Stat. Ann. § 15:529.1 in effect when the underlying felony was committed governs, even if sentencing occurs after a statutory amendment; the court also recognized the applicable pre-amendment mandatory minimum and amended sentencing range.

State v. Williams · filed 2003-02-25(A)(2)(c)(ii); (A)(2)(c)(i)

This Court has held that the preamendment version of La. R.S. 15:529.1 applies when the underlying offense is committed before the effective date of Act 403, even when the sentence is imposed after the effective date of Act 403.[10] As noted above, defendant's underlying offense was committed on March 30, 2001; thus, under our current jurisprudence, the pre-amendment statute is applicable in this case.

For a habitual-offender proceeding under § 15:529.1(A)(1)(b)(ii), the version in effect when the underlying offense was committed governs, and the pre-amendment provision mandated life imprisonment without benefits for the qualifying offenses.

State v. Davis · filed 2003-02-25(A)(1)(b)(ii)

This Court has held that the pre-amendment version of La. R.S. 15:529.1 applies when the underlying offense is committed before the effective date of Act 403, even when the sentence is imposed after the effective date of Act 403.[29] As noted above, defendant's underlying offense was committed on May 28, 2000; thus, under our current jurisprudence, the pre-amendment statute is applicable in this case.

Amendments to La. R.S. 15:529.1 apply prospectively, so an amendment effective after the defendant's habitual-offender adjudication and resentencing does not apply to his case.

State v. Hayes · filed 2003-03-05

In 2001 La. Acts, No. 403, § 2, effective June 15, 2001, the Legislature amended La. R.S. 15:529.1 to require a life sentence for a third felony offender only if the third felony and both of the predicate offenses were crimes of violence, certain sex offenses, drug offenses punishable by more than ten years, or any other crimes punishable by more than twelve years. The defendant notes that under the present law, the sentencing range for his conviction and multiple offender adjudication would be six years and eight months to twenty years imprisonment. However, the Legislature expressly stated the amendment was to be applied prospectively. The defendant's adjudication as a multiple offender occurred prior to the amendment's effective date and, thus, the amendment is inapplicable to this case.

Section 15:529.1(D)(1)(b) bars a defendant from later attacking the sentence based on a prior conviction or adjudication when no written objection was made before sentencing; subsection (A)(1)(c)(ii), as then worded, required a life minimum for a fourth felony offender when the fourth or a prior felony was a crime of violence.

State v. Gaddis · filed 2003-03-14(D)(1)(b); (A)(1)(c)(ii)

No written objection to the proceedings was filed in accordance with La. R.S. 15:529.1(D)(1)(b). Of course, any challenge to the previous conviction or adjudication which is not made before the sentence is imposed may not thereafter be raised to attack the sentence and is not preserved for appellate review. La. R.S. 15:529.1(D)(1)(b); ... In compliance with La. R.S. 15:529.1(A)(1)(c)(ii), as it read on the date of Gaddis's offense, and which imposed a statutory minimum life sentence for a fourth felony offender whose fourth or previous felonies were defined as a crime of violence under La. R.S. 14:2(13), the court sentenced Gaddis to life imprisonment without benefit of parole, probation or suspension of sentence.

Section 15:529.1(A)(1)(c)(ii) requires a life sentence without parole, probation, or suspension when the present offense and at least two prior offenses are crimes of violence.

State v. Roberts · filed 2003-03-26(A)(1)(c)(ii)

However, La. R.S. 15:529.1 A(1)(c)(ii) provides in part that where the present offense and at least two of the prior offenses are crimes of violence as defined by La. R.S. 14:2(13), the defendant shall be sentenced to life imprisonment without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence. The appellant's present offense was forcible rape, and two of his prior offenses according to the multiple bill were armed robbery and another count of the intentional exposure to the AIDS virus, all three of which are defined as crimes of violence by La. R.S. 14:2(13). Thus, the trial court erred by not specifying that the sentence be served without benefit of parole.

Section 15:529.1(G) requires a sentence imposed on a second offender to exclude the benefits of probation and suspension of sentence.

State v. Clements · filed 2013-03-13G

In addition, the district court found that Mr. Clements was a second offender. La. R.S. 15:529.1 G provides that a sentence as a second offender must be imposed without the benefit of probation or suspension of sentence. The district court, however, failed to include these prohibitions when imposing the sentence. Nonetheless, pursuant to La. R.S. 15:301.1 A, and State v. Williams, 00-1725, pp. 10-11 (La. 11/28/01), 800 So.2d 790, 798-99, the sentence is deemed to have been imposed with these restrictions of benefits even in the Labsence of the district court delineating them. See State v. Phillips, 03-0304 (La.App. 4 Cir. 7/23/03), 853 So.2d 675, 677. Thus, there is no need for this court to correct the sentence.

Section 15:529.1(D)(1)(b) requires a person challenging an alleged prior conviction to file a particularized written response and bear the burden of proving the constitutional invalidity of that conviction.

State v. Durden · filed 2003-04-09(D)(1)(b)

We consider Durden's motion to quash the use of two prior convictions, filed in response to the habitual offender bill of information, as a written response as required in La. R.S. 15:529.1(D)(1)(b). ... Applying this rationale and scrutinizing both the transcript of the prior guilty plea and the hearing to invalidate it, we find that Durden did not meet his burden under La. R.S. 15:529.1(D)(1)(b) of showing that the plea was involuntary or unknowingly entered.

For habitual-offender sentencing, the version of La. R.S. 15:529.1 in effect when the offender is adjudicated governs, rather than the version in effect when the offense was committed.

State v. Orange · filed 2003-04-11

For the reasons stated in State v. Parker, we conclude that the law in effect at the time of the adjudication is applicable. Therefore, the sentence must be vacated and the matter remanded for re-sentencing.

Section 15:529.1(A)(1)(b)(ii), as applicable at the time, required a life sentence without benefits when the third felony or either prior felony was a drug offense punishable by more than five years; the court held that imposing that sentence on Combs was constitutionally excessive as applied.

State v. Combs · filed 2003-05-21(A)(1)(b)(ii)

We find in this case substantial evidence to rebut the presumption that the mandated sentence is constitutional. ... Furthermore, because of a change in the Habitual Offender Law since his conviction, he would not qualify for a life term under current law.[1] ... The life sentence imposed on this third offender is not proportionate to the crimes for which he was convicted. ... Therefore, we vacate the defendant's life sentence and remand the case for resentencing in accordance with this opinion. ... La. R.S. 15:529.1(A)(1)(b)(ii), as it existed at the time of the offense, provided that when the third felony or either of the prior felonies is a violation of the Uniform Controlled Dangerous Substance Law punishable by imprisonment for more than five years, the sentence is life imprisonment at hard labor without benefits. Under the current law such a sentence can be imposed only if all of the three of the drug offenses are punishable by ten year or more.

Section 15:529.1(A)(1)(c)(i) requires at least a twenty-year sentence for a fourth or subsequent felony punishable by less than life, and finding a subsection (ii) natural-life sentence excessive does not require a sentence below that minimum.

State v. Augillard · filed 2003-06-04(A)(1)(c)(i)-(ii)

However, the defendant mistakenly maintains that when this Court found the life term excessive it mandated that he be resen-tenced to a term less than the statutory minimum under La. R.S. 15:529.1(A)(l)(c)(i). This Court held only that the life sentence under La. R.S. 15:529.1(A)(l)(c)(ii) was constitutionally excessive.

Subsection (D) requires the district court to inform the defendant of the allegations in the multiple bill and give him time to object, but it does not require the State to produce its proof before the multiple-bill hearing.

State v. Williams · filed 2003-06-04(D)

As per La. R.S. 15:529.1(D), the district court must inform the defendant of the allegations in the multiple bill and allow him time to object to the allegations. The statute does not require the State to produce its proof of the multiple bill prior to the hearing.

The amended penalty provision does not apply to crimes committed before its June 15, 2001 effective date; the governing version is the one in effect when the offense was committed.

State v. Surry · filed 2003-09-24(A)(1)(b)(i)

In light of the clear legislative intent and the reasoning set forth in State v. Barnes, supra, and State v. Wade, supra, the trial court did not err in sentencing defendant in accordance with La. R.S. 15:529.1 as it read at the time of the offense of conviction.

Section 15:529.1(D)(1)(b) requires a written response challenging a prior conviction, but an oral objection at the habitual-offender hearing can preserve the issue for appellate review.

State v. Wuneburger · filed 2003-10-15(D)(1)(b)

Although defendant did not file a written response challenging the validity of his prior guilty plea as required by La. R.S. 15:529.1(D)(1)(b), he did orally object at the habitual offender hearing to the failure of the trial judge to correctly inform defendant of the nature of the charge in one of his prior convictions. Therefore, because defendant objected at the habitual offender hearing, he has preserved the issue for review.

