La. Stat. Ann. § 14:27

For attempted theft punishable as a felony, Subsection (D)(2) supplies the penalty; Subsection (D)(3)'s one-half limitation applies only to offenses not covered by (D)(1) or (D)(2), and neither subsection limits restitution.

State v. PORTIE · filed 2009-09-16(D)(2) and (D)(3)

La. R.S. 14:27(D)(3), cited by defendant, does not apply to attempted thefts because La. R.S. 14:27(D)(2) expressly does. La. R.S. 14:27(D)(3) applies to “all other cases,” meaning all those cases not covered by La. R.S. 14:27(D)(1) and (2). Further, La. La. R.S. 14:27(D)(2) and La. R.S. 14:27(D)(3) refer only to terms of imprisonment and fines, and make no mention of restitution.

Section 14:27(D)(2) requires the jury to determine and state whether the value of property involved in attempted theft makes the underlying theft a felony or misdemeanor before a sentence may be imposed.

State v. White · filed 1975-07-10(D)(2)

In a theft case defendant may not properly be sentenced upon a jury finding of guilt of attempted theft under R.S. 14:27(D)(2) absent a determination of value by the jury. Therefore in a theft case a verdict of attempted theft must describe either the value of the property which is the object of the attempted theft or whether such property in value is $100 or more, or less than $100.

An attempt to commit a crime punishable by life imprisonment carries at least ten years at hard labor without parole, probation, or suspension of sentence.

State of Louisiana v. Portalis · filed 2023-12-06(D)(1)(a)

Defendant was thus subject to at least ten years in prison, without parole, probation, or suspension of sentence.

Section 14:27 defines attempt as specific intent plus an overt act, treats lying in wait with a dangerous weapon as an attempt, and provides a ten-to-fifty-year imprisonment range for attempted second degree murder.

State of Louisiana v. James · filed 2024-01-10(A), (B)(1), (D)(1)(a)

An attempted second degree murder occurs when an offender has the specific intent to kill and commits an overt act to accomplish his objective. La.R.S. 14:27(A); 14:30.1(A)(1). Lying in wait with a dangerous weapon constitutes an attempt. La.R.S. 14:27(B)(1). Attempted second degree murder requires at least ten years but at most fifty years of imprisonment. La.R.S. 14:27(D)(1)(a).

Section 14:27 requires an attempt to include an act tending directly toward the crime's accomplishment undertaken with a specific intent to commit that crime; for attempted murder, that means specific intent to kill.

State v. Butler · filed 1975-11-24

La.R.S. 14:27 provides that to attempt a crime an accused must do an act tending directly towards accomplishing his object, "having a specific intent" to commit the crime. The crime of murder is "the killing of a human being," under certain circumstances. Thus, as this court held in State v. Roberts, 213 La. 559, 35 So.2d 216, 217 (1948), "the elements of the crime of attempted murder are specific intent to kill a human being (Article 30, Criminal Code) and an overt act in furtherance of the object."

Section 14:27 sets the maximum penalty for attempted forcible rape at twenty years at hard labor, with at least one year imposed without benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence.

State v. James · filed 1991-01-17

Defendant was convicted of attempted forcible rape which meant the maximum sentence would be twenty years at hard labor with the condition that at least one year of the sentence had to be imposed without benefit of probation, parole or suspension of sentence. ... Defendant's sentence does not include this condition, and thus it is illegally lenient.

For attempted murder, § 14:27 requires specific intent to kill plus an overt act tending toward accomplishment of the killing.

State v. Meads · filed 1999-04-01

"[t]he gravamen of the crime of attempted murder, whether first or second degree, is the specific intent to kill and the commission of an overt act tending toward the accomplishment of that goal."

Section 14:27 limits the penalty for an attempted offense to no more than one-half of the maximum fine and does not impose a minimum fine.

State v. Patterson · filed 2010-05-12

Although La. R.S. 14:95.1 also calls for a mandatory fine, La. R.S. 14:27 only prescribes a penalty of not over one-half of the maximum fine. No minimum fine is mandated.

Section 14:27 requires specific intent to commit the target offense and an overt act tending toward its accomplishment.

State of Louisiana v. Bethley · filed 2013-02-06

To prove attempted murder, the State had to show proof of the “specific intent to kill the victim and the commission of an overt act that tends toward the accomplishment of the victim’s death.” George, 19 So.3d at 618; La.R.S. 14:27. Specific intent “is that state of mind which exists when the circumstances indicate that the offender actively desired the prescribed criminal consequences to follow his act.” La.R.S. 14:10(1); State v. Daniels, 109 So.2d 896, 899 (La.1959).

Section 14:27(D)(1)(a) sets the penalty for attempted murder at 10 to 50 years of hard labor without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence.

State of Louisiana v. Lukens · filed 2019-10-02(D)(1)(a)

Under La.R.S. 14:27(D)(1)(a), the penalty range for attempted murder is imprisonment “at hard labor for not less than ten nor more than fifty years without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence.” Accordingly, Defendant’s sentence represents forty percent of the maximum period of incarceration he could have received.

For attempted second degree murder, § 14:27(D)(1)(a) provides a sentence of 10 to 50 years without parole, probation, or suspension of sentence.

State of Louisiana v. Kelby Meaux A/K/A Kelby D. Meaux · filed 2022-02-23(D)(1)(a)

Attempted second degree murder carries a sentencing range of “not less than ten nor more than fifty years without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence.” La.R.S. 14:27(D)(1)(a).

For attempted murder, § 14:27(A) requires specific intent to kill and an act in furtherance of that intent.

State v. Byrd · filed 1986-06-25(A)

Clearly, if the jury believed Deputy Calais’ testimony, there was more than enough evidence presented from which the jury could infer that the defendant fully intended to kill the deputy and that he did an act or acts in furtherance of that intent.

Section 14:27(D)(1), together with the second degree murder provision, sets a ten-to-fifty-year hard-labor sentencing range for attempted second degree murder, without parole, probation, or suspension of sentence.

State v. Peters · filed 2000-12-22(D)(1)

The penalty for attempted second degree murder is imprisonment at hard labor for not less than ten and not more than fifty years, without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence.

Section 14:27(D)(1)(a), applied with the second-degree-murder statute, sets attempted second-degree murder at ten to fifty years of hard labor without parole, probation, or suspension of sentence.

State of Louisiana Versus Jonathon Brown · filed 2023-06-21(D)(1)(a)

Pursuant to La. R.S. 14:30.1(B) and La. R.S. 14:27(D)(1)(a), the sentencing range for attempted second degree murder was imprisonment at hard labor for not less than ten nor more than fifty years without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence.

Attempted murder requires specific intent to kill and an overt act tending toward that result.

State of Louisiana v. Gary P. Sims, Jr. · filed 2021-06-30(A)

The crime of attempted murder, whether first or second degree, requires proof of the specific intent to kill and the commission of an overt act tending toward the accomplishment of that goal. ... Viewed in the light most favorable to the state, the evidence was sufficient to prove that Sims had the specific intent to kill Dep. McCrell.

Section 14:27(C) treats an attempt as a separate but lesser grade of the intended crime and permits conviction for an attempt even when the intended crime was actually completed.

State of Louisiana v. Dillion · filed 2026-03-19(C)

Furthermore, La. R.S. 14:27(C) provides that “[a]n attempt is a separate but lesser grade of the intended crime; and any person may be convicted of an attempt to commit a crime, although it appears . . . that the crime intended or attempted was actually perpetrated by such person in pursuance of such attempt.” Accordingly, the offense of attempted unauthorized use of a motor vehicle is a lesser grade of the offense of unauthorized use of a motor vehicle and, therefore, it is a valid responsive verdict.

Section 14:27(C) permits conviction for an attempt even when the attempted crime was completed, while § 14:27(D)(3) limits punishment for the attempt to no more than one-half of the maximum punishment for the offense attempted.

State of Louisiana Versus Cire Johnson · filed 2023-12-27(C), (D)(3)

Even though the evidence at trial may show that the crime attempted was actually completed by the defendant, he may nevertheless be convicted of an attempt to commit the crime. La. R.S. 14:27(C); ... Therefore, under La. R.S. 14:108.2 and La. R.S. 14:27, the required penalty for each count was a fine not to exceed of one thousand dollars, or a term of imprisonment with or without hard labor not to exceed one and one-half years, or both.

Section 14:27(C) treats an attempt as a separate, lesser grade of the intended crime, while § 14:27(D)(3) limits imprisonment for an attempt to no more than one-half of the longest term prescribed for the offense attempted.

State of Louisiana v. Manuel · filed 2022-04-06(C), (D)(3)

“An attempt is a separate but lesser grade of the intended crime; and any person may be convicted of an attempt to commit a crime, although it appears on the trial that the crime intended or attempted was actually perpetrated by such person in pursuance of such attempt.” La. R.S. 14:27(C). ... La. R.S. 14:27(D)(3) provides, in pertinent part, that a person convicted of attempting to commit a crime shall be imprisoned in the same manner as for the offense attempted; however, such imprisonment shall not exceed “one-half of the longest term of imprisonment prescribed for the offense so attempted ….”

