La. Stat. Ann. § 15:529.1

For a second felony punishable by up to ten years, § 15:529.1 permits a determinate sentence up to twice the longest first-offense term and requires no probation or suspension, but it does not authorize denying parole; in a challenge to a prior conviction, the defendant bears the burden of proving factual issues by a preponderance after responding to the habitual-offender bill.

State v. Callegari · filed 2000-11-02(A)(1)(a), (G), and (D)(1)(b)

First, the trial court imposed the Defendant’s sentence without benefit of parole when neither the penalty provision of the substantive statute nor the habitual offender provision authorized such a restriction on the Defendant’s parole eligibility. ... (G) Any sentence imposed under the provisions of this Section shall be without benefit of probation or suspension of sentence. ... Section D(l)(b) states that the presumption of regularity of judgment shall be sufficient to meet the original burden of proof and requires that a defendant file a written response to the habitual offender bill of information if he claims that a prior conviction is invalid. ... La.R.S. 15:529.1D(l)(b) states that the defendant “shall have the burden of proof, by a preponderance of the evidence, on any issue of fact raised by the response.”

Section 15:529.1 permits the State to enhance a first-offense obscenity sentence based on a prior obscenity conviction when the defendant was not already sentenced under the obscenity statute's repeat-offender provision.

State v. Walker · filed 2000-12-22

Simply put, since defendant was convicted of first offense obscenity, he was not subjected to an enhanced sentence because of a previous obscenity conviction. It follows that enhancement of the penalty for first offense obscenity under the habitual offender statute does not amount to a multiple enhancement of the penalty for that offense. Although the rationale of Harrelson, Cox and Sanders may be applicable to multiple enhancement situations, it is inapplicable under these circumstances.

Section 15:529.1(D)(1)(b) requires a defendant challenging a prior conviction in a habitual-offender proceeding to state the constitutional claim and factual basis with particularity before sentencing, while § 15:529.1(A)(1)(b)(ii)'s mandatory minimum remains subject to constitutional-excessiveness review as applied.

State v. Briscoe · filed 2001-01-17(D)(1)(b); (A)(1)(b)(ii)

It cannot be said that this action by defense counsel "set forth his claim, and the factual basis therefor, with particularity" as required by La. R.S. 15:529.1(D)(1)(b). Accordingly, the defendant cannot raise this issue on appeal. ... Following Stevenson, we find that the record suggests that the defendant is simply a drug addict who might not be deserving of the minimum mandatory life sentence provided by La. R.S. 15:529.1(A)(1)(b)(ii). Therefore, we vacate the defendant's sentence and remand this case for a hearing at which the defendant may show by clear and convincing evidence that the mandatory sentence is unconstitutionally excessive as applied to him.

Section 15:529.1 bars a defendant from attacking a predicate conviction after sentence is imposed if the constitutional challenge was not raised before sentencing, and requires a habitual-offender sentence without benefit of probation or suspension of sentence, but not without benefit of parole.

State v. Jackson · filed 2001-02-28(D)(1)(b), (G)

"Any challenge to a previous conviction or adjudication of delinquency which is not made before sentence is imposed may not thereafter be raised to attack the sentence." ... "Accordingly, Jackson is not entitled to raise that complaint for purposes of appellate review." ... "Since Jackson was adjudicated a second felony offender, La. R.S. 15:529.1 provided for a sentencing range of 15 to 60 years at hard labor without benefit of probation or suspension of sentence." ... "La. R.S. 15:529.1G provides that any sentence imposed under the habitual offender statute be imposed without benefit of probation or suspension of sentence." ... "Accordingly, the trial court erred in imposing Jackson's sentence without benefit of parole." ... "As such, the sentence of the trial court is vacated only to the extent that it eliminates from Jackson's sentence the conditions required by law, and we amend the sentence to provide that Jackson serve 18 years at hard labor without benefit of probation or suspension of sentence only."

Section 15:529.1(D)(3) requires the court to vacate the defendant's prior sentence before imposing the habitual-offender sentence.