For a habitual-offender sentence under La. Stat. Ann. § 15:529.1, the State must prove that a prior guilty plea was knowing and voluntary and included articulated waivers of the three Boykin rights.

State v. Townsend · filed 2003-10-29(A)(1)(a)

To use a prior guilty plea to enhance punishment, the state has the initial burden to show that there was a conviction and that the defendant | fiwas represented by counsel (or waived counsel) at the time he entered his plea. State v. Shelton (La.1993), 621 So.2d 769. Once the state produces such proof, the burden then shifts to the defendant to prove “a significant procedural defect in the proceedings.” Once a defendant makes an affirmative showing of an infringement of his rights or a procedural irregularity in the plea transcript, the burden reverts to the state and it must *889prove the constitutionality of the predicate plea. State v. Zachary, 2001-3191 (La.10/25/02), 829 So.2d 405. ... A guilty plea form which excludes one of the three rights enunciated in Boykin unsupported by a minute entry or guilty plea colloquy is insufficient for the state to meet its burden of proof that the predicate plea was entered into knowingly and voluntarily for the purposes of a multiple bill. As such, we reverse the habitual offender conviction and remand this matter to the trial court for re-sentencing.

For habitual-offender sentencing, the version of La. Stat. Ann. § 15:529.1 in force when the underlying offense was committed controls; a later amendment does not apply.

State v. Williams · filed 2003-11-12

Therefore, we deem the issue settled. Where, as here, the amendment of the sentencing provision of the Habitual Offender Law (La.R.S. 15:529.1, as amended by 2001 La. Acts 403) became effective after the date of commission of the instant offense, the amendment to the habitual offender sentencing provisions does not apply to the habitual offender sentence imposed. Therefore, in this case the trial court correctly found the habitual offender sentence imposed under the pre-amendment version of La.R.S. 15:529.1 applicable.

Section 15:529.1(D)(b) requires a defendant to raise a challenge to an alleged prior conviction before sentencing, including by written response, or the challenge is not preserved for review and cannot later be used to attack the habitual-offender sentence.

State v. Stevenson · filed 2004-02-10(D)(b)

We note that defendant did not file a written response challenging the validity of prior guilty plea as provided by La. R.S. 15:529.1(D)(b), nor did he raise these issues at the habitual offender hearing. Therefore, defendant has not preserved these issues for review and is precluded from presenting them to this Court on appeal.

Section 15:529.1(D)(1)(b) bars a defendant from later challenging the validity of prior convictions used for habitual-offender adjudication when he did not object to them at the habitual-offender hearing.

State v. Lewis · filed 2008-08-13(D)(1)(b)

Defendant did not make an objection under La. R.S. 15:529.1(D)(1)(b) to the validity of his prior convictions and is barred from raising that issue now.

A defendant must raise challenges to alleged prior convictions before sentencing in the multiple-offender proceeding; an unraised challenge cannot later be used to attack the sentence.

State v. Taylor · filed 2012-11-28(D)(1)(b)

Accordingly, Louisiana jurisprudence has recognized that where an issue is not presented in writing or orally during multiple offender proceedings, it cannot be raised on appeal. State v. Landfair, 10-1698, pp. 6-7 (La.App. 4 Cir. 7/20/11), 70 So.3d 1061, 1066 (motion to quash multiple offender bill of information for using previous convictions entered on the same date failed to preserve arguments that the State failed to prove his identity and the validity of prior guilty pleas). See also State v. Moore, 10-0314, p. 10 (La.App. 4 Cir. 10/13/10), 57 So.3d 1033, 1040 (Oral objection to identity did not preserve issue of cleansing period for review). The instant record shows no written or oral objections were made at any point during multiple offender proceedings. Thus, none of Taylor’s arguments concerning his multiple offender adjudication has been preserved for appeal, and they are barred from review by this Court.

A challenge to a prior conviction used for habitual-offender sentencing must be made before sentence is imposed or it cannot later be raised to attack the sentence.

State of Louisiana v. Sigue · filed 2014-03-05(D)(1)(b)

Louisiana Revised Statutes 15:529.1(D)(1)(b) states that “any challenge to a previous conviction which is not made before sentence is imposed may not thereafter be raised to attack the sentence.” As Defendant failed to raise this issue in his written “Objection to Multiple Offender Bill” or in his oral argument at the habitual offender hearing, the issue was not preserved for appellate review, and he is precluded from raising it for the first time here.

Section 15:529.1(D)(l)(b) bars a challenge to a prior conviction used for sentence enhancement when the defendant did not make the challenge before sentencing.

State v. Sigue · filed 2014-03-05(D)(l)(b)

As discussed above, La.R.S. 15:529.1(D)(l)(b) states that “any challenge to a previous conviction which is not made before sentence is imposed may not thereafter be raised to attack the sentence.” Here, Defendant did not raise his argument in his written “Objection To Multiple Offender Bill” or at the habitual offender hearing. As such, Defendant failed to preserve the issue for appeal.

Section 15:529.1(D)(b) requires a defendant to file the prescribed written response challenging prior guilty pleas to preserve that challenge for appellate review.

State v. Hager · filed 2014-07-30(D)(b)

Defendant did not file a written response challenging the validity of the prior guilty pleas as provided by La. R.S. 15:529.1(D)(b). Further, he did not make any objections to the validity of the prior forgery conviction at the habitual offender hearing. Therefore, we find that defendant has not preserved that issue for review and is precluded from presenting it to this Court on appeal.

Section 15:529.1(D)(1) requires a defendant to file particular written objections to alleged predicate convictions before sentencing to preserve those challenges for appeal.

State v. Hust · filed 2017-01-11(D)(1)

A defendant has the right to challenge the constitutional- sufficiency of previous convictions through- a written response to the state’s filing of a habitual offender bill of information. La. R.S. 15:529.1(D.)(1). A defendant must make such a response in order to preserve challenges to previous convictions for appeal-able review.

Section 15:529.1(D)(1)(b) bars a defendant from later attacking the habitual-offender sentence with a challenge to a prior conviction that was not raised before sentence was imposed.

State of Louisiana v. McGhee · filed 2017-10-04(D)(1)(b)

Under La.R.S. 15:529.1(D)(1)(b), “[a]ny challenge to a previous conviction which is not made before sentence is imposed may not thereafter be raised to attack the sentence.” Although Defendant objected to the use of his prior convictions as predicate offenses during the habitual offender adjudication, his argument was that Defendant was not properly Boykinized because he was not informed that he had thirty days within which to file an appeal, and furthermore that there appeared to be some confusion during Defendant’s plea to assault by drive-by shooting. At no point in time was there any allusion that Defendant’s counsel during the plea had a conflict and could not properly represent Defendant.

Section 15:529.1(D)(1)(b) permits a defendant to challenge a prior conviction used for habitual offender sentencing; after the defendant shows a defect in the prior guilty plea, the State must prove the plea was constitutional.

State v. Chapman · filed 1994-10-05(D)(1)(b)

Therefore, we conclude that defendant has met the burden of proving the allegations contained in his motion to quash. The burden of proving the constitutionality of the plea now shifts to the State.

Section 15:529.1(D)(1)(b) bars a challenge to a prior conviction raised for the first time after sentencing to attack the sentence.

State v. Kittlin · filed 1997-06-04(D)(1)(b)

Furthermore, La.R.S. 15:529.1(D)(1)(b) states that "[a]ny challenge to a previous conviction or adjudication of delinquency which is not made before sentence is imposed may not thereafter be raised to attack the sentence." Consequently, the Defendant is barred from challenging the validity of his prior guilty pleas on the grounds alleged in his appeal.

A defendant must challenge a prior conviction used for habitual offender sentencing before sentence is imposed to preserve the challenge for appeal.

State v. Harrell · filed 2010-05-11(D)(1)(b)

La. R.S. 15:529.1(D)(l)(b) provides that “[a]ny challenge to a previous conviction or adjudication of delinquency which is not made before sentence is imposed may not thereafter be raised to attack the sentence.” ... Since the defendant failed to apprise the trial judge at the sentencing hearing of his objection for “double enhancement” and the basis for the objection, he did not preserve this issue for review on appeal.

Section 15:529.1(D)(1)(b) bars a challenge to a prior conviction after sentencing if that challenge was not raised before sentence was imposed.

State v. McGhee · filed 2017-10-04(D)(1)(b)

Defendant is precluded from raising this argument on review. Under La.R.S. 15:529.1(D)(l)(b), “[a]ny challenge to a previous conviction which is not made before sentence is imposed may not thereafter be raised to attack the sentence.”

A challenge to a prior conviction must be made before sentencing; afterward, it cannot be used to attack the sentence.

