La. Stat. Ann. § 15:529.1

Section 15:529.1(D) requires that a habitual-offender defendant be advised of the right to remain silent before admitting habitual-offender status, but the admission may nevertheless be valid when the proceedings as a whole provide fundamental fairness and due process.

State v. Boswell · filed 1997-02-12(D)

While the trial court informed Defendant of his right to have the State prove his identification as a habitual offender as required by La.R.S. 15:529.1(D), the trial court did not inform Defendant of his right to remain silent. Although the right to remain silent is not specifically set forth in La.R.S. 15:529.1, in State v. Johnson, 432 So.2d 815 (La.1983), writ granted on other grounds, 438 So.2d 1113 (La.1983), appeal after remand, 457 So.2d 1251 (La.App. 1 Cir.1984), appeal after remand, 471 So.2d 1041 (La.App. 1 Cir. 1985), the Louisiana Supreme Court held this statute clearly recognizes a defendant's right to remain silent, and implicitly provides the defendant should be advised of that right. ... As such, we find Defendant's habitual offender admission valid because the habitual offender hearing was fundamentally fair.

Section 15:529.1(C) bars use of a prior conviction when more than ten years have elapsed since the defendant's actual discharge from the prior sentence, and subsection (F) makes competent proof of the discharge date essential; under subsection (G), failure to expressly state that the sentence is without probation or suspension is substantially compliant when no probation or suspension was imposed.

State v. Balser · filed 1996-11-14(C), (F), and (G)

In examining the transcript of the habitual offender proceeding, we find the State failed to prove that the predicate conviction fell within ten years of defendant's discharge from his previous sentence, as required by La.R.S. 15:529.1(C). ... "The `cleansing period' begins to run from the date that defendant is actually discharged from state custody and supervision.... Thus, evidence of the date of discharge, as provided in La.R.S. 15:529.1(F), is essential to the case...." ... Because the State did not submit sufficient evidence to prove the 10-year cleansing period, the manslaughter conviction cannot be used as a predicate for the second felony offender charge. ... First, the court failed to stipulate that the sentence would be without benefit of probation or suspension of sentence, La.R.S. 15:529.1(G). Since the trial court did not affirmatively suspend any portion of the sentence or impose any probationary period, however, there was substantial compliance with the sentencing directives of the multiple offender statute.

Section 15:529.1(G) authorizes a habitual-offender sentence without benefit of probation or suspension of sentence, but it does not authorize denial of parole.

State v. Thomas · filed 1996-11-14(G)

The defendant's 100-year sentence as a third felony offender is illegal in that the trial court required the sentence to be served without benefit of parole. La.R.S. 15:529.1(G) only provides for the imposition of sentence without benefit of probation and suspension of sentence—not parole.

Section 15:529.1(C) cannot be applied to extend the cleansing period from five to seven years when the underlying felony was committed before the amendment took effect, because doing so violates ex post facto prohibitions.

State v. Morgan · filed 1996-12-30(C)

Accordingly, we hold that the amendment to La. R.S. 15:529.1(C), as applied to this defendant, violated the prohibitions against ex post facto laws and, therefore, the trial court erred by applying the seven-year cleansing period in adjudicating the defendant a fourth felony offender.

Section 15:529.1(D)(1)(b) requires a defendant challenging an alleged predicate conviction to file a written response, prove its invalidity by a preponderance of the evidence, and raise the challenge before sentencing.

State v. Washington · filed 1997-01-15(D)(1)(b)

Although the state has the burden of proving any issue of fact, "[t]he presumption of regularity of judgment shall be sufficient to meet the original burden of proof." La.R.S. 15:529.1(D)(1)(b). Under this statute, if the defendant wishes to claim that any of the alleged convictions are invalid, then he must file a written response to the information and prove the invalidity by a preponderance of the evidence. If the defendant fails to challenge the validity of the prior convictions before sentence is imposed, he will not be allowed to raise such an attack. Id.

Section 15:529.1(D)(l)(b) requires the State to sufficiently prove an out-of-state predicate offense before using it to adjudicate a defendant a fourth felony offender.

State v. Stewart · filed 1997-02-26(D)(l)(b)

The issue in this case is whether the State proved a predicate offense which occurred in the State of Maryland sufficiently to adjudicate the defendant, Robert A. Stewart, a fourth felony offender. We find the State met its burden of proof under La.R.S. 15:529.1(D)(l)(b) and State v. Martin, 427 So.2d 1182 (La.1983).

Section 15:529.1 permits the State, in a single prosecution, to adjudicate a defendant a third offender and later a fourth offender using a conviction and documentary evidence not previously used to determine multiple-offender status, so long as the punishment does not exceed what the legislature prescribed and the State did not seek separate hearings to oppress or harass the defendant.

State v. Denis · filed 1997-04-25

As long as the punishment imposed on the defendant does not exceed what the legislature has prescribed, and in the absence of any evidence that the state sought separate hearings to oppress or harass the defendant, principles of res judicata or double jeopardy do not preclude the state in a single prosecution from adjudicating the defendant a third offender and then adjudicating him a fourth offender in a subsequent proceeding on the basis of a conviction and documentary evidence not used previously to determine his multiple offender status.

Under § 15:529.1(C) and (D)(1)(b), the State bears the burden of proving habitual-offender facts beyond a reasonable doubt, but need not establish a defendant’s discharge date when the relevant convictions and subsequent offense are separated by less than ten years.

State v. Wallace · filed 2009-10-28(D)(1)(b), (C)

La. R.S. 15:529.1(D)(l)(b) provides that “the district attorney shall have the burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt of any issue of fact,” and “any challenge to a previous conviction or adjudication of delinquency which is not made before sentence is imposed may not thereafter be raised to attack the sentence.” ... The use of Cpl. Rachal’s expert testimony as to the fingerprints of the defendant when compared to photographs contained in the duly authenticated record is clearly within the confines of Louisiana’s habitual offender law. ... Although the state has the burden of proving that the 10-year period has not expired, the state need not prove the discharge date when less than | s10 years have elapsed between the last conviction and the subsequent conviction. ... It was therefore unnecessary for the state to prove the date of discharge of defendant’s prior convictions because each of defendant’s prior convictions occurred within less than 10 years of each other, and it was not possible that 10 years could have elapsed between | ¡¡release from custody and commission of the offénse at issue.

Section 15:529.1(C) requires the State to prove that predicate convictions fall within the applicable cleansing period, which generally runs from actual discharge from state supervision, subject to the rule for shorter conviction-to-offense intervals.

State v. Humphrey · filed 1997-04-29(C)

At the time of the commission of the underlying felony, La. R.S. 15:529.1(C) established a seven-year cleansing period as follows[2]: ... The State bears the burden of showing that the predicate convictions fall within the cleansing period. ... The imposed sentence does not govern the determination of the expiration of the cleansing period. Rather, the actual discharge from supervision by the Department of Corrections controls. Thus, the commencement of the cleansing period is from the date of discharge from state supervision, because the discharge can take place earlier than the theoretical date on which the sentence would have terminated due to pardon, commutation or good time credit, or it could take place later because of parole revocation. ... However, if less than the cleansing period has elapsed between defendant's conviction on a predicate felony and his commission of a subsequent predicate felony, the State need not prove the date of discharge on the earlier sentence in the habitual offender proceedings. ... In this case, more than seven years elapsed between defendant's conviction for the first offense, December 17, 1974, and the commission of the second offense, October 7, 1982. Thus, it was incumbent upon the State to prove defendant's discharge date for the first offense in order to establish that seven years did not pass between that date and the date of the commission of the second offense. There is nothing in the record to show the date of defendant's discharge from state supervision on the first offense. Therefore, we find that the State failed to prove that the cleansing period did not lapse between the first and second offenses.

Section 15:529.1(C) excludes a prior conviction from habitual-offender treatment only when the statutory cleansing period has elapsed, and the amended period may apply to a later felony committed after the amendment without violating ex post facto protections.

State v. Brinson · filed 1997-09-03(C)

The 1995 amendment to the statutory cleansing period did not eliminate any defense available under the law existing when the defendant committed his second offense in 1996, the only relevant crime for purposes of this analysis. At the time of his arrest in 1996 he had been placed on notice by the state that the cleansing period had changed and he could no longer rely on the former five year cleansing period which was applicable in 1984 at the time of his first crime. There was no violation of the Ex Post Facto Clause.

Section 15:529.1(C) permits the state to pursue another habitual-offender hearing when it can present duly authenticated evidence of when the defendant was discharged from all state custody, including parole supervision; Louisiana law governs the statute's cleansing period for prior convictions used to enhance a felony conviction in Louisiana.

State v. Langlois · filed 1997-11-14(C)

Louisiana law governs the applicability of the cleansing period provided by R.S. 15:529.1(0 to prior convictions used to enhance the defendant’s conviction following conviction of a felony committed in this state. ... On remand, the state is not precluded from proceeding with another habitual offender hearing at which time it may present duly authenticated evidence on the question of whether, and if so, when, the defendant was actually discharged from all state custody, including parole supervision, by the Florida Department of Correction on his 1968 *1282conviction. ... La.R.S. 15:529.1(C).

Section 15:529.1 requires independent proof that a defendant is the person identified in the prior-conviction records and requires advisement of the right to remain silent before accepting a multiple-offender plea.

State v. Addison · filed 1996-11-13

Although evidence of the prior convictions was presented, proof that the accused is the same person previously convicted is a separate element of the habitual offender adjudication. ... Thus, the trial court's failure to advise the defendants of their right to remain silent prior to acceptance of their guilty pleas requires that the multiple offender adjudications be vacated and the matter remanded.

Under the former version of Section 15:529.1, a mandatory life sentence for a fourth felony offender required the fourth felony and two prior felonies to be enumerated felonies.

State v. Carr · filed 1997-09-10(A)(3)(b)

At the time of the commission of the instant offense in May of 1994, former La. Rev.Stat. 15:529.1 A(3)(b) provided for a life sentence, [i]f the fourth or subsequent felony and two of the prior felonies involved a violation of R.S. 14:34, R.S. 14:62.1, R.S. 14:62.2, R.S. 14:62.3, R.S. 14:65, R.S. 14:110(B), or of any crime punishable by imprisonment for more than twelve years.... *1107 Under this version, the fourth felony and two of the prior felonies must be an enumerated felony.[1] ... Consequently, the defendant was erroneously sentenced to serve a mandatory term of life imprisonment under the habitual offender statute. Instead, he should have been sentenced under former La. R.S. 15:529.1 A(3)(a), which provided for a sentence of "not less than the longest prescribed for a first conviction but in no event less than twenty years and not more than his natural life." Accordingly, the enhanced sentence is unlawful and must be vacated.

Section 15:529.1(D)(1)(b) requires a defendant challenging the validity of an alleged prior conviction to file a particularized written response before sentencing; otherwise the challenge cannot later be used to attack the sentence, and the provision allocates the burdens of proof.

State v. Winfrey · filed 1997-10-28(D)(1)(b)

In 1993, the legislature enacted La.R.S. 15:529.1(D)(1)(b) to "establish the procedure to be followed to attack the validity of a prior conviction" and "to set forth burdens of proof. 1993 La.Acts 896. Article 15:529.1(D)(1)(b) provides as follows: ... Any challenge to a previous conviction or adjudication of delinquency which is not made before sentence is imposed may not thereafter be raised to attack the sentence. (Emphasis added). ... However, in the interests of justice or judicial economy we will address the issue. See: State v. Cittadino, 628 So.2d 251, 254 (La.App. 5th Cir.1993). ... According to the jurisprudential and statutory scheme cited above, the burden then shifted to defendant to affirmatively prove an infringement existed on his rights or a procedural irregularity occurred in the taking of the plea itself. State v. Conrad, 646 So.2d at 1064. ... Because defendant failed to introduce evidence that affirmatively proved an irregularity during the prior guilty plea or an infringement of his rights, defendant has not met his burden of proof. Id.

Section 529.1(D)(3) requires the court to vacate a previously imposed sentence when sentencing a defendant as an habitual offender; otherwise, the original sentence remains effective and the habitual-offender sentence is void.