State v. Montgomery · filed 2007-09-19(D)(3)

By his second assignment of error, Montgomery urges the district court erred in failing to vacate the 2½-year sentence before sentencing him as a habitual offender to five years at hard labor. La. R.S. 15:529.1 D(3). The state concedes that this was error, and we agree.

Section 15:529.1 requires the State to prove the prior felony conviction and that the defendant is the same person convicted, and identity may be established through competent evidence such as fingerprint comparison.

State v. Johnson · filed 2010-05-26(A)(1)(a)

To prove a defendant is a habitual offender under La. R.S. 15:529.1, the State is required to establish the prior felony conviction and that the defendant is the same person convicted of that felony. ... Proof of identity can be established in various ways, including the State presenting: (1) the testimony of witnesses to pri- or crimes, (2) expert testimony matching the fingerprints of the accused with those in the record of the prior proceeding, (3) photographs contained in a duly authenticated record, or (4) evidence of identical drivers license number, sex, race, and date of birth.

Section 15:529.1(A)(4)(a) sets a fourth-or-subsequent felony sentence at no less than 20 years and no more than life, while § 15:529.1(D)(1)(b) bars a challenge to a prior conviction or adjudication that was not raised before sentencing.

State v. Lewis · filed 2015-01-14(A)(4)(a), (D)(1)(b)

The person shall be sentenced to imprisonment for the fourth or subsequent felony for a determinate term not less than the longest prescribed for a first conviction but in no event less than twenty years and not more than his natural life. ... The sentence imposed by the trial court falls within the statutory guidelines of La. R.S. 15:529.1. ... Any challenge to the previous conviction or adjudication which is not made before the sentence is imposed may not thereafter be raised to attack the sentence and is not preserved for appellate review. La. R.S. 15:529.1(D)(1)(b); State v. Henry, 36,217 (La.App.2d Cir.8/14/02), 823 So.2d 1064; State v. Hunter, 33,066 (La.App.2d Cir.9/27/00), 768 So.2d 687, writs denied, 2000-3070 (La.10/26/01), 799 So.2d 1150 and 2001-2087 (La.4/19/02), 813 So.2d 424. Therefore, this claim is without merit.

Section 15:529.1(D)(1)(b) bars a challenge to a previous conviction not made before sentence from later attacking the habitual-offender sentence, and subsection (G) does not restrict parole eligibility.

State v. Ferguson · filed 2015-09-19(D)(1)(b), (G)

see also La. R.S. 15:529.1(D)(1)(b) (“[a]ny challenge to a previous conviction which is not made before sentence is im*138posed may not thereafter be raised to attack the sentence.”). ... As this assignment of-error has merit, we amend the enhanced sentence to delete the restriction of parole, and affirm as amended.

Section 15:529.1 permits a defendant to be sentenced as a habitual offender on multiple convictions arising from distinct criminal events, even when the convictions occur on the same date.

State v. Hawthorne · filed 2000-11-08

In the case at bar, appellant was convicted of two distinct criminal events — an armed robbery of Kenneth Porter on December 31, 1994, and an attempted armed robbery of Joanna M. Anderson on January 8, 1995 — even though the two convictions occurred on the same date. Therefore, the trial court properly sentenced him as a habitual offender on both counts. State ex rel. Porter v. Butler, supra; Ward, 94-0490 at pp. 12-14, 670 So.2d at 568-69.

Section 15:529.1 permits only one multiple-offender sentence when the defendant’s crimes arise from a single transaction.

State v. McCurtis · filed 2001-11-02

The defendant’s crimes formed part of a single transaction and therefore support only one multiple offender sentence under La.R.S. 15:529.1.

Section 15:529.1 requires the sentencing court to specify the defendant's multiple-offender felony tier, based on the number of felonies proven, before imposing the enhanced sentence.

