La. Stat. Ann. § 15:529.1

At the time of the defendant’s 1999 guilty plea, the Habitual Offender Law allowed prior juvenile adjudications rendered without the right to a jury trial to be used as predicate offenses.

State v. Jones · filed 2013-09-04

Although the Louisiana Supreme Court in State v. Brown, 03-2788 (La.7/06/04), 879 So.2d 1276, writ denied, 543 U.S. 826, 125 S.Ct. 158, 160 L.Ed.2d 40 (2004) later struck down the provision in the Habitual Offender law that allowed prior juvenile adjudications rendered without the right to a jury trial to be used as predicate offenses, the provision was in effect at the time of defendant’s guilty plea in 1999 and, thus, advice that the adjudications could be used as predicates was not misleading.

For a third-felony habitual offender convicted of aggravated battery punishable by up to ten years, § 15:529.1 requires a minimum sentence of six years and eight months at hard labor, without probation or suspension of sentence, and requires the court to vacate any previously imposed sentence.

State v. Brundy · filed 2016-08-24(A)(3)(a), (D)(3), (G)

The Habitual Offender Law provides that if thé third-felony is such that upon a first conviction the offender would be punishable by imprisonment for any haterm less that his natural life, then the third-felony habitual offender shall be sentenced to imprisonment for a determinate term not less than two-thirds of the longest possible sentence for the conviction and not more than twice the longest possible sentence prescribed for a first conviction. La. R.S. 15:529.1 A(3)(a). Any sentence imposed under the Habitual Offender Law “shall be at hard labor without benefit of probation or ’suspension of sentence.” La. R.S. 15:529.1 G. Brundy was convicted of aggravated battery — the intentional use of force or violence with a “dangerous weapon” upon the person of another. La. R.S. 14:33; La. R.S. 14:34 A, La. R.S. 14:2(3). The penalty of imprisonment for aggravated battery under the circumstances of the present case'is imprisonment with or without hard labor for not more than ten years. La. R.S. 14:34 B. Thus, the minimum sentence of imprisonment for Brundy.as a third-felony habitual offender was imprisonment at hard labor for six years and eight months (two-thirds of the longest sentence of imprisonment for aggravated battery), without ben*1257efit of probation or suspension of sentence. La. R.S. 15:529.1 A(3)(a); La. R.S. 14:34 B; La. R.S. 15:529.1 G. The longest possible sentence of imprisonment in this case was twenty years. Id.

Subsection (A)(1)(b)(I) requires a mandatory minimum sentence for a third offender, subject to an as-applied constitutional challenge.

State v. Jones · filed 2006-03-31(A)(1)(b)(I)

We agree with Judge Kuhn on the court of appeal panel, see State v. Jones, 05-1715 (La.App. 1st Cir.10/31/05), ___ So.2d ___ (Kuhn, J., dissenting), that the record at sentencing does not show clearly and convincingly that the mandatory *1243 minimum sentence for a third offender required by La.R.S. 15:529.1(A)(1)(b)(I) is unconstitutional as applied to defendant in the present case.

Section 15:529.1(A)(1)(c)(i) requires a fourth felony offender whose new felony is punishable by less than life imprisonment to receive a determinate sentence no shorter than the longest term prescribed for a first conviction, subject to the statutory floor.

State v. Hall · filed 2008-06-04(A)(1)(c)(i)

If the fourth felony is such that, "upon a first conviction the offender would be punishable by imprisonment for any term less than his natural life, then the person shall be sentenced to imprisonment for the fourth or subsequent felony for a determinate term not less than the longest prescribed *874 for a first conviction but in no event less than 20 years and not more than his natural life." La. R.S. 15:529 A(1)(c)(i). Armed robbery carries a maximum sentence of 99 years without benefits. La. R.S. 14:64 B. Hall was therefore subject to a minimum term of 99 years without benefits for armed robbery as a fourth felony offender.

Section 15:529.1(A)(1)(b)(I) does not itself prohibit parole for a fourth felony offender.

State v. Robertson · filed 2006-04-12(A)(1)(b)(I)

Technically, La. R.S. 14:31 and La. R.S. 15:529.1(A)(1)(b)(I) and G do not provide for a prohibition against parole. We are aware that a trial court apparently lacks authority to prohibit parole eligibility pursuant to that statute.

Section 15:529.1(A)(1)(a) removes eligibility for probation and suspension of sentence for a second-felony offender but does not remove parole eligibility.

State v. Gray · filed 2007-01-10(A)(1)(a)

Further, Defendant stated during his trial testimony that he had pleaded guilty to forcible rape in 1979 and that he had only been released from prison nine months before the incident in the present case. In State v. King, supra, this court held that a defendant's prior felony conviction was proved by his own admission along with the certified bill of information and minutes.

Section 15:529.1(G) does not restrict parole eligibility on a habitual offender sentence; parole restrictions come from the underlying offense and apply only to that offense's mandatory minimum term.

State v. Davis · filed 2007-12-14(G)

Although the trial court sought to conform defendant's sentence to the requirements of La.R.S. 15:529.1(G) by amending the sentence originally imposed to deny eligibility for probation or suspension of sentence on the entire term of imprisonment, the court went too far when it also eliminated parole eligibility on the entire term of imprisonment. La.R.S. 15:529.1(G) does not purport to restrict parole eligibility on any habitual offender sentence, and the underlying offense of conviction, possession of cocaine with intent to distribute, subjects the offender to a sentence imposed without benefit of suspension of sentence, probation, and parole, *983 only on the mandatory minimum term of imprisonment of two years at hard labor.

Section 15:529.1 requires the applicable parole-eligibility restriction, and that restriction is deemed imposed even when the sentencing court does not expressly delineate it.

State v. Harvey · filed 2009-05-13

A review of the record fails to show that the district court restricted parole eligibility for the first two years of appellant’s sentences as required by La. R.S. 40:967 and La. R.S. 15:529.1. However, as per La. R.S. 15:301.1 A and State v. Williams, 2000-1725 (La.11/28/01), 800 So.2d 790, the sentence is deemed to have been imposed with the restriction, even in *498the absence of the trial court’s failure to delineate the restriction. Thus, there is no need for this court to correct the sentence.

Section 15:529.1 does not prohibit parole eligibility for a second felony habitual offender.

State v. McKEAVER · filed 2010-01-27(G)

However, the second felony habitual offender statute does not prohibit eligibility for parole, thus McKeaver’s sentence was illegal in regard to the trial court’s denial.

At the time of the 2001 offense, § 15:529.1(G) did not authorize restricting parole benefits for a multiple-offender sentence.

State v. Junior · filed 2011-05-24(G)

A multiple offender is sentenced according to the law in effect at the time the offense was committed. State v. Ventress, 01-1165 (La.App. 5 Cir. 4/30/02), 817 So.2d 377, 381-383; State v. Flagg, 01-965 (La.App. 5 Cir. 3/26/02), 815 So.2d 208, 215. The underlying offense was committed on September 20, 2001. At that time, La. R.S. 15:529.1(G) did not authorize the restriction of parole benefits.

Subsection (G) requires a multiple-offender sentence to be served without probation or suspension, but does not itself authorize denying parole; parole restrictions come from the underlying offense.

State v. Randall · filed 2011-06-22(G)

While the multiple offender sentenced imposed Lunder La. R.S. 15:529.1 must be served without the benefit of probation or suspension of sentence, the statute does not provide that the sentence be served without the benefit of parole. La. R.S. 15:529.1(G).

For a fourth or subsequent felony covered by § 15:529.1(A)(4)(a), the enhanced sentence is not automatically barred from parole; § 15:529.1(G) bars probation and suspension of sentence but not parole.

State v. Pettus · filed 2012-05-22(A)(4)(a), (G)

In our review of the record for errors patent, we find that Pettus was adjudicated a fourth felony offender pursuant to La. R.S. 15:529.1(A)(4)(a). Such a sentence does not provide for a prohibition on parole. ... Accordingly, we find the trial court |fierred in restricting parole. We amend the sentence to allow for the possibility of parole in accordance with the applicable sentencing provisions and order the trial court to correct and amend the commitment to reflect the availability of parole.

Subsection (G) prohibits probation or suspension of sentence for the entire enhanced sentence, but does not itself prohibit parole eligibility.

State v. Leonard · filed 2011-11-15(G)

Defendant’s enhanced sentence is illegal because parole has been restricted for the entire term of the sentence. Because La. R.S. 40:967(B)(4)(b) allows for parole eligibility after the first two years, and La. R.S. 15:529.1(G) prohibits only “probation or suspension of sentence” for the entire sentence, relator’s sentence should not prohibit parole eligibility after the first two years.

The applicable versions of § 15:529.1(A)(1)(a) and (G) do not require denial of parole eligibility as a condition of a habitual-offender sentence.

State v. Sterling · filed 2012-03-09(A)(1)(a), (G)

Defendant’s sentence is amended to delete the denial of parole eligibility, a condition not required by the applicable versions of La.R.S. 15:529.1(A)(1)(a) and La.R.S. 15:529.1(G), or by R.S. 14:64.8.

Section 15:529.1(A)(2)(c)(i) does not authorize a sentencing court to impose the habitual-offender sentence without the benefit of parole.

State of Louisiana v. Jackson · filed 2012-06-06(A)(2)(c)(i)

After reviewing the record, we find that there is an error patent in that the trial court ordered the sentence to be served without the benefit of parole. Defendant asserts that neither the underlying statute, La.R.S. 14:67.10, nor La.R.S. 5:529.1(A)(2)(c)(i) prohibited parole; thus, the trial court erred in ordering the sentence to be served without the benefit of parole, citing State v. Bordelon, 09-1245 (La.App. 3 Cir. 5/5/10), 37 So.3d 480, writ denied, 10-1745 (La. 2/4/11), 56 So.3d 990. The State concedes that Defendant is correct. Therefore, we hereby amend the sentence to delete that portion which prohibits the benefit of parole. The trial court is ordered to note the amendment in the court minutes.

Section 15:529.1 requires a multiple-offender sentence to be served without probation or suspension of sentence, but it does not prohibit parole.

State v. Magee · filed 2013-03-06

La. R.S. 15:529.1 1 (-provides that a sentence under the multiple offender statute is to be served without benefit of probation or suspension of sentence, but it does not preclude parole.

Section 15:529.1(G) restricts probation and suspension of sentence for a multiple-offender sentence, but it does not restrict parole eligibility.

State v. Wilson · filed 2013-06-12(G)

The record reflects that the trial court improperly restricted parole eligibility on the defendant’s eleven-year multiple offender sentence. Although Section “G” of the multiple offender statute restricts probation and suspension of sentence, it does not restrict parole. La. R.S. 15:529.1(G); State v. Young, 02-1280, p. 6 (La.App. 4 Cir. 1/22/03), 839 So.2d 186, 191. Thus, the trial court improperly denied defendant parole eligibility.

Section 15:529.1 does not itself prohibit parole eligibility for a sentence imposed under the habitual-offender statute.

