La. Stat. Ann. § 15:529.1

Before a defendant stipulates to a habitual-offender bill, the statute requires advisement of the bill's specific allegations, the right to a formal hearing at which the State must prove its case, and, implicitly, the constitutional right to remain silent.

State v. McGee · filed 2009-09-29(D)(1)(a)

La. R.S. 15:529.1(D)(l)(a) requires that prior to stipulating to the allegations in a habitual offender bill, a defendant must be advised of the specific allegations contained in the bill and his right to a formal hearing at which the State must prove its case. Implicit in this requirement is the additional requirement that the defendant be advised of his constitutional right to remain silent.

Section 15:529.1(D) does not set a specific deadline for filing a multiple-offender bill, but the State must file it within a reasonable time after learning that the defendant has a prior felony record.

State v. Abraham · filed 1988-02-10(D)

Although the multiple offender statute, La.R.S. 15:529.1(D), does not set a specific period of time in which a multiple bill must be filed, jurisprudence requires the State to file a multiple bill within a reasonable time after it becomes known that the defendant has a prior felony record.

Section 15:529.1(D) permits a convicted felon to be charged as a multiple offender after conviction or sentence when a prior felony appears; because it sets no prescriptive period, the habitual offender bill must be filed within a reasonable time after the prosecution knows of the prior felony record.

State v. Thornton · filed 1992-05-28(D)

The habitual offender law, La.R.S. 15:529.1(D), provides in part: “If, at any time, either after conviction or sentence, it shall appear that a person convicted of a felony has previously been convicted of (another) felony,” the defendant may be charged as a multiple offender. The statute does not provide a prescriptive period; however, the Louisiana Supreme Court has held that the habitual offender bill must be filed within a “reasonable time” after the prosecution knows of defendant’s prior felony record. ... We do not find that the State’s five months delay in filing was unreasonable.

Subsection (D) requires the State to file a multiple-offender bill within a reasonable time after it knows that the defendant has a prior felony record, although the statute sets no prescriptive period.

State v. Conrad · filed 1994-11-16(D)

While the multiple offender statute, La.R.S. 15:529.1(D), does not impose a prescriptive period, our jurisprudence clearly indicates the State must file the information "within a reasonable time after the prosecution knows that a defendant has a prior felony record." State v. Broussard, 416 So.2d 109, 110 (La.1982) (citations omitted).

Section 15:529.1 requires a written multiple-offender bill of information before prior felony convictions may be used to enhance a sentence.

State v. Fullilove · filed 1994-11-16

Since the record discloses and the state concedes that a written multiple offender bill of information was not filed in this case, the defendant’s sentence cannot be enhanced based on the three previous felony convictions.

Section 15:529.1(D) permits multiple-offender charging after a felony conviction or sentence, but a multiple bill must be filed within a reasonable time after the State learns of the defendant's prior felony record.

State v. McNeal · filed 2000-06-14(D)

La. R.S. 15:529.1(D) provides that a defendant may be charged as a multiple offender if at any time after either conviction or sentence, it appears that a person convicted of a felony has previously been convicted of another felony. The statute does not contain a prescriptive period; but, in State v. Broussard, 416 So.2d 109 (La.1982), the Supreme Court held that a multiple bill must be filed within a reasonable time after the State becomes aware of the defendant's prior felony record. ... While almost two years elapsed between defendant's conviction and the filing of the multiple bill, the delay was not prejudicial. ... Therefore, it appears that the delay was not prejudicial and the trial court did not err when it denied defendant's motion to quash.

Subsection (D)(1)(a) permits the State to file a habitual-offender bill after a felony conviction or sentence, but the bill must be filed within a reasonable time after the State learns of the defendant's prior felony convictions.

State v. Jones · filed 2008-10-28(D)(1)(a)

Nevertheless, a habitual offender bill must be filed within a reasonable time after the State learned the defendant had prior felony convictions.

Section 15:529.1 permits a multiple offender bill to be filed after conviction or sentence, but it must be filed within a reasonable time after the State learns of the defendant’s prior felony convictions.

State v. Buckley · filed 2011-12-27(D)(1)(a)

Under La. R.S. 15:529.1 D(l)(a), a multiple bill may be filed against a defendant who has been convicted of a felony “at any time, either after conviction or sentence.” While La. R.S. 15:529.1 does not establish a time limit for multiple offender proceedings, the jurisprudence holds that a multiple offender bill must be filed within a reasonable time after the State learns the defendant has prior felony convictions.

Section 15:529.1(D)(1)(a) allows a habitual-offender bill after conviction or sentence but requires filing within a reasonable, case-specific period after the State learns of prior felony convictions.

State v. Newman · filed 2012-12-05(D)(1)(a)

Under La. R.S. 15:529.1(D)(1)(a), a habitual offender bill may be filed against a defendant who has been convicted of a felony “at any time, either after conviction or sentence.”

Section 15:529.1 requires the State to file a written multiple-offender bill of information before a defendant may be adjudicated and sentenced as a habitual offender.

State v. Cureaux · filed 2013-05-01

We hold that the State must file a written bill of information charging the defendant as a multiple offender.

Section 15:529.1(D)(1)(a) permits the State to file a multiple-offender bill after conviction or sentence, but requires filing within a reasonable time after the State learns of the prior felony conviction.

State v. Stanfield · filed 2014-03-26(D)(1)(a)

Stanfield could have been charged as a multiple offender any time after his conviction and sentence within a reasonable time. ... Although there was a delay in the hearing, the State was timely in filing the multiple bill, and the district court did not unreasonably delay the hearing. Therefore, we find that the multiple bill was filed within a reasonable time following Stan-field’s March 4, 2010 sentence.

A habitual offender bill may be filed after conviction or sentence, but it must be filed within a reasonable time, judged from the facts of the case and when the district attorney learned that the defendant was a multiple offender.

State v. Ellis · filed 2016-03-02(D)(1)(a)

La. R.S. 15:529.1 D(l)(a) provides that a multiple bill may be filed “at any time, either after conviction or sentence.” Although the statute does not prescribe a time within which the multiple bill must be filed, this court has made a determination that ‘“the district attorney must file the habitual offender bill within a reasonable time.’” State v. Muhammad, 2003-2991, p. 14 (La.5/25/04), 875 So.2d 45, 55 (quoting State v. McQueen, 308 So.2d 752, 755 (La.1975)). See also La.C.Cr.P. art. 874 (“Sentence shall be imposed without unreasonable delay.”) Although “[t]he determination of whether the hearing is held within a reasonable time hinges on the facts and circumstances of the specific case,” an important factor in the reasonableness analysis “requires a determination of when the district attorney acquired the knowledge that defendant is a multiple offender.” Muhammad, 2003-2991, p. 14, 875 So.2d at 55.

Section 15:529.1 requires only enough information in a multiple-offender bill to notify the defendant of a prior qualifying felony conviction; an error that causes no prejudice does not invalidate the proceeding.