State v. Olivieri · filed 2003-10-28

First, although defendant was charged as a third felony offender, the trial judge failed to specify that it found defendant to be a third felony offender. Rather, the trial judge stated, "the Court concludes that the State has met its burden of establishing that the Defendant is a Multiple Offender pursuant to La. R.S. 15:529.1 and should be sentenced accordingly." Since the trial judge failed to specify that defendant was a third felony offender, the sentence is defective because it is not determinate. State v. Jones, 516 So.2d 396, 402 (La.App. 5 Cir.1987). Therefore, we vacate the sentence on the multiple offender finding and remand the case for a determination of the number of felonies proven by the State and for re-sentencing following that determination.

Section 15:529.1 requires the State to prove the existence of a predicate guilty plea and counsel representation or a constitutional waiver before using the conviction to enhance a sentence; if the State fails that initial burden, the habitual-offender finding and enhanced sentence must be vacated.

State v. Tomlinson · filed 2005-10-06

When a defendant denies the allegations in a habitual offender bill of information, the state must prove the existence of the predicate guilty plea and that the defendant was represented by counsel (or constitutionally waived counsel) at the time he entered his plea.

Section 15:529.1 requires the state to prove a prior felony conviction beyond a reasonable doubt and permits prima facie proof through statutory compliance or other competent evidence.

State v. Griffin · filed 2015-11-18(D)(1)(b) and (F)

The state' bears the burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt in habitual offender proceedings. ... Prima facie proof of a prior felony conviction may be established by compliance with La. R.S. 15:529.1(F) or by other competent evidence.

A fourth-felony offender’s enhanced sentence may not depart from the mandatory minimum without legally sufficient justification.

State of Louisiana Versus Kevin Johnson · filed 2023-08-09

we find defendant’s enhanced sentence is illegally lenient and that the trial court abused its discretion in deviating from the mandatory minimum sentence for a fourth-felony offender. Accordingly, we vacate defendant’s enhanced sentence and remand for resentencing according to law.

Section 15:529.1(A)(3) produced a sentencing range of 20 to 80 years for this third-felony offender.

State of Louisiana Versus Rondell M. Lasalle · filed 2023-08-18(A)(3)

prescribed for a first conviction. Therefore, defendant faced a sentence range of twenty to eighty years imprisonment at hard labor.

For the third-felony offender in this case, the applicable habitual-offender sentencing range was 6⅔ to 20 years.

State of Louisiana v. Simpson · filed 2023-11-15(A)(3)(a)

Therefore, the correct sentencing range for the habitual offender sentence was 6-2/3 years to 20 years.

Subsection (G) requires a multiple-offender sentence to omit probation and suspension of sentence but does not itself impose a parole restriction.

State of Louisiana Versus Peter A. Barrosse · filed 2024-04-17(G)

While La. R.S. 15:529.1(G) requires all multiple offender sentences to be imposed without benefit of probation or suspension of sentence, it does not impose a parole restriction.

Subsection (C)(1) requires the prior sentence to end within five years of the next felony arrest for that conviction to link to the habitual-offender adjudication.

State of Louisiana v. Sterling · filed 2024-07-17(C)(1)

Pursuant to La. R.S. 15:529.1(C)(1), for Mr. Sterling’s May 2007 conviction to link with his other convictions, his sentence must end within 5 years of his next felony arrest.

Subsection (G) requires all multiple-offender sentences to be imposed without probation or suspension of sentence.

State of Louisiana Versus Brett H Elmer · filed 2024-12-18(G)

La. R.S. 15:529.1(G) requires all multiple-offender sentences to be imposed without benefit of probation or suspension of sentence.

Section 15:529.1(D)(3) requires written reasons for a multiple-offender determination, but transcribed oral reasons make a failure to provide separate written reasons harmless, and § 15:529.1(A)(1)(c)(ii)'s mandatory life sentence may be reduced when clear and convincing evidence shows that applying it would be constitutionally excessive.

