La. Stat. Ann. § 15:529.1

Subsection F requires the certified proof used for habitual-offender sentencing to state the length of imprisonment and the date of discharge, enabling the court to determine whether more than five years have elapsed since expiration of the maximum sentence.

State v. Bullock · filed 1975-03-31F

The certification so offered does not meet the statutory requirements set forth by La.R.S. 15:529.1, subd. F to subject a defendant to punishment as a multiple-offender. It does not, specifically, set forth the "length of time imprisoned, and the date of discharge from prison or penitentiary." This requirement is apparently designed to permit the sentencing court to make the essential determination that "more than five years have elapsed since expiration of the maximum sentence", La.R.S. 15:529.1, subd. C. Cf., State v. Broussard, 213 La. 338, 34 So.2d 883 (1948). We hold, therefore, that the 1945 court-martial conviction cannot be used as a prior conviction to enhance the penalty for the defendant's 1974 conviction of manslaughter in the present case.

Section 15:529.1(D) requires a habitual-offender sentencing proceeding to be completed before the defendant serves the sentence being enhanced.

State Ex Rel. Williams v. Henderson · filed 1974-01-31(D)

State v. George, supra, should not be extended beyond its facts. We find that R.S. 15:529.1(D) requires that a proceeding to have a defendant sentenced as a multiple offender must be completed before the defendant serves the sentence which is to be enhanced. ... The proceeding was not held timely and the State was without power to resentence the defendant.

Section 15:529.1 authorizes enhanced punishment for people previously convicted of felonies, and a multiple-offender indictment need only allege a prior felony conviction within the statute's time period; other details are surplusage.

State v. Rowell · filed 1975-01-20

The multiple offender statute, La.R.S. 15:529.1, concerns the punishment of those persons who have been previously convicted of felonies. The term "convicted" means "adjudicated guilty after a plea or after trial on the merits." Art. 934, La. Code Crim.P. (1966). The indictment must, of necessity, inform the accused of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. La.Const. art. 1, § 10 (1921). The multiple offender indictment need only inform the accused that he was previously convicted of a felony within the time period set forth in the statute. La.R.S. 15:529.1. Any other matter within the indictment can be regarded as surplusage. The bill is without merit.

Section 15:529.1(D) requires the multiple-offender bill to be filed within a reasonable time after the district attorney obtains the necessary information; an unreasonable delay divests the court of jurisdiction to impose the enhanced sentence.

State v. McQueen · filed 1975-02-24(D)

We find R.S. 529.1 requires the Multiple Offender Bill to be filed within a reasonable time after the necessary information is available to the appropriate district attorney; that the failure of the district attorney to file the Multiple Offender Bill within a reasonable time after having the necessary information is not sanctioned by the statute, and is prohibited by C.Cr.P. Art. 874; that an unreasonable delay in filing the Multiple Offender Bill divests jurisdiction to have the defendant sentenced as a Multiple Offender; and that the unexplained delay of three years eight months under the facts of this case is unreasonable.

When a defendant denies the prior-felony allegations, Section 15:529.1(D) requires the judge to set the hearing with sufficient delay for the defendant to investigate the allegations and prepare a response.

State v. Davalie · filed 1975-04-24(D)

Where the accused denies the allegations of the information, as in the instant case, the statute does not provide any specific period of delay for setting the hearing to inquire into whether the offender has been convicted of the prior felonies as set forth in the information. However, it is only reasonable to assume that the legislature intended that the judge fix the hearing with sufficient delay to afford the accused an adequate opportunity to investigate the allegations of prior convictions and to respond thereto. Considerations of fairness and justice require such an interpretation.

Section 15:529.1 permits enhanced punishment for a current felony based on specified prior felonies, but the original conviction must first be sentenced before the habitual-offender enhancement procedure proceeds, subject to the required sentencing delay or waiver.

State v. Dorsey · filed 2018-11-07(D)(3)

If the habitual offender adjudication hearing is conducted, and the trial judge finds at the adjudication hearing that Defendant is a habitual offender and adjudicates him as such in accordance with the specific provisions of La.R.S. 15:529.1, then a habitual offender sentencing hearing can be conducted after observing the mandatory sentencing delays of La.Code Crim.P. art. 873, unless delays are waived.

To establish habitual-offender status, the State must prove both the prior felony conviction and that the defendant is the person previously convicted; competent identification evidence can satisfy that burden.

State v. Monette · filed 1996-03-06

In order to prove that the defendant is a habitual offender, the State must establish by competent evidence that there is a prior felony conviction and that the defendant is the person convicted of the prior felony.

Section 15:529.1 permits the district attorney to charge a person as a multiple offender after a felony conviction, requires a hearing on disputed prior convictions, and permits enhanced sentencing only when the prior felony conviction was obtained without violating a specified federal constitutional right.

State v. LeBlanc · filed 1975-06-23

The Louisiana Habitual Offender Law, La.R.S. 15:529.1, allows the district attorney to file a bill of information at any time after conviction or sentence against any person prosecuted by him for, and convicted of, a felony, accusing him of prior felony convictions. Upon the filing of the information, the court in which the subsequent conviction was obtained shall cause the accused to be brought before it, inform him of the allegations contained in the information and of his right to be tried as to the truth thereof, and require the offender to say whether the allegations are true. If the accused denies the allegations of the information, the judge must fix a day to inquire whether the offender has been convicted of the prior felony, or felonies, as charged in the information. If the judge finds that the accused has been convicted of the prior felonies, the court shall sentence him according to the enhanced penalties prescribed by the statute. ... In order for a prior felony conviction to form the basis for a multiple offender charge, it must, inter alia, have been obtained without the violation of a specific federal constitutional right of the accused.

Subsection F requires the State to use the specified prison-official certificate, including the imprisoned person's name, photograph, and fingerprints, to make a prima facie case of prior imprisonment and discharge in a habitual-offender proceeding.

State v. Curtis · filed 1975-10-01(F)

Nowhere does it appear that there exists a presumption such as the one so strenuously argued to the trial court in support of the State's position that the defendant should be adjudged an habitual offender. La.R.S. 15:529.1, subd. F. sets forth the elements of proof necessary for a prima facie case against a defendant charged under the Habitual Offender Law. The State did not offer into evidence any certificate of the warden containing the imprisoned person's name, photograph and fingerprints, as required by the statute. Considering the State's failure to prove, in accordance with La.R.S. 15:529.1, that the defendant is the same person as the individual previously charged and convicted in the cases reflected by the evidence presented, we are constrained to reverse that finding and the sentence based thereon.

Subsection F makes penitentiary records prima facie evidence of a prior conviction only when the required information is certified by the warden or other chief officer under the office seal, if any.

State v. Washington · filed 1975-11-03(F)

The records were not shown to be “certified by the officer who is the legal custodian” of the document offered and thus admissible as an officially certified copy of a document. La.R.S. 15 :457. Neither did the informal letter of transmittal meet the statutory standard provided for prima facie evidence of the imprisonment and discharge of the defendant on a prior conviction. La.R.S. 15:529.1, subd. F. The last-cited statute provides that, for the penitentiary document to have such effect, it should be established by the certificate of the warden under his seal, if any.

Section 15:529.1(F) makes penitentiary records prima facie evidence of a prior imprisonment and discharge only when they contain the required information and are certified by the warden or other chief officer under the office seal, if any.

State v. Washington · filed 1975-11-24(F)

The proof required for a multiple-offender conviction (that there was a prior felony committed and that the defendant is the person who committed it, State v. Dugas, 170 La. 5, 127 So. 345 (1930)) is prima facie established where the state presents (a) documents from the state penitentiary, properly authenticated, together with a photograph and fingerprints of the person imprisoned on the prior offense, La.R.S. 15:529.1, subd. F (1958), State v. Morris, 222 La. 480, 62 So.2d 649 (1953), and (b) evidence establishing that the defendant is the same person. ... Neither did the informal letter of transmittal meet the statutory standard provided for prima facie evidence of the imprisonment and discharge of the defendant on a prior conviction. La.R.S. 15:529.1, subd. F. The last-cited statute provides that, for the penitentiary document to have such effect, it should be established by the certificate of the warden under his seal, if any.

Section 15:529.1 requires the state to prove both the defendant's prior felony conviction and identity, but permits the facts supporting enhanced punishment to be established through competent evidence other than the subsection (F) certificates.

State v. Lee · filed 1978-11-13(F)

La.R.S. 15:529.1 requires proof of an accused's alleged prior felony conviction as well as his alleged identity. Moreover, the burden of proof rests with the state when an accused denies the allegations of the information or refuses to answer or remains silent. While La.R.S. 15:529.1 permits the establishment of prima facie proof of a prior felony conviction by compliance with subsection F,[5] necessary facts which permit enhanced punishment may also or instead be proved by other competent evidence. State v. Curtis, 338 So.2d 662 (La.1976).

Section 15:529.1(A) permits a habitual-offender bill to use only prior convictions, not an offense committed before the conviction of the penalty-enhancing offense.

State v. Perron · filed 1978-12-22(A)

The case is remanded for resentencing because application of the habitual offender statute, La.R.S. 15:529.1, was improper. The subject offense, for which the penalty was sought to be enhanced, was committed before defendant was convicted of the penalty-enhancing offense. However, La.R.S. 15:529.1(A) authorizes only the use of prior convictions in a habitual offender bill.

Subsection (F) makes certain certified copies of prior-conviction records prima facie evidence of the individual's imprisonment and discharge, allowing them to be admitted as a statutory exception to the hearsay rule.

State v. Jackson · filed 1984-01-06(F)

This statute created a statutory exception to the hearsay rule by making certain certified copies of prior conviction records prima facie evidence of the imprisonment and discharge of the individual. Our examination of the record indicates that a certified copy of defendant's record was introduced by the State. The trial court correctly admitted said record into evidence, as it complied with the provisions of law.

Section 15:529.1 requires prior-offense proof to be certified by the officer with legal custody, and its five-year lookback runs from actual discharge while excluding periods of penal servitude.

State v. Lambert · filed 1985-08-22(C), (F)

A non-penitentiary agency is not authorized to offer proof of prior offenses. ... Only documents properly certified under La.R.S. 15:529.1(F.) by the officer with legal custody of the documents can be admitted into evidence as proof of prior offenses. ... In the case before us the packets were certified by the secretary of the Louisiana Department of Corrections which is a penitentiary agency that had legal custody of the documents. The trial court, thus, properly admitted the prison packets. ... For purposes of the multiple offender statute, in the determination of the expiration of a given sentence, it is not the imposed sentence which governs, but the date of the persons' actual discharge from supervision by the Department of Corrections. ... That statute states, however, that any period of servitude in a penal institution shall not be included in the computation of the five years.

Subpart (F) provides one method for proving prior convictions, but the facts supporting enhanced punishment may also be established by other competent evidence.

State v. Horton · filed 1986-04-11(F)

Even though subpart (F) provides one method of proof of prior convictions, the facts necessary to permit enhanced sentence may also be proved by other competent evidence.

Section 15:529.1 permits the State to use an out-of-state guilty plea as a prior conviction for sentence enhancement when it proves the conviction and date with a certified minute entry or equivalent showing the plea and counsel.

State v. Hannah · filed 1988-08-16

“In Holden we held that, when the state intends to use a plea of guilty as a prior conviction in order to enhance punishment under La.R.S. 15:529.1: “(1) If taken before the decision in Boy-kin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 89 S.Ct. 1709 [sic] 23 L.Ed.2d 274 (1969), the plea is valid, if voluntary and with counsel, without any need for articulated waiver of the constitutional rights subsequently required by Boykin to be articulated and expressly waived in order that a plea be considered to be knowing and made with' a full understanding of its consequences. “(2) As to non-Louisiana and federal pleas of guilty: “The state may prove the conviction and its date by a certified copy of a minute entry (or an equivalent contemporaneously recorded or executed document) showing the plea and that the accused was represented by counsel. (The state must, of course, prove that the defendant in the plea and the present accused are the same person.) “The defendant has the burden of proving that the plea was involuntary or that (if taken subsequent to Boykin) he did not waive Boykin rights; he may do so in the enhancement proceedings only by the colloquy at the time of the plea of guilty, which must affirmatively show substantial defect in this regard. For any other collateral attack upon the prior plea, the defendant is relegated to any remedy he has in the court which took his plea. Bolton, at 723.” Therefore, because the State introduced a certified copy of a judgment which reflected defendant’s guilty plea and his representation by counsel, the State satisfied its burden of proof for this out-of-state guilty plea. Thus, this assignment of error is without merit.

For a guilty plea entered before December 8, 1971, to be used as a predicate conviction for multiple-offender sentencing, the State must prove the conviction and that the defendant was represented by counsel.