Hudson v. Day · filed 1997-11-07D(3)

La.R.S. 15:529.1 D(3) states, in part, as follows: “When the judge finds that [defendant] has been convicted of a prior felony ..., the court shall sentence him to the punishment prescribed in this Section, and shall vacate the previous sentence if already imposed, deducting from the new sentence the time actually served under the sentence so vacated.” (emphasis added) If the court failed to vacate the original sentence at the time of the sentencing of defendant as an habitual offender, the original sentence remains in effect and the subsequent sentence as a multiple offender is null and void. State v. Jackson, 95-423, p. 6 (La.App. 5th Cir. 11/15/95), 665 So.2d 467, |3469 (and eases cited therein). The defendant can receive only one sentence for the underlying crime. In the event of a conflict between the minutes and the sentencing transcript, on an issue relative to sentencing, the transcript controls. State v. Fisher, 628 So.2d 1136, 1138 n. 1 (La.App. 1st Gir.1993), writs denied, 94-0226 (La.5/20/94), 637 So.2d 474 & 94-0321 (La.5/20/94), 637 So.2d 476.

For habitual-offender treatment, the cleansing period in effect when the latest felony is committed controls; applying the current extended period does not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause.

State v. Roach · filed 1997-11-26(C)

Furthermore, in State v. Brinson, 97-1471 (La.App. 4th Cir. 9/3/97), 699 So.2d 510, we recently held that the cleansing period in effect at the time of the latest offense controlled for purposes of LSA-R.S. 15:529.1 and the application of the current cleansing period did not violate the Ex Post Facto clause.

For a second felony offender convicted of distribution of cocaine, Section 15:529.1(A)(1)(a) permits a sentence ranging from 15 to 60 years.

State v. McIntyre · filed 1998-01-27(A)(1)(a)

As a second felony offender, defendant could have received a sentence that ranged between 15 and 60 years. La. R.S. 40:967(B)(1); La.R.S. 15:529.1(A)(1)(a). Defendant's sentence of 20 years is toward the low end of the range for the offense.

Section 15:529.1(D)(1)(b) requires a defendant to specifically challenge the validity of predicate convictions before sentencing and bars a later challenge to those convictions in attacking the habitual-offender sentence.

State v. Hayes · filed 1998-05-15(D)(1)(b)

However, a thorough review of the record indicates that the defendant failed to preserve the instant challenges to the predicate offenses charged against him in the state's habitual offender information. The defendant failed to file a written response to the information attacking the validity of the predicate offenses charged therein and setting forth, with particularity, his claims and the factual bases therefor. See La. R.S. 15:529.1(D)(1)(b). "Any challenge to a previous conviction ... which is not made before sentence is imposed may not thereafter be raised to attack the sentence." La. R.S. 15:529.1(D)(1)(b).

After a court has established that the defendant is a second habitual offender, resentencing him as a second offender after vacating a third-offender adjudication does not require a second habitual-offender hearing.

State v. Kennerson · filed 1998-06-03

Based on this court's analysis, the Harris County convictions and one of the Jefferson County convictions were not shown to be equivalent to Louisiana felonies, as required by La.R.S. 15:529.1. ... This court thoroughly reviewed the habitual offender proceeding and confirmed that the State had in fact proven that Defendant was a second habitual offender. The trial court was not required to conduct another habitual offender hearing in order to establish Defendant was a second habitual offender. ... A second habitual offender hearing was not necessary since the State did not try to enhance Defendant's sentence as a third habitual offender. Therefore, this assignment lacks merit.

A defendant's failure to file a written response to the habitual offender bill of information precludes appellate review of a challenge to the use of a prior conviction.

State v. Smith · filed 1998-06-03(D)(1)(b)

But the defendant failed to preserve this issue for appellate review because he did not file a written response to the habitual offender bill of information. State v. Cossee, 95-2218 (La.App. 4 Cir. 7/24/96), 678 So.2d 72; La. R.S. 15:529.1(D)(1)(b). The record contains no written response to the multiple bill, and there was no oral objection made at the multiple bill hearing to the use of the prior conviction. Therefore, appellate review of whether defendant was properly Boykinized on the prior conviction is precluded.

As applied to a juvenile convicted of a non-homicide offense, Section 15:529.1(A)(3)(b)'s life-without-parole sentence is illegal under Graham and must allow parole consideration based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation.

State of Louisiana v. Thayer Green · filed 2017-06-29(A)(3)(b)

Thus, we conclude Graham is applicable to defendant’s life sentence imposed pursuant to the Habitual Offender Law. Therefore, we hold defendant’s enhanced sentence as a third felony offender to life imprisonment without parole for the home invasion committed as a juvenile is illegal under Graham and can be corrected at any time pursuant to La. C.Cr.P. art. 882.

Section 15:529.1 permits a juvenile adjudication to enhance a later felony sentence only when the juvenile offense is a qualifying narcotics offense or a listed crime of violence.

State v. Ayche · filed 1998-07-28(A)

La. R.S. 15:529 allows the use of a juvenile adjudication of guilt to enhance the sentence for a subsequent felony conviction where the juvenile offense is one involving distribution or possession with intent to distribute narcotics, or is one of the crimes of violence listed under paragraph (2) of subsection A. ... It appears, then, that the juvenile conviction should not have been used to enhance defendant's sentence.

Section 15:529.1 requires the original sentence to be vacated before a multiple-offender sentence is imposed and requires the multiple bill to be filed within a reasonable time after the prosecution learns of the prior felony record.

State v. Taylor · filed 1998-07-29(D)(3), (D)

The trial court must vacate the original sentence before imposing sentence under the multiple bill. La.R.S. 15:529.1(D)(3). ... La.R.S. 15:529.1(D) provides that if, at any time either after conviction or sentence, it appears that a person convicted of a felony has previously been convicted of another felony, the defendant may be charged as a habitual offender. Although the statute does not contain a prescriptive period for filing a multiple bill, such a bill must be filed within a reasonable time after the prosecution becomes aware of the defendant's prior felony record.

Section 15:529.1(F) makes specified prison records prima facie evidence of imprisonment and discharge, while § 15:529.1(A)(2)(b) requires the current and two prior felonies to be listed violent offenses or crimes punishable by more than twelve years for a life sentence.

State v. Johnson · filed 1998-08-19(F), (A)(2)(b)

Documents certified by the warden of a state prison, containing the name of the person imprisoned, photograph and fingerprints of the person, a statement of the court in which the conviction was had, the date of sentence, the length of sentence and the date of discharge, shall be prima facie evidence of the imprisonment and the discharge under the conviction stated and set forth in the certificate. La. R.S. 15:529.1(F). ... The applicable enhancement statute is the one existing at the time of the commission of the offense for which the sentence is to be enhanced. ... On that date, the “violent offender” provision, at La. R.S. 15:529.1(A)(2)(b), provided for life imprisonment “[i]f the third felony and each of the two prior felonies involved a violation of R.S. 14:34 [aggravated battery], R.S. 14:62.1 [simple burglary of a pharmacy], R.S. 14:62.2 [simple burglary of an inhabited dwelling], R.S. 14:62.3 [unauthorized entry of an inhabited dwelling], R.S. 14:65 [simple robbery], R.S. 14:110(B) [simple escape], or of any crime punishable by imprisonment for more than twelve years.” ... The possession of cocaine conviction was punishable by a maximum of five years. Thus, that conviction did not qualify as a violent offense as set forth in the relevant sentencing statute on the date of the commission of the instant offense.

Section 15:529.1's mandatory sentence is presumed constitutional, but a trial court may reduce it when clear and convincing evidence shows that applying it to a particular offender would be constitutionally excessive; such departures are reserved for truly rare, atypical cases.

State v. Burns · filed 1998-11-10(A)(1)(c)(ii)

The penalties provided by La. R.S. 15:529.1 are not unconstitutional on their face. State v. Pollard, 93-0660 (La.10/20/94), 644 So.2d 370. The trial court has the authority to reduce the mandatory minimum sentence provided by the statute for a particular offense and offender when such a term would violate the defendant's constitutional protection against excessive punishment. Id. Because the minimum sentence is presumed constitutional, a trial court, in considering whether the minimum sentence for a particular crime would be unconstitutional if applied to a particular defendant, may do so only if there is clear and convincing evidence to rebut the presumption of constitutionality. State v. Johnson, 97-1906 (La.3/4/98), 709 So.2d 672, 677. ... The court sought to make intelligible the holding of State v. Dorthey, supra, and to make it understood that a downward departure from the mandatory sentences of La. R.S. 15:529.1 is only available in truly rare situations and cannot be premised solely on the nonviolent nature of the current or prior offenses. Rather, the defendant must be atypical in that the legislature did not meaningfully circumscribe a proper sentence tailored to accommodate the circumstances of the particular case.

Section 15:529.1(A)(1) permits a prior out-of-state felony conviction to support a second-felony-offender adjudication when the Louisiana offense most analogous to it is a felony.

State v. Medious · filed 1998-11-25(A)(1)

Furthermore, defendant's prior conviction was obtained in Mississippi, for one count of burglary of a dwelling, in violation of then Miss.Code Ann. § 97-17-19[4].9 The defendant committed the predicate offense on November 21,1986, at which time the Louisiana statute most analogous to Miss.Code Ann. 97-17-19 was LSA-R.S. 14:62.2, which provided for the felony offense of simple burglary of an inhabited dwelling. Accordingly, defendant's prior conviction in Mississippi could be used to adjudicate defendant a second felony offender. La. R.S. 15:529.1(A)(1).

For a third felony offender whose new offense carries a maximum sentence of five years, Subparagraph (A)(2)(a) limits the sentence to ten years unless the prior-offense requirements for the life sentence in Subparagraph (A)(2)(b) are met.

State v. Ballay · filed 1999-01-13(A)(2)(a), (A)(2)(b)

The bill of information filed on October 9, 1996 indicated that the conviction forming the basis for the multiple bill was the defendant's 1996 conviction for second-degree battery, an offense that constitutes a crime of violence under La. R.S. 14:2(13). Pursuant to La. R.S. 14:34.1, the maximum penalty for committing a second degree battery is five years and/or a maximum fine of two thousand dollars. Thus, unless the requirements of La. R.S. 15:529.1(A)(2)(b) were met, the maximum sentence the defendant could have received pursuant to La. R.S. 15:529.1(A)(2)(a) as a third felony offender was ten years. ... Because it does not appear that either of the two prior offenses were crimes of violence, crimes for a violation of the Controlled Substance Law punishable by imprisonment for more than five years, or crimes punishable by imprisonment for more than twelve years, the provisions of La. R.S. 15:529.1(A)(2)(b) do not apply. In fact, it is not clear that any of the prior offenses would meet the requirements set forth in La. R.S. 15:529.1(A)(2)(b).[1] ... Because the trial court erroneously sentenced the defendant to an illegal sentence, the defendant's sentences must be vacated and the case remanded for resentencing pursuant to the provisions of La. R.S. 15:529.1 in effect at the time of the commission of the instant offense.

The Habitual Offender Statute allows a downward departure from its mandatory minimum sentence only in rare cases when the defendant clearly and convincingly shows that the minimum sentence is constitutionally excessive.

State v. Gass · filed 1999-01-20

In summary, though the trial judge set forth reasons which would support a sentence at the lower end of the range prescribed by the Habitual Offender Statute, the reasons did not support the result that a deviation was warranted. In short, the trial court did not articulate, and the defendants did not show by clear and convincing evidence, that they were the rare defendants envisioned by State v. Johnson for which the mandatory minimum sentence for attempted armed robbery as adjudicated second felony offenders was constitutionally excessive. State v. Johnson, supra.[3] As such, this court vacates the sentence and remands this case for re-sentencing within the prescribed range.

Section 15:529.1 permits qualifying records to establish prior convictions, bars a challenge to prior pleas not raised at the habitual-offender hearing, requires life imprisonment when the fourth felony is a crime of violence, and treats offenses committed within the applicable cleansing period as timely predicates.

State v. Jackson · filed 1999-01-20(A)(1)(c)(ii), (D)(1)(b), (F), (C)

The documents introduced by the state met the initial burden of proof required by Shelton and do not affirmatively disclose a Boykin defect. The defendant did not complain at the hearing of any such defect in his prior pleas; thus, he is not entitled to raise that complaint now. ... The pertinent statute is La. R.S. 15:529.1(F), which provides, in part: ... The certificates of the warden or other chief officer of any state prison, or of the superintendent or other chief officer of any penitentiary of this state or any other state of the United States, or of any foreign country, or of any chief officer of any parish or county jail in this state or any other state of the United States, or of the clerk of court of the place of conviction in the state of Louisiana, under the seal of his office, if he has a seal, containing the name of the person imprisoned, the photograph, and the fingerprints of the person as they appear in the records of his office, a statement of the court in which a conviction was had, the date and time of sentence, length of time imprisoned, and date of discharge from prison or penitentiary, shall be prima facie evidence of the imprisonment and of the discharge of the person, either by a pardon or expiration of his sentence as the case may be under the conviction stated and set forth in the certificate. ... The pen pack presents no obvious hearsay problem. The court did not err in admitting this evidence. ... Because the defendant is a fourth felony offender and his fourth felony is a crime of violence, La. R.S. 15:529.1(A)(1)(c)(ii) provides that his sentence is life imprisonment at hard labor without benefit of parole, probation or suspension of sentence. The statute is neither vague nor ambiguous. ... The state needed to prove nothing else to satisfy its burden under La. R.S. 15:529.1(C).