State Of Louisiana v. Charles · filed 2026-02-23(D)(1)(b)

Any challenge to a previous conviction which is not made before sentence is imposed may not thereafter be raised to attack the sentence. La. R.S. 15:529.1(D)(1)(b); State v. Chaney, 2020-0981 (La. App. Ist Cir. 6/4/21), 327 So.3d 1038, 1042, writ denied, 2021-01204 (La. 11/10/21), 326 So.3d 1251.

Section 15:529.1(D)(1)(b) requires a challenge to a previous conviction to be made before sentencing if it is to be used to attack the sentence.

State Of Louisiana v. Richard L. King, Jr · filed 2026-04-20(D)(1)(b)

Any challenge to a previous conviction which is not made before sentence is imposed may not thereafter be raised to attack the sentence.

Section 15:529.1(D)(1)(b) requires a defendant to challenge predicate convictions in a written response before sentencing to preserve the challenge for appeal.

State v. Cossee · filed 1996-07-24(D)(1)(b)

In the instant case, the defendant did not file a written response to the habitual offender bill of information complaining of any of the prior convictions. Accordingly, his argument that the State did not produce sufficient proof of the prior convictions was not preserved for appeal.

A defendant who fails to challenge predicate convictions in a written response to the habitual offender bill does not preserve that challenge for appeal.

State v. Short · filed 1998-11-18(D)(1)(b)

Following the Louisiana Supreme Court decision in State v. Shelton, 621 So.2d 769 (La.1993), the legislature amended La. R.S. 15:529.1(D)(1)(b) to place the burden of challenging a predicate conviction in a multiple bill proceeding on the defendant. ... The defendant did not file a written response to the habitual offender bill of information complaining of any of the prior convictions. Accordingly, his argument that the State did not produce sufficient proof of the prior convictions was not preserved for appeal.

Section 15:529.1 permits habitual-offender enhancement of each separate felony conviction arising from separate offenses committed at separate times, and sets the enhanced sentencing range for a second felony offender.

State v. Hotard · filed 2003-12-30(A)(1)(a)

The Defendant was sentenced to eight and one-half years on each count, to run concurrently, which is in the middle of the range. ... Further, there is no merit in the Defendant's claim that the trial court erroneously imposed enhanced sentences on both counts. It is well settled that a defendant, convicted on the same day of separate felonies arising out of separate criminal offenses committed at separate times, is subject to being adjudicated a habitual offender on each conviction. ... Thus, under State ex rel. Porter, both of the counts were subject to enhancement.

Section 15:529.1 permits a fourth-offense DWI conviction to be further enhanced under the Habitual Offender Law unless another statute specifically prohibits that enhancement.

State v. Guidera · filed 2012-09-21

Further, the supreme court noted in Baker that there is no restriction on the type of felony which may be enhanced by the habitual offender law, except when a statute specifically prohibits further enhancement. Baker, 06-2175 at p. 12, 970 So.2d at 955. We find no such restriction in the DWI statute, so defendant’s fourth-offense DWI conviction is subject to further enhancement.

Section 15:529.1 permits enhancement of the penalty for a new felony, not a prior offense.

State v. Campbell · filed 2003-10-16

Moreover, the state erroneously seeks to enhance a penalty for a prior offense under the habitual offender statute. The jurisprudence holds that the La. R.S. 15:529.1 enhancement of a penalty for a new felony is for a new crime only.

Section 15:529.1 permits enhancement of each sentence for separate offenses committed at separate times.

State v. Baylor · filed 2008-11-26

We find that no error occurred in imposing an enhanced sentence for each offense as the convictions were separate criminal offenses committed at separate times and did not arise out of a single criminal act or episode.

Section 15:529.1 permits a deferred-drug-plea offense to serve as a habitual-offender predicate once probation is revoked, adjudication of guilt is entered, and sentence is imposed; the guilty-plea date controls the required offense-conviction-offense sequence.

State v. Goldston · filed 2004-02-11(A)

Accordingly, Mr. Goldston can be sentenced as a multiple offender on the possession of cocaine offense because his plea under La. R.S. 40:983 was set aside and an adjudication of guilt was imposed upon him. ... Accordingly, the State is correct that the date the defendant pleaded guilty |14under La. R.S. 40:983 is the significant date, and it is January 19, 1993. Thus, there is no violation of the sequencing of offense, conviction, offense, and the defendant was properly sentenced as a third felony offender.

For sentence enhancement, § 15:529.1 requires only that the subsequent felony be committed after the predicate conviction or convictions; it does not require sequential convictions or prior adjudications as a second or third offender.

State v. Butler · filed 2005-01-12(A)(1) and (B)

The statute simply does not contain a sequential conviction requirement. Rather, the only requirement in the statute is one which has been imposed from the inception: for sentence enhancement purposes, the subsequent felony must be committed after the predicate conviction or convictions.

For a second felony offender, § 15:529.1(A)(1)(a) sets the enhanced sentencing range, and § 15:529.1(G) makes the underlying offense's parole, probation, and suspension restrictions apply by operation of law.

State v. Harris · filed 2004-02-23(A)(1)(a) (G)

As a second-felony offender, defendant was subject, under La. R.S. 15:529.1(A)(1)(a), to a minimum of fifteen years and a maximum of not more than sixty years of imprisonment. ... On appeal, the State notes that defendant received an illegally lenient enhanced sentence because the trial judge did not impose the enhanced sentence without "benefit of probation or suspension of sentence" or without benefit of parole for the first five years of the sentence. La. R.S. 15:529.1(G); La. R.S. 40:967(B)(4)(b), West 1999. ... When a defendant is sentenced as a multiple offender, "the penalty increase is computed by reference to the sentencing provisions of the underlying offense. Similarly, the conditions imposed on the sentence are those called for in the reference statute." State v. Taylor, 99-385 (La.App. 5 Cir. 8/31/99), 743 So.2d 749, 754. We agree with the State's contention and note that, under La. R.S. 15:301.1(A), as interpreted by State v. Williams, 00-1725 (La.11/28/01), 800 So.2d 790, 799, these restrictions are imposed by operation by law. ... Accordingly, no corrective action is required on appeal.

Section 15:529.1(A)(1)(a) permits a second-felony offender convicted of armed robbery to receive an enhanced sentence of twice the longest sentence provided for a first conviction.

State v. Fuller · filed 2008-02-19(A)(1)(a)

The defendant was sentenced to the maximum sentence permissible as a second-felony habitual offender convicted of armed robbery, 198 years at hard labor without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence. That is twice the longest sentence provided for a first conviction of armed robbery. La.R.S. 14:64(B) and La.R.S. 15:529.1(A)(1)(a).

Section 15:529.1 authorizes enhanced sentences relating to imprisonment but does not authorize a trial judge to impose a fine when resentencing a habitual offender.

State v. Williams · filed 2005-03-29

With respect to the fine, the Louisiana Supreme Court has held that La.R.S. 15:529.1 does not authorize imposition of a fine, but only provides for enhanced sentences relating to the term of imprisonment. State v. Dickerson, 584 So.2d 1140 (La.1991); State v. Dixon, 584 So.2d 668 (La.1991). In Dixon and Dickerson, the supreme court concluded that a trial judge is without authority to impose a fine on resentencing under La.R.S. 15:529.1. Thus, the enhanced habitual offender sentence in this case is not illegally lenient as to imposition of a fine.

Subsection (G) requires a sentence imposed under the habitual-offender provisions to be served at hard labor without benefit of probation or suspension of sentence, but it does not itself impose a parole restriction.

State v. Clifton · filed 2018-05-23(G)

The multiple offender statute, La. R.S. 15:529.1(G), provides that any sentence imposed under its provisions "shall be at hard labor without benefit of probation or suspension of sentence." Thus, the multiple offender statute does not impose a parole restriction.

For offenders whose convictions became final on or after November 1, 2017, and whose habitual offender bills were filed before that date, the full amendments made by 2017 La. Acts 282 apply, rather than the later version incorporating Subsection (K).

State of Louisiana v. Lyles · filed 2019-10-22(K)

We find that 2017 La. Acts 282, § 2, which provides that Act 282 “shall become effective November 1, 2017, and shall have prospective application only to offenders whose convictions became final on or after November 1, 2017” is unequivocal, and therefore not subject to further judicial construction. For persons like defendant, whose convictions became final on or after November 1, 2017, and whose habitual offender bills were filed before that date, the full provisions of Act 282 apply. Accordingly, we find defendant was adjudicated and sentenced pursuant to the wrong version of the Habitual Offender Law. We reverse the court of appeal, vacate the habitual offender adjudication and sentence, and remand for further proceedings. On remand, the district court is directed to apply the version of the Habitual Offender Law, La.R.S. 15:529.1, as it was amended by 2017 La. Acts. 282, and before its amendment by 2018 La. Acts 542.

