La. Stat. Ann. § 40:967

Section 40:967(C) permits possession of methadone administered under medical supervision and control by an authorized treatment program, and carrying that lawfully obtained methadone off clinic premises is not criminalized by the statute.

State v. Brown · filed 1979-01-08(C)

Accordingly, possession of methadone, when obtained by a person under medical supervision and control, as part of a program for the treatment and rehabilitation for narcotic addicts administered by the Louisiana Narcotics Rehabilitation Commission is not a crime. Although the prosecution introduced evidence that the commission has adopted regulations limiting the circumstances under which an addict may carry methadone off clinic premises, there is no statute or constitutional provision by which this conduct is defined as criminal.

Section 40:967(C) makes knowing or intentional possession of a Schedule II controlled dangerous substance unlawful unless it was obtained directly or pursuant to a valid prescription or practitioner’s order, and the prescription exception is a defense the defendant bears the burden of proving.

State v. Lewis · filed 1983-02-23(C)

Under these provisions, the possession of a Schedule II or III drug is not unlawful if they are possessed pursuant to a valid prescription. Thus, this is an exception set forth within the statute. ... Hence, La.R.S. 40:990 makes it clear that a defendant has the burden of proof that he possessed the drugs by a valid prescription, an exception to possession of a controlled dangerous substance. If defendant had claimed to have come within the exceptions in the statutes, he could have urged it as a defense to the charge.

Section 40:967(C)(1) prohibits the unauthorized possession of a Schedule II controlled substance such as pentazocine.

State v. Malonson · filed 1984-07-31(C)(1)

Talwin is the trademark name for pentazocine which is a Schedule II drug listed in La.R.S. 40:964 and its unauthorized possession is proscribed by La.R.S. 40:967(C)(1).

Section 40:967(A) prohibits distribution of phentermine, including furnishing it by prescription, subject to the exemption for a licensed physician prescribing for a legitimate medical purpose in good faith in the usual course of professional practice.

State v. Moody · filed 1981-01-26(A)

The defendant was charged with distribution of phentermine. Distribution of phentermine is prohibited as a criminal offense. La.R.S. 40:967(A); 40:964, Schedule II(C)(6). Distribution includes delivery of phentermine by furnishing a prescription. La.R.S. 40:961(13). However, prescription of phentermine issued by a licensed physician for a legitimate medical purpose, for the purpose of correcting a physical, mental or bodily ailment, and acting in good faith in the usual course of his professional practice, is exempt from any criminal penalty. La.R.S. 40:961(30); 40:978(A).

Section 40:967(A)(1) prohibits knowingly or intentionally producing, manufacturing, distributing, dispensing, or possessing with intent to do so a Schedule II controlled dangerous substance, and a single undercover officer's testimony can be sufficient to prove drug distribution.

State v. Rose · filed 1999-12-08(A)(1)

La. R.S. 40:967(A)(1) defines distribution of a controlled dangerous substance as follows: ... (1) To produce, manufacture, distribute, or dispense or possess with intent to produce, manufacture, distribute, or dispense, a controlled dangerous substance classified in Schedule II. ... The testimony of a single undercover police officer is sufficient to convict a defendant charged with drug distribution.

Section 40:967(A)(1) prohibits knowingly or intentionally distributing a Schedule II controlled dangerous substance, and the evidence that Johnson supplied cocaine to Ernest for sale supported Johnson's distribution conviction.

State v. Johnson · filed 2000-01-26(A)(1)

La. R.S. 40:967 provides, in pertinent part: A. Manufacture; distribution. Except as authorized by this Part or by Part VII-B of Chapter 5 of Title 40 of the Louisiana Revised Statutes of 1950, it shall be unlawful for any person knowingly or intentionally: (1) To produce, manufacture, distribute, or dispense or possess with intent to produce, manufacture, distribute, or dispense, a controlled dangerous substance classified in Schedule II.... ... Winters' testimony showed that Johnson provided the cocaine to Ernest who in turn sold it to Winters. Johnson received the proceeds of the sale from Ernest. ... Accordingly, when viewed in the light most favorable to the state, the evidence presented was sufficient to support the distribution of cocaine conviction.

Section 40:967(B)(1) prohibits distributing controlled dangerous substances listed in Schedule II, including cocaine.

State v. Texada · filed 2000-02-02(B)(1)

La.R.S. 40:967 proscribes distribution of controlled dangerous substances listed in Schedule II, which includes cocaine.

Section 40:967(B)(4) makes the prior cocaine-distribution conviction a controlled-substance offense punishable by ten years of imprisonment or more, qualifying it for the habitual-offender sentencing provision.

State v. Lyles · filed 2018-12-27(B)(4)

Accordingly, we find that the 2015 version of La. R.S. 15:529.1(A)(3)(b) is the sentencing provision applicable to defendant herein because his third felony (the aggravated battery conviction) and his predicate conviction of manslaughter are crimes of violence under La. R.S. 14:2(B)(5) and La. R.S. 14:2(B)(4), respectively. Additionally, defendant's 1991 conviction for distribution of cocaine in violation of La. R.S. 40:967(A) was a violation of the Uniform Controlled Dangerous Substance Law punishable by ten years of imprisonment or more. La. R.S. 40:967(B)(4). Under the habitual offender statute as it existed at the time of the commission of the underlying offense of aggravated battery, defendant was subject to an enhanced mandatory sentence of life imprisonment without the benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence.

Section 40:967(A)(1) requires proof of each element of distributing oxycodone, and the evidence was sufficient for a reasonable jury to find those elements beyond a reasonable doubt.

Jordan v. Kent · filed 2020-09-21(A)(1)

He then proceeds to detail the requirements under the law to establish guilt for distribution of oxycodone in violation of La. R.S. 40:967(A)(1),13 and, after a thorough review of the evidence adduced during the trial, concludes that, “The evidence at trial was more than sufficient to prove to a reasonable jury each element of distribution of oxycodone by Jordan.”14 This Court agrees with the Magistrate Judge’s review and analysis, finding that it sufficiently addresses the issue, including Petitioner’s objection regarding the sufficiency of the evidence.

Section 40:967(A)(1) prohibits knowingly or intentionally distributing a Schedule II controlled dangerous substance; distribution requires delivery or physical transfer, guilty knowledge, and proof of the substance’s exact identity.

State of Louisiana Versus Kevin Johnson · filed 2023-08-09A(1)

Defendant was convicted of one count of distribution of methamphetamine weighing less than twenty-eight grams in violation of La. R.S. 40:967 A(1), which provides that it is unlawful for any person to knowingly or intentionally distribute a controlled dangerous substance classified in Schedule II, which includes methamphetamine. La. R.S. 40:964 C(2). To establish the offense of distribution of a controlled dangerous substance, the State must prove: (1) delivery or physical transfer; (2) guilty knowledge of the controlled dangerous substance at the time of transfer;12 and (3) the exact identity of the controlled dangerous substance. State v. Beason, 16-195 (La. App. 5 Cir. 12/07/16), 204 So.3d 1206, 1210.

Section 40:967 permits felony prosecution of a licensed pharmacist who knowingly distributes controlled drugs for illegal purposes, even though the conduct may also violate the separate licensing provision.

State v. Valasquez · filed 1979-10-08

The statute thus provides for two generically different distribution offenses: one for "any person" who illegally distributes controlled drugs, La.R.S. 40:966-70; and another for persons "subject to the [licensing] requirements" of the statute, La.R.S. 40:971 A(1)(a). Conduct which is criminal as violation of two different statutory enactments may be prosecuted under either, at the discretion of the district attorney.

Section 40:967(B) authorizes imprisonment and a fine for methamphetamine distribution but does not authorize adding a GED-completion requirement to the sentence.

State v. Patterson · filed 2012-02-01(B)

For distribution of methamphetamine, La. R.S. 40:967 carries a sentence of imprisonment at hard labor for not less than two nor more than thirty years and a potential fine of not more than fifty thousand dollars. The statute does not provide for completion of a GED program as part of the penalty. Additionally, we know of no statute or jurisprudence authorizing the imposition of such a condition when the defendant is not placed on probation. ... We find that the portion of the sentence requiring Defendant to participate in and complete a GED program is illegal.

Section 40:967 permits possession to be proved constructively when the defendant has dominion or control over the drug and guilty knowledge, and intent to distribute may be inferred from the substance’s packaging, quantity, scales, or other paraphernalia.

State v. Tasker · filed 1984-02-28

In narcotics and drug offenses, possession may be established by a proof of the defendant's actual or constructive possession, State v. Baker, 338 So.2d 1372 (La.1976); State v. Marks, supra. In order for a person to constructively possess a drug, he must either own it or have "dominion or control" over it. State v. Marks, supra; State v. Mims, 330 So.2d 905 (La. 1976). The State must show that the defendant had guilty knowledge of the illegality of the drug. State v. Trahan, 425 So.2d 1222 (La.1983); State v. Smith, 245 So.2d 327 (La.1971). The factfinder may draw reasonable inferences to support these conclusions based upon the evidence presented at trial. State v. Edwards, 354 So.2d 1322 (La.1978); La.R.S. 15:446. ... The intent to distribute may also be inferred from the surrounding circumstances. The trier of fact may look to how the substance was packaged, the quantity of the substance seized and the presence of scales or other paraphernalia for drug use or packaging. State v. Trahan, 425 So.2d 1122 (La.1983).

(A)(1) makes it unlawful to knowingly or intentionally possess a Schedule II controlled substance with intent to distribute it.