Section 15:529.1(G) makes a habitual-offender sentence ineligible for probation or suspension of sentence, but does not prohibit parole eligibility.

State v. Brual · filed 1999-01-26(G)

Finally, we note that the trial court erred in imposing defendant's June 5, 1998 multiple offender sentence without the benefit of parole. La. R.S. 15:529.1 G provides that "[a]ny sentence imposed under the provisions of this Section shall be without benefit of probation or suspension of sentence." The statute does not prohibit parole eligibility for multiple offenders.

Sections 15:529.1(A)(1)(b)(i) and 15:529.1(G) do not give a trial court additional authority to restrict a third offender's parole eligibility.

State v. Watts · filed 1999-01-29(A)(1)(b)(i) and (G)

La.R.S. 14:69 does not deny parole eligibility on any sentence imposed for possession of stolen things and neither La.R.S. 15:529.1(A)(1)(b)(i) nor La.R.S. 15:529.1(G) gives the trial court any additional authority to place restrictions on the parole eligibility of a third offender.

Section 15:529.1(A)(1)(a) increases a second felony offender's sentence by reference to the longest term prescribed for the underlying offense, while the sentence's parole conditions come from that underlying offense.

State v. Rowell · filed 1999-02-10(A)(1)(a)

After all is said and done, although this defendant was sentenced as a habitual offender, the penalty provisions of the underlying offense (by La. R.S. 14:27 and 14:30) are the reference provisions on which the penalty increase is calculated. As stated by the Louisiana Supreme Court in State v. Bruins, 407 So.2d 685 (La. 1981), "It is not a crime to be a habitual offender. The statute increases the sentence for a recidivist. The penalty increase is computed by reference to the sentencing provisions of the underlying offense. Similarly, the conditions imposed on the sentence are those called for in reference statute." Id. at 687.

Section 15:529.1 requires procedural notice and an opportunity to object in habitual-offender proceedings, but such lapses are harmless absent prejudice, and it mandates life imprisonment for a qualifying third-felony offender even without a violent crime.

State v. Finch · filed 1999-02-24(D)(1)(a), (D)(1)(b), (A)(2)(b)(ii)

While it is preferable that the trial court adhere to the simple procedural requirements of La. R.S. 15:529.1(D)(1), any such procedural error in the instant case is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, and defendant's adjudication as a third-felony habitual offender was surely unattributable to any such error. ... La. R.S. 15:529.1(A)(2)(b)(ii) provides that a third-felony habitual offender shall be sentenced to life imprisonment if any one of the three felonies is a violation of the Uniform Controlled Dangerous Substances Law punishable by imprisonment for more than five years, or any other crime punishable by imprisonment for more than twelve years. ... While there is no indication that the defendant is a violent person, it should be noted that a violent crime is not a requirement for mandatory sentencing to life imprisonment under La. R.S. 15:529.1(A)(2)(b)(ii).

Section 15:529.1(C) requires the State to prove that prior convictions fall within the statute’s 10-year cleansing period, and § 15:529.1(D)(l)(b) requires a defendant to file a particularized written response to preserve challenges to the habitual-offender bill for appeal.

State v. Richmond · filed 1999-03-10(C), (D)(l)(b)

The State must further show that the Rprior convictions fall within the 10 year cleansing period prescribed by La. R.S. 15:529.1(C). ... In this case, defendant failed to file a written response to the bill of information, setting forth with particularity her claim and the factual basis for it, as mandated by La.R.S. 15:529.1(D)(l)(b). ... Accordingly, she cannot raise those issues now to attack her sentence as a third felony offender.

Section 15.529.1 permits prior convictions used to establish felon-in-possession status to also enhance a separate sentence under the habitual-offender law, because that is not double enhancement when the convictions are used only once for each separate conviction.

State of Louisiana v. Arthur Bias, Jr. · filed 2011-05-04

Based on the clear holdings of the supreme court, we find that the State did not commit double enhancement in using the prior convictions of simple robbery only once to support Defendant’s conviction as a felon in possession of a firearm and only once to enhance Defendant’s sentence for attempted armed robbery. Thus, this assignment lacks merit.

Section 15:529.1 enhances punishment for recidivism, but the defendant must first be sentenced on the current conviction before the enhanced sentence is imposed and the original sentence is vacated.

State of Louisiana v. Adrian A. Dorsey A/K/A Adrian Anton Dorsey · filed 2018-11-07(D)(3)

The habitual offender law, La.R.S. 15:529.1, as the name implies, is a legislative punishment scheme designed to increase or enhance punishment based on recidivism. ... It follows logically that a sentence for a particular crime should not be “enhanced” under the habitual offender law until the defendant has first been sentenced for the original crime. The trial judge then must, in most circumstances, vacate the original sentence before imposing the enhanced sentence under the habitual offender law. A fortiori, a sentence cannot be vacated if it has never been imposed.

Subsection (K)(2) gives qualifying offenders the reduced cleansing period while their enhanced sentences are calculated using the penalties in effect on the offense date.

State of Louisiana v. Quinton Damone Hill · filed 2020-03-04(K)(2)

It appears that Hill may qualify for the third category, those “persons whose convictions became final on or after November 1, 2017, and whose habitual offender bills were filed on or after August 1, 2018 [the effective date of Act 542].” Those persons are eligible to receive the benefit of the reduced cleansing period, but their sentences are calculated with reference to the penalties in effect of the date of the offense. Lyles, supra at 410; La. R.S. 15:529.1(K)(2).

Subsection K(2) applies the reduced cleansing period in the 2017 amendments to habitual-offender bills filed on or after November 1, 2017.

State of Louisiana v. Sharp · filed 2020-11-18(K)(2)

Under the facts provided in Lyles, Mr. Sharp falls within category three. Specifically, Mr. Sharp’s habitual offender adjudication and sentencing occurred before the opinion in Lyles was rendered and the trial court applied the ten-year cleansing period as provided in the 2016 version of the habitual offender law. Accordingly, the trial court must now contemplate whether Subsection K(2) added by Act 542 will have any effect upon the applicable cleansing period. ... As such, we are required to vacate Mr. Sharp’s sentence and remand the case to the trial court for resentencing in consideration of Lyles, supra and so Mr. Sharp can be advised of his post-conviction rights.

Section 529.1(C)(1) requires the State to prove that the five-year cleansing period has not elapsed by showing the actual discharge dates for relevant predicate offenses, while Section 529.1(4)(a) sets a fourth-offender sentence at least as long as the longest first-offense term, with a twenty-year minimum and natural-life maximum.

State of Louisiana v. Barras · filed 2021-02-03(C)(1), (4)(a)

Defendant is correct in observing that in a habitual offender proceeding, the State must prove that the five-year “cleansing period’ has not elapsed between offenses. In setting forth such proof, the State must show the actual discharge date for the relevant predicate offense or offenses. ... Evidence on this issue may be supported with such materials as records from predicate offenses, “rap sheets,” and parole board documents. ... In the present case, the State introduced the “pen packet” and the minutes related to each relevant offense. ... Based on the timeline discussed, the State demonstrated that the cleansing period never elapsed and thus the habitual offender adjudication was valid. ... As a fourth habitual offender, Defendant was subject to sentencing as set forth in La.R.S. 15:529.1, which states in pertinent part: ... Pursuant to La.R.S. 15:529.1(4)(a), the potential term was “not less that the longest prescribed for a first conviction but in no event less than twenty years and not more than his natural life.” ... We do not find the district court abused its sentencing discretion by ordering maximum sentences.

Under the ameliorated habitual-offender provision, a third felony offender receives a mandatory life sentence only when the third felony and both prior felonies satisfy specified violent-crime or drug-offense criteria; otherwise, the statute provides a determinate sentencing range.

State of Louisiana v. Williams · filed 2021-09-29(A)

However, under the more lenient sentencing provisions enacted in 2001, made retroactive by La. R.S. 15:308, the relevant habitual offender provision mandates a life sentence only if the third felony and the two prior felonies be crimes of violence or violations of the Uniform Controlled Dangerous Substances Law punishable by ten years or more. ... The more lenient sentencing provision that now applies to Relator provides that “[t]he person shall be sentenced to imprisonment for a determinate term not less than one-half of the longest possible sentence for the [third felony] conviction and not more than twice the longest possible sentence prescribed for a first conviction.” La. R.S. 15:529.1(A).

Section 15.529.1(A)(4)(b) requires a fourth-felony offender in the circumstances described to receive at least twenty years and no more than twice the longest first-conviction sentence, while § 15.529.1(C)(1)'s five-year cleansing period does not lapse until correctional supervision ends; here, continued supervision meant the period had not elapsed.

State of Louisiana v. Richard · filed 2022-05-18(A)(4)(b) (C)(1)

Defendant is La.R.S. 15:529.1(A)(4)(b): ... If the fourth felony and no prior felony is defined as a crime of violence under R.S. 14:2(B) or as a sex offense under R.S. 15:541, the person shall be imprisoned for not less than twenty years nor more than twice the longest possible sentence prescribed for a first conviction. If twice the possible sentence prescribed for a first conviction is less than twenty years, the person shall be imprisoned for twenty years. ... Accordingly, the habitual offender sentencing range for each of the CDS offenses within a drug free zone is imprisonment for twenty to thirty years at hard labor, without benefit of probation or suspension of sentence, and with two years to be served without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence. ... In “linking” up the defendant’s prior convictions, the date that a defendant is actually discharged from state custody and supervision is the date upon which the cleansing period begins. ... While a defendant is on parole, he is still in state custody. ... Thus, the cleansing period does not begin until the defendant’s parole ends. ... Therefore, the five-year cleansing period did not lapse between the end of Defendant’s supervision on the 2005 offense and the commission of the 2011 offense. Accordingly, this assignment of error has no merit.

Section 15.529.1(A)(3)(a) requires a third-felony offender whose third felony is punishable by less than life imprisonment to receive a determinate sentence ranging from two-thirds of the maximum first-offense sentence to twice that maximum.

State of Louisiana v. McKnight · filed 2021-03-03(A)(3)(a)

The version of La. R.S. 15:529.1 applicable at the time of this offense provided, in pertinent part: ... (a) The person shall be sentenced to imprisonment for a determinate term not less than two-thirds of the longest possible sentence for the conviction and not more than twice the longest possible sentence prescribed for a first conviction. (Emphasis added.) ... At the time McKnight committed forcible rape, La. R.S. 14:42.1 imposed a hard labor sentence of not less than 5 nor more than 40 years. Thus, for his third-felony habitual offender adjudication, McKnight faced potential sentencing exposure of 26.6-80 years at hard labor under La. R.S. 15:529.1(A)(3)(a).

For a third-felony habitual offender, the statute sets the applicable sentencing range and requires hard labor without probation or suspension; parole eligibility is determined by the underlying offense, so an armed-robbery sentence is also without parole.

State of Louisiana v. Gay · filed 2021-06-30(A)(1)(b)(i), (A)(1)(b)(ii), and (G)

These more lenient penalty provisions apply to habitual offenders convicted or sentenced under La. R.S. 15:529.1(A)(1)(b)(ii) and (c)(ii), provided that their application ameliorates the person’s circumstances. ... As amended, La. R.S. 15:529.1(A)(1)(b)(i) now provides that a third-felony offender shall be sentenced to imprisonment for a determinate term not less than two-thirds of the longest possible sentence for the conviction and not more than twice the longest possible sentence prescribed for a first conviction. ... La. R.S. 15:529.1(G) states that any sentence imposed under the habitual offender provisions shall be at hard labor without benefit of probation or suspension of sentence. ... Therefore, when armed robbery is the underlying conviction for the third felony habitual offender adjudication, the habitual offender sentence shall be served without benefit of parole.

For a third-felony offender whose third felony is armed robbery, the statute required a sentence of 66 to 198 years at hard labor without benefits under the law applicable here, subject to a rare constitutional downward departure.

State of Louisiana v. Burns · filed 2021-06-30(A)(3)(a)

The record shows the trial court properly sentenced Burns under La. R.S. 15:529.1. His sentencing range was 66-198 years, so the imposed term of 66 years, the mandatory minimum, is statutorily compliant. By law, the sentence was to be imposed without probation, parole, or suspension of sentence.