Section 15:529.1(D)(1)(b) places the initial burden of proving habitual-offender allegations on the district attorney, shifts the burden to the defendant for factual challenges to a prior conviction, and requires such challenges before sentencing.

State v. Tilmon · filed 2004-04-14(D)(1)(b)

La. R.S. 15:529.1(D)(1)(b) provides in pertinent part: ... Except as otherwise provided in this Subsection, the district attorney shall have the burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt on any issue of fact. The presumption of regularity of judgment shall be sufficient to meet the original burden of proof.... A person claiming that a conviction or adjudication of delinquency alleged in the information was obtained in violation of the Constitutions of Louisiana or of the United States shall set forth his claim, and the factual basis therefor, with particularity in his response to the information. The person shall have the burden of proof, by a preponderance of the evidence, on any issue of fact raised by the response. Any challenge to a previous conviction or adjudication of delinquency which is not made before sentence is imposed may not thereafter be raised to attack the sentence.

Section 15:529.1(D)(1)(b) places on a defendant who alleges a constitutional defect in a prior conviction the burden of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, factual issues raised in responding to the habitual-offender bill.

State of Louisiana v. Parker · filed 2019-10-22(D)(1)(b)

This aspect of Shelton was incorporated in La. R.S. 15:529.1(D)(1)(b) by 1993 La. Acts 896, which provides that a defendant who has alleged a constitutional deficiency in one or more of his prior convictions “shall have the burden of proof, by a preponderance of the evidence, on any issue of fact raised by [his] response [to the state’s habitual offender bill.].”

Section 15:529.1(K)(1) requires the court to apply the Habitual Offender Law provisions in effect on the date the defendant committed the instant offense.

State v. Edden · filed 2018-11-14(K)(1)

Because the 2018 amendments are procedural and this decision is being decided after August 1, 2018, we find that Edden was sentenced under the proper habitual offender law in effect in 2014, the date of the underlying offense.

The habitual-offender penalty is determined under the version of Section 15:529.1 in effect when the underlying felony was committed, rather than the version effective when the defendant was adjudicated a habitual offender.

State v. Parker · filed 2004-04-14(A)(1)(b)(ii)

After consideration of the language of Act 403, this court's well-settled jurisprudence, and the policies involved, we conclude that defendant should be sentenced in accord with the version of La. R.S. 15:529.1 in effect at the time of the commission of the charged offense. The general rule long applied in this state is that the law in effect at the time of the commission of the offense determines the penalty to be applied to the convicted accused. As previously explained, defendant became a third felony offender on the date he committed the underlying felony offense. He was therefore subject to the punishment provided for by the law as it existed on that date; that is, defendant should be punished pursuant to the provisions of La. R.S. 15:529.1(A)(1)(b)(ii) in effect prior to the ameliorative changes made by Act 403.

For § 15:529.1(A)(1)(b)(ii), the version in effect when the offense was committed governs; Act 403's later amendment applies prospectively, while § 15:308 provides a Risk Review Panel remedy rather than judicial resentencing.

State v. Evans · filed 2008-10-31(A)(1)(b)(ii)

At the time of the commission of the instant offense, and prior to amendment by 2001 La. Acts No. 403, § 2, La. R.S. 15:529.1(A)(1)(b)(ii) provided for a life sentence if the third felony or either of the two prior felonies were violations of the Uniform Controlled Dangerous Substances Law punishable by imprisonment for more than five years. Following amendment by Act 403, La. R.S. 15:529.1(A)(1)(b)(ii) provided for a life sentence if the third felony and the two prior felonies were violations of the Uniform Controlled Dangerous Substances Law punishable by imprisonment for more than ten years. ... Similarly, in the instant case, the trial court correctly sentenced the defendant under La. R.S. 15:529.1 prior to amendment by 2001 La. Acts No. 403, § 2. The defendant committed the instant offense prior to the effective date of 2001 La. Acts No. 403, § 2. The provisions of 2001 La. Acts No. 403 only apply prospectively. 2001 La. Acts No. 403, § 6; Sugasti, 01-3407 at 5, 820 So.2d at 521. Section 308 of title 15 of the Louisiana Revised Statutes does not change the applicable habitual offender law; rather it provides an exclusive remedy of applying to the Louisiana Risk Review Panel. See Dick, 06-2223 at 10-14, 951 So.2d at 131-33.

Section 15:529.1 applies in the version in effect when the defendant committed the instant offense, so later amendments do not apply retroactively.

State v. Floyd · filed 2018-08-15(A)(3)(b)

The jurisprudence also holds that the version of the habitual offender law in effect at the time of the crime is the version that applies; amended provisions apply only to offenses committed after their effective dates. State v. Parker , supra ; State v. Casaday , supra ; State v. Barker , supra . We therefore cannot adopt Floyd's premise of using the 2017 amendment as a convenient metric to find his sentence excessive.

A habitual-offender sentence is governed by the version of La. Stat. Ann. § 15:529.1 in effect when the underlying offense was committed, so later amendments do not retroactively change the enhancement.

State v. Vaughn · filed 2018-09-24(A)(1), (K)(1)

While the penalty for a second-felony habitual offender was revised4 after defendant's offenses, it is well-settled that "[a] defendant is not convicted of being a habitual offender. Rather, a defendant is adjudicated as a habitual offender as a result of prior felony convictions. The sentence to be imposed following a habitual offender adjudication is simply an enhanced penalty for the underlying conviction." As such, the Louisiana Supreme Court held that a defendant "should be sentenced in accord with the version of La. R.S. 15:529.1 in effect at the time of the commission of the charged offense." State v. Parker, 03-0924 (La, 4/14/04), 871 So.2d 317, 325-26. Moreover, Act 542 of the 2018 Regular Legislative Session adds a new Subsection to LSA-R.S. 15:529.1, which reads, "(K)(I) Except as provided in Paragraph (2) of this Subsection, notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary, the court shall apply the provisions of this Section that were in effect on the date that the defendant's instant offense was committed." Therefore, as defendant committed the instant offenses on September 14, 2016, the trial court correctly sentenced defendant under the version of LSA-R.S. 15:529.1 prior to the 2017 amendments. See State v. Johnson, 17-1347 (La.App. 1 Cir. 3/13/18), 2018 WL 1312575 (unpublished); State v. Bowie, 17-1762 (La.App. 1 Cir. 6/1/18), 2018 WL 2453480 (unpublished).

The Habitual Offender Law increases the sentence for persons convicted of second and subsequent felonies; it does not create a new or separate offense.

State v. Turner · filed 2018-11-28

It is well-settled law that double jeopardy does not apply to multiple offender proceedings. ... The Habitual Offender Law, La. R.S. 15:529.1, does not create a new or separate offense based on the commission of more than one felony but merely provides for imposition of an increased sentence for persons convicted of second and subsequent felonies. ... Accordingly, we find no merit to defendant's argument that his sentence as a habitual offender constitutes double jeopardy.

Section 15:529.1 requires the court to apply the version in effect when the defendant committed the instant offense; under the 2015 version of Subsection (A)(3)(b), qualifying third-felony offenders faced mandatory life imprisonment without benefits, and the sentence was required to be served at hard labor.

State v. Lyles · filed 2018-12-27(K)(1), (A)(3)(b), (G)

Upon review, we rely on the well settled jurisprudence that the law in effect at the time of the offense is determinative of a defendant's punishment, including for habitual offender proceedings. ... Therefore, after review, we find that the Habitual Offender Law in effect at the time of the commission of defendant's underlying offense of aggravated battery should be applied in determining defendant's habitual offender sentence, and the trial court did so correctly when imposing defendant's enhanced sentence of life imprisonment without benefits.

Subsection (K)(1) clarifies that the version of Section 15:529.1 in effect when the instant offense was committed governs the habitual-offender sentencing provision, subject to statutory exceptions.

State v. Lyles · filed 2018-12-27(K)(1), (A)(3)(b)

Further, we find that by enacting subsection K, the legislature clarified its original intent that the date of commission of the underlying offense be used to determine the sentencing provision applicable to a habitual offender, except as otherwise explicitly provided in the statute.

The habitual-offender penalty provision in effect when the offense was committed governs the enhanced sentence.

State of Louisiana v. Prince Record · filed 2019-02-27(K)

Consequently, despite the 2017 ameliorative changes to the habitual offender statute, the first and second circuits have applied the habitual offender penalty provision in effect when the offense was committed, as directed by the 2018 amendment and the Legislative mandate to do so. We agree that the version of La.R.S. 15:529.1 at the time of the commission of the offenses, February 19 and 20, 2014, applies to Defendant’s convictions and sentences.

Subsection (K) requires the habitual-offender penalty provision in effect when the offense being enhanced was committed to be applied.