Section 14:27(C) makes attempt a separate but lesser grade of the intended crime and permits conviction for attempt even when the intended crime was actually perpetrated in pursuance of the attempt.

State v. Credeur · filed 1976-02-23(C)

The definition of an "attempt" as set forth in La.R.S. 14:27 is: . . . [A] separate but lesser grade of the intended crime; and any person may be convicted of an attempt to commit a crime, although it appears on the trial that the crime intended or attempted was actually perpetrated by such person in pursuance of such attempt. The responsive verdicts to specific offenses are set forth in article 814 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Though all offenses are not enumerated in this article, the Official Revision Comment (b) following the article states: . . . For all other offenses not enumerated and listed in the above article attempt would be responsive. The crime for which the defendant is charged, namely aggravated crime against nature, does not appear in article 814; therefore, it follows that "attempt" is a responsive verdict. See State v. Ackal, 290 So.2d 882 (La.1974). Since "attempt" is a responsive verdict to the crime charged, defendant's argument is of no moment.

Section 14:27 supplies the attempt offense used to treat attempted aggravated rape as a responsive offense to aggravated rape.

State v. D.T. · filed 2008-12-11

Attempted aggravated rape is a responsive offense to aggravated rape. La.R.S. 14:27, La.R.S. 14:42. However, based on the same reasoning stated above, the victim’s testimony is insufficient to prove the elements of this offense.

Section 14:27 limits the sentence for an attempt to one-half of the longest imprisonment term for the offense attempted.

State v. Jones · filed 1976-02-23

Conviction of an attempt to commit simple burglary must not exceed one-half of the longest term of imprisonment for the offense so attempted. La.R.S. 14:27. Therefore, the trial judge was authorized to sentence defendant to serve three years at hard labor, a sentence not exceeding one-half of nine years, and a sentence falling within the limits prescribed by Sections 27 and 62 of Title 14 of the Revised Statutes.

Section 14:27 limits the penalty for attempted armed robbery to no more than one-half of the longest imprisonment term prescribed for armed robbery.

State v. McClinton · filed 1976-03-29

As set forth in La.R.S. 14:27, the penalty for an attempt to commit armed robbery must not exceed one-half of the longest term of imprisonment prescribed for armed robbery.

Section 14:27(D)(3) authorizes a sentence of one-half the maximum penalty for the completed felony when the defendant is convicted of attempting it.

State Ex Rel. Miller v. Henderson · filed 1976-03-29(D)(3)

Accordingly, as authorized by the attempt statute, La.R.S. 14:27, subd. D(3), the district court sentenced the defendant to five years at hard labor, that being one-half of the maximum penalty provided for violation of the intended crime (i. e., the ten years provided for escape from the penitentiary, La.R.S. 14:110.2 (1969).) ... The verdict was thus responsive to the charge, and the sentence imposed was thus within the statutory limits allowable for the violation held proved by the verdict.

Section 14:27(D)(3) limits punishment for an attempt to one-half the largest fine and one-half the longest imprisonment term prescribed for the completed offense, or both.

State v. Young · filed 1983-05-17(D)(3)

An attempted forgery is punishable by a fine of up to one-half the largest fine for forgery, imprisonment of up to one-half the longest term of imprisonment for forgery, or both. La. R.S. 14:27(D)(3) and 14:72.

Subsection (C) treats an attempt as a separate but lesser grade of the intended crime and permits conviction for attempt even when the intended crime was actually completed.

State v. Wallace · filed 1985-03-12(C)

An attempt is a separate but lesser grade of the intended crime; a defendant may be convicted of an attempt to commit a crime, although it appears on the trial that the crime intended or attempted was actually perpetrated by the defendant. La. R.S. 14:27(C).

Section 14:27(C) makes an attempt a lesser included offense of the charged crime, so a defendant may be convicted of attempting the offense when the evidence supports only partial completion.

State v. Crayton · filed 1985-05-13(C)

R.S. 14:27(C) makes an attempt a lesser included offense of the charged crime. ... We find that under these facts the trial judge properly convicted the defendant of attempted illegal possession of a concealed weapon by a convicted felon.

Section 14:27(C) makes an attempt a lesser included offense of the charged crime, so a jury may convict of attempt when it could convict of the completed crime.

State v. Ebey · filed 1986-07-21(C)

[2] The question of whether attempt is a valid responsive verdict to this crime has been previously passed upon by the Louisiana Supreme Court. In State v. Ford, 407 So.2d 688 (La.1981), the court stated: "Finally, defendant assigns error in the jury's returning a verdict of attempted unlawful possession of a firearm, argues that attempt cannot be a responsive verdict under the facts of the case. R.S. 14:27(C) makes an attempt a lesser included offense of the charged crime. Defendant's argument appears to be with the legislature's definition of an attempt, but we are not persuaded that his rights were somehow violated when the jury convicted him only on attempt when they could have convicted him of the crime itself. Perhaps they reasoned that his offense was committed when he was outside the car and not in physical possession of the firearm at the time. Regardless, we find no merit to this assignment." State v. Ford, supra, at 691. Thus, it appears clear that the jury may properly convict the defendant of attempt when it could have convicted him of the crime itself. La.R.S. 14:27.

Section 14:27(C) treats attempt as a lesser grade of the intended crime and permits conviction for attempt even when the intended crime was actually completed in pursuit of the attempt.

State v. Victorian · filed 1986-10-08(C)

La.R.S. 14:27(C) provides that attempt is a lesser grade of the intended crime; any person may be convicted of attempt to commit a crime although it appears on trial that the crime was actually perpetrated by such person in pursuit of such attempt.

Subsection (C) treats an attempt as a separate but lesser grade of the completed crime, so an indictment for the completed offense gives notice of the attempted offense.

State v. Kalathakis · filed 1989-04-19(C)

The purpose of the indictment was to inform the defendant of the crime she was accused of violating. An indictment charging a defendant with a completed offense informs the defendant that she must prepare a defense for that charge and every lesser included offense. “An attempt is a separate but lesser grade” of a completed crime. La.R.S. 14:27(C). The defendant was, therefore, adequately notified that attempted manufacturing was among the crimes with which she was charged.

Subsection (C) makes attempt a separate but lesser grade of the intended crime and permits conviction for attempt even when the intended crime was actually completed.

State v. Ponsell · filed 2000-08-23(C)

La. R.S. 14:27(C) defines an attempt, in pertinent part: C. An attempt is a separate but lesser grade of the intended crime; and any person may be convicted of an attempt to commit a crime, although it appears on the trial that the crime intended or attempted was actually perpetrated by such person in pursuance of such attempt. (Emphasis supplied.) Accordingly, attempted sexual battery is a lesser included grade of the crime of sexual battery. All of the elements of Attempted Sexual Battery are elements in Sexual Battery. ... Therefore, we conclude that attempted sexual battery is a lesser and included grade of the offense of sexual battery. La. R.S. 14:27. Therefore, the prior 1991 conviction of the defendant for attempted sexual battery is a valid felony conviction for purposes of the habitual offender proceeding.

Section 14:27(C) makes an attempt a separate but lesser grade of the intended crime, permitting a court to return an attempted-crime verdict even when the evidence shows the completed crime was solicited or committed.

State v. Little · filed 2002-03-28(C)

Accordingly, though the defendant actually solicited (and did not merely "attempt" to solicit) the officer to commit crime against nature, under R.S. 14:27(C) the district judge could return a verdict of the lesser offense of attempted crime against nature.

Subsection (C)'s description of attempt as a separate but lesser grade does not make attempted battery a separate Louisiana offense or a proper responsive verdict to a battery charge.

State v. Johnson · filed 2002-05-31(C)

In addition, despite the broad language of La. R.S. 14:27(C) that attempt "is a separate but lesser grade of the intended crime," attempted battery is not a proper responsive verdict to a charged offense of battery because it is not a separate offense in Louisiana.

Subsection (C) treats an attempt as a separate, lesser grade of the intended crime, so it can serve as a responsive verdict for the completed offense.

State v. Brown · filed 2013-07-24(C)

Second, regardless of the definition of a lesser included offense on which she relies, attempted cruelty to a juvenile is a legislatively authorized lesser included offense by virtue of La. 14:27(C); therefore, it is a responsive verdict by virtue of La.C.Cr.P. art. 815.

Section 14:27(C) makes an attempt a separate but lesser grade of the intended crime and permits conviction for an attempt to commit a crime.

State v. Joseph · filed 2016-12-07(C)

La. R.S. 14:27(C) provides in pertinent part that “an attempt is a separate but lesser grade of the intended crime; and any person may be convicted of an attempt to commit a crime.”

Section 14:27(A) requires specific intent plus an act or omission tending directly toward the intended crime, while subsection (C) makes attempt a separate lesser grade even when the intended crime was actually perpetrated.

State of Louisiana v. White · filed 2025-12-11(A) (C)

“Any person who, having a specific intent to commit a crime, does or omits an act for the purpose of and tending directly toward the accomplishing of his object is guilty of an attempt to commit the offense intended; and it shall be immaterial whether, under the circumstances, he would have actually accomplished his purpose.” La. R.S. 14:27(A). “An attempt is a separate but lesser grade of the intended crime; and any person may be convicted of an attempt to commit a crime, although it appears on the trial that the crime intended or attempted was actually perpetrated by such person in pursuance of such attempt.” La. R.S. 14:27(C).