State v. Fleury · filed 1989-06-08

In State v. Holden, 375 So.2d 1372 (La. 1979), the Louisiana Supreme Court held that in order to use a guilty plea entered prior to December 8, 1971, as a predicate conviction for multiple bill purposes, the State must show proof of a defendant's conviction and evidence that he was represented by counsel. ... The notation on the docket master sheet is insufficient to show that the defendant was represented by counsel when he entered a plea of guilty in 1969. Therefore, we must reverse defendant's adjudication-conviction as a fourth offender. It is not disputed by defendant that sufficient evidence was presented by the State to adjudicate him to be a third offender under La.R.S. 15:529.1. Accordingly we will remand this case to the trial court for the re-sentencing of defendant as a third offender.

Section 529.1(F) permits the State to establish a prior felony conviction prima facie with compliant evidence, while § 529.1(G) limits the judge's discretion to suspend or probate the habitual-offender sentence and permits additional conditions, such as parole ineligibility, when required by the underlying offense.

State v. Richard · filed 1989-09-27(F) (G)

In any event, the State introduced evidence in compliance with La.R.S. 15:529.1(F) and other competent evidence to establish a prima facie case of a prior felony conviction. The State provided expert fingerprint analysis of the fingerprints on the bills of information to prove the identity of defendant as the perpetrator of the armed robbery offense and the prior offense of possession of cocaine. The State also provided competent evidence, including testimony proving that the defendant was the perpetrator of these offenses. The above-described evidence was sufficient to adjudicate defendant an habitual offender. See State v. Evans, 506 So.2d 1283 (La.App. 2d Cir.1987). ... La.R.S. 15:529.1(G) was added by Acts 1987, No. 774. The penalty increase provided by the habitual offender statute is still computed by referring to the underlying offense. Conditions may be imposed in addition to those provided for in La.R.S. 15:529.1(G), if those additional conditions are provided in the referenced statute. Although State v. Bruins, supra, was decided prior to the enactment of La.R.S. 15:529.1(G), State v. Bruins, supra, may be applied by analogy to this situation to provide that the ineligibility for parole, provided by La.R.S. 14:64, may be imposed upon this defendant. La.R.S. 15:529.1(G) simply limits the judge's discretion to suspend or probate a sentence imposed upon an habitual offender. These assignments lack merit.

Section 15:529.1 requires the State to prove both the prior felony conviction and that the defendant is the same person previously convicted; matching names alone is insufficient, but other competent identity evidence may suffice.

State v. Neville · filed 1997-05-21

To obtain a multiple offender conviction, the State is required to establish both the prior felony conviction and that the defendant is the same person convicted of that felony. ... Establishing that the defendant's name and that of the person previously convicted is the same is insufficient evidence of identity under R.S. 15:529.1. ... We agree, and find that other competent evidence establishes Mr. Neville's identity under R.S. 15:529.1.

Section 15:529.1 requires the State to prove both the defendant's prior felony conviction and that the defendant is the same person who was convicted of it before obtaining a multiple-offender adjudication.

State v. Picot · filed 1998-07-01

To obtain a multiple offender conviction, the State is required to establish both the prior felony conviction and that the defendant is the same person convicted of that felony.

Section 15:529.1(D)(1)(b) places on the district attorney the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt any factual issue in a habitual-offender proceeding, initially satisfied by the presumption of regularity, and requires proof of the prior felony and that the defendant was the person convicted of it.

State v. Wolfe · filed 2000-04-19D(1)(b)

La. R.S. 15:529.1 D(1)(b) states that the district attorney has the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt any issue of fact and that the presumption of regularity of judgment shall be sufficient to meet the original burden of proof. The State must establish the prior felony and that the defendant was the same person convicted of that felony.

Section 529.1(F) allows the State to prove that a defendant is the person previously convicted through varied competent evidence; no specific method is required, and matching identifiers plus photographs can suffice.

State of Louisiana Versus Landon P Rogers · filed 2024-08-28(F)

To prove that a defendant is a habitual offender, the State must establish by competent evidence the defendant’s prior felony convictions and that defendant is the same person who was convicted of the prior felonies. ... The defendant’s identity may be shown by a variety of methods, including the testimony of witnesses, fingerprint analysis by an expert, photographs in a duly authenticated record, or evidence of identical driver’s license number, social security number, sex, race, and date of birth. ... Merely establishing that the defendant’s name and that of the person previously convicted are the same is not sufficient evidence of identity under La. R.S. 15:529.1. ... The State is not required to use a specific type of evidence. ... Because the name, race, date of birth, address, social security number, and state identification number are the same between Defendant and the person that previously pled guilty to possession of marijuana with intent to distribute on February 4, 2019, we find the State sufficiently established that the individuals were one and the same. Further, the photographs reflect the same individual. Thus, we find the district court did not err in adjudicating Defendant a second-felony offender.

Under La. Stat. Ann. § 15:529.1, a properly executed waiver-of-rights or guilty-plea form, together with a minute entry showing that the defendant was represented by counsel when pleading guilty, is sufficient to establish the prior plea for multiple-offender adjudication.

State v. Lacy · filed 2001-02-21(D)(1)(b)

Recently, however, this court has held that a minute entry showing that the defendant was attended by counsel at the time he pled guilty, along with a properly executed waiver of rights/ guilty plea form, is sufficient to carry the State’s burden under the multiple offender statute. State v. Weaver, supra, at p. 8, 775 So.2d at 618-619 (citing State v. Wolfe, 99-0389 (La.App. 4 Cir. 4/19/00), 761 So.2d 596). Accordingly, we agree with the State that the trial court erred in failing to accept this conviction as a basis for the multiple offender adjudication.

Section 15:529.1(F) identifies the prima facie proof of identity for multiple-bill purposes and requires a certificate from the head jailer or clerk containing specified identifying and sentencing information.

State v. Hargrove · filed 2004-10-27(F)

Prima facie proof of identity (and incarceration dates) for multiple bill purposes is set out in La. R.S. 15:529.1(F), which requires a certificate from the head jailer or clerk of court containing the name of the prisoner, a photograph, fingerprints, a statement of the convicting court, the date and time of sentence, the length of the sentence and the time of discharge. ... Ms. Young was not, however, familiar with Defendant's prior convictions listed in the habitual offender bill and did not establish that Defendant was the same person who committed those crimes in accordance with La. R.S. 15:529.1.

Section 15:529.1 requires the State to prove both a defendant’s prior felony conviction and identity as the person convicted, but does not require fingerprints on a bill of information.

State v. Cosey · filed 2005-07-13

To obtain a habitual offender conviction, the State is required to establish both the prior felony conviction and that the defendant is the same person convicted of that felony. State v. Payton, 2000-2899, p. 6 (La.3/15/02), 810 So.2d 1127, 1130, citing State v. Neville, 96-0137 (La.App. 4 Cir. 5/21/97), 695 So.2d 534, 538-39. The court in Payton said that in attempting to establish identity, the State may present: ... (1) testimony from witnesses; (2) expert opinion regarding the fingerprints of the defendant when compared with those in the prior record; (3) photographs in the duly authenticated record; or (4) evidence of identical drivers license number, sex, race and date of birth. (Emphasis added). Payton, 2000-2899, p. 6, 810 So.2d at 1130-31. The court in Payton cited the twenty-five year old case of State v. Westbrook, 392 So.2d 1043 (La.1980), where it had held in a second offense driving while intoxicated case that a driver's license number, sex, race, and birth date all identified the prior offender as the defendant, and thus that the State proved the defendant's identity as the same person previously convicted. Thus, not only are fingerprints on the bill of information not necessary to establish that a defendant charged as a habitual offender is the same person previously convicted, fingerprints are not absolutely required to prove identity. In Payton, however, as in the instant case, the New Orleans Police Department fingerprint expert matched the defendant's fingerprints to fingerprints on the backs of two arrest registers for the two previous convictions. The Louisiana Supreme Court held that this was sufficient proof of identity. This result is in accordance with previous decisions by this Court finding that the matching of a defendant's fingerprints to fingerprints on an arrest register, and the linking of that arrest register to other documents evidencing a conviction is sufficient to establish that the defendant is the same person previously convicted. See State v. Francois, 2002-2056 (La.App. 4 Cir. 9/14/04), 884 So.2d 658; State v. Wolfe, 99-0389 (La.App. 4 Cir. 4/19/00), 761 So.2d 596; State v. Hawthorne, 580 So.2d 1131 (La.App. 4 Cir.1991); State v. Armstead, 542 So.2d 28 (La.App. 4 Cir.1989). Further, a trial court has no discretion to find a defendant not guilty of being a habitual offender where the state produces adequate evidence to prove its accusation. State v. Dean, 588 So.2d 708, 709 (La.App. 4 Cir.1991).

Subsection (F) supplies a prima facie certification method, but the State may prove prior convictions and the defendant’s identity in a habitual-offender proceeding with any competent evidence rather than a specific type of evidence.

State v. Robertson · filed 2006-02-01(F)

This Court has repeatedly held that the Habitual Offender Act does not require the State to use a specific type of evidence to carry its burden at an habitual offender hearing and that prior convictions may be proved by any competent evidence.”

Subsection (F) makes sealed clerk-certified copies from the place of conviction prima-facie evidence of the conviction and sentence.

State v. Ayche · filed 2008-03-11(F)

In this case, the certified copies under seal from the clerk of court of the place of conviction complies with La.R.S. 15:529.1(F) as prima facie evidence of the conviction and sentence.

Subsection (F) allows the State to prove prior convictions at a habitual-offender hearing with any competent evidence; it does not require a particular form of proof.

State v. Quinn · filed 2010-05-12(F)

This Court has repeatedly stated that R.S. 15:529.1(F) does not require the state to use a specific type of evidence to carry its burden at an habitual offender hearing; prior convictions may be proved by any competent evidence.

Section 15:529.1 requires the State to prove both the defendant’s prior felony convictions and that he is the person who committed them before imposing an enhanced penalty.

State v. Brown · filed 2012-02-10(D)(1)(b)

For the defendant to receive an enhanced penalty under La. R.S. 15:529.1, the state must prove prior felony convictions and then prove the defendant is the same person who committed the prior felonies.

Section 15:529.1(D)(1)(b) requires the State to prove beyond a reasonable doubt both the prior felony conviction and that the defendant is the person previously convicted, and judicial notice may be sufficient proof of identity when supported by the record.

State of Louisiana v. Montgomery · filed 2014-12-17(D)(1)(b)

For the defendant to receive an enhanced penalty under La.R.S. 15:529.1, the state must prove prior felony convictions and then prove the defendant is the same person who committed the prior felonies. ... Both the identity and the prior conviction alleged must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. La.R.S. 15:529.1(D)(1)(b). ... Various methods of proof establishing identity have been recognized as sufficient to sustain the state’s burden of proof, including testimony of witnesses, expert opinion as to fingerprints, and photographs contained in duly authenticated records. ... In considering the matter now before us, we first note that the methods of proof set forth in Brown are illustrative and not mandatory. In fact, other methods of proof, including judicial notice, have been found adequate to meet the state’s burden of proof on the issue of identity.

A habitual offender adjudication requires proof that the defendant is the person convicted of the prior felony; unauthenticated fingerprints cannot establish identity when no other evidence links the defendant to that conviction.

State v. Daniels · filed 2000-11-08

To obtain a multiple offender conviction, the State is required to establish both the prior felony conviction and that the defendant is the same person convicted of that felony. ... Because the state failed to present certified or authenticated fingerprints and therefore failed to prove the defendant’s identity in connection with the [^Philadelphia conviction, his adjudication as a second offender is vacated.

Section 15:529.1(F) allows the state to prove a defendant’s prior convictions with competent evidence without requiring a particular type of proof.

State v. Lewis · filed 2012-11-14(F)

In State v. Lindsey, 99-3302 (La.10/17/00), 770 So.2d 339, cert. denied, 532 U.S. 1010, 121 S.Ct. 1739, 149 L.Ed.2d 663 (2001), the court observed that La. R.S. 15:529.1(F) does not require the state to use a specific type of evidence to carry its burden at a habitual offender hearing, and that prior convictions may be proven by competent evidence. ... Based on the testimony of these two witnesses, the state produced competent evidence that defendant, Quierza Lewis, is the same person who was convicted in all three cases. Therefore, defendant was properly adjudicated a third-felony offender, and this assignment of error lacks merit.

Section 15:529.1 requires the State to prove a prior conviction; when the defendant challenges a prior guilty plea, the State must prove the plea was constitutional only after the defendant produces evidence of a rights violation or procedural irregularity.

State v. Shelton · filed 1993-07-01

If the defendant denies the allegations of the bill of information, the burden is on the State to prove the existence of the prior guilty pleas and that defendant was represented by counsel when they were taken. If the State meets this burden, the defendant has the burden to produce some affirmative evidence showing an infringement of his rights or a procedural irregularity in the taking of the plea.[24] If the defendant is able to do this, then the burden of proving the constitutionality of the plea shifts to the State.

Section 15:529.1 required life imprisonment for a third felony offender whose current felony was distribution of cocaine, a qualifying controlled-substances offense.

State v. Smith · filed 1999-04-07

Thus, the defendant, a third felony offender, was mandated by statute to life imprisonment as a result of his conviction for distribution of cocaine. The trial court did not err when it stated that the multiple offender statute required defendant to be sentenced to life imprisonment.