Section 15:529.1 applies the habitual-offender sentencing range in effect when the instant felony was committed, permits a constitutionally excessive sentence to be reduced only with stated reasons and the most severe nonexcessive sentence imposed, and requires advising the defendant of the habitual-offender allegations, hearing right, and right to remain silent.

State of Louisiana v. Hawthorne · filed 2021-09-22(A)(1), (I), (D)(1)(a)

Section 2 of both Acts stated that its effective date was November 1, 2017, and it “shall have prospective application only to offenders whose convictions became final on or after November 1, 2017.” Hawthorne was convicted on January 28, 2020. ... La. R.S. 15:529.1 was again amended by Act 542 of 2018 to add Subsection (K), which states in its first paragraph, “Except as provided in Paragraph (2) of this Subsection, notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary, the court shall apply the provisions of this Section that were in effect on the date that the defendant’s instant offense was committed.” ... The armed robbery was committed on September 28, 2016. Under the Habitual Offender Law in existence at the time, Hawthorne faced an habitual offender sentence of “not less than one-half the longest term and not more than twice the longest term prescribed for a first conviction.” La. R.S. 15:529.1(A)(1). ... Upon resentencing, the trial court should be mindful that as stated in La. R.S. 15:529.1(I): “If the court finds that a sentence imposed under the provisions of this Section would be constitutionally excessive pursuant to the criteria set forth in State v. Dorthey, 623 So. 2d 1276 (La. 1993), then the court shall state for the record the reasons for such finding and shall impose the most severe sentence that is not constitutionally excessive.” ... La. R.S. 15:529.1(D)(1)(a) requires that the defendant be advised of the specific allegations contained in the habitual offender bill of information and his right to a formal hearing at which the State must prove its case. Implicit in this requirement is the additional requirement that the defendant be advised of his constitutional right to remain silent.

Section 15:529.1 requires a third-felony offender whose first-conviction penalty is less than life imprisonment to receive a determinate sentence of at least two-thirds of the longest possible sentence for the conviction and no more than twice that sentence.

State of Louisiana v. Vinson · filed 2021-11-17(A)(3)(a)

Therefore, pursuant to La. R.S. 15:529.1, Vinson’s sentence should have been two-thirds of his longest possible sentence, which in this case, is 20 years.

Section 15:529.1(A)(4)(a) requires a fourth or subsequent felony offender to receive a determinate sentence of at least the longest term prescribed for a first conviction, but at least twenty years and no more than life imprisonment.

State of Louisiana v. Cooley · filed 2022-10-05(A)(4)(a)

counts five through eight involve non-violent drug offenses, and on appeal, this court vacated the life sentences on counts five through eight and remanded for resentencing under La.R.S. 15:529.1(A)(4)(a). Cooley, 329 So.3d 870. This article provides, “The person shall be sentenced to imprisonment for the fourth or subsequent felony for a determinate term not less than the longest prescribed for a first conviction but in no event less than twenty years and not more than his natural life.” Therefore, the sentencing ranges as a fourth habitual offender for possession of morphine sulphate, attempted possession of temazepam, attempted possession of zolpidem tartrate, and attempted possession of tramadol are not less than twenty years but not more than life imprisonment.

For a fourth-felony offender, the former (A)(1)(c)(ii) required life imprisonment when the qualifying offenses met its listed categories, while (A)(1)(c)(i) authorized a determinate term from the longest first-offense sentence up to life.

State of Louisiana Versus Johnny Lee · filed 2023-03-01(A)(1)(c)(ii), (A)(1)(c)(i)

Under La. R.S. 15:529.1(A)(1)(c)(ii) in 1995, the defendant was properly sentenced to life imprisonment as a fourth-felony offender; however, in 2001, after the amendment, the defendant’s underlying and predicate crimes no longer subjected him to a mandatory life sentence. Under La. R.S. 15:529.1(A)(1)(c)(i) in 1995, defendant’s sentence as a fourth-felony offender with his predicate convictions would have been for a determinate term not less than the longest prescribed for a first conviction, which would have been ninety-nine years, the maximum sentence for armed robbery, and not more than his natural life. See La. R.S. 14:64. On October 27, 2021, the trial court resentenced defendant to imprisonment for ninety-nine years, the minimum sentence under the statute.

Section 15.529.1(A)(1) sets the habitual-offender sentencing range at one-third to twice the longest term for the underlying crime.

State of Louisiana v. Ladray Bias, Jr. · filed 2023-03-29(A)(1)

Under La.R.S. 14:27(D)(1)(a) and 14:30.1, the sentencing range for attempted second degree murder is ten to fifty years. Thus, the State correctly stated the applicable habitual offender sentencing range under La.R.S. 15:529.1(A)(1), which prescribes a sentence of not less than one-third of the longest term nor more than twice the longest term for a first offense of the crime at issue.

Section 15:529.1(G) requires multiple-offender sentences to be imposed without probation or suspension of sentence, but it does not itself impose a parole restriction.

State of Louisiana Versus Terez Ard · filed 2021-04-28(G)

While La. R.S. 15:529.1(G) requires all multiple offender sentences to be imposed without benefit of probation or suspension of sentence, it does not impose a parole restriction.

Subsection (G) requires a habitual-offender enhanced sentence to be served at hard labor and without probation or suspension of sentence; parole restrictions come from the referenced underlying statute.

State of Louisiana Versus Reginald Bradley · filed 2022-12-21(G)

The transcript reflects that the trial court did not state that the enhanced sentence was to be served at hard labor although La. R.S. 15:529.1(G) requires the sentence to be served at hard labor. ... Because La. R.S. 15:529.1(G) requires the enhanced sentence to be served at hard labor, affording the trial judge no discretion, no corrective action is necessary. ... La. R.S. 15:529.1(G) requires the enhanced sentence to be imposed without the benefit of probation or suspension of sentence. Also, the restrictions on parole eligibility imposed on habitual offender sentences under La. R.S. 15:529.1 are those called for in the referenced statute. ... Therefore, the trial judge correctly ordered defendant’s enhanced sentence to be served without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence.

Section 15.529.1(G) requires habitual offender sentences to exclude probation and suspension of sentence but does not itself impose a parole restriction.

State of Louisiana Versus Jeremy M. Dubourg · filed 2023-03-01(G)

While La. R.S. 15:529.1(G) requires all habitual offender sentences to be imposed without benefit of probation or suspension of sentence, it does not impose a parole restriction. Rather, when a defendant is sentenced as a habitual offender, it is the penalty provision for the underlying offense that imposes a parole restriction.

Section 15:529.1(D)(1)(a) requires a defendant who denies, refuses to answer, or remains silent in response to a habitual offender bill to be given 15 days to file particular objections.

State of Louisiana v. Taylor · filed 2021-05-05(D)(1)(a)

La. R.S. 15:529.1 is clear and unambiguous. The provision is mandatory and requires that a defendant be given 15 days in which to respond to a habitual bill of information filed against him if he either denies the allegation of the information, refuses to answer, or remains silent. In response to the multiple offender bill filed against him, Taylor remained silent; as such, he should have been afforded 15 days in which to file objections to the bill. Therefore, it is our position that Taylor was not precluded from bringing this error on appeal despite not having objected to it at trial.

Subsection (A)(1)(c)(ii) requires a mandatory life sentence for a fourth felony offender when the current crime of violence and the two qualifying prior convictions meet the statute's specified offense and sentencing-range criteria.

State of Louisiana v. Gaddis · filed 2021-11-17(A)(1)(c)(ii)

However, in reviewing this matter on appeal, we conclude our prior determination was incorrect. As the state points out in its brief, the requirements for imposition of the mandatory life sentence under R.S. 15:529.1(A)(1)(c)(ii) have been satisfied by the combination of defendant’s conviction for manslaughter, a crime of violence, with his prior convictions of distribution of a controlled dangerous substance, with a sentencing range of 2 to 30 years, and simple burglary of an inhabited dwelling, with a sentencing range of 1 to 12 years.

Section 15:529.1(C) requires the state to prove that predicate convictions fall within the applicable cleansing period, which begins on the offender's actual discharge date.

State of Louisiana v. Taylor · filed 2021-11-17(C)

The state bears the burden of proving that the predicate convictions fall within the “cleansing period” provided by La. R.S. 15:529.1(C). State v. Meadows, 51,980 (La. App. 2 Cir. 4/11/18), 247 So. 3d 1018. The Louisiana Supreme Court has long held that the actual discharge date is what activates the cleansing period. State v. Meadows, supra; State v. Casaday, supra.

Under La. R.S. 15:529.1, convictions used to enhance a habitual-offender sentence must count toward the offender-status determination; when predicate convictions are vacated, the defendant's status changes and an enhanced sentence exceeding the applicable maximum is illegal.

Ex Rel Joseph Barnes Versus Tim Hooper Warden · filed 2022-07-22

Relator was adjudicated a fourth felony offender on both counts of sexual battery and was thereafter sentenced to concurrent terms of life imprisonment. Relator has provided documentation in support of his motion to correct illegal sentence to show that two of the three predicate offenses used to enhance his multiple offender sentences have been vacated as a result of two separate post-conviction proceedings in Orleans Parish Criminal District Court. In the absence of these two prior convictions for simple robbery and attempted armed robbery, relator would no longer be a fourth felony offender, and the life sentences that were imposed exceed the maximum penalties he could have received without the prior convictions counted in the offender status ladder.

Section 15:529.1(A)(1)(b)(i) is the appropriate habitual-offender provision for the sentence at issue.

State Of Louisiana v. Wilson · filed 2022-08-12(A)(1)(b)(i)

Relator was sentenced under La. R.S. 15:529.1(A) (1) (b) (i), the appropriate subsection and subparagraph of the habitual offender statute.

For this third-felony offender, the applicable mandatory minimum under the Habitual Offender Law could be reduced only upon a clear and convincing showing that the sentence was constitutionally excessive in an exceptional, rare case.

State of Louisiana Versus Emile Pierce · filed 2022-10-31(A)(1)(b)(ii)

Taking into account the legislature’s constitutional authority to enact statutes such as the Habitual Offender Law, the sentencing court is only allowed to determine whether the particular defendant before it has proven that the mandatory minimum sentence is so excessive in his case that it violates our constitution. Id. Applying these principles, we evaluate whether defendant clearly and convincingly established that the sixty-six year minimum sentence required by the Habitual Offender Law was excessive under the facts and circumstances of this case. In addition, while recognizing that the minimum is presumed constitutional, we examine the reasons given by the district judge for departing from the mandatory minimum sentence and finding defendant an exceptional and rare case.

Section 15:529.1(A)(1)'s mandatory minimum is presumed constitutional, and a court may depart downward only upon clear and convincing evidence that the defendant is exceptional and the minimum sentence is unconstitutionally excessive.

State of Louisiana v. Hawthorne · filed 2023-01-11(A)(1)

A trial court may reduce a defendant’s sentence to one not unconstitutionally excessive if the trial court finds that the sentence mandated by the Habitual Offender Law “makes no measurable contribution to acceptable goals of punishment,” or is nothing more than “the purposeful imposition of pain and suffering” and is “grossly out of proportion to the severity of the crime.” Johnson, supra. A sentencing judge must always start with the presumption that a mandatory minimum sentence under the Habitual Offender Law is constitutional. A court may only depart from the minimum sentence if it finds that there is clear and convincing evidence in the particular case before it which would rebut this presumption of constitutionality. Johnson, supra; State v. Lindsey, 99-3302 (La. 10/17/00), 770 So. 2d 339; State v. Roland, 49,660 (La. App. 2 Cir. 2/27/15), 162 So. 3d 558, 568, writ denied, 2015-0596 (La. 2/19/16), 186 So. 3d 1174.

Section 15:529.1(D)(3) requires the court to vacate any previously imposed sentence before imposing a habitual-offender sentence.

State of Louisiana v. Marlin Devary Demouchet · filed 2022-11-16(D)(3)

Thus, vacation of the original sentence is required prior to the imposition of the habitual offender sentence.

Section 15:529.1 sets enhanced sentencing ranges for repeat felony offenders, requires enhanced sentences to omit probation and suspension, and leaves parole restrictions to the statute defining the underlying offense.

