La. Stat. Ann. § 15:529.1

Section 15:529.1(D)(1)(b) places on the district attorney the burden of proving habitual-offender facts beyond a reasonable doubt, while § 15:529.1(A)(1)(b)(ii) mandates natural-life imprisonment without benefits for a qualifying third felony offender.

State v. Smith · filed 2000-12-20(D)(1)(b); (A)(1)(b)(ii)

Therefore, defendant received the mandatory life sentence as a third felony habitual offender under La.R.S. 15:529.1(A)(1)(b)(ii).

Section 15:529.1(A)(1)(b)(ii) requires imposition of a life sentence when its habitual-offender provision applies.

State v. Ashford · filed 2005-07-13(A)(1)(b)(ii)

Although the trial court more than adequately explained the basis for the sentences it imposed, in light ‘of La. R.S. 15:529.1 A(l)(b)(ii), the sentence of 198 years on count one is vacated as a matter of law and the matter remanded for imposition of a life sentence.

Section 15:529.1 applies when no more than ten years have elapsed between expiration of a prior sentence and commission of the underlying felony, after which qualifying felony convictions are counted to impose the applicable enhanced penalty, including mandatory life for a qualifying fourth offender.

State v. Cummings · filed 2011-01-26(A), (C)

La. R.S. 15:529.1 mandates a life sentence without benefits for a defendant who is a fourth felony offender when two of the prior felony convictions and the fourth felony conviction are for certain violations of the Uniform Controlled Dangerous Substance Law. ... In the present case, the defendant was convicted of his third felony in 2006. He committed the present offense in 2008. Because 10 years had not passed between these two offenses or between any of the other felony convictions, under the provisions of La. R.S. 15:529.1, the defendant was properly adjudicated a fourth felony offender.

Section 15:529.1(A)(3)(b) requires a fourth or subsequent felony offender to serve life without parole, probation, or suspension when the present felony and at least two prior felonies meet the statute's specified offense or penalty criteria.

State v. Dickerson · filed 1991-04-17(A)(3)(b)

Under the habitual offender law contained in La.R.S. 15:529.1(A)(3)(b), a person sentenced to imprisonment for a fourth or subsequent felony shall be imprisoned for the remainder of his natural life, without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence if the present felony and at least two of the prior felonies involved violations of certain enumerated Louisiana laws, or of any crime punishable by imprisonment for more than twelve years. ... Defendant's twenty year sentence for the first degree murder conviction obviously had a possible sentence that would satisfy the habitual offender statute. The conviction of unlawful sale of a controlled dangerous substance had a possible sentence of not less than two nor more than fifteen years. ... The assault with intent to rob conviction had a possible sentence of not less than two nor more than twenty years. ... Finally, the unlawful possession of a controlled dangerous substance conviction also had a possible sentence of not less than two nor more than twenty years. ... We find that defendant's life sentence was not excessive based on the defendant's extensive criminal record.

Section 15:529.1(A)(1)(c)(ii) requires a fourth or subsequent felony offender with two qualifying prior felonies to serve the remainder of his natural life without parole, probation, or suspension of sentence, under the version in effect when the last crime was committed.

State v. Jones · filed 1997-06-04(A)(1)(c)(ii)

The form of La.R.S. 15:529.1(A)(1)(c)(ii) which was in effect on June 29, 1995, the date of the commission of Defendant's last crime, states: ... If the fourth or subsequent felony and two of the prior felonies are felonies defined as a crime of violence under R.S. 14:2(13) or as a violation of the Uniform Controlled Dangerous Substances Law punishable by imprisonment for more than five years or of any other crime punishable by imprisonment for more than twelve years, the person shall be imprisoned for the remainder of his natural life, without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence. ... We conclude that this assignment is meritless since the version of La.R.S. 15:529.1 which was in effect at the time of the commission of Defendant's last crime, specifically states that Defendant is to be imprisoned for the remainder of his natural life without benefit of parole, probation or suspension of sentence.

Under the version of § 15:529.1(A)(2)(b) in effect when the offense was committed, a predicate punishable by only five years does not qualify as a violent offense for the life-sentence provision; subsection (F) makes properly certified prison records prima facie proof of the listed imprisonment and discharge.

State v. Johnson · filed 1998-08-19(F), (A)(2)(b)

Documents certified by the warden of a state prison, containing the name of the person imprisoned, photograph and fingerprints of the person, a statement of the court in which the conviction was had, the date of sentence, the length of sentence and the date of discharge, shall be prima facie evidence of the imprisonment and the discharge under the conviction stated and set forth in the certificate. ... Furthermore, even if the possession of cocaine conviction was listed as a predicate offense in the original multiple bill, it could have been used to adjudicate defendant as a triple offender but could not be used as justification for the imposition of a life sen*559tence under the “violent offender” provision of the Habitual Offender Law. The possession of cocaine conviction was punishable by a maximum of five years. Thus, that conviction did not qualify as a violent offense as set forth in the relevant sentencing statute on the date of the commission of the instant offense.

When the fourth felony is a crime of violence, Section 15:529.1(A)(1)(c)(ii) requires a fourth felony offender to be imprisoned for life without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence.

State v. Jackson · filed 1999-01-20(A)(1)(c)(ii)

The defendant's fourth felony, the instant crime, is armed robbery. Armed robbery is defined as a crime of violence in La. R.S. 14:2(13)(w). Each of the predicate crimes was a felony. Because the defendant is a fourth felony offender and his fourth felony is a crime of violence, La. R.S. 15:529.1(A)(1)(c)(ii) provides that his sentence is life imprisonment at hard labor without benefit of parole, probation or suspension of sentence. The statute is neither vague nor ambiguous.

Section 15:529.1(A)(1)(b)(ii) makes the enhanced sentence mandatory when the underlying felony and one predicate felony are crimes of violence.

State v. Zeno · filed 1999-08-31(A)(1)(b)(ii)

Because the underlying felony, armed robbery, as well as one of the predicate felonies was a crime of violence, the enhanced sentence was mandatory.

For a fourth felony offender whose fourth felony and no prior felony are not defined as a crime of violence or sex offense, Section 15.529.1 sets imprisonment at no less than twenty years and up to twice the longest sentence for a first conviction, with a twenty-year floor.

State of Louisiana v. Hughes · filed 2021-05-05(A)(4)(b)

Accordingly, the trial court possessed a single legal sentence it could impose upon Defendant, twenty years at hard labor.

Section 15.529.1(A)(4) requires a fourth or subsequent felony offender whose first-offense penalty is less than life imprisonment to receive a determinate sentence of at least the longest first-offense term, but at least 20 years and no more than life imprisonment.

State of Louisiana Versus Darren K. Lloyd · filed 2022-08-24(A)(4)

If the fourth or subsequent felony is such that, upon a first conviction the offender would be punishable by imprisonment for any term less than his natural life, then the offender shall be sentenced to a determinate term not less than the longest prescribed for a first conviction but in no event less than 20 years and not more than his natural life.

Subsection (A)(4)(a) sets a fourth or subsequent felony offender's sentence at a determinate term of at least the longest first-offense term, but at least twenty years and no more than life, while subsection (A)(4)(b) requires life imprisonment when the specified fourth and prior felonies meet its crime-of-violence or serious-drug-offense conditions.

State of Louisiana v. Dorsey · filed 2022-10-05(A)(4)(a), (A)(4)(b)

Therefore, under the provisions of La.R.S. 15:529.1(A)(4)(b) in effect on the date of the commission of the offenses, Defendant was subject to a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment without the benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence for his conviction of resisting an officer with force or violence, because his fourth conviction was a crime of violence and two of his prior felonies were violations of the Uniform Controlled Dangerous Substances Law punishable by imprisonment for ten years or more. For his conviction of possession of marijuana, fourth offense, Defendant was exposed to a sentence of twenty years to life imprisonment.3 La.R.S. 15:529.1(A)(4)(a).

For a fourth or subsequent felony that would carry less than life imprisonment on a first conviction, Section 15:529.1(A)(1)(c)(i) requires a sentence ranging from the longest first-conviction term, with a minimum of twenty years and a maximum of natural life; the court applied that range to Ballay's theft conviction.

State v. Ballay · filed 2000-02-29(A)(1)(c)(i)

The defendant was originally convicted of theft of goods, which, according to La. R.S. 14:67.10(B)(2), is punishable by a maximum of two years imprisonment. However, based on the sentencing provisions in La.R.S. 15:529.1(A)(1)(c)(i), the defendant faced an enhanced sentencing exposure of twenty years to life imprisonment.

Section 15:529.1(A)(4)(a) requires a fourth or subsequent felony offender, when the new felony carries a first-offense punishment of less than natural life, to receive a determinate sentence at least as long as the longest first-offense term, with a minimum of 20 years and a maximum of natural life.

State of Louisiana v. Lejeune · filed 2024-05-02(A)(4)(a)

Even if the statutes in effect at the time Defendant committed the underlying offense in this case did not require a life sentence, Defendant faced a term not less than the longest prescribed for a first conviction as a fourth offender. See La. R.S. 15:529.1(A)(4)(a).

Section 15:529.1(A)(4) generally requires a fourth or subsequent felony sentence of at least 20 years and no more than life, while specified combinations of qualifying prior and current felonies require life imprisonment; the court applied that range and upheld a 35-year sentence.

State of Louisiana v. Allen · filed 2024-05-22(A)(4)

The applicable version1 of La. R.S. 15:529.1(A)(4) states: ... (a) The person shall be sentenced to imprisonment for the fourth or subsequent felony for a determinate term not less than the longest prescribed for a first conviction but in no event less than twenty years and not more than his natural life; or (b) If the fourth felony and two of the prior felonies are felonies defined as a crime of violence under R.S. 14:2(B), a sex offense as defined in R.S. 15:540 et seq. when the victim is under the age of eighteen at the time of commission of the offense, or as a violation of the Uniform Controlled Dangerous Substances Law punishable by imprisonment for ten years or more, or of any other crime punishable by imprisonment for twelve years or more, or any combination of such crimes, the person shall be imprisoned for the remainder of his natural life, without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence. ... Further, the 35-year sentence does not shock the sense of justice, and the trial court did not abuse its discretion in imposing this sentence on this fifth-felony habitual offender.

When a fourth-felony offender's current felony is a crime of violence but none of the predicate felonies is, both Subparagraphs (A)(4)(a) and (A)(4)(b) apply; Subparagraph (A)(4)(b) requires a twenty-year sentence, so Subparagraph (A)(4)(a) does not authorize a life sentence.

State of Louisiana v. Riggs · filed 2025-02-12(A)(4)(a) and (A)(4)(b)

The instant offense, aggravated flight from an officer (La. R.S. 14:108.1), is a “crime of violence.” La. R.S. 14:2(B)(39). None of the predicate offenses are crimes of violence or sex offenses. Therefore, subparagraph (b), by its terms, applies and dictates a sentence of twenty years while, simultaneously, subparagraph (a) applies and dictates a sentencing range of a minimum of 20 years to a maximum of the remainder of the defendant’s natural life. ... It strikes the court as quite odd that the legislature would (under subparagraph (b)) be more lenient toward a defendant whose instant offense is a crime of violence—i.e., more lenient than toward defendants with no crimes of violence (subparagraph (a)). However, we find no “express legislative intent” that resolves the inconsistency. To render subparagraph (b) inapplicable in this case, it would be necessary for us to, in effect, rewrite that provision of the legislation; moreover, if we did so, Riggs’ sentencing exposure would be severely increased. Such is not the province of the judiciary, with or without supposed “express legislative intent.” Therefore, Riggs’ sentence of life imprisonment is illegal, regardless of whether it is constitutionally prohibited as “cruel or unusual.”