State v. Viator · filed 1986-10-21(A)(1)

In the case at bar, the defendant and two other men were observed weighing and packaging a substantial amount of cocaine. In accordance with Sweeney, supra, this is sufficient to prove defendant's constructive or actual possession of the cocaine. In viewing this evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant had either actual or constructive possession of the cocaine, scales and packaging equipment in the dresser and was therefore properly convicted of possession of cocaine, a schedule II controlled substance, with intent to distribute, in violation of La.R.S. 40:967(A)(1).

Section 40:967(A) requires proof that the defendant possessed pentazocine and, while possessing it, specifically intended to distribute it.

State v. Spencer · filed 1988-10-11(A)

The State had the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that Griffin (1) possessed pentazocine, and (2) while so possessing, had the specific intent to distribute it. La.R.S. 40:967 A.

Section 40:967(A)(1) requires the State to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant knowingly and intentionally possessed cocaine with the specific intent to distribute it.

State v. Sterling · filed 1990-03-14(A)(1)

Under La.R.S. 40:967(A)(1) the State had the burden of establishing beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant (1) knowingly and intentionally possessed cocaine, and (2)so possessed the drug with the specific intent to distribute it.

Section 40:967(A) makes it unlawful to knowingly or intentionally possess cocaine with intent to distribute it.

State v. Johnson · filed 1995-08-23(A)

La.R.S. 40:967(A) provides in pertinent part that it is "unlawful for any person knowingly or intentionally ... [to] possess with intent to ... distribute" cocaine. ... Accordingly, there was sufficient evidence for the jury to conclude, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendants possessed cocaine with the intent to distribute.

Section 40:967(A)(1) makes it unlawful to knowingly or intentionally possess a Schedule II controlled dangerous substance with intent to distribute it.

State v. Harris · filed 1996-10-09(A)(1)

That statute provides in pertinent part: (A) [I]t shall be unlawful for any person knowingly or intentionally: (1) To produce, manufacture, distribute, or dispense or possess with intent to produce, manufacture, distribute, or dispense, a controlled dangerous substance classified in Schedule II;.... In her brief, defendant states she admitted to possession of six rocks of crack cocaine weighing one and four-tenths grams. Thus, the only issue contested by defendant is whether or not she intended to distribute the cocaine. For the following reasons, we find that the evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of possession with the intent to distribute cocaine.

Section 40:967(A)(1) requires proof that the defendant knowingly or intentionally possessed cocaine and specifically intended to distribute it; a defendant who aids and abets the possession may be convicted as a principal.

State v. Belino · filed 1996-12-20(A)(1)

The remaining elements of the possession charge are that defendant knowing or intentionally possessed the drug and specifically intended to distribute it. La. R.S. 40:967(A). ... Although less than overwhelming, this direct evidence, combined with the circumstantial evidence, is sufficient to permit a rational juror to infer defendant was serving as an armed lookout during the drug transaction. In doing so, he aided and abetted the codefendants and thus was a principal to the crime they committed.

Section 40:967(A)(1) prohibits knowingly or intentionally possessing a Schedule II controlled dangerous substance with intent to distribute; constructive possession requires dominion and control, and intent to distribute may be inferred from circumstances.

State v. Stelly · filed 1997-04-30(A)(1)

The defendant was convicted of possession of cocaine with the intent to distribute, a violation of La.R.S. 40:967(A). ... [I]t shall be unlawful for any person knowingly or intentionally: (1) To produce, manufacture, distribute, or dispense or possess with intent to produce, manufacture, distribute, or dispense, a controlled dangerous substance classified in Schedule II[.] ... The State is not required to show actual possession in order to convict, but only that the defendant exercised dominion and control over the illegal substance. ... Considering the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, we find sufficient evidence of either possession or constructive possession of the crack cocaine by the defendant. ... We find that the evidence supports the jury's finding that the defendant not only possessed the cocaine, but had specific intent to distribute as well. Therefore, the defendant's assignment is without merit.

Section 40:967(1) requires proof that the defendant possessed a Schedule II controlled dangerous substance and specifically intended to distribute it.

State v. Martin · filed 1997-05-13(1)

The crime of possession with intent to distribute cocaine requires the state to show the defendant possessed the controlled dangerous substance with specific intent to distribute it.

Section 40:967(A)(1) makes possession of a controlled dangerous substance with intent to distribute it a crime, and constructive possession satisfies the possession element.

State v. Gladney · filed 1997-09-24(A)(1)

To support a conviction for possession with intent to distribute, the state must prove: (1) possession of the controlled dangerous substance; and (2) intent to distribute it. La. R.S. 40:967 A(1); State v. Lee, 25,917 (La.App.2d Cir. 05/04/94), 637 So.2d 656, writ denied, 94-1451 (La.10/07/94), 644 So.2d 631; State v. Tyler, 544 So.2d 495 (La.App. 2d Cir.1989). One need not actually possess the controlled dangerous substance; constructive possession is sufficient to convict.

Section 40:967(A)(1) requires proof of both possession of the controlled dangerous substance and specific intent to distribute it to support a conviction for possession with intent to distribute.

State v. Spencer · filed 1998-01-21(A)(1)

To support a conviction for possession with intent to distribute, the state must prove (1) possession of the controlled dangerous substance and (2) specific intent to distribute it. La. R.S. 40:967 A(1); State v. Elzie, 343 So.2d 712 (La.1977); State v. Daniels, supra.

Section 40:967(A) requires proof that the defendant knowingly and intentionally possessed cocaine with the specific intent to distribute; constructive possession is sufficient, and intent may be inferred from distribution-related factors.

State v. Goodjoint · filed 1998-06-24(A)

Defendant was charged with possession of cocaine with intent to distribute. The prosecution was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant knowingly and intentionally possessed the drug with the specific intent to distribute. La. R.S. 40:967(A). One need not actually possess the controlled dangerous substance; constructive possession is sufficient to convict. ... Having determined that defendant possessed the cocaine, the next inquiry concerns his intent. Factors that help in determining whether defendant intended to distribute the cocaine include: (1) packaging in a form usually associated with distribution; (2) evidence of other sales or attempted sales by defendant; (3) a large amount or quantity of the drug; (4) expert or other testimony that the amount was inconsistent with personal use; and (5) the existence of paraphernalia commonly used in distribution.

Section 40:967(A)(1) requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant possessed cocaine with the intent to distribute it; cocaine, cash, and testimony that the amount exceeded a usual personal-use purchase were insufficient here.

State v. Perry · filed 1998-07-22(A)(1)

In the instant case, the defendant was found with twenty-two rocks of crack cocaine in his own home. He had $268.00 in his hand. The officers found no drug paraphernalia or weapons. Evidence relative to drug transactions at the location, which was a part of the search warrant affidavit, was excluded by the trial judge prior to trial for failure of the State to give adequate notice of this “other crimes” evidence. Accordingly, the evidence of intent which was ^presented to the jury consisted only of the cocaine, the cash, and an officer’s testimony that the amount of cocaine seized was more than the usual amount of a purchase. Considering the above cases, the evidence introduced is insufficient for a rational trier of fact to find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant had the intent to distribute.

Section 40:967 requires proof that the defendant knowingly and intentionally possessed cocaine and specifically intended to distribute it.

State v. Franklin · filed 1998-09-23

The crime of possession with intent to distribute cocaine requires proof that the defendant knowingly and intentionally possessed the drug and that he did so with the specific intent to distribute.

Section 40:967(A)(1) requires proof that the defendant knowingly and intentionally possessed a controlled dangerous substance and intended to distribute it; quantity alone may establish the intent-to-distribute element.

State v. Bentley · filed 1998-10-21(A)(1)

To support a conviction for possession of a controlled dangerous substance with intent to distribute, the State must prove *412 that the defendant knowingly and intentionally possessed the contraband and that he did so with the intent to distribute it. ... Thus, we find that the quantity alone was sufficient to support the element of intent to distribute in the case at bar.

Section 40:967 permits a conviction for possession of cocaine with intent to distribute when the evidence, including individually packaged cocaine and corroborating drug-trafficking circumstances, supports an inference of intent to distribute.

State v. Martin · filed 1999-02-24

In the present case expert testimony was unnecessary to establish that the substantial amount of cocaine found in Martin's possession was inconsistent with personal use. The officers found 39 individually wrapped pieces of cocaine, as well as a crack pipe in the apartment. Pursuant to a search after Martin's arrest, the police found $303 on Martin. It was later determined that Martin resided at the apartment. It was stipulated at trial that the pieces of cocaine tested positive for cocaine, and there was cocaine residue in the pipe. The state provided evidence of the substantial amount of cocaine found, other evidence of drug paraphernalia, as well as testimony of what appeared to Officer Lainez to be drug transactions in the manner that subjects arrived and left the apartment after brief periods of time. The officer testified that a female was reaching for money. The weight of the evidence is within the fact finder's discretion. We defer to the jury's determination that the amount of cocaine and other evidence indicate an intent to distribute. We find no error in the jury's finding that the evidence supported the conviction for possession with the intent to distribute cocaine.

Section 40:967(A)(1) prohibits knowingly and intentionally possessing a Schedule II controlled dangerous substance with the specific intent to distribute it, and the evidence here was sufficient to prove that offense.

State v. Hollins · filed 1999-08-31(A)(1)

The crime of possession with intent to distribute cocaine requires proof that the defendant knowingly and intentionally possessed the drug and that he did so with the specific intent to distribute it. La. R.S. 40:967(A); State v. Bell, 97-1134 (La. App. 5th Cir. 2/25/98), 709 So.2d 921, 925, writ denied, 98-0792 (La.9/16/98), 721 So.2d 477. ... In this case, the evidence of the amount, the packaging and the lack of paraphernalia all support an inference that defendant had the intent to distribute the cocaine. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, we find that the evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction beyond a reasonable doubt. Thus, the trial court did not err in denying defendant's motion for new trial.