State v. Record · filed 2019-02-27(K)

In addition, we find that the trial court applied the wrong version of La.R.S. 15:529.1 when sentencing Defendant. ... We agree that the version of La.R.S. 15:529.1 at the time of the commission of the offenses, February 19 and 20, 2014, applies to Defendant's convictions and sentences.

Section 15:529.1(K)(1) requires applying the habitual-offender penalty provisions in effect when the defendant committed the instant offense, including to cases decided after the 2018 amendment.

State v. Farry · filed 2019-03-07(K)(1)

Following independent review, as well as consideration of the above jurisprudence, we too conclude that the 2018 amendment is interpretive in nature given its enactment after Williams and its specific directive for application of the law in effect at the time of the commission of the instant offense. Accordingly, Defendant's sentence stems from the penalty in effect when he committed the armed robbery - life imprisonment.

Section 15:529.1(K) requires the court to apply the habitual-offender provisions in effect on the date the defendant's instant offense was committed, so later amendments operate prospectively.

State v. Arceneaux · filed 2019-04-24(K)

We find no merit in Defendant's argument that the more recent 2017 amendments to La. R.S. 15:529.1 apply to his case. Under the 2017 amendments, effective November 1, 2017, Defendant would face a sentencing range of 15-60 years as a third felony offender, as opposed to 20-60 years under the 2001 version of the statute. See La. R.S. 15:529.1(A)(3)(a). The 2017 amendments made it clear that they were to have prospective application only - to those offenders whose convictions became final on or after November 1, 2017. In 2018, the legislature clarified that "notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary, the court shall apply the provisions of this Section that were in effect on the date that the defendant's instant offense was committed." La. R.S. 15:529.1(K). Here, Defendant's conviction became final in 2000 after it was affirmed by this Court on appeal and no further review was sought. Although the underlying offense was committed in 1996, it is clear that under La. R.S. 15:308, the 2001 version of La. R.S. 15:529.1 applies to Defendant.

Section 15:529.1(K)(1) requires applying the version of the Habitual Offender Law in effect when the instant offense was committed, and subsection (G) requires the sentence to be served at hard labor.

State v. Thomas · filed 2019-05-22(K)(1), (G)

A 2018 amendment further clarified the legislature's intent by adding La. R.S. 15:529.1(K)(1), which provides that "notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary, the court shall apply the provisions of this Section that were in effect on the date that the defendant's instant offense was committed." ... Defendant's second degree battery charge was committed in 2016. The trial court stated on the record that it was using the ten-year cleansing period to adjudicate him as a fourth-felony offender, the law in effect in 2016. We find that the trial court used the correct cleansing period. ... A review of the record reveals errors patent. First, the trial court failed to order that Defendant's life sentence and 20-year sentence for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon be served at hard labor as required by La. R.S. 15:529.1(G) and 14:95.1(B), rendering the sentences illegally lenient. ... Because La. R.S. 15:529.1 and 14:95.1 are mandatory felonies requiring any sentence to be served at hard labor, the error is harmless and self-correcting.

Section 15:529.1 applies according to the version in effect when the defendant committed the underlying offense; habitual-offender status imposes an enhanced penalty for that conviction.

State v. Kennon · filed 2019-05-22(K)(1)

A defendant is not convicted of being a habitual offender but is adjudicated a habitual offender as a result of prior felony convictions. The sentence to be imposed following a habitual offender adjudication is simply an enhanced penalty for the underlying conviction. ... Thus, the punishment to be imposed on a habitual offender is that provided by La. R.S. 15:529.1 as it exists on the date a defendant commits the underlying offense.

For offenders whose convictions became final on or after November 1, 2017, and whose habitual-offender bills were filed before that date, the full provisions of 2017 La. Acts 282 apply rather than the pre-Act 282 version of La. Stat. Ann. § 15:529.1 or the later 2018 amendment.

State of Louisiana v. Henry · filed 2019-12-18(K)

For persons like defendant, whose convictions became final on or after November 1, 2017, and whose habitual offender bills were filed before that date, the full provisions of Act 282 apply.

The version of the Habitual Offender Law in effect when the criminal act was committed governs sentencing.

State v. Bates · filed 2003-10-16

After being adjudicated a third felony offender, the defendant was correctly sentenced by the court under the Habitual Offender Law in effect at the time the criminal act was committed.

Section 15:529.1(A)(1)(c)(i) imposes a mandatory minimum sentence for a fourth felony offender, but it does not require that the sentence be served without parole.

State v. Bailey · filed 2004-05-26(A)(1)(c)(i)

It is presumed that a mandatory minimum sentence under the Habitual Offender Law is constitutional. ... First, the trial judge imposed an illegal sentence detrimental to the Defendant when he improperly imposed the Defendant's enhanced sentence without the benefit of parole. Neither La.R.S. 15:529.1(A)(1)(c)(i), nor La.R.S. 40:967(C) provide that this enhanced sentence must be served without benefit of parole.

Section 15:529.1(A)(l)(c)(ii) imposes the mandatory life sentence applied here, and later ameliorative changes to habitual-offender sentencing do not govern an earlier offense.

State v. Terrell · filed 2004-06-04(A)(l)(c)(ii)

The court of appeal’s decision is reversed and defendant’s sentence of life imprisonment at hard labor imposed under La.R.S. 15:529.1(A)(l)(c)(ii), is reinstated. ... We find no abuse of discretion by the trial court in concluding that it had no constitutional basis for departing from the mandatory sentence specified by the legislature. The court otherwise correctly applied the law in effect at the time of the offense and not the ameliorative changes, of which the court was fully aware, made in the law with respect to habitual offender sentencing by 2001 La. Acts 403.

Section 15:529.1 cannot be used to enhance the sentence of a defendant convicted of third-offense DWI when the defendant has two prior non-DWI felony convictions, because the enhancement would conflict with the mandatory suspension and treatment requirements of the DWI statute.

State v. Campbell · filed 2004-07-06(A)(1)(b)(i), (G)

For all these reasons, we find a DWI third-offender cannot be sentenced pursuant to Louisiana's Habitual Offender Law, even where that defendant has two prior non-DWI felony convictions. Habitual offender adjudication under La.Rev.Stat. 15:529.1 would preclude the trial court from crafting a sentence which complied with the requirements of La.Rev.Stat. 14:98 D.

Section 15:529.1 could enhance a sentence for a third DWI committed in 2008 because the applicable DWI law no longer required suspension of the remaining sentence.

State v. GT, JR. · filed 2011-06-15

With regard to the habitual offender issue, defense counsel’s advice that the habitual offender law was applicable to DWI, third offense, was actually correct.

The habitual offender law can enhance a third-offense DWI sentence when the applicable DWI statute does not require suspension of the remaining prison term.

State of Louisiana v. G. T., Jr. · filed 2011-06-15

The language omitted by the 2005 amendment was the very language upon which the Campbell decision was based. Accordingly, the ruling in Campbell would not be applicable to a conviction for DWI, third offense, committed in 2008. ... Defendant did face the possibility of an enhanced sentence if convicted of DWI, third offense.

Section 15:529.1(G) requires a multiple-offender sentence to be served without benefit of probation or suspension of sentence, but it does not make the sentence parole-ineligible.

State v. Myles · filed 2004-10-12(G)

La. R.S. 15:529.1(G) requires that the defendant's multiple offender sentence be served without benefit of probation or suspension of sentence; the statute makes no mention of parole ineligibility. Because "without benefits" is ambiguous, and could be interpreted to mean that parole eligibility is also excluded, the sentence may be illegal. La.C.Cr.P. art. 882 allows this Court to correct an illegal sentence "at any time." Therefore, we amend defendant's multiple offender sentence to be served without benefit of probation or suspension of sentence.

Section 15:529.1(G) bars probation and suspension of sentence but does not bar parole eligibility.

State v. Givens · filed 2004-03-24(G)

(Nothing in the substantive statute prohibits the benefits of parole, probation, and suspension of sentence; although the multiple offender law, La. R.S. 15:529.1(G), prohibits the benefits of probation and suspension of sentence, nothing in that statute prohibits parole eligibility).

Section 15:529.1(A)(1)(c)(ii) requires the specified qualifying offenses to carry a potential punishment of at least twelve years, not a minimum punishment of twelve years.

State v. Green · filed 2004-08-18(D)(1)(b), (A)(1)(c)(ii)

We do not take the habitual offender statute to mean that the specified crimes must be punishable by no less than twelve years, but that there is a potential punishment of at least twelve years.

Under the 1999 version, the statute mandates a life sentence when a predicate or the underlying felony is a crime of violence or is punishable by more than twelve years, but the mandatory minimum remains subject to constitutional-excessiveness review in rare exceptional circumstances.