Section 15:529.1 does not create a crime of being a multiple offender; it imposes an enhanced penalty for multiple offenders and does not punish status or inflict cruel and unusual punishment.

State v. Williams · filed 1975-11-20

It is well established that the law does not make it a crime to be a multiple offender; it merely prescribes an enhanced penalty for multiple offenders. As an enhancement-of-penalty provision, the statute does not punish a status, nor does it impose cruel and unusual punishment.

Section 15:529.1 is a sentencing-enhancement provision rather than a separate crime, and a multiple-offender hearing concerns only sentencing.

State v. Bullock · filed 1976-03-29(A), (D)

The Habitual Offender Law, R.S. 15:529.1, does not make it a crime to be a multiple offender. It provides for an enhanced penalty against the multiple offender for the basic crime for which he has been convicted. A multiple offender hearing relates only to the sentencing of a defendant.

Section 15:529.1 increases punishment for a subsequent felony without charging a new crime; its application here did not violate double jeopardy or ex post facto protections.

State v. Billizone · filed 2016-12-14

We thus find no merit to defendant’s claims that the application of the habitual offender statute to his case violates double jeopardy and ex post facto laws.

Section 15:529.1(D) requires a multiple-offender prosecution to be instituted no later than completion of the sentence initially imposed for the latest conviction, and constitutional speedy-trial guarantees require the bill to be filed within a reasonable time after the prosecution learns of the prior felony.

State v. Bell · filed 1975-12-08(D)

Under the statute, a district attorney is authorized to charge a defendant as a multiple-offender "If, at any time, either after the conviction or sentence, it shall appear that a person convicted of a felony" has previously been convicted of another felony. La.R.S. 15:529.1D. We have held that, under the statute, the prosecution of a convicted defendant to secure enhanced punishment as a multiple offender must at the latest be instituted before completion of the sentence initially imposed in the latest conviction. State ex rel. Williams v. Henderson, 289 So.2d 74 (La.1974). As Williams noted, the institution of such a prosecution is further governed by constitutional guarantees of a speedy trial to a defendant. Sixth Amendment, United States Constitution; Art. 1, Section 16, Louisiana Constitution of 1974. Accordingly we have held that a multiple-offender bill must be filed within a reasonable time after the prosecution knows that the defendant has a prior felony record. State v. McQueen, 308 So.2d 752 (La.1975).

Section 15:529.1 permits the district attorney to file the multiple-offender bill after conviction or sentence on the substantive offense, rather than requiring it in the initial charging instrument.

State v. Ricks · filed 1976-03-29

Based on the fact that procedure set forth in La.R.S. 15:529.1 specifically instructs the state to file the multiple offender bill of information after conviction or sentence and that prior convictions are not elements of the latest substantive offense, we conclude it was not error, but rather the appropriate procedure, for the district attorney to wait until after conviction before filing the multiple offender bill of information against defendant.

Section 15:529.1 permits the district attorney to file a post-conviction information alleging prior convictions and seeking enhanced punishment as a multiple offender; the proceeding does not charge a new crime.

State v. Alexander · filed 1976-01-19A

As will be shown, the constitutional provision was not intended to and does not apply to the institution of enhanced-penalty proceedings, La.R.S. 15:529.1, after a defendant has been convicted of a crime charged. It applies only to the substantive crime with which an accused is initially charged. ... Under the statute, the district attorney may file an information charging a defendant, after conviction, as a multiple-offender if prior convictions are known or learned of. This (bill of) information does not charge a crime but is merely a method of informing the sentencing court of the circumstances and requesting an enhancement-of-penalty.

Section 15:529.1 makes a multiple-offender proceeding an enhancement-of-penalty proceeding, permits filing the bill after conviction or sentence, and does not require a jury trial or grand-jury indictment; a warden's incarceration certificate is prima facie evidence but is not the exclusive means of proving the statutory elements.

State v. Maduell · filed 1976-01-19

The multiple offender statute, La.R.S. 15:529.1, does not require that such a proceeding be tried by a jury. The questions required to be determined by the proceeding are purely questions of fact; they do not relate to facts bearing upon guilt or innocence at issue because of the alleged violation of a law defining and punishing a crime. ... The answer to this contention is found in the multiple offender statute (La.R.S. 15:529.1) which specifically permits the filing of a bill of information "at any time, either after conviction or sentence." ... The multiple offender statute is an enhancement-of-penalty provision. It is not a new prosecution for an offense. ... Defense counsel argues, in effect, the statute (La.R.S. 15:529.1) requires that for a prima facie case to be presented in a multiple offender proceeding the certificate of the warden attesting to the incarceration of the defendant must be introduced. This is true. However, this does not mean that other evidence could not establish the requisite elements for imposition of the enhanced penalty.

Section 15:529.1 creates a multiple-offender sentencing proceeding decided by a judge without a jury, permits the charge to be filed by bill of information after conviction or sentencing, and authorizes the judge to vacate the prior sentence and impose the enhanced penalty.

State v. Williams · filed 1976-01-19D

In the multiple offense proceeding, the defendant's guilt is not at issue, and the standard is not "beyond a reasonable doubt" as in the classic criminal trial. By the words of the statute "If the judge finds that he has been convicted of a prior felony . . . the court shall sentence him . . . ." La.R.S. 15:529.1 D. This reference to the judge plainly excludes a jury trial. ... In addition to the clear legislation permitting multiple offender charges to be filed by the district attorney in a bill of information, La.R.S. 15:529.1 D, we are again convinced, as we were in our consideration of Article I, Section 17, in connection with Assignment of Error No. 2, that the constitution has made no change in the law dealing with multiple offenders. Article I, Section 15, does not require a grand jury indictment to institute a multiple offender hearing. ... Under the authority of the former, a bill charging the defendant as a multiple offender may be filed at any time after conviction or sentencing, and the judge is given the power to vacate his previous sentence; whereas, Article 881 of the Code of Criminal Procedure grants authority to amend or change the sentence only "prior to the beginning of execution of the sentence."

Section 15:529.1 requires a defendant to respond within 15 days to preserve challenges to prior convictions, provides a formal hearing when the convictions are not conceded, and excludes enhancement when the cleansing period has expired, which runs from discharge from state custody and supervision.

State v. Harris · filed 2009-09-23(C), (D)(1)(a), (D)(1)(b)

A defendant has the right to challenge the constitutional sufficiency of previous convictions through a written response to the state’s filing of a habitual offender bill of information. ... In addition, if a defendant does not concede the validity of previous convictions, he is entitled to a formal hearing. ... Defendant’s Motion to Quash was, therefore, untimely and the trial judge was not required to consider the motion. ... La. R.S. 15:529.1(C) provides that the habitual offender statute is inapplicable in cases where more than ten years have elapsed since the expiration of a defendant’s maximum sentence for a prior conviction and the commission of the defendant’s last felony. ... This is known as the “cleansing period” and it begins to run from the date that a defendant is actually discharged from state custody and supervision. ... The state has the burden of proving the date of a defendant’s discharge from state supervision. ... Thus, the adjudication of Defendant as a fourth and subsequent felony offender and the corresponding enhanced sentences are vacated and the case is remanded for further proceedings.

Prior felony convictions may enhance punishment only if no more than five years elapsed between expiration of the prior conviction's maximum sentence and the present offense, and the required facts may be proved by competent evidence other than a warden's certificate.

State v. Montana · filed 1976-05-17(C), (F)

The evidence further proves that the present offense had been committed in early 1974, and that the maximum sentence for neither of the prior convictions had elapsed more than five years prior thereto. (A prerequisite for use of prior felony convictions to enhance punishment is that not more than five years shall elapse between (a) the expiration of the maximum sentence on the prior conviction and (b) the commission of the present offense, La.R.S. 15:529.1 C.) ... The defendant complains that these facts were not proved by the certificate of the warden, as permitted by La.R.S. 15:529 F. However, this statute merely permits proof by this method; but the necessary facts which permit enhanced punishment may also or instead be proved by other competent evidence.

Subsection (F) permits fingerprints to be introduced as they appear in prison records, so a certified Xeroxed copy is sufficient when it reproduces every imprint and does not impair fingerprint analysis.

State v. Madison · filed 1977-04-11(F)

The statute provides for the introduction of fingerprints "as they appear" in the prison records. Detective DeRoche, who conducted the in-court analysis of the fingerprints, testified that a Xeroxed copy would reflect every imprint on the original card and that his analysis would not be impaired by the fact that he was working from a copy. The trial court properly overruled defendant's objection.

Section 15:529.1 permits a prior felony to be proved by means other than a warden's certificate, allows sentencing as a second offender when only one prior offense is proved, and requires the court to consider the five-year limitation.

State v. Hill · filed 1976-05-17(C), (D), and (F)

The provisions of La.R.S. 15:529.1 D. instruct the trial judge "to inquire whether the offender has been convicted of a prior felony or felonies, as set forth in the information." If a defendant, such as defendant in the instant case, is charged as a fourth offender, but the trial judge is satisfied as to proof of only one prior offense, it is appropriate to sentence him as a second offender. Lack of sufficient proof of one or more of the prior felonies set forth in the multiple offender bill of information does not require the entire bill to fall. ... While this subsection of the multiple offender law does set forth one means of proving that a defendant is an habitual offender, it is not the exclusive means of doing so. ... In addition, the judge must be satisfied that no more than five years has elapsed since the expiration of the maximum sentence of the previous felony conviction or convictions. La.R.S. 15:529.1C. ... Under these facts, the sentencing judge did not need to rely on a warden's or superintendent's certificate as set forth in La.R.S. 15:529.1F. in order to properly find that defendant was a second offender.

The Habitual Offender Law may constitutionally apply to repeat offenders whose crimes involve specific intent, general intent, or negligence; the relevant consideration is repetition of criminal acts rather than the offender’s level of consciousness in a single act.

State v. Womack · filed 1976-05-17

We find the legislature’s system of grading an offense on the basis of both the purposefulness of the crime and its total effect upon society to be sensible and desirable. Consequently, we do not think it unreasonable for the legislature to include within the ambit of the Habitual Offender Law crimes involving specific intent, general intent and negligence.

Section 15:529.1's enhanced penalty for a repeat offender does not constitute cruel and unusual punishment.

State v. Sockwell · filed 1976-09-13

Nevertheless, the claim that the enhanced penalty is cruel and unusual punishment has no merit. Recidivist statutes have been upheld on many occasions against the attack that they involve cruel and unusual punishment.

Subsection (F) permits certified prison records containing the required conviction and incarceration information, photograph, and fingerprints to make a prior felony conviction prima facie, and when the defendant offers no contrary evidence the trial judge may establish identity by comparing the defendant with the photograph; subsection (D) requires the judge to find that the accused is the person previously convicted.

State v. Curtis · filed 1976-10-06(F), (D)

Likewise, in the instant case, we conclude that where the state has complied with the requisites of subsection (F) which includes photographs of a person with the same name as defendant in the habitual offender proceedings and defendant has offered no evidence to the contrary, there is sufficient evidence for the trial judge to make a comparison between defendant's appearance and the photographs in the prison record, and thereafter conclude that defendant is the same person named in the prison record as having been convicted of the prior felony. Under these circumstances, defendant's identity, for the purpose of La.R.S. 15:529.1, was properly established. Hence, the trial judge correctly found defendant to be a multiple offender.

Section 15:529.1(A)(2) permits a 49½-to-198-year sentence without parole, probation, or suspension for a defendant's third felony conviction for armed robbery.

State v. Overton · filed 1976-10-06(A)(2)

Defendant's third felony conviction, in this case for armed robbery, subjected him to a prison term of 49½-198 years without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence. La.R.S. 15:529.1(A)(2); La.R.S. 14:64. He was in fact sentenced to serve a term of sixty years without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence, less than two-thirds the maximum sentence for a first offense. We do not find this too severe a punishment for a third serious offense. See State v. Walker, 328 So.2d 87 (La.1976).

Section 15:529.1 authorizes enhanced sentences for repeat felony offenders, but it does not further enhance the penalty for a status offense whose special statute already accounts for the defendant’s prior felony conviction.

State v. Sanders · filed 1976-10-15

The habitual offender statute, enacted in 1956, does not create a new or separate offense based on the commission of more than one felony but merely provides for imposition of an increased sentence for persons convicted of second and subsequent felonies. ... Consequently, we find that the penalty provisions enacted in R.S. 14:95.1 were intended by the legislature to delimit the permissible punishment for that offense because the statute itself takes into account the fact of defendant's previous felony conviction and the legislature gave no indication that it wanted the multiple-billing procedure to remain available as a vehicle for further enlargement of the penalty.

Section 15:529.1 does not permit a simple-escape conviction to be used as a habitual-offender predicate when the defendant's prior felony conviction already enhanced the escape offense and sentence, absent explicit legislative authorization for the additional enhancement.