Section 40:967(A)(1) requires proof that the defendant possessed a controlled dangerous substance and specifically intended to distribute it; the evidence here did not establish the distribution intent beyond a reasonable doubt.

State v. Young · filed 2000-03-31(A)(1)

To support a conviction for the crime charged, the State had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the defendant: 1) possessed the controlled dangerous substance; and 2) had an intent to distribute the controlled dangerous substance. ... Analyzing the facts of this case and applying the House factors, we conclude there was insufficient evidence of defendant's intent to distribute the cocaine. ... Accordingly, a rational trier of fact could not have concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that the State proved the "intent to distribute" element of the crime. Thus, we find the State has not proven beyond a reasonable doubt all the elements of the offense of possession with intent to distribute cocaine.

Section 40:967(A)(1) prohibits possessing cocaine with intent to distribute, and the court held that the evidence here was sufficient to establish that intent.

State v. Butler · filed 2000-05-01(A)(1)

We agree with relator that the amount of cocaine recovered by the police from his person, a single rock weighing .07 grams, ordinarily would not support a jury’s finding of an intent to distribute. ... However, in his statements to the police after his arrest, relator admitted that two other rocks of cocaine had spilled out of his pocket during a struggle with the officers and that he made his living by selling drugs. ... Under these circumstances, we conclude that the evidence was sufficient to .support relator’s conviction of possession of cocaine with intent to distribute.

Section 40:967(A)(1) prohibits knowingly or intentionally possessing a Schedule II controlled dangerous substance with intent to distribute; constructive possession may satisfy the possession element when the defendant exercises dominion and control over the drug.

State v. Scott · filed 2000-06-07(A)(1)

In order to obtain a conviction, the State must prove every element of the crime charged, beyond a reasonable doubt. In the instant matter, the defendant was charged with violating La.R.S. 40:967(A)(1), which states in part: [I]t shall be unlawful for any person knowingly or intentionally: (1) To possess with intent to ... distribute,... a controlled dangerous substance classified in Schedule II.[1] (Footnote added.) ... Thus, we find the evidence supports a finding that the defendant had constructive possession of the crack cocaine, in that he had knowledge that the drugs were in the refrigerator and that he exercised dominion and control over the drugs by padlocking it shut and maintaining the key. Moreover, we find the evidence sufficient to prove the defendant's intent to distribute the drugs.

Section 40:967(A)(1) requires proof that the defendant knowingly and intentionally possessed the controlled dangerous substance and intended to distribute it.

State v. Jones · filed 2000-06-21(A)(1)

To support a conviction for possession of a controlled dangerous substance with intent to distribute, the State must prove that the defendant knowingly and intentionally possessed the contraband and that he did so with the intent to distribute it. State v. Smith, 94-1502, p. 3 (La.App. 4 Cir. 1/19/95), 649 So.2d 1078, 1081; La. R.S. 40:967(A)(1).

Section 40:967(A) requires proof that the defendant knowingly and intentionally possessed cocaine with the specific intent to distribute it; expert or other testimony that the quantity is inconsistent with personal use may support that intent.

State v. Stokes · filed 2000-04-13(A)

To establish defendant's guilt, the state was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant knowingly and intentionally possessed the cocaine with the specific intent to distribute it. La. R.S. 40:967(A). One of the factors that may be used to prove the defendant's intent to distribute a controlled dangerous substance is expert or other testimony to establish that the amount of the drug found in the defendant's possession is inconsistent with personal use only. State v. Hearold, 603 So.2d 731 (La.1992); State v. White, 98-91 (La.App. 5 Cir.6/30/98), 715 So.2d 714, writ denied, 98-2043 (La.11/25/98), 729 So.2d 577.

Section 40:967(A)(1) supports a conviction for possession of cocaine with intent to distribute when the evidence is sufficient to establish the intent to distribute.

State v. Butler · filed 2000-05-01(A)(1)

For the following reasons, we affirm relator’s conviction and sentence for possession of cocaine with intent to distribute in violation of La.R.S. 40:967(A)(1). ... Under these circumstances, we conclude that the evidence was sufficient to .support relator’s conviction of possession of cocaine with intent to distribute.

Section 40:967(A)(1) requires proof that the defendant knowingly and intentionally possessed a controlled dangerous substance with the specific intent to distribute it.

State v. Jones · filed 2000-06-21(A)(1)

To support a conviction for possession of a controlled dangerous substance with intent to distribute, the State must prove that the defendant knowingly and intentionally possessed the contraband and that he did so with the intent to distribute it. State v. Smith, 94-1502, p. 3 (La.App. 4 Cir. 1/19/95), 649 So.2d 1078, 1081; La. R.S. 40:967(A)(1). ... Viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant possessed the cocaine with the specific intent to distribute it.

Section 40:967(A)(1) requires proof that the defendant knowingly and intentionally possessed the controlled substance and intended to distribute it; constructive possession satisfies the possession element.

State v. Hebert · filed 2001-04-11(A)(1)

To support a conviction for possession of a controlled dangerous substance with intent to distribute, the State must prove that the defendant knowingly and intentionally possessed the contraband and that he did so with the intent to distribute it. State v. Jones, 99-0861, 769 So.2d at 35; State v. Smith, 94-1502, (La. App. 4 Cir. 1/19/95), 649 So.2d 1078, 1081; La. R.S. 40:967(A)(1). The State need not prove that the defendant was in actual possession of the narcotics found; constructive possession is sufficient. See State v. Trahan, 425 So.2d 1222 (La.1983).

Section 40:967(A) requires knowing and intentional possession of cocaine plus specific intent to distribute; intent to distribute may be inferred from circumstances surrounding possession.

State v. Manson · filed 2001-06-27(A)

The crime of possession with intent to distribute cocaine requires proof that the defendant knowingly and intentionally possessed the drug and that he did so with the specific intent to distribute it. ... The intent to distribute cocaine, for purposes of proving the charge of possession of cocaine with intent to distribute, may be established by proving circumstances surrounding the defendant's possession which give rise to reasonable inferences of intent to distribute. ... Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, we find the evidence was sufficient to prove the elements of the charged offense beyond a reasonable doubt.

For a conviction under § 40:967(A)(1), the State must prove possession of cocaine and an intent to distribute it.

State v. Ducre · filed 2001-09-28(A)(1)

The evidence presented at trial in the instant case shows a substantial amount of cocaine was found on the defendant’s body and two smaller bags fell from his pants leg. The value of the cocaine was approximately $1,500. The State’s expert testified that the amount found was a “distribution amount.” Additionally, either the defendant or his severed co-defendant telephoni-cally set up a date, time, and place to effectuate a sale of cocaine and then arrived at the scheduled time and place with cocaine in three different containers. The evidence was sufficient to support the jury’s decision finding the defendant guilty of possession of cocaine with the intention to distribute. This assignment of error is without merit.

Section 40:967 requires proof that the defendant knowingly and intentionally possessed the controlled dangerous substance and intended to distribute it.

State v. Clark · filed 2001-12-05

To convict a defendant of possession of a controlled dangerous substance with intent to distribute, the state must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he knowingly and intentionally possessed the contraband and that he did so with the intent to distribute it. La. R.S. 40:967; State v. Smith, 94-1502 (La.App. 4th Cir.1/19/95), 649 So.2d 1078, 1081.

Section 40:967(A)(1) requires proof that the defendant knowingly and intentionally possessed the controlled dangerous substance and intended to distribute it; intent to distribute may be inferred from circumstances such as the drug's quantity and packaging, expert testimony, and distribution paraphernalia.

State v. Wade · filed 2002-10-23(A)(1)

To support the conviction for possession of CDS with the intent to distribute, the State must prove that the defendant knowingly and intentionally possessed the CDS and did so with the intent to distribute it. La. R.S. 40:967 A(1); State v. Smith, 94-1502 (La.App. 4 Cir. 1/19/95), 649 So.2d 1078.

Section 40:967(A)(1) requires proof that the defendant possessed a controlled dangerous substance and intended to distribute it; the court held the evidence was sufficient to establish both elements for marijuana.

State v. Sanders · filed 2003-04-11(A)(1)

To support a conviction for possession with intent to distribute, the state must prove: (1) possession of the controlled dangerous substance; and (2) intent to distribute it. La. R.S. 40:967(A)(1); State v. Thomas, 32,495 (La.App.2d Cir.10/27/99), 745 So.2d 776, writs denied, 00-1008 (La.11/27/00), 775 So.2d 445, and 00-0242 (La.12/08/00), 775 So.2d 1076. ... Certainly a jury could have concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant intended to distribute the marijuana which he possessed, either directly or as a principal. La.R.S. 14:24. ... Viewing the totality of evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, all the elements of the crime of possession of marijuana with intent to distribute are present here.

Section 40:967(A)(1) requires proof that the defendant knowingly and intentionally possessed the drugs with the specific intent to distribute them.

State v. Smith · filed 2003-12-09(A)(1)

In this case, defendant was charged with possession with intent to distribute cocaine. The State was required to prove that defendant knowingly and intentionally possessed drugs with the specific intent to distribute them. La. R.S. 40:967(A)(1).

Section 40:967(A)(1) prohibits knowingly or intentionally possessing a Schedule II controlled dangerous substance with intent to distribute; constructive possession can satisfy possession, and the nature and quantity of the drugs can establish the intent to distribute.