State v. Neal · filed 2000-05-30(D)(3); (A)(1)(c)(ii)

According to La. R.S. 15:529.1(D)(3), the trial court "shall provide written reasons for its determination" that the defendant is a multiple offender. ... Thus, any failure to supply written reasons is harmless error. ... When a trial court determines the minimum sentence mandated by La. R.S. 15:529.1 makes no "`measurable contribution to acceptable goals of punishment'" or that the sentence amounts to nothing more than "`the purposeful imposition of pain and suffering'" and is `"grossly out of proportion to the severity of the crime,'" the trial judge must reduce the sentence to one that would not be constitutionally excessive. ... We therefore find that the trial court did not err in re-sentencing defendant to a term below the statutory minimum.

Under the 1995 version of § 15:529.1, the enhanced life sentence in Subsection A.(1)(b)(ii) did not apply when one of the offender’s prior felonies was possession of stolen property, because that offense was neither a crime of violence nor a controlled-substances violation.

State v. Marts · filed 2000-05-31(A)(1)(b)(ii)

Thus, under the version of the statute that was in effect at the time Mr. Marts committed the instant offense, he was not subject to the sentence enhancement specified in Subsection A.(1)(b)(ii) because one of his three felonies, possession of stolen property, is neither defined as a crime of violence nor is a violation of controlled substances laws.

Section 15:529.1(D)(1)(b) requires a written response to a multiple bill to preserve appellate review of challenges to the documentary evidence supporting prior convictions, although an oral objection may also suffice.

State v. Alford · filed 2000-06-14(D)(1)(b)

In State v. Cossee, 95-2218 (La.App. 4 Cir. 7/24/96), 678 So.2d 72, this Court held that the failure to file a written response to the multiple bill as required by La. R.S. 15:529.1(D)(1)(b) precluded appellate review of the defendant's claim that the documentary evidence was not sufficient to support prior convictions set forth in the multiple bill. In State v. Anderson, 97-2587 (La.App. 4 Cir. 11/18/98), 728 So.2d 14 this court found that an oral object would be sufficient to preserve issues related to the multiple bill adjudication for appellate review. However, in the instant case wherein neither a written nor an oral objection was made, issues related to the multiple bill adjudication have not been preserved.

The habitual-offender statute's mandatory life sentence is presumptively constitutional, but a defendant may overcome that presumption by clearly and convincingly showing exceptional circumstances that make the sentence constitutionally excessive.

State v. Debrow · filed 2000-06-21(A)(1)(b)(ii)

Pursuant to this function the legislature has enacted the habitual offender statute which has been held, on numerous occasions, to be constitutional. State v. Johnson, supra. Thus the mandatory life sentence of R.S. 15:529.1 is presumptively constitutional. Id. To rebut the presumption, the defendant must show clearly and convincingly that he is exceptional, i.e., because of unusual circumstances he is the victim of the legislature's failure to assign sentences that are meaningfully tailored to the culpability of the offender, gravity of the offense, and circumstances of the case. Id. Although a mandatory sentence may be found constitutionally excessive, the courts have made it clear that such a finding should be rare, not commonplace. State v. Dorthey, 623 So.2d 1276 (La.1993).

Section 15:529.1(G) makes a habitual-offender sentence unavailable for probation or suspension of sentence, but does not authorize denying parole.

State v. Dawson · filed 2000-11-15(G)

However, La. R.S. 15:529.1(G) provides that any habitual offender sentence shall be without the benefit of probation or suspension of sentence.

Section 15:529.1(A)(1)(a) sets a mandatory minimum habitual-offender sentence that is presumed constitutional, but a court may reduce it when clear and convincing evidence shows that it is grossly disproportionate and serves no acceptable punishment goal.

State v. Triche · filed 2003-12-30(A)(1)(a)

The mandatory minimum sentence under the Habitual Offender Law is presumed constitutional. ... If, however, a trial court finds that an enhanced punishment mandated by La. R.S. 15:529.1 makes "no measurable contribution to acceptable goals of punishment" or that the sentence amounts to nothing more than "the purposeful imposition of pain and suffering" and is "grossly out of proportion to the severity of the crime," the trial court has the option and duty to reduce such sentence to one that would not be constitutionally excessive. ... We find that defendant did not present any evidence, much less clear and convincing evidence, sufficient to rebut the presumption that the mandatory minimum sentence mandated by the legislature is constitutional.