State v. Cox · filed 1977-04-11

The question presented is whether the State may employ a conviction of simple escape in seeking to have a person declared an habitual offender under La.R.S. 15:529.1. ... The escape statute itself causes an enhancement of penalty by requiring consecutive sentences because of a defendant's previous felony conviction. ... In any event, there is sufficient doubt that the penalty for a simple escape should be escalated twice by what may be an unforeseen combination of two criminal statutes, and in the absence of an explicit legislative authorization, we will construe the law strictly by refusing to give it such an expansive interpretation.

Section 15:529.1(A)(3) requires a defendant convicted of simple burglary who is a fourth or subsequent felony offender to receive a sentence of at least 20 years and no more than natural life.

State v. Alexander · filed 1977-05-25(A)(3)

However, under the provisions of La.R.S. 15:529.1(A)(3), a defendant convicted of simple burglary in violation of La.R.S. 14:62 and found to be a fourth or subsequent felony offender is appropriately sentenced to not less than twenty (20) years and not more than his natural life.

Under § 15:529.1(C), the five-year cleansing period begins when the prior sentence actually expires at the person's legal discharge from custody or supervision, including an earlier discharge caused by pardon or good-time credits.

State v. Anderson · filed 1977-07-01(C), (F)

The statutory intent, thus, is that a sentence expires when the prisoner is discharged from state custody and supervision, not when the theoretical date arrives on which the initial sentence would have terminated. Thus, when the convicted person is discharged earlier (as well as later) then the expiration date of the sentence initially sentenced, then the actual maximum sentence is that determined by his date of legal discharge, whether extended through revocation of parole or shortened by law due to "good time" diminution of the initial sentence. It is not until the date of actual discharge that the individual has fully paid his debt to society, insofar as owed because of an offense for which he has been convicted.

Before the 1994 amendment, § 15:529.1(A)(3)(a) required a fourth felony offender to serve at least the longest term prescribed for a first conviction and no more than life imprisonment.

State v. Franklin · filed 1998-09-23(A)(3)(a)

However, Franklin was adjudicated a fourth felony offender. At the time of this offense, the Habitual Offender statute mandated that a fourth offender serve not less than the longest term prescribed for a first conviction (30 years at hard labor) nor more than life. La. R.S. 15:529.1 A(3)(a) (prior to the amendment by La. Acts 1994, 3d Ex.Sess., No. 144).

Under § 15:529.1, an out-of-state or federal conviction may enhance a Louisiana sentence only if the comparable offense would have been a Louisiana felony when committed.

State v. Singleton · filed 1977-11-14

Louisiana Revised Statute 15:529.1 provides that any "person who, after having been convicted within this state of a felony, or who, after having been convicted under the laws of any other state or of the United States, or any foreign government or country of a crime which, if committed in this state would be a felony" may receive an enhanced sentence. The federal charge, therefore, can only be used to enhance defendant's sentence if the offense is one which "if committed in this state would be a felony." ... Although this state law was amended in 1976 to raise the crime of possession of unregistered firearms to a relative felony, that change does not affect this defendant because the character of a prior offense as a felony or non-felony is determined as of the date of a defendant's commission of the offense, not as of the date of its utilization by the state in enhancement proceedings.

Section 15:529.1 excludes an out-of-state or federal conviction unless the underlying crime would be a Louisiana felony, and its five-year cleansing period runs from actual discharge from the prior sentence to commission of the later felony.

State Ex Rel. Wilson v. Maggio · filed 1982-11-29(A), (C)

There are two relevant legal propositions which dictate our result here. First, La. R.S. 15:529.1, the multiple offender statute, specifically provides that for an out of state *1123 or federal conviction to be used to support a multiple offender adjudication, the crime upon which the conviction is based must be a felony under the laws of Louisiana.[1] The second proposition is that in order to use a prior felony offense to support a multiple offender adjudication there must not have intervened, before commission of another felony, a five year "cleansing" period, that is, five years between the end of the previous sentence and the commission of another felony.[2] In determining the expiration of a given sentence, it is not the imposed sentence which governs, but the date of the person's actual discharge from supervision by the department of corrections. Discharge from supervision can take place earlier than the theoretical date on which the initial sentence would have terminated, because of a pardon, commutation or good time credit. Or it can take place later because of parole revocation. State v. Anderson, 349 So.2d 311 (La.1977). ... Applying these principles to the present case, we find that relator was erroneously adjudicated a multiple offender because the July 31, 1974, federal conviction does not qualify under La.R.S. 15:529.1(A); and, in its absence, more than five years have elapsed between the expiration of the 1967 sentence and the commission of the instant offense.

An out-of-state guilty plea cannot serve as a predicate for enhanced punishment under the habitual-offender statute when the plea record does not affirmatively show that the defendant was advised of and waived the privilege against self-incrimination.

State v. Sisk · filed 1983-12-22

Because the Illinois court did not use the magic words in explaining affirmatively defendant's privilege against self-incrimination, i.e., his right to stand trial without being forced to testify against himself, McGinnis dictates his guilty plea therein can not be used as a predicate for a multiple-offender proceeding in Louisiana. We so hold though we deem the result illogical and contrary to the proper administration of criminal justice.

Section 15:529.1(A) permits an out-of-state conviction to serve as a habitual-offender predicate only when the offense would be a felony if committed in Louisiana, judged by the nature of the act rather than the foreign penalty.

State v. Smith · filed 1996-09-27(A)

For a conviction from another state to serve as a predicate felony conviction for purposes of the Louisiana Habitual Offender Law, the conviction must be of “a crime which, if committed in this state would be a felony.” La. R.S. 15:529.1(A) (prior to renumbering by 1994 La. Acts 3rd Ex. Session No. 23, § 1). If the offense from the other state for which the defendant was convicted does not necessarily include conduct considered to be a felony under Louisiana law, that conviction cannot be used under the habitual offender statute to lead to an enhanced penalty. ... The habitual offender statute requires Louisiana courts to determine the analogous state crime according to the nature of the act involved in the crime, not the penalty provided for the offense in the foreign jurisdiction.

Section 15:529.1 requires a defendant challenging a predicate conviction to identify the objection or constitutional claim and its factual basis in a written response, and an out-of-state conviction qualifies as a felony predicate based on the nature of the conduct compared with Louisiana law.

State v. Hennis · filed 1999-02-19(D)(1)(a) and (D)(1)(b); (A)(1)

Furthermore, the record does not contain any written response to the habitual offender bill of information filed by defendant setting forth any objection to the information, or any claim that the predicate upon which the state relied was obtained in violation of the Constitutions of Louisiana or of the United States and the factual basis for the claim, as required by La.R.S. 15:529.1(D)(1)(a) and (D)(1)(b). Consequently, defendant is precluded from urging his claim that the predicate plea was entered without a knowing waiver of Boykin rights. ... For a conviction from another state to serve as a predicate felony for purposes of the Louisiana Habitual Offender Law, the conviction must be of "a crime which, if committed in this state would be a felony." See La.R.S. 15:529.1(A)(1). ... The habitual offender statute requires Louisiana courts to determine the analogous Louisiana crime according to the nature of the act involved in the crime of the other state or jurisdiction, not the penalty provided for the offense in the other state or jurisdiction.

Section 15:529.1(A)(1) permits a qualifying out-of-state felony conviction to serve as the predicate for adjudicating a defendant a second felony offender when the most analogous Louisiana offense is a felony.

State v. Medious · filed 1998-11-25(A)(1)

Furthermore, defendant's prior conviction was obtained in Mississippi, for one count of burglary of a dwelling, in violation of then Miss.Code Ann. § 97-17-19[4].9 The defendant committed the predicate offense on November 21,1986, at which time the Louisiana statute most analogous to Miss.Code Ann. 97-17-19 was LSA-R.S. 14:62.2, which provided for the felony offense of simple burglary of an inhabited dwelling. Accordingly, defendant's prior conviction in Mississippi could be used to adjudicate defendant a second felony offender. La. R.S. 15:529.1(A)(1).

Section 15:529.1 requires a defendant challenging a predicate conviction to state the objection or constitutional claim and its factual basis in a response to the habitual-offender bill, and permits an out-of-state conviction to qualify only when the conduct would constitute a Louisiana felony, judged by the nature of the act rather than the foreign penalty.

State v. Hennis · filed 1999-02-19(D)(1)(a) and (D)(1)(b); (A)(1)

Furthermore, the record does not contain any written response to the habitual offender bill of information filed by defendant setting forth any objection to the information, or any claim that the predicate upon which the state relied was obtained in violation of the Constitutions of Louisiana or of the United States and the factual basis for the claim, as required by La.R.S. 15:529.1(D)(1)(a) and (D)(1)(b). Consequently, defendant is precluded from urging his claim that the predicate plea was entered without a knowing waiver of Boykin rights. ... For a conviction from another state to serve as a predicate felony for purposes of the Louisiana Habitual Offender Law, the conviction must be of "a crime which, if committed in this state would be a felony." See La.R.S. 15:529.1(A)(1). If the offense from the other state for which the defendant was convicted does not necessarily include conduct considered to be a felony under Louisiana law, that conviction cannot be used to enhance a subsequent felony under the habitual offender statute. The habitual offender statute requires Louisiana courts to determine the analogous Louisiana crime according to the nature of the act involved in the crime of the other state or jurisdiction, not the penalty provided for the offense in the other state or jurisdiction.

A conviction from another state may enhance a Louisiana felony only if the offense would be a Louisiana felony, determined by comparing the nature of the conduct rather than the other state's penalty.

State v. Sandoval · filed 2010-02-08(A)(1)

In order for a conviction from another state to serve as a predicate felony for enhancement purposes, the conviction must be for a “crime which, if committed in this state would be a felony....” La. R.S. 15:529.1(A)(1). If the offense from the other state for which the defendant was convicted does not necessarily include conduct considered to be a felony under Louisiana law, that conviction cannot be used to enhance a subsequent felony under the habitual offender statute. The habitual offender statute requires Louisiana courts to determine the analogous Louisiana crime according to the nature of the act involved in the crime of the other state or jurisdiction, not the penalty provided for the offense in the other state or jurisdiction.

A conviction from another state can enhance a Louisiana sentence under § 15:529.1(A)(1) only if the same conduct would have been a felony in Louisiana; the comparison turns on the nature of the act, not the foreign penalty.

State of Louisiana v. Mason N. Godfrey · filed 2010-03-03(A)(1)

In order for a conviction from another state to serve as a predicate felony for enhancement purposes, the conviction must be for a “crime which, if committed in this State would be a felony. . . .” LSA-R.S. 15:529.1(A)(1). Louisiana courts must determine the analogous state crime according to the nature of the act involved, not the penalty provided for the offense in the foreign jurisdiction. ... The evidence introduced by the state included nothing concerning the circumstances surrounding the defendant’s Texas conviction. Thus, we are left with only the fact that the defendant was convicted of assaulting a Texas peace officer and causing him “bodily injury.” Such a criminal act in 1974 was analogous to Louisiana’s offense of simple battery, a misdemeanor. ... We find that the trial court erred in adjudicating the defendant as a fourth felony offender and, hereby, vacate the defendant’s adjudication and sentence.

Section 15:529.1(A)(1) permits an out-of-state conviction to serve as a predicate felony only when the offense would have been a felony if committed in Louisiana, judged by the nature of the act rather than the foreign penalty.

State v. Godfrey · filed 2010-03-03(A)(1)

In order for a conviction from another state to serve as a predicate felony for enhancement purposes, the conviction must be for a “crime which, if committed in this State would be a felony....” LSA-R.S. 15:529.1(A)(1). Louisiana courts must detei'mine the analogous state crime according to the nature of the act involved, not the penalty provided for the offense in the foreign jurisdiction.

Section 15:529.1(A) allows an out-of-state or federal conviction to support habitual-offender proceedings only when the underlying crime would be a felony if committed in Louisiana.

State v. Baskin · filed 2014-06-13(A)

To qualify for use in habitual offender proceedings, a conviction in another state or under federal law must involve a crime “which, if committed in this state would be a felony.” La.R.S. 15:529.1(A). The federal crime defined in 8 U.S.C. § 1324 addresses the bringing into the United States, and the harboring of certain aliens in an illegal manner (as specified), or the knowing transportation of illegal aliens within the United States, and invokes the plenary federal authority over immigration. There is no comparable provision in Louisiana law, felony or misdemeanor.

An out-of-state conviction supports habitual-offender enhancement only if the offense would be a felony in Louisiana.

State v. Lanier · filed 1985-10-11(A)

This misdemeanor offense could not, therefore, form the basis for enhancement of the defendant’s sentence as a habitual offender. La. R.S. 15:529.1.

An out-of-state conviction counts as a habitual-offender predicate only if the state proves the offense would have been a Louisiana felony when committed.

State v. Kennerson · filed 1997-05-07(D)(1)(b)

Based on this court's analysis, the Harris County convictions and one of the Jefferson County convictions were not shown to be equivalent to Louisiana felonies, as required by La.R.S. 15:529.1. As the Jefferson County convictions counted as one predicate offense, the defendant, at most, was proven to be a second habitual offender, and should be resentenced as such.