State v. Lewis · filed 2016-02-03

It is unclear if the court imposed the sentence without benefit of parole — which would be in error, as neither La. R.S. 40:967 nor La. R.S. 15:529.1 prohibits parole eligibility — or if the court was merely commenting that generally a defendant is not eligible for parole if he has three felony convictions. See La. R.S. 15:574.4 A(l)(a).

Section 15:529.1 does not restrict parole eligibility for a person convicted of third-offense marijuana possession.

State v. Ladd · filed 2016-04-13(A)(3)(a)

Neither La. R.S. 40:966 E(3) nor La. R.S. 15:529.1 restricts a person convicted of possession of marijuana third offense from the benefit of parole. ... Therefore, we direct the trial court, in resentencing the defendant upon remand, to include the defendant’s benefit of parole.

Section 15:529.1(K) requires courts to apply the version of the habitual-offender law in effect when the present offense was committed, and the statute itself does not restrict parole eligibility.

State v. Carr · filed 2018-09-26(K)

Defendant argues his sentence is excessive because the provisions of La. R.S. 15:529.1 as amended in 2017 should have been applied in his case. However, La. 15:529.1(K), effective August 1, 2018, provides that the courts shall apply the provisions of the law that were in effect on the date the present offense was committed. In any event, defendant faced a minimum 20-year sentence under the pre- and post-amendment versions of La. R.S. 15:529.1. ... Neither La. R.S. 15:529.1 nor La. R.S. 40:967 contains any restrictions on parole eligibility. Therefore, the inclusion of the restriction on parole renders defendant's sentence illegal.

Section 15:529.1(G) requires a habitual-offender sentence to be served at hard labor without probation or suspension, but it does not restrict parole eligibility; § 15:529.1(A)(1) likewise does not restrict parole.

State of Louisiana v. Jubbard Price · filed 2019-07-03(G), (A)(1)

However, like La. R.S. 14:32(C)(1), La. R.S. 15:529.1(A)(1) does not restrict parole. ... While La. R.S. 15:529.1(G) requires that any sentence imposed under the habitual offender law “shall be served at hard labor without benefit of probation or suspension of sentence,” it does not restrict parole.

Subsection (G) requires a second felony habitual offender’s sentence to be at hard labor without benefit of probation or suspension of sentence, but it does not itself restrict parole.

State Of Louisiana v. Benbow · filed 2020-05-12(G)

Additionally, La. R.S. 15:529.1(G) provides that the sentence for a second felony habitual offender shall be at hard labor without benefit of probation ocr suspension of sentence; however, it does not restrict parole.

Section 15:529.1(A)(3)(a) does not itself restrict parole eligibility, so the parole restriction remains the same as for the underlying offense.

State v. Cheley · filed 2019-05-01(A)(3)(a)

However, we note that the habitual offender penalty provision being utilized by the State does not restrict parole eligibility. Accordingly, the parole restriction would be the same as the underlying offense. La.R.S. 15:529.1(A)(3)(a) ; State v. Esteen , 01-879, (La.App. 5 Cir. 5/15/02), 821 So.2d 60, writ denied , 02-1540 (La. 12/13/02), 831 So.2d 983.

Subsection (G) bars probation and suspension of sentence for a habitual offender sentence but does not bar parole.

State v. Hardy · filed 1998-07-17(G)

However, LSA-R.S. 15:529.1 G states that a sentence thereunder shall be without benefit of probation or suspension of sentence. No provision is made for denial of parole. Therefore, the defendant's sentence as a multiple offender should not have prohibited parole.

Section 15:529.1(G) requires multiple offender sentences at hard labor without probation or suspension of sentence, but does not prohibit parole.

State v. Henry · filed 2013-09-04(G)

Further, La. R.S. 15:529.1(G) mandates that multiple offender sentences “shall be |fiat hard labor without benefit of probation or suspension of sentence.” The statute does not prohibit parole.

Section 15:529.1 does not itself prohibit parole for a third felony offender.

State v. Doming · filed 2016-07-27

An independent review of the record supports appellate counsel’s assertion that there are no non-frivolous issues to be raised on appeal and that defendant was resentenced in compliance with the Louisiana Supreme Court’s Order. Specifically, the Supreme Court’s Order directed, the trial court to resentence defendant to a term which does not include a prohibition on parole, because the terms of La. R.S. 14:100 and La. R.S. 15:529.1 do not include such a prohibition. ... Defendant was properly sentenced in accordance with La. R.S. 14:100 and La. R.S. 15:529.1.

For habitual-offender enhancement, the cleansing period is calculated from release from physical custody on good-time credits rather than the prior sentence’s full-term date when the prior offense predates the governing amendment.

State v. Washington · filed 2006-04-28(A)(l)(a)

The correct date by which to calculate the cleansing period in the present case was therefore January 3, 1988, the date on which defendant was released from the penitentiary on good time credits, and not his full term date of September 23, 1990.

Section 15:529.1(A)(1)(b)(i) sets the sentencing range for a third felony offender convicted of simple robbery, and subsection (G) requires habitual-offender sentences to be served without probation or suspension of sentence.

State v. Hill · filed 2006-05-17(A)(1)(b)(i) (G)

Following his conviction, defendant was adjudicated a third felony offender. The sentencing range for a third felony offender convicted of simple robbery was between 4 years and 8 months and 14 years. See La. R.S. 15:529.1(A)(1)(b)(i). Defendant's seven-year hard labor sentence is at the lower end of this range and we cannot say that it is excessive under the circumstances of this case. ... In the instant case, the terms of the statutes under which defendant was sentenced do not include a prohibition on parole. See La. R.S. 14:65; La. R.S. 15:529.1(G) (which does provide, however, that sentences imposed under the habitual offender law are to be served without benefit of probation or suspension of sentence). Instead, defendant's ineligibility for parole is statutorily mandated by La. R.S. 15:574.4(A)(1), which provides that a person convicted of a third (or subsequent) felony offense is not eligible for parole.

Section 15:529.1 provides a third felony offender convicted of aggravated burglary with a sentencing range of 20 to 60 years at hard labor, without benefit of probation or suspension of sentence.

State v. Dorsey · filed 2006-09-20

Following adjudication as a third felony offender, the sentencing range for aggravated burglary is not less than 20 years nor more than 60 years at hard labor, without benefit of probation or suspension of sentence. La. R.S. 15:529.1; La. R.S. 14:60.

Section 15:529.1(G) requires a sentence for a second felony offender to be imposed without benefit of probation or suspension of sentence, while additional restrictions such as parole ineligibility are allowed only when the underlying offense provides for them.

State v. Coleman · filed 2007-01-24(G)

However, the defendant was sentenced as a second felony offender under La. R.S. 15:529.1. Under La. R.S. 15:529.1(G), such a sentence is to be imposed "without benefit of probation or suspension of sentence." Additional restrictions may be imposed on the sentence provided those additional restrictions are provided in the underlying offense of conviction.

Subsection (G) requires an enhanced habitual-offender sentence to be imposed without probation or suspension of sentence, but does not itself authorize denial of parole; parole restrictions come from the reference statute.

State of Louisiana v. Hollier · filed 2012-05-09(G)

Section G of Louisiana Revised Statutes 15:529.1, the habitual offender statute, requires all enhanced sentences to be imposed without benefit of probation or suspension of sentence; it does not authorize the trial court to impose enhanced sentences without the benefit of parole. The restrictions on parole eligibility imposed on multiple offender sentences under La.R.S. 15:529.1 are those called for in the reference statute.

Section 529.1 authorizes a fourth-felony-offender sentence of twenty years to life and requires that the sentence be imposed without probation or suspension of sentence.

State v. Tatten · filed 2013-05-01(G), (A)(4)(a)

Pursuant to La. R.S. 15:529.1(A)(4)(a), the defendant was subject to a sentencing range from twenty years to life imprisonment. ... However, La. R.S. 15:529.1 requires that the sentence must be imposed without the benefit of probation or suspension of sentence.

A sentence under the Habitual Offender Law must incorporate the sentencing provisions and restriction on parole applicable to the underlying crime.

State v. Lawrence · filed 2019-05-15

A defendant's sentence under the Habitual Offender Law, La. R.S. 15:529.1, is determined by the sentencing provisions of both the underlying crime and the Habitual Offender Law. State v. Holmes, 12-351 (La. App. 5 Cir. 12/11/12), 106 So.3d 1076, 1081-82, writ denied, 13-86 (La. 06/14/13), 118 So.3d 1080. While defendant was sentenced pursuant to La. R.S. 15:529.1 as a second-felony offender to fifteen years imprisonment without benefit of probation or suspension of sentence, the trial court did not order that at least five years of defendant's sentence is to be served without benefit of parole.

Section 15:529.1 permits the State to prove prior felony convictions and identity with any competent evidence rather than a specific type of proof.

State v. Howard · filed 2018-11-07(D)(1)(b)

The Habitual Offender Law, La. R.S. 15:529.1, does not require the State to use a specific type of evidence, including *87fingerprints, to carry its burden at a habitual offender hearing, and prior convictions may be proved by any competent evidence.

Subsection (F) permits the state to prove prior convictions at a habitual offender hearing with any competent evidence rather than a specific type of evidence.

State v. Mays · filed 2006-05-26(F)

This Court has repeatedly stated that R.S. 15:529.1(F) does not require the state to use a specific type of evidence to carry its burden at an habitual offender hearing; prior convictions may be proved by any competent evidence.

Section 15:529.1(B) removes the sequential-conviction requirement for enhanced sentencing on multiple convictions obtained after October 19, 2004.

State v. Shaw · filed 2006-08-23(B)

The state's position has merit. In State v. Johnson, supra, the court held that its earlier interpretation of the 1982 version of R.S. 15:529.1 was incorrect. The 2005 amendment in fact removed any sequential requirement for enhanced penalties in sentencing multiple offenders, if the convictions were obtained after October 19, 2004. While State v. Johnson did not explicitly overrule State ex rel. Porter, supra, it did overrule State ex rel. Mims v. Butler, 601 So.2d 649 (La.1992), which approved the rationale of State ex rel. Porter. As a result, the district court did not err in applying third felony enhancement to all five criminal charges arising out of Shaw's criminal conduct.

Section 529.1(D)(1)(a) requires the court to advise a multiple offender of the allegations and the right to trial, including the right to remain silent, while Section 529.1(A)(1) sets a second felony offender's sentencing range at one-half to twice the longest term for a first conviction.

State v. Taylor · filed 2017-12-27(D)(1)(a), (A)(1)

La. R.S. 15:529.1(D)(1)(a) provides the court shall inform a defendant of the allegations contained in the bill of information and of his right to be tried as to the truth thereof according to law. Implicit in this directive is the additional requirement that the defendant be advised of his constitutional right to remain silent. State v. Jones , 09-788 (La. App. 5 Cir. 4/13/10), 35 So.3d 1162, 1167, writ denied, 10-1448 (La. 9/2/11), 68 So.3d 534. The multiple offender waiver of constitutional rights form signed by defendant indicates he was advised of his right to a hearing at which the State would have to prove his multiple offender status and of his right to remain silent throughout the hearing. The district court also informed defendant of these rights at the hearing. Both during the multiple bill plea colloquy and on the form, defendant was also advised of the potential sentencing range of 15 years to 60 years as a second felony offender, and of his actual sentence of 20 years. Defendant also indicated he had not been forced or coerced into stipulating to the multiple bill. After conducting the plea colloquy, the district court accepted his stipulation to the multiple bill as knowingly, intelligently, freely, and voluntarily made by defendant. We find no error in this determination.