Section 15:529.1(G) requires an enhanced habitual-offender sentence to be imposed without benefit of probation or suspension of sentence, but it does not authorize denying parole eligibility.

State v. Purland · filed 2007-02-28(G)

Section G of the habitual offender statute requires that all enhanced sentences be imposed without benefit of probation or suspension of sentence. La. R.S. 15:529.1(G). No authority is granted to a court to enhance a sentence by denying benefit of parole.

The statute's mandatory minimum sentence is presumed constitutional, and a court may depart from it only when unusual circumstances show the defendant is exceptional.

State v. Briggs · filed 2009-08-19

Mr. Briggs was sentenced to twenty years as a fourth offender under the Habitual Offender Law, La. R.S. 15:529.1, which provides a range for attempted possession of crack cocaine as a fourth felony offender of a minimum of twenty years and a maximum of life imprisonment. ... The minimum sentences imposed by the Habitual Offender Law are presumed to be constitutional. ... Absent unusual circumstances that establish a particular defendant is exceptional so that the mandatory minimum sentence, as applied to him, is nothing more than the needless infliction of pain and suffering, courts do not have the discretion to deviate therefrom.

Section 15:529.1(G) requires a habitual-offender sentence to be served at hard labor without probation or suspension, and those conditions supplement rather than replace the underlying felony's parole restrictions.

State v. Thurman · filed 2011-06-22(G)

La. R.S. 15:529.1(G) provides that any sentence imposed under the provisions of this section shall be at hard labor without benefit of probation or suspension of sentence. ... The sentence conditions required by La. R.S. 15:529.1(G) are additions to, rather than replacements of, those conditions required by the sentencing provisions for the underlying of fense.

Section 15:529.1's mandatory minimum sentences are presumed constitutional, but a court may depart from the minimum when clear and convincing evidence shows that the defendant is exceptional because unusual circumstances make the statutory sentence insufficiently tailored to the case.

State of Louisiana v. Harrison · filed 2014-02-12

Although the minimum sentences imposed upon multiple offenders pursuant to the Habitual Offender Law are presumed constitutional, a court has the power to declare such a sentence excessive under Article I, Section 20 of the Louisiana Constitution. ... “A court may only depart from the minimum sentence if it finds that there is clear and convincing evidence in the particular case before it which would rebut this presumption of constitutionality.” ... To rebut the presumption of constitutionality, the defendant must show that he is “exceptional, which in this context means that because of unusual circumstances [he] is a victim of the legislature’s failure to assign sentences that are meaningfully tailored to the culpability of the offender, the gravity of the offense, and the circumstances of the case.” ... In the absence of such a showing, the assignment lacks merit.

Section 15:529.1's mandatory minimum sentences are presumed constitutional, and a sentence for a third crime of violence is not excessive absent clear and convincing evidence that the defendant's circumstances are exceptional.

State v. Small · filed 2016-02-24

The minimum sentences mandated by the habitual offender law-are presumed to be constitutional. ... Courts have the power to- declare a | ](¡sentence excessive under La. Const, art. I, § 20 although it falls within the statutory limits provided'by the legislature; however, this power should be exercised only if the court finds that there is clear and convincing evidence in the particular case before it which would rebut this presumption of constitutionality, State v, Johnson, supra; State v. Lindsey, 99-3302 (La.10/17/00), 770 So.2d 339. ... We do not find this sentence for a third crime of violence to be shocking to a sense of justice nor has it been shown that, defendant’s circumstances are exceptional.

Section 15:529.1 authorizes enhanced imprisonment terms for habitual offenders but does not authorize imposing a fine as part of the enhanced sentence.

State v. Jamison · filed 2017-05-17(1)

The habitual offender statute, La. R.S. 15:529.1, does not, however, authorize the *920imposition of a .fíne, but only provides for enhanced sentences relating to the term of imprisonment.