Subsection (A)(1)(c)(ii) requires a fourth felony offender to serve life imprisonment without parole, probation, or suspension when the current or a prior felony falls within specified serious-offense categories.

State v. Baker · filed 2000-11-15(A)(1)(c)(ii)

Based on the foregoing, the trial judge was required to sentence defendant to life imprisonment without benefit of parole, probation or suspension of sentence, because the fourth felony conviction, possession of heroin, is a violation of the Uniform Controlled Dangerous Substances Law punishable by imprisonment for more than five years, and because defendant's conviction of being a convicted felon in possession of a firearm is punishable by imprisonment for more than 12 years.

Section 15:529.1 does not expose a fourth felony offender to a life sentence when none of the prior or current convictions is a crime of violence, involves illegal drugs, or has a sentencing minimum of more than 12 years.

State v. Hanson · filed 2000-12-13

This was incorrect as none of the prior convictions or the current conviction is a crime of violence, involve illegal drugs, or have sentencing minimums of more than 12 years. See: La. R.S. 15:529.1.

Section 15:529.1(A)(1)(c)(ii) requires a fourth or subsequent felony offender to be imprisoned for life without parole, probation, or suspension when the instant or a prior felony is a qualifying crime of violence or other specified felony, subject to a constitutionally required downward deviation only upon clear and convincing evidence.

State v. Calhoun · filed 2000-11-02(A)(1)(c)(ii)

Thus, the mandatory minimum sentence for Defendant's crime was life imprisonment.

For a fourth felony offender, subsection (A)(1)(c)(ii) requires life imprisonment without parole, probation, or suspension of sentence when the fourth or a prior felony is a qualifying controlled-substances offense punishable by more than five years, or another felony punishable by more than twelve years.

State v. Baker · filed 2000-11-15(A)(1)(c)(ii)

Based on the foregoing, the trial judge was required to sentence defendant to life imprisonment without benefit of parole, probation or suspension of sentence, because the fourth felony conviction, possession of heroin, is a violation of the Uniform Controlled Dangerous Substances Law punishable by imprisonment for more than five years, and because defendant's conviction of being a convicted felon in possession of a firearm is punishable by imprisonment for more than 12 years.

Section 15:529.1(A)(1)(c)(ii) requires a fourth felony offender convicted of distribution of cocaine to receive life imprisonment without parole, probation, or suspension of sentence.

State v. Green · filed 2000-11-29(A)(1)(c)(ii)

The appellant's conviction for distribution of cocaine, as a fourth offender, carries a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence. La. R.S. 15:529.1(A)(1)(c)(ii). When the statute provides for a mandatory sentence, it is an exercise in futility for the trial court to enumerate its reasons for sentencing.

For a fourth or subsequent felony that would carry less than life imprisonment on a first conviction, the statute requires a determinate sentence of at least the longest first-conviction term, with a minimum of twenty years and a maximum of natural life.

State v. Jones · filed 2003-06-18A(1)(e)(i)

The person shall be sentenced to imprisonment for the fourth or subsequent felony for a determinate term not less than the longest prescribed for a first conviction but in no event less than twenty years and not more than his natural life.

Section 15:529.1(A)(4)(a) requires a fourth or subsequent felony, when the first-conviction punishment is less than life imprisonment, to receive a sentence of at least twenty years and no more than life imprisonment.

STATE OF LOUISIANA VERSUS HAROLD OZENE A/K/A JAMIE OZENE A/K/A HAROLD J. BOOTE A/K/A HAROLD J. OZENE A/K/A HAROLD BOUTTE · filed 2013-04-10(A)(4)(a)

The state argues that because the defendant is a sixth-felony offender, La.R.S. 15:529.1(A)(4)(a) requires the imposition of a minimum sentence of twenty years. We agree. ... Thus, the minimum incarceration sentence required by La.R.S. 15:529.1(A)(4)(a) in the defendant’s case is twenty years.

Section 15:529.1(A)(1)(c)(ii) requires a fourth-felony offender whose current felony and two prior felonies are punishable by imprisonment for twelve years or more to serve life imprisonment without parole, probation, or suspension of sentence, absent a constitutionally excessive mandatory sentence.

State of Louisiana v. Winters · filed 2013-07-24(A)(1)(c)(ii)

Based on the record before us, we find no extraordinary circumstances to allow the trial court to deviate from the sentencing requirements of La.R.S. 15:529.1; we find that the trial court erred in sentencing the defendant as a third-felony offender; and we find that the proper sentencing provision applicable to the defendant is La.R.S. 15:529.1(A)(1)(c)(ii). Thus, we find merit in the state‟s assertion that the defendant should have been sentenced to life imprisonment at hard labor without the benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence.

For a fourth or subsequent felony, when the current felony and two prior felonies are punishable by imprisonment for twelve years or more, the statute requires life imprisonment without parole, probation, or suspension of sentence.

State v. Winters · filed 2013-07-24(A)(1)(c)(ii)

Clearly, given the defendant’s record, the mandated sentence is life in prison without the benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence. ... We vacate the defendant’s twelve-year sentence and remand the matter to the trial court for resentencing pursuant to La.R.S. 15:529.1(A)(l)(c)(ii).

For a fourth felony offender, the minimum sentence is the longest term prescribed for a first conviction of the underlying felony, but never less than 20 years.

State v. Norah · filed 2013-12-11(A)(4)(a)

In sentencing the defendant, the trial court was required to impose “a definite term not less than the longest prescribed for a first conviction but in no event less than twenty years and not more than his natural life.” La. R.S. 15:529.1 A(4)(a).

For a defendant with the requisite prior convictions, adjudication as a third or fourth felony offender requires a life sentence without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence.

State of Louisiana v. Hamilton · filed 2015-03-04(A)(3)(b), (A)(4)(b)

Although the trial court noted that Defendant would be a “fifth felony offender” if he were adjudicated a habitual offender, La.R.S. 15:529.1 only recognizes up to fourth felony offenders. That distinction, however, is somewhat irrelevant as Defendant would be subject to a life sentence without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence if adjudicated as either a third or fourth felony offender given his prior convictions. See La.R.S. 15:529.1(A)(3)(b) and La.R.S. 15:529.1(A)(4)(b).

For a fourth or subsequent felony habitual offender, subsection (A)(4)(a) requires a minimum determinate sentence of 20 years and permits a maximum sentence of life imprisonment.

State v. Allen · filed 2016-09-28(A)(4)(a)

Significantly, subsection (b) carries a mandatory minimum sentence of life, while subsection (a) carries a mandatory minimum sentence of 20 years and a maximum sentence of life.

Section 15:529.1(A)(4)(b) mandates life imprisonment without parole, probation, or suspension of sentence for a fourth felony offender, but the resulting sentence may be unconstitutionally excessive as applied and require a downward departure.

State v. Johnson · filed 2016-12-21(A)(4)(b)

At the outset, we note that Mr. Johnson was sentenced under a provision of the Habitual Offender Statute that mandates a sentence of life imprisonment without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence as a fourth felony offender. See La. R.S. 15:529.1 A(4)(b). Thus, the sentence imposed on Mr. Johnson is “legal” in the sense that it falls within the statutory range. See State v. Gibson, 16-0132, pp. 8-9 (La.App. 4 Cir. 3/16/16), 192 So.3d 132, 137-38. Despite its legality, however, we And the life-without-parole sentence imposed upon Mr. Johnson unconstitutionally excessive.

Section 15:529.1 imposes enhanced penalties on repeat felony offenders, applies a 10-year cleansing period that may be interrupted before it runs, and mandates life imprisonment when the specified fourth-offender conditions are met.

State of Louisiana v. Billy R. Meadows, Jr. · filed 2020-03-04(A)(4)(b), (C)

La. R.S. 15:529.1 exposes a person who has previously been convicted of a felony to enhanced penalties for any felony committed after the date of the prior felony conviction. ... La. R.S. 15:529.1(A)(4) sets forth the sentence for fourth or subsequent felony offenders when, upon a first conviction, the offense would be punishable by imprisonment for any term less than natural life. Specifically, La. R.S. 15:529.1(A)(4)(b) at the time of Meadows’ conviction stated: ... If the fourth felony and two of the prior felonies are felonies defined as a crime of violence under R.S. 14:2(B), a sex offense as defined in R.S. 15:540 et seq. when the victim is under the age of eighteen at the time of commission of the offense, or as a violation of the Uniform Controlled Dangerous Substances Law punishable by imprisonment for ten years of more, or of any other crime punishable by imprisonment for twelve years or more, or any combination of such crimes, the person shall be imprisoned for the remainder of his natural life, without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence. ... The cleansing period at the time of the commission of the underlying offenses was 10 years. La. R.S. 15:529.1(C). ... Accordingly, the State showed that the 10-year cleansing period was repeatedly interrupted. As such, the district court properly found that Meadows is a fifth-felony offender. ... the district court was correct in sentencing Meadows to the statutorily mandated sentence of life imprisonment without the benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence.

A minute entry showing that the defendant was represented by counsel when pleading guilty, together with a properly executed waiver-of-rights form, is sufficient to prove the validity of the predicate guilty plea for habitual-offender enhancement.

State v. Weaver · filed 2000-11-15

A minute entry showing that the defendant was attended by counsel at the time he pled guilty, along with a properly executed waiver of rights/guilty plea form is sufficient to carry the State's burden under La. R.S. 15:529.1.

Section 15:529.1 requires the prior convictions used for habitual-offender enhancement to have become final before the later felony was committed.

State v. Townley · filed 1993-11-18

We find relator's prior convictions of simple burglary and simple criminal damage to property were not final at the time relator committed the crime of simple escape.

Section 15:529.1 requires independent proof that the defendant is the same person identified in records of the prior conviction; fingerprint evidence unrelated to that conviction does not establish identity.

State v. Payne · filed 1991-09-18

We conclude that, although the state adequately proved the defendant's prior felony conviction for the May 2, 1985 burglary in case number 85-1384, the state did not positively establish that the Andrew Payne in the case before us is the same person as the Andrew Payne convicted in number 85-1384, the predicate case. ... Boling produced no prints taken in connection with case number 85-1384; consequently, they are of no value whatever in proving that the same person was convicted of a felony in the present case and in the one cited in the multiple offender bill of information.

Section 15:529.1 cannot be used to further enhance a penalty when the same prior conviction already enhanced the underlying offense under its own statute.

State v. Harrelson · filed 1991-11-22

Since the penalty for the instant offense, second offense obscenity, was already enhanced due to defendant's prior first offense obscenity conviction, we conclude that the state cannot now attempt to further enhance the penalty by using the first offense obscenity offense conviction as a predicate offense under La.R.S. 15:529.1 to adjudicate defendant as a third felony offender.