State v. Baptiste · filed 2016-12-14

In State v. Rowell, 306 So.2d 671, 675 (La. 1975), the Louisiana Supreme Court held that while a multiple offender bill must “inform the accused of the nature and cause of the accusation against him,” any information beyond informing the accused of a previous felony conviction within the time period established by La. R.S. 15:529.1 is unnecessary. ... Upon review of the multiple offender waiver of rights form and the hearing transcript, we find that defendant and his counsel were on notice that defendant was alleged to be a second felony offender pursuant to La. R.S. 15:529.1. The apparent error regarding which underlying conviction was being used to enhance defendant’s sentence does not invalidate defendant’s stipulation to the multiple offender charge. ... Accordingly, despite an error in the multiple offender bill, the absence of any prejudice to defendant renders this error harmless and requires no corrective action by this Court.

Section 15:529.1(D)(1)(a) allows a prosecutor to file a multiple offender bill of information after the defendant has been convicted or sentenced.

State of Louisiana Versus Robert Celestine, Jr. · filed 2020-11-04(D)(1)(a)

La. R.S. 15:529.1(D)(1)(a) allows a prosecutor to file a multiple offender bill of information accusing a person convicted of a felony of a previous conviction of a felony at any time after conviction or sentence.

Section 15:529.1(D) permits the state to file a multiple offender bill again when the first bill was rejected because its supporting documents were not properly authenticated.

State v. Hill · filed 1976-11-08(D)

A hearing on a multiple offender bill is a trial in only a very broad sense. It is more pertinently an inquiry into defendant's prior criminal conviction or convictions, as part of the sentencing process. Technical inadequacies in the state's documentation at such "trial" mandates a negative determination by the court. On the other hand, such a determination is not a conclusive one "on a fact distinctly put in issue," as is the case where, relative to prosecution for commission of a criminal offense, there is a judgment that defendant be freed "as a matter of substantive law" (State v. Latil, supra). We hold therefore, that res judicata is not applicable here.

Section 15:529.1(C) requires the State to establish that the five-year cleansing period has not elapsed, while § 15:529.1(F)'s warden certificate is only one way to prove the predicate offender's discharge date; evidence of equal weight may suffice.

State v. Bennett · filed 1988-03-02(C) (F)

This provision sets forth what we feel is a "nonexclusive" means of establishing the date of discharge. That is, evidence other than a warden's certificate may be sufficient to establish the date of discharge. Just as the burden is on the state to establish the prior felony conviction(s), it must also establish that the five-year period has not elapsed. If it has been five years or more since the date of discharge for the predicate felony offense, the state may still show that the five-year cleansing period was interrupted by "any period of servitude" by the defendant "in a penal institution, within or without the state." Thus, the five-year cleansing period may be interrupted by time served in a parish jail. ... In light of the inclusion of Section (C) in the habitual offender statute we feel the legislature intended that, at a minimum, the state must present prima facie evidence of the date of discharge through such means as presentation of a warden's certificate or evidence of equal weight. This was not done in the case at bar. Accordingly the sentence imposed under La.R.S. 15:529.1 cannot stand.

Section 15:529.1(C) requires a five-year cleansing period between the actual end of a prior sentence and the commission of the later felony, excluding time spent in penal servitude, and the State must prove that timing.

State v. Nasworthy · filed 1989-04-13(C)

In accord with this provision, in order to use a prior felony offense to support a multiple offender adjudication there must not have intervened before the commission of another felony, a five year "cleansing" period, that is, five years between the actual end of the previous sentence and the commission of another felony. State ex rel. Wilson v. Maggio, 422 So.2d 1121 (La., 1982). In considering the end of the previous sentence the court will consider the sentence actually served, whether it be diminished by good time or increased by a revocation of parole or probation. State v. Anderson, 349 So.2d 311 (La., 1977). ... However, the State failed to demonstrate the date of discharge from this conviction. As such the State has failed to prove that this 1980 conviction qualified as a predicate offense in the multiple offender proceeding because it failed to prove that less than five years elapsed between the end of the previous sentence and the commission of another felony.

The five-year cleansing period is measured from the offender’s actual discharge from supervision, and when the last conviction was within five years, the State need not prove the discharge date for an earlier conviction.

State v. Sanders · filed 1989-04-19(C)

When determining the expiration of a given sentence for the purposes of the Habitual Offender Statute, it is not the sentence imposed which governs, but the date of the person's actual discharge from supervision by the Department of Corrections. State ex rel. Wilson v. Maggio, 422 So.2d 1121 (La.1982); State v. Lambert, 475 So.2d 791 (La.App. 3rd Cir.1985), writ denied, 481 So.2d 1345 (La.1986). ... However, where less than five years have lapsed since the defendant's last conviction, the State need not prove the date of discharge on the earlier sentence in the Habitual Offender proceeding. State ex rel. Clark v. Marullo, 352 So.2d 223 (La.1977). Since the State was not required to prove the date of the defendant's discharge on his 1982 conviction, as it was within the five year period, the defendant was correctly sentenced as a second felony offender.

Section 15:529.1(C) requires the State to show that the five-year cleansing period has not elapsed before a prior conviction may support a habitual-offender adjudication.

State v. Bennett · filed 1989-05-24(C)

The circumstances of the case sub judice are not unlike those present in Lockhart. At the initial hearing, evidence of defendant's 1980 conviction was erroneously admitted because of the State's failure to make the predicate showing that the five year period provided for by La.R.S. 15:529.1(C) had not elapsed.

For habitual-offender enhancement, the five-year cleansing period runs from the felon's actual discharge from state custody and supervision, probation is custody, and the State must make a prima facie showing that five years has not elapsed.

State v. Tropez · filed 1989-06-29(C), (F)

The State must produce prima facie evidence that five years has not elapsed since the date of discharge from custody of the predicate offense. La.R.S. 15:529.1(F). The five year period provided by La.R.S. 15:529.1(C) begins to run from the date the felon is actually discharged from State custody and supervision. State v. Killion, 483 So.2d 1281 (La.App. 4th Cir.), writ denied, 492 So.2d 1215 (La.1986). While on probation, a person is still under the supervision of the State and is therefore in custody. State v. Battista, 517 So.2d 1096 (La.App. 3rd Cir.1987). Therefore, the State had to prove that the defendant in this case had not been discharged from the custody of the State, or in the defendant's case from probation, for a period of more than five years.

The five-year cleansing period under § 15:529.1(C) must be applied in accordance with the governing precedent.

State ex rel. Mills v. State · filed 1991-09-27(C)

The district court is to reconsider application of the five-year cleansing period in La.R.S. 15:529.1(C) in accordance with State ex rel. Wilson v. Maggio, 422 So.2d *5561121 (La.1982) and State v. Anderson, 349 So.2d 311 (La.1977).