State of Louisiana v. Cassetti Dewayne Brown, Jr. · filed 2022-11-16(G), (A)(4)(a), (A)(3)(a)

Although La.R.S. 15:529.1(G) requires all enhanced sentences to be imposed without benefit of probation or suspension of sentence, it does not authorize the trial court to impose enhanced sentences without benefit of parole. “[T]he restrictions on parole eligibility imposed on multiple offender sentences under La.R.S. 15:529.1 ‘are those called for in the reference statute.’” ... Regarding the nature of the offenses, on counts one through three, Defendant was adjudicated a fourth felony habitual offender and sentenced to eighty years at hard labor pursuant to La.R.S. 15:529.1(A)(4)(a). ... At the time of the offenses, La.R.S. 15:529.1(A)(4)(a) provided for a sentence of “a determinate term not less than the longest prescribed for a first conviction but in no event less than twenty years and not more than his natural life[.]” ... On count four, Defendant was adjudicated a third felony habitual offender and sentenced to forty years at hard labor without the benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence pursuant to La.R.S. 15:529.1(A)(3)(a). At the time of the offense, La.R.S. 15:529.1(A)(3)(a) provided for a sentence of a “determinate term not less than two-thirds of the longest possible sentence for the conviction and not more than twice the possible sentence prescribed for a first conviction[.]”

Section 529.1 makes the parole restriction on a habitual-offender sentence track the restriction imposed by the statute defining the underlying offense.

State of Louisiana Versus Darryl v. Wade · filed 2023-02-27

The restrictions on parole eligibility imposed on habitual offender sentences under La. R.S. 15:529.1 are “those called for in the reference statute.” ... However, to ensure accuracy of the record, we remand this matter to the trial court to correct the multiple offender UCO and sentencing minute entry to reflect that the entire enhanced sentence is to be served without the benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence.

Section 15:529.1(G)'s requirement that an enhanced sentence be served without benefit of probation or suspension of sentence is self-activating, even when the sentencing record does not expressly state the restriction.

State of Louisiana Versus Cory W. Wall · filed 2022-12-07(G)

However, the transcript does not reflect that defendant’s enhanced sentence was to be served without benefit of probation or suspension of sentence in accordance with La. R.S. 15:529.1(G). Under State v. Williams, 00-1725 (La. 11/28/01), 800 So.2d 790, 799, and La. R.S. 15:301.1(A), the “without benefits” provision is self-activating.

For a prior offense that is neither a crime of violence nor a sex offense, § 15:529.1(C)(1) provides a five-year cleansing period measured between the current offense and expiration of correctional supervision or imprisonment.

State of Louisiana Versus Brandon L. Pike · filed 2022-12-28(C)(1)

Pursuant to the amendment to La. R.S. 15:529.1, for sentencing enhancement, where the prior offense was not a crime of violence or a sex offense, no more than five years may elapse between the “date of the commission of the current offense or offenses and the expiration of the correctional supervision, or term of imprisonment[.]” Here, the State set forth a predicate offense of unauthorized use of a motor vehicle, which is neither a crime of violence as defined in La. R.S. 14:2(B), nor a sex offense as defined in La. R.S. 15:541. As such, La. R.S. 15:529.1(C)(1) applies instead of La. R.S. 15:529.1(C)(2), and the applicable cleansing period is five years.

Subsection (G) makes parole restrictions on a habitual-offender sentence follow the reference statute.

State of Louisiana Versus Jontreal A. Fisher · filed 2020-12-23(G)

The restrictions on parole eligibility imposed on habitual offender sentences under La. R.S. 15:529.1 “are those called for in the reference statute.”

Section 15:529.1(A)(3)(a) set the applicable maximum enhanced sentence at 20 years in this case.

State of Louisiana v. Bell · filed 2021-01-13(A)(3)(a)

Consequently, the defendant in the instant case faced a maximum sentence of 20 years at hard labor.

Subsection (G)’s restriction on probation and suspension of sentence is self-activating.

State of Louisiana Versus Arthur Williams, Jr · filed 2021-04-28(G)

enhanced sentence under the habitual offender laws be imposed without the benefit of probation or suspension of sentence.

Subsection (B) counts same-day predicate convictions entered before October 19, 2004 as one conviction.

State of Louisiana v. Cooley · filed 2021-10-06(B)

Thus, they must be counted as one conviction since they were entered prior to October 19, 2004. La.R.S. 15:529.1(B).

Section 15:529.1 implicitly requires the trial court to advise a defendant of the right to remain silent in a habitual-offender proceeding.

State of Louisiana Versus John B. Gustave, Jr. · filed 2022-12-28(D)(1)(a)

15:529.1 also implicitly requires that the trial court advise defendant of his right to remain silent.

Subsection (D) permits a habitual-offender bill to be filed after the defendant’s conviction and sentence.

State of Louisiana v. Marlon Antwan Miller · filed 2023-01-11(D)

A defendant may be charged as an habitual offender at any time, even after conviction and sentence. La. R.S. 15:529.1(D).

Section 15:529.1(G) makes a second felony habitual offender ineligible for probation, while subsection (C) measures the five-year cleansing period from expiration of the maximum prior sentence, excluding imprisonment; for a parolee, discharge from parole supervision is equated with expiration of the maximum sentence.

State v. Gamberella · filed 1993-12-29(G) (C)

However, because defendant was sentenced as a second felony habitual offender, he was not eligible for probation. See La.R.S. 15:529.1(G). ... The habitual offender statute provides for a cleansing period as follows: ... This Section shall not be applicable in cases where more than five years have elapsed since the expiration of the maximum sentence, or sentences, of the previous conviction, or convictions, and the time of the commission of the last felony for which he has been convicted. In computing the period of time as provided herein, any period of servitude by a person in a penal institution, within or without the state, shall not be included in the computation of any of said five year periods. ... La.R.S. 15:529.1(C). For a defendant who has been released from custody on parole, the date of discharge from parole supervision is equated with the expiration of the maximum sentence. ... Thus, the state was not required to prove the date of discharge on the earlier sentence. See State ex rel. Clark v. Marullo, 352 So.2d 223 (La. 1977); State v. Sanders, 542 So.2d 1134 (La. App. 3d Cir.1989). Defendant's argument is without merit.

The Habitual Offender Law's minimum sentence for a recidivist is presumed constitutional, but a defendant may obtain a downward departure by clearly and convincingly showing exceptional circumstances; such departures are rare.

State v. Norris · filed 2000-03-01(A)(1)(c)(ii)

Since that statute in its entirety is constitutional, the minimum sentences it imposes on recidivists are presumed constitutional. ... In order to successfully rebut the presumption that the mandatory minimum sentence is constitutional, a defendant must clearly and convincingly show that he is exceptional, which in this context means that because of unusual circumstances this defendant is a victim of the legislature's failure to assign sentences that are meaningfully tailored to the culpability of the offender, the gravity of the offense, and the circumstances of the case. ... Finally, it must be emphasized that the departure downward from the minimum sentence prescribed under the Habitual Offender Law should occur only in rare instances.

Subsection A(1)(c)(ii) mandates life imprisonment without benefits for a fourth or subsequent felony offender when the triggering felony or a prior felony is a crime of violence, but permits a downward departure only when substantial evidence rebuts the presumption that the mandatory sentence is constitutional.

State v. Bazile · filed 2000-04-26A(1)(c)(ii)

Under La. R.S. 15:529.1 A(1)(c)(ii), the defendant is subject to a mandatory life sentence as a fourth felony offender.[1] The penalties provided by La. R.S. 15:529.1 are not unconstitutional on their face and do not provide grounds for quashing a multiple bill. State v. Pollard, 644 So.2d 370 (La.1994). The trial court has the authority to reduce the mandatory minimum sentence provided by the statute for a particular offense and offender when such a term would violate the defendant's constitutional protection against excessive punishment. See Id. However, since statutory minimum sentences are presumed constitutional, a trial court may so reduce a sentence only if there is substantial evidence to rebut the presumption of constitutionality, State v. Young, (La.App. 4th Cir. 10/26/95), 663 So.2d 525, writ denied, 95-3010 (La.3/22/96), 669 So.2d 1223.

Section 15:529.1's mandatory minimum is presumed constitutional, but a court may reduce it if the defendant clearly and convincingly shows unusual circumstances making the sentence constitutionally excessive.

State v. Lee · filed 2000-05-17

The trial court has the authority to reduce a mandatory minimum sentence provided by the multiple offender statute for a particular offense and offender if the sentence would be constitutionally excessive. State v. Pollard, 93-0660 *1130 (La.10/20/94), 644 So.2d 370. Because the Habitual Offender Law has been held constitutional, the minimum sentences it imposes upon multiple offenders are presumed to be constitutional. State v. Johnson, 97-1906 (La.3/4/98), 709 So.2d 672. To rebut the presumption of constitutionality, the defendant must clearly and convincingly show that he is exceptional in that, because of unusual circumstances, the defendant is a victim of the legislature's failure to assign sentences that are meaningfully tailored to the culpability of the offender, the gravity of the offense, and the circumstances of the case. State v. Young, 94-1636 (La. App. 4 Cir. 10/26/95), 663 So.2d 525, 531, writ denied, 95-3010 (La.3/22/96), 669 So.2d 1223.

Section 15:529.1(D)(3) mandates life imprisonment without benefits for a third felony habitual offender convicted of a violent crime unless the record clearly and convincingly shows that the defendant is exceptional.

State v. Johnson · filed 2000-10-20(D)(3)

The State of Louisiana filed a writ application asserting that the trial court abused its discretion by imposing a sentence less than that mandated by La. R.S. 15:529.1(D)(3) and that there was insufficient evidence to support a deviation below the statutorily mandated life sentence. ... We disagree. There is nothing in this record to clearly and convincingly show that this defendant is exceptional. ... This court gives great deference to legislatively-mandated minimum sentences. ... Accordingly, we overturn the District Judge's sentence of 27 years without benefits for Johnson, and instead sentence the defendant to incarceration at hard labor for life, without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence.

A defendant may obtain a downward departure from the mandatory minimum only by clearly and convincingly showing exceptional circumstances; a nonviolent offense or history cannot be the major reason for the departure.

State v. Calhoun · filed 2000-11-02(A)(1)(c)(ii)

In the present case, we find that Defendant did not produce clear and convincing evidence that the mandate of La. R.S. 15:529.1 should not apply to him. ... Johnson, 709 So.2d 672, clearly states that a non-violent history cannot be the major reason for a downward deviation. At the reconsideration hearing the trial court acknowledged Johnson, but then relied upon Defendant's non-violent history as the main reason for its downward deviation. The only other factor in the trial court's reasons was its view of policy considerations. However, as explained in Johnson, policy decisions regarding habitual offenders have already been made by the legislature. We, therefore, find merit in the State's assignments of error. Accordingly, Defendant's sentence is vacated, and the case is remanded for resentencing consistent with Johnson and with this opinion.

Section 15:529.1's mandatory minimum sentence is not automatically unreviewable; a sentencing court may depart from the minimum when clear and convincing evidence shows that applying it would be constitutionally excessive.

State v. Washington · filed 2000-09-26

While a sentencing judge must always start with the presumption that a mandatory minimum sentence is constitutional, a trial court may depart from the minimum sentence if it finds that there is clear and convincing evidence in the particular case before it which would rebut the presumption of constitutionality. ... Therefore, we order the sentence vacated and the case remanded for resentencing in accordance with law. La. R.S. 15:529.1; State v. Johnson, supra; State v. Dorthey, supra.

Section 15:529.1(A)(b)(ii) mandates life imprisonment without benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence for a qualifying triple offender, subject to a constitutionally justified downward departure.

State v. Hebert · filed 2001-04-11(A)(b)(ii)

At the sentencing the trial court declared that it was required by law to impose a life sentence without benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence under La. R.S. 15:529.1(A)(b)(ii). The trial court did not determine that the mandatory life sentence was constitutionally excessive in this case. Although the defendant argues that a deviation from the mandatory life sentence required by La. R.S. 15:529.1 would have been appropriate, the defense presented nothing at the sentencing and made no argument regarding a sentence under Dorthey. This assignment of error lacks merit.

Section 529.1's mandatory minimum sentence is presumed constitutional, and a court may depart downward only upon clear and convincing proof of exceptional circumstances.

State v. Ormond · filed 2001-04-24(A)(c)(ii)

The Habitual Offender Law in its entirety has been found constitutional and, accordingly, the minimum sentences it imposes are likewise presumed to be constitutional. LSA-R.S. 15:529.1. State v. Johnson, 97-1906 (La.3/4/98), 709 So.2d 672, citing State v. Dorthey, 623 So.2d 1276 (La.1993).

Section 15:529.1(A)(1)(a) requires a fifteen-year minimum sentence for a second felony offender convicted of possession of marijuana with intent to distribute, subject to a narrow constitutional exception for a downward departure in a rare, exceptional case.