State of Louisiana v. Monceaux · filed 2004-10-20(A)(1)

The offense of possession with intent to distribute Schedule II substances is regulated by Louisiana Revised Statutes 40:967 which provides, in pertinent part: ... (1) To produce, manufacture, distribute, or dispense or possess with intent to produce, manufacture, distribute, or dispense, a controlled dangerous substance or controlled substance analogue classified in Schedule II[.] ... Accordingly, the record supports the finding that the defendant had joint possession of the drugs or at the least that the defendant exercised dominion and control sufficient to constitute constructive possession of the drugs, even though it was his brother who was discovered in actual possession. ... We conclude that the nature and amount of the drugs established in the record was sufficient for the jury to conclude that the defendant had the requisite intent to distribute.

Section 40:967(A)(1) prohibits knowingly or intentionally possessing a Schedule II controlled substance with intent to distribute it, and proof of an actual distribution plus an amount inconsistent with personal use can establish that intent.

State of Louisiana v. Benedict · filed 2004-11-10(A)(1)

Thus, the State in the present case showed an instance of actual distribution and that Defendant had, on his person, an amount of methamphetamine inconsistent with personal use. Given the testimony regarding the price of methamphetamine, Defendant had six hundred dollars worth of the drug on his person and a total of at least fourteen hundred dollars worth was found at the scene. Comparing the evidence adduced to the House factors and viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, we find that the jury was not unreasonable in finding that Defendant had the intent to distribute methamphetamine. For the reasons discussed, this assignment lacks merit.

Section 40:967 A(1) requires proof that the defendant knowingly and intentionally possessed the drug with the specific intent to distribute it, and the intent to distribute may be inferred from the circumstances.

State v. Wiley · filed 2005-10-26A(1)

The crime of possession of crack cocaine with the intent to distribute requires proof that the defendant knowingly and intentionally possessed the drug and did so with the specific intent to distribute it. ... Intent is a question of fact to be decided by the trier of fact; it need not be proven as fact, but may be inferred from the circumstances.

Section 40:967(A)(1) prohibits knowingly or intentionally possessing a Schedule II controlled dangerous substance with intent to distribute it, requiring proof of possession and intent to distribute.

State of Louisiana v. Davis · filed 2005-12-30(A)(1)

To support a conviction for possession with intent to distribute, the State must show that an accused was in possession of a controlled dangerous substance and intended to distribute the drug. Louisiana Revised Statutes 40:967(A) provides, in pertinent part, that it is “unlawful for any person knowingly or intentionally: (1) To produce, manufacture, distribute, or dispense or possess with intent to produce, manufacture, distribute, or dispense, a controlled dangerous substance . . . classified in Schedule II.”

Section 40:967(A)(1) requires proof that the defendant knowingly and intentionally possessed cocaine and intended to distribute it; circumstantial evidence of intent must exclude every reasonable hypothesis of innocence.

State of Louisiana v. Durgan · filed 2006-05-31(A)(1) (C)

In pertinent part, La.R.S. 40:967(A)(1) states, “[I]t shall be unlawful for any person to knowingly or intentionally . . . possess with intent to . . . distribute . . . a controlled dangerous substance or controlled substance analogue classified in Schedule II.” Cocaine is one of the controlled dangerous substances classified in Schedule II. La.R.S. 40:964(II)(A)(4). Thus, the prosecution must have proved that (1) Defendant knowing and intentionally possessed cocaine and that (2) Defendant intended to distribute the cocaine. ... Because the State only used circumstantial evidence to prove Defendant’s intent to distribute, it must have excluded every other reasonable hypothesis. ... Therefore, this court may find that the State failed to prove Defendant’s intent to distribute under the appropriate analysis. ... This court will reverse the Defendant’s conviction for possession of a controlled dangerous substance with intent to distribute and enter a judgment of guilty to possession of a controlled dangerous substance, in violation of La.R.S. 40:967(C).

Section 40:967(A)(1) requires proof of possession of cocaine and intent to distribute it; the court held that the evidence established only illegal possession, not intent to distribute.

State v. Jenkins · filed 2007-01-24(A)(1)

Concerning the six rocks and the pistol, we find, under the Jackson standard, and considering the small amount of drugs imputable to the defendant, that only the elements of illegal possession were proven.

Section 40:967(A)(1) requires proof that the defendant intentionally possessed cocaine and specifically intended to distribute it.

State of Louisiana v. Lee · filed 2007-04-18(A)(1)

Given these charges, the State was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant intentionally possessed cocaine and marijuana and that he had the specific intent to distribute the cocaine and marijuana. See La.R.S. 40:967(A)(1) and La.R.S. 40:966(A)(1). ... As for the remaining element of the offenses, specific intent to distribute the cocaine and marijuana, we find that the record supports the determination that the State presented evidence sufficient in this regard. ... However, given the context of the contraband’s discovery, two bags of marijuana bundled with 115 bags of cocaine, we find that the trial court was free to conclude that the sheer amount and packaging of the drugs were indicative of intent to distribute rather than personal use. ... Considering both the testimony of these officers and the quantity of the packages of drugs discovered in a light most favorable to the prosecution, we conclude that the trial court could have reasonably concluded that the evidence established that the defendant possessed the cocaine and marijuana with intent to distribute.

Section 40:967(B)(1) prohibits knowingly or intentionally possessing cocaine with intent to distribute, and that intent may be inferred from surrounding circumstances.

State v. Davis · filed 2007-04-25(B)(1)

Defendant was convicted of violating Louisiana Revised Statute 40:967. This statute requires that the state prove that defendant "knowingly" or "intentionally" possessed the cocaine "with intent to distribute." Specific intent to distribute may be established by proving circumstances surrounding defendant's possession which give rise to a reasonable inference of intent to distribute.

Section 40:967(A)(1) prohibits knowingly or intentionally possessing a Schedule II controlled dangerous substance with intent to distribute, and the State need not prove actual possession if it proves dominion or control.

State v. Sims · filed 2007-12-21(A)(1)

The crime of possession with intent to distribute cocaine is defined as follows: "it shall be unlawful for any person knowingly or intentionally ... [t]o ... possess with intent to... distribute ... a controlled dangerous substance ... classified in Schedule II[.]" La. R.S. 40:967(A)(1). Thus, in order to support a conviction, the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant possessed the drug with the intent to distribute it. The prosecution is not required to prove actual possession, but needs only to show the defendant exercised dominion or control over the illegal substance.

Section 40:967(A)(1) prohibits possessing methamphetamine with intent to distribute, and intent may be inferred from the drug's form and amount and from distribution paraphernalia.

State of Louisiana v. Sammy D. Smith · filed 2008-01-30(A)(1)

The State had the burden of proving that the Defendant possessed methamphetamine with the intent to distribute same. La.R.S. 40:967(A)(1). ... Lastly, applying the factors enumerated in House, 325 So.2d 222, to the instant case, the Defendant is correct in that there was no evidence presented at trial indicating that he has ever distributed or attempted to distribute methamphetamine. However, the testimony of Sergeant Hensen indicates that the methamphetamine seized was in a form usually associated with possession for distribution to others. Additionally, Sergeant Henson opined that the amount, 6.3 grams, was significant enough to create an inference of an intent to distribute and was inconsistent with personal use only. Lastly, Sergeant Henson stated that the paraphernalia, including baggies and a scale, evidenced the Defendant’s intent to distribute.

Section 40:967(A)(1) requires proof that the defendant knowingly possessed a Schedule II controlled dangerous substance and specifically intended to distribute it; constructive possession and intent to distribute may be inferred from the circumstances.

State v. Griffin · filed 2008-02-08(A)(1)

The crime of possession with intent to distribute cocaine is defined as follows: it shall be unlawful for any person knowingly or intentionally to "possess with intent to . . . distribute . . . a controlled dangerous substance . . . classified in Schedule II." La. R.S. 40:967(A)(1). Thus, in order to support a conviction, the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant knowingly possessed the drug and he intended to distribute it. ... Constructive possession is sufficient. A person is considered to be in constructive possession of a controlled dangerous substance if it is subject to his dominion and control, regardless of whether it is in his physical possession. ... As to the evidence of defendant's intent to distribute crack cocaine, it is well settled that intent to distribute may be inferred from the circumstances. ... Thus, viewing the totality of the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, a rational trier of fact could have concluded beyond a reasonable doubt, and to the exclusion of any reasonable hypothesis of innocence, that the defendant possessed the crack cocaine found in his trunk and he did so with the specific intent to distribute it. All of the essential elements of the crime of possession of cocaine with intent to distribute were proven.

Section 40:967(A)(1) requires proof that the defendant knowingly and intentionally possessed cocaine with the specific intent to distribute it; constructive possession satisfies the possession element.

State v. Kirts · filed 2009-02-25(A)(1)

A person commits the crime of possession of cocaine with intent to distribute if he knowingly or intentionally possesses cocaine with the intent to distribute it. La. R.S. 40:967(A)(1). The state must prove that the defendant knowingly and intentionally possessed the drug and that he did so with the specific intent to distribute it. ... It is not necessary for the state to prove that the defendant was in actual possession of the contraband; rather, proof of constructive possession is sufficient. ... Our review of the evidence indicates that the Jackson standard has clearly been met. If believed, the testimony of the officers established beyond a reasonable doubt that before Kirts exited the back door of the house, Agent Denham had positioned himself behind the house and for one to two minutes had made a brief search of the area with a flashlight. When Kirts emerged and after a struggle to subdue him, a quantity of cocaine was found within two feet of the defendant, in the area previously searched by the officer. There was no evidence of any other person encountered by the officers behind the house where the cocaine was found. The amount of cocaine was inconsistent with personal use and consistent with amounts held for distribution. Thus, although the officers did not observe Kirts discard the cocaine, the evidence established that the cocaine was found close to him in an area which was free of drugs only minutes before the struggle. From the facts established by the direct evidence and inferred from the circumstantial evidence presented by the state, the jury could have reasonably rejected Kirts's claim that he knew nothing about the cocaine or that it belonged to somebody else. For these reasons, Kirts's conviction is affirmed.