Section 15:529.1 makes the habitual-offender minimum sentence presumptively constitutional, allowing a downward departure only when the defendant clearly and convincingly shows exceptional circumstances making the sentence constitutionally excessive.

State v. Harris · filed 2017-12-20(A)(1)(c)(ii)

The Louisiana Supreme Court has recognized that a mandatory minimum sentence under the Habitual Offender Law may still be reviewed for constitutional excessiveness. ... However, it is presumed that the mandatory minimum sentence under the Habitual Offender Law is constitutional. ... In order to rebut the presumption of constitutionality, the defendant must clearly and convincingly show that he is “exceptional, which ... means that because ■ of unusual circumstances this defendant is a victim of the legislature’s failure to assign sentences that are meaningfully tailored to the culpability of the offender, the gravity of the offense and the circumstances of the case.” ... Downward departures from the minimum sentence mandated by La. R.S. 15:529.1 should only occur in rare situations.

Section 15:529.1(D)(1)(b) requires a specific written response for a collateral attack on a prior conviction in a habitual-offender proceeding, but an objection that the State's evidence fails to establish a predicate conviction is not a collateral attack.

State v. Guy · filed 2000-07-19(D)(1)(b)

Under these circumstances it must be considered that defendant has preserved his right to object to what essentially is the sufficiency of the State's evidence presented on the habitual offender information. This is not a collateral attack on the prior conviction as contemplated by La. R.S. 15:529.1(D)(1)(b), requiring a specific written response.

Section 529.1(D)(1)(b) bars a defendant from attacking a prior conviction or adjudication to challenge a habitual-offender sentence on appeal if the challenge was not made before sentencing.

State v. Ponsell · filed 2000-08-23(D)(1)(b)

La. R.S. 15:529.1 D(1) governs the procedure for preserving these issues on appeal. The procedure requires the court in which the subsequent conviction was obtained to bring the offender before the court, inform him of the allegations contained in the information and of his rights and require the offender to say whether the allegations are true. If the offender denies the allegation, refuses to answer or remains silent, his plea or the fact of his silence is entered on the record and he shall be given 15 days to file particular objections to the information. Any challenge to the previous conviction or adjudication of delinquency not made before sentence is imposed may not thereafter be raised to attack the sentence. La. R.S. 15:529.1(D)(1)(b).

Subsection D(1)(b) requires a defendant challenging the validity of an alleged prior conviction to file a written response stating the claim and factual basis with particularity before sentencing; a challenge not made before sentence cannot later attack the sentence.

State v. Marshall · filed 2000-08-30(D)(1)(b)

Any challenge to a previous conviction or adjudication of delinquency which is not made before sentence is imposed may not thereafter be raised to attack the sentence.

A defendant challenging a prior conviction used for habitual-offender sentencing must raise the challenge before sentence is imposed, or it cannot later be used to attack the sentence.

State v. English · filed 2000-12-20(D)(1)(b)

Any challenge to a previous conviction or adjudication of delinquency which is not made before sentence is imposed may not thereafter be raised to attack the sentence. In the absence of an objection to the habitual offender bill, Assignment of Error No. Three is not properly before the court for review.

Subsection (G) requires a habitual-offender sentence to be without probation or suspension of sentence, but it does not itself authorize denying parole.

State v. Dawson · filed 2000-02-02(G)

La. R.S. 15:529.1(G) provides that any habitual offender sentence shall be without the benefit of probation or suspension of sentence.

Subsection (G) requires a second felony offender's sentence to be served without benefit of probation or suspension of sentence.

State v. Watson · filed 2000-08-23(G)

Because the defendant was adjudicated a second felony offender, his sentence must be served without the benefit of probation or suspension of sentence per La.R.S. 15:529.1 G. However, the defendant's sentence is amended to delete that portion of the sentence requiring that the sentence be served without benefit of parole.

Subsection (G) requires a multiple-offender sentence to be without benefit of probation or suspension of sentence, but it does not itself bar parole; an unraised favorable sentencing error is not corrected on appeal.