Section 15:529.1(D)(1)(a) requires arraignment, notice of the habitual-offender allegations and rights, and 15 days to object; failure to arraign can be waived by not objecting, while subsection (A)(1)(a) supplies the second-offender sentencing range.

State v. James · filed 2006-08-23(D)(1)(a), (A)(1)(a)

Because the defendant was not arraigned on the habitual bill of information, the trial court violated La. R.S. 15:529.1(D)(l)(a), and there is no showing that the defendant was given 15 days to file particular objections to the information. However, any issue regarding the trial court’s failure to arraign the defendant was waived because he did not object before |fithe trial portion of the habitual offender proceeding. ... The sentencing range applicable in this case based on the defendant’s habitual offender status is between one and four years, with or without hard labor, without the benefits of probation or suspension of sentence. The sentence imposed, while it is the maximum allowed, is not constitutionally excessive.

Under § 15:529.1(A)(1)(c)(i), the 20-years-to-life sentencing bracket does not require considering the length of sentences for underlying CDS or other convictions; subsection (c)(ii) requires mandatory life and is based in part on those imprisonment lengths.

State v. Washington · filed 2006-09-01(A)(1)(c)(i), (A)(1)(c)(ii)

La. R.S. 15:529.1(A)(1)(c)(i), which provides a sentencing bracket of 20-years to life, does NOT require consideration of the length of sentences relative to underlying convictions on CDS and other matters.

Section 15:529.1(D)(3) does not require the court to sentence a defendant on the underlying conviction before adjudicating and sentencing the defendant as a habitual offender.

State v. HARMASON · filed 2008-11-14(D)(3)

The plain wording of the statute imposes no such requirement that the trial court sentence the defendant on his underlying conviction prior to adjudicating and sentencing the defendant as a habitual offender.

Section 15:529.1(G) requires an enhanced sentence to be imposed without benefit of probation or suspension of sentence, but it does not eliminate parole eligibility unless the underlying offense statute does so.

State of Louisiana v. Cain · filed 2010-03-10(G)

Although La.R.S. 15:529.1(G) requires all enhanced sentences to be imposed without benefit of probation or suspension of sentence, it does not authorize the trial court to impose enhanced sentences without benefit of parole unless the underlying statute provides for no parole eligibility. See State v. Tate, 99-1483 (La. 11/24/99), 747 So.2d 519. The penalty provision found in La.R.S. 14:65, which is the underlying statute, does not authorize the trial court to impose any portion of the sentence without benefit of parole. Therefore, the trial court improperly denied parole eligibility.

Section 15:529.1(G) requires enhanced sentences to be imposed without benefit of probation or suspension of sentence, but parole eligibility is governed by the statute defining the underlying offense.

State v. Guillory · filed 2015-10-07(G)

Although Section G of La.R.S. 15:529.1 requires all enhanced sentences to be imposed without benefit of probation or suspension of sentence, it does not authorize the trial court to impose enhanced sentences without benefit of parole. “[T]he restrictions on parole eligibility imposed on multiple offender sentences under La.R.S. 15:529.1 ‘are those called for in the reference statute.’ (citation omitted)” State v. Tate, 99-1483, pp. 1-2 (La.11/24/99), 747 So.2d 519, 520.

Section 15:529.1 requires the court to advise the defendant of the multiple-bill allegations and the right to have their truth tried, while the habitual-offender sentence restrictions are governed by the reference statute and omitted “without benefits” provisions operate by law.

State v. Moore · filed 2007-04-11(D)(1)(a), (G)

La.R.S. 15:529.1 provides, inter alia, that the trial court shall inform the defendant of the allegations contained in the information and of his right to be tried as to the truth thereof according to law, and shall require the offender to say whether the allegations are true. ... Because the prosecutor listed the allegations contained in the multiple bill in open court with the defendant and his counsel present, immediately prior to the defendant stipulating to the multiple bill, we find the defendant was properly advised of the allegations of the multiple bill in accordance with La.R.S. 15:529.1. ... The restrictions on parole eligibility imposed on habitual offender sentences under La.R.S. 15:529.1 "are those called for in the reference statute." ... Nevertheless, these errors need not be corrected on remand. Under State v. Williams, 00-1725 (La.11/29/01), 800 So.2d 790, 799, and La.R.S. 15:301.1(A), the "without benefits" provision is self-activating.

Section 15:529.1(D)(1)(a) requires advising a defendant of the habitual-offender allegations and the rights to a formal hearing, to require the State to prove identity, and to remain silent; an omission is harmless when competent State evidence independently establishes habitual-offender status.

State v. Brown · filed 2007-09-26(D)(1)(a)

La. R.S. 15:529.1(D)(1)(a) requires that the Defendant be advised of the specific allegations contained in the habitual offender bill of information and his right to a formal hearing at which the State must prove its case. Implicit in this requirement is the additional requirement that the Defendant be advised of his constitutional right to remain silent. Generally, the failure of the trial court to advise the Defendant of his right to a hearing and his right to remain silent is not considered reversible error where the Defendant's habitual offender status is established by competent evidence offered by the State at a hearing rather than by admission of the Defendant. However, when the guilt of the Defendant is proven by his own stipulation or admission to the habitual offender bill of information, without having been informed of his right to a hearing or his right to remain silent by either the trial court or his attorney, there is reversible error. ... Under the circumstances of the present case, where the defendant admitted during his trial testimony to the prior convictions and where the state presented certified copies of the bills of information, court minutes, and transcripts corresponding to those prior convictions, there was competent evidence to establish that the defendant was a habitual offender outside of his stipulation. Accordingly, there was competent evidence to establish the defendant's habitual offender status, and the trial court's failure to inform him of his right to remain silent and right to require the state to prove his identity as a habitual offender was harmless error.

In a habitual-offender proceeding, § 15:529.1(D) requires advising the defendant of the right to a formal hearing and to demand that the State prove its case, and the statute implicitly recognizes a right to remain silent.

State v. Gobert · filed 2009-12-09(D)

Although the right to remain silent is not specifically set forth in La. R.S. 15:529.1, ... the Louisiana Supreme Court held this statute clearly recognizes the defendant has the right to remain silent, and the statute implicitly provided defendant should be advised by the court of his right to remain silent. ... further stated La. R.S. 15:529.1(D) specifically provides defendant shall be advised of his right to a formal hearing and to demand that the state prove its case. ... Although the record before this court does not reflect that the Defendant was advised of his rights, ... The Defendant was represented by counsel, and he was adjudicated an habitual offender after a full hearing at which the State presented evidence to prove his habitual offender status. Therefore, we find that the Defendant was afforded a fundamentally fair hearing and that the error was harmless.

Section 15:529.1(D) implicitly requires that a defendant be advised of the right to remain silent before admitting habitual-offender status, and the proceeding is fundamentally unfair when the defendant is not advised of that right or the right to a hearing, does not waive the hearing, and the State presents no independent identity evidence.

STATE OF LOUISIANA VERSUS OTERREL J. BOUTTE AKA O'TERREL BOUTTE, AKA O'TERRELL BOUTTE, ETC. · filed 2010-01-13(D)

While La.R.S. 15:529.1 does not specifically address the issue of a defendant’s right to remain silent, in State v. Johnson, 432 So.2d 815 (La.1983), writ granted on other grounds, 438 So.2d 1113 (La.1983), appeal after remand, 457 So.2d 1251 (La.App. 1 Cir.1984), appeal after remand, 471 So.2d 1041 (La.App. 1 Cir.1985), the supreme court concluded that the statute clearly recognizes that a defendant has the right to remain silent and thus implicitly provides that a defendant should be advised by the trial court of this right before he acknowledges or confesses his status as an habitual offender. ... In this case, Defendant was not advised of his right to remain silent, the right to a hearing, and to have the State prove its case, including identity. Defendant did not waive his right to the hearing. No independent evidence was introduced by the State to prove identity except for Defendant’s stipulation. Additionally, Defendant’s stipulation was not part of a plea bargain agreement. Consequently, we find that Defendant was denied a fundamentally fair hearing.

Section 15:529.1(D)(l)(a) requires the trial court to inform a defendant of the allegations in the multiple-offender bill and of the right to have their truth tried according to law; failure to advise of the habitual-offender hearing and right to remain silent is harmless when the status is proved by competent state evidence at a hearing.

State v. Carter · filed 2012-05-31(D)(l)(a)

La. R.S. 15:529.1(D)(l)(a) provides that the trial court shall inform a defendant of allegations contained in the bill of information and of his right to be tried as to the truth thereof according to law. Implicit in this directive is the additional requirement that the defendant be advised of his constitutional right to remain silent. State v. Hart, 10-905, p. 5 (La.App. 5 Cir. 5/10/11), 66 So.3d 44, 47, writ denied, 11-1178 (La.11/18/11), 75 So.3d 448. A trial court’s failure to advise a defendant of his right to a habitual offender hearing or his right to remain silent is considered harmless error when the defendant’s habitual offender status is established by competent evidence offered by the state at a hearing. In the instant ease, defendant’s multiple offender status was established by competent evidence offered by the state at a hearing rather than by an admission of the defendant. Consequently, the failure of the trial court to advise the defendant of his rights is harmless error and does not require corrective action.

Section 15:529.1 requires an habitual-offender bill to sufficiently inform the defendant of the charge and its basis, gives the defendant fifteen days to file particular objections after denying or not answering the allegations, and requires the enhanced sentence to be imposed without probation or suspension of sentence but does not itself eliminate parole unless another statute does.

State v. Williams · filed 2013-02-27(D)(1)(a), (G)

As such, the bill sufficiently informed the defendant that he was being charged as an habitual offender and of the basis for the charge. The bill complies with the specific provisions of La. R.S. 15:529.1, the Habitual Offender Law. ... Though the record does not show that Williams appeared to answer the allegations of the habitual offender bill of information, the record does show there was adequate opportunity for him to have responded by filing a motion to quash the bill, if he had grounds to do so, and to prepare for the hearing. ... Under La. R.S. 15:529.1(G), habitual offender sentences are to be imposed at hard labor without benefit of probation or suspension of sentence. Contrary to these provisions, the trial court sentenced the defendant to 40 years without all benefits.

Section 15:529.1(A)(1) allows a prior conviction for an enhanced felony to support habitual-offender enhancement when the underlying predicate conviction is not independently used, while subsection (G) requires the resulting sentence to be served without probation or suspension of sentence.

State v. Butler · filed 2016-05-25(A)(1), (G)

Accordingly, upon a review of the full record on appeal, we maintain that Butler’s sentence for his manslaughter conviction was properly enhanced under La. R.S. 15:529.1(A)(1). As determined by Baker, supra and Platt, supra, the state properly utilized Butler’s prior conviction for theft) second or subsequent offense, to enhance the sentence for his instant manslaughter conviction under La. R.S. 15:529.1, because it did not also independently use the conviction underlying the theft, second or subsequent offense conviction (a misdemeanor), to enhance the sentence for the defendant’s manslaughter sentence. ... We note that Butler’s sentence should have been imposed without the benefit of probation or suspension of sentence per La. R.S. 15:529.1(G), which requires that any sentence imposed under the habitual offender law shall be at hard labor without the benefit of probation or suspension of sentence.