Subsection (C)'s five-year cleansing period can preclude a fourth-felony-offender finding when the defendant proves that the period applies.

Brown v. State · filed 1992-12-21(C)

Relator has failed to carry his burden of proving that the five-year cleansing period of La.R.S. 15:529.1(C) prohibited the lower court’s finding that he is a fourth felony offender.

The five-year cleansing period is applied between each successive predicate felony conviction, excluding time served, so an older predicate may still support habitual-offender enhancement when each intervening conviction falls within the period.

State v. Gaines · filed 1994-06-24(C)

In the instant case, although defendant's discharge on the first felony conviction occurred more than five years before his commission of the instant armed robbery conviction, because his commission of the second felony was within five years of his discharge on the first conviction and his commission of the instant felony was within five years of his discharge on the second felony, the five-year cleansing period of Subsection C does not preclude defendant's adjudication as a third felony offender. See State v. Richardson (La.App. 1st Cir.1994); 637 So.2d 709. We believe that the decisions of the Third and Fourth Circuits are correct interpretations of LSA-R.S. 15.529.1 C. In so ruling, we decline to follow the decision of the Fifth Circuit in Williams.

Section 15:529.1(C) permits a prior felony to support a habitual-offender adjudication unless five crime-free years intervened between the end of the previous sentence and commission of another felony.

State v. Finley · filed 1995-12-06(C)

Although the defendant was discharged from the first felony conviction more than five years before the present offense, his commission of a second felony was within five years of his discharge on the first felony conviction and his commission of the instant felony was within five years of his discharge on the second felony conviction. ... This court is bound by the ruling in State v. Broussard, 34 So.2d 883. Accordingly, the five year cleansing period of La.R.S. 15:529.1(0) does not preclude the trial court from adjudicating the defendant as a second or third felony offender.

The five-year cleansing period in § 15:529.1(C) is measured from completion of a prior sentence to commission of the subsequent offense.

State v. Cooper · filed 1996-07-17(C)

As seen by the dates of these prior convictions, the five year cleansing period set forth in La.R.S. 15:529.1(C) never lapsed between the completion of any of defendant's prior sentences and commission of the subsequent offenses.

Section 15:529.1 requires the State to establish that five years have not elapsed between a defendant's release from custody on a predicate offense and the new offense, but when the convictions are less than five years apart, the State need not prove the discharge date.

State v. Tucker · filed 1996-09-18

In a multiple offender proceeding, the State has the burden of establishing that five years have not elapsed between the defendant's release from custody and the new offense. State v. Tropez, 546 So.2d 1376 (La.App. 4th Cir.1989). However, where less than five years have elapsed between convictions, it is not necessary for the State to prove discharge dates. State ex rel. Clark v. Marullo, 352 So.2d 223 (La.1977). The record clearly shows that less than five years elapsed between the defendant's convictions. Therefore, the State was not required to provide proof of discharge from the prior offense.

The statute's five-year cleansing period runs from discharge from state custody or supervision, but separate proof of discharge dates is unnecessary when the record otherwise shows each predicate offense falls within that period.

State v. Christmann · filed 1997-03-12(C)

The "cleansing period" begins to run from the date the defendant is discharged from state custody or supervision on the prior offense. State v. Simmons, 95-309 (La.App. 5 Cir. 10/18/95), 663 So.2d 790. Evidence of the date of discharge for a prior sentence is an essential element to be proven in an habitual offender case. State v. Franklin, 94-409 (La.App. 5 Cir. 12/14/94), 648 So.2d 962, writ denied, 95-0143 (La.5/19/95), 654 So.2d 1354; State v. Metoyer, 612 So.2d 755 (La.App. 5 Cir.1992). ... It is evident from the guilty plea transcript, arrest registers, and fingerprint cards introduced by the state at the multiple bill hearing that each of the prior offenses falls within the statute's five-year cleansing period. Proof of discharge dates on the predicate offenses was therefore unnecessary. See State v. Mayweather, 28,271 (La.App. 2 Cir. 6/26/96), 677 So.2d 594.

Generally, the State must prove that the cleansing period has not expired, but it need not prove the defendant's discharge dates when less than the statutory time limit elapsed between the predicate offense and the later conviction.

State v. Nicholas · filed 1999-04-28(C)

Generally, the State has the burden of proving that the cleansing period has not expired; however, where less than the time limitation set forth in La.R.S. 15:529.1(1)(C) has elapsed between convictions or completion of sentence on the predicate offense, it is not necessary for the State to prove defendant's discharge dates.

For a multiple-offender adjudication, the State must prove that the cleansing period had not elapsed, including the defendant's actual discharge date.

State v. Capers · filed 2007-08-02C

On appeal, this court affirmed the offenses of conviction but vacated the multiple offender adjudication for insufficient proof that the cleansing period of La. R.S. 15:529.1 C had not elapsed. ... Capers again appeals, urging insufficient proof that the cleansing period had elapsed. ... In brief, the state concedes that it "failed to offer proof of defendant's actual discharge date at the multiple offender hearing" and that the adjudication and sentences should be vacated. ... We agree that this error patent requires us to vacate the adjudication and sentences and remand the case for further proceedings.

Section 15:529.1(C) requires the State to prove that fewer than five years elapsed between final discharge from the prior sentence and the new felony; subsection (F) prescribes certified proof of imprisonment and discharge.

State v. Lowery · filed 1986-06-05(C)

In a multiple bill proceeding, the State must present evidence of imprisonment and the date of discharge of the person by the certified proof prescribed by R.S. 15:529.1(F). Although the record shows that Lowery was found guilty on October 22, 1975 of violating the Federal Controlled Substances Act and sentenced to seven years imprisonment and a three year special parole term, the record does not show when Lowery was discharged from that sentence. Therefore, the State did not prove that five years had not elapsed and thus failed to prove a pri-ma facie case against Lowery on the multiple bill.

Section 15:529.1(C)'s five-year period begins when the defendant is discharged from parole, and the state must prove that the period had not elapsed before the new felony.

State v. Baker · filed 1984-05-30(C)

This line of analysis was applied in State v. Vincent, 387 So.2d 1097 (La.1980), where the court equated the date of discharge from parole with the expiration of maximum sentence for defendant's last prior felony conviction. Following these guidelines, we find that the state met its burden of proving that more than five years had not elapsed since the expiration of the maximum sentence for defendant's last prior felony conviction (February 27, 1976) and the time of commission of the felony for which he was convicted herein (October 7 and 8 of 1980).

Section 15:529.1(C) permits the state to establish that the five-year cleansing period has not elapsed from the record, even without direct evidence of the defendant’s release date.