State v. Brooks · filed 2004-11-30(A)(1)(b)(ii)

In 1999, La. R.S. 15:529.1 provided for a mandatory life sentence when one of the predicate felonies or the underlying felony is a crime of violence or any crime punishable by imprisonment for more than twelve years. Both of the Defendant's predicates fit within the criteria, since simple robbery is defined as a crime of violence and illegal carrying of a weapon is punishable by imprisonment for more than twelve years. See, La. R.S. 15:529.1(A)(1)(b)(ii) (West, 1999); La. R.S. 14:95.1(B); La. R.S. 14:2(13)(y). Since the Defendant committed the underlying offense of possession of cocaine on March 17, 1999, the Defendant was subject to a mandatory life sentence under the 1999 version of La. R.S. 15:529.1. ... Despite having received the mandatory minimum sentence, the Defendant's sentence may be reviewed for constitutional excessiveness. ... The trial court should exercise its authority to declare excessive a minimum sentence mandated by La. R.S. 15:529.1 only under "rare" circumstances. ... Instead, the trial court must impose the longest sentence that is not constitutionally excessive, with specific reasons, explaining why that sentence is the longest constitutionally permissible sentence.

Section 15:529.1’s mandatory life sentence may be constitutionally excessive as applied when the defendant presents circumstances showing that the sentence is grossly disproportionate to the offense.

State v. Jarreau · filed 2005-12-14(A)(1)(b)(ii)

Based on this opinion and the report of the pre-sentence investigation, the trial court shall determine whether the life sentence mandated by La. R.S. 15:529.1, as in effect at the time Mr. Jarreau committed the crime of possession of cocaine, was constitutionally excessive as it was applied to him under the particular circumstances of his case.

Section 15:529.1(A)(1)(c)(ii) mandates a life sentence for a fourth felony offender, subject to a constitutionally required downward departure only when the defendant clearly and convincingly proves exceptional circumstances making the sentence excessive.

State of Louisiana v. Colton · filed 2007-10-31(A)(1)(c)(ii)

The trial court found Defendant to be a fourth habitual offender; thus, a life sentence was mandated by La.R.S. 15:529.1(A)(1)(c)(ii). ... Defendant has failed to demonstrate that he is “exceptional” pursuant to Johnson and Young. ... Pursuant to the jurisprudence discussed, we conclude the assignment lacks merit.

For a fourth felony offender, this provision mandates a life sentence, subject to a constitutionally required downward departure only when the defendant clearly and convincingly proves that the mandatory sentence is excessive as applied.

State v. Colton · filed 2007-10-31(A)(1)(c)(ii)

The trial court found Defendant to be a fourth habitual offender; thus, a life sentence was mandated by La.R.S. 15:529.1(A)(1)(c)(ii). ... A sentencing judge must always start with the presumption that a mandatory minimum sentence under the Habitual Offender Law is constitutional. ... A court may only depart from the minimum sentence if it finds that there is clear and convincing evidence in the particular case before it which would rebut this presumption of constitutionality. ... Defendant has failed to demonstrate that he is "exceptional" pursuant to Johnson and Young. ... Pursuant to the jurisprudence discussed, we conclude the assignment lacks merit.

Section 15:529.1(A)(1)(c)(ii) mandates a life sentence, but a trial court may depart from that sentence when clear and convincing evidence shows that it would be constitutionally excessive, imposing the longest constitutionally permissible sentence instead.

State v. Winters · filed 2017-05-17(A)(1)(c)(ii)

We find the decision by the trial court to deviate from the mandatory life sentence as set forth in the habitual offender statute in effect at the time, La.R.S. 15:1529.1(A)(1)(c)(ii), and sentence the defendant to fourteen years at hard labor was based on sufficient evidence and was within his discretion.

Section 15:529.1(A)(1)(b)(ii) requires a life sentence without parole, probation, or suspension of sentence for a third felony offender when the third felony or either prior felony meets its stated criteria.

State v. Mitchell · filed 1997-06-20(A)(1)(b)(ii)

La. R.S. 15:529.1(A)(1)(b)(ii)[3] provides the following punishment: If the third felony or either of the two prior felonies is a felony defined as a crime of violence under R.S. 14:2(13) or as a violation of the Uniform Controlled Dangerous Substances Law punishable by imprisonment for more than five years or any other crime punishable by imprisonment for more than twelve years, the person shall be imprisoned for the remainder of his natural life, without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence. Thus, the life sentence imposed by the trial court was the minimum mandatory sentence allowed by statute.

Section 15:529.1(A)(4)(b) requires a life sentence for each qualifying distribution conviction when the defendant is a fourth-felony habitual offender.

State v. Robinson · filed 2013-01-16(A)(4)(b)

As noted by this court in Robinson’s prior appeal, Robinson was adjudicated a fourth-felony habitual offender under La. R.S. 15:529.1(A)(4)(b), based on his prior convictions for drug possession and distribution and battery of a police officer, and was subject to the mandatory life sentence for each of the two distribution convictions.

Subsection (A)(1) sets the enhanced determinate-term range, while subsection (G) requires hard labor without probation or suspension but does not authorize denying parole to a second-felony habitual offender in these circumstances.

State v. George · filed 2016-11-09(A)(1) (G)

The applicable provision of the Habitual Offender Law under which Defendant was sentenced as a second-felony habitual offender, La. R.S. 15:529.1(A)(1), merely provides for imprisonment for a determinate term not less than one-half the longest term and not more than twice the longest term prescribed for a first conviction. Although another provision of the Habitual Offender Law, La. R.S. 15:529.1(G), provides that “[a]ny sentence” under the Habitual Offender Law “shall be at hard labor without benefit of probation or suspension of sentence,” there is no provision for the denial of the benefit of parole to a second-felony habitual offender in Defendant’s circumstances.

Section 15:529.1(A)(4)(a) sets a fourth-or-subsequent felony offender's sentencing range at the longest first-conviction term, but at least twenty years and no more than life; subsection (G) requires no benefit of probation or suspension of sentence but does not itself prohibit parole.

State v. Hampton · filed 2016-05-18(A)(4)(a), (G)

La. R.S. 15:529,1 does not contain a prohibition against parole, but provides that the sentences imposed in conformity with that article be given without benefit of probation or suspension of sentence. Accordingly, Hampton correctly argues on appeal that the trial court erred when, after adjudicating Hampton a fifth-felony offender, it imposed Hampton’s enhanced sentence to be served without the benefit of parole. La. R.S. 15:529.1(G) does not *563require that a sentence under the habitual offender statute be served without the benefit of parole.

Section 15:529.1 authorizes enhanced punishment for a subsequent felony based on a prior felony conviction, and using that prior conviction does not violate the defendant's right to a jury trial.

State v. Winn · filed 2004-12-15(A)(1)(a)

Prior convictions are specifically excluded from the rulings in Apprendi and Blakely because, unlike virtually any other consideration used to enlarge the possible penalty for an offense, a prior conviction must itself have been established through procedures satisfying the fair notice, reasonable doubt, and jury trial guarantees. ... In the present case, the defendant's adjudication as a second felony offender and the enhancement of his sentence based upon that finding does not violate his right to a jury trial.

Section 15:529.1 permits convictions for unrelated felonies entered on the same date to be used for sentence enhancement, so long as the subsequent felony was committed after the predicate conviction or convictions.

State v. Lowery · filed 2004-12-17(B)

We therefore hold today that the habitual offender statute, LSA-R.S. 15:529.1, as it appears post-amendment, is clear and unambiguous. There is no statutory bar to applying the law in sentencing for more than one conviction obtained on the same date based on unrelated conduct. The statute simply does not contain a sequential conviction requirement. Rather, the only requirement in the statute is one which has been imposed from the inception: for sentence enhancement purposes, the subsequent felony must be committed after the predicate conviction or convictions. See, LSA-R.S. 15:529.1(A) ("Any person who, after having been convicted within this state of a felony ... thereafter commits any subsequent felony."). Johnson, 2003-2993 at pp. 17-18, 884 So.2d at 578-579.

Section 15:529.1 does not permit the same prior conviction to serve as both the predicate for a La. R.S. 14:95.1 conviction and the predicate for a habitual-offender enhancement.

State v. Emilien · filed 2016-07-27

Defendant’s contention that the same conviction was used as a predicate for both his underlying conviction and enhanced sentenced is not correct. The record reflects the bill of information was amended to remove a predicate from the underlying charge which was later used for the habitual offender enhancement.

Section 15:529.1(G) requires the court to state that a habitual-offender sentence is to be served without probation or suspension; when the required restriction is mandated, omission of that statement does not prevent the sentence from being served without benefits for the required period.