Section 15:529.1(D)(1)-(2) requires that a defendant be advised of the habitual-offender allegations and rights, and that the prior felony be properly proved and adjudicated before a second-offender sentence is imposed.

State v. Melancon · filed 1992-03-11(D)(1)-(2)

After a careful reading of the record, we cannot find where the defendant was advised of his rights and pled guilty to a conviction of a prior felony nor where proper evidence was admitted to prove that defendant had a prior felony conviction. Therefore, defendant’s conviction is affirmed but his sentence as a second felony offender must be considered illegal and vacated, and this matter remanded for a sentencing hearing in compliance with La. R.S. 15:529.1 D(l) and (2).

Section 15:529.1 does not support a habitual-offender adjudication or enhanced sentence when the prior felony conviction used as the predicate has been vacated.

State v. Petty · filed 1992-03-26

Because defendant’s habitual offender adjudication is predicated on a prior felony conviction which has been vacated, the habitual offender adjudication and enhanced sentence given under La.R.S. 15:529.1 must be vacated.

At a formal multiple-bill hearing where the defendant is adjudicated a multiple offender rather than pleading guilty, § 15:529.1 does not require advising him of the right to remain silent before accepting an identity stipulation.

State v. Wright · filed 1992-04-30(D)

The defendant in this case was given a formal hearing where the State presented evidence of defendant's earlier convictions. Although defense counsel stipulated to the identification of defendant on these prior convictions without the necessity of the State producing a fingerprint expert to verify that defendant's fingerprints matched those on the earlier convictions, we find that in this instance the statutory requirements of LSA-R.S. 15:529.1 do not mandate the advisement of defendant's right to remain silent. The defendant, unlike Martin or Desmond, did not plead guilty to the multiple bill, but was rather adjudicated by the trial court as a multiple offender.

Section 15:529.1(C) bars habitual-offender enhancement when the State fails to prove that the five-year cleansing period has not expired.

State v. Tatten · filed 1992-04-30(C)

The State did not prove the date of Tatten’s discharge from prison to show that five years had not elapsed, and as a consequence, the State has failed to meet its burden of proof.

When multiple convictions are entered on the same date for offenses arising from one criminal episode, they count as only one conviction for habitual-offender sentencing.

State v. Guillory · filed 1992-05-12

Because convictions on more than one count entered on the same date for offenses arising out of one criminal episode, should be treated as only one conviction when applying the habitual offender law, the trial judge erred in sentencing the defendant as a multiple offender on all three counts.

Section 15:529.1 does not give a trial court discretion to find that a defendant is not a habitual offender when the State has met its burden of establishing that status.

State v. Franklin · filed 1992-05-12

Nor does a trial court have the “discretion” to find a that a defendant is not a habitual offender unless the State fails to meet its burden of establishing that status pursuant to La.R.S. 15:529.1.

Section 15:529.1(1)(A) requires prior convictions to have the proper sequencing before they may constitute more than one offense for a multiple-offender adjudication.

State ex rel. Mallett v. State · filed 1992-09-04(1)(A)

As alleged in the multiple bill, relator’s convictions in 1981 and 1982 for crimes committed in 1980 lacked the proper sequencing to constitute more than one offense for purposes of La.R.S. 15:529.-1(1)(A).

For habitual-offender adjudication, multiple convictions entered on the same date lack the sequencing required to count as more than one offense under § 15:529.1.

State v. Nevers · filed 1993-01-20(A)(1)

Nevertheless, since these three convictions were entered on the same date, they lacked the proper sequencing to constitute more than one offense for purposes of La.R.S. 15:529.1. See State ex rel. Mims v. Butler, 601 So.2d 649 (La.1992) (on rehearing). Therefore, we conclude that the trial court incorrectly adjudicated the defendant to be a fourth felony habitual offender. Accordingly, the instant habitual offender adjudication and sentence are vacated, and the case is remanded with instructions that the trial court enter a judgment adjudicating the defendant to be a second felony habitual offender. Thereafter, the trial court shall resentence the defendant in accordance with LA.R.S. 15:529.1(A)(1).

Section 15:529.1 permits a prior guilty plea to support second-offender sentencing when the record sufficiently proves that the defendant knowingly and voluntarily waived his constitutional rights.

State v. Robair · filed 1993-07-27

The fact that the defendant was represented by counsel at the time he pleaded guilty, that he signed a plea form on which his rights were specified, and that the rights were delineated on the minute entry are evidence that he voluntarily waived his constitutional rights when he pleaded guilty to the predicate offense.

Section 15:529.1(F) requires the State to prove by competent evidence the existence of each alleged prior felony conviction and that the defendant is the person convicted; for guilty-plea predicates, it must also prove the plea and representation by counsel.

State v. Windham · filed 1998-05-27(F)

To prove that a defendant is a multiple offender, the state need only establish by competent evidence, that there is a prior felony conviction and that the defendant is the same person who was convicted of the prior felony. ... Here, the state alleged that the defendant had three prior convictions, each obtained by a plea of guilty. Thus, the state had to prove, at a minium, the existence of each guilty plea and that defendant was represented by counsel at the time of each plea.

A person previously convicted of a felony is subject to multiple-offender punishment under the statute upon committing a subsequent felony in Louisiana.

State of Louisiana v. Savoy · filed 2012-10-03

Anyone who has been convicted of a felony “shall be punished” as a multiple offender when he commits a subsequent felony in Louisiana. La.R.S. 15:529.1. The State was justified by statute in charging Defendant as a multiple offender, relying on its long list of prior felony convictions.

A trial court may depart below the minimum sentence required by § 15:529.1 when its stated reasons support finding that the mandatory sentence would be constitutionally excessive.

State v. Hodges · filed 1995-03-01

Although Dorthey provides no guidance for this court to ascertain how specific a trial court must be when stating for the record the reasons for the imposition of a sentence less than the minimum provided by La.R.S. 15:529.1, the reasons given by the trial judge in this case were sufficient to support his downward departure from the sentencing guidelines and the provisions of La.R.S. 15:529.1.

Section 15:529.1(A)(1) sets a second felony habitual offender’s sentence for attempted first-degree robbery at ten to forty years without parole, probation, or suspension.

State v. Southall · filed 1995-03-03

The penalty for a defendant who has been convicted of attempted first degree robbery who is béing sentenced as a second felony habitual offender is imprisonment at hard labor for not less than ten years and not more than forty years, without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence.

When imposing a multiple-offender sentence, § 15:529.1(D) requires vacating the prior sentence and deducting time served, while subsection (G) bars probation and suspension of sentence but does not bar parole.

State v. Dearmas · filed 1992-09-29D and G

La.R.S. 15:529.1 D provides that when sentencing the defendant as a multiple offender the court "shall vacate the previous sentence if already imposed, deducting from the new sentence the time actually served under the sentence so vacated." Where the original sentence on the underlying offense has not been vacated at the time of the sentencing the defendant as a multiple offender, the original sentence remains in effect and the subsequent sentence as a multiple offender is null and void. See State v. Hingle, 242 La. 844, 139 So.2d 205 (1961). Furthermore, the transcript, unlike the minute entry and commitment, reveals that the trial court ordered the sentence to be served without the benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence; however, La.R.S. 15:529.1 G states that a sentence thereunder shall be without benefit of probation or suspension of sentence. No provision is made for denial of parole. Therefore, the defendant's sentence as a multiple offender should not have prohibited parole.

Section 15:529.1 requires the court to advise a defendant of the right to a hearing, proof by the State, and silence before an admission of prior felony convictions, and permits enhanced-offender status only when later crimes follow earlier convictions.

State v. Deal · filed 1992-10-06(D), (A)

Under the statute, before the defendant chooses to acknowledge or confess in open court that he has been previously convicted of a felony, he must first be advised of his rights by the court. La.R.S. 15:529.1(D); State v. Johnson, 432 So.2d 815 (La.1983). Specifically, defendant must be advised by the court of his right to a formal hearing and to have the state prove its case. State v. Johnson, supra. Further, this section implicitly provides that the defendant must be advised by the court of his statutory right to remain silent. State v. Johnson, supra. ... In the second error patent, we find that the court erred when it found defendant to be a third felony offender, instead of a second felony offender. However, subsequent to the trial court's opinion, the Supreme Court, in State ex rel. Mims v. Butler, 601 So.2d 649 (La.1992), held that La.R.S. 15:529.1(A) sets forth a sequential requirement for enhanced penalties in the sentencing of multiple offenders. "The cornerstone of that scheme is that felons graduate to second offender status, not by committing multiple crimes, but by committing a crime or crimes after having been convicted." The sequence necessary for enhancement of a sentence under the Habitual Offender Law is commission of a crime, or crimes, followed by conviction (equals a first offender), then commission of another crime, or crimes, followed by conviction (equals a second offender), and so forth. ... In the instant case, defendant was adjudged a third felony offender for having committed two prior felonies. These felonies were separate crimes, committed on separate dates. However, defendant was convicted (pled guilty) of both of these prior felonies on the same date, November 12, 1990. Defendant can only be a second felony offender, according to the language in the rehearing opinion in Mims. Therefore, defendant's sentence for distribution of cocaine in docket number 229,803 should be set aside and the case remanded to the district court for sentencing in compliance with La.R.S. 15:529.1 and La.C.Cr.P. art. 894.1.

Section 15:529.1 sets a 33-year hard-labor mandatory minimum for a multiple offender convicted of armed robbery, with the sentence served without benefit of parole.

State Ex Rel. Davis v. Waldron · filed 1992-10-09

This case is remanded to the district court for correction of relator's sentence of 33 years at hard labor, the mandatory minimum penalty that any court could impose on a multiple offender convicted of armed robbery and sentenced under La.R.S. 15:529.1, to reflect that the sentence will run without benefit of parole.

Section 15:529.1 imposes a 33-year mandatory minimum sentence on a multiple offender convicted of armed robbery, and the sentence must be served without benefit of parole.

State ex rel. Dright v. State · filed 1992-10-09

This case is remanded to the district court for correction of relator’s sentence of 33 years at hard labor, the mandatory minimum penalty that any court could impose on a multiple offender convicted of *1107armed robbery and sentences under the provisions of La.R.S. 15:529.1, to reflect that the sentence will run without benefit of parole.

Section 15:529.1 requires the mandatory minimum term for a multiple offender convicted of armed robbery and leaves the district court no discretion to impose a lesser term.

State ex rel. Bienemy v. Whitley · filed 1992-10-09

The sentence imposed in 1975 represented the mandatory minimum term *1113of years for a multiple offender convicted of armed robbery and sentenced under La. R.S. 15:529.1. The district court has no discretion to impose a lesser term of years and the court’s correction of its sentence to reflect the requirement of law that the penalty run without benefit of parole, probation or suspension of sentence does not give rise to a presumption of vindictiveness under North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 89 S.Ct. 2072, 23 L.Ed.2d 656 (1969).

When a multiple offender convicted of armed robbery is sentenced under § 15:529.1, 33 years at hard labor is the mandatory minimum sentence, and the sentence must run without benefit of parole.