Section 40:967(A)(1) requires knowing and intentional possession of cocaine with intent to distribute, and constructive possession may satisfy the possession element.

State v. Duncan · filed 2009-06-17(A)(1)

To support a conviction for possession of a controlled dangerous substance in violation of La. R.S. 40:967, the State must prove that the defendant knowingly and intentionally possessed the drug. ... We find that the evidence supports the district court’s finding that defendant had, at a minimum, constructive possession of the cocaine, as the circumstances surrounding defendant’s possession gave rise to a reasonable inference of an intent to distribute.

Section 40:967(A)(1) makes it unlawful to knowingly or intentionally possess a Schedule II controlled substance, including cocaine, with intent to distribute it.

State of Louisiana v. Cyriak · filed 2009-12-09(A)(1)

In pertinent part, La.R.S. 40:967(A)(1) states, “[I]t shall be unlawful for any person to knowingly or intentionally . . . possess with intent to . . . distribute . . . a controlled dangerous substance or controlled substance analogue classified in Schedule II.” Cocaine is one of the controlled dangerous substances classified in Schedule II. La.R.S. 40:964(II)(A)(4). Thus, the prosecution must have proved that (1) Defendant knowing and intentionally possessed cocaine and that (2) Defendant intended to distribute the cocaine.

Section 40:967(A)(1) requires proof that the defendant intentionally possessed cocaine and specifically intended to distribute it.

State of Louisiana v. Hunter · filed 2010-06-02(A)(1)

The Defendant was convicted of possession with intent to distribute CDS Schedule II, cocaine. The State was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the Defendant intentionally possessed cocaine and that he had the specific intent to distribute the cocaine. La.R.S. 40:967(A)(1). ... Accordingly, we find the evidence was not sufficient to prove the Defendant had constructive possession of the crack cocaine at issue. ... Thus, the State failed to present proof that the Defendant directly committed the act constituting the offense, aided and abetted in its commission, or directly or indirectly counseled or procured Michael to commit possession with intent to distribute crack cocaine. ... For the reasons asserted herein, we find the State did not prove the Defendant was a principal to Michael’s possession with intent to distribute crack cocaine.

Section 40:967(A)(1) requires proof that the defendant knowingly or intentionally possessed cocaine with the specific intent to distribute it.

State v. Scott · filed 2010-10-22(A)(1)

Even assuming, arguendo, that the three prior sales at the Hailey street address did not form part of the res gestae, they were plainly relevant to the question of whether defendant, assuming further that he had actual or constructive possession of the contraband in the residence, intended to distribute the cocaine, an essential element of the offense charged.

Section 40:967(A)(1) requires proof that the defendant knowingly and intentionally possessed a Schedule II controlled dangerous substance and specifically intended to distribute it.

State v. Bobo · filed 2011-06-08(A)(1)

In this case, all three of the defendant’s convictions are for possession of Schedule I and II controlled dangerous substances with intent to distribute. The crime of possession with intent to distribute a Schedule I or Schedule II substance requires proof that the defendant knowingly and intentionally possessed the drug and that he did so with the specific intent to distribute it.

Section 40:967(A)(1) prohibits knowingly or intentionally possessing a Schedule II controlled substance with intent to distribute, and that specific intent may be inferred from circumstances but must still be proven beyond a reasonable doubt.

State of Louisiana v. Jerry H. Credeur, Jr. · filed 2011-11-23(A)(1)

Defendant was convicted of possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine, a violation of La.R.S. 40:967(A)(1), which provides, in pertinent part, that it is ―unlawful for any person knowingly or intentionally: (1) To produce, manufacture, distribute, or dispense or possess with intent to produce, manufacture, distribute or dispense, a controlled dangerous substance or controlled substance analogue classified in Schedule II[.]‖ Intent to distribute is a specific intent crime, and it is well settled jurisprudence in Louisiana that intent to distribute may be inferred from the circumstances. ... In the current case, we find the evidence was insufficient to prove that Defendant was distributing drugs out of the house in question. ... The evidence was insufficient to prove Defendant had the intent to distribute beyond a reasonable doubt. ... Therefore, we vacate Defendant‘s conviction and sentence for possession with intent to distribute a controlled dangerous drug, Schedule II. The record clearly establishes Defendant admitted to and does not refute that he was in possession of methamphetamine; accordingly, we find Defendant guilty of possession of a controlled dangerous drug, Schedule II, and remand the matter to the trial court for sentencing on the lesser included offense.

(A)(1) prohibits knowingly or intentionally possessing a Schedule II controlled dangerous substance with intent to distribute, and the defendant's admission plus nearby packaged cocaine provided sufficient evidence to prove that offense.

State v. Johnson · filed 2012-04-11(A)(1)

These facts, when viewed in a light most favorable to the state, provide sufficient evidence for conviction.

Section 40:967(A)(1) requires proof that the defendant intentionally possessed cocaine, specifically intended to distribute it, and knowingly possessed the drug; guilty knowledge may be inferred from the circumstances.

State v. McGinnis · filed 2008-04-30(A)(1)

The State was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the Defendant intentionally possessed cocaine and that he had the specific intent to distribute the cocaine. La.R.S. 40:967(A)(1). The State was also required to prove guilty knowledge, "i.e., ... that an accused is aware of the illegal drugs in his possession." State v. Davis, 05-543, p. 8 (La.App. 3 Cir. 12/30/05), 918 So.2d 1186, 1192, writ denied, 06-587 (La.10/13/06), 939 So.2d 372. "However, since knowledge is a state of mind, it need not be proven as fact, but rather may be inferred from the circumstances." State v. Major, 03-3522, p. 8 (La.12/1/04), 888 So.2d 798, 803 (citation omitted). ... The Defendant herein admitted that the 30.7 grams of cocaine in his car belonged to him and that he sold drugs. Additionally, police found a weight scale in the Defendant's car. Furthermore, the Defendant had a prior conviction for possession with intent to distribute CDS Schedule II, cocaine. There was no testimony in the case at bar that the amount of cocaine found by police was not consistent with personal use, but the trial court was able to view the cocaine, as it was admitted as an exhibit at trial. The evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to the State, supports the Defendant's conviction for possession with intent to distribute CDS Schedule II, cocaine. For these reasons, the Defendant's conviction for possession with intent to distribute CDS Schedule II, cocaine, is affirmed.

Section 40:967(A)(1) applies to possession of cocaine or hydrocodone with intent to distribute; subsection (A)(2) does not apply to cocaine, and subsection (F) does not apply to hydrocodone.

State of Louisiana v. Nix · filed 2012-11-07(A)(1)

The bill of information erroneously cites La.R.S. 40:967(A)(2) for possession with intent to distribute cocaine. The bill indicates that the substance Defendant possessed with intent to distribute was cocaine, not a counterfeit controlled dangerous substance. Thus, the correct citation for the offense is La.R.S. 40:967(A)(1). ... The bill of information erroneously cites La.R.S. 40:967(F) for possession with intent to distribute hydrocodone. The correct citation for the offense is La.R.S. 40:967(A)(1).

Section 40:967(A) requires proof that a defendant knowingly and intentionally possessed cocaine with the specific intent to distribute it, which may be inferred from surrounding circumstances such as quantity, packaging, expert testimony, and paraphernalia.

State v. Smith · filed 2012-12-11(A)

To prove these offenses, the State was required to show defendant knowingly and intentionally possessed the drug, and that he did so with the specific intent to distribute it. ... The intent to distribute may be established by proving circumstances surrounding the defendant’s possession, which give rise to reasonable inferences of intent to distribute. ... The State presented evidence through expert testimony that the cocaine found in the bedroom was consistent with distribution and inconsistent with personal use, after considering the quantity, value, and packaging of the cocaine. The expert also testified regarding the paraphernalia, which evidences an intent to distribute.

Section 40:967(A)(1) requires proof that the defendant possessed a controlled dangerous substance and intended to distribute it.

State v. Stephens · filed 2013-05-29(A)(1)

To support a conviction for possession with intent to distribute, the state must prove: (1) possession of the controlled dangerous substance; and (2) intent to distribute it. La. R.S. 40:967(A)(1); State v. Gladney, 29,791 (La.App.2d Cir.9/24/97), 700 So.2d 575; State v. Lee, 25,917 (La.App.2d Cir.5/4/94), 637 So.2d 656, writ denied, 94-1451 (La.10/7/94), 644 So.2d 631.

Section 40:967(A)(1) requires proof that the defendant possessed the controlled dangerous substance and intended to distribute it.

State v. Moore · filed 2013-11-20(A)(1)

To support a conviction for possession with intent to distribute, the state must prove possession of the controlled dangerous substance and intent to distribute it.

Section 40:967(A)(1) requires proof that the defendant knowingly or intentionally possessed the controlled substance and specifically intended to distribute it; possession alone is insufficient unless the quantity or circumstances preclude personal use.