A conviction that has already enhanced the punishment for an earlier conviction cannot be used again as a separate prior conviction for additional multiple-offender enhancement.

State v. Siegel · filed 1978-01-30

The defendant correctly contends that the 1961 attempted escape conviction (italicized above) (which had already enhanced the punishment for the burglary conviction) cannot be used as basis for additional enhanced punishment as constituting a separate prior conviction for purposes of La.R.S. 15:529.1. State v. Taylor, 347 So.2d 172 (La.1977); State v. Cox, 344 So.2d 1024 (La.1977); State v. Schamburge, 344 So.2d 997 (La.1977) (all decided prior to the present sentencing hearing).

A prior conviction remains usable to enhance a later sentence under the multiple-offender statute even when the defendant is automatically pardoned as a first offender for restoration of citizenship rights.

State v. Lewis · filed 1978-12-15

The constitutional provision was not intended to restore the status of innocence, nor to affect the use of the prior conviction for purposes of enhanced sentence as a multiple offender upon subsequent convictions.

Section 15:529.1 does not permit a conviction to enhance a sentence when that conviction was already used as an element of another predicate conviction used in the multiple-offender bill, because that would constitute double enhancement.

State v. Harrison · filed 1999-10-27

The bill of information charging Harrison with second offense possession of marijuana utilized as the underlying felony the earlier distribution of marijuana conviction in docket no. 30,437. Accordingly, the crime of possession of marijuana, second offense required proof of the predicate offense, distribution of marijuana. Said another way, the distribution of marijuana conviction was an element of the crime of possession of marijuana, second offense. It has been held that the use of both a La. R.S. 14:95.1 conviction, carrying of a firearm by a convicted felon, and the underlying felony used as an element of the firearm conviction to enhance under La. R.S. 15:529.1 constitutes double enhancement. ... We extend these holdings to the present facts as well. It is therefore necessary that we vacate Harrison's enhanced sentence and remand for resentencing.

Section 15:529.1 applies only after a person is convicted of a felony, and the district attorney has discretion whether to file the habitual-offender information.

State v. Sherer · filed 1978-01-30(A) and (D)

The habitual offender proceeding is not applicable until after a person has been convicted of a felony within this state. La. R.S. 15:529.1(A) and (D). Thereafter, the filing of an information accusing the convicted felon of a previous conviction(s) is discretionary with the district attorney. La.R.S. 15:529.1(D). Hence, the habitual offender proceeding is a separate proceeding applicable only after conviction and then at the discretion of the district attorney. It forms no part of the punishment of the criminal case involving defendant's guilt or innocence; therefore, it has no bearing on the determination of the number of persons comprising the jury for the trial of the case.

Section 15:529.1 does not authorize multiple-offender sentencing based on a current La.R.S. 14:95.1 conviction, even when the enhancement relies on a different prior conviction.

State v. Firmin · filed 1978-02-10

Although in the instant case the state relied upon one prior conviction in charging the defendant with having violated La.R.S. 14:95.1 and a different prior conviction in seeking to have his sentence enhanced under the provisions of La.R.S. 15:529.1, the rule of State v. Sanders, supra, is still applicable and the defendant should not have been sentenced as a multiple offender.

Section 15:529.1 is a penalty-enhancing device that permits only one sentence, requiring any sentence for the substantive offense to be vacated when the enhanced habitual-offender penalty is imposed.

State v. White · filed 1978-02-10

Because La. R.S. 15:529.1 is merely a penalty-enhancing device and an indictment thereunder does not charge a criminal offense, the statute permits the imposition of only one sentence. ... Any sentence imposed for the substantive offense prior to the filing of an habitual offender charge is to be vacated coincidentally with imposition of the enhanced penalty.

Section 15:529.1(D) requires the district attorney to file the habitual offender information within a reasonable time after the prosecution knows that the defendant has a prior felony record, even though the statute sets no specific prescriptive period.

State v. Broussard · filed 1982-06-21(D)

Although the above statute does not impose a specific prescriptive period in which the district attorney must file an habitual offender information, we have held that it does not allow an indefinite time for filing the information once the necessary information is available.

Subsection (D) permits a defendant to be charged as a multiple offender after conviction or sentence when a prior felony appears, but the habitual-offender bill must be filed within a reasonable time after the prosecution becomes aware of the prior felony record.

State v. Morris · filed 1994-11-17(D)

The Habitual Offender Law, La.R.S. 15:529.1(D), provides, inter alia, that "if, at any time, either after conviction or sentence, it shall appear that a person convicted of a felony has previously been convicted of [another] felony," then the defendant may be charged as a multiple offender. Although the statute does not contain a prescriptive period, the Louisiana Supreme Court, in State v. Broussard, 416 So.2d 109 (La.1982), held that a habitual offender bill must be filed "within a reasonable time" after the prosecution becomes aware of the defendant's prior felony record. ... Application of the Broussard doctrine is a fact-specific inquiry which depends on the particular circumstances of each case. ... Therefore, the State's actions did not constitute an unreasonable delay and did not prejudice defendant.

Section 15:529.1(D)(1)(b) requires a defendant to file a written response to a habitual-offender bill to preserve objections for appellate review.

State v. Smith · filed 1998-06-03(D)(1)(b)

But the defendant failed to preserve this issue for appellate review because he did not file a written response to the habitual offender bill of information. State v. Cossee, 95-2218 (La.App. 4 Cir. 7/24/96), 678 So.2d 72; La. R.S. 15:529.1(D)(1)(b). The record contains no written response to the multiple bill, and there was no oral objection made at the multiple bill hearing to the use of the prior conviction. Therefore, appellate review of whether defendant was properly Boykinized on the prior conviction is precluded.

Section 15:529.1 requires a defendant to file a written response specifying objections to the habitual-offender bill and provides procedures for arraignment and advisement of rights; unpreserved objections are waived, and certain omissions may be harmless when the defendant proceeds silently to trial.

State v. Richmond · filed 1999-03-10(D)(1)(a), (D)(1)(b)

In this case, defendant failed to file a written response to the bill of information, setting forth with particularity her claim and the factual basis for it, as mandated by La.R.S. 15:529.1(D)(l)(b). ... Accordingly, she cannot raise those issues now to attack her sentence as a third felony offender. ... However, under C.Cr.P. art. 555, a failure to arraign the defendant or the fact that she did not plead, is waived if the defendant enters upon the trial without objecting thereto, and it shall be considered as if she had pled not guilty. Furthermore, we note that she was not advised of her right to trial or to remain silent, as required by R.S. 15:529.1 D(l)(a). However, this is harmless error when defendant has not pled or admitted to any allegation in the bill of information, proceeds to trial and is silent.

A defendant who challenges the validity of a prior conviction used in a habitual-offender proceeding must file a written response stating the constitutional claim and its factual basis with particularity; failure to comply bars a direct attack on that conviction on appeal.

State v. Owens · filed 1999-10-27(D)(1)(b)

Through the presumption of regularity of judgment, the State met its burden of proof at the habitual offender proceeding by introducing the indictment, minutes, and sentencing transcript of the defendant's prior offense and by establishing through fingerprints that the defendant was the same person who pled guilty to manslaughter in 1994. ... Because the defendant failed to comply with the requirements of La. R.S. 15:529.1(D)(1)(b), we find that he is barred from directly attacking the validity of his prior offense on appeal.

Section 15:529.1(D)(1)(b) places the burden on a defendant to challenge the validity of an alleged predicate conviction and bars an unraised challenge after sentencing.

State v. Crosby · filed 1999-11-17(D)(1)(b)

If the person claims that any conviction or adjudication of delinquency alleged is invalid, he shall file a written response to the information.... A person claiming that a conviction or adjudication of delinquency alleged in the information was obtained in violation of the constitutions of Louisiana or of the United States shall set forth his claim, and the factual basis therefore, with particularity in his response to the information. ... Because defendant is consequently barred from raising this issue on appeal, this assignment of error is without merit.

Section 15:529.1(D)(1)(b) requires a defendant challenging an alleged predicate conviction to file a detailed written response, prove factual issues raised by that response by a preponderance of the evidence, and raise the challenge before sentencing or lose the ability to attack the sentence on that ground.

State v. Washington · filed 1999-11-17(D)(1)(b)

The defendant did not file a written response to the habitual offender bill of information complaining of any of the prior convictions or object orally at the multiple bill hearing to the State’s alleged lack of proof. Accordingly, his argument that the State did not produce sufficient proof of the prior conviction was not preserved for appeal.

Section 15:529.1(D) permits the district attorney in the parish where a subsequent conviction occurred to file a bill alleging a prior conviction or delinquency adjudication, after which the trial judge must set a hearing to determine whether the offender has prior felony convictions.

State v. Hopkins · filed 2000-12-20(D)

Pursuant to La. R.S. 15:529.1(D), the district attorney of a parish, where a subsequent conviction occurred, may file a bill of information accusing the person of a previous conviction or adjudication of delinquency. Upon such filing, the trial judge shall fix a day to inquire whether the offender has been convicted of a prior felony or felonies.

Subsection (D)(l)(a) permits a habitual offender bill to be filed against a defendant convicted of a felony at any time after conviction or sentence.

State v. Spellman · filed 2014-04-09(D)(l)(a)

Under La. R.S. 15:529.1(D)(l)(a), a habitual offender bill may be filed against a defendant who has been convicted of a felony “at any time, either after conviction or sentence.”

Section 15:529.1 does not subject a convicted offender to double jeopardy or impose cruel and unusual punishment.

State v. King · filed 1978-03-06

In these assignments of error, defendant contends that the Habitual Offender Law, La.R.S. 15:529.1, violates the federal and state constitutions in that it subjects a convicted offender to double jeopardy and imposes cruel and unusual punishment. This contention has been addressed in several decisions of this court. State ex rel. Clark v. Marullo, 352 So.2d 223 (La.1977); State v. Linkletter, 345 So.2d 452 (La.1977); State v. Badon, 338 So.2d 665 (La.1976); State v. Jolla, 337 So.2d 197 (La.1976); State v. Bullock, 329 So.2d 733 (La.1976); State v. Harvey, 329 So.2d 731 (La.1976); State v. Walker, 328 So.2d 87 (La.1976); State v. Williams, 326 So.2d 815 (La.1976); State v. Boatner, 304 So.2d 661 (La.1974). For the reasons expressed therein, it is without merit.

Section 15:529.1 cannot further enhance a sentence when the underlying offense already provides an enhanced penalty based on the defendant's prior felony conviction.

State v. Holland · filed 1978-03-15

Since defendant's status as a prior felon subjected him to an enhanced penalty under La.R.S. 14:95.1, his sentence could not be further enlarged by application of La.R.S. 15:529.1.

Section 15:529.1 may not be used to impose a further habitual-offender enhancement when the underlying conviction is under La. R.S. 14:95.1, because that firearms statute already enhances punishment based on the offender’s prior felony status.

State v. Williams · filed 1978-04-10

There is merit, however, in defendant's contention that a conviction of violation of the firearms statute, which is itself a recidivist law, may not be used to have one adjudged to be an habitual offender. In State v. Sanders, 337 So.2d 1131 (La. 1976), this Court held such an application to be contrary to the legislative intent, stating: "The firearms statute at issue here, R.S. 14:95.1, was enacted in 1975 and, as previously explained, provides that possession or concealment of a weapon by a person who has previously been convicted of one of the offenses therein enumerated is a felon, and that punishment therefor is confinement for three to ten years. Under the statute it is not the possession or concealment of a weapon— standing alone— which is a felony. It is made a felony only when the person committing the act has previously been convicted of one of the enumerated offenses. The act of possessing or concealing becomes a felony only because the person has the status of convicted felon. Consequently, the *948 legislature has itself imposed an increased penalty on a possessor or concealor of a weapon, if he is a felon, by means of this legislation specially aimed toward the convicted felon. We assume that the legislature was prompted to make this change because a person multiple-billed after conviction under the original statute, R.S. 14:95, could usually be given only a very short sentence. Since the legislature in passing R.S. 14:95.1 has in that very statute provided enhanced penalties for the act of concealing a weapon when the concealor is a felon, we therefore presume that it must not have intended the multiple enhancement incident to the state's using R.S. 15:529.1 to further enhance the penalty." 337 So.2d at 1134. (Footnotes omitted.)

Mandatory minimum sentences under subsection (A)(1)(b)(ii) are presumed constitutional, and a defendant must clearly and convincingly show exceptional circumstances to obtain a downward departure.

State v. Mead · filed 2009-07-01(A)(l)(b)(ii)

Since the habitual offender law is constitutional in its entirety, the minimum sentences it imposes upon recidivists are also presumed to be constitutional.

Section 15:529.1 imposes graduated punishment for repeat felony convictions, increasing the penalty as the number of convictions rises, subject to constitutional limits.

State v. Ross · filed 2016-12-21(A)(1)-(4)

The habitual offender statute is based on a concept of graduated punishment—that is, the more convictions one acquires, the harsher the ... punishment will be each time. See La. R.S. 15:529.1 A(l)-(4).