Section 15:529.1(D)(1)(a) requires advising a defendant of the habitual-offender allegations, the right to a formal hearing, and the constitutional right to remain silent.

State v. Lynn · filed 2018-08-15(D)(1)(a)

La. R.S. 15:529.1(D)(1)(a) requires that the defendant be advised of the specific allegations contained in the habitual offender bill of information and his right to a formal hearing at which the state must prove its case. Implicit in this requirement is the additional requirement that the defendant be advised of his constitutional right to remain silent. ... Generally, the failure of the trial court to advise the defendant of his right to a hearing and his right to remain silent is not considered reversible error where the defendant's habitual offender status is established by competent evidence offered by the state at a hearing rather than by admission of the defendant. However, when the guilt of the defendant is proven by his own stipulation or admission to the habitual offender bill of information, without having been informed of his right to a hearing or his right to remain silent by either the trial court or his attorney, there is reversible error. ... In this case, the defendant received a full hearing prior to his habitual offender adjudication. Therein, the state presented competent evidence to prove his guilt. Considering these facts, no reversible error occurred.

Section 15:529.1 allows the State to pursue an enhanced penalty after conviction through a multiple-offender bill that is not a criminal charge and need not be presented to a grand jury.

State v. Boyette · filed 2019-01-16

The constitutional provision and article 382 do not apply to the institution of enhanced-penalty proceedings, pursuant to La. R.S. 15:529.1, after a defendant has been convicted of a crime charged. State v. Alexander , 325 So.2d 777 (La. 1976) ; State v. Keys , 29,369 (La. App. 2 Cir. 5/7/97), 694 So.2d 1107, writ denied , 97-1387 (La. 10/31/97), 703 So.2d 21, and writ denied , 97-1497 (La. 10/31/97), 703 So.2d 21. They apply only to the substantive crime with which an accused is initially charged. State v. Alexander , supra ; State v. Keys , supra . A multiple-offender bill of information does not charge a crime, but is merely a method of informing the sentencing court of the circumstances and requesting an enhancement-of-penalty. State v. Alexander , supra . Thus, multiple billing need not be by grand jury indictment in cases involving possible life sentences. State v. Jolla , 337 So.2d 197 (La. 1976).

Section 15:529.1 permits enhanced-penalty proceedings to be instituted without a grand-jury indictment because the indictment requirement is based on the penalty for the substantive offense, not the enhanced penalty.

State v. Mickel · filed 2007-05-29

Our Supreme Court in State v. Alexander, 325 So.2d 777, 778-779 (La. 1976) has made it clear that the constitutional requirement of a grand jury indictment in capital cases or cases punishable by life imprisonment does not apply to the institution of enhanced-penalty proceedings under La. R.S. 15:529.1. Id.

Section 15:529.1 permits a habitual-offender proceeding to be initiated without a grand-jury indictment and does not require a jury trial.

State of Louisiana v. Johnson · filed 2008-11-05

Furthermore, in State v. Alexander, 325 So.2d 777 (La.1976), the supreme court concluded that the requirements of La.Const. art. 1, § 15 and La.Code Crim. P. art. 382 did not apply to the institution of enhanced penalty proceedings. ... In fact, all of the jurisprudence on this issue reflects a consistent conclusion that a grand jury indictment is not required to institute a habitual offender proceeding, even if the effect of the adjudication would be a life sentence. ... Additionally, this issue has been directly addressed by the courts of this state and those decisions have consistently rejected a defendant’s right to a jury trial in habitual offender proceedings.

Section 529.1 enhanced-penalty proceedings do not require a grand-jury indictment, even when the enhanced sentence may be life imprisonment.

State v. Lomax · filed 2011-11-28

As to the defendant’s contention that he must have a grand jury indictment relative to his multiple offender status, the Louisiana Supreme Court in State v. Alexander, 825 So.2d 777, 778-779 (La.1976) has made it clear that the constitutional requirement of a grand jury indictment in capital cases or cases punishable by life imprisonment does not apply to the institution of enhanced-penalty proceedings under La. R.S. 15:529.1. Id.

La. R.S. 15:529.1 does not create a separate crime; it establishes the conditions for enhancing the penalty for the current offense.

State v. Torrence · filed 2019-02-06

The Habitual Offender Law creates no independent offense but rather prescribes the conditions under which there is an enhanced penalty for the current offense.

Section 15:529.1 requires the trial court to advise a defendant of the multiple-bill allegations, the right to a hearing, and the right to remain silent; failure to give those advisements is harmless when competent State evidence establishes multiple-offender status at a hearing.

State v. McClure · filed 2015-10-07

This was in violation of La. R.S. 15:529.1, which requires the trial court to advise a defendant of the allegations contained in the bill of information, his right to a hearing, and his right to remain silent. ... However, the failure of the trial court to advise a defendant of his right to a trial and to remain silent is harmless error when the multiple offender status is established by competent evidence offered by the State at a hearing, rather than by the admission of the defendant.

Section 15:529.1 does not authorize a fine for a habitual-offender sentence.

State v. Martin · filed 2015-12-23(C)

Since *1238La. R.S. 15:529.1 does not authorize a fíne, no corrective action is required.

Section 15:529.1(A)(b)(ii) imposes a mandatory life sentence for the qualifying third felony offender, while § 15:529.1(D)(3) does not require articulated sentencing reasons when the statute prescribes a mandatory sentence.

State v. Farry · filed 2016-11-16(A)(b)(ii); (D)(3)

Because the sentence imposed for the habitual offender adjudication is prescribed by statute, the trial court’s compliance with La. C. Cr. P. art. 894.1 is not required. ... Pursuant to Williams, we find the trial court did not err in failing to articulate reasons for the mandatory sentence. This assignment lacks merit.

Section 15:529.1 does not authorize imposing a fine as part of a habitual-offender sentence.

State v. Camp · filed 2017-03-15

Accordingly, we amend defendant’s enhanced sentence to delete the fine, and as amended, affirm defendant’s habitual offender sentence.

When a defendant denies a multiple-offender bill, the State must first prove the prior guilty pleas and counsel representation; the burden then shifts to the defendant to show a rights infringement or procedural irregularity, after which the State must prove the plea's validity.

State v. Bowers · filed 2007-09-19

If the defendant denies the allegations of the bill of information charging her as a multiple offender, La. R.S. 15:529.1, the burden is on the state to prove the existence of the prior guilty pleas and that defendant was represented by counsel when they were taken. State v. Shelton, supra. Once the state carries this initial burden, the burden of production shifts to the defendant "to produce some affirmative evidence showing an infringement of [her] rights or a procedural irregularity in the taking of the plea." Id.; State v. Madison, XXXX-XXXX (La.8/31/00), 768 So.2d 593. If she does so, the burden returns to the state to prove the validity of the predicate; this may be done with a "perfect" transcript, but a "perfect" transcript is not required. State v. Shelton, supra; State v. Townsend, XXXX-XXXX (La.4/23/04), 874 So.2d 152. The court must weigh the evidence to determine whether the state has met its burden of proving the prior guilty plea was informed and voluntary, and made with an articulated waiver of the three Boykin rights. Id.; State v. Zachary, XXXX-XXXX (La.10/25/02), 829 So.2d 405.

For a prior guilty plea to be used to enhance punishment under La. Stat. Ann. § 15:529.1, the State must prove the prior guilty plea and that the defendant was represented by counsel; the defendant must then present affirmative evidence of a rights violation or procedural irregularity before the State must prove the plea's constitutionality.

State v. Golden · filed 2013-10-30

Pursuant to Shelton and Zachary, when a predicate conviction is based upon a guilty plea, the State need only prove the prior guilty plea and that the defendant was represented by counsel at the time he entered his plea. ... Under Shelton and Zachary, the State is not required to produce the plea form, fingerprint evidence linking the defendant to the conviction, or indicate specifically which rights he was advised of before entry of his plea unless and until the constitutionality of the plea process is called into question.

Section 15:529.1(D)(1)(b) requires the State to establish the validity of a predicate guilty plea after the defendant shows that the plea infringed his rights.

State v. Kunzman · filed 1999-05-05(D)(1)(b)

Defendant's guilty plea in that predicate offense, therefore, may not be used as a basis for an habitual-offender charge against him. As such, we find that Defendant has met his burden as required by La. R.S. 15:529.1; and, therefore, under Shelton, supra, the onus is on the State to rebut Defendant's proof by introducing a "perfect" transcript of the taking of the guilty plea.

Section 15:529.1(D)(1)(b) requires a written response to challenge a prior conviction but permits appellate review when the challenge was made before sentencing, including by oral objection; the fourth-offender minimum is presumed constitutional and may be reduced only on clear and convincing proof of exceptional circumstances, while subsection (G) bars probation and suspension of sentence but does not itself bar parole.

State v. Henry · filed 2007-09-19(D)(1)(b), (A)(1)(c)(i), (G)

While the statute clearly requires a defendant to file a written objection to a habitual bill of information when challenging the validity of a prior felony conviction, the plain language of the statute only precludes appellate review of such errors when no challenge is made prior to sentencing. Further, an oral objection at the habitual offender hearing can be sufficient to preserve the issue for appeal despite a failure to file a written objection to the habitual offender bill of information. ... The sentencing range for fourth-felony offenders is "for a term not less than the longest prescribed for a first conviction but in no event less than twenty years and not more than his natural life." La. R.S. 15:529.1(A)(1)(c)(i). ... The court may only depart from the minimum sentence if it finds that Defendant presented "clear and convincing evidence" to rebut that presumption of constitutionality, which requires a showing that "[he] is exceptional, which in this context means that because of unusual circumstances this Defendant is a victim of the legislature's failure to assign sentences that are meaningfully tailored to the culpability of the offender, the gravity of the offense, and the circumstances of the case." ... According to La. R.S. 15:529.1(G), all habitual offender sentences are to be imposed without benefit of probation or suspension of sentence. ... Although Defendant is a fourth-habitual offender, the trial court should not have imposed sentence without benefit of parole because the statute under which he was convicted contains no prohibition on parole.

Section 15:529.1 requires timely challenges to predicate convictions, permits enhancement when the current felony follows the predicate conviction or convictions, and makes the mandatory minimum presumptively constitutional absent clear and convincing proof of exceptional circumstances warranting a downward departure.