State v. Ellis · filed 2014-06-25(A)(1)

La. R.S. 40:967(A)(1) provides that it is unlawful for anyone to produce, manufacture, distribute, or dispense or possess with intent to producé, manufacture, distribute, or dispense, a controlled dangerous substance or controlled substance analogue classified in Schedule II. ... To convict a defendant of possession of a controlled dangerous substance with intent to distribute, the state must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he knowingly or intentionally possessed the contraband and that he did so with the intent to distribute it. La. R.S. 40:967; State v. Williams, 47,574 (La.App.2d Cir. 11/14/12), 107 So.3d 763, writ denied, 2013-0079 (La.6/14/13), 118 So.3d 1080. While specific intent to distribute may be inferred from circumstantial evidence, the state must prove the amount of drugs recovered was inconsistent with personal use. ... Possession by itself does not constitute intent to distribute unless the quantity is so large as to preclude any other inference.

Section 40:967(A)(1) prohibits knowingly or intentionally possessing a Schedule II controlled dangerous substance with intent to distribute; possession may be constructive, and intent to distribute may be inferred from surrounding circumstances.

State v. Campbell · filed 2015-06-24(A)(1)

To support a conviction for possession of a controlled dangerous substance in violation of La. R.S. 40:967, the elements the State must prove include that the defendant knowingly and intentionally possessed the drug. State v. Keys, 12-1177, p. 5 (La.App. 4 Cir. 9/4/13), 125 So.3d 19, 27, writ denied, 13-2367 (La.4/4/14), 135 So.3d 637 (citing State v. Perron, 01-0214, p. 6 (La.App. 4 Cir. 1/16/02), 806 So.2d 924, 928). Since knowledge and intent are states of mind, they need not be proven as facts; rather, they may be inferred from the circumstances.

Section 40:967(A) requires proof that a defendant knowingly and intentionally possessed cocaine and specifically intended to distribute it.

State v. Bell · filed 2015-10-28(A)

In this case, defendant was charged with possession with intent to distribute cocaine, which requirés proof that the defendant knowingly and intentionally possessed the drug and that he did so with the specific intent to distribute it.

Section 40:967(A)(1) makes it unlawful to knowingly or intentionally possess a Schedule II controlled dangerous substance with intent to distribute; the State must prove possession and intent to distribute, which an offer to sell pills can establish.

State v. Skinner · filed 2016-04-27(A)(1)

Under La. R'.S. 40:967(A)(1) and La. R.S. 40:969(A)(1), “it shall be unlawful for any person knowingly or intentionally ... [t]o ... possess with intent to ... distribute ... a controlled dangerous substance ... classified in Schedule II” and “classified in Schedule IV,” respectively. The State was required to prove that the defendant “knowingly” and "intentionally” possessed the drug with the “intent to distribute.” ... That evidence was sufficient to .establish that the defendant possessed a controlled dangerous substance. Additionally, the defendant’s offer to sell pills to the detective proved his intent to distribute.

Section 40:967(A)(1) requires sufficient evidence of an intent to distribute; possession of five rocks weighing .77 grams, without distribution paraphernalia, was insufficient to prove that element.

State of Louisiana v. James · filed 2017-04-05(A)(1)

The Louisiana Supreme Court has set a test for determining whether a defendant possessed an illegal substance with the intent to distribute. State v. House, 325 So.2d 222 (La.1975). We should consider whether: (1) Mr. James ever distributed or attempted to distribute the substance; (2) the substance was in a form typically associated with possession for distribution; (3) the amount created a presumption of the intent to distribute; (4) expert or other testimony showed the amount was inconsistent with personal use; and (5) any paraphernalia associated with the intent to distribute was present. Id. The Court will address each factor in turn. ... Accordingly, because the above factors weigh in favor of acquittal of possession with intent to distribute, we vacate that conviction. We enter a guilty verdict on the lesser charge of possession of crack cocaine and remand for resentencing on that conviction.

A valid prescription that lawfully authorizes possession does not require dismissal of a charge under Section 40:967(A)(1) for possession with intent to distribute.

State v. Ioveniti · filed 2018-02-07(A)(1) and (C)

I find, in this case, whether Defendant had a valid prescription is not a defense which requires dismissal of counts one and two of the bill of information. Thus, a party can illegally distribute or have possession with intent to distribute a drug under the Uniform Controlled Dangerous Substances Law ("UCDSL") but have a valid prescription to lawfully possess the drug.

Section 40:967(A)(1) prohibits possessing cocaine with intent to produce, manufacture, distribute, or dispense, and does not require a specified drug quantity.

United States v. Benton · filed 2019-03-25(A)(1)

It is true that the subsection for possesion with intent to distribute cocaine does not identify drug quantities. See La. R.S. § 40:967(A)(1) (prohibiting the possession of cocaine “with intent to produce, manufacture, distribute, or dispense”).

Section 40:967(A) is divisible, and possession with intent to distribute cocaine under it is sufficiently narrow to match the generic federal possession-with-intent-to-distribute offense.

United States v. Mack · filed 2021-06-18(A)

This argument too is foreclosed by precedent. See United States v. Frierson, 981 F.3d 314 (5th Cir. 2020). There, we held “§ 40.967(A) is divisible.” Id. at 318. We further held that “possession with intent to distribute cocaine under § 40.967(A)” is “sufficiently narrow to fall within the scope of the elements in the ‘generic crime,’ § 841(a).” Id. Accordingly, a conviction under that statute “supports the application of the career offender sentence enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1.” Id. Under Frierson, the district court did not err in treating Mack’s § 40.967(A) conviction as a predicate for application of the career-offender enhancement.

Section 40:967(A) requires proof that the defendant knowingly and intentionally possessed cocaine with the specific intent to distribute it.

State of Louisiana Versus Darren K. Lloyd · filed 2022-08-24(A)

To prove the offense of possession with intent to distribute cocaine, in violation of La. R.S. 40:967(A), the State was required to show Defendant knowingly and intentionally possessed cocaine and that he did so with the specific intent to distribute it.

Section 40:967(A)(1) prohibits knowingly or intentionally possessing a Schedule II controlled dangerous substance with the specific intent to distribute it.

State of Louisiana v. Williams · filed 2024-02-07(A)(1)

Louisiana Revised Statutes 40:967(A)(1) states, in pertinent part, it is: unlawful for any person knowingly or intentionally . . . to produce, manufacture, distribute, or dispense or possess with intent to produce, manufacture, distribute, or dispense, a controlled dangerous substance or controlled substance analogue classified in Schedule II. Thus, to convict Defendant of possession with the intent to distribute fentanyl, the State was required to prove that Defendant possessed fentanyl and had the specific intent to distribute fentanyl.

Possession of marijuana with intent to distribute requires the state to prove the accused's intent.

State v. Grey · filed 1982-01-25(A)(1)

The crime charged in this case, possession of marijuana with intent to distribute, requires that the state prove intent on the part of the accused. Since intent is an essential element of the crime, evidence of prior offenses was properly admitted.

Section 40:967(A) requires knowing and intentional possession of cocaine with the specific intent to distribute it.

State of Louisiana Versus Charles R. Lane · filed 2020-12-23(A)

To prove the offense of possession with intent to distribute cocaine, in violation of La. R.S. 40:967(A), the State was required to show defendant knowingly and intentionally possessed cocaine and that he did so with the specific intent to distribute it.

Under § 40:967(A), possession of cocaine in a quantity so large that no other inference is reasonable can establish intent to distribute.

State v. Brown · filed 2017-12-20(A)

We have found that possession of a quantity of narcotics that is so great that no other inference other than intent to distribute can prove intent under La. R.S. § 40:966 (A) and La, R.S. § 40:967 (A).

Section 40:967(A)(1) makes specific intent to distribute a required element of possessing a Schedule II controlled dangerous substance with intent to distribute.

State v. Randolph · filed 2017-05-03(A)(1)

In 8ruling after that hearing, the district court-noted that the statutes for possession with the intent to distribute narcotics require the State to prove specific intent.17 See La. R.S. 40:966(A)(1) *432(regarding Schedule I substances, such as heroin and marijuana); La. R.S. 40:967(A)(l)(regarding Schedule II substances, such as cocaine). ... Thus, because specific intent is an element of the charged crimes, when Defendant pled not guilty, he necessarily put his intent at issue.

Intent to distribute cocaine may be inferred from circumstances such as the drug's form and amount, evidence of prior or attempted distribution, expert testimony that the quantity is inconsistent with personal use, and distribution paraphernalia.

State v. Magee · filed 2014-03-24(A)(1)

It is well settled that intent to distribute may be inferred from the circumstances. Factors useful in determining whether the State’s circumstantial evidence is sufficient to prove intent to distribute include: (1) whether the defendant ever distributed or attempted to distribute illegal drugs; (2) whether the drug was in a form usually associated with distribution; (3) whether the amount was such to create a presumption of intent to distribute; (4) expert or other testimony that the amount found in the defendant’s actual or constructive possession was inconsistent with personal use; and (5) the presence of other paraphernalia evidencing intent to distribute.

Section 40:967(A)(1) requires proof of knowing or intentional possession and intent to distribute; when intent to distribute is not proven, the conviction may be reduced to simple possession under § 40:967(C), with sentencing governed by the applicable penalty provisions.