State v. Jackson · filed 2005-03-02(G)

Finally, our error patent review reveals that in sentencing Jackson, the trial court failed to state that his sentence was to be served without benefit of probation or suspension of the sentence as required under La. R.S. 15:529.1(G). When a district court fails to order service of a sentence without benefits in a case in which a determinate time period to be so served is mandated by the statute of conviction, the sentence automatically will be served without benefits for the required time period.

Section 15:529.1(A)(1) sets the sentencing range for a second-felony offender, while subsection (G) requires hard labor without probation or suspension of sentence but does not prohibit parole.

State v. Rathore · filed 2019-01-16(A)(1), (G)

Our habitual offender law is promulgated in La. R.S. 15:529.1(A)(1) and provides in the case of a second-felony offender that, if the second felony is such that upon a first conviction the offender would be punishable by imprisonment for any term less than his natural life, then the sentence to imprisonment shall be for a determinate term not less than one-third the longest term and not more than twice the longest term prescribed for a first conviction. ... La. R.S. 15:529.1(G) provides that any sentence imposed under the habitual offender statute "shall be at hard labor without benefit of probation or suspension of sentence." Parole is not included in the prohibition.

Section 15:529.1(G) requires a habitual-offender sentence to be served at hard labor without probation or suspension of sentence, and those restrictions are deemed imposed even if the trial court fails to state them.

State v. Jones · filed 2015-12-30(G)

A review of the record for errors patent reveals two. First, the trial court failed to inform the defendant at the multiple bill hearing that his sentence was to be served at hard labor without benefit of probation or suspension of sentence in accordance with La. R.S. 15:529.1(G).2 Although the minute entry indicates that the imposed sentence was to be served at hard labor, the transcript of the multiple bill hearing reflects that the trial court merely stated the defendant was to serve twelve years, six months. Despite this omission, however, pursuant to La. R.S. 15:301.1(A) and State v. Williams, 2000-1725 (La.11/28/01), 800 So.2d 790, the sentence is deemed to have been imposed with the restrictions of benefits. See also: State v. Byrd, 2012-0556, p. 14 (La.App. 4 Cir. 6/5/13), 119 So.3d 801, 809-810. Therefore, this Court need not take any action to cure this error.

Subsection (G) requires a habitual-offender sentence to be without benefit of probation or suspension, but no amendment is necessary when the sentence imposed is neither probated nor suspended.

State v. Taylor · filed 2005-04-06(G)

The court declined to impose the sentence without benefit of probation or suspension of sentence in accordance with La. R.S. 15:529.1 G. However because the sentence was neither probated nor suspended, an amendment is unnecessary.

Section 15:529.1(G) requires a habitual-offender sentence to be served without benefit of probation or suspension of sentence.

State v. Scott · filed 2008-02-27(G)

By omitting the provision that the sentence be without benefit of probation or suspension of sentence, the trial court imposed an illegally lenient, mid-range sentence of seven years at hard labor. We amend the sentence to comport with La. R.S. 15:529.1(G), requiring that the sentence be served without benefit of probation or suspension of sentence.

Subsection (G) requires every sentence imposed under the habitual-offender statute to be served without benefit of probation or suspension of sentence.

State v. James · filed 2008-06-25(G)

La. R.S. 15:529.1(G) provides that all sentences imposed under the statute are to be served without benefit of probation or suspension of sentence.

Subsection (G) requires any sentence imposed under the Habitual Offender Law to be served at hard labor.

State v. Johnson · filed 2012-08-08(G)

Further, La. R.S. 15:529.1(G) mandates that any sentence imposed under the Habitual Offender Law shall be served at hard labor.

Subsection (G) requires habitual offender sentences to be served without the benefit of probation or suspension of sentence.

State v. Spikes · filed 2011-05-10(G)

We, nevertheless, advise the trial judge that on remand, the enhanced sentence should be imposed at hard labor and that pursuant to La. R.S. 15:529.1(G) all habitual offender sentences are to be served without the benefit of probation or suspension of sentence.

Section 15:529.1(G) requires sentences imposed under the multiple-offender statute to be served without benefit of probation or suspension of sentence.

State v. Molere · filed 2012-09-05(G)

However, La. R.S. 15:529.1 G provides that all sentences imposed under the statute are to be served without benefit of probation or suspension of sentence.

Section 15:529.1(G) requires a habitual-offender sentence to state that it is without benefit of probation or suspension of sentence.

State v. Handy · filed 2014-12-10(G)

We note that the fifteen-year sentence imposed by the trial court pursuant to Handy's guilty plea to the multiple bill of information failed to specify that the sentence was "without benefit of probation or suspension of sentence” as required by La. R.S. 15:529.1(G). Nevertheless, when a criminal statute requires that all or portion of a sentence be served without the benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence, or of any one of them, any combination thereof, La. R.S. 15:301.1 self-activates the correction and eliminates the need to remand for a ministerial correction. La. R.S. 15:301.1(A), (C); State v. Williams, 00-1725, pp. 1112, 14 (La. 11/28/01), 800 So.2d 790, 798-799, 801. Thus, no corrective action is necessary.

Subsection (G) requires sentences imposed under the Habitual Offender Statute to be served without benefit of probation or suspension of sentence, and those restrictions apply automatically even if the sentencing court does not state them.

State v. McCorvey · filed 2016-02-03(G)

La. R.S. 15:529.1(G) provides that any sentences imposed under the Habitual Offender Statute are to be served “without benefit of probation or suspension of sentence.” In this case, the trial court failed to include these prohibitions when imposing the sentence. However, pursuant to La. R.S. 15:301.1(A), which is self-activating, the sentence is deemed to have been imposed with these restrictions of benefits even in the absence of the district court delineating them. ... Therefore, we need not correct this sentence.

Subsection (G) requires a sentence imposed under the habitual-offender statute to be served without benefit of probation or suspension of sentence.

State v. Bell · filed 2017-05-17(G)

The transcript showed that the trial court properly directed that this sentence be served without benefit of probation or suspension of sentence, pursuant to La. R.S. 15:529.1(G).

Section 15:529.1(G) requires a multiple-offender sentence to be served without benefit of probation or suspension, but that restriction applies automatically even when the sentencing court omits it.

State v. Casaday · filed 2018-04-11(G)

The trial court failed to order that the defendant's sentence as a multiple offender be served without benefit of probation or suspension of sentence, as required by La. R.S. 15:529.1(G). However, this error does not require corrective action, because the "without-benefits" provisions of the statutes are self-activating.

Section 15:529.1(G) requires an enhanced sentence without probation or suspension; a court complies even if it does not say so expressly, provided it grants neither.

State v. Lopez · filed 1995-12-27(G)

It is additionally noted that Lopez’ enhanced sentence was not specifically imposed without benefit of probation or suspension as required by La.R.S. 15:529.1 G. However, since the trial judge did not suspend any portion of the sentence or impose *1205any probationary period, he, in effect, complied with the sentencing directive of the statute.

The 2017 amendments to § 15:529.1 apply to convictions that became final on or after November 1, 2017; a conviction not final by that date is governed by the amended statute even if the habitual-offender sentence was imposed earlier.

State of Louisiana v. Purvis · filed 2018-04-18(A)(3)(a), (A)(3)(b), (D)(3)

Defendant’s writ application is still outstanding. Therefore, his aggravated arson conviction is not yet final and will become so after November 1, 2017. Accordingly, we find that the amended version of La.R.S. 15:529.1 is now applicable to Defendant. ... For the foregoing reasons, we vacate Defendant’s habitual offender sentence and remand the matter for resentencing under the version of La.R.S. 15:529.1 that became effective on November 1, 2017.

The 2017 amendments to § 15:529.1 apply to offenders whose convictions became final on or after November 1, 2017, including a conviction that was still pending review when the habitual-offender sentence was imposed before that date.

State of Louisiana v. Jacob Purvis AKA Jacob Dewayne Purvis · filed 2018-04-18(A)(3)(a), (A)(3)(b), (D)(3)

Defendant’s writ application is still outstanding. Therefore, his aggravated arson conviction is not yet final and will become so after November 1, 2017. Accordingly, *502we find that the amended version of La.R.S. 15:529.1 is now applicable to Defendant.

For a fourth or subsequent felony, or when a prior felony falls within the specified serious-offense categories, this provision requires imprisonment for the remainder of the offender's natural life without parole, probation, or suspension of sentence; the sentencing law in effect when the underlying offense was committed governs.

State v. Walker · filed 2005-04-26(A)(1)(c)(ii)

With respect to habitual offenders, the applicable sentencing provisions are those in effect when the underlying offepse is committed. ... The Louisiana Supreme Court has specifically held that |4“the changes mandated by 2001 La. Acts 403 do not apply to sentences imposed for crimes committed before the act’s effective date. Operation of this rule extends to habitual offender sentences imposed pursuant to R.S. 15:529.1.” ... The defendant was subject to the sentencing enhancement provisions of La.R.S. 15:529.1(A)(l)(c)(ii), which provided as follows at the time of the underlying offense: If the fourth or subsequent felony or any of the prior felonies is a felony defined as a crime of violence under R.S. 14:2(13) or as a violation of the Uniform Controlled Dangerous Substances Law punishable by imprisonment of more than five years or any other crime punishable by imprisonment for more than twelve years, the person shall be imprisoned for the remainder of his natural life, without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence.