State ex rel. Johnson v. Whitley · filed 1992-12-21

This case is remanded to the district court for correction of relator’s sentence of 33 years at hard labor, the mandatory minimum penalty that any court could impose on a multiple offender convicted of armed robbery and sentenced under La.R.S. 15:529.1, to reflect that the sentence will run without benefit of parole.

For a qualifying third felony, the Habitual Offender Law mandates life imprisonment without parole, probation, or suspension of sentence when the current or either prior felony meets the statute’s specified offense or punishment criteria.

State v. Hollins · filed 1999-08-31(A)(1)(b)(ii)

La.R.S. 15:529.1(A)(1)(b)(ii) sets out the sentencing requirements of third felony offenders, as follows: If the third felony or either of the two prior felonies is a felony defined as a crime of violence under R.S. 14:2(13) or as a violation of the Uniform Controlled Dangerous Substances Law punishable by imprisonment for more than five years or of any other crime punishable by imprisonment for more than twelve years, the person shall be imprisoned for the remainder of his natural life, without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence. Defendant was convicted of a violation of La.R.S. 40:967(A), which is punishable by a term of imprisonment at hard labor for not less than five years, nor more than thirty years. Accordingly, the trial court was mandated to sentence the defendant to life imprisonment at hard labor without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence. La. R.S. 15:529.1(A)(1)(c)(ii).

Subsection (A)(1)(c)(i) sets a fourth felony offender's enhanced sentencing exposure at 20 years to life when the underlying felony is punishable by less than natural life.

State v. Woods · filed 2010-03-09(A)(l)(c)(i)

Because the underlying conviction of attempted simple burglary was punishable by a term of imprisonment less than the Defendant’s natural life, pursuant to La. R.S. 15:529.1(A)(l)(c)(i), the Defendant’s enhanced sentencing exposure was twenty years to life imprisonment.

Section 15:529.1(G) requires a sentence imposed under the multiple-offender statute to include no benefit of probation or suspension of sentence, and those restrictions apply even when the sentencing court does not expressly state them.

State v. Kennedy · filed 2011-08-10(G)

Furthermore, La. R.S. 15:529.1(G) states that any sentence imposed under the multiple offender statute shall be imposed without benefit of probation or suspension of sentence. Under La. R.S. 15:301.1(A) and State v. Williams, 2000-1725 (La.11/28/01), 800 So.2d 790, the sentence is deemed to have been imposed with these restrictions of benefits, even in the absence of the trial court’s failure to delineate them. Thus, there is no need for this Court to correct the sentences.

Section 15:529.1(G) requires a third-offender sentence to be served without the benefit of probation or suspension of sentence, but the omission of that language does not invalidate the sentence because the restriction self-activates under § 15:301.1(A).

State v. Young · filed 2019-05-01(G)

Our review for errors patent on the face of the record reveals one. In sentencing Defendant as a third offender, the district court failed to stipulate that the sentence be served without the benefit of probation or suspension of sentence in accordance with La. R.S. 15:529.1(G). However, La. R.S. 15:301.1(A) provides, in pertinent part: "[t]he failure of a sentencing court to specifically state that all or a portion of the sentence is to be served without benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence shall not in any way affect the statutory requirement" that those restrictions apply. Our jurisprudence recognizes that "this paragraph self-activates the correction and eliminates the need to remand for a ministerial correction of an illegally lenient sentence which may result from the failure of the sentencing court to impose punishment in conformity with that provided in the statute." State v. Williams , 00-1725, p. 10 (La. 11/28/01), 800 So.2d 790, 799 ; State v. Dowell , 16-0371, pp. 4-5 (La.App. 4 Cir. 8/10/16), 198 So.3d 243, 246.

Section 15:529.1(G) requires habitual offender sentences to be served at hard labor without probation or suspension of sentence.

State v. Griffin · filed 2015-09-16(G)

When resen-tencing defendant ás a third-felony habitual offender, the district court left out the restriction that the sentence be served without probation in addition to the restrictions that it be served without benefit of parole or suspension of sentence. See La. R.S. 15:529.1 G (providing that "[a]ny sentence imposed under the provision of this Section shall be at hard labor without benefit of probation or suspension of sentence”); see also State v. Sterling, 11-1837 (La.3/9/12), 84 So.3d 557 (providing that sentencing restrictions imposed on habitual offenders are those stipulated for the present felony as well as those in the applicable portions of the Habitual Offender Law, La. R.S. 15:529.1).

Section 15:529.1 does not require a sentence imposed under it to be served without parole or good-time credits.

State v. Henderson · filed 1992-10-15

A review of the record for errors patent reveals that neither La.R.S. 14:62 or La.R.S. 15:529.1, the two statutes under which defendant was sentenced, requires that the sentence be served without the benefit of parole. The defendant's eligibility for parole should be left to the determination of the Department of Corrections in accordance with La.R.S. 15:574.4. ... Furthermore, neither statute under which defendant was sentenced provides for the denial of good time, although as a multiple offender the defendant may be ineligible under La.R.S. 15:571.3.

For third-offender sentencing under § 15:529.1(A)(2)(b), qualifying out-of-state felonies are evaluated using the maximum penalties under the foreign state's law, and the statute mandates life imprisonment without benefits when its conditions are met.

State v. Carouthers · filed 1992-11-04(A)(2)(b)

It is our opinion that the trial judge properly considered the Texas penalty provisions for the defendant's two prior convictions in sentencing him under La.R.S. 15:529.1A(2)(b). ... The trial court was statutorily mandated to sentence the defendant to serve life imprisonment without benefit of parole, probation or suspension of sentence under La.R.S. 15:529.1A(2)(b).

Section 15:529.1 imposes enhanced penalties on repeat offenders, confines the sentence to the statutory range, and leaves the decision to seek habitual-offender treatment to the district attorney.

State v. Carter · filed 1992-11-20

Defendant was convicted of first degree robbery and sentenced as a second felony habitual offender. Thus, the minimum sentence the court could impose was twenty years at hard labor without benefit of parole, probation or suspension of sentence. The maximum possible sentence was eighty years at hard labor without benefit of parole, probation or suspension of sentence. See La.R.S. 14:64.1(B) & 15:529.1(A)(1). The trial court’s imposition of the minimum sentence complies with the statutory requirements. ... The Habitual Offender Law (La.R.S. 15:529.1) provides enhanced penalties for multiple offenders based on repetition of criminal conduct. ... Furthermore, “the discretion to charge a defendant under the Habitual Offender Law lies with the district attorney and no one else.” ... Accordingly, we find defendant’s argument is not supported by the case law.

Section 15:529.1(C) permits prior felonies to support habitual-offender status when the five-year cleansing period has not expired, which can be shown by prison and discharge-date records.

State v. Wilkinson · filed 1992-12-23(C)

Finally, the pen pack (State Exhibit 2) was prima facie evidence of the defendant's imprisonment and discharge dates. This pen pack clearly established that the five year cleansing period provided in La.R.S. 15:529.1(C) had not expired at the time of the instant armed robbery conviction.

Under subsection (D), failure of the record to show that a defendant was advised of the right to remain silent at arraignment on a multiple bill does not require reversal when the defendant exercised that right and suffered no adverse effect.

State v. Miles · filed 1993-02-03(D)

A review of the record of defendant's multiple offender proceeding for patent error fails to reflect whether defendant was advised of his right to remain silent at his arraignment on the multiple bill. La. R.S. 15:529.1(D); State v. Gilbert, 520 So.2d 1184 (La.App. 5 Cir.1988). However, the defendant did, in fact, exercise this right and did not testify. Therefore, he has suffered no adverse effects to his substantial rights sufficient to warrant reversal. La.C.Cr.P. art. 921; State v. McDonald, 562 So.2d 25 (La.App. 5 Cir.1990).

Section 15:529.1(D)(1) requires the court to advise a defendant of the right to remain silent before requiring an admission to the habitual-offender allegations.

State v. Perry · filed 1995-05-31(D)(1)

Based on the foregoing, we find the trial court was required to advise the defendant of his right to remain silent prior to the defendant’s admission of the allegations contained in the habitual offender bill and that it failed to do so.

Section 15:529.1 makes a 33-year hard-labor sentence the mandatory minimum for a multiple offender convicted of armed robbery, and the sentence must run without benefit of parole.

State ex rel. Neyland v. State · filed 1993-02-19

This case is remanded to the district court for correction of relator’s sentence of 33 years at hard labor, the mandatory minimum penalty that any court could impose on a multiple offender convicted of armed robbery and sentenced under La. R.S. 15:529.1, to reflect that the sentence will run without benefit of parole.

For a defendant adjudicated a third felony offender in this case, § 15:529.1, applied with § 40:967, made twenty years at hard labor the minimum sentence.

State v. Johnson · filed 1995-08-23

A review of the record for errors patent reveals that the trial court imposed an illegally lenient sentence after adjudicating DiBartolo a third felony offender under the Habitual Offender Statute. ... Under La.R.S. 15:529.1 and La.R.S. 40:967, the minimum sentence the trial court could impose was twenty years at hard labor.

For a prior conviction from another jurisdiction to trigger the mandatory-life provision, Louisiana law determines whether the analogous conduct would constitute a felony punishable by more than twelve years at hard labor.

State v. Carouthers · filed 1993-05-24A(2)(b)

Given the severe sanction of a mandatory life term at hard labor without benefit of parole, probation or suspension of sentence, strict construction of R.S. 15:529.1 A(2)(b) dictates a similar rule that the state may not use a prior conviction from a foreign jurisdiction unless the analogous conduct under Louisiana law would constitute a felony punishable by a sentence of more than twelve years at hard labor.

Section 15:529.1 requires a habitual-offender bill to be filed within a reasonable time after the prosecutor learns of the defendant’s felony record, and it does not violate separation of powers or due process merely because the district attorney has charging discretion.

State v. Williams · filed 1993-06-15

The Habitual Offender Law (La.R.S. 15:529.1) does not specify a time limit to file a bill of information; however, it must be filed within a "reasonable time" after the prosecutor learns of the defendant's felony record. ... Based on Thornton a five-month delay is not unreasonable. ... La.R.S. 15:529.1 can and should be interpreted to uphold its constitutionality. ... The Habitual Offender Law does not violate the separation of powers doctrine in the Louisiana Constitution. ... The defendant's claim that the multiple bill statute violates due process is based on the arbitrary nature of the district attorney's discretion. This argument has been consistently rejected.

Section 15:529.1 permits a multiple-offender adjudication for only one of multiple convictions entered on the same day for crimes arising from a single criminal episode.

State ex rel. Tucker v. State · filed 1993-11-05

Having been convicted on the same day and of crimes arising from a single criminal episode, relator was exposed to a multiple offender adjudication on only one of his two convictions in this case. ... This case is remanded to the district court, which is to vacate one of the two sentences subject to La.R.S. 15:529.1 and resentence relator.

Section 15:529.1(D) requires a compliant habitual-offender resentencing hearing when the prior-offender adjudication cannot support the sentence because the required rights advisement or identification proof is lacking.

State v. Jones · filed 1994-02-02(D)

In the instant case, the trial judge did not advise defendant of his rights at the habitual offender hearing prior to defendant’s admission to a previous felony conviction. Therefore, his admission cannot be used against him. ... Based on the principles enunciated in the cited jurisprudence, we find the State failed to meet its burden of proof in this instance. Accordingly, the case must be remanded for another sentencing hearing. ... This matter is remanded for a sentencing hearing in compliance with La.R.S. 15:529.1 D.