State v. Marino · filed 2001-06-27(A)(1)(a)

Defendant received the minimum sentence for a second felony offender convicted of possession of marijuana with the intent to distribute, the sentencing range being fifteen to sixty years. La. R.S. 15:529.1(A)(1)(a); La. R.S. 40:966. Even though a sentence under La. R.S. 15:529.1 is the minimum provided by that statute, the sentence may still be unconstitutionally excessive if it makes no measurable contribution to acceptable goals of punishment, or is nothing more than the needless and purposeless imposition of pain and suffering and is grossly out of proportion to the severity of the crime. State v. Dorthey, 623 So.2d 1276 (La.1993). However, the entire Habitual Offender Law has been found constitutional; thus, the minimum sentences it imposes upon multiple felony offenders are presumed to be constitutional. State v. Johnson, 97-1906 pp. 6-7 (La.3/4/98), 709 So.2d 672, 675. There must be substantial evidence to rebut the presumption of constitutionality. State v. Francis, 96-2389 (La.App. 4 Cir. 4/15/98), 715 So.2d 457. ... The trial court did not err in imposing this sentence.

Section 15:529.1(A)(1)(b)(ii) mandates a natural-life sentence without parole, probation, or suspension for a third felony offender when the third or either prior felony is a qualifying offense, subject to a constitutionally permissible downward departure only upon clear and convincing proof of exceptional circumstances.

State v. Decay · filed 2001-09-13(A)(1)(b)(ii)

Thus, we find that the trial court did not abuse its wide discretion in imposing the mandatory minimum sentence on the Defendant and, further, we find that the sentence was not excessive.

Section 15:529.1 requires a third-offender sentence of at least forty months at hard labor without probation or suspension, and a downward departure requires clear and convincing proof that the defendant is exceptional.

State v. Brown · filed 2002-06-19(A), (G)

LSA-R.S. 15:529.1(G) provides: “Any sentence imposed under the provisions of this Section shall be without benefit of probation or suspension of sentence.” ... The State correctly points out that under LSA-R.S. 40:967(0(2) and LSA-R.S. 15:529.1 the minimum statutory sentence which could have been imposed was forty months at hard labor without benefit of probation or suspension of sentence. ... The reasons provided do not justify the sentence below the statutory minimum as required by Dorthey and its progeny.

Section 15:529.1's mandatory minimum sentence must be enforced unless the defendant proves by clear and convincing evidence that the sentence is unconstitutionally excessive, and any departure must be limited to the longest constitutional sentence.

State v. Ricks · filed 2002-07-10

On the record before us, the trial judge court did not determine from clear and convincing evidence that the defendant had proven that the minimum sentence was so excessive in his case that it violated the Louisiana constitution. We cannot conclude that the reasons provided by the trial court justified a sentence below the statutory minimum as required by Dorthey and its progeny. In light of State v. Lindsey, 770 So.2d at 339, the trial court erred by sentencing the defendant below the statutorily mandated fifteen years at hard labor, the first two years to be served without benefit of probation, parole or suspension of sentence.

The statute's mandatory enhanced sentence is presumed constitutional and may be reduced only when the defendant presents clear and convincing evidence of exceptional circumstances showing that it is constitutionally excessive.

State v. Cho · filed 2002-10-29(A)(1)(b)(ii)

It is presumed that a mandatory minimum sentence under the Habitual Offender Law is constitutional. ... A trial judge may only depart from the mandatory sentence if he finds clear and convincing evidence that would rebut the presumption of constitutionality. ... The Defendant does not argue any special circumstances that might serve to rebut the presumption of constitutionality. Based on the record, we find the sentence is not excessive.

Section 15:529.1 A(1)(a) imposes a mandatory enhanced sentence for a qualifying second felony offender, presumed constitutional, but permits a downward departure when clear and convincing evidence shows the mandatory sentence is constitutionally excessive.

State v. Terrase · filed 2003-02-25A(1)(a)

The Defendant's sentence of five years imprisonment at hard labor as a second felony offender was the minimum allowed under La.R.S. 14:67 B(1) and La. R.S. 15:529.1 A(1)(a). It is presumed that a mandatory minimum sentence under the Habitual Offender Law is constitutional. ... However, if the trial judge finds that an enhanced punishment mandated by La. R.S. 15:529.1 makes no "measurable contribution to acceptable goals of punishment" or that the sentence amounts to nothing more than "the purposeful imposition of pain and suffering" and is "grossly out of proportion to the severity of the crime," the trial judge has the option and duty to reduce such sentence to one that would not be constitutionally excessive. ... A trial judge may only depart from the mandatory sentence if he finds clear and convincing evidence that would rebut the presumption of constitutionality. ... Here, the Defendant failed to show any unusual or special circumstances that might serve to rebut the presumption of constitutionality. After our review, we find that the sentence was not excessive.

Section 15:529.1(A)(1)(b)(ii) makes the habitual-offender minimum mandatory, subject to a downward departure only when clear and convincing evidence shows that the sentence is constitutionally excessive as applied to an exceptional defendant.

State v. Bentley · filed 2003-03-12(A)(1)(b)(ii)

As a third felony offender, the defendant's sentence of twenty years was the prescribed minimum under La. R.S. 15:529.1 A(1)(b)(ii). ... The standard set forth in State v. Dorthey, 623 So.2d 1276 (La.1993), requires affirmance of the statutory sentence unless it makes no measurable contribution to acceptable goals of punishment or is nothing more than the purposeful imposition of pain and suffering and is grossly out of proportion to the severity of the crime. A trial court may depart from the statutory minimum sentence only where there is clear and convincing evidence that would rebut the presumption of constitutionality, and such cases are rare. ... In contemplation of the laws enacted by the legislature, and considering the defendant's non-violent history, his drug use, and the small amount of drugs involved, in the aggregate, these factors are not sufficient to prove clearly and convincingly that the defendant is "exceptional." ... The defendant did not show that because of unusual circumstances, the defendant is a victim of the legislature's failure to assign sentences that are meaningfully tailored to the culpability of the offender and the gravity of the offense.

Section 15:529.1's mandatory minimum is presumed constitutional, but a court may depart from it when clear and convincing evidence shows the sentence would be constitutionally excessive for the particular offender and offense.

State v. Wilson · filed 2003-11-06(A)(1)(c)(ii)

As noted above, R.S. 15:529.1(A)(1)(c)(ii) at the time of original conviction, subjected defendant to a mandatory life sentence as a fourth felony offender convicted of simple robbery even though his three priors were non-violent offenses. The penalties provided by La. R.S. 15:529.1 are not unconstitutional on their face. State v. Pollard, 93-0660 (La.10/20/94), 644 So.2d 370. The trial court has the authority to reduce the mandatory minimum sentence provided by the statute for a particular offense and offender when such a term would violate the defendant's constitutional protection against excessive punishment. Id. Because the minimum sentence is presumed constitutional, a trial court exercising its discretionary power under Johnson should depart from the statutory minimum only upon a finding of clear and convincing evidence to rebut the presumption of constitutionality.

The Habitual Offender Law in effect when the offense was committed governs the enhancement, but a sentencing court may consider a later, more lenient legislative policy when deciding whether the mandatory life sentence is constitutionally excessive.

State v. Terrell · filed 2003-11-18(A)(1)(c)(ii)

Because Terrell committed the present offense prior to the effective date of the amendments to La. R.S. 15:529.1, the enhancement statute to be applied is the one in effect at the time of the commission of the offense for which the sentence is being enhanced. ... According to Wilson, the trial court may take into consideration such leniency as reflected in the legislature’s new policy. ... After those considerations, the trial court may conclude that former La. R.S. 15:529.1’s mandatory life sentence makes no measurable contribution to acceptable goals of punishment now reflected in this state for this defendant.

Section 15:529.1 presumes its mandatory minimum habitual-offender sentences constitutional, and permits a downward departure only upon a clear and convincing showing of exceptional circumstances.

State v. Johnson · filed 2003-12-09(A)(1)(c)(i)

The mandatory minimum sentences established in the Habitual Offender Statute are presumed to be constitutional. La. R.S. 15:529.1; State v. Johnson, 97-1906 (La.3/4/98), 709 So.2d 672, 675 (citing State v. Dorthey, 623 So.2d 1276, 1281 (La.1993)). In order to rebut the presumption that the mandatory minimum sentence is constitutional, defendant must clearly and convincingly show that he is exceptional, that is, that because of unusual circumstances he is a victim of the legislature's failure to assign sentences that are meaningfully tailored to the culpability of the offender, the gravity of the offense, and the circumstances of the case. State v. Johnson, supra; State v. Dorthey, supra. Downward departures from the minimum sentence under the Habitual Offender Statute should occur only in rare situations.

Section 15:529.1(A)(1)(c)(i) carries a presumption of constitutional validity, but a court may depart from its mandatory minimum in a rare case when the defendant clearly and convincingly shows exceptional circumstances making the sentence excessive.

State v. Hall · filed 2006-04-26(A)(1)(c)(i)

Since the habitual offender law is constitutional in its entirety, the minimum sentences it imposes upon recidivists are also presumed to be constitutional. ... Although the supreme court stated in State v. Dorthey, 623 So.2d 1276 (La.1993) that courts have the power to declare a mandatory minimum sentence excessive under Art. I, § 20 of the Louisiana Constitution, this power should only be exercised in rare cases and only when the court is firmly convinced that the minimum sentence is excessive. ... In order to rebut the presumption that the mandatory minimum sentence is constitutional, the defendant must clearly and convincingly show that: [he] is exceptional, which in this context means that because of unusual circumstances this defendant is a victim of the legislature's failure to assign sentences that are meaningfully tailored to the culpability of the offender, the gravity of the offense, and the circumstances of the case.

Section 15:529.1's mandatory minimum sentence is presumed constitutional, and a court may depart from it only upon substantial, clear and convincing evidence that the defendant is exceptional and the sentence would otherwise be constitutionally excessive.

State v. Anderson · filed 2006-10-31

However, if the trial judge finds that an enhanced punishment mandated by La. R.S. 15:529.1 makes no "measurable contribution to acceptable goals of punishment" or that the sentence amounts to nothing more than "the purposeful imposition of pain and suffering" and is "grossly out of proportion to the severity of the crime," the trial judge has the option and duty to reduce such sentence to one that would not be constitutionally excessive. ... A trial court may depart from the minimum sentence only if it finds clear and convincing evidence rebutting the presumption of constitutionality. ... In order to rebut the presumption, the defendant has the burden of showing that: [h]e is exceptional, which in this context means that because of unusual circumstances this defendant is a victim of the legislature's failure to assign sentences that are meaningfully tailored to the culpability of the offender, the gravity of the offense, and the circumstances of the case. ... This evidence must be substantial. ... Therefore, after review of the record, we find that the imposed sentence of 20 years at hard labor for this Defendant is not constitutionally excessive.

A mandatory minimum sentence under the Habitual Offender Law is presumed constitutional, and a court may depart from it only upon clear and convincing evidence specific to the case; the nonviolent nature of the defendant’s offenses alone is insufficient.

State v. Hall · filed 2007-11-21(A)(1)(c)(i)

A sentencing judge must always start with the presumption that a mandatory minimum sentence under the Habitual Offender Law is constitutional. A court may only depart from the minimum sentence if it finds that there is clear and convincing evidence in the particular case before it which would rebut this presumption of constitutionality. ... A trial judge may not rely solely upon the non-violent nature of the instant crime or of past crimes as evidence which justifies rebutting the presumption of constitutionality. ... So while a defendant's record of non-violent offenses may play a role in a sentencing judge's determination that a minimum sentence is too long, it cannot be the only reason, or even the major reason, for declaring such a sentence excessive.

Section 15:529.1(A)(1)(c)(i) sets a minimum twenty-year sentence for a fourth or subsequent felony when the new felony is punishable by less than life imprisonment, but the sentence remains subject to constitutional excessiveness review and a rare-case downward departure.

State v. Allen · filed 2010-01-13(A)(1)(c)(i)

Based on this record, we cannot say that Mr. Allen’s situation is one of those rare cases deserving of a downward departure from the habitual offender law.

Section 15:529.1's mandatory minimum sentences for multiple offenders are presumed constitutional; a defendant seeking a lesser sentence must clearly and convincingly show unusual circumstances warranting a downward departure.