State v. Piker · filed 2001-05-30(G)

La. R.S. 15:529.1(G) provides that the sentence for a multiple offender is to be without benefit of probation or suspension of sentence.

When a habitual-offender sentence replaces the original sentence, § 15:529.1 requires the original sentence to be vacated; where the record shows the enhanced sentence was intended to replace it, the court may vacate the original sentence and reinstate the habitual-offender sentence.

State ex rel. Norwood v. State · filed 2001-08-29(D)

Thus, we vacate the original forty-year sentence imposed on February 20, 1997, to conform to the requirements of La. R.S. 15:529.1.

For a third felony offender with a qualifying predicate, § 15:529.1 requires life imprisonment without parole, probation, or suspension of sentence.

State v. Jackson · filed 2002-02-13(A)(1)(b)(ii)

The trial court did not give Joseph Jackson, as a third felony offender, the mandatory life sentence without the benefit of parole, probation or suspension of sentence.

Under § 15:529.1(A)(1)(b)(ii), a third-felony offender with a qualifying violent predicate and drug offense faces a mandatory life sentence without benefits.

State v. Dillon · filed 2002-02-26(A)(1)(b)(ii)

Under La. R.S. 15:529.1(A)(1)(b)(ii), the mandatory minimum sentence that the trial judge could have imposed was life imprisonment without benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence.

The habitual-offender bill must be filed and adjudicated within a reasonable time after the State knows of the prior felony record, and the proceeding must be completed before the defendant serves the sentence being enhanced.

State v. Perkins · filed 2002-02-26(D)

The habitual offender statute does not impose a prescriptive period for filing a bill of information. However, the jurisprudence holds that the State must file it "within a reasonable time after the prosecution knows that a Defendant has a prior felony record."

Section 15:529.1(A)(1)(a) sets a second-offender sentencing range of fifteen to sixty years for the underlying aggravated-burglary offense, and the statute permits reduction of an excessive minimum sentence.

State v. Robinson · filed 2002-04-24(D), (A)(1)(a)

The sentencing range under La. R.S. 14:60 and La. R.S. 15:529.1(A)(l)(a) is fifteen to sixty years.

Subsection (C) places on the State the burden to prove that the cleansing period has not elapsed between the defendant’s release from the prior offense and the new offense; an unpreserved challenge is not reviewed on appeal.

State v. Williams · filed 2002-11-20(C)

The State has the burden of proving that ten years has not elapsed between the defendant’s release from custody on the prior offense and the new offense.

Section 15:529.1 permits habitual offender sentencing while an appeal of the current felony conviction is pending.

State v. Martin · filed 1975-06-23

The multiple offender law merely prescribes enhanced penalties for a basic conviction. ... Extended to its logical extreme, defendant's reasoning would prevent a trial judge from sentencing any duly convicted criminal defendant until all avenues of appeal on the validity of the conviction alone had been exhausted. This argument is contrary to the procedures set forth in the Code of Criminal Procedure and the Louisiana Habitual Offender Law.[3] Accordingly, this assignment of error is without merit.

Section 15:529.1 cannot support a habitual offender adjudication when the conviction on which the enhanced sentence rests is reversed.

State v. Love · filed 1992-05-20

Love was sentenced as a habitual offender on the authority of La.R.S. 15:529.1 to five years at hard labor without benefit of parole, probation or suspension of sentence for public intimidation. Defendant's status as a habitual offender was based on the public intimidation conviction and a prior simple burglary conviction of March 13, 1990. Because we find that the public intimidation conviction must be reversed, it logically follows that said conviction could not be used to support the court's subsequent finding that Love was a habitual offender.

Section 15:529.1 does not violate Louisiana’s separation of powers clause by allowing a district attorney to seek an enhanced sentence for a habitual offender.

State v. Toliver · filed 1994-03-16

Defendant’s argument in Dorthey is the same as defendant’s argument here, the unconstitutionality of R.S. 15:529.1. The decision in Dorthey is clear. The statute is constitutional. We find defendant’s arguments herein have.no merit.