State v. Falgout · filed 1991-01-31(C)

La. R.S. 15:529.1(C), the habitual offender law, provides that the statute does not apply when more than five years has elapsed since expiration of the sentence of the previous conviction and the commission of the last felony. Moreover, the state has the burden of establishing that five years has not elapsed between the defendant's release from custody and a new offense. ... Unlike Nasworthy where the previous conviction was from Georgia and the release date was not apparent from the record, we find that although the State did not affirmatively establish that the time period had not elapsed, the record indicates "more probable than not" it had not elapsed.

Section 15:529.1(C) requires the state to prove that predicate convictions fall within the five year cleansing period.

State v. Franklin · filed 1994-12-14(C)

At the multiple bill hearing in this matter, the state produced sufficient evidence to prove that both predicate convictions alleged in the multiple bill fell within the five year cleansing period provided by La.R.S. 15:529.1. The state introduced the district court minute entries, as well as the penitentiary packs, which verify defendant's sentencing dates and dates of release.

Under the five-year version of § 15:529.1(C), the State must prove that five years had not elapsed between release from custody on a prior offense and the new offense.

State v. Lorio · filed 1995-09-28(C)

La.R.S. 15:529.1(C), the Habitual Offender Law, provides that the statute does not apply when more than five years has elapsed since the expiration of the maximum sentence, or sentences, of the previous convictions, or convictions, and the time of the commission of the last felony for which he has been convicted.[1] The State has the burden of proving that five years has not elapsed between the defendant's release from custody on the prior offense and the new offense. ... Accordingly, because the State did not present affirmative proof as to the discharge dates of the three predicate offenses, which are essential elements in a habitual offender case (see State v. Franklin), this assignment of error has merit.

Section 15:529.1(C) permits an earlier conviction to support habitual offender status when each successive felony was committed within five years after discharge on the preceding conviction, even if more than five years separate the earliest and latest offenses.

State v. Webster · filed 1995-11-02(C)

Although the defendant was discharged from the first felony conviction more than five years before the present offenses, his commission of a second felony was within five years of his discharge on the first felony conviction and his commission of the instant felonies was within five years of his discharge on the second felony conviction. Accordingly, we find the five year cleansing period of La.R.S. 15:529.1(C) does not preclude the trial court from adjudicating the defendant as a third felony offender.

Section 15:529.1(C) permits enhancement only when the five-year cleansing period has not elapsed, and the State must establish the release date when that period is at issue.

State v. Langlois · filed 1997-05-21(C)

Nevertheless, this Court has consistently held that the State must provide a release date when the five year cleansing period is at issue. The expiration of the previous sentence is determined by the date of the actual discharge from supervision of the Department of Corrections.

Subsection (D)(1)(a) requires advising a defendant of the specific allegations in the habitual offender bill, the right to a formal hearing where the State must prove its case, and the constitutional right to remain silent.

State v. Hartshorn · filed 2009-11-10(D)(1)(a)

La. R.S. 15:529.1(D)(1)(a) requires that the defendant be advised of the specific allegations contained in the habitual offender bill of information and his right to a formal hearing at which the State must prove its case. Implicit in this requirement is the additional requirement that the defendant be advised of his constitutional right to remain silent.

Section 15:529.1(A)(1) sets the habitual-offender sentencing range at one-third to twice the maximum penalty for the current felony, rather than the maximum term for the prior conviction.

State v. Briggs · filed 1988-05-11(A)(1)

The trial judge realized the inconsistency of looking to the first conviction for the term to be enhanced and correctly cited the sentencing range under La.R.S. 15:529.1(A)(1) as one-third to twice the maximum penalty for the forcible rape conviction at bar, forty years, for a range of thirteen and one-third years to eighty years, at least two of which must be without benefit of parole, probation or suspension of sentence. There is no other interpretation that a man of ordinary intelligence could make of this statute.

Subsection (D) requires the court to advise a defendant of the right to a formal hearing, to have the state prove the habitual-offender allegations, and to remain silent before accepting an admission.

State v. Biglane · filed 1999-05-19(D)

R.S. 15:529.1(D) specifically provides that defendant be advised by the court of his right to a "formal hearing" and to have the state prove its case. ... Upon review of the instant matter, we find that the colloquy between defendant and the trial court, coupled with the executed waiver of rights form, support a finding that defendant knowingly and voluntarily waived his rights prior to admitting the allegations contained in the multiple offender bill of information.

Section 15:529.1 requires the trial court to advise a defendant of the habitual-offender allegations, the right to a hearing, and the right to remain silent, but failure to give those advisements is harmless when the State proves habitual-offender status at a hearing.

State v. E.J.M. · filed 2013-05-23

La. R.S. 15:529.1 requires the trial court to advise a defendant of the allegations contained in the information, his right to a hearing, and his right to remain silent. ... The failure of the trial court to advise a defendant of his right to a trial and to remain silent is harmless error when the multiple offender status is established by competent evidence offered by the State at a hearing, rather than by the admission of the defendant. ... Here, the defendant proceeded to the multiple bill hearing, and the State presented competent evidence at the hearing to establish his multiple offender status. Hence, the trial court’s failure to advise him of the specific allegations against him and of his right to be tried and to remain silent was harmless error.

Section 15:529.1(D) requires the court to advise a defendant of his rights before accepting a stipulation to identity at a multiple offender hearing.

State v. Bravo · filed 1992-03-31(D)

At most multiple offender hearings the only factual issue is whether the defendant is the same individual previously convicted of a felony as alleged in the bill. Thus, it is error to accept a stipulation or a plea before advising the defendant of his rights, because an admission of identity at such a hearing is the equivalent of a plea of guilty.

Failure to advise a defendant of the rights associated with a habitual offender hearing is harmless when the defendant receives a fundamentally fair hearing.

State of Louisiana v. Moore · filed 2011-10-05(D)

Nevertheless, the failure to apprise the Defendant of his rights was harmless; the Defendant received a fundamentally fair hearing.

Section 15:529.1(D) requires the court to inform a defendant of the right to a hearing on a habitual offender bill before accepting a guilty plea; failure to do so requires vacating the enhanced sentence.

State v. Williams · filed 1988-03-10(D)

However, as stated above, the defendant's sentence will be vacated in any event because of the trial judge's failure to inform the defendant of his right to a hearing on the allegations contained in the multiple bill prior to accepting defendant's guilty plea on that charge.

For a second-felony offender, § 15:529.1(A)(1) sets imprisonment at one-half to twice the longest term for the underlying offense, while § 15:529.1(C)'s ten-year cleansing period may be established by the timing of the prior conviction, probation, arrest warrant, and subsequent offense.

State v. Gaines · filed 2019-02-27(A)(1), (C)

If the second felony is such that upon a first conviction the offender would be punishable by imprisonment for any term less than his natural life, then the sentence to imprisonment shall be for a determinate term not less than one-half the longest term and not more than twice the longest term prescribed for a first conviction.

Section 15:529.1 permits a second felony offender convicted of armed robbery to be sentenced from thirty-three to one hundred ninety-eight years at hard labor, without benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence.