Section 14:27 defines an attempt as requiring specific intent plus an act or omission tending directly toward commission; mere preparation alone is insufficient.

State of Louisiana Versus Marvin K Chest · filed 2025-02-26A, B(1), and C

La. R.S. 14:27 defines an “attempt,” for purposes of Title 14 crimes, as: ... A. Any person who, having a specific intent to commit a crime, does or omits an act for the purpose of and tending directly toward the accomplishing of his object is guilty of an attempt to commit the offense intended; and it shall be immaterial whether, under the circumstances, he would have actually accomplished his purpose. ... B. (1) Mere preparation to commit a crime shall not be sufficient to constitute an attempt; … ... C. An attempt is a separate but lesser grade of the intended crime; and any person may be convicted of an attempt to commit a crime, although it appears on the trial that the crime intended or attempted was actually perpetrated by such person in pursuance of such attempt.

Section 14:27 defines an attempt as a specific-intent act or omission that tends directly toward committing the intended crime and treats attempt as a separate, lesser grade of that crime.

State v. Kenner · filed 1976-06-21

Attempt (R.S. 14:27) covers any person who, having a specific intent to commit a crime, does or omits an act for the purpose of tending directly toward the accomplishment of his object. An attempt is a separate but lesser grade of the intended crime.

Section 14:27(A) requires specific intent to commit the underlying crime and an act or omission done for the purpose of and tending directly toward accomplishing that crime.

State v. Hall · filed 1983-11-29(A)

Thus, by the very definition of an attempt, specific intent is required to convict of an attempt to commit a crime. In order to attempt to commit a crime an offender must actively desire to cause the specific result required by a particular criminal statute [here influence the conduct of a potential witness] and do or omit an act for the purpose of and tending directly toward the accomplishing of his object. See State v. Parish, 405 So.2d 1080 (La.1981).

Section 14:27 defines an attempt as specific intent to commit a crime plus an act or omission for the purpose of or tending directly toward accomplishing the intended offense.

State v. Britton · filed 1984-05-10

Any person who, having a specific intent to commit a crime, does or omits any act for the purpose of or tending directly towards the accomplishment of his object is guilty of an attempt to commit the offense intended. La.R.S. 14:27.

For an attempted crime, it does not matter whether the accused could actually have completed the intended offense under the circumstances.

State v. Ballard · filed 1976-09-13

For an attempted crime, "it shall be immaterial whether, under the circumstances, he [the accused] would have actually accomplished his purpose." La.R.S. 14:27.

Section 14:27(C) permits conviction for an attempt even when the defendant actually completes the intended crime in pursuing the attempt.

State v. Clark · filed 1976-12-13C

As provided by La.R.S. 14:27 C (“Attempt”), “ * * * any person may be convicted of an attempt to commit a crime, although it appears on the trial that the crime intended or attempted was actually perpetrated by such person in pursuance of such attempt.” Some evidence thus proves the offense of which the defendant is convicted.

Section 14:27 permits an attempt conviction even when the defendant completed the more serious underlying offense, because failure is not an essential element of attempt.

State v. Williams · filed 1983-10-12

Furthermore, the fact that the defendant actually completed the crime does not preclude a conviction for attempt thereof. See: La.R.S. 14:27. The defendant cannot escape conviction by showing he committed a more serious offense inasmuch as failure is not an essential element of attempt.

Section 14:27(C) permits a defendant to be convicted of an attempt even when the evidence shows that the intended offense was actually completed.

State v. Jenkins · filed 1984-08-22(C)

Attempted aggravated rape is a responsive verdict to the crime charged. An accused may be found guilty of an attempt to commit a crime although it appears on the trial that the crime intended or attempted was actually perpetrated. La.R.S. 14:27.

Section 14:27 requires a specific intent to commit the target crime for an attempt conviction.

State v. Progue · filed 1977-10-10

As written, the special charge requires explanation that a specific intent to kill is an essential element of the crime of attempted murder.

Section 14:27 makes an attempt when a person specifically intends to commit a crime and takes an act for the purpose of and tending directly toward accomplishing it.

State v. Peebles · filed 1979-10-08

A person who, having a specific intent to commit a crime, does an act for the purpose of and tending directly toward the accomplishing of his object is guilty of an attempt to commit the offense intended. ... Applying these rules to the evidence in this case, we conclude that the officers had reasonable cause to believe that the defendant had attempted to distribute methaqualone. Under the circumstances, the defendant's acts in approaching a person and offering to sell him drugs indicated a probability that the defendant specifically intended to commit the crime and had taken a step for the purpose of and tending directly toward the accomplishment of his objective.

Section 14:27 makes specific intent an essential element of an attempted crime.

State v. Williams · filed 1980-10-06

Specific intent, an essential element of an attempted crime, La.R.S. 14:27, was also required by the charged offense in this case, and necessarily found by the jury when it found defendant guilty as charged.

Section 14:27 requires a defendant to have specific intent to commit the target crime in order to be guilty of an attempt.

State Ex Rel. Womack v. Blackburn · filed 1981-01-26

Furthermore, R.S. 14:27, the attempt statute, requires that defendant have a specific intent to commit the crime in order to be guilty of attempt.

Section 14:27 requires specific intent to commit the intended crime and an act tending directly toward accomplishing it; mere preparation is generally insufficient.

State v. Knighton · filed 1984-04-30

Thus, it was necessary that the state prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant had a specific intent to kill the victim or to inflict great bodily harm upon him and engaged in some act in an attempt to accomplish this purpose.

Section 14:27 makes a person guilty of an attempt when, with specific intent to commit a crime, the person does or omits an act tending directly toward accomplishing it.

State v. Honore · filed 1984-05-14

La.R.S. 14:27 states in pertinent part that "[a]ny person who, having a specific intent to commit a crime, does or omits an act for the purpose of and tending directly toward the accomplishing of his object is guilty of an attempt to commit the offense intended...." ... We find both the direct and circumstantial evidence presented by the state in this matter is such that when reviewed in a light most favorable to the prosecution, a rational trier of fact could, indeed, find the essential elements of the crime of attempted simple robbery were proven beyond a reasonable doubt.

Section 14:27 defines an attempt as requiring specific intent plus an act or omission tending directly toward completion, and attempted manslaughter therefore requires specific intent.

State v. Bosley · filed 1984-08-22

La.R.S. 14:27 provides: A. Any person who, having a specific intent to commit a crime, does or omits an act for the purpose of and tending directly toward the accomplishing of his object is guilty of an attempt to commit the offense intended; and it shall be immaterial whether, under the circumstances, he would have actually accomplished his purpose. ... Thus, the crime of attempted manslaughter is a crime which requires the presence of specific intent.

Section 14:27 makes a person guilty of an attempt when, with specific intent to commit a crime, the person does or omits an act tending directly toward accomplishing it, even if the crime would not actually have been completed.

State v. Hicks · filed 1989-12-19A

An "attempt" is defined in La.R.S. 14:27, in pertinent part, as follows: A. Any person who, having a specific intent to commit a crime, does or omits an act for the purpose of and tending directly toward the accomplishing of his object is guilty of an attempt to commit the offense intended; and it shall be immaterial whether, under the circumstances, he would have actually accomplished his purpose. Thus, to be guilty of attempted armed robbery, a defendant must have a specific intent to commit armed robbery, and he must do or omit an act for the purpose of and tending directly toward the accomplishment of his object.

Section 14:27(A) defines an attempt as a specific-intent crime in which the defendant performs or omits an act tending directly toward accomplishing the criminal objective, even if the crime could not have been completed under the circumstances.

State v. Green · filed 1992-12-29(A)

Attempt is defined as: "Any person who, having a specific intent to commit a crime, does or omits an act for the purpose of and tending directly toward the accomplishing of his object is guilty of an attempt to commit the offense intended; and it shall be immaterial whether, under the circumstances, he would have actually accomplished his purpose." La.R.S. 14:27(A).

Section 14:27(A) defines an attempt as an act done with specific intent to commit a crime that tends directly toward accomplishing it, even if the crime would not actually have been completed.

State v. Crawford · filed 1993-05-28A

La.R.S. 14:27 provides, in pertinent part: A. Any person who, having a specific intent to commit a crime, does or omits an act for the purpose of and tending directly toward the accomplishing of his object is guilty of an attempt to commit the offense intended; and it shall be immaterial whether, under the circumstances, he would have actually accomplished his purpose. ... We find that, based on defendant's actions, rational fact finders could conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant did have the specific intent to rape the victim, despite his intoxication.

Section 14:27(A) requires specific intent to commit the intended crime and an act or omission tending directly toward its accomplishment; the court held that the defendant’s retaliatory threats supported attempted obstruction of justice.

State v. Duplessis · filed 1995-06-07(A)

La.R.S. 14:27(A) provides: ... A. Any person who, having a specific intent to commit a crime, does or omits an act for the purpose of and tending directly toward the accomplishing of his object is guilty of an attempt to commit the offense intended; and it shall be immaterial whether, under the circumstances, he would have actually accomplished his purpose. ... However, the evidence does support a conviction under Subparagraph (3). Defendant’s words conveyed his intent to retaliate against Klein for his giving evidence against defendant’s son at the probation revocation hearing. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, the State proved beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant committed attempted obstruction of justice.