State v. Durgan · filed 2006-05-31(A)(1), (C), (C)(2), (B)(4)(b)

In pertinent part, La.R.S. 40:967(A)(1) states, "[I]t shall be unlawful for any person to knowingly or intentionally ... possess with intent to ... distribute ... a controlled dangerous substance or controlled substance analogue classified in Schedule II." Cocaine is one of the controlled dangerous substances classified in Schedule II. La.R.S. 40:964(II)(A)(4). Thus, the prosecution must have proved that (1) Defendant knowing and intentionally possessed cocaine and that (2) Defendant intended to distribute the cocaine. ... This court will reverse the Defendant's conviction for possession of a controlled dangerous substance with intent to distribute and enter a judgment of guilty to possession of a controlled dangerous substance, in violation of La. R.S. 40:967(C). Because the sentencing range for possession of a controlled dangerous substance, cocaine, is substantially less than that required for a conviction of possession of a controlled dangerous substance, cocaine, with intent to distribute, this court remands Defendant's case to the trial court for re-sentencing. La.R.S. 40:967(C)(2); La.R.S. 40:967(B)(4)(b).

Section 40:967(A) requires proof that the defendant knowingly and intentionally possessed cocaine with the specific intent to distribute it.

State v. Bell · filed 1998-02-25(A), (B)(1)

The crime of possession with intent to distribute cocaine requires proof that the defendant knowingly and intentionally possessed the drug, and that he did so with the specific intent to distribute it.

Section 40:967(C) requires knowing and intentional possession of cocaine.

State v. Woods · filed 1995-04-20(C)

Therefore, a knowing and intentional possession of cocaine is necessary for both a violation of La.R.S. 14:95(E) and 40:967.

Section 40:967(A) makes it unlawful to knowingly or intentionally distribute a Schedule II controlled dangerous substance, and distribution of cocaine requires only general intent, which may be shown by voluntary distribution.

State v. Vigers · filed 1996-01-31(A)

Distribution of cocaine requires only general intent, which can be established by mere proof of voluntary distribution.

Section 40:967(A)(1) requires criminal intent to commit the offense; a confidential informant assisting an undercover sting lacks that intent.

State v. Sumlin · filed 1993-04-14(A)(1)

In order to be convicted under LSA-R.S. 40:967(A)(1), a person must intend to commit the crime. A confidential informant, assisting law enforcement officials in an undercover sting operation, does not possess the criminal intent required for a conviction under LSA-R.S. 40:967(A)(1).

Section 40:967(A)(1) requires proof of possession of a controlled dangerous substance and intent to distribute it for a possession-with-intent-to-distribute conviction.

State v. Willis · filed 2003-04-09(A)(1)

To support a conviction for possession with intent to distribute, the state must prove: (1) possession of the controlled dangerous substance; and (2) intent to distribute it. La.R.S. 40:967(A)(1); State v. Thomas, 32,495 (La.App.2d Cir.10/27/99), 745 So.2d 776, writ denied, 00-1008 (La.11/27/00), 775 So.2d 445, writ denied, 00-0242 (La.12/08/00), 775 So.2d 1076.

Section 40:967(A)(2) requires proof of specific intent to distribute for possession of cocaine with intent to distribute.

State v. Elzie · filed 1977-03-07(A)(2)

Specific intent is required to commit the crime to possess cocaine "with intent to distribute."

Section 40:967(A) requires proof that defendants knowingly and intentionally possessed the specified substance and had specific intent to distribute it.

State v. Williams · filed 1984-10-10(A)

Thus, the State was required to prove that defendant's knowingly and intentionally possessed a substance as alleged in the bills of information, and, that at the time of the possession, defendants had a specific intent to distribute such substances.

Section 40:967(A) requires proof of specific intent to distribute, and mere possession of 7.75 grams of cocaine, without evidence tying the defendant to distribution, does not establish that intent; possession of cocaine is punishable under § 40:967(C).

State v. McIntyre · filed 1989-05-24(A), (C)

Examining the totality of the evidence presented by the State, it is clear that the State proved that defendant had 7.75 grams of crack and cocaine in his possession. However, mere possession of this amount of cocaine is not of itself evidence of possession with intent to distribute.

Section 40:967(A)(1) requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt that a defendant specifically intended to distribute the controlled substance.

State v. Porter · filed 1989-06-28(A)(1)

Moreover, in order to sustain a conviction under R.S. 40:967(A)(1), the State must prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant had a specific intent to distribute the illegal substance. ... Consequently, we do not feel that the hearsay testimony of the State's confidential informants, indicating that the defendant had been engaged in selling cocaine as recently as two days prior to his arrest, is sufficient to convince a rational trier of fact that the defendant had the requisite specific intent to distribute the cocaine he was found possessed of on the night of his arrest.

Section 40:967 requires proof of a specific intent to distribute to convict for possession of narcotics with intent to distribute, which may be established by the surrounding circumstances.

State v. Roberts · filed 1989-09-28

In order to successfully prove the crime of possession of narcotics with the intent to distribute, the State must prove a specific intent to distribute. La.R.S. 40:967. ... In this case although no money was found on the defendant or in his home, the arresting officers personally observed two drug transactions take place, seized eight packets of cocaine from the defendant and drug paraphernalia from his home which was consistent with distribution. Therefore viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, a rational trier of fact could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of possession of cocaine with an intent to distribute.

Section 40:967(A)(1) requires only general criminal intent for the offense of knowingly or intentionally distributing a Schedule II controlled substance.

State v. Goins · filed 1990-10-03(A)(1)

The defendant was convicted of violating La.R.S. 40:967(A)(1), which states in pertinent part, "[e]xcept as authorized by this part, it shall be unlawful for any person [to] knowingly or intentionally distribute a controlled dangerous substance classified in Schedule II." Cocaine is a controlled dangerous substance classified in Schedule II. La.R.S. 40:964(A)(4). Distribution of a controlled dangerous substance requires only general criminal intent. State v. Rexrode, 536 So.2d 671 (La.App. 3 Cir. 1988). Therefore, the prosecution need only show that the defendant "must have averted to the prescribed criminal consequences" of distribution. La.R.S. 14:10(2).

Section 40:967(A) permits intent to distribute to be inferred from circumstances surrounding the defendant's possession, including packaging, quantity, paraphernalia, cash, and evidence of drug transactions.

State v. Alsandor · filed 1991-10-02(A)

The intent to distribute may be established by proving circumstances surrounding defendant’s possession which give rise to reasonable inferences of intent to distribute. ... The courts of this State have enumerated some of the factors from which intent may be inferred: ... Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, we find that the State presented ample evidence from which a rational trier of fact could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the essential elements of the crime of possession of cocaine with intent to distribute.

Section 40:967 requires proof that the defendant knowingly or intentionally possessed a Schedule II substance with the specific intent to distribute it; the intent may be inferred from negotiating and carrying out a cocaine sale.

State v. Johnson · filed 1995-12-06

For defendant's conviction of possession of a Schedule II substance with intent to distribute to be upheld, the record must establish that the State proved beyond a reasonable doubt all the essential elements of the crime. The State was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt: (1) defendant's identity as the perpetrator of the crime, (2) that the defendant knowingly or intentionally possessed a Schedule II substance, and (3) that the defendant did so with the specific intent to distribute it. La.R.S. 40:967; Young, 596 So.2d 403. ... Defendant's voluntary act of negotiating and executing the sale of cocaine to Juneau is sufficient for a rational trier of fact to have concluded that the necessary intent was present.

Section 40:967(A)(1) requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant knowingly or intentionally possessed a Schedule II controlled dangerous substance with the specific intent to distribute it.

State v. Walker · filed 1996-10-09(A)(1)

Under this statute, the state must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant possessed cocaine with the specific intent to distribute it.

Section 40:967(A) requires proof that the defendant knowingly and intentionally possessed the controlled substance and specifically intended to distribute it; intent to distribute may be shown through factors including packaging, quantity, value, and the absence of personal-use paraphernalia.

State v. Smith · filed 1998-05-13(A)

The crime of possession with intent to distribute cocaine requires proof that the defendant knowingly and intentionally possessed the drug, and that he did so with the specific intent to distribute it. La. R.S. 40:967(A). In order for the state to obtain a conviction, it must prove the elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. ... The evidence presented at trial satisfies several of the House factors. Seized from the defendant's car were six individually packaged plastic bags containing crack cocaine. The cocaine "rocks" found were large in size and would not generally be possessed by a user. No paraphernalia for using the drugs was found in the defendant's possession. Detective Freeman also testified the quantity of drugs seized from the defendant was a larger quantity than that usually possessed by a user of cocaine.

Section 40:967 requires knowing and intentional possession of cocaine together with an intent to distribute, which may be inferred from circumstances such as drug-packaging evidence and admissions.

State v. Crosby · filed 1999-11-17

To support defendant's convictions, the State must prove that the defendant "knowingly" and "intentionally" possessed the cocaine and marijuana with the "intent to distribute". State v. Williams, 594 So.2d 476, 478 (La.App. 4 Cir.1992). Specific intent to distribute may be established by proving circumstances surrounding defendant's possession which give rise to a reasonable inference of intent to distribute. State v. Dickerson, 538 So.2d 1063 (La.App. 4 Cir.1989). ... The evidence seized, coupled with Officer Lampard's testimony and the admissions of Ms. Addison and defendant, enabled the jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant possessed cocaine with the intent to distribute it. This court will not disturb that finding.

Section 40:967(A) requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant knowingly and intentionally possessed cocaine with the specific intent to distribute it.

State v. Stokes · filed 2000-04-13(A)

To establish defendant's guilt, the state was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant knowingly and intentionally possessed the cocaine with the specific intent to distribute it. La. R.S. 40:967(A).

Section 40:967(A)(1) requires proof that the defendant possessed a controlled dangerous substance and specifically intended to distribute it; possession alone does not establish the intent-to-distribute element absent sufficient circumstances.