State v. Vincent · filed 2011-01-19A(1)(c)(i)

Vincent was adjudged a quadruple offender and as such was subject to a sentencing range of twenty years to life imprisonment. La. R.S. 15:529.1 A(l)(c)(i). The sentence imposed in this case is the minimum allowed by statute. ... As the jurisprudence indicates, the burden is on the defendant to present clear and convincing evidence that would justify a downward departure of the mandatory minimum sentence. ... The foregoing does not amount to objective and exceptional facts and circumstances warranting a lesser sentence.

A defendant subject to the mandatory minimum sentence under Subsection (A)(1)(b)(ii) may receive a downward departure only upon evidence showing that he is exceptional and rebutting the presumption that the minimum sentence is constitutional.

State of Louisiana v. Bourda · filed 2011-06-08(A)(1)(b)(ii)

More significantly, the Defendant presented no evidence which would tend to reflect that he is “exceptional” so as to rebut the presumption that the mandatory minimum sentence is constitutional, which is necessary to justify a downward departure from the sentence mandated by La.R.S. 15:529.1(A)(1)(b)(ii).

Section 15:529.1(A)(1)(b)(ii) mandates a life sentence for a qualifying third felony offender unless clear and convincing evidence shows that the defendant is exceptional and the mandatory sentence is constitutionally excessive.

State v. BOURDA · filed 2011-06-08(A)(1)(b)(ii)

More significantly, the Defendant presented no evidence which would tend to reflect that he is exceptional |aso as to rebut the presumption that the mandatory minimum sentence is constitutional, which is necessary to justify a downward departure from the sentence mandated by La.R.S. 15:529.1(A)(l)(b)(ii). ... Accordingly, the sentence imposed on the Defendant is vacated, and a sentence of life imprisonment is imposed by this court in accordance with La.R.S. 15:529.1(A)(l)(b)(ii). Further, the case is remanded to the trial court with instructions to make a minute entry imposing a sentence of life imprisonment in accordance with the ruling of this court.

Section 15:529.1(A)(1) requires the applicable mandatory minimum sentence for a qualifying fourth felony offender, but permits constitutional downward departure only upon clear and convincing proof that the defendant is exceptional; the enhancement statute itself does not authorize a fine.

State v. Thompson · filed 2012-11-21(A)(1)

A sentencing judge must always start with the presumption that a mandatory minimum sentence under the Habitual Offender Law is constitutional. ... A court may only depart from the minimum sentence if it finds that there is clear and convincing evidence in the particular case before it which would rebut this presumption of constitutionality. ... A trial judge may not rely solely upon the nonviolent nature of a crime before the court or of past crimes as evidence that justifies rebutting the presumption of constitutionality. ... the statute of enhancement, |sLa. R.S. 15:529.1(A), does not authorize the imposition of a fine. Thus, such fine is appropriately deleted.

For a fourth felony offender subject to La. Stat. Ann. § 15:529.1(A)(4)(b), a sentence below the applicable mandatory minimum requires the trial judge to articulate specific reasons why the mandatory minimum is constitutionally inappropriate.

State of Louisiana v. Simcoe Cole AKA Simco W. Cole · filed 2014-05-07(A)(4)(b)

The trial judge misinterpreted this court’s prior ruling and again failed to sufficiently set forth specific reasons for its imposition of a sentence that fell below the mandatory minimum set forth in La.R.S. 15:529.1. For these reasons, the defendant’s sentence is vacated and the matter remanded to the trial court for resentencing. If the trial court sentences the defendant to a sentence that is less than ninety-nine years, the trial judge must set forth specific reasons for imposition of said sentence.

Section 15:529.1(A)(4)(a) requires a fourth-felony offender convicted of second degree cruelty to juveniles to receive at least 40 years, unless clear and convincing evidence shows that the defendant is exceptional and rebuts the presumption that the mandatory minimum is constitutional.

State v. Price · filed 2014-05-15(A)(4)(a)

The court noted that it had considered Price’s presentence investigation report and his status as a fourth-felony offender and noted that the sentencing range for a fourth-felony offender convicted of second degree cruelty to juveniles was 40 years to life imprisonment. La. R.S. 15:529.1(A)(4)(a). ... Because the habitual offender law is constitutional in its entirety, the minimum sentences it imposes upon recidivists are also presumed to be | ^constitutional. ... A sentencing judge must always start with the presumption that a mandatory minimum sentence under the habitual offender law is constitutional. A court may depart from the minimum sentence if it finds that there is clear and convincing evidence in the particular case before it that would rebut this presumption of constitutionality. ... On this record we cannot say that Price has demonstrated by clear and convincing evidence that he is the exceptional defendant for which downward departure is justified. ... For these reasons, we vacate the sentence and remand the matter for resentencing to a term of imprisonment | ainot less than the mandatory minimum of 40 years required by law.

The Habitual Offender Law's mandatory minimum sentence is presumed constitutional, and a defendant seeking a downward departure must clearly and convincingly show exceptional circumstances.

State v. Sims · filed 2015-08-12

Mandatory minimum sentences imposed on multiple offenders under the Habitual Offender Law are presumed to be constitutional, and a defendant bears the burden of rebutting that presumption.

Section 15:529.1's mandatory sentence may be reduced when applying it to a particular defendant would make the sentence constitutionally excessive.

State v. Mosby · filed 2015-11-20

We find a departure from the sentence mandated by R.S. 15:529.1 is constitutionally required for this particular defendant- ... Accordingly, we remand this case to the District Court and order it to re-sentence this defendant, reducing the term of her imprisonment to one that would "not be constitutionally excessive and stating for the record its considerations and factual basis'. La.C.Cr. P. art. 894.1.

Subsection (G) permits a sentencing court to depart downward from the habitual-offender sentence when the facts and evidence warrant exercising its broad discretion.

State v. Hagans · filed 2016-10-17(G)

Instead, the downward departure imposed by Judge Buras of eight years hard labor without benefit of suspension or probation under La. R.S. 15:529.1(G) is an appropriate exercise of her broad discretion under the facts and particular evidence in this case.

Section 15:529.1(A)(4)(b) mandates a life sentence for a qualifying fourth-felony habitual offender, subject to downward departure only when the defendant clearly and convincingly proves exceptional circumstances.

State v. Dickerson · filed 2017-04-12(A)(4)(b)

There is nothing particularly unusual about the defendant’s circumstances that would justify a downward departure from the mandatory sentence under La. R.S. 15:529.1(A)(4)(b). ... The defendant has not proven by clear and convincing evidence that he is exceptional such that a mandatory life sentence would not be meaningfully tailored to the culpability of the offender, the gravity of the offense, and the circumstances of the case. See Johnson, 709 So.2d at 676. Accordingly, no downward departure from the presumptively constitutional mandatory life sentence is warranted.

Section 15:529.1 requires specific reasons and exceptional facts supporting any downward departure from the statutory minimum and requires the court to identify the underlying sentence being enhanced.

State of Louisiana v. McKartney Young · filed 2018-05-09(A)(3)(a)

The trial court is instructed to provide specific reasons for sentencing, and said reasons should include any factors supporting a downward departure from the statutory minimum and any facts that demonstrate Defendant is “exceptional” so that such a downward deviation is appropriate. Further, the trial court must state which underlying sentence is being enhanced under the habitual offender law.

Section 15:529.1(A)(4)(a) sets a fourth felony offender’s sentence at twenty years to life, and a downward departure is justified only by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant is exceptional; nonviolent prior offenses cannot be a major reason for finding the mandatory sentence excessive.

State of Louisiana v. Charles Nicholas Brown, Jr. A/K/A Charles Brown, Jr. · filed 2020-05-06(A)(4)(a)

A sentencing judge must always start with the presumption that a mandatory minimum sentence under the Habitual Offender Law is constitutional. ... A court may only depart from the minimum sentence if it finds that there is clear and convincing evidence in the particular case before it which would rebut this presumption of constitutionality. ... As noted in Johnson, 709 So.2d 672, the non-violent nature of Defendant’s prior convictions was factored into the habitual offender statute by the legislature, and the Defendant’s record of non-violent offenses cannot be a major reason in declaring the mandatory sentence excessive. ... As such, the trial court erred in finding Defendant exceptional and imposing a thirteen-year sentence. Accordingly, Defendant’s sentence is vacated and the matter remanded for resentencing.

Downward departures from § 15:529.1’s mandatory minimum should occur only rarely, when clear and convincing evidence rebuts the sentence’s presumed constitutionality.

State v. Taylor · filed 2007-03-13

Downward departures from the minimum sentence mandated by La. R.S. 15:529.1 should only occur in rare situations. ... As noted above, a court may only depart from the mandatory sentence if it finds clear and convincing evidence in the present case that would rebut the presumption of constitutionality. State v. Johnson, 709 So.2d at 676. The record before us reveals that the trial judge did not err in refusing to deviate from the mandatory minimum sentence because defendant did not present sufficient evidence to rebut the presumption of constitutionality.

A third felony offender subject to the mandatory life sentence may obtain a downward departure only by showing clear and convincing evidence of exceptional circumstances.

State v. Burks · filed 2013-01-16(A)(3)(b)

A sentencing judge must always start with the presumption that a mandatory minimum sentence under the Habitual Offender Law is constitutional. A court may depart from the minimum sentence if it finds that there is clear and convincing evidence in the particular case before it which would rebut this presumption of constitutionality. ... Burks received the mandatory minimum sentence set forth in La. R.S. 15:529.1(A)(S)(b). His sentence is presumed constitutional and he has failed to provide clear and convincing evidence to rebut that presumption.

Section 15:529.1(A)(b)(ii) requires a fifteen-year minimum sentence for this second felony offender; the circumstances identified by the trial court did not justify a shorter sentence.

State v. Louis · filed 1997-04-09(A)(b)(ii)

On the application of the State of Louisiana, we grant certiorari to review the correctness of the trial court’s sentencing of the defendant to ten years as a second felony offender rather than the statutorily mandated minimum sentence of fifteen years. ... Accordingly, for the above reasons, the ten year sentence imposed by the trial judge is vacated. The case is remanded to the trial court for resentencing in conformity with La. R.S. 15:529.1(A)(b)(ii).

A court departing from Section 15:529.1’s mandatory life sentence must justify the departure with a supported finding that the minimum is unconstitutionally excessive.

State v. Lacoste · filed 1997-05-28(A)(1)(b)(ii)

The trial court is ordered to justify its deviation from the statutorily-mandated minimum sentence in this case under La. R.S. 15:529.1 and to render the maximum sentence that is not constitutionally excessive.

Section 15:529.1’s mandatory minimum sentence may be reduced only when clear and convincing evidence shows it is constitutionally excessive for the defendant; the judge must then impose the longest sentence that is not excessive.

State v. Johnson · filed 1998-03-06

Finally, if a sentencing judge finds clear and convincing evidence which justifies a downward departure from the minimum sentence under the Habitual Offender Law, he is not free to sentence a defendant to whatever sentence he feels is appropriate under the circumstances. Instead, the judge must sentence the defendant to the longest sentence which is not constitutionally excessive.

Section 15:529.1(D)(1)(b) bars a defendant from attacking a sentence based on a prior conviction unless the challenge is made before sentencing, and the statute permits habitual-offender adjudication for each of multiple subsequent felony convictions.

State v. Brooks · filed 1999-12-08(D)(1)(b)

The habitual offender statute forbids a defendant from attacking his sentence if his challenge to a previous conviction is not made before the sentence is imposed. ... Further, there is no statutory bar for applying the habitual offender statute in sentencing for more than one conviction. Where an offender with a prior felony conviction subsequently commits multiple separate felonies and is thereafter convicted of the subsequent felonies, he is subject to being adjudicated a habitual offender as to each conviction.

In a habitual-offender proceeding, the statute places the initial burden of proving factual issues beyond a reasonable doubt on the district attorney, permits the presumption of regularity to satisfy that initial burden, shifts to the defendant the burden of proving a claimed constitutional violation or factual issue by a preponderance of the evidence, and bars challenges first raised after sentencing.

State v. Dunn · filed 2000-09-13(D)(1)(b)

Any challenge to a previous conviction or adjudication of delinquency which is not made before sentence is imposed may not thereafter be raised to attack the sentence.

Section 15:529.1 permits a prior felony conviction to be reused as a predicate to enhance a later felony even when that conviction already enhanced another unrelated felony.

State v. Montgomery · filed 2010-01-27(A)(1)(a)

The supreme court in State v. Shaw, 06-2467 (La.11/27/07), 969 So.2d 1233, held that a previous conviction could be used as a predicate offense to again enhance a defendant’s sentence as a second felony offender. ... This reasoning is applicable to the present case. Montgomery is clearly a recidivist; therefore he falls within the parameters of the statute.