An attempt requires specific intent to commit a crime and an act or omission tending directly toward accomplishing it; actual completion of the crime is immaterial.

State v. Lewis · filed 1995-09-28

La.R.S. 14:27 defines an attempt: "Any person who, having a specific intent to commit a crime, does or omits an act for the purpose of and tending directly toward the accomplishing of his object is guilty of attempt to commit the offense intended; and it shall be immaterial whether, under the circumstances, he would have actually accomplished his purpose."

Section 14:27(A) requires specific intent to commit the intended crime and an act tending directly toward accomplishing it for an attempt conviction.

State v. Holmes · filed 1997-10-29(A)

An "attempt," as defined in La. R.S. 14:27, requires specific intent to commit a crime and commission of an act tending directly toward the accomplishing of his object.

Section 14:27 defines an attempt as an act or omission, done with specific intent to commit a crime, that tends directly toward accomplishing it, even if the crime is not completed.

State v. Allen · filed 1998-01-14

La.R.S. 14:27 provides in pertinent part: A. Any person who, having a specific intent to commit a crime, does or omits an act for the purpose of and tending directly toward the accomplishing of his object is guilty of an attempt to commit the offense intended; and it shall be immaterial whether, under the circumstances, he would have actually accomplished his purpose.

Section 14:27 treats an act or omission tending directly toward commission of a crime as an attempt and permits conviction for the attempt even when the intended crime was completed.

State v. Montgomery · filed 1999-01-27

An individual who does or omits an act tending directly toward possessing cocaine can be found guilty of attempted possession. However, an attempt is a separate but a lesser grade of the intended crime. A person may be convicted of an attempt to commit a crime, even though it appears at trial that the crime intended or attempted was actually perpetrated by such person in pursuance of such attempt. La.R.S. 14:27.

Section 14:27 treats an attempt as requiring specific intent plus an act or omission tending directly toward committing the intended crime, even if the crime could not actually have been completed.

State v. Milton · filed 2000-02-01

Any person who, having a specific intent to commit a crime, does or omits an act for the purpose of and tending directly toward the_Lyaccomplishing of his object is guilty of an attempt to commit the offense intended; and it shall be immaterial whether, under the circumstances, he would have actually accomplished his purpose.

Section 14:27(A) defines an attempt as an act or omission, undertaken with specific intent to commit a crime, that directly tends toward accomplishing the crime, even if the crime would not actually have been completed.

State v. Texada · filed 2000-02-02(A)

An attempt is defined in La.R.S. 14:27(A): Any person who, having a specific intent to commit a crime, does or omits an act for the purpose of and tending directly toward the accomplishing of his object is guilty of an attempt to commit the offense intended; and it shall be immaterial whether, under the circumstances, he would have actually accomplished his purpose. First degree murder is the killing of a human being when the offender has a specific intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm upon more than one person. In order to find a defendant guilty of attempted first degree murder, the defendant is required to have had specific intent to kill. [5] ... At trial, the evidence presented sufficiently supported his convictions for two counts of attempted first degree murder and conspiracy to commit first degree murder.

Section 14:27(A) makes an attempt punishable when a person specifically intends to commit an offense and takes or omits an act directly tending toward its accomplishment, regardless of whether the offense could actually have been completed.

State v. Ballett · filed 2000-03-15A

La. R.S. 14:27 A defines attempt as: Any person who, having a specific intent to commit a crime, does or omits an act for the purpose of and tending directly toward the accomplishing of his object is guilty of an attempt to commit the offense intended; and it shall be immaterial whether, under the circumstances, he would have actually accomplished his purpose.

Section 14:27(A) makes an attempt a specific-intent crime when a person commits or omits an act tending directly toward accomplishing the intended offense, even if the offense is not completed.

State v. Young · filed 2000-04-17(A)

Attempt is defined in La. R.S. 14:27(A) as follows: ... LA. Any person who, having a specific intent to commit a crime, does or omits an act for the purpose of and tending directly toward the accomplishing of his object is guilty of an attempt to commit the offense intended; and it shall be immaterial whether, under the circumstances, he would have actually accomplished his purpose.

Section 14:27(A) defines an attempt as having specific intent to commit a crime and doing or omitting an act directed toward accomplishing that crime.

State v. Holley · filed 2001-10-03(A)

An attempt occurs when a person having a specific intent to commit a crime, "does or omits an act for the purpose of and tending directly toward the accomplishing of his object[.]" La.R.S. 14:27(A).

Section 14:27 defines attempt as requiring specific intent and an act or omission tending directly toward committing the crime, regardless of whether the crime could actually be completed.

State v. Barthe · filed 2001-12-27

La. R.S. 14:27 defines the crime of attempt as occurring when an individual, "having a specific intent to commit a crime, does or omits an act for the purpose of and tending directly toward the accomplishing of his object ...; and it shall be immaterial whether, under the circumstances, he would have actually accomplished his purpose."

Section 14:27 defines an attempt as requiring specific intent to commit a crime and an act or omission tending directly toward accomplishing it, even if the crime would not actually have been completed.

State v. Davies · filed 2002-04-05

Attempt is defined in La. R.S. 14:27, which provides in pertinent part: Any person who, having a specific intent to commit a crime, does or omits an act for the purpose of and tending directly toward the accomplishing of his object is guilty of an attempt to commit the offense intended; and it shall be immaterial whether, under the circumstances, he would have actually accomplished his purpose.

Section 14:27(A) defines attempt by requiring specific intent to commit a crime and an act or omission tending directly toward its accomplishment; success need not be possible.

State v. Harris · filed 2003-05-20(A)

The overt act need not be the ultimate step toward or the last possible act in the consummation of the crime attempted. Id. It is the intent to commit the crime, not the possibility of success, that determines whether the act or omission constitutes the crime of attempt. Id. ... In the instant case, as in J.W. and Hollis, the state failed to introduce scientific evidence that the substance was cocaine. However, we find that there was sufficient evidence presented, when considered in its entirety, to support a guilty verdict of the charged offense.

Section 14:27(A) requires specific intent to commit a crime and an act or omission tending directly toward accomplishing it; the crime need not actually have been accomplished.

State of Louisiana v. Robert Glenn Jones A/K/A Ernest Hancock · filed 2003-09-10(A)

Attempt is defined in La.R.S. 14:27(A), which provides: Any person who, having a specific intent to commit a crime, does or omits an act for the purpose of and tending directly toward the accomplishing of his object is guilty of an attempt to commit the offense intended; and it shall be immaterial whether, under the circumstances, he would have actually accomplished his purpose. ... Thus, the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the Defendant specifically intended to kill or to inflict great bodily harm upon a human being and that he “committed an ‘act for the purpose of and tending directly toward the accomplishing of’ that intent.”

Section 14:27 defines an attempt as specific intent to commit a crime combined with an act tending directly toward accomplishing it.

State v. Ford · filed 2004-02-18

An attempt occurs when a person has the specific intent to commit a crime and does an act tending directly toward the accomplishing of his object.

Section 14:27 defines an attempt as a specific-intent act or omission tending directly toward committing the intended crime, regardless of whether the crime is completed.

State v. Kemp · filed 2005-03-11

Any person who, having a specific intent to commit a crime, does or omits an act for the purpose of and tending directly toward the accomplishing of his object is guilty of an attempt to commit the offense intended. It is immaterial whether the person actually accomplished his purpose. La. R.S. 14:27.

Section 14:27 makes a person guilty of an attempt when, with specific intent to commit a crime, the person does or omits an act that directly tends toward accomplishing the intended crime, even if the crime would not actually have been completed.

State v. Hunter · filed 2005-06-29(A)

La. R.S. 14:27 provides: A. Any person who, having a specific intent to commit a crime, does or omits an act for the purpose of and tending directly toward the accomplishing of his object is guilty of an attempt to commit the offense intended; and it shall be immaterial whether, under the circumstances, he would have actually accomplished his purpose. To convict a defendant of attempted armed robbery, the state must prove that the defendant, having the specific intent to commit armed robbery, did or omitted an act for the purpose of and tending directly toward the taking of anything of value belonging to another, from the person of another or in the immediate control of another, by the use of force or intimidation, while armed with a dangerous weapon. La. R.S. 14:27 and 64; State v. Musgrove, 33,977 (La.App. 2d Cir.12/15/00), 774 So.2d 1155, writ denied, 01-0356 (La.9/28/01), 798 So.2d 112.

Section 14:27 defines an attempt as specific intent to commit a crime plus an act or omission tending directly toward completing it, regardless of whether the crime would actually have been completed.

State v. George · filed 2005-07-01

Any person who, having a specific intent to commit a crime, does or omits an act for the purpose of and tending directly toward the accomplishing of his object is guilty of an attempt to commit the offense intended; and it shall be immaterial whether, under the circumstances, he would have actually accomplished his purpose. ... Defendant's repeated admission that he attempted to rape the victim, supported by the DNA evidence, was sufficient to convince a rational trier of fact that the state proved attempted forcible rape beyond a reasonable doubt.