Section 15:529.1(G) requires the applicable mandatory hard-labor sentence when a defendant is sentenced as a multiple offender under the habitual-offender law.

State of Louisiana v. Dahlem · filed 2016-03-15(G)

Even assuming a possible jury composition .error, we find it was rendered moot by the defendant’s multiple offender status, which required that he be sentenced under the mandatory hard labor requirement set forth in La. R,S. 15:529.1(G).

Section 15:529.1(G) bars probation and suspension of sentence for a habitual-offender sentence, but it does not authorize denying parole eligibility.

State v. Taylor · filed 2005-12-27(G)

Under La. R.S. 15:529.1(G), the trial judge should have imposed defendant's sentence without benefit of probation and suspension of sentence, but not parole.

For a fourth felony offender in this case, § 15:529.1(A)(1)(c)(i) required a twenty-year minimum sentence, while § 15:529.1(G)'s restrictions on probation and suspension of sentence operate automatically.

State v. Williams · filed 2005-05-31(A)(1)(c)(i) (G)

The Defendant's habitual offender sentence is illegally lenient in two respects: the eight year term is less than the mandatory minimum sentence of twenty years under La. R.S. 15:529.1(A)(1)(c)(i), and the trial judge failed to impose restrictions on probation and suspension of sentence as required by La. R.S. 15:529.1(G). This Court need not correct the latter, as the provisions of La.R.S. 15:529.1(G) are self-operating under La.R.S. 15:301.1.

Section 15:529.1 permits habitual-offender enhancement alongside the firearm enhancement in La. R.S. 14:64.3 when no underlying offense supporting the firearm conviction is reused in the habitual-offender chain; the resulting habitual-offender sentence replaces the sentence for the underlying armed-robbery offense.

State v. White · filed 2005-06-16

We find, however, that the state appropriately filed a habitual offender bill of information under La. R.S. 15:529.1 and that no double enhancement occurred in the state's application of both La. R.S. 15:529.1 and 14:64.3 for White's prosecution. ... Thus, the state's choice thereafter to proceed under the Habitual Offender Law and adjudicate White as a fifth felony offender subjected the defendant only to a life sentence under the Habitual Offender Law. The applicable sentence under the habitual offender law effectively replaces the sentence for the underlying crime under La. R.S. 14:64 and 14:64.3.

Section 15:529.1 does not permit prior convictions already used to elevate a marijuana possession offense to a felony to be reused to impose a habitual-offender enhancement.

State v. Causey · filed 2011-06-16(D)(1)(b)

Using the same prior convictions to enhance a misdemeanor to a felony and then to enhance the sentence on the felony is not permissible because what would be a misdemeanor as a first offense is elevated to the status of a felony in subsequent offenses, a conviction for repeated possession of marijuana is not subject to being further enhanced under the Habitual Offender Law.

Section 15:529.1 permits a felony status offense such as third-offense marijuana possession to be further enhanced when the predicate convictions used for the status offense are not reused in the habitual-offender bill.

State v. Lewis · filed 2012-11-30(B)

La. R.S. 15:529.1 is Louisiana’s general felony recidivist sentencing statute whose purpose is “to discourage commission of successive felonies and to enhance punishment for subsequent felonies.”

Section 15:529.1(D)(3) requires the court to vacate a prior sentence, deduct time served, and provide written reasons when adjudicating a defendant a habitual offender.

State v. Callier · filed 2005-07-27(D)(3)

If the trial court rules that a defendant is a habitual offender, then it shall sentence him to the punishment prescribed in La. R.S. 15:529.1, and shall vacate the previous sentence if already imposed, deducting from the new sentence the time actually served under the sentence so vacated. The court shall provide written reasons for its determination.

Section 15:529.1(D)(3) requires the trial court to vacate a previously imposed sentence for the substantive offense when it later imposes the enhanced habitual-offender sentence, with credit for time already served.

State v. George · filed 2005-10-26(D)(3)

Under this statute, a trial court is required to vacate the previous sentence if already imposed when the enhanced sentence is thereafter imposed for the substantive offense.

Section 15:529.1(D)(3) requires the trial court to vacate a previously imposed sentence when it later imposes the enhanced habitual-offender sentence.

State v. Wilson · filed 2009-10-28(D)(3)

Under this statute, a trial court is required to vacate the previous sentence if already imposed when the enhanced sentence is thereafter imposed for the substantive offense.

When imposing an enhanced habitual-offender sentence, the court must vacate the defendant’s previously imposed sentence.

State v. Wilson · filed 2011-05-18D(3)

The court “shall vacate the previous sentence already imposed” when it imposes an enhanced sentence under the habitual offender law. La. R.S. 15:529.1 D(3). ... For these reasons, we vacate Wilson’s sentences and remand the case to the district court for a new sentence hearing at which Wilson is present and otherwise fully complies with R.S. 15:529.1.

Section 15:529.1(D)(3) requires the trial court to vacate a previously imposed sentence before imposing a habitual offender sentence.

State of Louisiana v. Allen · filed 2011-12-07(D)(3)

Louisiana Revised Statutes 15:529.1(D)(3) requires the trial court to vacate the previously imposed sentence prior to imposing a habitual offender sentence.

Before imposing an enhanced sentence under La. Stat. Ann. § 15:529.1, the trial court must vacate the defendant’s underlying sentence on that count.

State v. Meadows · filed 2017-04-12

We note that prior to imposing an enhanced sentence on courit two under La. R.S. 15:529.1, the trial court will be required to vacate the underlying sentence on count two.

Before imposing a habitual-offender enhanced sentence, the trial court must vacate any original sentence imposed for the underlying conviction.

State v. Grimble · filed 2017-07-05(D)(3)

While a trial court is not required to impose an original sentence for the underlying conviction, the trial court is required to vacate any original sentence that is imposed prior to imposing the enhanced sentence as a multiple offender. La. R.S. 15:529.1(D)(3); State v. Pratt, 50,152 (La. App. 2 Cir. 12/30/15), 184 So.3d 816, 820.

Before imposing an enhanced habitual-offender sentence under § 15:529.1, the court must vacate the defendant's original sentence on the underlying offense.

State v. Lyles · filed 2018-02-21(A)(3)(b)

When a defendant's original sentence on an underlying offense has not been vacated by the court at the time of defendant's sentencing as an habitual offender, the original sentence remains in effect and the subsequent sentence as an habitual offender is null and void.

The statute does not permit the State to file a second multiple bill based on the same underlying offense and predicate convictions after an enhanced sentence has been imposed.

State v. Mays · filed 2005-11-29

As suggested by Stott, the actual imposition of an enhanced sentence under La. R.S. 15:529.1 prevents the filing of a second multiple bill based on the same underlying offense and predicate convictions as the first multiple bill.

Section 15:529.1(D)(3) requires time actually served under a vacated sentence to be deducted from the new habitual-offender sentence, and credit for time served satisfies that requirement.

State v. Torres · filed 2005-11-29(D)(3)

Although defendant argues to the contrary, we find that the trial court's granting of credit for time served complies with the provisions of LSA-R.S. 15:529.1(D)(3). Accordingly, this assigned error is likewise without merit.

Section 15:529.1 may not be used to enhance a sentence with a juvenile adjudication obtained without the right to a jury trial.

State v. Lemon · filed 2006-02-14

For the reasons which follow, we agree and find that defendant's adjudication as a habitual offender under La. R.S. 15:529.1 is not constitutionally permissible. ... In light of State v. Brown, supra, we find that the use of defendant's prior juvenile adjudication as a predicate offense was unconstitutional.

At the time of Jones's 1999 guilty plea, the statute allowed certain prior juvenile adjudications to be used as predicate offenses for habitual-offender sentencing.

State v. Jones · filed 2013-08-27(A)(1)

Although the Louisiana Supreme Court in State v. Brown, 03-2788 (La.7/06/04), 879 So.2d 1276, writ denied, 543 U.S. 826, 125 S.Ct. 158, 160 L.Ed.2d 40 (2004), later struck down the provision in the Habitual Offender law that allowed prior juvenile adjudications rendered without the right to a jury trial to be used as predicate offenses, the provision was in effect at the time of defendant’s guilty plea in 1999 and, thus, advice that the adjudications could be used as predicates was not misleading. See also, State v. Lemon, 05-567 (La.App. 5 Cir. 2/14/06), 923 So.2d 794.