State v. Landfair · filed 2011-07-20(D)(1)(b), (B), (A)(4)(b), (A)(3)(b)

Appellant argues that La. R.S. 15:529.1 requires a defendant to have been convicted of an offense before he commits the next offense in order to be adjudicated a habitual offender. ... Appellant’s argument is without merit. First, there is nothing in the added text to indicate that the legislature was attempting to reinstate a strict offense, conviction, offense, conviction sequencing requirement. ... On its face, the 2005 amendment to La. R.S. 15:529.1 does not apply to the predicate convictions used to prove that the appellant is a fourth offender. Those convictions were not entered on the same day, and the instant offense was committed after his three prior separate convictions for possession of cocaine with intent to distribute. This assignment of error lacks merit. ... Even though a sentence under the Habitual Offender Law is the minimum provided by that statute, the sentence may still be unconstitutionally excessive if it makes no measurable contribution to acceptable goals of punishment, or is nothing more than the purposeful imposition of pain and suffering and is grossly out of proportion to the severity of the crime. ... To rebut the presumption that the mandatory minimum sentence is constitutional, the defendant must show by clear and convincing evidence that he is exceptional, which in this context means that because of unusual circumstances he is a victim of the legislature’s failure to assign sentences that are meaningfully tailored to the culpability of the offender, the gravity of the offense, and the circumstances of the case. ... “Departures downward from the minimum sentence under the Habitual Offender Law should occur only in rare situations.” ... Despite his attempt to present mitigating factors, the record fails to provide evidence that there were exceptional circumstances that would justify a downward departure from the mandatory term of life imprisonment. See State v. Williams, 2005-0176 (La.App. 4 Cir. 5/3/06), 932 So.2d 693. This assignment of error has no merit.

Section 15:529.1(A)(1)(a) sets a habitual offender's sentencing range at one-half to twice the longest sentence available for a first conviction.

State of Louisiana v. Davis · filed 2009-10-07(A)(1)(a)

The defendant’s adjudication as a habitual offender subjected him to a sentence of not less than one-half the longest possible sentence and not more than twice the longest possible sentence for a first conviction. La.R.S. 15:529.1(A)(1)(a). Thus, the potential sentencing range for this defendant was fifteen to sixty years at hard labor.

Section 15:529.1 requires resentencing a multiple offender with an enhanced term of imprisonment and does not authorize imposing a fine.

State of Louisiana v. Johnlouis · filed 2009-11-04

[Louisiana Revised Statutes] 15:529.1 requires that the sentencing judge vacate the original sentence and resentence the defendant as a multiple offender. In resentencing, the judge must impose a sentence authorized by La.Rev.Stat. 15:529.1. That statute does not authorize the imposition of a fine, but only provides for enhanced sentences relating to the term of imprisonment. The trial judge was therefore without authority to impose a fine on resentencing under La.Rev.Stat. 15:529.1.

Section 15:529.1 authorizes enhanced imprisonment terms for habitual-offender resentencing but does not authorize imposing a fine.

State v. Johnlouis · filed 2009-11-04

In light of the Dickerson case and La. R.S. 15:529.1, the court amends the Defendant’s sentences to delete the fine provisions and instructs the trial court to make an entry in the minutes of court to reflect the amendment.

Section 15:529.1 provides enhanced imprisonment for habitual offenders, bars probation and suspension of sentence, but does not authorize a fine or bar parole.

State v. Cass · filed 2011-04-13(A)(1) (G)

However, because La. R.S. 15:529.1, the habitual offender statute, does not authorize imposition of a fine, but only provides for enhanced sentences relating to [sthe term of imprisonment, a trial court is without authority to impose a fíne under this statute. ... This statute does not provide that the sentence be served without benefit of parole.

Subsection (G) requires a habitual-offender sentence to be imposed at hard labor without benefit of probation or suspension of sentence.

State v. Willis · filed 2011-09-07(G)

The trial court failed to impose the sentence as a multiple offender at hard labor without benefit or probation or suspension of sentence as mandated by La. R.S. 15:529.1(G). However, La. R.S. 15:301.1(A) provides that in instances where the statutory restrictions are not recited at sentencing, they are deemed contained in the sentence, whether or not imposed by the sentencing court. State v. Williams, 2000-1725, p. 10 (La.11/28/01), 800 So.2d 790, 799. Accordingly, we need take no action to correct the trial court’s failure to specify that the defendant’s sentence is to be served without benefit probation or suspension of sentence as the correction is statutorily effected.

Section 15:529.1(A)(4)(b) mandates a natural-life sentence when the fourth felony and two prior felonies fall within its listed categories, and a prior offense need not be expressly enumerated in La. R.S. 14:2(B) if it satisfies that statute’s definition of a crime of violence; subsection (G) bars probation or suspension of sentence; and subsection (D)(1)(a) requires advising the defendant of the right against self-incrimination, which is equivalent to the right to remain silent.

State v. Robinson · filed 2011-12-14(A)(4)(b), (G), (D)(1)(a)

La. R.S. 15:529.1(D)(l)(a) requires that a defendant be advised of the specific allegations contained in the multiple offender bill of information and his right to a formal hearing. ... It is technically true that the trial court did not state “waive your right to remain silent.” The court did, however, specifically ask, more than once, if the defendant want to “give up” or “waive” his right against self-incrimination, which is the equivalent of defendant’s right to remain silent. ... Therefore, contrary to the defendant’s argument, the trial court correctly sentenced the defendant for the felony theft conviction in accordance with La. R.S. 15:529.1(G). There is no error on this point. ... The language in La. R.S. 15:529.1(A)(4)(b) provides for a mandatory life sentence of a fourth-felony offender *1278when one of the prior felonies is defined as a crime of violence under La. R.S. 14:2(B); it does not require that the offense be enumerated as a crime of violence. The list of crimes in La. R.S. 14:2(B) is not exclusive. ... The crime of battery of an officer in 2007 satisfied the definition of a crime of violence. It is of no moment whether or not the crime of battery of a police officer in 2007 was an enumerated crime of violence.

Section 15:529.1 permits a triple-offender sentence when the State proves the prior felony convictions and the defendant’s identity, and the mandatory minimum is presumed constitutional absent clear and convincing proof of an exceptional case.

State v. Hackett · filed 2013-08-21(A)(3)(a), (C), (F)

To obtain a multiple offender conviction, the State is required to establish both the prior felony conviction and that the Appellant is the same person convicted of that felony. ... Applying the standard of proof enunciated in Henry, the evidence is sufficient to support Hackett’s adjudication as a third felony offender. ... Under the Habitual Offender Law, the penalty for a triple offender is imprisonment “for a determinate term not less than two-thirds of the longest possible sentence for the conviction and not more than twice the longest possible sentence prescribed for a first conviction.” La. R.S. 15: 529.1 A(3)(a). Accordingly, Hackett faced a sentencing range of twenty to sixty years at hard labor. ... Hackett has presented no evidence to rebut the presumption that the mandatory minimum twenty-year sentence in his case is unconstitutional. His argument lacks merit.

Section 15:529.1 authorizes enhanced sentences concerning imprisonment but does not authorize imposing a fine.

State v. Young · filed 2014-04-09

When sentencing defendant as a habitual offender, the trial judge imposed a fine of $50,000.00. La. R.S. 15:529.1 only provides for enhanced sentences relating to the term of imprisonment. The statute does not authorize the imposition of a fine. State v. Dickerson, 584 So.2d 1140 (La.1991).

When a defendant is sentenced on multiple counts, the sentencing court must state whether either count has been enhanced under § 15:529.1.

State v. Lawrence · filed 2014-04-11

The court must in any event impose sentence on both counts and indicate whether one of both counts has been enhanced under the provisions of La.R.S. 15:529.1.

A defendant sentenced under the habitual-offender law may also receive the mandatory additional five-year firearm sentence under La. R.S. 14:64.3.

State v. Briley · filed 2014-10-01

The Louisiana Supreme Court in State v. King, 2006-1903, p. 8 (La.10/16/07), 969 So.2d 1228, 1232, held that the additional five-year sentence' provided by La. R.S. 14:64.3 can be imposed when the defendant is sentenced pursuant to the habitual offender law. ... Accordingly, because the trial court failed to articulate whether the sentence it imposed included the mandatory additional five years for armed robbery with a firearm under La. R.S. 14:64.3(A), the sixty-year sentence is vacated and the matter remanded for clarification and/or resen-tencing in accordance with La. R.S. 14:64.3 and La. R.S. 15:529.1.

Section 15:529.1's enhanced sentence does not displace the separate, consecutive firearm enhancement when the underlying conviction is armed robbery with a firearm.

State v. Bell · filed 2015-03-11(A)(1)

The separate, consecutive sentence enhancement required by La. R.S. 14:64.3 applies to enhanced sentences imposed under La. R.S. 15:529.1, when the underlying conviction is an armed robbery with a firearm. State v. King, 06-1903 (La.10/16/07); 969 So.2d 1228, 1232; State v. Johnson, 08-1156 (La.App. 5 Cir. 4/28/09); 9 So.3d 1084, 1094, writ denied, 09-1394 (La.2/26/10); 28 So.3d 268.

Section 15:529.1(A)(1) sets a repeat felony offender's determinate sentencing range at no less than one-half and no more than twice the longest term prescribed for a first conviction when the first-offense punishment is less than life imprisonment.

State v. Dale · filed 2015-11-18(A)(1)

Based- on La. R.S. 14:81.2 and La. R.S. 15:529.1, the range within which Dale could be sentenced is 49½ years to 198 years, the first 25 years of which must be served without the benefit of parole.

Section 15:529.1(G) requires every sentence imposed under the habitual-offender statute to be served at hard labor without probation or suspension of sentence, and those requirements apply to an enhanced sentence.

State v. Brown · filed 2016-12-07(G)

Further, La. R.S. 15:529.1(G) provides “[a]ny sentence imposed under the provisions of this Section shall be at hard labor without benefit of probation or suspension of sentence.” Therefore, the trial court imposed an illegally lenient sentence when it did not specify that defendant’s enhanced sentence was to be served at hard labor. ... Further, no corrective action is necessary regarding the failure of the trial court to specify that the sentences were" to be served at hard labor since La. R.S. 40:967 and La. R.S. 15:529.1 both mandate imprisonment at hard labor.

Section 15:529.1 makes a habitual-offender sentence depend on both the underlying offense’s sentencing provisions and the Habitual Offender Law.

State v. Ables · filed 2017-02-08

A defendant’s sentence under the Habitual Offender Law, La. R.S. 15:529.1, is determined by the sentencing provisions of both the underlying crime and the Habitual Offender Law.

Section 15:529.1 requires habitual-offender sentences to omit probation and suspension of sentence, does not itself authorize denying parole eligibility, and provides the procedure for arraigning an alleged habitual offender.

State v. Ford · filed 2017-04-19(G); (D)(1)(a)

Although Section G of La.R.S. 15:529.1 requires habitual offender sentences to be imposed without the benefit of probation or suspension of sentence, it does not authorize the trial court to deny parole eligibility. ... Therefore, Defendant’s sentence must be amended to delete the denial of parole eligibility and the trial court is instructed to make an entry in the court minutes reflecting that change. ... Likewise, the habitual offender arraignment in the present case should not be considered a critical stage at which counsel was required because no evidence was admitted or a guilty plea entered that could have undermined Defendant’s constitutional rights. ... Thus, we find the habitual offender arraignment in the present case was not a critical stage requiring the presence of counsel.