Section 14:27 makes a person guilty of attempt when, with specific intent to commit a crime, the person performs or omits an act tending directly toward accomplishing it, regardless of whether the crime would actually have been completed.

State v. Gatti · filed 2005-10-13(A)

La. R.S. 14:27 provides, in pertinent part: A. Any person who, having a specific intent to commit a crime, does or omits an act for the purpose of and tending directly toward the accomplishing of his object is guilty of an attempt to commit the offense intended; and it shall be immaterial whether, under the circumstances, he would have actually accomplished his purpose. Gatti argues that his conviction for attempted aggravated burglary of the Palmer home should be overturned because he did not try to steal anything or commit any felony in the garage. To the contrary, when the gang drove the van into this garage, Gatti tried to force his way into the house, but was stopped by gunfire from the owner.

Section 14:27(A) defines an attempt as specific intent plus an act or omission tending directly toward accomplishing the crime, and makes it immaterial whether the crime could actually have been completed.

State v. Draughn · filed 2007-01-17(A)

An attempt occurs when a person "having the specific intent to commit a crime, does or omits an act for the purpose of and tending directly toward the accomplishing of his object. . . ." La. R.S. 14:27(A). Under the definition of attempt, ". . . it shall be immaterial whether, under the circumstances, he would have actually accomplished his purpose." Id. Whether or not the perpetrator ultimately took anything of value from Ms. White, a rational juror could find that a person, having the specific intent to kill, performed various actions from which a specific intent to commit armed robbery may be found proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Here, the perpetrator entered the victim's house, stabbed or cut the victim 61 times until she bled to death, and moved throughout her house opening drawers and rummaging through the contents of her purse. We find that the element of first degree murder challenged here, that the murder was committed during the perpetration or attempted perpetration of armed robbery, was proven to a rational juror beyond a reasonable doubt.

Section 14:27 requires specific intent to commit the target crime plus an act or omission tending directly toward accomplishing it; actual completion is immaterial.

State v. Brown · filed 2007-10-03

Attempt is defined by La.R.S. 14:27, which states, in relevant part: A. Any person who, having a specific intent to commit a crime, does or omits an act for the purpose of and tending directly toward the accomplishing of his object is guilty of an attempt to commit the offense intended; and it shall be immaterial whether, under the circumstances, he would have actually accomplished his purpose.

Section 14:27 makes a person guilty of an attempt when, with specific intent to commit a crime, the person performs or omits an act tending directly toward accomplishing it, regardless of whether the crime could actually have been completed.

State v. Buckenberger · filed 2008-02-08

Any person who, having a specific intent to commit a crime, does or omits an act for the purpose of and tending directly toward the accomplishing of his object is guilty of an attempt to commit the offense intended; and it shall be immaterial whether, under the circumstances, he would have actually accomplished his purpose.

Section 14:27 makes a person guilty of an attempt when, with specific intent to commit a crime, the person does or omits an act tending directly toward accomplishing it, even if the crime would not actually have been completed.

State v. Shaw · filed 2008-06-18

Viewing all of evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found all of the essential elements of the offense of attempted aggravated rape present beyond a reasonable doubt. La. R.S. 14:27 [3] . ... A. Any person who, having a specific intent to commit a crime, does or omits an act for the purpose of and tending directly toward the accomplishing of his object is guilty of an attempt to commit the offense intended; and it shall be immaterial whether, under the circumstances, he would have actually accomplished his purpose.

Section 14:27 defines criminal attempt as having specific intent to commit a crime and performing or omitting an act that tends directly toward accomplishing it.

State v. Conner · filed 2008-10-01

La. R.S. 14:27 defines an attempt to commit a crime as having a specific intent to commit a crime, and doing or omitting an act for the purpose of and tending directly toward accomplishing the crime.

Section 14:27 defines an attempt as a specific intent to commit a crime accompanied by an act or omission tending directly toward accomplishing it, even if the crime would not actually have been completed.

State v. Jeter · filed 2010-04-07

A. Any person who, having a specific intent to commit a crime, does or omits an act for the purpose of and tending directly toward the accomplishing of his object is guilty of an attempt to commit the offense intended; and it shall be immaterial whether, under the circumstances, he would have actually accomplished his purpose. ... Defendant’s actions indicated he desired to have sexual intercourse with the victim and he used force in an attempt to accomplish the act.

Section 14:27(A) makes a person guilty of attempt when, with specific intent to commit a crime, the person does or omits an act for the purpose of and tending directly toward accomplishing that object.

State v. Collins · filed 2010-06-28(A)

Under La. R.S. 14:27(A), a person is guilty of an attempt to commit an offense when he has a specific intent to 11scommit a crime and “does or omits an act for the purpose of and tending directly toward the accomplishing of his object.”

Section 14:27(A) makes a person guilty of attempt when, with specific intent to commit a crime, the person performs or omits an act directed toward accomplishing it, even if the crime would not actually have been completed.

State v. Bass · filed 2010-08-11(A)

Any person who, having a specific intent to commit a crime, does or omits an act for the purpose of and tending directly toward the accomplishing of his object is guilty of an attempt to commit the offense intended; and it shall be immaterial whether, under the circumstances, he would have actually accomplished his purpose. ... The defendant evidenced an intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm on Corporal Lambert during the high speed chase. The facts clearly establish the requisites for attempted first degree murder.

Section 14:27 requires specific intent to commit a crime and an act or omission for the purpose of and tending directly toward accomplishing it; actual completion need not be possible.

State v. Miller · filed 2010-11-03

In order to convict the defendant for the crime of attempted second degree murder, the state carried the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant had the specific intent to kill Mrs. Bergeron and committed an act for the purpose of and tending directly toward the accomplishment of killing Mrs. Bergeron.

Section 14:27 makes an attempt when a person with specific intent commits or omits an act tending directly toward completing the intended crime, even if the crime would not actually have been completed.

State v. McCord · filed 2012-02-15

La. R.S. 14:27, which defines “attempt,” states that “[a]ny person who, having a specific intent to commit a crime, does or omits an act for the purpose of and tending directly toward the accomplishing of his object is guilty of an attempt to commit the offense intended; and it shall be immaterial whether, under the circumstances, he would have actually accomplished his purpose.” ... Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, we conclude that the evidence was sufficient to convince a rational juror that Mr. McCord was a principal to the crime of attempted unauthorized entry of an inhabited dwelling.

Section 14:27(A) defines an attempt as requiring specific intent to commit a crime and an act or omission tending directly toward accomplishing the intended offense.

State of Louisiana v. Letrakus Tyler AKA Trey Tyler · filed 2012-05-02(A)

Attempt is defined as “Any person who, having a specific intent to commit a crime, does or omits an act for the purpose of and tending directly toward the accomplishing of his object is guilty of an attempt to commit the offense intended.” La. R.S. 14:27(A). The crime of attempted murder, whether first or second degree, requires proof of the specific intent to kill and the commission of an overt act tending toward the accomplishment of that goal. State v. Cepriano, 00-213 (La.App. 5 Cir. 8/29/00), 767 So.2d 893, 897. ... Based on Wommack, we find that Defendant’s verbalizing of his intent to kill, along with the fact that he placed his hand over D.C.’s mouth, his putting of a shirt over her face to suffocate her, and his holding of her neck hard enough to cause bruising were sufficient for the trial court to infer that he had the specific intent to kill D.C. Accordingly, we find this assignment of error lacks merit.

Section 14:27(A) defines an attempt as conduct performed with specific intent to commit a crime that directly tends toward accomplishing it, even if the crime is not completed.

State v. Joyner · filed 2012-10-24(A)

An attempt occurs when a person, having a specific intent to commit a crime, does or omits an act for the purpose of and tending directly toward the accomplishing of his object; it is immaterial whether he would have actually accomplished his purpose. La. R.S. 14:27(A).

Section 14:27 defines an attempt as specific intent plus an act or omission tending directly toward commission of the offense, and permits an attempt conviction even when the intended offense was actually completed.

State of Louisiana v. Rodney L. Johnson, Sr. · filed 2014-06-04(A) (C)

The pertinent part of the attempt statute, La.R.S. 14:27(A), states: Any person who, having a specific intent to commit a crime, does or omits an act for the purpose of and tending directly toward the accomplishing of his object is guilty of an attempt to commit the offense intended; and it shall be immaterial whether, under the circumstances, he would have actually accomplished his purpose. A defendant may be convicted of an attempt to commit a crime even when the evidence at trial shows the attempted or intended crime was actually committed. La.R.S. 14:27(C).

Section 14:27(A) defines attempt as specific intent to commit a crime plus an act tending directly toward accomplishing it, and actual completion is immaterial.

State v. Falkins · filed 2014-07-23(A)

Louisiana Revise Statute 14:27(A) defines attempt, in pertinent part, as the specific intent to commit a crime by doing an act for the purposes of and tending directly toward the accomplishing of his object, it being immaterial whether, under the circumstances, the offender would have actually accomplished his purpose.

Section 14:27 defines an attempt as specific intent to commit a crime plus an act or omission tending directly toward accomplishing it, regardless of whether the crime could actually have been completed.