State v. Harris · filed 1988-10-12(A)(1)

As a second felony offender, the trial court could have imposed a term ranging from the minimum sentence of thirty-three years at hard labor to a maximum term of one hundred ninety-eight years at hard labor, without benefit of probation, parole or suspension of sentence.

For a third felony habitual offender, Subsection (A)(2)(a) increased the sentencing range for this offense to seven and one-half years to thirty years at hard labor.

State v. Williams · filed 1991-10-18(A)(2)(a)

When he was adjudicated a third felony habitual offender, the defendant's sentencing exposure was increased to a minimum of seven and one-half years at hard labor and a maximum of thirty years at hard labor. See La.R.S. 15:529.1(A)(2)(a), prior to its amendment by Acts 1989, No. 482. Therefore, a sentence of sixty years at hard labor exceeds the maximum statutorily authorized penalty for this offense. Accordingly, the sentence is vacated and the case is remanded to the trial court for resentencing.

Section 15:529.1 permits a third-felony-offender sentence of eight to 24 years for simple burglary, but the sentencing court must properly apply the felony sentencing guidelines when selecting the sentence.

State v. Hooker · filed 1993-08-18(A)(2)

Naturally the court could have imposed a legal sentence under R.S. 15:529.1 (eight to 24 years) by formally departing upward from the designated sentence range under the procedure of La.S.G. § 209 A. ... We would observe that the sentence imposed is legal under R.S. 15:529.1 and could perhaps be supported with valid aggravated circumstances under La.S.G. § 209. However, because of the error discussed we feel a remand is proper so the trial court may exercise its sentencing intent with a proper appreciation of the guidelines.

When both the current felony and the prior felony are sex offenses, Section 15:529.1(A)(2)(a) sets the second-offender sentencing range at one-half of the longest term prescribed for the current conviction to twice that term, without benefits.

State v. Cavazos · filed 2012-05-16(A)(2)(a)

Under the 2009 Habitual Offender Law (La. R.S. 15:529.1(A)(2)(a)), if the second felony and the prior felony are sex offenses, the mandatory sentencing range is between one-half of the longest term for the conviction and not more than twice the longest term prescribed for a first conviction, without benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence. At the time of commission of the offense in this case, the sentencing range was not less than twenty-five years nor more than ninety-nine years. Consequently, the defendant was exposed to a sentencing range of between 49-1/2 to 198 years as a second offender. His sentence of sixty-five years is a little more than the minimum sentence but below the mid-range of sentencing and substantially less than the maximum he was exposed to. Given the facts of this case and the physical and psychological injury the defendant inflicted on the victim, plus his prior conviction for the same offense on an earlier defenseless victim, the sentence is not excessive.

Section 15:529.1 sets a fourth felony offender’s sentencing range at a minimum of twenty years and a maximum of life imprisonment, subject to constitutional reduction when the mandated sentence is excessive.

State v. Frank · filed 1995-03-01

In this case, the twenty year sentence imposed on the defendant is the statutory minimum for four-time felony offenders under La.R.S. 15:529.1. The maximum sentence under the statute is life imprisonment. However, the Louisiana Supreme Court noted in the case of State v. Dorthey, 623 So.2d 1276, 1280 (La.1993) that a trial court may, in certain circumstances, impose a lesser sentence than that which is mandated by the multiple offender statute: ... The sentence the judge imposed was not only within the statutory limits but was, in fact, the minimum sentence. Therefore, considering the totality of the circumstances, we cannot say that this sentence constitutes a manifest abuse of his discretion.

Section 15:529.1 requires a second felony offender convicted of simple burglary to serve six to twenty-four years in prison, plus a fine of up to $2,000.

State v. White · filed 1997-12-10

In addition, because the defendant was adjudged a second offender, the habitual offender law under La.R.S. 15:529.1 was applicable. The penalty for a second offender convicted of simple burglary is a mandated prison term of not less than six years and not more than twenty-four years, and a fine of not more than two thousand dollars. La.R.S. 15:529.1.

The pre-1994 version of § 15:529.1 A(3)(a) required a fourth felony offender to serve at least the longest term prescribed for a first conviction and allowed a sentence up to life imprisonment.

State v. Franklin · filed 1998-09-23A(3)(a)

At the time of this offense, the Habitual Offender statute mandated that a fourth offender serve not less than the longest term prescribed for a first conviction (30 years at hard labor) nor more than life. La. R.S. 15:529.1 A(3)(a) (prior to the amendment by La. Acts 1994, 3d Ex.Sess., No. 144).[5] ... Under the circumstances of this case, the enhanced sentence of 40 years at hard labor is not inappropriate.

For a second felony offender, Section 15:529.1(A)(1)(a) authorized a sentencing range of twenty years minimum to one hundred years maximum for the racketeering offense at issue.

State v. Bailey · filed 1998-04-28(A)(1)(a)

The trial court vacated the original sentence on the racketeering conviction and, under La. R.S. 15:529.1(A)(1)(a), resentenced defendant as an habitual offender to fifty years at hard labor without benefit of parole, probation or suspension of sentence. Under that statute, as a second felony offender, defendant was exposed to a sentencing range of twenty years minimum to one hundred years maximum. La. R.S. 15:1354(A) & La. R.S. 15:529.1(A) (1)(a). Thus, defendant's sentence to fifty years was less than one half of his sentencing exposure. Considering the ongoing nature of defendant's criminal activity, as well as the fact that his prior conviction was also for a drug offense, we do not find that this sentence is constitutionally excessive.

For a third felony offender, § 15:529.1(A)(2)(a) sets a determinate sentencing range tied to the longest first-offense sentence, while § 15:529.1(A)(2)(b) imposes life imprisonment without benefits only when the third and each of the two prior felonies fall within specified serious-offense categories.

State v. Ballay · filed 1999-01-13(A)(2)(a), (A)(2)(b)

Thus, unless the requirements of La. R.S. 15:529.1(A)(2)(b) were met, the maximum sentence the defendant could have received pursuant to La. R.S. 15:529.1(A)(2)(a) as a third felony offender was ten years. ... Because it does not appear that either of the two prior offenses were crimes of violence, crimes for a violation of the Controlled Substance Law punishable by imprisonment for more than five years, or crimes punishable by imprisonment for more than twelve years, the provisions of La. R.S. 15:529.1(A)(2)(b) do not apply. ... Because the trial court erroneously sentenced the defendant to an illegal sentence, the defendant's sentences must be vacated and the case remanded for resentencing pursuant to the provisions of La. R.S. 15:529.1 in effect at the time of the commission of the instant offense.

Section 15:529.1(A)(1) sets a second felony offender's determinate sentence at not less than one-third and not more than twice the longest term prescribed for the underlying felony, when that felony carries a sentence less than life.