Subsection F allows certain facts proving prior offenses at a multiple-offender hearing to be established by a penitentiary warden’s sealed certificate, but not by a state-police superintendent or other non-penitentiary agency.

State v. Nicholas · filed 1978-06-19(F)

This statutory authorization only permits proof of certain specific facts by certificate of the warden, etc., of a penitentiary under seal of his office for the purpose of proving prior offenses at a multiple-offender hearing. The statute does not, however, authorize such proof to be made by the superintendent of state police or of any non-penitentiary agency, as was attempted here.

Section 15:529.1 requires a defendant to admit the allegations in a habitual offender bill or contest them at a contradictory hearing; a defendant must be cautioned about his rights before admitting prior offenses.

State v. Watson · filed 1992-12-09

La.R.S. 15:529.1 requires that the defendant either admit the truth of the allegations contained in the habitual offender bill or contest the allegations through contradictory hearing. If defendant wishes to acknowledge the prior offenses, he must be duly cautioned as to his rights before making such statement.

For a fourth or subsequent felony, § 15:529.1(A)(3) authorizes a determinate sentence of at least the longest first-offense term and at least 20 years, capped at the offender's natural life; it does not apply when the first-offense punishment is life imprisonment.

State v. Delaney · filed 1978-06-19A(3)

At the outset, we note that enhanced sentencing under this provision is not authorized if, upon a first conviction, the offender would be subject to life imprisonment. The provision further provides that the sentence for the fourth subsequent felony shall be for a determinate term of not less than the longest term prescribed for a first conviction and not more than his natural life and in no case less than twenty years. ... The issue is whether a sentence for a determinate number of years which is the longest term prescribed for the first conviction violates the prohibition in the statute that the sentence be "not more than his natural life." We think not. ... Hence, if the sentence of imprisonment is for a determinate term which is not less than twenty years and which represents the longest term prescribed for a first conviction, then it constitutes the minimum sentence authorized for a fourth subsequent felony conviction and does not violate the prohibition in the statute that the sentence be "not more than his natural life." ... Hence, it does not violate the prohibition in the statute that the sentence be "not more than his natural life." Hence, the sentence complies with *978 La.R.S. 15:529.1 A(3). It is not an illegal sentence.

Section 15:529.1 gives the district attorney discretion to enforce the Habitual Offender Law, but requires an habitual offender bill to be filed within a reasonable time after the prosecution learns of a defendant’s prior felony record and sets no specific prescriptive period.

State v. Wilson · filed 1978-06-19

This court has recognized that the enforcement of the Habitual Offender Law rests within the discretion of the district attorney. State v. Badon, 338 So.2d 665 (La.1976); State v. Overton, 337 So.2d 1201 (La.1976). However, the district attorney must file an habitual offender bill within a reasonable time after the prosecution knows that a defendant has a prior felony record. State v. Bell, 324 So.2d 451 (La.1975). Although La.R.S. 15:529.1 does not allow an indefinite time in which a district attorney may file an habitual offender bill once such information is available, neither does it impose a specific prescriptive period in which the district attorney must act upon the receipt of the necessary information. State v. McQueen, 308 So.2d 752 (La.1975).

Section 15:529.1(A)(3) permits a sentence from twenty years up to the accused’s natural life, so a term exceeding natural life is illegal.

State v. Alexander · filed 1978-09-14(A)(3)

La.R.S. 15:529.1(A)(3), as applied in this case, provides for a sentence of not less than twenty years nor more than the accused’s natural life. The term of 100 years actually imposed on defendant clearly exceeds his natural life, See, State v. Delaney, 359 So.2d 976 (La.1978), and therefore is illegal.

Section 15:529.1 limited the sentence for a second or third offender convicted of possessing pentazocine in 1980 to 10 years at hard labor.

State v. Bates · filed 1985-01-14

At the time of the offense in 1980, pentazocine occupied Schedule IV in La.R.S. 40:964, as amended by Acts 1979, No. 659, and carried a maximum penalty of 5 years at hard labor for a first offender, or 10 years at hard labor for a second or third offender sentenced under La.R.S. 15:529.1. Defendant’s multiple offender sentence is therefore illegal and subject to correction at any time.

Section 15:529.1(A)(1)(a) provides a 20-to-80-year sentencing range for a second felony offender convicted of perjury in a trial involving a crime punishable by life imprisonment.

State v. Griffin · filed 2000-11-01(A)(1)(a)

The sentence range for perjury involving a trial of a matter which may be punished by a life sentence, La. R.S. 14:123(C)(1), is not less than 5 years, without benefits, to no more than 40 years. For a second felony offender the range is 20 to 80 years, La. R.S. 15:529.1(A)(1)(a).

Section 15:529.1(C) provides a five-year “cleansing” period, and proof that the period elapsed may support postconviction relief from habitual-offender treatment.

State v. Turner · filed 1978-12-15(C)

While the record does not affirmatively establish that the five years had or had not elapsed, the showing indicates that more probably than not it had not elapsed between the crimes. If, in fact, Mallett is able to show that the five years had elapsed, then he can secure appropriate relief upon postconviction proceedings.

Section 15:529.1(C) does not apply when more than five years elapsed between the expiration of the maximum sentence for the prior conviction and commission of the latest felony.

State v. Santiago · filed 1982-07-02(C)

The multiple offender statute is inapplicable in cases where more than five years have elapsed between the expiration of the maximum sentence of the previous conviction and the time of the commission of the last felony for which the offender has been convicted. La.R.S. 15:529.1(C).

Subsection (C) excludes a prior conviction when more than ten years have elapsed from the expiration of its maximum sentence to the commission of the latest felony, with expiration measured by actual discharge from Department of Corrections supervision.

State v. Smith · filed 2005-07-20(C)

La. R.S. 15:529.1(C) states that the provisions of the Habitual Offender Law shall not be applicable "where more than ten years have elapsed since the expiration of the maximum sentence or sentences of the previous conviction or convictions ... and the commission of the last felony for which he has been convicted." It is the date of actual discharge from supervision from the Department of Corrections that determines the expiration of the previous sentence. State ex rel. Wilson v. Maggio, 422 So.2d 1121, 1123 (La.1982); State v. Collins, XXXX-XXXX (La.App. 4 Cir. 8/21/02), 826 So.2d 598.

Subsection (C) measures the five-year period from the expiration of the sentence for the last prior felony to the commission of the latest felony.

State v. Badon · filed 1976-10-06(C)

In State v. Broussard, 213 La. 338, 34 So.2d 883 (1948), we construed this section *671 as using as measuring posts for the five year term the interval ". . . between the expiration of the sentence imposed for the last previous felony conviction and the date of the commission of the latest felony."

For a third felony offender, the five-year limit applies between successive felonies, excluding time served in a penal institution; discharge from parole counts as expiration of the prior sentence.

State v. Tucker · filed 1992-06-24(C)

Thus, where a defendant is sentenced as a third offender, no more than five years can have elapsed between the first and second felony convictions and between the second and third convictions excluding time served, although more than five years may have elapsed between the first and third convictions. ... Tucker was well short of meeting the five-year requirement and was properly adjudicated and sentenced as a third felony offender.

Section 15:529.1 permits prior guilty-plea convictions to enhance punishment, with the proof burden depending on whether the conviction is governed by Louisiana's Jackson and LeBlanc rules or is an earlier, federal, or non-Louisiana conviction.

State v. Holden · filed 1979-10-08

However, Lewis is overruled insofar as it announced a similar rule for Louisiana state convictions prior to December 8, 1971, and insofar as it implied a similar rule for federal and non-Louisiana convictions. As to these convictions not governed by our own decisions in Jackson and LeBlanc, we find that the basis in federal constitutional law upon which we relied in Jackson has been modified by United States v. Timmreck, ___ U.S. ___, 99 S.Ct. 2085, 60 L.Ed.2d 634 (1979). Accordingly, as to these convictions not governed by Jackson and LeBlanc, the state is required only to prove the conviction by a plea of guilty with representation by counsel. The defendant has the burden of proving that he did not waive his constitutional rights in making the plea, if the plea was taken subsequent to Boykin's requirement in this regard. Unless the colloquy at the time of the plea of guilty affirmatively shows substantial defect in this regard, the defendant will not be permitted to make any other collateral attack beyond the colloquy upon these otherwise-valid guilty pleas in the enhanced-punishment proceedings.

Section 15:529.1 permits the State to use a prior guilty plea to enhance punishment when the plea was voluntary and counseled, without requiring an articulated waiver of Boykin rights for a plea taken before Boykin.

State v. Bolton · filed 1979-11-12

In Holden we held that, when the state intends to use a plea of guilty as a prior conviction in order to enhance punishment under La.R.S. 15:529.1: (1) If taken before the decision in Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 23 L.Ed.2d 274 (1969), the plea is valid, if voluntary and with counsel, without any need for articulated waiver of the constitutional rights subsequently required by Boykin to be articulated and expressly waived in order that a plea be considered to be knowing and made with a full understanding of its consequences.

A prison record certificate satisfying subsection (F) is properly certified when issued by the officer with legal custody of the documents.

State v. Lozier · filed 1979-10-08(F)

The documents from the Louisiana State Penitentiary were properly certified under La.R.S. 15:529.1(F)[5] by the officer with legal custody of the documents.

A plea of nolo contendere is treated as a conviction for purposes of the habitual offender statute.

State v. Royal · filed 1988-06-21

Under La.Code of Crim.P. art. 552(4), a plea of nolo contendere clearly is to be considered as a conviction within the meaning of the habitual offender statute, i.e., La.R.S. 15:529.1.

Section 15:529.1(F) requires the state, when using guilty-plea convictions in a multiple-offender proceeding, to prove the existence of each guilty plea and that the defendant was represented by counsel when each plea was entered.

State v. Windham · filed 1998-05-27(F)

Here, the state alleged that the defendant had three prior convictions, each obtained by a plea of guilty. Thus, the state had to prove, at a minium, the existence of each guilty plea and that defendant was represented by counsel at the time of each plea. ... The evidence submitted by the state does not show either the existence of the 1988 simple burglary plea, or that defendant was represented by counsel at the time he allegedly entered the plea. We therefore find that, on the face of the record before us, insufficient evidence exists to support the adjudication of defendant as a fourth felony offender.

Section 529.1(D)(1)(b) requires a defendant challenging a predicate conviction as constitutionally invalid to prove the factual basis of the challenge by a preponderance of the evidence after the State satisfies its initial burden, subject to the State's opportunity to rebut.

State v. Walker · filed 1999-09-24(D)(1)(b)

Here, while the defendant has shown that his guilty pleas in 1986 and 1987 appear to have been improper, the state has not been afforded an opportunity to rebut the defendant's proof by introducing a "perfect" transcript or other evidence as described in Shelton, supra. We therefore vacate both the judgment adjudicating the defendant a fourth felony offender and the sentence imposed by the trial court and remand for further proceedings.

Section 15:529.1(D)(1)(b) bars appellate review of whether predicate offenses satisfy the sequential and cleansing-period requirements when the defendant did not raise those objections in a response to the multiple bill or at the multiple-offender hearing.

State v. Mayer · filed 1999-09-28(D)(1)(b)

In essence, he complains that it is impossible to determine if the alleged predicate offenses (1) meet the sequential requirement and (2) fall within the cleansing period. However, this issue was not preserved for appellate review because defendant did not include this complaint in a response to a multiple bill and he did not object on this basis during the multiple offender hearing.

Section 15:529.1 requires the State to prove the prior conviction and counsel or a waiver of counsel; if the defendant shows a significant procedural defect, the State must then prove the prior guilty plea was informed, voluntary, and included an articulated waiver of the Boykin rights.

State v. LeBlanc · filed 2004-12-17

In order to use a prior guilty plea to enhance punishment under La. R.S. 15:529.1, the State need only prove the fact of conviction and that the defendant was represented by counsel (or waived counsel) at the time he entered his plea. Thereafter, the defendant bears the burden of proving a significant procedural defect in the proceedings. See State v. Shelton, 621 So.2d 769, 779-80 (La.1993). Once a defendant makes an affirmative showing of an infringement of his rights or a procedural irregularity in the plea transcript, the State must prove the constitutionality of the predicate pleas by producing a "perfect" transcript. If the State produces anything less than a "perfect" transcript, for example, a guilty plea form, a minute entry, an "imperfect" transcript, or any combination thereof, the judge must then weigh the evidence to determine whether the State has met its burden of proving that defendant's prior guilty plea was informed and voluntary, and made with an articulated waiver of the three Boykin rights. Shelton, 621 So.2d at 780.

For a third-felony-offender adjudication, the State must prove the prior conviction and counsel or a valid waiver at the plea, after which the defendant must show a significant procedural defect before the State must establish the plea’s constitutionality with a perfect transcript or equivalent factual proof.