Section 15:529.1 allows a trial court to impose less than the statutory minimum when the minimum sentence would be constitutionally excessive as applied to the defendant, if the court gives sufficient reasons.

State v. Littleton · filed 1994-03-29

There is no doubt that the trial court could impose a lesser sentence than the minimum under La.R.S. 15:529.1. Although Dorthey gives almost no guidance as to how detailed a trial court must be when giving reasons for the imposition of less than the minimum sentence under La.R.S. 15:529.1, the record supports a finding that the reasons given by the trial court were sufficient to support its decision to do so.

Section 15:529.1's mandatory minimum penalties are facially constitutional, but a district court may reduce a mandatory minimum when it would be constitutionally excessive as applied to the particular offense and offender.

State v. Pollard · filed 1994-10-20

The penalties provided by La.R.S. 15:529.1 are not unconstitutional on their face, State v. Lee, 364 So.2d 1024 (La.1978), and do not provide grounds for quashing a multiple bill. The district court does have the authority, however, to reduce any of the mandatory minimum sentences provided by the multiple offender statute for a particular offense and offender status when such terms would violate the defendant's constitutional protection against excessive punishment. La. Const.1974, Art. I, § 20; State v. Dorthey, 623 So.2d at 1280-81.

The five-year cleansing period is measured between successive predicate convictions; more than five years between an older conviction and the current offense does not by itself eliminate that predicate when the intervening cleansing periods have not elapsed.

State v. Barber · filed 1995-04-10(C)

Therefore, as noted in Gaines and Richardson, although the defendant’s discharge on the older predicate felony convictions occurred more than five years before his commission of the instant offense, because the individual five-year cleansing periods between each of the predicate convictions did not elapse, it does not matter that a total of more than five years elapsed between the older predicate felony convictions and the commission of the instant offense.

Section 15:529.1 requires the state to prove that predicate felony convictions fall within the applicable five-year cleansing period, including evidence of the date of discharge from the prior sentence.

State v. Ellis · filed 1995-05-30

To prove that a defendant is a multiple offender, the state must establish, by competent evidence, the prior felony convictions and that the defendant is the same person who was convicted of the prior felonies. ... The state bears the additional burden of showing that the predicate convictions fall within the five year cleansing period. Evidence of the date of discharge for the prior sentence is therefore an essential element of the habitual offender case.

A conviction for simple escape may be used to enhance a sentence under the habitual-offender statute, without constituting multiple enhancement.

State v. Townley · filed 1995-05-03

Thus, the court in Harrelson concluded that the conviction of simple escape could be used to apply the provisions of La.R.S. 15:529.1. We agree that the rationale of Cox is no longer applicable to a conviction for simple escape and the use of the habitual offender statute does not amount to a multiple enhancement of the penalty as contemplated in Cox.

Section 15:529.1 allows only one same-day conviction to support sentence enhancement across multiple counts and requires the enhanced sentence to be without probation or suspension, although substantial compliance with that directive may suffice.

State v. Brown · filed 1995-05-30(A)(1)(c)(i), (G)

Only one count of a multi-count indictment/information can be used to enhance the penalty pursuant to La.R.S. 15:529.1 when the convictions were entered on the same day. ... Furthermore, because two of the counts arose from a single criminal episode, the defendant could not have been sentenced as a multiple offender on all counts. ... Convictions on more than one count entered on the same date should be treated as one conviction for purposes of the habitual offender statute. Id. Therefore, the enhanced sentence imposed must be vacated and the case remanded to the trial court for resentencing. ... The second patent error is that the trial judge failed to specify that the sentence imposed pursuant to the multiple offender bill of information was without benefit of probation or suspension of sentence, as required by La.R.S. 15:529.1(G). However, because the trial court did not suspend any portion of the sentence or impose any probationary period, there was substantial compliance with the statutory sentencing directive, making this error harmless.

Section 15:529.1 may be used to enhance a simple-escape sentence when the prior felony conviction is not an element of simple escape; doing so does not constitute double jeopardy or double enhancement.

State v. Hatter · filed 1995-06-07

The simple escape statute1 requires proof of lawful confinement; it does not require proof of any conviction and certainly not of a felony conviction. The multiple bill conviction based on the predicate offense of simple escape does not violate the prohibition against double jeopardy and double enhancement.

The Habitual Offender Law permits a court to reduce a mandated sentence when applying it in a particular case would make the punishment constitutionally excessive.

State v. Legaux · filed 1995-06-29

The trial judge retains the right to determine if a particular punishment mandated by the habitual offender law (La.R.S. 15:529.1) is constitutionally excessive as it pertains to a particular case, and to reduce the sentence to the maximum sentence which would not be constitutionally excessive.

Section 15:529.1's minimum sentence is presumed constitutional, and a trial court may depart below it only when the minimum would be a purposeless and needless infliction of pain and suffering.

State v. Hyorth · filed 1995-09-15

The trial court has discretion to find that the multiple bill minimum sentence is grossly out of proportion to the severity of the crime and is constitutionally excessive as to a particular defendant. State v. Dorthey, 623 So.2d 1276 (La.1993). However, as noted in Justice Marcus's concurrence, the minimum sentence in the multiple offender statute should be presumed constitutional; the trial court should not deviate from the statutory minimum sentences unless it is clearly nothing more than a purposeless and needless infliction of pain and suffering. Dorthey at 1281. ... The trial court clearly abused its discretion by sentencing the defendant below the minimum under LSA-R.S. 15:529.1.

Section 15:529.1 permits departure from its mandatory minimum sentence only when the trial judge finds that the sentence is constitutionally excessive under the applicable standards.

State v. Webster · filed 1996-02-02

However, in order to find the punishment mandated by La.R.S. 15:529.1 excessive, the trial judge must find that the sentence makes no measurable contribution to the acceptable goals of punishment or that the sentence amounts to nothing more than the purposeful imposition of pain and suffering *655 and is grossly out of proportion to the severity of the crime.

Section 15:529.1 requires the statutory minimum sentence for a fourth felony offender, but a trial court may depart from that minimum only upon a sufficient showing that it is constitutionally excessive and must justify the reduced sentence.

State v. Gordon · filed 1996-05-10

However, in order to find the punishment mandated by La.R.S. 15:529.1 excessive, the trial judge must find that the sentence makes no measurable contribution to the acceptable goals of punishment or that the sentence amounts to nothing more than the purposeful imposition of pain and suffering and is grossly out of proportion to the severity of the crime. ... Although the trial judge cited Dorthey in his reasons, it does not appear that he made a sufficient showing on the record to say that imposition of the statutorily mandated minimum sentence would be constitutionally excessive under these facts. Moreover, even assuming the statutorily mandated minimum sentence was excessive under these facts, the trial judge failed to justify his reduction of the sentence down to forty months. Accordingly, the judgment of the court of appeal is vacated and the case remanded to the trial court to justify its deviation from the statutorily-mandated minimum sentence in this case.

Section 15:529.1 requires a twenty-year minimum sentence for this third felony offender unless a constitutionally justified departure is supported by a meaningful assessment of mitigating or aggravating circumstances.

State v. Eggerson · filed 1995-09-15

Under La.R.S. 40:967(F) and La.R.S. 15:529.1 the mandatory minimum sentence is twenty years at hard labor. ... The trial judges's conclusory statement does not qualify as the type of searching inquiry necessary to justify declaring a legislatively mandated sentence unconstitutional under La. Const. art. I, Sec. 20. Accordingly, for the above reason, the ten year sentence imposed by the trial judge is vacated. The case is remanded to the trial court for resentencing in conformity with La.R.S. 15:529.1.

Section 15:529.1's mandatory minimum is presumed constitutional, and a trial court may depart below it only on substantial evidence showing that applying it to the particular defendant would be constitutionally excessive.

State v. Young · filed 1995-10-26

One of the basic principles universally applied by courts in testing constitutionality is the presumption of constitutionality. In the application of this principle a trial court considering whether the minimum sentence prescribed by the legislature for the particular crime committed by a defendant would be unconstitutional if applied to a particular defendant may do so only if there is substantial evidence to rebut the presumption of constitutionality. The trial court may not depart from the legislaturely mandated minimum simply because of some subjective impression or feeling about the defendant.

Section 15:529.1 permits a court to sentence below its mandatory minimum when imposing that minimum would be constitutionally excessive, but requires an express, fact-supported assessment justifying the departure.

State v. Alexis · filed 1996-05-22

The trial court must provide adequate support for its decision to impose a sentence which is less than the statutory minimum. It must make a meaningful assessment sufficient to justify a sentence below the mandatory minimum of La. R.S. 15:529.1.

Section 15:529.1 requires a meaningful, fact-supported justification before a court may sentence below its mandatory minimum on constitutional-excessiveness grounds.

State v. Neusham · filed 1996-05-29

The trial court must provide adequate support for its decision to impose a sentence which is less than the statutory minimum. It must make a meaningful assessment sufficient to justify a sentence below the mandatory minimum of La.R.S. 15:529.1, 1996 State v. Morgan, 96-0354 (La.App. 4 Cir. 4/17/96), 673 So.2d 256.

Section 15:529.1 permits a sentence below its mandatory minimum only when the court makes a meaningful, factually supported assessment that the mandated sentence would be constitutionally excessive.

State v. Randleston · filed 1996-05-29

It is clear that the trial court may not merely reiterate the language in Dorthey. Conclusory statements tracking the often-quoted clauses defining constitutional exces-siveness are not sufficient. The trial court must provide adequate support for any sentence which is less than the statutory minimum. The court must make a meaningful assessment sufficient to justify a sentence below the mandatory minimum of La.R.S. 15:529.1.

Section 15:529.1(D) requires the sentencing court to advise a defendant, before accepting a guilty plea to a multiple bill, of the right to a formal hearing and the constitutional right to remain silent.

State v. Williams · filed 1995-11-03(D)

The jurisprudence clearly recognizes that this section of the multiple offender statute requires that before allowing a defendant to plead guilty to a multiple bill, the sentencing court must advise the defendant of his right to a "formal hearing" at which the state must prove its case for the multiple offender status. Implicit in this requirement is the additional requirement that the defendant be advised of his constitutional right to remain silent.

Section 15:529.1D(1)(a) requires the court to advise a defendant of the multiple-offender allegations and the right to contest their truth, and to require the defendant to state whether the allegations are true.

State v. Cummings · filed 1996-02-28(D)(1)(a)

However, we find the court of appeal correctly vacated the trial court's multiple offender adjudication and sentence. La.R.S. 15:529.1D(1)(a) provides that after the district attorney files a multiple offender bill against a defendant, the court "shall inform him of the allegation contained in the information and of his right to be tried as to the truth thereof according to law and shall require the offender to say whether the allegations are true." In the present case, the transcript indicates that although defendant withdrew his plea of not guilty and admitted to being a second offender, the trial judge never advised him of the allegations in the bill and his right to be tried as to the truth of the allegations. Defendant did not admit that the allegations of the bill were true, nor did the state establish defendant's multiple offender status by competent evidence. Accordingly, defendant's multiple offender adjudication and sentence must be vacated, and the case remanded for a new sentencing hearing. On remand, no new multiple bill need be filed. Defendant may be adjudicated and sentenced as a second felony offender upon proper compliance with La.R.S. 15:529.1.