State v. Cushenberry · filed 2014-07-16

An attempt is defined by La. R.S. 14:27 as occurring when “[a]ny person who, having a specific intent to commit a crime, does or omits an act for the purpose of and tending directly toward the | i7accomplishing of his object ... and it shall be immaterial whether, under the circumstances, he would have actually accomplished his purpose.”

Section 14:27(A) defines an attempt as requiring specific intent to commit a crime and an act or omission tending directly toward accomplishing it.

State v. Baham · filed 2015-03-11(A)

Attempt is defined as “Any person who, having a specific intent to commit a crime, does or omits an act for the purpose of and tending directly toward the accomplishing of his object is guilty of an attempt to commit the offense intended.” La. R.S. 14:27 A. The crime of attempted murder requires proof of the specific intent to kill and the commission of an overt act tending toward the accomplishment of that goal. ... A rational trier of fact could have found that the evidence showed that defendant had the specific intent to kill Matthews and that he committed an overt act in furtherance of that goal.

Section 14:27(A) defines an attempt as a specific-intent act or omission that directly tends toward completing the intended crime, even if the crime is not completed.

State of Louisiana v. Pierre · filed 2015-05-06(A)

Attempt is defined as: Any person who, having a specific intent to commit a crime, does or omits an act for the purpose of and tending directly toward the accomplishing of his object is guilty of an attempt to commit the offense intended; and it shall be immaterial whether, under the circumstances, he would have actually accomplished his purpose. La.R.S. 14:27(A). ... Based on the foregoing, we find that the evidence was sufficient to sustain the verdicts of attempted second degree murder and armed robbery beyond a reasonable doubt.

Section 14:27(A) defines an attempt as acting or failing to act with specific intent to commit a crime in a way that directly tends toward completing it, even if the crime is not actually completed.

State v. Wallace · filed 2015-12-23(A)

Any person who, having a specific intent to commit a crime, does or omits an act for the purpose of and tending directly toward the accomplishing of his object is guilty of an attempt to commit the offense intended; and it shall Lbe immaterial whether, under" the circumstances, he would have actually accomplished his purpose.

Section 14:27(A) requires specific intent to commit the intended crime and an act or omission tending directly toward accomplishing it; the intended crime need not actually be completed.

State v. Falgout · filed 2016-08-24(A)

An attempt is defined -in pertinent part by La. R.S. 14:27: ... A. Any person who, having a specific intent to commit a crime, does or omits an act for the purpose of and tending directly toward the accomplishing of his object is guilty of an attempt to commit the offense intended; and it shall be immaterial whether, under the circumstances, he would have actually accomplished his purpose. ... While the defendant hints that the evidence did not show that the victim was raped, the evidence adduced at trial supports the jury’s finding that two counts of attempted rape occurred.

Section 14:27(A) defines attempt as requiring specific intent to commit a crime and an act or omission tending directly toward accomplishing the intended crime.

State v. Bradstreet · filed 2016-06-30(A)

Attempt is. defined as “[a]ny person who, having a specific intent to commit a crime, does or omits an act for the purpose of and tending directly toward the accomplishing of his object is guilty of an attempt to commit the offense intended[.]” La. R.S. 14:27(A).

Section 14:27 requires specific intent to commit the intended crime and an act or omission tending directly toward accomplishing it, but the intended crime need not actually be completed.

State v. Lapoint · filed 2016-09-28

A. Any person who, having a specific intent to commit a crime, does or omits an act for the purpose of and tending directly toward the accomplishing of his object is guilty of an attempt to commit the offense intended; and it shall be immaterial whether, under the circumstances, he would have actually accomplished his purpose.

Section 14:27 defines an attempt as specific intent plus an act or omission tending directly toward committing the intended crime, regardless of whether success was possible.

State v. Turner · filed 2017-04-05

Attempt is defined in La. R.S. 14:27 as follows: ... Any person who, having a specific intent to commit a crime, does or omits an act for the purpose of and tending directly toward the accomplishing of his object is guilty of an attempt to commit the offense intended; and it shall be immaterial whether, under the circumstances, he would have actually accomplished his purpose. ... Specific intent may be inferred from the circumstances surrounding the offense and the conduct of the defendant. ... The state has the burden of proving that the offender had specific intent to commit the crime and that the offender committed or omitted an act for the purpose of accomplishing his object. ... However, we believe that the evidence was sufficient to support the jury’s finding that Turner was guilty of attempted resisting a police officer with force or violence. ... It thus appears that a jury could have reasonably found that Turner was attempting to injure the officers with the open handcuff.

Section 14:27 defines an attempt as acting or omitting to act with specific intent to commit a crime for the purpose of or tending directly toward accomplishing it.

State ex rel. M.B. · filed 2017-04-19

An attempt occurs when a person who has the specific intent to commit a crime does or omits an act “for the purpose of or tending directly toward the accomplishing of his object....” La. R.S. 14:27.

Section 14:27 makes a person guilty of an attempt when, with specific intent to commit a crime, the person does or omits an act tending directly toward accomplishing the intended offense, regardless of whether the offense would actually have been completed.

State v. Saulny · filed 2017-05-17

La. R.S. 14:27 provides that any person who, having a specific intent to commit a crime, does or omits an act for the purpose of and tending directly toward the accomplishing of his object is guilty of an attempt to commit the offense intended; and, it shall be immaterial whether, under the circumstances, he would have actually accomplished his purpose.

Section 14:27(A) defines an attempt as requiring specific intent to commit a crime and an act or omission directed toward accomplishing that crime.

State v. Carter · filed 2018-10-10(A)

A person is guilty of an attempt when he, "having a specific intent to commit a crime, does or omits an act for the purpose of and tending directly toward the accomplishing of his object is guilty of an attempt to commit the offense intended[.]" La.R.S. 14:27(A).

Section 14:27 makes a person guilty of an attempt when, with specific intent to commit a crime, the person performs or omits an act intended and tending directly toward accomplishing it.

State v. Burch · filed 2018-11-14

Any person who, having a specific intent to commit a crime, does or omits an act for the purpose of and tending directly toward the accomplishment of his object is guilty of an attempt to commit the offense intended. La. R.S. 14:27.

Section 14:27(A) makes a person guilty of attempt when, with specific intent to commit a crime, the person does or omits an act directed toward accomplishing that crime.

State v. Lampley · filed 2018-11-02(A)

Under La. R.S. 14:27(A), a person is guilty of an attempt to commit an offense when he has a specific intent to commit a crime and "does or omits an act for the purpose of and tending directly toward the accomplishing of his object."

Section 14:27(A) defines an attempt as requiring specific intent to commit a crime and an act or omission tending directly toward accomplishing it, even if the crime would not actually have been completed.

State of Louisiana v. Garnett · filed 2019-01-23(A)

The presence of the condom wrapper supports not only intent, but an act “tending directly toward the accomplishing” the crime as set forth in the attempt statute. La.R.S. 14:27(A).

Section 14:27 makes a person guilty of attempt when, with specific intent to commit a crime, the person performs or omits an act tending directly toward accomplishing it, even if the crime would not actually have been completed.

State of Louisiana v. Latique · filed 2019-02-20

Any person who, having a specific intent to commit a crime, does or omits an act for the purpose of and tending directly toward the accomplishing of his object is guilty of an attempt to commit the offense intended; and it shall be immaterial whether, under the circumstances, he would have actually accomplished his purpose.

Section 14:27 makes an attempt criminal when a person with specific intent commits or omits an act tending directly toward committing the intended crime, even if the crime would not actually have been completed.

State v. Douglas · filed 2019-04-10

An attempt is defined by La. R.S. 14:27 as any person who, having a specific intent to commit a crime, does or omits an act for the purpose of and tending directly toward the accomplishing of his object is guilty of an attempt to commit the offense intended; and it shall be immaterial whether, under the circumstances, he would have actually accomplished his purpose.

Section 14:27 requires specific intent and an act or omission tending directly toward the intended crime; mere preparation is insufficient.

State of Louisiana v. Dukes · filed 2019-10-02

Any person who, having a specific intent to commit a crime, does or omits an act for the purpose of and tending directly toward the accomplishing of his object is guilty of an attempt to commit the offense intended; and it shall be immaterial whether, under the circumstances, he would have actually accomplished his purpose.

Section 14:27 requires specific intent to commit a crime and an act or omission tending directly toward accomplishing it; mere preparation is insufficient, and whether conduct is an overt act depends on the totality of the circumstances.

State of Louisiana v. Dukes · filed 2019-10-02

In State v. Jones, the Supreme Court discussed what constitutes an overt act, the second element necessary for an attempt. ... The attempt statute makes a distinction between actions which are “mere preparation” and are not sufficient to constitute attempt, and acts which are committed for the purpose of and tending directly toward the accomplishing of the criminal object. ... Where a defendant’s actions fall on the continuum is a question for the trier of fact and is determined by evaluating the “the totality of the facts and circumstances presented by each case.” ... The overt act need not be the ultimate step toward or the last possible act in the consummation of the crime attempted, and it is the intent to commit the crime, not the possibility of success, that determines whether the act or omission constitutes the crime of attempt.