State v. Young · filed 2000-03-31(A)(1)

To support a conviction for the crime charged, the State had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the defendant: 1) possessed the controlled dangerous substance; and 2) had an intent to distribute the controlled dangerous substance. ... Analyzing the facts of this case and applying the House factors, we conclude there was insufficient evidence of defendant's intent to distribute the cocaine. ... Accordingly, a rational trier of fact could not have concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that the State proved the "intent to distribute" element of the crime. Thus, we find the State has not proven beyond a reasonable doubt all the elements of the offense of possession with intent to distribute cocaine.

Section 40:967 requires proof that the defendant possessed cocaine and specifically intended to distribute it; circumstantial evidence may establish intent when the amount or manner of carrying it is inconsistent with personal use.

State v. Johnson · filed 2001-09-26

The crime of possession with intent to distribute cocaine requires proof of the following elements to support the defendant's conviction. The prosecutor must show beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was in possession of a controlled dangerous substance, i.e., cocaine, with specific intent to distribute same. La. R.S. 40:967; ... When the specific intent to distribute a controlled dangerous substance is based on circumstantial evidence, the state must prove the amount of the substance, and/or the manner in which it was carried was inconsistent with personal use.

Subsection (A)(1) requires the State to prove that the defendant intended to distribute cocaine.

State of Louisiana v. Carmouche · filed 2008-01-30(A)(1)

Pursuant to La.R.S. 40:967(A)(1), the State has the burden of proving that Defendant had the intent to distribute cocaine.

Section 40:967 requires proof that the defendant knowingly or intentionally possessed the controlled substance and intended to distribute it.

State v. Foster · filed 2009-01-28

To convict a defendant of possession of a controlled dangerous substance with intent to distribute, the state must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he knowingly or intentionally possessed the contraband and that he did so with the intent to distribute it. La. R.S. 40:967; State v. Moore, 40,311 (La-App. 2d Cir.1/13/06) 920 So.2d 334, unit denied, 2006-2267 (La.6/1/07), 957 So.2d 167.

Section 40:967(A)(1) requires proof that the defendant intentionally possessed crack cocaine, specifically intended to distribute it, and had guilty knowledge; possession of a digital scale and less than two grams of crack cocaine was insufficient to prove specific intent to distribute.

State of Louisiana v. Joseph · filed 2009-11-04(A)(1)

With regard to Defendant’s conviction of possession with intent to distribute crack cocaine, the State was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he: 1) intentionally possessed crack cocaine; 2) had the specific intent to distribute the crack cocaine, La.R.S. 40:967(A)(1); and 3) had guilty knowledge, i.e., knew he had the illegal drugs in his possession. ... The same is not true with respect to whether the State proved Defendant had the intent to distribute the crack cocaine. The digital scale seized pursuant to the search warrant and Detective Pitre’s testimony that crack is sold by weight is the only evidence the State presented on this issue. ... Review of pertinent jurisprudence leads us to conclude that possession of a digital scale and two rocks of crack cocaine weighing less than two grams, is insufficient to establish Defendant had the specific intent to distribute crack cocaine.

Section 40:967(A)(1)'s intent-to-distribute element may be proved by circumstantial evidence, and the Hearold factors are useful but not exclusive.

State of Louisiana v. Sereal · filed 2011-05-04(A)(1)

Intent to distribute can be inferred from the circumstances surrounding the arrest. ... In finding no error in the trial court’s determination that the state established the “intent” element beyond a reasonable doubt, we are mindful that our jurisprudence has held that the list of factors in Hearold is not exclusive. Rather, they are useful to the trier of fact and the supreme court did not suggest that the evidence establishing intent must fall squarely within those factors.

Section 40:967(A) requires proof that the defendant knowingly and intentionally possessed cocaine and specifically intended to distribute it.

State v. Paul · filed 2016-01-27(A)

In the present case, defendant was charged with possession with intent to distribute cocaine, in violation of La. R.S. 40:967(A). . To prove that offense, the State was required to show defendant knowingly and intentionally possessed cocaine and that he did so with the specific intent to distribute it. See State v. Haynes, 09-109 (La.App. 5 Cir. 2/9/10), 34 So.3d 325, 337, writ denied, 10-0493 (La.9/24/10), 45 So.3d 1073.

Section 40:967(A)'s possession-with-intent offense requires knowing and intentional possession of the controlled substance plus a specific intent to distribute it.

State v. Williams · filed 2016-08-24(A)

Defendant was charged with and convicted of being a principal to possession with intent to distribute cocaine, a violation of La. R.S. 40:967(A). The offense of possession with intent to distribute a controlled dangerous substance is comprised of two elements: (1) a knowing and intentional possession of the substance (2) with a specific intent to distribute it. See State v. Paul, 15-501 (La.App. 5 Cir. 01/27/16), 185 So.3d 188, 199; State v. Elzie, 343 So.2d 712, 713-14 (La.1977).

Section 40:967 requires proof of an intent to distribute beyond mere possession; five rocks of crack cocaine, without distribution-related paraphernalia or other corroborating evidence, were insufficient here.

State v. James · filed 2017-04-05

Here, Mr. James possessed five rocks of crack cocaine. This amount is not sufficient to create a presumption of intent to distribute. ... Five rocks are indicative of possession by a crack user, not a distributor. ... Fifth, no paraphernalia associated with distribution was present. He was not arrested with scales, baggies, individually wrapped rocks, weapons, or a large amount of money to suggest that he was distributing crack cocaine. ... Accordingly, because the above factors weigh in favor of acquittal of possession with intent to distribute, we vacate that conviction. We enter a guilty verdict on the lesser charge of possession of crack cocaine and remand for resentencing on that conviction.

Section 40:967(C)(2) prohibits knowing and intentional possession of cocaine, a Schedule II controlled dangerous substance.

State v. Robinson · filed 2010-03-24(C)(2)

The State had to prove that the defendant knowingly and intentionally possessed cocaine. See La. R.S. 40:967 C; State v. Williams, 2007-0700 (La.App. 4 Cir. 2/13/08), 977 So.2d 1101.

Section 40:967 requires proof that the defendant possessed the controlled dangerous substance and knowingly or intentionally possessed it.

State v. Ricard · filed 2000-01-19(C)

To support a conviction for possession of a controlled dangerous substance, the state must prove that the defendant was in possession of the illegal drug and that he knowingly or intentionally possessed the drug. La. R.S. 40:967; State v. Chambers, 563 So.2d 579 (La.App. 4th Cir.1990).

Section 40:967(A) requires possession to be knowing or intentional, and intent may be inferred from the circumstances of the transaction.

State v. Tornabene · filed 1976-09-13(A)

An essential element of the crime with which defendant was charged is that the possession be knowing or intentional. La. R.S. 40:967(A). However, La.R.S. 15:445 provides that intent need not be proven as a fact but "may be inferred from the circumstances of the transaction." Thus we conclude that there was ample evidence in the record from which the jury could have inferred that defendant's possession of the codeine was intentional.

Section 40:967(C) requires knowing or intentional possession of the controlled substance, and intent may be inferred from the surrounding circumstances.

State v. Gallow · filed 1984-05-30(C)

Defendant was charged with possession of Pentazocine, a violation of La.R.S. 40:967(C), which requires that the person charged knowingly or intentionally possesses the substance. Although intent is a question of fact, it need not be proven as a fact; it may be inferred from the circumstances of the transaction.

Section 40:967(C) requires knowing and intentional possession of a controlled dangerous substance.

State v. Rodriguez · filed 1990-03-30(C)

We find that, under the Jackson v. Virginia, a rational trier of fact could have found that Rodriguez knowingly and intentionally possessed the controlled dangerous substance as required under La.R.S. 40:967 C.

Section 40:967(A) requires proof that the defendant knowingly and intentionally possessed cocaine and specifically intended to distribute it.

State v. Grant · filed 2004-12-15(A)

The crime of possession with intent to distribute cocaine requires proof that the defendant knowingly and intentionally possessed the drug, and that he did so with the specific intent to distribute it.

Section 40:967 prohibits knowingly and intentionally possessing a Schedule II drug, and possession is established when cocaine is recovered from the defendant's mouth and the evidence shows he knowingly ingested it.

State v. Senegal · filed 2008-01-09

Louisiana Revised Statutes 40:967 declares it is illegal to knowingly and intentionally possess a Schedule II drug, one of which is cocaine. ... In the present case, Officer Gilbert testified he saw Defendant chewing something prior to ordering him to spit out the contents of his mouth on the ground. A field test as well as later lab analysis confirmed that the substance collected by Officer Gilbert contained cocaine. Additionally, Defendant admitted to Officer Gilbert that he had eaten two rocks of cocaine. Thus, the evidence presented was sufficient for a rational trier of fact to find beyond a reasonable doubt that Defendant knowingly and intentionally possessed cocaine. ... In this case, cocaine was recovered from Defendant's mouth and testing established that it was in fact cocaine. Furthermore, Defendant admitted to Officer Gilbert that he had ingested two rocks of cocaine. Under these circumstances, we find the State proved beyond a reasonable doubt that Defendant possessed cocaine.

Section 40:967 makes knowingly and intentionally possessing a Schedule II drug unlawful; second or subsequent offenders face an increased penalty under § 40:982.

State of Louisiana v. Senegal · filed 2008-01-09(C)

Louisiana Revised Statutes 40:967 declares it is illegal to knowingly and intentionally possess a Schedule II drug, one of which is cocaine. Second or subsequent offenders are subject to an increased penalty pursuant to La.R.S. 40:982.