Section 15:529.1(D)(3) requires the court to vacate the prior sentence and give written reasons when imposing a habitual-offender sentence, while § 15:529.1(D)(2) requires identifying the offender tier and the conviction being enhanced, with § 15:529.1(A)(1) supplying the applicable sentencing range.

State v. Clark · filed 2018-11-14(D)(3), (D)(2), (A)(1)

When the court adjudicates a defendant a habitual felony offender, "the court shall sentence him to the punishment prescribed in this Section, and shall vacate the previous sentence if already imposed, deducting from the new sentence the time actually served under the sentence so vacated. The court shall provide written reasons for its determination." La. R. S. 15:529.1(D)(3). ... Here, the record is clear that the trial court failed to vacate Clark's previous sentence. ... Furthermore, La. R. S. 15:529.1(D)(2) requires that following the contradictory habitual offender hearing, the court shall find whether a defendant is a second, third, or fourth felony offender. ... Likewise, a trial court must specify which of multiple underlying sentences is being enhanced under La. R. S. 15:529.1. ... Considering the vast difference in sentencing range for the two crimes of which Clark was convicted, the habitual offender sentence imposed by the trial court is clearly indeterminate and remand is required.

The habitual-offender statute placed Defendant's second-offender sentence within a 15-to-60-year sentencing range, making the 18-year sentence fall within the applicable range.

State v. Chirlow · filed 2018-12-12

During the plea colloquy, he was correctly informed by the court that his sentence as a habitual offender under La. R.S. 15:529.1 would fall between 15 and 60 years, which is above the eight years mentioned by the court. ... Since Defendant's sentence is within the sentencing range set forth in the statutes, and is beneficial to him we find that the district court's statement is not a reversible error for appeal.

Subsection (K) requires the court to apply the habitual-offender provisions that were in effect on the date the defendant committed the instant offense, including retroactively to this case.

State of Louisiana v. Ladray Bias, Jr. · filed 2019-02-06(K)

However, Act 542 of the 2018 Louisiana Legislature added La.R.S. 15:529.1(K), which provides, in pertinent part, “the court shall apply the provisions of [La.R.S. 15:529.1] that were in effect on the date that the defendant’s instant offense was committed.’” This court has not yet addressed whether that provision is retroactive. ... We agree with the first and second circuits and find La.R.S. 15:529.1(K) applies retroactively to this case. ... This court finds that La.R.S. 15:529.1(K) applies retroactively, and the trial court correctly applied the sentencing range of twenty-five to one hundred years.

Section 15:529.1(A) defines a habitual offender to include a person previously convicted of a Louisiana felony who thereafter commits another Louisiana felony.

State of Louisiana Versus Derrick A. Ford, Jr. · filed 2019-06-19(A)

Pursuant to La. R.S. 15:529.1 A, a habitual offender is “[a]ny person who, after having been convicted within this state of a felony, or who, after having been convicted under the laws of any other state or of the United States, or any foreign government of a crime which, if committed in this state would be a felony, thereafter commits any subsequent felony within this state.” ... The State proved at the habitual offender hearing that defendant was previously convicted of distribution of cocaine within 2,000 feet of a drug-free zone, a felony cognizable under the laws of Louisiana.

For qualifying offenses committed before June 15, 2001, the more lenient amended habitual-offender penalties apply retroactively; a third-felony offender whose offenses fall under subsection (A)(1)(b)(i) faces a 20-to-60-year range rather than a mandatory life sentence under subsection (A)(1)(b)(ii).

State of Louisiana Versus Anthony O. Stokes · filed 2019-09-04(A)(1)(b)(i), (A)(1)(b)(ii)

In 2006, the Louisiana Legislature enacted La. R.S. 15:308, which provided that the more lenient penalty provisions enacted by Act 403 applied retroactively to those defendants who committed, were convicted of, or were sentenced for certain enumerated offenses prior to June 15, 2001, if such application ameliorated the defendant’s circumstances. One such statute amended was La. R.S. 15:529.1(A)(1)(b)(ii) which addressed enhanced life sentences for third-felony offenders. Further, Defendant committed the instant offense in May 1997, thus the more lenient penalty provisions apply retroactively to him. After the 2001 amendments, Defendant’s underlying and predicate convictions no longer subjected him to a life sentence. ... Defendant’s underlying conviction of possession with intent to distribute cocaine and his predicate convictions of attempted simple burglary and simple burglary subject him to the sentencing provisions of La. R.S. 15:529.1(A)(1)(b)(i), which—as it existed in both May 1997 and in 2001—provides for a sentencing range of 20 to 60 years.

Section 15:529.1 makes a defendant with a prior felony who commits another felony eligible for enhanced imprisonment, with the applicable version determining the habitual-offender sentencing range.

State of Louisiana v. Lynn Tony Clark, Jr. · filed 2020-03-04(A)(1)

La. R.S. 15:529.1 provides that when a person has been convicted of a felony, and subsequently commits an additional felony, that offender shall be subject to enhanced imprisonment sentences as set forth in the statute. ... That enhancement to a habitual offender is the only new requisite fact to place Clark squarely within the provisions of La. R.S. 15:529.1 and its significantly enhanced sentencing provisions. Additionally, as Clark’s two convictions were within both a 5-year and 10-year cleansing period, he was subject to being adjudicated as a habitual offender. ... As a second-felony habitual offender falling within the interim period of the November 1, 2017-August 1, 2018 version of La. R.S. 15:529.1(A)(1), Clark faced a potential sentence of one-third the longest sentence to two times the longest sentence for each conviction.

Section 15:529.1 does not require a court to impose a sentence before sentencing a defendant as a habitual offender.

State v. Hills · filed 1999-01-20(D)(3)

Section 529.1 does not mandate that a sentence be imposed before the sentence on the multiple bill. The trial judge did not err by sentencing the defendant only once as an habitual offender.

When a defendant alleges a constitutional deficiency in a prior conviction in response to a habitual offender bill, the defendant bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence any factual issue raised by that response.

State v. Clesi · filed 2007-11-02(D)(1)(b)

This aspect of Shelton has been incorporated in La.R.S. 15:529.1(D)(1)(b), 1993 La. Acts 896, which provides that a defendant who has alleged a constitutional deficiency in one or more of his prior convictions "shall have the burden of proof, by a preponderance of the evidence, on any issue of fact raised by [his] response [to the state's habitual offender bill.]."

In a habitual offender proceeding, when the defendant denies the allegations, the state must prove the prior guilty pleas and that the defendant was represented by counsel when entering them.

State v. Douglas · filed 2004-10-29

A review of the record reflects that the state met its initial burden of proof in the habitual offender proceeding under La. R.S. 15:529.1, as stated in State v. Shelton, supra. Since Douglas denied the allegations of the bill of information, the burden shifted to the state to prove the existence of the prior guilty pleas and that Douglas was represented by counsel when they were taken. This proof was met by the testimony and exhibits introduced and set forth hereinabove.

Before the 1993 amendment, § 15:529.1 did not require proof beyond a reasonable doubt in habitual offender proceedings.

State v. Hongo · filed 1993-10-06(D)(1)

This court is aware of no jurisprudence establishing that the standard of beyond a reasonable doubt should be applied to a habitual offender proceeding.[2] The only evidentiary requirements found are those contained in the statute itself.

At the time of Jarreau's 1998 offense, § 15:529.1 A(2)(b)(ii) made life imprisonment mandatory for a third offender when the current or either prior felony met specified violent, drug, or twelve-year felony categories; the 2001 amended sentencing range did not govern.

State v. Jarreau · filed 2008-03-26A(2)(b)(ii)

At the time of offense, La. R.S. 15:529.1 A(2)(b)(ii) provided that a defendant was subject to a mandatory life sentence if his third felony or any of the two prior felonies was a crime of violence, was a violation of the Uniform Controlled Dangerous Substances Law punishable by more than five years, or was a felony punishable by more twelve years imprisonment. ... He is incorrect, in that the maximum sentence he could have received was a life sentence. Ten years would have been the maximum sentence he could have received had he committed his crime after the amendments to La. R.S. 15:529.1, but he committed the present crime before the amendments.

Section 15:529.1 applies according to the version in effect when the underlying offense was committed, so later amendments cannot be used to treat the habitual-offender sentence as excessive.

State of Louisiana v. Wade · filed 2020-01-15(A)(1)(b)(i)

Thus, the punishment to be imposed on a habitual offender is that provided by La. R.S. 15:529.1 as it exists on the date a defendant commits the underlying offense. State v. Parker, supra; State v. Kennon, supra. The application of a subsequent amendment to a sentence is an improper metric to find a sentence excessive.

Section 15:529.1(A)(1) requires the predicate felony conviction to occur before the principal subsequent felony offense for which the defendant's multiple-offender status is enhanced.

State v. Jackson · filed 2008-03-26(A)(1)

Nevertheless, the first sentence of R.S. 15:529.1 A(1) still states, "Any person who, after having been convicted in this state of a felony * * *, thereafter commits any subsequent felony within this state, upon conviction of said felony, shall be punished as follows * * *" (emphasis added). This portion of the statute, and the jurisprudence interpreting it, require that the prior conviction must precede the principal offense in order to be used as a predicate to enhance a defendant's status as a multiple offender.

Section 15:529.1(A)(1) requires the subsequent felony to be committed after the qualifying prior conviction before enhanced second-offender sentencing can apply.

State of Louisiana v. Fruge · filed 2015-10-14(A)(1)

At the time of trial, defendant was technically a first offender and could not have been sentenced as a second offender under La. R.S. 15:529.1 on the simple rape conviction because he did not commit the 2006 sexual assault on J.H. after his 2009 conviction for the 2004 attack on R.A.

Section 15:529.1 does not treat an invalid guilty plea to a nonexistent offense as a qualifying prior felony conviction for habitual-offender adjudication.

State v. Lambert · filed 2016-03-16(A)(1)

Attempted aggravated second degree battery is not a felony in this state because it is not a crime in this state. Accordingly, an invalid guilty plea to attempted aggravated second degree battery does not constitute a prior conviction for the purposes of adjudicating a defendant an habitual offender.

Subsection (A)(1)(c)(ii)'s life-sentence provision applies only when the prior felonies meet its specified categories; when they do not, a fourth offender is sentenced under (A)(1)(c)(i), which permits a determinate term from the longest first-conviction sentence up to natural life, with a minimum of twenty years.

State v. Johnson · filed 2008-04-30(A)(1)(c)(i), (A)(1)(c)(ii)

The trial court used the correct sentencing provision, La. R.S. 15:529.1(A)(1)(c)(i), which calls for imprisonment "for a determinate term not less than the longest prescribed for a first conviction but in no event less than twenty years and not more than his natural life."

Section 15.529.1 enhances the term of imprisonment for a multiple offender but does not authorize imposing a fine.

State v. Payne · filed 2017-05-17

The multiple offender statute does not authorize the imposition of a fine but only provides for enhanced sentences relating to the term of imprisonment.

Section 15:529.1 does not authorize imposing a fine as part of a habitual-offender enhanced sentence; it authorizes enhancement of the term of imprisonment.

State v. Thomas · filed 2016-04-27(G)

La. R.S. 15:529.1 does not authorize the imposition of a fine but only provides for enhanced sentences relating to the term of imprisonment.