The cleansing period in effect when the latest offense was committed governs, and the mandatory minimum sentence under the Habitual Offender Law is presumed constitutional and may be reduced only upon clear and convincing proof that the defendant is exceptional.

State v. Carthan · filed 1999-12-08(A)(1)(c)(ii), (C)

As the supreme court stated in State v. Rolen, 95-347, p. 5 (La.9/15/95); 662 So.2d 446, 449: "Cleansing periods are, however, purely statutory rules constituting self-imposed restraints on the state's plenary power to define and punish crimes. Due process does not require them and several Louisiana repeat offender statutes do not have them." ... We, likewise, find no violation of the ex post facto clause here. ... However, before the punishment mandated by the Habitual Offender Law can be found excessive, the trial court must first determine that (1) "the sentence makes no measurable contribution to the acceptable goals of punishment" or (2) "the sentence amounts to nothing more than the purposeful imposition of pain and suffering and is grossly out of proportion to the severity of the crime." ... A sentencing judge must always start with the presumption that a mandatory minimum sentence under the Habitual Offender Law is constitutional.

The cleansing period that applies is the period in effect when the newest offense was committed.

State v. Causey · filed 2000-01-26

The cleansing period in effect at the time the newest offense was committed controls for purposes of La. R.S. 15:529.1. State v. Carr, 96-2388 (La.App. 4 Cir. 9/10/97), 699 So.2d 1105, writ denied, 97-2633 (La.2/6/98), 709 So.2d 732. In this case, the newest offenses were committed on 19 April 1996. A ten-year cleansing period was in effect on that date. Celestine pled guilty to the predicate felony on 28 September 1987. The record is sufficient to prove that the cleansing period between offenses had not elapsed.

Section 15:529.1(C) bars habitual-offender enhancement when the applicable cleansing period has elapsed, and the State must prove that the conviction falls within that period; the period in effect when the current offense was committed applies.

State v. Boykin · filed 2000-12-06(C)

The Habitual Offender Law is inapplicable in cases where a certain amount of time has lapsed between the expiration of the defendant's maximum sentence for a prior conviction and the time of the commission of the "subsequent felony." La. R.S. 15:529.1 C. ... The State concedes that the cleansing period to be applied is the one in effect at the time Boykin committed the instant offense. ... We further note that in habitual offender proceedings, the State bears the burden of proof that the crime of conviction falls within the cleansing period of R.S. 15:529.1 C.

Section 15:529.1(C)'s cleansing period cannot be extended retroactively to link prior offenses when the shorter period in effect at the time of the later offense had already expired.

State v. Everett · filed 2000-09-27(C)

Pursuant to the express wording of this statute, the statute does not apply in cases where a cleansing period of ten years has elapsed since the expiration of the maximum sentence of previous convictions. Prior to 1994 this section provided for a five-year cleansing period. However, in 1994 the cleansing period was enlarged from five to seven years, and in 1995 the cleansing period was enlarged still further to ten years. ... Under these facts, using an extended cleansing period, enacted after the prior offenses (i.e. ex post facto), to link said prior offenses would violate the ex post facto clause.

Subsection C bars habitual-offender enhancement when the applicable cleansing period has elapsed and places the burden on the State to prove that the conviction falls within that period.

State v. Boykin · filed 2000-12-06(C)

The Habitual Offender Law is inapplicable in cases where a certain amount of time has lapsed between the expiration of the defendant's maximum sentence for a prior conviction and the time of the commission of the "subsequent felony." La. R.S. 15:529.1 C. ... We further note that in habitual offender proceedings, the State bears the burden of proof that the crime of conviction falls within the cleansing period of R.S. 15:529.1 C. State v. Boykin, supra; State v. Ignot, supra.

Section 15:529.1(C) does not apply when more than ten years have elapsed since the expiration of the maximum sentence for a prior conviction and the commission of the last felony; the State meets its burden when the records show that ten years did not elapse between the offenses.

State v. Lewis · filed 2000-12-13(C)

La. R.S. 15:529.1(C) provides that the statute does not apply when more than ten years have elapsed since the expiration of the maximum sentence, or sentences, of the previous convictions, or convictions, and the time of the commission of the last felony for which he has been convicted. As the documents produced by the State reflect that the ten years did not elapse between each offense, the State met its burden of proof under La. R.S. 15:529.1.

Section 15:529.1(C) measures the cleansing period between expiration of the prior sentence and commission of the latest felony; if no more than ten years elapsed, subsection (A) determines the habitual-offender level and penalty.

State v. Johnson · filed 2007-08-15(C)

Subsection (C) is concerned only with that period of time between the expiration of the sentence for the last previous felony conviction and the commission of the last felony. It is only that time period which the legislature has made relevant to determine whether defendant will be sentenced under the Habitual Offender Law.

The applicable cleansing period is determined by the version of § 15:529.1 in effect when the subsequent felony was committed.

State v. Wise · filed 2014-10-15(C)

This Court has found that the applicable cleansing period is the one in effect at the time ■ of the commission of the subsequent felony.

Section 15:529.1(C) does not require the State to prove a prior conviction's discharge date when fewer than ten years elapsed between the relevant prior conviction and the next offense in the habitual-offender sequence.

State v. Pierre · filed 2015-05-06(C)

Using the foregoing analysis in the present case, Defendant’s current offenses were committed on December 12, 2011. ... Since ten years did not lapse between the Defendant’s commission of the instant offenses on December 12, 2011, and his most recent prior conviction of possession with intent to distribute cocaine, the State was not required to prove the date on which Defendant was discharged for serving his sentence for possession with intent to distribute cocaine. Additionally, since ten years did not lapse between Defendant’s conviction for possession with intent to distribute cocaine and the next previous conviction which was armed robbery, the State was not required to prove Defendant’s discharge date for the armed robbery conviction. Thus, counsel is correct in his assertion that the State was not required to prove Defendant’s discharge dates pursuant to Bourque.

The State must prove that predicate convictions fall within the statute’s cleansing period, but a defendant who stipulates to the habitual offender bill waives a non-jurisdictional challenge to that proof.

State v. Kent · filed 2015-10-28(C)

We note that the State bears the burden of proving that the predicate convictions fall within the “cleansing period” prescribed by La. R.S. 15:629.1(C). State v. Hollins, 99-278 (La.App. 5 Cir. 8/31/99), 742 So.2d 671, 685, writ denied, 99-2853 (La.1/5/01), 778 So.2d 587. In the instant case,- the applicable period is Laten years.9 Defendant, however, stipulated to the habitual bill. An unconditional plea, willingly and knowingly made, waives any and all non-jurisdictional defects and bars a defendant from later asserting on appeal that the State failed to produce sufficient proof at the habitual offender hearing. See State v. Spellman 13-908 (La.App. 5 Cir. 4/09/14), 140 So.3d 751, 753-54, writ denied, 14-1815 (La.2/6/15), 158 So.3d 815; Sehaefer, supra. By stipulating to the habitual bill, defendant waived his right to a hearing and any possible non-jurisdictional defects. Id. Accordingly, defendant has waived any potential challenge that the State failed to prove the applicable cleansing period. As such, no corrective action is required on this issue.

Section 15:529.1(C) makes the habitual offender law inapplicable when the statutory cleansing period has elapsed, measures that period using the law in effect when the following offense was committed, and requires proof of the defendant’s actual discharge date to establish that the period had not expired.

State v. Casaday · filed 2017-05-17(C)

The habitual offender law is inapplicable in cases where a certain amount of time has lapsed between the expiration of the maximum sentence for a prior conviction and the time of the commission of the following offense. La. R.S. 15:529.1 C. The cleansing period to be applied is the one in effect at the time the defendant committed the following offense. State v. Rolen, 95-0347 (La. 9/15/95), 662 So.2d 446; State v. Boykin, supra. ... The state’s failure to prove the defendant’s date of discharge, and thus prove that the cleansing period has not expired, is error patent on the face of the record.

The five-year cleansing period applies to predicate offenses that are neither violent offenses nor sex offenses when the 2017 amendments govern the habitual-offender proceeding.

State of Louisiana v. Dewayne Sylvester -Aka- Dwayne Anthony Sylvester, Sr. · filed 2020-02-05(C)(1)

These changes include a reduction in sentencing exposure as well as a reduction in the applicable cleansing period. The legislature reduced the cleansing period from ten years to five years for predicate offenses that are non-violent and non-sex-offenses. Although Defendant’s current offense (attempted second degree murder) is a violent offense, Defendant’s predicate offenses (both possession of controlled dangerous substances) are neither violent offenses nor sex offenses. Thus, the five-year cleansing period applies to Defendant’s predicate offenses.

Section 15:529.1 applies a five-year cleansing period to a defendant in the statute's third category whose conviction was not final and whose habitual-offender bill was filed on or after August 1, 2018; the court held that using a ten-year period was error.

State of Louisiana v. Cassetti Dewayne Brown · filed 2020-05-29(K)(2)

As Mr. Brown’s conviction and sentence have not become final, we agree with Mr. Brown that he falls into the third category, meaning the applicable cleansing period for Mr. Brown’s habitual offender adjudication is five years.

Section 15:529.1(C) applies the ten-year cleansing period in effect when the defendant committed the latest offense; an earlier five-year gap between convictions does not bar enhancement.

State v. Lyles · filed 2003-09-16(C)

Rather, the relevant time period in the instant case is between the instant offense (December 1998) and the one immediately preceding it (the 1991 conviction of simple burglary of an inhabited dwelling). Also, the applicable time period to be considered is ten years under La. R.S. 15:529.1(C), in effect at the time the Defendant committed the latest offense.

The cleansing period applicable under the Habitual Offender Law is the period in effect when the defendant commits the subsequent felony.

State v. Ignot · filed 1997-09-24(C)

However, we find that the cleansing period applicable to the defendant's case was 10 years, the term specified in the statute at the time of the instant offense.

Section 15:529.1(C) requires the state to prove a predicate felony’s discharge date when more than five years passed between that conviction and the commission of a later felony.

State v. Raymond · filed 1998-08-25(C)

In order to use the second felony as a predicate offense, the state had to prove that the date of discharge from the second felony was within five years of the date on which defendant committed the third felony. The state failed to make that showing at trial. The state offered no evidence of the dates on which defendant was discharged from custody. Nor does the transcript reflect that the state orally alleged a date on which defendant was discharged on his previous felony convictions. Thus, the adjudication of defendant as a fourth felony offender must be vacated.

Section 15:529.1(C) does not require proof of a prior sentence’s discharge date when less than the applicable cleansing period elapsed between the prior conviction and the new felony.

State v. Watts · filed 1999-05-19(C)

It is well settled that although the State must generally prove the date of discharge on a predicate offense, if less than the cleansing period has elapsed between defendant's conviction on a predicate felony and his commission of a subsequent felony, the State need not prove the date of discharge on the earlier sentences. ... The applicable cleansing period at the time defendant committed the instant offense was 10 years. La. R.S. 15:529.1(C). Evidence of the dates of defendant's release from custody was not necessary in this case.

Section 15:529.1(D)(1)(b) places the burden of proving factual issues beyond a reasonable doubt on the State in an habitual-offender adjudication, and the presumption of regularity of judgment satisfies the State's initial burden.

State v. Williams · filed 1999-12-08(D)(1)(b)

La. R.S. 15:529.1 provides, in pertinent part, that in an habitual offender adjudication, the state shall have the burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt |1gon any issue of fact and that the presumption of regularity of judgment shall be sufficient to meet the original burden of proof.

Section 15:529.1 does not require a specific type of evidence to prove habitual-offender status; competent evidence of a prior felony conviction and the defendant’s identity as the person convicted is sufficient.

State v. Coleman · filed 2003-09-17

The Payton opinion cites State v. Chaney, 423 So.2d 1092 (La.1983), where the court held that in “order to prove the defendant is a habitual offender, the State need only establish by competent evidence that there is a prior felony conviction and that the defendant is the same person who was convicted of the prior felony.” Id. at 1103. ... In Payton the Supreme Court concluded that missing fingerprints were not fatal to a multiple bill. The court stated: “This Court has repeatedly held that [the Habitual Offender Act] does not require the State to use a specific type of evidence to carry its burden at an habitual offender hearing and that prior convictions may be proved by any competent evidence.” State v. Payton, 810 So.2d at 1132, citing State v. Lindsey, 770 So.2d at 344 n. 3. ... Given the evidence in the record and the judge’s contemporaneous reasons for judgment, we find that even in the absence of the sentencing transcript 113from the multiple offender hearing, there was sufficient competent evidence to establish the appellant’s second offender status.