Section 14:27(A) defines an attempt as an act done for the purpose of and tending directly toward accomplishing the intended crime.

State of Louisiana v. Vaccaro · filed 2021-03-17(A)

An attempt is the commission or omission of “an act for the purpose of and tending directly toward the accomplishing of his object[.]” La.R.S. 14:27(A). ... We find these facts showed the jury could have reasonably believed Defendant intentionally placed the victim in reasonable apprehension of receiving a battery involving a firearm. Defendant’s behavior would very reasonably result in the victim’s apprehension of harm. The jury weighed the evidence and made credibility determinations; according to those determinations, we find the evidence was sufficient to convict Defendant of attempted aggravated assault with a firearm.

Section 14:27(A) defines an attempt as specific intent to commit a crime plus an act or omission tending directly toward accomplishing it, regardless of whether the crime would actually have been completed.

State of Louisiana v. D'Mycal Lmontay Turner · filed 2022-04-13(A)

Any person who, having a specific intent to commit a crime, does or omits an act for the purpose of and tending directly toward the accomplishing of his object is guilty of an attempt to commit the offense intended; and it shall be immaterial whether, under the circumstances, he would have actually accomplished his purpose.

Section 14:27(D)(3) limits the sentence for an attempt to no more than half of the maximum sentence possible for the crime attempted.

State of Louisiana v. Grimsley · filed 2023-09-27(D)(3)

La. R.S. 14:27 provides the definition and punishment for the crime of attempting to commit a crime. Subsection (D)(3) thereof is the applicable sentencing provision. It dictates that the sentence for attempt can be no more than half of the maximum sentence possible for the crime attempted.

Section 14:27(A) defines an attempt as a specific-intent crime accompanied by an act or omission tending directly toward its accomplishment, and Section 14:27(D)(1)(a) provides a sentence of 10 to 50 years at hard labor without benefits when the attempted offense is punishable by life imprisonment.

State of Louisiana v. Lynn · filed 2024-02-28(A) (D)(1)(a)

An attempt to commit an offense occurs when any person, having a specific intent to commit a crime, does or omits an act for the purpose of and tending directly toward the accomplishing of his object. La. R.S. 14:27(A). ... If the attempted offense is punishable by life imprisonment, the defendant shall be imprisoned at hard labor for not less than 10 nor more than 50 years without benefit of parole, probation or suspension of sentence. La. R.S. 14:27(D)(1)(a).

Section 14:27(A) makes a person guilty of attempt when, with specific intent to commit a crime, the person does or omits an act tending directly toward accomplishing it, regardless of whether the crime could actually be completed.

State of Louisiana v. Galloway · filed 2024-04-10(A)

Any person who, having a specific intent to commit a crime, does or omits an act for the purpose of and tending directly toward the accomplishing of his object is guilty of an attempt to commit the offense intended; and it shall be immaterial whether, under the circumstances, he would have actually accomplished his purpose.

Section 14:27(A) defines an attempt as an act or omission, undertaken with specific intent to commit a crime, that tends directly toward accomplishing it, even if the crime would not actually have been completed.

State of Louisiana v. Watson · filed 2024-11-27(A)

Any person who, having a specific intent to commit a crime, does or omits an act for the purpose of and tending directly toward the accomplishing of his object is guilty of an attempt to commit the offense intended; and it shall be immaterial whether, under the circumstances, he would have actually accomplished his purpose.

Section 14:27(A) applies when a defendant takes direct steps toward committing sexual battery but is prevented from completing it.

State of Louisiana v. Coliston · filed 2025-08-27(A)

Count 3, attempted sexual battery of TB, she described an incident on Hwy. 2 when Coliston came into the room, got in the bed with her, pulled down her clothes, and choked her, but she was able to push him away. This obviously meets the criteria for an attempt, La. R.S. 14:27 (A), to commit sexual battery.

Section 14:27 applies to an attempted armed robbery when the evidence permits a jury to infer beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendants intended to rob the store, even though they did not ask for money.

State v. Johnson · filed 1978-11-13

The defendants principally contend that, because Porter and Johnson (the armed individuals who approached and shot the store employees) did not ask for money, there is no evidence that an armed robbery was intended. ... Under the evidence presented to the jury, it could reasonably infer that beyond a reasonable doubt Porter, Johnson, and Winfield were in a group which intended through Porter and Johnson to rob the store, with Winfield through his vehicle to provide the means of escaping from the scene after the intended robbery. ... We find no merit to these assignments of error.

Section 14:27, together with La. R.S. 14:64(B), requires an attempted armed robbery sentence ranging from five years to forty-nine years and six months before the firearm enhancement.

State v. Adams · filed 2011-06-01

As to the Lapaz count, the district court shall sentence Mr. Adams to hard labor without benefit of probation, parole or suspension of sentence for a period not less than five years, nor more than forty-nine years and six months, as provided by La. R.S. 14:27 and 14:64 B (with credit for time served), and to an additional period at hard labor without benefit of probation, parole or suspension of sentence for a period of five years, to be served consecutively to the preceding period.

Section 14:27(A) does not require a completed taking for attempted armed robbery when the evidence establishes intent to take something of value.

State v. Debrow · filed 2002-02-27(A)

For the crime of attempted armed robbery, the act of taking something of value need not be established so long as the evidence is sufficient to establish the intent to take something |sof value.

Section 14:27(A)’s attempt elements were satisfied by evidence that the defendant assaulted the victim while trying to rape her, despite the absence of penetration.

State v. Vargas-Alcerreca · filed 2013-10-02A

Viewing the above evidence and all the other record evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found all the elements of attempted forcible rape present beyond a reasonable doubt.

Section 14:27(D)(1)(a) requires a sentence for an attempt to commit a crime punishable by death or life imprisonment to be served at hard labor.

State v. Jackson · filed 2018-01-10(D)(1)(a)

Because La. R.S. 14:27(D)(1)(a) requires that the sentence be served at hard labor, the trial court's error is harmless and self-correcting.

Section 14:27(D)(1) permits a sentence of up to fifty years at hard labor when the attempted offense is punishable by death or life imprisonment.

State v. Prejean · filed 1986-11-05(D)(1)

In addition, La.R.S. 14:27 establishes the sentences for attempted crimes. It provides: ... (1) If the offense so attempted is punishable by death or life imprisonment, he shall be imprisoned at hard labor for not more than fifty years....” Thus, the maximum penalty which a defendant convicted of attempted aggravated rape could receive is fifty years imprisonment at hard labor.

Section 14:27 limits the sentence for attempted aggravated rape to fifty years at hard labor when read with the completed-offense penalty in § 14:42.

State v. Waymire · filed 1987-03-04

The maximum sentence which can be imposed for attempted aggravated rape is fifty years at hard labor. La.R.S. 14:27 and 14:42.

Section 14:27 combines with the statute defining a completed offense to make an attempt to commit that offense a cognizable crime, even when the legislature has not separately named the attempt.

State v. Trackling · filed 2006-01-19(C)

Attempted sexual battery is a cognizable offense in the same way that attempted first degree murder and second degree murder are cognizable offenses; not because the legislature has specifically denominated the crimes, but because the definitions of the completed offenses in LSA-R.S. 14:30 and 14:30.1 coalesce with the general attempt statute, LSA-R.S. 14:27, to produce that result. All crimes in Louisiana are statutory. There can be no crime which is not defined and denounced by statute. In this instance, sexual battery is a crime denounced and defined by statute, LSA-R.S. 14:43.1. Another statute, LSA-R.S. 14:27, makes an attempt to commit a crime an offense. These two provisions coalesce, with the result that the offense charged, attempted sexual battery, is a crime denounced and defined to be such under the statutory laws of this state.

Section 14:27 can be harmonized with the DWI statute to make attempted DWI a cognizable crime in Louisiana.

State v. DEW · filed 2007-10-17

Attempted DWI, while certainly a rare event, is nonetheless a possible crime. ... We find that it is of no moment that in Louisiana, the crime of attempted DWI requires the additional harmonization of the attempt statute, La. R.S. 14:27, with DWI, La. R.S. 14:98.

Section 14:27 treats an attempt as a separate but lesser grade of the intended crime, but an attempted offense is unavailable when the attempt and completed offense have identical elements, as with attempted concealment of a weapon.

State v. Dyer · filed 1980-09-24

La.R.S. 14:27 provides that an attempt, specific intent to commit a crime and an act in furtherance of the purpose, is a separate but lesser grade of the intended crime and La.R.S. 14:5 provides that one who commits an offense which includes all of the elements of other lesser offenses may be prosecuted for and convicted of either the greater offense or one of the lesser and included offenses. In prosecutions for illegal carrying of weapons, the state must prove that a defendant specifically intended to conceal the weapon on his person. Because a defendant's guilt is based on his intent to conceal, rather than the extent of his concealment, his conduct would be such that he either did or did not commit the substantive offense. In other words, the nature of the offense is such that proof of the attempted offense proves the substantive offense, as the elements of the attempted offense are the same as that of the substantive offense. Hence, it is obvious that attempted concealment, comprising the identical elements, cannot be a "lesser grade" of La.R.S. 14:95(A)(1). Proof of the elements of attempted concealment would not be proof of a "lesser offense" under La.R.S. 14:5 but would be proof of the greater offense alone. Accordingly, we agree with the trial judge's ruling that there can be no attempt to carry a concealed weapon.