State v. Henderson · filed 2013-02-27A(3)(a)

To obtain a multiple offender adjudication against a defendant under La. R.S. 15:529.1, the state need prove only the fact of conviction and that he was represented by counsel (or waived counsel) at the time he entered his plea. State v. Zachary, 2001-3191 (La.10/25/02), 829 So.2d 405. Thereafter, the defendant bears the burden of proving a significant procedural defect in the proceedings. State v. Shelton, 92-8070 (La.7/1/93), 621 So.2d 769. If he meets this burden, the state then must prove the constitutionality of the predicate plea by producing a “perfect” transcript; anything less than a “perfect” transcript requires the court to make a factual determination whether the predicate plea was free and voluntary, and made with a specific waiver of Boykin rights. Id.

In habitual offender proceedings, the state must prove a prior guilty plea and representation by counsel before the defendant must offer affirmative evidence of a rights violation or irregularity in the plea.

State v. Gullette · filed 2008-02-13

The minutes for the 1999 conviction reflect that the state met its burden of proving under State v. Shelton, 621 So.2d 769 (La.1993), the existence of this prior guilty plea and that defendant was represented by counsel when it was entered. The defendant, however, has not met his subsequent burden to produce some affirmative evidence showing an infringement of his rights or a procedural irregularity in the taking of the plea. Therefore, the trial court did not err in adjudicating the defendant to be a fourth felony habitual offender based on this conviction.

Section 15:529.1(A) permits an out-of-state or federal conviction to enhance punishment only when the underlying offense would be a felony if committed in Louisiana.

State v. Molinario · filed 1980-04-07(A)

In the instant case, the federal offense for which defendant was convicted was analogous at the time of the commission of the offense to the crime in this state of false swearing (La.R.S. 14:125).[5] A felony in this state is defined as "any crime for which an offender may be sentenced to death or imprisonment at hard labor." La. R.S. 14:2(4). A misdemeanor is "any crime other than a felony." Id. 2(6). The penalty for false swearing is a fine not more than five hundred dollars, or imprisonment for not more than one year, or both. Therefore, the crime of false swearing is a misdemeanor and not a felony because it is not punishable by imprisonment at hard labor. Since the federal offense for which defendant was convicted would not have been a felony "if committed in this state," it may not be used to enhance defendant's punishment. State v. Singleton, supra.

Section 15:529.1(C) excludes habitual-offender treatment only when more than five years have elapsed between expiration of the prior sentence and commission of the current felony, excluding periods of servitude; expiration is measured by actual discharge, including the end of parole custody.

State v. Vincent · filed 1980-11-05(C)

La.R.S. 15:529.1(C) provides: This Section shall not be applicable in cases where more than five years have elapsed since the expiration of the maximum sentence, or sentences, of the previous conviction, or convictions, and the time of the commission of the last felony for which he has been convicted. In computing the period of time as provided herein, any period of servitude by a person in a penal institution, within or without the state, shall not be included in the computation of any of said five year periods. ... In State v. Anderson, 349 So.2d 311 (La. 1977), we held "maximum" sentence in La. R.S. 15:529.1(C) to mean actual "maximum" sentence served. ... Hence, the state met its burden of proving that more than five years had not elapsed since the expiration of the maximum sentence for defendant's last prior felony conviction and the time of the commission of the felony for which he was convicted herein.

For a prior conviction under another jurisdiction's law, § 15:529.1(A) uses Louisiana law to determine whether the underlying crime would be a felony in Louisiana.

State v. Thomas · filed 2000-01-05(A)

The multiple offender statute, La. R.S. 15:529.1 provides for the enhancement of sentences imposed upon persons with prior convictions. The statute includes persons who have been “convicted under the laws of any other state or the United States, or any foreign government of a crime which, if committed in this state would be a felony.” La. R.S. 15:529.1(A). Louisiana law and not the law of the foreign jurisdiction determines the seriousness of the defendant’s prior felony convictions. State v. Carouthers, |3618 So.2d 880 (La.1993); State v. Wright, 598 So.2d 493 (La.App. 2 Cir.1992).

Section 15:529.1(C) excludes a prior felony from multiple-offender enhancement only when more than five years elapsed between expiration of the prior sentence and commission of the latest felony; subsection (F) allows certified records and the defendant's trial admission to prove the prior conviction.

State v. Martin · filed 1981-07-02(C), (F)

The contention that there was inadequate proof tendered to establish the first conviction is without merit. At the multiple offender hearing the state introduced exemplified and certified copies of California court records that showed that defendant was convicted after plea of guilty of the charge of possession of heroin for sale. Moreover, the trial court was entitled to refer to defendant's admission on direct examination at trial that he was convicted in California of the felony offense of possession of narcotics for sale. The trial judge has a right in the multiple offender proceeding to take judicial cognizance of any prior proceeding which was a part of the same case he had previously tried. State v. Jones, 332 So.2d 461 (La.1976); State v. O'Day, 191 La. 380, 185 So. 290 (1938). The copies of the California court records and cognizance of defendant's admission of his previous conviction during his trial were adequate proof of the prior felony conviction. La.R.S. 15:529.1(F); State v. Jones, supra. ... The five year "cleansing" period provided in La.R.S. 15:529.1(C) had not elapsed in defendant's case. His prior conviction in California occurred on June 8, 1973. He was sentenced to six months in prison and five years on active probation. He was adjudged a multiple offender on January 21, 1980. The enhanced sentence statute, La.R.S. 529.1, is not applicable when a period of more than five years has elapsed between the expiration of the sentence imposed for the last previous felony conviction and the time of commission of the latest felony. The statutory intent is that a sentence expires when the prisoner is discharged from state custody and supervision, whether the sentence has been extended through revocation of probation or parole or shortened by law due to "good time" diminution of the original sentence. See State v. Anderson, 349 So.2d 311 (La.1977). Accordingly, five years had not elapsed between the expiration of defendant's California sentence and the time of commission of his Louisiana offense. The record reflects that he has not been discharged from California probation supervision due to a violation of its conditions. Moreover, five years had not elapsed between the date originally scheduled for his probation termination/discharge and his commission of his latest felony.

Section 15:529.1 requires the State to prove a prior felony conviction, but not that the defendant was sentenced for it, to establish habitual-offender status.

State v. Chaney · filed 1982-11-29

La.R.S. 15:529.1 does not require that the State prove that defendant was sentenced; only that he was convicted. See State v. Martin, 356 So.2d 1370 (La. 1978).

For enhancement under § 15:529.1, the state may prove a non-Louisiana guilty-plea conviction and its date with a certified minute entry showing the plea and counsel, while the defendant must prove involuntariness or nonwaiver of Boykin rights from the plea colloquy, which must affirmatively show a substantial defect.

State v. McGinnis · filed 1981-11-16(A)(3)(a)

When the state intends to use a non-Louisiana plea of guilty as a prior conviction in order to enhance punishment under La.R.S. 15:529.1 it may prove the conviction and its date by a certified copy of a minute entry (or an equivalent contemporaneously recorded or executed document) showing the plea and that the accused was represented by counsel. (The state must, of course, prove that the defendant in the plea and the present accused are the same person.) The defendant has the burden of proving that the plea was involuntary or that (if taken subsequent to Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 23 L.Ed.2d 274 (1969)) he did not waive Boykin rights; he may do so in the enhancement proceedings only by the colloquy at the time of the plea of guilty, which must affirmatively show substantial defect in this regard. For any other collateral attack upon the prior plea, the defendant is relegated to any remedy he has in the court which took his plea.

When a foreign guilty-plea conviction is used to enhance punishment under § 15:529.1, the defendant may use other evidence to prove that the required Boykin rights were not explained if the plea colloquy record is unavailable through no fault of the defendant.

State v. Smith · filed 1982-01-25

We therefore hold today that where a defendant is multiple-billed by use of a foreign guilty plea conviction, if the defendant can establish that a record of his colloquy is unavailable through no fault of his own (e.g., if it has been destroyed or was not recorded originally) he may then attempt to meet his burden of proof by other means. In other words, State v. Holden, supra, is still viable in the situations addressed therein, with one exception. Where a defendant can show that the transcript of his colloquy cannot be produced he will be allowed to prove by other evidence that he was not informed of his Boykin rights prior to entering his guilty plea.

When § 15:529.1 increases a sentence based on a felony conviction, the sentence carries the parole, probation, and suspension conditions prescribed for the underlying offense.

State v. Bruins · filed 1981-12-14(A)(1)

It is not a crime to be an habitual offender. The statute increases the sentence for a recidivist. The penalty increase is computed by reference to the sentencing provisions of the underlying offense. Similarly, the conditions imposed on the sentence are those called for in the reference statute.

Section 15:529.1(A) permits prior federal convictions to serve as felony predicates for multiple-offender sentencing when the equivalent offenses would be felonies under Louisiana law.

State v. Jones · filed 1982-01-25(A)

Since in each instance the stolen check which Joseph had in her possession was in an amount in excess of $100, it seems clear that the offense would have been a felony under Louisiana law. La.R.S. 14:69; La. R.S. 15:529.1(A). ... The trial judge properly adjudged defendant Joseph a third felony offender.

Section 15:529.1 treats an out-of-state conviction as a felony predicate when the same crime would be a Louisiana felony, even if the conduct also constitutes a Louisiana misdemeanor, but it does not permit double enhancement based on a prior felony whose punishment was already increased because of the defendant's felony status.

State v. Morris · filed 1983-02-23

Because the defendant was convicted under the laws of another state of a crime which, if committed in Louisiana would be a felony, that foreign state offense constitutes a felony for purposes of the habitual offender law. La.R.S. 15:529.1. That the conduct proscribed by the foreign state statute to which the defendant pleaded guilty also constitutes a lesser included misdemeanor in Louisiana does not prevent its use as a basis for a third felony offender adjudication. ... This court has held that where a defendant's status as a prior felon has subjected him to an enhanced penalty under certain criminal provisions, his sentence may not be further enlarged by application of the habitual offender law. ... In the present case, none of the felonies underlying the multiple offender adjudication, including the Texas conviction, was based on a statute which provided for more severe punishment because of a defendant's status as a convicted felon. Hence, defendant's multiple offender adjudication and sentence are not based upon an enhanced or aggravated prior felony.

Section 15:529.1 does not allow a guilty plea to serve as a predicate for a multiple-offender adjudication when the record fails to show that the defendant was informed of and knowingly waived the right to stand trial without being compelled to testify against himself.

State v. Robicheaux · filed 1982-04-16

The colloquy in the present case shows that the information conveyed to Powell about his right against self-incrimination was equally deficient. Insofar as the record discloses, the defendant was not informed of his right to stand trial without being forced to testify against himself. For this reason, his guilty plea should not have been used as a basis for the multiple offender charge against him.

Section 15:529.1(C) requires the State to prove that a prior felony falls within the applicable cleansing period, measured from discharge from custody when the gap between the prior conviction and current felony exceeds that period.

State v. Brown · filed 1999-03-10(C)

On September 29, 1994, the date the defendant committed the crime of purse snatching, the cleansing period under the law in effect was seven years[2]. In Orleans Parish criminal district court case number 285-181, the defendant committed the felony of armed robbery on September 29, 1981, for which he was convicted on November 19, 1981. As more than seven years elapsed between the date of the commission of the underlying felony offense (September 29, 1994) and the date of the previous felony conviction (November 19, 1981), the state had to prove the date of discharge for the defendant's original felony conviction in order to use the previous conviction as a predicate offense. Pages three and four of State Exhibit number One reflect that the defendant was sentenced to ten years imprisonment at hard labor for his conviction in Orleans Parish district court case number 285-181. The defendant admitted that he received a sentence of ten years imprisonment for this armed robbery conviction. However, the state did not offer any proof regarding the date upon which the defendant was actually discharged from custody on said sentence. Thus, the state did not prove that the defendant's prior felony fell within the cleansing period.

Section 15:529.1(C) applies the cleansing period in effect when the present felony is committed, even if an earlier version imposed a shorter period when the predicate conviction occurred.

State v. Brady · filed 1999-03-16(C)

Howell was adjudicated a fourth felony offender based on predicate convictions in 1981, 1984, and 1993. La. R.S. 15:529.1(C) provided in 1995, at the time of the instant offenses, that the habitual offender statute would not be applicable in cases where more than seven years had elapsed since the expiration of the maximum sentence of the previous conviction and the present felony offense. ... The application of the seven-year cleansing period is not the application of an ex post facto law, nor is such application otherwise fundamentally unfair to defendant.

Section 15:529.1(C) requires the state to show that prior convictions fall within the 10-year cleansing period, and subsection (D)(1)(b) requires a defendant to file a written response stating the claim and factual basis with particularity.

State v. Crawford · filed 1999-11-10(C); (D)(1)(b)

The state must further show that the prior convictions fall within the 10 year cleansing period prescribed by La. R.S. 15:529.1(C). ... In fact, defendant failed to file a written response to the bill of information, setting forth with particularity his claim and the factual basis for it, as mandated by La. R.S. 15:529.1(D)(l)(b).

Section 15:529.1(C) cannot use a longer cleansing period enacted after the prior offenses to link those offenses for habitual-offender enhancement when doing so violates the ex post facto clause.