Section 15:529.1 enhances the term of imprisonment for a habitual offender but does not require imposition of the fine prescribed for the underlying offense.

State v. Morris · filed 2008-09-17(A)(1)(a), (G)

La. R.S. 15:529.1 does not require the imposition of a fine, but only provides for enhanced sentences relating to the term of imprisonment, so the absence of a fine (required by the penalty provision for the underlying statute) is not an error.

Section 15:529.1(A)(1) enhances the imprisonment term for a second felony but does not authorize imposing a fine.

State of Louisiana Versus Walter Dj Thomas · filed 2020-11-04(A)(1)

In resentencing defendant, the trial court properly did not impose a fine. See State v. LeBlanc, 14-323 (La. App. 5 Cir. 11/25/14), 165 So.3d 1022, 1024, wherein this Court held that the multiple offender statute does not authorize the imposition of a fine, but only provides for enhanced sentences relating to the term of imprisonment.

A clerical error in the statutory citation for a prior felony does not prejudice the defendant or defeat a multiple-bill adjudication when the record and bill identify the conviction and the defendant knew the offense to which he pleaded guilty.

State v. Conner · filed 2008-10-01(A)(1)(c)(i)

In the present case, no indication is present or exists that Conner was prejudiced by the clerical error in the statutory citation of his underlying conviction. The multiple bill contained the correct case number, section of court, and date of the defendant's guilty plea to simple robbery. Moreover, a review of the Boykin hearing of 21 February 2003 and the Waiver of Rights — Plea of Guilty form executed by the defendant clearly indicate that the defendant knew what he was charged with and pled guilty to, namely, simple robbery. Thus, the error in the statutory citation of Conner's underlying conviction in the multiple bill did not prejudice him. In light of the foregoing, the trial court erred in adjudging the defendant a triple, rather than a quadruple, offender. The states writ application has merit and we must correct the trial courts finding.

Section 15:529.1(A)(1)(c)(ii) requires a natural-life sentence without parole, probation, or suspension when a fourth felony and two prior felonies fall within the statute’s listed qualifying categories, subject to review for unconstitutional excessiveness.

State v. Brewer · filed 2008-12-30(A)(1)(c)(ii)

Based on the foregoing, we find that the State is correct in its argument and that the sentence that the court should have imposed was a mandatory life sentence, barring any finding that a life sentence would be excessive under State v. Dorthey, 623 So.2d 1276 (La.1993). ... However, given the status of the defendant’s present and two of his prior offenses, he falls within the mandatory life provisions of La. R.S. 15:529.1 A(l)(c)(ii). Consequently, the trial court erred by denying the State’s motion to correct the illegal sentence. ... Accordingly, we affirm the defendant’s conviction and adjudication as a fourth offender, vacate the fifty-year sentence, and remand the case for re-sentencing under La. R.S. 15:529.1 A(l)(c)(ii).

Section 15:529.1 A(1)(b)(ii) requires a presumptive life sentence without benefits when the third felony and two prior felonies satisfy its crime-of-violence or controlled-substances criteria, subject to rare departure for an exceptional defendant.

State v. Welch · filed 2011-01-26A(1)(b)(ii)

At the time of this offense, R.S. 15:529.1 A(1)(b)(ii) provided that if the third felony and the two prior felonies “are felonies defined as a crime of violence under R.S. 14:2(B), * * * or as a violation of the Uniform Controlled Substances Law punishable by imprisonment for ten years or more,” then the penalty is imprisonment for life without benefit of parole, 1 ^probation or suspension of sentence. Aggravated flight from an officer is a crime of violence, La. R.S. 14:2 B(39), and both of the prior offenses, possession of Ecstasy, R.S. 40:966 E, and attempted possession with intent to distribute cocaine, R.S. 40:979 and 967 A(1), were violations of the controlled dangerous substances lawp the court properly applied the presumptive life sentence of § 529.1 A(1)(b)(ii).

Section 15:529.1(A)(3)(b) requires a third-felony offender to be imprisoned for life without benefits when the third and two prior felonies meet the provision’s specified violent-crime or drug-law criteria.

State v. Johnson · filed 2015-11-18(A)(3)(b)

La. R.S. 15:529.1(A)(3)(b) provides, in salient part, that if the third felony and the two prior felonies are defined as crimes of violence under R.S. 14:2(B), or as a violation of the Uniform Controlled Dangerous Substances Law punishable by imprisonment for 10 years or more, the person shall be imprisoned for life, without benefits.

Section 15:529.1(A)(3)(b) requires a qualifying third habitual offender to serve life imprisonment without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence.

State of Louisiana v. Pierre · filed 2016-03-02(A)(3)(b)

Further, we find that the sentences imposed are legal in all respects. ... Thus, the trial court imposed the sentence mandated by La.R.S. 15:529.1(A)(3)(b) for both of Defendant’s enhanced sentences—life imprisonment, without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence.

Section 15.529.1(D)(1)(b) bars a defendant from later attacking the habitual-offender sentence with a challenge to a prior conviction that was not raised before sentence was imposed.

State of Louisiana v. McGhee · filed 2017-10-04(D)(1)(b)

Under La.R.S. 15:529.1(D)(1)(b), “[a]ny challenge to a previous conviction which is not made before sentence is imposed may not thereafter be raised to attack the sentence.” Although Defendant objected to the use of his prior convictions as predicate offenses during the habitual offender adjudication, his argument was that Defendant was not properly Boykinized because he was not informed that he had thirty days within which to file an appeal, and furthermore that there appeared to be some confusion during Defendant’s plea to assault by drive-by shooting. At no point in time was there any allusion that Defendant’s counsel during the plea had a conflict and could not properly represent Defendant.

Section 529.1(D)(l)(b) bars a defendant from challenging a prior conviction or habitual-offender adjudication on appeal when the challenge was not made before sentencing.

State v. Thomas · filed 2009-01-14(D)(l)(b)

Any challenge to the previous conviction or adjudication which is not made before the sentence is imposed may not thereafter be raised to attack the sentence and is not preserved for appellate review.

Section 15:529.1 does not authorize imposing a fine as part of an enhanced sentence.

State v. Dotie · filed 2009-01-14(A)

Although the statute of conviction, R.S. 14:95.1 B, mandates a fine of $1,000 to $5,000, the statute of enhancement, R.S. 15:529.1 A, does not authorize the imposition of a fine.

Section 15:529.1 does not authorize imposing a fine as part of an enhanced habitual-offender sentence.

State v. Ealy · filed 2009-05-13(A)

Although the statute of conviction, La. R.S. 14:34, authorizes a fine of up to $5,000, the statute of enhancement, La. R.S. 15:529.1 A, does not authorize the imposition of a fine.

Section 15:529.1 requires resentencing as a multiple offender and authorizes enhanced imprisonment sentences, but it does not authorize imposing a fine.

State v. Dyas · filed 2010-03-03

La. R.S. 15:529.1 requires that the sentencing judge vacate the original sentence and resentence the defendant as a multiple offender. In resentencing, the judge must impose a sentence authorized by La. R.S. 15:529.1. That statute does not authorize the imposition of a fine, but only provides for enhanced sentences relating to the term of imprisonment. The trial judge was therefore without authority to impose a fine on resentencing under La. R.S. 15:529.1.

On resentencing under § 15:529.1, the court may impose an enhanced term of imprisonment but may not impose a fine.

State of Louisiana v. Edwards · filed 2010-03-17

La.Rev.Stat. 15:529.1 requires that the sentencing judge vacate the original sentence and resentence the defendant as a multiple offender. In resentencing, the judge must impose a sentence authorized by La.Rev.Stat. 15:529.1. That statute does not authorize the imposition of a fine, but only provides for enhanced sentences relating to the term of imprisonment. The trial judge was therefore without authority to impose a fine on resentencing under La.Rev.Stat. 15:529.1.

Section 15:529.1 does not authorize a fine as part of a habitual-offender sentence, so a fine imposed under that sentence is illegal and must be deleted.

State v. Cross · filed 2012-02-29

The habitual offender statute does not provide for imposition of a fine. State v. Dickerson, 584 So.2d 1140 (La.1991). Even though the underlying statute providing the basis for defendant’s conviction may authorize the imposition of a fine, the enhancing statute does not. State v. Ealy, 44,252 (La.App.2d Cir.05/13/09), 12 So.Sd 1052, unit denied, 09-1393 (La.02/05/10), 27 So.3d 298. Because the trial court was without authority to impose such a fine, a fine imposed in sentencing a habitual offender is illegal and should be deleted. State v. Cass, 46,228 (La.App.2d Cir.04/13/11), 61 So.3d 840, writ denied, 11-1006 (La.11/04/11), 75 So.3d 922.

Section 15:529.1 does not authorize imposition of a fine as part of a multiple-offender sentence.

State v. Canales · filed 2016-12-07

The trial court further erred in imposing a “[g]eneral fine” of $250.00 during sentencing on the multiple bill, when La. R.S. 15:529.1 does not authorize a fine. State v. Dickerson, 584 So.2d 1140 (La. 1991).

Section 15:529.1 does not authorize a fine when a defendant is sentenced as a habitual offender.

State v. Lewis · filed 2018-01-31

Although the underlying statutes providing the basis for Lewis' convictions authorize the imposition of a fine, see La. R.S. 14:72.2(A) and 40:966(B)(3), the habitual offender statute, La. R.S. 15:529.1, does not. State v. Dickerson , 584 So.2d 1140 (La. 1991). Because the trial court was without authority to impose the $2,000 fines on Lewis after his habitual offender adjudication, we amend his sentences to omit the fines. See State v. Cross , 46,996 (La. App. 2 Cir. 02/29/12), 91 So.3d 995, 1002.

Section 15:529.1 authorizes enhanced imprisonment but does not authorize a fine on habitual offender resentencing.

State v. Marshall · filed 2010-09-22

Because the trial court was without authority to impose a fine under the habitual offender statute, Marshall’s sentence is amended to delete the $50,000 fine.

Section 15:529.1 authorizes enhanced terms of imprisonment but does not authorize a fine.

State v. Gillin · filed 2016-09-22

In our error patent review, we note, as pointed out by the State in its appellee brief, that the trial judge imper-missibly imposed a' $500 fine when sentencing Defendant under |sthe multiple offender law. See State v. Dickerson, 584 So.2d 1140 (La.1991) (per curiam) (La. R.S. 15:529.1 does not authorize imposition of a fine but only provides for enhanced sentences relating to the term of imprisonment).

Subsection D(3) permits the court to sentence a defendant as a multiple offender without first imposing an ordinary sentence, while requiring it to vacate a prior sentence if one was already imposed and deduct time served.

State v. Shepard · filed 2009-04-08D(3)

There is no requirement in Louisiana statutes or jurisprudence that a court must first impose a sentence, only to vacate it and impose a sentence after a habitual offender adjudication. La. R.S. 15:529.1 D(3) contains no such requirement and, by its express language, contemplates the situation where the trial court may not have already imposed sentence at the time a defendant is found to be a multiple offender.