Section 14:27 requires specific intent for an attempt, so attempted criminally negligent mistreatment or neglect is legally impossible.

State v. Strother · filed 2009-10-07(A)

Where the evidence is insufficient to sustain the conviction for second degree cruelty to juveniles because there was minimal evidence submitted which could have established that the injury to the victim’s arm was inflicted on February 2, 2007, by Defendant, it is axiomatic that there was insufficient evidence to support the conviction of attempted second degree cruelty to a juvenile under the theory of intentional mistreatment or neglect. Further, criminally negligent mistreatment or neglect is a legal impossibility for the reasons put forth in State v. Cortez, 96-859 (La.App. 3 Cir. 12/18/96), 687 So.2d 515.

Section 14:27 does not permit an attempted failure to register as a sex offender because failure to register is not a specific intent crime.

State v. Williams · filed 2012-07-18

There is no such crime as an attempt to not register as a sex offender. The crime of failure to register is not a specific intent crime. One either fails to register or not. One can not attempt to not register.

For an attempt, § 14:27(D)(3) permits imprisonment in the same manner as for the attempted offense but limits imprisonment to no more than one-half of that offense’s longest prescribed term.

State of Louisiana v. Hearnsberger · filed 2023-03-01(D)(3)

The penalty for an attempt is imprisonment in the same manner as for the offense attempted, with imprisonment that does not exceed one-half of the longest term prescribed for the offense attempted, La. R.S. 14:27 D(3). In this case, the maximum sentence was 49½ years at hard labor.

Section 14:27(D)(3) limits the punishment for an attempted crime to no more than one-half of the longest imprisonment term or largest fine prescribed for the completed offense.

State of Louisiana v. Green · filed 2023-04-05(D)(3)

La. R.S. 14:27(D)(3), which provides the penalties when a person is found guilty of attempted crimes, states that he: shall be fined or imprisoned or both, in the same manner as for the offense attempted; such fine or imprisonment shall not exceed one-half of the largest fine, or one-half of the longest term of imprisonment prescribed for the offense so attempted, or both.

Subsection (D)(3) limits punishment for an attempted crime to the same type of punishment as the completed offense and no more than half its maximum fine or imprisonment term.

State of Louisiana v. Keuntrel Rayshun Knight · filed 2022-03-09(D)(3)

[s]hall be fined or imprisoned or both, in the same manner as for the offense attempted; such fine or imprisonment shall not exceed one-half of the largest fine, or one-half of the longest term of imprisonment prescribed for the offense so attempted, or both.

Section 14:27 requires an attempted-offense sentence to be imposed in the same manner as the offense attempted, including the applicable sentencing restriction of benefits.

State v. Benoit · filed 2017-12-29(D)(3)

Although these cases deal with aggravated incest and not attempted aggravated incest, La. R.S. 14:27 requires that defendant shall be fined or imprisoned or both, in the same manner as for the offense attempted; this additional sentencing requirement applies in this case.

Section 14:27(D)(3) requires an attempt to be punished in the same manner as the completed offense, except that the fine or imprisonment may not exceed one-half of the maximum prescribed for that offense.

State v. Patterson · filed 1971-06-28D(3)

This result is also dictated by the language of the attempt statute (La.Crim. Code art. 27D [3]) providing that person convicted of "attempt" shall be fined and imprisoned in "the same manner" as for the offense attempted; but such fine or imprisonment shall not exceed one-half of the largest fine, or one-half of the longest term of imprisonment prescribed for the offense so attempted, or both. In the case of "attempted armed robbery" the phrase "in the same manner" means that except for the term of imprisonment, which is specifically provided for, the other aspects of the fine or imprisonment shall be "in the same manner" as provided for armed robbery; that is, "at hard labor" and "without benefit of parole, probation or suspension of sentence."

Section 14:27(D)(3) makes an attempt punishable in the same manner as the attempted offense, but limits the fine or imprisonment to one-half of that offense's maximum, so an attempt to fraudulently procure food punishable by hard labor is a felony.

Keys v. Sambo's Restaurant, Inc. · filed 1980-10-08(D)(3)

Under 14:27 D(3) an attempt to fraudulently procure food from a restaurant would be a felony just like the parent offense because the offender would be fined or imprisoned “in the same manner as for the offense attempted” except that the fine or imprisonment would not exceed one-half of the maximum fine or imprisonment prescribed for the offense attempted. ... Since R.S. 21:21 provides that the offender may be imprisoned at hard labor, one guilty of an attempt may be imprisoned in the same manner-at hard labor.

Section 14:27 imposes no minimum sentence for attempted armed robbery and caps the term of imprisonment at one-half the longest term prescribed for the completed offense.

State v. Barrose · filed 1985-04-15(D)(3)

R.S. 14:27(D)(3) provides that a person convicted of an attempt (in all cases except an offense punishable by death or life imprisonment or an offense of attempted theft or receiving stolen things) shall be fined or imprisoned or both, in the same manner as for the offense attempted, however, such fine or imprisonment shall not exceed one-half of the largest fine or one-half of the longest term of imprisonment prescribed for the offense so attempted. Since R.S. 14:27 provides for a rendition of only the maximum sentence and is silent as to the minimum, the question arises as to whether the minimum sentence for an attempted armed robbery is zero, two and one-half, or five years. ... Hence, it was error when the trial judge said the minimum sentence was two and one-half years.

Section 14:27(D)(3) permits up to six years of imprisonment, with or without hard labor, a fine up to $1,000, or both, for an attempt in the residual category.

State v. Brown · filed 1987-03-04(D)(3)

Defendant was found guilty of attempted simple burglary which carries a penalty of a fine not to exceed $1,000.00 or imprisonment with or without hard labor for not more than six years, or both. La. R.S. 14:27(D)(3) and 14:62. Here, defendant received the maximum prison term of six years at hard labor. ... After a careful review of the record and the trial court's explanation of sentence under La. C.Cr.P. art. 894.1, we conclude that the sentence is not excessive and is not an abuse of the much discretion granted to a trial court.

Section 14:27(D)(3) limits the sentence for an attempted felony to no more than one-half of the longest term prescribed for the completed offense and requires it to be imposed in the same manner.

State v. Knight · filed 1989-08-24(D)(3)

For attempted distribution the sentence can not exceed one-half the longest term prescribed, fifteen years, and in the same manner as for the offense. La.R.S. 14:27 D(3).

Section 14:27(D)(3) provides no minimum sentence for an attempted crime, limits the punishment to one-half of the maximum for the completed offense, and carries over the completed offense’s restrictions on probation, parole, or suspension.

State v. Dorsey · filed 1998-06-24(D)(3)

Although there is no minimum sentence for attempted crimes under La. R.S. 14:27(D)(3), State v. Callahan, 95-1331 (La.3/29/96), 671 So.2d 903, the sentence for attempt is to be imposed "in the same manner as for the offense attempted." This "same manner" language incorporates the benefits disability of the original statute. See State v. Middlebrook, 409 So.2d 588 (La. 1982).

Section 14:27(D)(3) requires an attempted offense to be fined or imprisoned in the same manner as the completed offense, including any statutory prohibition on probation, parole, or suspension of sentence.

State v. Mark · filed 1999-03-24(D)(3)

La. R.S. 14:27(D)(3) provides that a person convicted of an “attempt” crime shall be fined or imprisoned “in the same manner as for the offense attempted”. ... Therefore, the trial court could not legally suspend the defendant’s sentence in this case.

Section 14:27(D)(3) limits punishment for an attempt in other cases to one-half of the maximum fine or imprisonment prescribed for the completed offense, including one-half of a restriction on benefits.

State of Louisiana Versus Leroy Tate · filed 2023-04-26(D)(3)

La. R.S. 14:27(D)(3), the attempt statute, provides, “In all other cases he shall be fined or imprisoned or both, in the same manner as for the offense attempted; such fine or imprisonment shall not exceed one-half of the largest fine, or one-half of the longest term of imprisonment prescribed for the offense so attempted, or both.” Thus, the trial court imposed an illegally lenient sentence by failing to stipulate that at least one year of defendant’s sentence for attempted second degree kidnapping, which is one-half of the statutory restriction, be served without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence.

Section 14:27 limits the sentence for an attempt to half the maximum term for the completed offense and requires imprisonment to carry the same restrictions on probation, parole, and suspension of sentence.

State v. DELVALLE · filed 2011-09-21

Therefore, at the time of the commission of the present offense, the maximum sentence for attempted possession of a firearm or carrying a concealed weapon by a person convicted of certain felonies was seven and one-half years, and any sentence imposed was required to be served without benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence.

Section 14:27 limits imprisonment for attempted carjacking to half the longest term allowed for carjacking, with the same restrictions on benefits.

State v. Taylor · filed 2012-08-08(D)(3)

Taylor was convicted of attempted carjacking, subjecting him to be sentenced in the same manner as the offense attempted, but with the sentencing range reduced to half the longest sentence available, in this case, from zero to 10 years at hard labor, without benefits.