Section 15:529.1(D) requires the court to advise a defendant of the right to a formal hearing, the state's burden to prove the habitual-offender allegations, and the right to remain silent before accepting the defendant's admission to a multiple-offender bill.

State v. Brown · filed 1995-11-15(D)

This section of the statute clearly recognizes that the defendant, if he chooses, has the right to remain silent. Once the defendant chooses to remain silent the state must then by competent evidence prove the elements of R.S. 15:529.1 before the defendant can be sentenced as an habitual offender. Before the defendant chooses to acknowledge or confess in open court that he has been previously convicted of a felony, the statute requires that he first be cautioned by the trial court as to his rights. R.S. 15:529.1(D) specifically provides that defendant be advised by the court of his right to a "formal hearing" and to have the state prove its case. State v. Martin, 427 So.2d 1182 (La.1983). Further, this section implicitly provides that the defendant should be advised, by the court, of his statutory right to remain silent.

Section 15:529.1 requires the mandatory habitual-offender sentence unless the trial judge finds that it is constitutionally excessive under the strict standard described by the court.

State v. Lombard · filed 1995-11-27

However, in order to find the punishment mandated by La.R.S. 15:529.1 excessive, the trial judge must find that the sentence makes no measurable contribution to the acceptable goals of punishment or that the sentence amounts to nothing more than the purposeful imposition of pain and suffering and is grossly out of proportion to the severity of the crime.

Section 15:529.1's mandatory sentence may be reduced when the trial judge finds that imposing it would be constitutionally excessive under the stated standards.

State v. Hamilton · filed 1996-02-02

However, in order to find the punishment mandated by La.R.S. 15:529.1 excessive, the trial judge must find that the sentence makes no measurable contribution to the acceptable goals of punishment or that the sentence amounts to nothing more than the purposeful imposition of pain and suffering and is grossly out of proportion to the severity of the crime.

Section 15:529.1's mandatory sentence may be reduced only when the trial court finds, under the governing constitutional standard, that the sentence is excessive.

State v. Kelly · filed 1996-02-02

However, in order to find the punishment mandated by La.R.S. 15:529.1 excessive, the trial judge must find that the sentence makes no measurable contribution to the acceptable goals of punishment or that the sentence amounts to nothing more than the purposeful imposition of pain and suffering and is grossly out of proportion to the severity of the crime.

Section 15:529.1's mandatory minimum may be reduced only when the trial judge makes the required constitutional-excessiveness finding and adequately justifies the deviation.

State v. Johnson · filed 1996-06-28

However, in order to find the punishment mandated by La.R.S. 15:529.1 excessive, the trial judge must find that the sentence makes no measurable contribution to the acceptable goals of punishment or that the sentence amounts to nothing more than the purposeful imposition of pain and suffering and is grossly out of proportion to the severity of the crime.

Section 15:529.1's mandatory sentence may be reduced only when the trial judge finds that imposing it would be constitutionally excessive under the stated criteria.

State v. Wilson · filed 1996-10-04

However, in order to find the punishment mandated by La.R.S. 15:529.1 excessive, the trial judge must find that the sentence makes no measurable contribution to the acceptable goals of punishment or that the sentence amounts to nothing more than the purposeful imposition of pain and suffering and is grossly out of proportion to the severity of the crime.

Section 15:529.1's mandatory sentence may be reduced for constitutional excessiveness only when the trial judge finds that it serves no measurable sentencing purpose or is merely purposeless pain and suffering and grossly disproportionate to the offense.

State v. Randleston · filed 1996-10-04

However, in order to find the punishment mandated by La.R.S. 15:529.1 excessive, the trial judge must find that the sentence makes no measurable contribution to the acceptable goals of punishment or that the sentence amounts to nothing more than the purposeful imposition of pain and suffering and is grossly out of proportion to the severity of the crime. ... Although the trial judge cited Dorthey in his reasons, it does not appear that he made a proper finding that imposition of the statutorily-mandated sentence would be constitutionally excessive.

Section 15:529.1's mandatory minimum may be reduced when, as applied to the particular defendant, it would be constitutionally excessive, but the trial court must make a searching inquiry and meaningfully assess the relevant mitigating and aggravating circumstances before doing so.

State v. Kingston · filed 1996-01-19

In the present case, the trial court failed to find that the statutorily mandated minimum sentence would be unconstitutional as applied to this defendant. The court merely noted, "We're going to take the age into consideration, the fact that the six years he will be serving will be flat time.... And also the Court feels that any higher amount of time would be unjust.... The court gave him six years under State v. Dorthey." (Tr. 6-7). These statements do not indicate that the trial court made a "searching inquiry necessary to justify declaring a legislatively mandated sentence unconstitutional" nor do they indicate that the trial court made a "meaningful assessment of any mitigating or aggravating circumstances appropriate to this case." See Eggerson. Accordingly we vacate the sentence imposed by the trial court and remand for resentencing.

A multiple-offender sentence imposed under Section 15:529.1 after a conviction for armed robbery must include the parole disability provided by La. Stat. Ann. § 14:64(B).

State Ex Rel. Simmons v. Stalder · filed 1996-01-26

First, any multiple offender sentence imposed under La.R.S. 15:529.1 following the offender's conviction for armed robbery must carry the parole disability provided by La.R.S. 14:64(B).

Section 15:529.1 requires the trial court, after a prior habitual-offender adjudication is set aside because a predicate conviction was improperly used, to re-adjudicate the defendant’s habitual-offender status before resentencing.

State v. Serio · filed 1996-02-14

On remand, it was incumbent on the trial court to re-adjudicate defendant’s habitual offender status, and dismiss the habitual offender bill or find defendant a specific habitual offender, if the evidence permitted, before resentencing him.

Section 15:529.1(G) requires a habitual-offender sentence to be without benefit of probation or suspension of sentence, but it does not make the offender ineligible for parole.

State v. Thomas · filed 1996-05-08(G)

La.R.S. 15:529.1(G) provides that any sentence imposed under the provisions of the Habitual Offender act shall be without benefit of probation or suspension of sentence. However, parole is still available to habitual offenders.

Section 15:529.1 permits a defendant to deny a multiple-offender bill and remain silent while choosing whether to present affirmative evidence challenging a predicate guilty plea, and its challenged procedures do not violate due process, fair-trial, or self-incrimination rights.

State v. Denomes · filed 1996-05-10(D)(1)(a), (D)(1)(b)

In our view, there clearly is no internal inconsistency in La.R.S. 15:529.1. Nor is there any tension between that statute and defendant's Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination or his right to remain silent under Art. I, § 13 of the Louisiana Constitution. It is entirely consistent that a defendant may choose to deny the allegations of a multiple offender bill, remain silent, and then make the further choice of presenting or declining to present affirmative evidence showing an infringement of his rights or a procedural irregularity in the taking of a challenged predicate guilty plea. Hence, we conclude that the challenged provisions of La.R.S. 15:529.1 do not violate the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, nor the rights to due process or to fair trial under Art. I, §§ 2 & 16, respectively, of the Louisiana Constitution.

Section 15:529.1 places discretion to charge a defendant under the Habitual Offender Law with the district attorney, not the trial court.

State v. Hamilton · filed 1996-06-07

Although the filing of an habitual offender bill does not involve the prosecution of a substantive crime, the discretion to charge a defendant under the Habitual Offender Law lies with the District Attorney and no one else.

Section 15:529.1 treats a habitual-offender adjudication as an ancillary sentencing finding, permits enhancement of only one sentence for same-day felonies arising from one course of conduct, requires the enhanced conviction to be identified, and applies the applicable cleansing period in effect at sentencing.

State v. Mayweather · filed 1996-06-26A and C

When a defendant with a felony record is convicted of two or more felony crimes committed on the same day that arise out of the same course of conduct—for instance, robbing two or more bank tellers in one bank at one time, as Mayweather did—only the sentence for one of the two or more felonies may be "enhanced" by the Habitual Offender Law. ... An adjudication as a second felony offender under La.R.S. 15:529.1 et seq. is not a "definitive judgment" of guilt, but merely a "finding" ancillary to the imposition of the sentence for the new crime. ... If a court fails to impose a sentence for each conviction of two or more convictions or fails to specify which of the two sentences is being enhanced under the statute, the sentence or sentences are set aside and defendant is remanded for resentencing as the law directs. ... When Mayweather was sentenced the period was seven years. § 529.1 C. ... It was not necessary for the State to prove Mayweather's discharge date.

Section 15:529.1 requires a trial court sentencing below the statutory minimum to use the specific Dorthey language and support the lesser sentence with additional factual information in the record.

State v. Morgan · filed 1996-09-09

We are compelled to conclude that the trial court, when sentencing below the statutory minimum, must use the specific boilerplate language stated by the Supreme Court in Dorthey supported by additional factual information made a part of the record as a basis for imposing a lesser sentence. Absent use of this specific language by the trial court, coupled with supportive factual information, the sentence is illegal.

Section 15:529.1(A)(1)(a) raises the sentencing range for a second felony offender, while subsection (G) requires the enhanced sentence to be imposed without probation or suspension of sentence; the court treated an unexpressed denial of those benefits as substantially compliant when none was granted.

State v. Lassere · filed 1996-10-01(A)(1)(a) (G)

Moreover, under our statutory scheme, defendant's sentence is illegally lenient, rather than excessive. Pursuant to La.R.S. 40:967 F(b), the correct sentencing range in this case, prior to enhancement, would have been between twenty and sixty years. The enhanced range would have been thirty to one hundred twenty years. La.R.S. 15:529.1(A)(1)(a). Accordingly, defendant's sentence of twenty years is ten years below the prescribed minimum sentence for his crime. ... La.R.S. 15:529.1(G) provides that any "sentence imposed under the provisions of this Section shall be without benefit of probation or suspension of sentence." ... Here, the trial court did not affirmatively grant a probationary period or suspension of sentence. Thus, the court was in substantial compliance with the statute.

Section 15:529.1 precludes probation or suspension of sentence for a person sentenced under the multiple-offender statute, but it does not preclude parole.

State v. Lewis · filed 1999-02-03

La. R.S. 14:80 does not deny a person convicted of carnal knowledge of a juvenile the possibility of parole, probation or suspension of sentence. La. R.S. 15:529.1, however, precludes probation or suspension of sentence for a person sentenced under the multiple offender statute. Thus, the trial court erroneously denied the defendant the possibility of parole.

Section 15:529.1 prohibits probation and suspension of sentence but does not itself prohibit parole.

State v. Calway · filed 1999-11-17

However, while La. R.S. 15:529.1 prohibits probation or suspension of sentence, it does not prohibit the benefit of parole.

Subsection (A)(4)(b) imposes a 20-year mandatory minimum on the applicable fourth-felony offender, while subsection (G) requires the sentence to be without probation or suspension of sentence but does not authorize denying parole.