Section 15:529.1 does not require imposition of the underlying sentence before sentencing on a multiple bill; if a prior sentence has already been imposed, the court must vacate it, and failure to advise of hearing and silence rights is harmless when the State proves multiple-offender status at a hearing.

State v. Dee · filed 2012-10-30(D)(l)(a), (D)(3)

We have reviewed the record for errors patent in accordance with La. C.Cr.P. art. 920; State v. Oliveaux, 312 So.2d 337 (La.1975); and State v. Weiland, 556 So.2d 175 (La.App. 5th Cir.1990), and find that the trial court failed to advise defendant of his multiple offender rights as required by La. R.S. 15:529.1(D)(l)(a). ... Thus, we find that the failure to advise defendant of his right to remain silent is not reversible because defendant’s multiple offender status was established by competent evidence offered by the State at a hearing rather than by admission of defendant. ... Under La. R.S. 15:529.1(D)(3), a trial court shall vacate a defendant’s previous sentence “if already imposed’’ before sentencing him as a multiple offender. Nothing in La. R.S. 15:529.1 mandates a sentence be imposed on the underlying sentence before the sentence on the multiple bill.

Section 15:529.1 authorizes enhanced imprisonment terms for multiple offenders but does not authorize the imposition of a fine.

State v. Anderson · filed 2017-05-17

However, La. R.S. 15:529.1, the multiple offender statute, does not authorize the imposition of a fine but only provides for enhanced sentences relating to the term of imprisonment.

Section 15:529.1(D)(1)(a) requires advising a habitual-offender defendant of the specific allegations, the right to a formal hearing, and implicitly the constitutional right to remain silent; failure to give those advisements is not reversible when the State proves habitual-offender status with competent evidence at a hearing rather than by the defendant's admission.

State v. Huntley · filed 2011-01-25(D)(1)(a)

La.R.S. 15:529.1(D)(l)(a) requires that the defendant be advised of the specific allegations contained in the habitual offender bill of information and his right to a formal hearing at which the state must prove its case. Implicit in this requirement is the additional requirement that the defendant be advised of his constitutional right to remain silent. ... In this case, the trial judge did not advise Mr. Huntley of his right to a formal hearing at which the state must prove its case or of his constitutional right to remain silent. Even so, the failure of the trial court to advise Mr. Huntley of these rights is not reversible error because Mr. Huntley’s habitual offender status was established by competent evidence offered by the state at a hearing rather than by Mr. Huntley’s admission.

Section 15:529.1 requires advising a defendant of the specific allegations in the habitual-offender bill and the right to a formal hearing, including the constitutional right to remain silent.

State v. Cambrice · filed 2011-04-26(D)(1)(a)

La. R.S. 15:529.1(D)(1)(a) requires that the defendant be advised of the specific allegations contained in the habitual offender bill of information and his right to a formal hearing at which the state must prove its case. Implicit in this requirement is the additional requirement that the defendant be advised of his constitutional right to remain silent.

Failure to advise a habitual-offender defendant of the right to a hearing and the right to remain silent is generally harmless when the State establishes habitual-offender status with competent evidence at a hearing rather than by admission.

State v. Goosby · filed 2013-03-06(D)(1)(a)

Generally, the failure of the trial court to advise the defendant of his right to a hearing and his right to remain silent is not considered reversible error where the defendant’s habitual offender status is established by ^competent evidence offered by the State at a hearing rather than by admission of the defendant.

When a defendant exercises the right to remain silent, failure to advise him of that right at the habitual-offender hearing is harmless if it causes no prejudice.

State v. Jackson · filed 2013-04-10(D)(1)(a)

We agree that the error was harmless and find, as we did in Timmons, that it had no prejudicial effect on any of Jackson’s substantive rights.

Section 15:529.1 requires the trial court to advise a defendant of the habitual offender allegations, the right to a hearing, and the right to remain silent; an uncounseled stipulation or admission without those advisements is reversible error.

State v. Lewis · filed 2015-03-25

La. R.S. 15:529.1 requires that the trial court advise the defendant of the allegations contained in the habitual offender bill of information, his right to a hearing, and his right to remain silent. ... However, when the defendant’s status as a habitual offender is established by his own stipulation or admission to the habitual offender bill of information without having been informed of his right to a hearing or his right to remain silent, by either the trial court or his attorney, there is reversible error.

Section 529.1 requires a trial court to advise a multiple-offender defendant of the bill's allegations and the rights to a hearing and to remain silent; failure to advise about silence is harmless when the State proves habitual-offender status with competent hearing evidence instead of defendant's admission.

State v. Anderson · filed 2018-10-17

La. R.S. 15:529.1 requires the trial court to advise a defendant of the allegations contained in the bill of information, his right to a hearing, and his right to remain silent. In the present case, defendant was advised of the allegations contained in the multiple offender bill and of his right to a hearing but was not advised of his right to remain silent. However, the failure of the trial court to advise a defendant of his right to remain silent is harmless error when the multiple offender status is established by competent evidence offered by the State at a hearing, rather than by the admission of the defendant.

Section 15:529.1(D)(1)(a) requires the court to inform a habitual-offender defendant of the allegations and the right to contest them, including a correlative right to remain silent; technical noncompliance is harmless when the defendant's interests are fully protected and the adjudication is independently supported.

State of Louisiana v. Colby James Kinsey A/K/A Colby J. Kinsey · filed 2020-01-29(D)(1)(a)

The requirements of R.S. 15:529.1(D)(1)(a) that the court inform a defendant of the allegations in a habitual offender bill of information, and of his right “to be tried as to the truth thereof according to law,” should not serve as technical traps for an unwary but otherwise conscientious judge. . . . It therefore appears that defendant was fully informed of the allegations in the habitual offender bill and of his right to contest those allegations, with a correlative right to remain silent at the hearing, that he thereafter voluntarily stipulated to the habitual offender allegations after conferring with counsel, and that the trial court adjudicated him a habitual offender on the basis of not only his stipulation but also the documentary evidence introduced by the state at the hearing. Defendant’s interests were fully protected and any technical non-compliance with the statutory directives in R.S. 15:529.1(D)(1)(a) was harmless. See State v. Brown, 11-1656 (La. 2/10/12), 82 So.3d 1232. As in the above cases, here, the trial court’s technical non-compliance with the advice of rights in the present case was harmless error.

Section 15:529.1(D) requires the court to advise a defendant of the right to a hearing and the right to remain silent before accepting a guilty plea to a habitual offender charge.

State v. Davis · filed 2003-10-08(D)

In the instant case there is nothing in the record to indicate that the defendant was advised of his rights prior to the court's acceptance of the defendant's guilty plea in the hearing where he was adjudicated a habitual offender. Therefore, this creates an error patent in this case.

At a habitual offender hearing, the defendant must be advised of the right to remain silent, the right to a hearing, and the right to require the State to prove its case; failure to give that advice can be harmless when the hearing was fundamentally fair and the State offered sufficient independent evidence.

State v. Jasper · filed 2011-11-02(D)

However, such an omission is subject to harmless error analysis, requiring that this court determine whether the proceedings as a whole were fundamentally fair and afforded the defendant due process of law. ... Thus, we find that the trial court’s omission in advising 14the defendant of his rights was harmless error and he was afforded a fundamentally fair hearing.

Section 15:529.1 cannot use a former La. R.S. 40:983 plea as a predicate conviction absent a later adjudication of guilt, and the State must prove that the ten-year cleansing period has not elapsed.

State v. Brown · filed 2011-01-26(D)(1)(b), (C)

Thus, in the instant case, if defendant entered a 1990 plea pursuant to former La. R.S. 40:983 such a plea cannot be used as a predicate offense under La. R.S. 15:529.1 — absent evidence, for example, that his probation was revoked, his plea under La. R.S. 40:983 set aside, and an adjudication of guilt imposed upon him. ... Under La. R.S. 15:529.1(C), defendant’s instant conviction shall not be counted as a second, third, fourth or higher offense if more than ten years has elapsed since the date of expiration of the maximum sentence of the previous conviction. In computing the ten-year interval of time, any period of servitude by a person in a penal institution, within or without the state, shall not be included in the ten-year period. Id. ... For habitual offender purposes, the State has the burden of proving that ten years has not elapsed between the date of the defendant’s release from custody on the prior offense and the date of the new offense.

Section 15:529.1(C) requires the State to prove that the ten-year cleansing period between expiration of sentences for predicate offenses and commission of the present offense has not elapsed.

State v. Patterson · filed 2018-03-07(C)

Pursuant to the Supreme Court's directive in State v. Kisack , 2016-0797 (La. 10/18/17), 236So.3d 1201, 2017 WL 4681356, an errors patent review of this case indicates the State met its burden of proving that the ten year "cleansing period" under La. R.S. 15:529.1(C) had not elapsed between the expiration of the sentences for the predicate offenses and the commission of the present offense.

When fewer than ten years have elapsed between convictions, the state need not prove the discharge date to establish that the habitual offender law’s ten-year cleansing period has not expired.

State v. Turner · filed 2010-02-03(C)

Because ten full years had not yet elapsed between convictions, the state was not required to prove the date of discharge and defendant’s argument lacks merit.

For a fourth or subsequent felony, when the enhancement is not based on two or more crimes of violence, the sentencing range is at least twenty years and no more than natural life.

State of Louisiana v. Romero · filed 2011-02-02(A)(1)(c)(i)

Under La.R.S. 15:529.1(A)(1)(c)(i), the sentencing range for fourth and subsequent felonies for crimes such as unauthorized use of a motor vehicle when the enhancement is not based upon two or more crimes of violence is “in no event less than twenty years and not more than his natural life.”

Section 15:529.1(A)(1)(c)(i) requires a fourth-felony offender whose new felony carries less than life imprisonment on a first conviction to receive at least 20 years and no more than natural life.

State v. Caldwell · filed 2011-09-21(A)(1)(c)(i)

Having been adjudicated as a fourth-felony offender based on his most recent conviction for theft of goods with a value in excess of $500, the sentencing range applicable to Defendant was imprisonment, with or without hard labor, for not less than 20 years nor more than his natural life.

For a habitual offender whose current felony and two prior felonies are crimes of violence, § 15:529.1(A)(2)(b)(i)(ii) makes life imprisonment the minimum sentence, subject to a possible downward departure upon a showing of exceptional circumstances.

State v. Phillips · filed 2011-02-17(A)(2)(b)(i)(ii)

Notably, the defendant committed his offense after the effective date of the amendments reducing the mandatory minimum sentence for habitual offenders. Thus, even after the legislature decided to reduce sentences for a variety of offenses and offenders by passing Act 403, a life sentence was still the minimum which could be imposed on the defendant under La. R.S. 15:529.1(A)(2)(b)(i)(ii). The life sentence was mandatory because the instant felony conviction and two of his prior felony convictions were crimes of violence as defined by La. R.S. 14:2(13). Thus, despite his attempt to present mitigating factors to the court, the defendant failed to provide substantial evidence that exceptional circumstances justified a downward departure from the mandatory term of life imprisonment. See State v. Trackling, 2007-0068 (La.App. 4 Cir. 5/16/07), 958 So.2d 1209. Accordingly, the district court did not err when it imposed a life sentence.