State of Louisiana Versus Jared Diaz · filed 2021-11-17(A)(1)

Once Mr. Diaz was adjudicated a multiple felony offender and his original 50-year maximum sentence was vacated, under La. R.S. 15:529.1(A)(1), Mr. Diaz faced a maximum sentence of 100 years at hard labor without benefit of probation or suspension of sentence. The 65-year enhanced sentence imposed upon Mr. Diaz clearly falls within the statutory range. ... The penalty for being a second felony offender found at La. R.S. 15:529.1(A)(1), provides that “[i]f the second felony is such that upon a first conviction the offender would be punishable by imprisonment for any term less than his natural life, then the sentence to imprisonment shall be for a determinate term not less than one-third the longest term and not more than twice the longest term prescribed for a first conviction.” Thus, the sentencing range Mr. Diaz was facing was 16.67 years to 100 years. His 65-year sentence is within mid-range of the statutory guidelines provided by the Legislature.

For a second felony habitual offender, the 2001 version provides a sentencing range of one-half to twice the longest term for the underlying offense; for a third felony habitual offender, it provides a range of two-thirds to twice that longest term.

State of Louisiana v. O'Neal · filed 2022-06-29(A)(1)(a), (A)(1)(b)(i)

Therefore, if O’Neal is determined to be a second felony habitual offender, his sentencing range will be 7 ½ years to 30 years. If O’Neal is determined to be a third felony habitual offender, his sentencing range will be 10 to 30 years. In either situation, a 30-year sentence is the maximum possible sentence.

Section 15:529.1 sets a second-felony offender’s sentence at one-third to twice the longest term for the underlying felony, requires hard labor without probation or suspension, and does not eliminate parole eligibility.

State of Louisiana v. Carter · filed 2022-12-14A(1), G, and H

Because this sentence is for less than natural life, the second felony carries a sentence of not less than one-third the longest term and not more than twice the longest term for a first conviction. La. R.S. 15:529.1 A(1). The sentence range for manslaughter, as a second felony offense, is therefore 13⅓ to 80 years. The sentence shall be at hard labor without benefit of probation or suspension of sentence. La. R.S. 15:529.1 G. ... We also note that under R.S. 15:529.1 H, the sentence does not exclude the possibility of parole.

Section 15:529.1(A)(3) subjects a third felony offender to imprisonment of at least one-half of the longest possible sentence for the current conviction and no more than twice the longest sentence prescribed for a first conviction.

State of Louisiana Versus Jonathon Brown · filed 2023-06-21(A)(3)

As a third felony offender pursuant to La. R.S. 15:529.1(A)(3), defendant was subject to a term of imprisonment for not less than one-half of the longest possible sentence for the conviction and not more than twice the longest possible sentence prescribed for a first conviction.

Section 15:529.1(A)(1)(b)(i) sets a third-felony offender’s imprisonment at no less than two-thirds and no more than twice the longest possible sentence for the underlying offense.

State of Louisiana v. Debrow · filed 2023-11-15(A)(1)(b)(i)

The sentencing penalty for attempted armed robbery is not more than 49 ½ years at hard labor without benefits. La. R.S. 14:27 and 14:64. When a defendant is adjudicated a third-felony offender under the 2001 amendments to La. R.S. 15:529.1(A)(1)(b)(i), the term of imprisonment is not less than two-thirds of the longest possible sentence and not more than twice the longest possible sentence. Therefore, Debrow’s sentencing range for count one was 33-99 years.

Section 15.529.1 increases a second felony habitual offender’s sentencing range for this offense to not less than 40 months and not more than 20 years.

State of Louisiana v. Davenport · filed 2024-01-10

As a second felony habitual offender, pursuant to La. R.S. 15:529.1, Davenport’s sentencing range increases to not less than 40 months and not more than 20 years.

Subsection (A)(1) sets a second-felony offender’s sentence at no less than one-third and no more than twice the longest term prescribed for a first conviction when the second felony is punishable by less than life imprisonment.

State of Louisiana v. Haire · filed 2024-02-28(A)(1)

Pursuant to this article, Haire faced up to 80 years at hard labor for manslaughter and a maximum of 20 years for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon.

Section 15:529.1(A)(1)(b)(i) requires a third-felony offender to receive a determinate term of two-thirds to twice the maximum sentence for the underlying conviction, served at hard labor without probation or suspension of sentence.

State of Louisiana v. O'Neal · filed 2024-02-28(A)(1)(b)(i)

The applicable version of La. R.S. 15:529.1(A)(1)(b)(i) mandates that a person adjudicated a third-felony offender under that provision be sentenced to imprisonment for a determinate term not less than two-thirds of the longest possible sentence for the conviction and not more than twice the longest possible sentence prescribed for a first conviction. Any sentence served under La. R.S. 15:529.1 must be served at hard labor without the benefits of probation or suspension of sentence. Therefore, the applicable sentencing range for O’Neal is 10 to 30 years’ imprisonment at hard labor. At least one year of his sentence must be served without the benefit of parole, and the entirety of his sentence must be served without the benefits of probation or suspension of sentence.

For a fourth felony offender whose fourth felony and no prior felony is a crime of violence or sex offense, § 15:529.1(A)(4)(b) requires imprisonment for 20 years to twice the longest sentence for a first conviction, with a 20-year minimum if twice that sentence is less than 20 years.

State of Louisiana v. Master · filed 2024-07-17(A)(4)(b)

Masters was also adjudicated as a fourth felony offender under La. R.S. 15:529.1(A)(4)(b) which provides, in pertinent part: If the fourth felony and no prior felony is defined as a crime of violence under R.S. 14:2(B) or as a sex offense under R.S. 15:541, the person shall be imprisoned for not less than twenty years nor more than twice the longest possible sentence prescribed for a first conviction. If twice the possible sentence prescribed for a first conviction is less than twenty years, the person shall be imprisoned for twenty years. Any sentence by the trial court for a habitual offender must fall within the sentencing requirements of the habitual offender statute. In this case, the sentencing range for this offense was not less than 20 years but no more than 50 years at hard labor, with at least two years to be served without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence.

Section 15:529.1 A(1) sets a second-felony offender’s sentence at no less than one-third and no more than twice the longest term prescribed for the underlying offense when that offense is punishable by less than life imprisonment.

State of Louisiana Versus Lester Haynes · filed 2024-07-31A(1)

Defendant’s sentencing exposure as a second felony offender was determined based on La. R.S. 15:529.1 A(1). Pursuant to this provision, “If the second felony is such that upon a first conviction the offender would be punishable by imprisonment for any term less than his natural life, then the sentence to imprisonment shall be for a determinate term not less than one-third the longest term and not more than twice the longest term prescribed for a first conviction.” Applying this provision here, defendant was exposed to a sentencing range of about six years and eight months to 40 years as a second-felony offender.

For a second felony punishable on first conviction by less than life, § 15:529.1(A)(1) sets a determinate sentence between one-third and twice the longest term prescribed for the first conviction.