State of Louisiana v. Boyd · filed 2023-04-05(A)(4)(b), (G)

However, as a fourth-felony offender, Boyd faced a mandatory minimum of 20 years. La. R.S. 15:529.1(A)(4)(b). ... However, a sentence imposed pursuant to the habitual offender statute is to be imposed without benefit of probation or suspension of sentence, but does not include a provision that it be imposed without benefit of parole. ... Accordingly, we remand this matter to the trial court to correct the minutes to reflect that Boyd’s sentence should be 20 years at hard labor, with credit for time served, and without the benefit of probation or suspension of sentence.

Section 15:529.1(G) requires multiple-offender sentences to be imposed without probation or suspension of sentence, but it does not itself restrict parole.

State of Louisiana Versus Joachim J. Cotton · filed 2024-07-31(G)

La. R.S. 15:529.1(G) requires that all multiple offender sentences are without the benefit of probation or suspension of sentence, but it does not restrict parole.

Subsection (A)(1)(b)(ii) requires a third-felony habitual-offender sentence to be without the benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence.

State v. Jones · filed 2000-06-21(A)(1)(b)(ii)

Defendant was sentenced pursuant to La. R.S. 15:529.1(A)(1)(b)(ii), which provided at the time of defendant's arrest, and provides now, that such sentence be without the benefit of parole, probation or suspension of sentence. Thus, the sentence is illegally lenient in that it fails to deny the benefit of parole. See State v. Alexander, 98-1377, p. 3 (La. App. 4 Cir. 2/16/00), 753 So.2d 933, 936. However, where such sentencing error is favorable to defendant, and the State has not complained, the illegally lenient sentence cannot be corrected on appeal. Id.

Subsection (G) requires a habitual-offender sentence to be imposed without probation or suspension of sentence, while parole ineligibility is limited to the applicable underlying minimum term.

State v. Toca · filed 2000-09-06(G)

La. R.S. 15:529.1(G) provides that any sentence shall be without benefit of probation or suspension of sentence. Thus, the sentence imposed on defendant improperly provides that the entire sentence is to be without benefit of parole when parole ineligibility should have been limited to the first ten years of the sentence.

Section 15:529.1(G) makes a habitual-offender sentence ineligible for probation or suspension of sentence, but does not itself impose parole ineligibility.

State v. Walker · filed 2001-05-16(G)

Also, La. R.S. 15:529.1(G) provides that the sentence is to be without benefit of probation or suspension of sentence and says nothing about parole. Therefore, because the substantive statute limits parole ineligibility to the first two and one-half years of the sentence, Walker’s sentence will be amended to set aside that portion of the sentence that provides for a period in excess of two and one-half years to be served without benefit of parole.

Subsection (G) makes the defendant's habitual-offender sentence without benefit of probation or suspension of sentence.

State v. Barnes · filed 2002-03-27(G)

However, under La. R.S. 15:529.1(G), the defendant's sentence is imposed without benefit of probation or suspension of sentence.

Section 15:529.1(G) bars probation or suspension of sentence for a habitual offender but does not eliminate parole eligibility.

State v. Triche · filed 2003-05-28(G)

La. R.S. 15:529.1(G) denies a habitual offender the benefit of probation or suspension of sentence, but does not deny him parole eligibility.

Section 15:529.1 requires the enhanced sentence to be served without probation or suspension of sentence, but it does not prohibit parole consideration.

State v. Fuller · filed 2003-10-16

On error patent review we note that sentences imposed under La. R.S. 15:529.1 "shall be served without benefit of probation or suspension of sentence." This does not preclude benefit of parole consideration, nor does the statute of conviction contain such a prohibition. Thus, that portion of the sentence providing that it shall be served without benefit of parole is not legally correct and must be set aside. La.C.Cr.P. art. 882.

Section 15:529.1(G) requires a sentence imposed under the habitual-offender statute to be served without benefit of probation or suspension of sentence, but it does not bar parole.

State v. Battaglia · filed 2003-11-25(G)

The Defendant subsequently stipulated to being a second felony offender pursuant to La. R.S. 15:529.1, which provides that any sentence imposed under the provisions of that section "shall be without benefit of probation or suspension of sentence." La. R.S. 15:529.1(G). After the Defendant stipulated to being a second felony offender, the trial judge vacated the original sentence and sentenced the Defendant to imprisonment at hard labor for ten years without benefit of "parole," probation, or suspension of sentence. Neither La. R.S. 15:529.1 nor La. R.S. 14:81 provide that the Defendant's enhanced sentence be served without benefit of parole. Thus, we find that the trial court erred in imposing the enhanced sentence without the benefit of parole.

Section 15:529.1(G) requires a habitual-offender sentence to be served without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence.

State v. Ellington · filed 2004-11-30(G)

Third, the trial court erred in failing to order that the habitual offender sentence on Count 2 be served without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence, as required by La.R.S. 40:967(B)(4)(b) and La.R.S. 15:529.1(G). As with the sentence on Count 1, no corrective action is necessary, because the sentences are deemed to contain that restriction under the provisions of La.R.S. 15:301.1.

Section 15:529.1(G) requires an enhanced sentence to be imposed without benefit of probation or suspension of sentence; a parole restriction prescribed by the underlying offense is self-activating and need not be expressly imposed.

State v. Pittman · filed 2004-12-28(G)

There is also patent error with respect to the enhanced sentence. The trial court imposed the twenty-year sentence without the benefit of probation or suspension of sentence as provided by La. R.S. 15:529.1(G) but did not impose the additional restriction of parole for the first five years as prescribed by the underlying statute. As such, defendant's enhanced sentence is illegally lenient. State v. Converse, 03-0711 (La.App. 5 Cir. 12/30/03), 864 So.2d 803, 811, writ denied, 04-0195 (La.6/4/04), 876 So.2d 74. However, under La. R.S. 15:301.1, a statute's requirement that a defendant be sentenced without benefit of parole, probation or suspension of sentence is self-activating; therefore, no remedial action is necessary.

Subsection (G) requires a sentence imposed under the habitual-offender statute to be served without benefit of probation or suspension of sentence.

State v. Dixon · filed 2005-03-15(G)

La. R.S. 15:529.1(G) requires the enhanced sentence to be served without benefit of probation or suspension of sentence.

Section 15:529.1(A)(1)(a) permits parole eligibility, while Section 15:529.1(G) requires a sentence without probation or suspension of sentence.

State v. Wallace · filed 2007-01-24(A)(1)(a), (G)

Because the underlying statutes of conviction, La. R.S. 14:81(C) and La. R.S. 15:529.1(A)(1)(a), allow for parole eligibility, and La. R.S. 15:529.1(G) requires imposition of sentence without benefit of probation or suspension of sentence, the trial court erred in imposing the sentence without benefit of parole.

Subsection (G) requires a habitual-offender sentence to be without probation or suspension of sentence, but it does not displace an underlying offense statute’s additional parole restriction.

State of Louisiana v. Collette · filed 2007-10-03(G)

The confusion arises because La.R.S. 15:529.1(G) provides that any sentence imposed under the habitual offender law “be without benefit of probation or suspension of sentence.” ... Therefore, we find that the habitual offender sentences imposed by the trial court were illegally lenient, and we hereby correct the defendant’s sentence to reflect that his term of imprisonment shall be served without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence as required by La.R.S. 14:64(B).

Subsection (G) requires the entire habitual-offender sentence to be imposed without probation or suspension of sentence, and an underlying offense’s parole restriction carries over to the enhanced sentence.

State v. Smith · filed 2009-08-25(G)

The court ordered that the entire habitual offender sentence be served without benefit of probation, or suspension of sentence for the entire term, as is required under La.R.S. 15:529.1(G). The underlying conviction that was enhanced in this matter was for possession with intent to distribute MDMA, in violation of La.R.S. 40:966(A). In pertinent part, La.R.S. 40:966(B)(2) mandates imprisonment at hard labor for not less than five nor more than 30 years, at least five of which shall be served without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence. As such, for the underlying conviction, the defendant faced a sentence imposing imprisonment for not more than 30 years of imprisonment, with at least five years without the statutory benefits, including parole restriction. However, because the underlying offense carried a disability against parole, the habitual offender sentence is to likewise be imposed without parole.

Subsection (G) requires every habitual-offender sentence to be served without probation or suspension of sentence.

State v. Evans · filed 2009-12-29(G)

La. R.S. 15:529.1(G) requires that all habitual offender sentences be served without the benefit of probation or suspension of sentence.

Section 15:529.1(G) requires a multiple-offender sentence to be served without probation or suspension of sentence, but it does not authorize a prohibition on parole.

State v. Randall · filed 2010-10-27(G)

Also, while the multiple offender sentence imposed under La. R.S. 15:529.1 must be served without the benefit of probation or suspension of sentence, the statute does not provide that the sentence be served without the benefit of parole. La. R.S. 15:529.1(G). Therefore, we find that the record must be corrected to delete the prohibition on parole from the appellant’s sentence.

Subsection (G) requires habitual-offender sentences to be served without benefit of probation or suspension of sentence.

State v. Horne · filed 2012-02-14(G)

La.R.S. 15:529.1(G) requires that all habitual offender sentences be served without the benefit of probation or suspension of sentence.

Subsection (G) requires a habitual-offender sentence to be served at hard labor without probation or suspension of sentence, but it does not require the sentence to be served without parole.

State v. Thomas · filed 2014-02-12(G)

La. R. S. 15:529.1(G) provides that a "sentence imposed under this Section shall be at hard labor without benefit of probation or suspension of sentence.” It does not mandate that the sentence also be served without the benefit of parole.

Subsection (G) requires a habitual-offender sentence to be imposed without probation or suspension of sentence, and those conditions supplement rather than replace the underlying offense's sentencing restrictions.

State v. Mandigo · filed 2014-02-26(G)

Pursuant to La. R.S. 15:529.1(G), a sentence under the Habitual Offender Law is to be imposed without benefit of probation or suspension of sentence. The sentence conditions required by La. R.S. 15:529.1(G) are additions to, rather than replacements of, those conditions required by the sentencing provisions for the underlying offense. ... Pursuant to La. R.S. 15:529.1(G), the court should have also ordered that the entire sentence be without benefit of probation or suspension of sentence. However, this error does not require corrective action, because the “without-benefits” provisions of the statutes lujare self-activating.

Section 15:529.1(G) requires a multiple-offender sentence to be without benefit of probation or suspension of sentence, but it does not itself restrict parole eligibility.

State v. Griffin · filed 2014-02-26(G)

This violates La. R.S. 15:529.1(G), which, at the time of the offense,8 provided that a sentence imposed *383under La. R.S. 15:529.1 “shall be without benefit of probation or suspension of sentence.” ... The sentence conditions required by La. R.S. 15:529.1(G) are additions to, rather than replacements of, those conditions required by the sentencing provisions for the underlying offense. ... Therefore, where neither the sentencing provision for defendant’s underlying offense nor the sentencing provision for his second felony offender status restricts parole eligibility, it is apparent that the trial court erred in restricting defendant’s parole eligibility.

Section 15:529.1(G) requires a habitual-offender sentence to include the underlying offense's applicable restrictions on parole, probation, or suspension of sentence; when the underlying offense bars parole for at least two years, the enhanced sentence must likewise bar parole for at least two years.