State v. Everett · filed 2000-09-27(C)

In this assignment of error the defendant questions whether the current ten-year cleansing period of La. R.S. 15:529.1(C) should have been applied to his 1984 conviction. ... Under these facts, using an extended cleansing period, enacted after the prior offenses (i.e. ex post facto), to link said prior offenses would violate the ex post facto clause. This assignment of error has merit.

Section 15:529.1(C) cannot apply a later-enacted, longer cleansing period to link prior convictions that were already cleansed under the earlier five-year period, because doing so violates the ex post facto clause.

State v. Abram · filed 2001-12-05(C)

The situation in the instant case is similar to that in Everett and Lewis. More than five years elapsed between Abram’s release from prison on March 22, 1985 and his arrest for the next felony on September 26, 1990. In Everett and Lewis this Court held that using an extended cleansing period, which was enacted after the prior offenses, to link the prior offenses would violate the ex post facto clause.

Under La. R.S. 15:529.1, the cleansing period is measured between discharge from the immediately preceding felony sentence and commission of the underlying felony; if that period has not elapsed, the defendant may be sentenced as a habitual offender and prior felony convictions are counted.

State v. Abram · filed 2002-11-13(C)

Applying this interpretation of the Habitual Offender Law to the instant case we find that Abram is subject to.sentencing as a fourth felony offender. The fact that more than five years1 had elapsed between Abram’s release from his 1981 conviction for burglary, on March 22, 1985, and his 1991 conviction for distribution of a false drug, is irrelevant. The relevant time period to consider, when sentencing under a multiple bill, is between the instant offense and the one immediately preceding it. In this case, the applicable “cleansing period” under the 1995 amendment to La. R.S. 15:529.1 which is ten years, had not elapsed between Abram’s previous conviction in 1991 for and the instant 1998 conviction for simple burglary. Since it is now established that Abram qualifies to be sentenced as a habitual offender under the statute, all of his previous offenses are counted, without regard to the time periods between them.

Section 15:529.1(B) treats a person as a second offender only when the crime leading to the second conviction was committed after the prior conviction.

State v. Wimberly · filed 1982-05-17(B)

The consistent application of our multiple offender statute and our repeated offense statutes over the years has been that prior convictions, in order to be available for imposition of a greater punishment as a subsequent offender, must precede the commission of the principal offense, that is, the latest prosecution in point of time. ... The multiple offender statute has ever since provided "that the offender shall be deemed a second offender only if the crime resulting in the second conviction shall have been committed after his first conviction." La.R.S. 15:529.1(B).

A prior guilty-plea conviction cannot be used to enhance punishment under § 15:529.1 unless the record affirmatively shows that the defendant knowingly and voluntarily waived the right to trial by jury and the privilege against self-incrimination.

State v. Age · filed 1982-05-17

Therefore, because the record does not affirmatively show that the defendant knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to trial by jury and his privilege against self-incrimination, the guilty plea conviction should not have been used as a basis for the multiple offender charge against him.

Section 15:529.1 permits a prior guilty plea to be used to enhance punishment when the State proves the conviction and representation by counsel, while the defendant bears the burden of showing that a post-Boykin plea was involuntary or that he did not waive the Boykin rights.

State v. Yarbrough · filed 1982-06-03

"Accordingly, as to these convictions not governed by Jackson and LeBlanc, the state is required only to prove the conviction by a plea of guilty with representation by counsel. The defendant has the burden of proving that he did not waive his constitutional rights in making the plea, if the plea was taken subsequent to Boykin's requirement in this regard. Unless the colloquy at the time of the plea of guilty affirmatively shows substantial defect in this regard, the defendant will not be permitted to make any other collateral attack beyond the colloquy upon these otherwise-valid guilty pleas in the enhanced-punishment proceedings. ... In Holden we held that, when the state intends to use a plea of guilty as a prior conviction in order to enhance punishment under La. R.S. 15:529.1: ... Moreover, under the holding of Holden and Bolton, supra, the defendant has the burden of proving that the plea was involuntary or, if taken subsequent to Boykin, that he did not waive the Boykin rights."

A federal conviction may be used for multiple-offender enhancement only if the underlying crime would be a felony if committed in Louisiana.

State v. Berndt · filed 1982-06-21A

However, it appears that in Louisiana it would have been a misdemeanor. ... The amount of the welfare check in defendant's possession in this case was $17.00; under R.S. 14:69 the offense is a misdemeanor. Therefore, the 1973 federal conviction cannot be used for enhancement purposes under R.S. 15:529.1, and defendant should not have been sentenced as a triple offender.

Section 15:529.1 treats habitual-offender proceedings as a means of enhancing the sentence for the new felony, not as a separate charge or a basis for imposing a separate additional sentence.

State v. Walker · filed 1982-06-21

La.R.S. 15:529.1 provides that a district attorney may file an information charging a defendant, after conviction as a multiple offender if he has prior conviction(s). However, this additional bill of information is merely a method of informing the court of the circumstances and of requesting an enhancement of the penalty to be imposed. State v. Alexander, 325 So.2d 777 (La.1976); State v. Jackson, 298 So.2d 777 (La.1974). More particularly, this proceeding does not charge a new crime but is merely a method of increasing the punishment of second and subsequent offenders.

Section 15:529.1 requires reversal of a multiple-offender adjudication when the conviction underlying that adjudication is reversed.

State v. Walker · filed 2003-04-09

Because this Court is reversing the conviction of the crime for which the defendant was charged and convicted as a multiple offender, his adjudication as a multiple offender pursuant to La. R.S. 15:529.1 must be reversed, also.

When a defendant objects to a prior guilty plea used for habitual-offender enhancement, the state must affirmatively prove a contemporaneous record showing that the defendant knowingly waived the privilege against self-incrimination, the right to a jury trial, and the right of confrontation.

State v. Lefevre · filed 1982-09-07

In the instant case, because the defendant objected to the predicate for the state's evidence that the guilty plea was knowing and voluntary, the burden then shifted to the state to show a voluntary waiver of those constitutional rights. Because the record is devoid of any evidence indicating that the defendant was advised of and knowingly waived his privilege against self-incrimination, his right to a jury trial, and his right to confront his accusers, these guilty pleas cannot serve to enhance defendant's penalty under the multiple offender statute.

Section 15:529.1(B) requires each successive felony to be committed after the prior conviction that established the offender's immediately preceding habitual-offender status.

State v. Simmons · filed 1982-11-05(B)

The obvious intent of La.R.S. 15:529.1 is to set up a sequential requirement; the third felony must be committed after the conviction responsible for the second offender status. This construction is consistent with the jurisprudence of Louisiana and the case law of other states.

To qualify as a third offender, the third offense must have been committed after the defendant's second conviction.

State v. Lennon · filed 1983-03-04(B)

In other words, La. R.S. 15:529.1 B requires that in order for one to be considered a third offender, the third offense must have been committed after the second conviction.

Section 15:529.1 authorizes enhanced sentencing for repeat offenders, but a multiple-offender adjudication cannot stand when the underlying guilty pleas were induced by an implied promise or justifiable belief that the defendant would not be multiple-billed.

State v. Hayes · filed 1982-11-29

Because we agree with his first contention, we reverse the conviction under La. R.S. 15:529.1, vacate the twenty four (24) year sentence, and remand the case to the district court for further proceedings. ... We therefore find that there was either an implied promise on the part of the district attorney not to multiple bill or otherwise expose Hayes to more than four years, or a justifiable belief in that regard on the part of the defendant; and, in any event, we find that the defendant's pleas were induced by that assumption, however mistaken it may have turned out. ... Under these circumstances, we cannot permit his conviction as a multiple offender to stand since it resulted in his receiving a twenty four instead of the four year jail sentence.

Section 15:529.1(D) requires the court to caution a defendant about the rights to a formal hearing and to require the state to prove identity before accepting an open-court admission of a prior felony conviction, but does not require advice about enhanced-sentence consequences.

State v. Martin · filed 1983-03-09(D)

La.R.S. 15:529.1 provides that the court may sentence a defendant as an habitual offender "[i]f the judge finds that [defendant] has been convicted of a prior felony ..., or if [defendant] acknowledges or confesses in open court, after being duly cautioned as to his rights, that he has been so convicted ...."[2] (Emphasis supplied.) ... Inasmuch as the other portions of the multiple offender statute make it evident that those are the "rights" of which the defendant should be cautioned, we conclude that defendant was adequately cautioned of his rights, as required by the statute.[4] ... Neither the pertinent statute nor any constitutional principle requires that the trial court discuss the consequences on the record before accepting the defendant's voluntary, counseled admission of identity.

Section 15:529.1 requires the State to institute habitual-offender proceedings within a reasonable time after it knows the defendant has a prior felony record; a two-month delay after remand was reasonable.

State v. Tuesno · filed 1984-08-31

In State v. Broussard, 416 So.2d 109 (La.1982) the Supreme Court of Louisiana held that the district attorney must file an habitual offender bill within a “reasonable time” after the prosecution knows that a defendant has a prior felony record. ... Under the circumstances here, we do not find an unreasonable delay in the institution of the habitual offender proceedings. ... Two months certainly is not an unreasonable delay. Accordingly, this assignment of error is without merit.

Section 15:529.1 permits the State to institute habitual-offender proceedings after conviction or sentencing, including after a prior sentence has begun to be served, and authorizes the court to vacate that sentence and impose the enhanced sentence.

State v. Bell · filed 1985-06-26D

The language of the habitual offender statute clearly authorizes the filing of a multiple bill "at any time, either after conviction or sentence" and as clearly contemplates that the bill may be filed after the sentence initially imposed in the latest conviction has been partly served, by the employment of this language in section 529.1 D: "If the judge finds that he has been convicted of a prior felony or felonies, or if he acknowledges or confesses in open court, after being duly cautioned as to his rights, that he has been so convicted, the court shall sentence him to the punishment prescribed in this Section, and shall vacate the previous sentence if already imposed, deducting from the new sentence the time actually served under the sentence so vacated."

Section 15:529.1 authorizes habitual-offender proceedings after conviction or sentence, but the proceedings must be completed before the defendant finishes the underlying felony sentence and is discharged from custody.

State v. Alexander · filed 1987-03-04(D)

It is well settled that the habitual offender proceeding provided by LSA-R.S. 15:529.1 is in the nature of an enhancement of penalty, rather than a prosecution for a crime. ... Although State ex rel. Glynn v. Blackburn, 485 So.2d 926 (La.1986) and State ex rel. Williams v. Henderson, 289 So.2d 74 (La.1974), specifically address instances where multiple offender bills were not filed until after an accused served the underlying sentence, they nonetheless stand for the proposition that proceedings against a convicted defendant to enhance his sentence under R.S. 15:529.1 must be completed before he has satisfied his sentence on the underlying felony and discharged from custody for that offense.

Section 15:529.1(A)(1) allows a maximum sentence of forty years for a qualifying habitual offender when the underlying felony carries a maximum twenty-year sentence.

State v. Nelson · filed 1987-11-04(A)(1)

Defendant was adjudicated to be an habitual offender. Under La.R.S. 15:529.1(A)(1), the maximum penalty defendant could have been sentenced to was forty years. Therefore, defendant's twenty-five year sentence is within the statutory permissible range.

Section 15:529.1 requires a prior conviction before a subsequent felony can support the next habitual-offender enhancement, so offenses committed before the first conviction do not cumulatively create third-offender status.

State Ex Rel. Mims v. Butler · filed 1992-05-26(A) and (B)

After further study, we find that R.S. 15:529.1 as amended by Act 688 of 1982 is vague and ambiguous. We conclude, therefore, that the amended habitual offender statute should be strictly construed and, moreover, that the doctrine of lenity requires this strict construction of the statute most favorably to the accused. As we interpret the statute, the sequential requirement for enhanced penalties in the sentencing of multiple offenders survives. The cornerstone of that scheme is that felons graduate to second offender status, not by committing multiple crimes, but by committing a crime or crimes after having been convicted. Relator Mims in this case is entitled to relief.

Section 15:529.1 permits a prior conviction to serve as a predicate for habitual-offender enhancement only after the conviction has become final.

State v. Bentley · filed 1998-10-21

Based on this Court's decision in Brass, and other cited jurisprudence, we conclude that Bentley should not have been adjudicated as a third felony habitual offender because his 1989 conviction had not become final at the time of his sentencing in the case sub judice. Therefore, Bentley's adjudication and sentence as a third felony habitual offender are vacated and set aside.

Section 15:529.1(A) requires a subsequent felony to be committed after the conviction for the preceding predicate felony before habitual-offender enhancement applies.

State v. Newman · filed 1999-12-15(A)

The habitual offense Bill of Information charges defendant with committing the instant underlying offense on April 1, 1996. It further alleges that defendant was convicted of the third predicate offense on December 1, 1997. Thus, although the present conviction was obtained after the conviction for the third offense, it was committed prior to the conviction for the third predicate offence. The defendant should not, therefore, have been found to be and sentenced as a fourth felony offender, since the commission of the underlying offense occurred before the conviction of the third predicate felony.