State of Louisiana Versus Tonny J Bauer · filed 2024-10-30(A)(1)

Thus, the defendant’s sentencing range as a second felony offender was between 6 2/3 and 40 years.

For a first-degree-robbery defendant who qualifies as a second felony offender, the statute authorizes imprisonment from twenty to eighty years.

State v. Baudier · filed 2001-05-23(A)(1)(a)

The penalty range for first degree robbery as a second felony offender is imprisonment for not less than twenty nor more than eighty years. La.R.S. 15:529.1 A(l)(a).

Section 15:529.1A(1)(a) sets second-felony-offender sentencing ranges, while § 15:529.1G requires no probation or suspension but does not bar parole.

State v. Loyd · filed 2002-02-27(A)(1)(a), (G)

Under La.R.S. 15:529.1A(1)(a), as a second felony offender, defendant faced a possible sentence of imprisonment at hard labor of not less than 24 ¾ years and not more than 99 years, without benefit of parole, probation or suspension of sentence, for the crime of attempted armed robbery. For his aggravated burglary conviction, defendant faced a possible hard labor sentence of imprisonment of not less than 15 years and not more than 60 years. La.R.S. 15:529.1G requires that any sentence imposed under the provisions of that section be without benefit of probation or suspension of sentence. It does not say without benefit of parole.

Section 15:529.1(A)(1)(a) permits a second-felony habitual offender convicted of armed robbery to receive a 198-year sentence, twice the longest sentence for a first armed-robbery conviction.

State v. Doleman · filed 2002-12-04(A)(1)(a)

Defendant was sentenced to the maximum sentence permissible as a second-felony habitual offender convicted of armed robbery, one hundred ninety-eight years at hard labor without benefit of probation, parole or suspension of sentence, twice the longest sentence provided for a first conviction of armed robbery. La. R.S. 14:64(B) and La. R.S. 15:529.1(A)(1)(a).

Section 15:529.1(A)(1)(a) exposes a second felony offender convicted of forcible rape to a sentencing range of twenty to eighty years.

State v. Carter · filed 2004-10-26(A)(1)(a)

Regarding defendant's claim that his habitual offender sentence is constitutionally excessive, we note that the trial judge imposed an enhanced sentence of thirty-seven years, which was the exact sentence imposed for the underlying conviction. As a second felony offender, defendant was exposed to a sentencing range of twenty to eighty years for forcible rape. La. R.S. 14:42.1; La. R.S. 15:529.1 A(1)(a). The imposed sentence of thirty-seven years is mid-range. We find that the sentence imposed was supported by the record and defendant's criminal history and not constitutionally excessive.

When a second felony is punishable on first conviction by less than life imprisonment, the statute sets the enhanced imprisonment term at no less than half and no more than twice the longest term prescribed for the first conviction.

State v. Alexander · filed 2005-05-31(A)(1)(a)

The habitual offender statute, La.R.S. 15:529.1 A(1)(a) provides: ... [i]f the second felony is such that upon a first conviction the offender would be punishable by imprisonment for any term less than his natural life, then the sentence to imprisonment shall be for a determinate term not less than one-half the longest term and not more than twice the longest term prescribed for a first conviction[.] Therefore, after being found a second felony offender, the Defendant could have received a sentence which ranged from two and one-half years to ten years.

Section 15:529.1(A)(1)(b)(i) subjects a third-felony habitual offender convicted of manslaughter to twenty-six years and eight months to eighty years at hard labor.

State v. Cuccia · filed 2006-03-15(A)(1)(b)(i)

Pursuant to La. R.S. 15:529.1(A)(1)(b)(i), as a third-felony habitual offender, defendant was subject to a minimum sentence of twenty-six years and eight months at hard labor and a maximum of eighty years.

Section 15:529.1(A)(1)(a) provides the sentencing range for a second felony offender, and the 2001 ameliorative sentencing provisions did not alter that range.

State v. Robert · filed 2007-03-09(A)(1)(a)

However, in the present case, the trial court imposed the mandatory minimum term of imprisonment provided by the legislature for a second felony offender convicted of distribution of marijuana, La.R.S. 40:966(B)(3); R.S. 15:529.1(A)(1)(a), and defendant made no showing below that he is the exceptional offender for whom a mandatory minimum penalty specified by the legislature is excessive as applied to him. ... In this regard, the ameliorative sentencing provisions enacted by 2001 La. Acts 403 have no bearing on defendant’s sentence, either directly or as a guide for what a trial judge might deem an appropriate punishment, see State v. Clark, 391 So.2d 1174, 1176 (La.1980)2 (“Inherent in mitigatory changes in penalty provisions of an offense is a legislative determination ... that a lesser penalty is sufficient to meet the legitimate ends of the criminal law.”) (citations omitted), as they did not change either the penalty provided for distribution of marijuana as a matter of La.R.S. 40:966(B)(3), or the sentencing range provided for a second offender by La.R.S. 15:529.1(A)(1)(a).

For a fourth felony offender convicted of cocaine distribution, this subsection produces a sentencing range of 30 years to life, making 30 years the mandatory minimum.

State v. Zeigler · filed 2007-10-24(A)(1)(c)(i)

The state presented evidence proving the defendant to be a fourth felony offender, and the sentencing range for fourth felony offenders is "for a term not less than the longest prescribed for a first conviction but in no event less than twenty years and not more than his natural life." La. R.S. 15:529.1(A)(1)(c)(i). Because Zeigler was convicted of distribution of cocaine, the mandatory minimum sentence that could be imposed upon him as a fourth felony offender was 30 years. La. R.S. 40:967(B)(4)(b). Thus, the trial court imposed the mandatory minimum sentence on the defendant.

For a fourth felony, when the offense would be punishable by less than life imprisonment on a first conviction, the statute requires a determinate sentence of at least the longest first-conviction term, but no less than twenty years and no more than life.

State v. Carmouche · filed 2008-01-30(A)(1)(c)(i)

In the instant case, the sentencing range for Defendant is thirty years to life.

Section 15:529.1(A)(2)(a) subjected this second habitual offender, whose manslaughter conviction carried a maximum forty-year term, to a sentencing range of twenty to eighty years, and the version applicable at the time of the offense did not authorize denial of parole.

State of Louisiana v. Robert Elijah Lamar Mincey AKA - Robert Bryant · filed 2009-06-03(A)(2)(a)

Pursuant to La.R.S. 14:31, the underlying manslaughter conviction subjected Defendant to a term of up to forty years. Therefore, as a second habitual offender, La.R.S. 15:529.1(A)(2)(a) subjected him to a term between twenty and eighty years. ... At the time of the offense, La.R.S. 14:31 and La.R.S. 15:529.1 did not provide for denial of parole.

Section 15:529.1(A)(l)(a) sets the enhanced sentencing range for a qualifying multiple offender at ten to forty years in this application.