State v. Payne · filed 2015-05-28(G)

The record reflects that the trial judge ordered that the entire habitual offender sentence be served without benefit of probation or suspension of sentence as is required under La. R.S. 15:529.1(G). However, the underlying conviction on count one that was enhanced in this matter was for forcible rape in violation of La. R.S. 14:42.1, which mandates imprisonment at hard labor for not less than five nor more than forty years, at least two of which shall be served without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence. Because the underlying offense prohibits parole for at least two years, the habitual offender sentence is to likewise be imposed without parole, for at least two years.

Section 15:529.1(G) permits a habitual-offender sentence without benefit of probation or suspension of sentence, but it does not itself preclude parole eligibility.

State of Louisiana v. Larry Joseph McKithern AKA - Larry McKithern AKA - Larry J. McKithern · filed 2016-04-06(G)

However, we do find that the sentence imposed for the aggravated arson is excessive in form. The trial court ordered that the complete sentence be imposed without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence. The underlying sentence for aggravated arson as set forth in La.R.S. 14:51(B), provides that only two years of any sentence can be served without the benefits of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence. However, La.R.S. 15:529.1(G) only allows for the imposition of sentence without benefit of probation or suspension of sentence; it does not preclude parole eligibility. Thus, we amend the sentence imposed to provide that only two of the twenty years imposed may be served without benefit of parole. We leave the remainder of the sentence as was imposed by the trial court.

Section 15:529.1(G) restricts probation or suspension of sentence, but does not authorize restricting parole.

State v. Durall · filed 2016-05-12(G)

Further, the Habitual Offender Law only provides for a restriction of probation or suspension of the sentence, not a restriction of parole.- La. R.S. 15:529.1(G).

Subsection (G) requires a habitual-offender sentence to be served without probation or suspension of sentence, but it does not bar parole.

State v. Griffin · filed 2017-09-01(G)

The habitual offender statute provides that the sentence be served without the benefit of probation or suspension of sentence, but does not prohibit parole.

Subsection (G) requires sentences imposed under the Habitual Offender Law to be without benefit of probation or suspension of sentence.

State v. Handy · filed 2017-09-13(G)

Louisiana’s Habitual Offender Law provides that any sentence imposed thereunder shall be without benefit of probation or suspension of sentence. See La. R.S. 15:529.1(G). In this case, the trial judge failed to restrict those benefits when sentence was imposed. However, La. R.S. 15:301.1(A) provides that in instances where the statutory restrictions are- not recited at sentencing, they are deemed contained in the sentence whether or not specified by the sentencing court, and are therefore statutorily effective. Pursuant to State v. Williams, 2000-1725, pp. 10-11 (La. 11/28/01), 800 So.2d 790, 798-799, the sentence is deemed to have been imposed with the restriction of benefits even in the absence of the district court delineating them. Accordingly, there is no need for corrective action.

Section 15:529.1(G) requires an enhanced sentence to be imposed without benefit of probation or suspension, while parole restrictions are those provided by the underlying reference statute.

State v. Heath · filed 2017-12-27(G)

La. R.S. 15:529.1(G) requires the enhanced sentence to be imposed without benefit of probation or suspension of sentence. The restrictions imposed on parole eligibility in multiple offender sentences under La. R.S. 15:529.1"are those called for in the reference statute." State v. Esteen , 01-879 (La. App. 5 Cir. 5/15/02), 821 So.2d 60, 79 n.24, writ denied , 02-1540 (La. 12/13/02), 831 So.2d 983. The underlying statute in the instant case does not provide for the prohibition of parole for the entire length of the sentence, only for the first year.

Subsection (G) requires a multiple-offender sentence to be imposed without probation or suspension of sentence, but it does not itself restrict parole.

State v. Luckett · filed 2017-12-27(G)

Additionally, while La. R.S. 15:529.1(G) requires all multiple offender sentences to be imposed without benefit of probation or suspension of sentence, it does not impose a parole restriction.

An armed robbery offender sentenced under § 15:529.1 must serve the mandatory minimum without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence.

State v. Truvia · filed 1993-06-18

This case is remanded to the district court for correction of the record to reflect that relator’s sentence, the mandatory minimum penalty imposed on an offender convicted of armed robbery and sentenced under the multiple offender provisions of La.R.S. 15:529.1, must run without benefit of parole, probation or suspension of sentence.

Section 15:529.1(G) is substantially satisfied when the trial court neither suspends any part of an enhanced sentence nor grants probation, even if it does not expressly state those restrictions.

State v. Williams · filed 1999-02-10(G)

Similarly here, because the trial court did not affirmatively suspend any portion of the sentence or grant any probationary period, we find substantial compliance with the sentencing directives of the multiple offender statute.

Section 15:529.1’s mandatory life sentence is not constitutionally excessive when the offense and offender circumstances do not make it grossly disproportionate.

State v. Keys · filed 1997-05-07

On the whole, we are unable to declare that the instant life sentence is constitutionally excessive.

Section 15:529.1's mandatory habitual-offender sentence is not constitutionally excessive when it makes a measurable contribution to punishment and long-term protection of society.

State v. Armstrong · filed 1996-10-11A(2)(c)(I)

The present defendant had two prior robbery convictions and a conviction for simple escape. In the case sub judice, he robbed a curb market at gunpoint, menacing two young clerks. The present crime also represents an escalation of a violent potential in Armstrong’s criminal career. With this in mind, the current sentence clearly makes a measurable contribution to acceptable penal goals; i.e., punishment of an incorrigible felon and long-term protection of society from a potentially violent offender.

Section 15:529.1's mandatory sentence may be reduced for constitutional excessiveness only upon a finding that it serves no measurable punishment goal or is purposeless pain and suffering and grossly disproportionate.

State v. Handy · filed 1997-01-06

However, in order to find the punishment mandated by La.R.S. 15:529.1 excessive, the trial judge must find that the sentence makes no measurable contribution to the acceptable goals of punishment or that the sentence amounts to nothing more than the purposeful imposition of pain and suffering and is grossly out of proportion to the severity of the crime. ... Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is vacated and the case remanded to the trial court to justify its deviation from the statutorily-mandated minimum sentence in this case.

Section 15:529.1 mandates a minimum sentence for a habitual offender, but a trial judge may depart from it only after a searching, meaningful assessment of exceptional facts and circumstances.

State v. Compton · filed 1996-10-23

This Court will not uphold a trial judge's discretion to deviate from a legislatively mandated minimum sentence without a record that contains a searching inquiry into and a meaningful assessment of exceptional facts and circumstances that justify the exercise of judicial discretion in a particular case. Some significant facts and circumstances in this context include family history, prior criminal conduct in light of whether it was violent or nonviolent and whether it was similar or dissimilar to the conviction for which the defendant is being sentenced, other aggravating and mitigating circumstances such as those provided in Code of Criminal Procedure article 894.1, and the impact of the crimes upon the victims. A record that reflects that a sentence was imposed after careful consideration of a particular defendant and the facts of the exceptional case in light of such concerns as these will support a trial judge's discretion under Dorthey to depart from a minimum sentence mandated by the Habitual Offender Law.

Section 15:529.1 mandates life imprisonment for a third felony offender whose prior convictions include a crime of violence, but a trial court may deviate if it finds the sentence constitutionally excessive and must justify the reduction and impose the maximum nonexcessive sentence.

State v. Bastian · filed 1996-12-13

The trial judge sentenced defendant to six years at hard labor, below the mandated sentence of life imprisonment for a third felony offender whose prior convictions include a crime of violence under La.R.S. 15:529.1. ... However, in order to find the punishment mandated by La.R.S. 15:529.1 excessive, the trial judge must find that the sentence makes no measurable contribution to the acceptable goals of punishment or that the sentence amounts to nothing more than the purposeful imposition of pain and suffering and is grossly out of proportion to the severity of the crime. ... Although the trial judge gave reasons for finding the statutorily mandated sentence to be constitutionally excessive, he failed to justify his reduction of the sentence from the statutorily mandated sentence of life imprisonment down to six years. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is vacated and the case is remanded to the trial court to justify its deviation from the constitutionally mandated sentence in this case and to render the maximum sentence that is not constitutionally excessive.

Section 15:529.1 requires adequate justification for departing below its habitual-offender mandatory minimum sentence; a non-violent criminal history alone is insufficient.

State v. Johnson · filed 1997-04-16

In view of the Supreme Court’s recent decisions in which a non-violent history is not sufficient to reduce a sentence, we find that the trial court failed to adequately justify imposing a sentence of only thirty months at hard labor. Accordingly, the defendant’s sentence of thirty months is vacated. The case is remanded to the trial court for resentencing in conformity with La. R.S. 15:529.1.

Section 15:529.1 requires a trial court departing from a mandatory habitual-offender sentence to find the sentence unconstitutionally excessive and fully explain the departure; HIV-positive status alone is not a legislatively recognized mitigating factor for that departure.

State v. Lee · filed 1997-08-13

The trial court is required to explain in detail the thirteen year sentence imposed in derogation of the mandated sentence. ... To justify a deviation from the mandatory statutory periods of incarceration the trial court must find the mandated term unconstitutionally excessive. ... The trial court's reasons for imposing a sentence below the statutory minimum are purely subjective and unsubstantiated. ... Status as HIV positive is not a legislatively recognized mitigating factor for sentencing or for deviation from the mandatory minimum sentence prescribed under the Habitual Offender Law. ... The defendant's conviction is affirmed. The sentence is vacated, and the case remanded for resentencing in accordance with the Habitual Offender Law.

When § 15:529.1 would require life imprisonment for a fourth felony offender because a prior felony is a crime of violence, a court may reduce that mandatory sentence if it is constitutionally excessive.

State v. Jackson · filed 1997-11-26A(1)(c)(ii)

A trial court is authorized to reduce a mandatory minimum sentence provided by statute for a [«particular offense and offender when such a term would be excessive under this standard. ... However, life in prison without the possibility of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence is excessive.

Section 15:529.1 requires advising a defendant of the right to remain silent and to a formal hearing, but failure to give the advisement is harmless when independent evidence proves the prior convictions and the defendant's identity.

State v. Demouchet · filed 1996-11-06(D)(1)

At the hearing, defendant admitted to the two convictions (the former conviction for manslaughter and the present conviction for aggravated battery) without being advised of his right to remain silent. ... Further, La.R.S. 15:529.1(D) specifically provides that the defendant be advised of his right to a formal hearing and requires that the state prove its case. ... Under State v. Brown, 514 So.2d 99 (La.1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1017, 108 S.Ct. 1754, 100 L.Ed.2d 216 (1988), rehearing denied, 487 U.S. 1228, 108 S.Ct. 2888, 101 L.Ed.2d 923 (1988), La.R.S. 15:529.1 requires independent proof that the defendant was the same person identified in the records. ... We therefore conclude that the court’s failure to comply with La.R.S. 15:529.1(D)(1) is a harmless error and does not require a remand of the case.

Section 15:529.1(D)(1) requires the defendant to be advised of the right to remain silent and that the State must prove the habitual-offender allegations.

State v. Veazie · filed 1996-11-06(D)(1)

La.R.S. 15:529.1(D)(1) requires defendant be informed of his right to remain silent and have the State prove its case. The trial judge failed to do so in this instance.