State v. Carter · filed 2009-06-03(A)(l)(a)

Accordingly, the range for Defendant’s enhanced obstruction of justice sentence was ten to forty years. La.R.S. 14:130.1(B)(2); La.R.S. 15:529.1(A)(l)(a). He was sentenced as a multiple offender to ten years, in actuality the minimum enhanced sentence rather than the maximum.

For a second felony offender convicted of molestation of a juvenile, § 15:529.1(A)(2)(a) set a sentencing range of 7 ½ to 30 years, with or without hard labor.

State v. Marshall · filed 2009-10-28(A)(2)(a)

Because the defendant was adjudicated a second felony offender under La. R.S. 15:529.1(A)(2)(a), the habitual offender sentencing range for molestation of a juvenile was not less than 7 ½ years, nor more than 30 years with or without hard labor.

Section 15:529.1(A)(1)(b)(i) supplies the enhanced sentencing range for a third felony offender, and a sentence at the low end of that range is not constitutionally excessive on this record.

State v. Morgan · filed 2011-03-29(A)(1)(b)(i)

As such, he was subject to a sentencing range of 26.6 years to 80 years. La. R.S. 15:529.1 A(l)(b)(i); R.S. 14:42.1. ... In the instant case, we find that the judge did not abuse his discretion by imposing the 40-year enhanced sentence in connection with Morgan’s forcible rape Iflconviction. The sentence was at the low end of the sentencing range, and he could have been sentenced to a maximum term of imprisonment of 80 years under the multiple bill statute.

Under the version in effect at the offense, this subsection mandated life imprisonment for qualifying third-offender predicates; under the current version applicable here, it provides a maximum sentence of ten years.

State v. Hall · filed 2011-04-18(A)(1)(b)(ii)

The district court clearly misstated the sentencing range. La. R.S. 15:529.1(A)(1)(b)(ii) currently provides for a maximum sentence of ten years under the circumstances of this case.

For a fourth or subsequent felony punishable on a first conviction by less than natural life, the statute requires a determinate sentence of at least the longest term prescribed for a first conviction, with a minimum of twenty years and a maximum of natural life.

State v. Henry · filed 2012-07-25(A)(4)

Louisiana R.S. 15:529.1(A)(4), which addresses sentencing upon conviction of a fourth felony offense states, in pertinent part: ... The trial court had the discretion to sentence Henry to life imprisonment.

Section 15:529.1(A)(1) sets a second-felony offender’s sentencing range here at five to twenty years, so an eight-year sentence falls within the authorized range.

State ex rel. Nicholas v. State · filed 2016-04-22(A)(1)

The sentencing range faced by-Mr. Nicholas as a second-felony offender was a term of imprisonment of five to twenty years. See La. R.S. 15:529.1 A(1) (West 2011); 40:966 C(1) (West 2011).3 Upon Mr. Nicholas’s ádmission, the trial judge vacated his original sentence and imposed a sentence under the Habitual Offender Law of eight years. ... Thus, because the term of Mr, Nicholas’s sentence imposed under the Habitual Offender Law is within the authorized statutory range, it is a legal sentence.

Subsection (A)(1) provides a sentencing range of twenty-five to one hundred years at hard labor for a second felony offender convicted of attempted second-degree murder.

State v. Bradstreet · filed 2016-06-30(A)(1)

Defendant was subsequently adjudicated a second felony offender. The trial court vacated defendant’s sentence on count one and imposed an enhanced sentence of sixty-five years on count one. The sentencing range for a second felony offender who commits attempted second-degree murder is twenty-five tó one hundred years at hard labor. See La. R.S, 15:529.1(A)(1); La. R.S. 14:27; La. R.S. 14:30.1. ... Accordingly, we find defendant’s enhanced sentence as a second felony offender is not unconstitutionally excessive. This assignment of error lacks merit.

Subsection (G) permits a second-felony offender convicted of forcible rape to be sentenced to 20 to 80 years at hard labor, without probation or suspension of sentence and with at least two years without parole.

State v. Moody · filed 2016-11-16(G)

For his second-felony adjudication, Moody faced potential sentencing exposure of not less than 20 years, nor more than 80 years at hard labor without the benefit of probation or suspension of sentence and at least two years without benefit of parole. La. R.S. 14:42.1; La. R.S. 15:529.1(G).

For a person convicted of a second felony punishable by less than life, § 15:529.1(A)(1) sets the enhanced sentence at no less than half and no more than twice the longest term prescribed for a first conviction.

State of Louisiana v. Richardson · filed 2016-12-28(A)(1)

However, these sentences must be viewed within the context of La.R.S. 15:529.1 4 as the defendant was found to be a second felony habitual offender and, thus, under these circumstances each sentence could not have been ―less than one-half the longest term and not more than twice the longest term prescribed for a first conviction.‖ Reference to the sentences indicates that the trial court stayed within the above framework as, upon the determination that the defendant was a second felony habitual offender, it sentenced the defendant to ten years without the benefit of probation or suspension of sentence for his negligent homicide conviction; twenty-five years without benefit of probation or suspension of sentence for each conviction for attempted second degree murder; and fifteen years without the benefit of probation or suspension of sentence for the felon in possession of a firearm conviction. Accordingly, we conclude that all of the defendant‘s sentences are within the statutory range.

Section 15:529.1 permits a second felony offender convicted of attempted second degree murder to receive a 100-year sentence, which falls within the statutory sentencing range and is not illegal.

State v. Jones · filed 2017-03-22(A)(1), (A)(2)(b)

Mr. Jones claims that 100 years amounts to a life sentence, which is not authorized by the habitual offender statute under unless the two felonies are both sex offenses. See La. R.S. 15:529.1 A(2)(b). A review of the jurisprudence, however, establishes that Louisiana courts have affirmed 100-year sentences for persons convicted of attempted second degree murder and *146found to be second felony offenders. See State v. Hills, 98-0507 (La.App. 4 Cir. 1/20/99), 727 So.2d 1215; State v. Hall, 606 So.2d 972 (La. App. 3 Cir. 1992). See also State v. Douglas, 39,036 (La.App. 2 Cir. 10/29/04), 888 So.2d 982 (defendant was not adjudicated a multiple offender, but had a lengthy criminal record and was |S1 sentenced to 100 years at hard labor for attempted second degree murder), and State v. Martinez, 2009-1057 (La.App. 5 Cir. 5/25/10), 40 So.3d 1113 (habitual offender sentence for attempted second degree murder conviction of 99 years at hard labor without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence not excessive).

For a second felony offender convicted of racketeering, Section 15:529.1 provides an enhanced sentencing range of 25 to 100 years.

State v. Smith · filed 2017-08-30

As a second felony offender, under La. R.S. 15:1354(A) and La. R.S. 15:529.1, Defendant was facing an enhanced sentencing range of 25 to 100 years imprisonment.