La. Stat. Ann. § 15:529.1

Section 15:529.1(A)(3)(a) sets a third-felony offender's imprisonment range at no less than half and no more than twice the longest sentence for the underlying conviction.

State of Louisiana v. Cheley · filed 2018-01-04(A)(3)(a)

Defendant was adjudicated a third-felony offender. Under the terms of La.R.S. 15:529.1(A)(3)(a), a person convicted of a third felony “shall be sentenced to imprisonment for a determinate term not less than one-half of the longest possible sentence for the conviction and not more than twice the longest possible sentence prescribed for a first conviction.” ... Defendant was sentenced to twenty-two-and-one-half years, about which the trial court stated, “[P]ursuant to the Code of Criminal Procedure Article 894.1D, your sentence imposed was not enhanced upon the basis of any habitual offender proceedings or enhancement statutes.” Because the sentence was not imposed pursuant to enhancement, it exceeded the maximum term of imprisonment allowed for the offense of aggravated second degree battery.

For a second-felony habitual offender whose current and prior felonies are sex offenses, the statute sets imprisonment at hard labor between two-thirds of the longest possible first-offense sentence and three times that sentence, without benefits.

State v. Young · filed 2018-01-18(A)(2)(a)

A defendant adjudicated a second-felony habitual offender, whose second felony and prior felony are sex offenses as defined by La. R.S. 15:541, shall be imprisoned at hard labor for a determinate term of not less than two-thirds of the longest possible sentence for the conviction and not more than three times the longest possible sentence prescribed for a first conviction, without the benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence. La. R.S. 15:529.1(A)(2)(a). At the time of Young's offense, the punishment for attempted simple rape was not more than 12½ years imprisonment, with or without hard labor, and without the benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence. Therefore, in accordance with La. R.S. 15:529.1, as a second-felony habitual offender, with both felonies being sex offenses, defendant faced a minimum sentence of 8¼ years and maximum sentence of 37½ years at hard labor, without the benefit of probation, parole, and suspension of sentence.

For a second felony punishable by less than life imprisonment, the statute requires a determinate sentence ranging from one-half to twice the longest term prescribed for a first conviction.

State v. Bibbins · filed 2018-10-24(A)(1)

If the second felony is such that upon a first conviction the offender would be punishable by imprisonment for any term less than his natural life, then the sentence to imprisonment shall be for a determinate term not less than one-half the longest term and not more than twice the longest term prescribed for a first conviction.

Section 15:529.1(A)(1) sets a second felony offender's enhanced sentence at a determinate term of at least one-half and no more than twice the longest term prescribed for the underlying offense; here, that produced a five-to-twenty-year range.

State v. Jackson · filed 2018-11-07(A)(1)

Also, the applicable term of imprisonment for a second felony offender at the time of defendant's enhanced sentence was "for a determinate term not less than one-half the longest term and not more than twice the longest term prescribed for a first conviction."See La. R.S. 15:529.1(A)(1). Thus, as a second felony offender, defendant was subject to a sentencing range of five to twenty years imprisonment for his enhanced sentence on his underlying conviction for sexual battery, for which he was sentenced by the trial court to twenty years imprisonment at hard labor without benefits.

For a second felony offense punishable by less than life imprisonment, § 15:529.1(1) requires a determinate sentence between one-half and twice the longest term prescribed for a first conviction.

State v. Ordon · filed 2018-11-07(1)

If the second felony offense is such that upon a first conviction the offender would be punishable by imprisonment for any term less than his natural life, then the sentence of imprisonment shall be for a determinate term not less than one-half the longest term and not more than twice the longest term prescribed for a first conviction.

For a third felony offender, § 15:529.1(A)(3)(a) requires a determinate sentence of at least two-thirds of the underlying offense's maximum sentence and no more than twice that maximum.

State of Louisiana v. Broadway · filed 2019-02-27(A)(3)(a)

Pursuant to the law in effect at the time of the commission of the offenses in 2014, he was subject to a sentencing range of eight to twenty-four years, La.R.S. 15:529.1(A)(3)(a), since his most recent conviction was based on La.R.S. 14:62. For third offenders, La.R.S. 15:529.1(A)(3)(a) prescribed a sentence of “not less than two-thirds of the longest possible sentence” for the underlying offense and “not more than twice the longest possible sentence.” The underlying statute, La.R.S. 14:62(B), prescribed a sentence of “not more than twelve years.”

For a second-felony offender whose second felony is punishable by less than natural life, Section 529.1(A)(1) requires a determinate sentence of one-half to twice the longest term prescribed for a first conviction, and amendments enacted after the offense do not apply retroactively.

State v. Martin · filed 2019-05-22(A)(1)

Louisiana's Habitual Offender Law, La. R.S. 15:529.1, gives the district attorney the option to pursue increased penalties upon the defendant's conviction of a felony if the defendant has already been convicted of certain other felonies within a specified time period (and certain other circumstances are present). Upon proof of the elements of the Habitual Offender Law, sentencing within the increased range provided thereunder is mandatory.3 Applicable in this case, La. R.S. 15:529.1(A)(1) states: "If the second felony is such that upon a first conviction the offender would be punishable by imprisonment for any term less than his natural life, then the sentence to imprisonment shall be for a determinate term not less than one-half the longest term and not more than twice the longest term prescribed for a first conviction." ... Second, at the sentencing hearing, the trial court incorrectly stated that the sentencing range for a habitual offender convicted of attempted second degree murder was 16 years and 8 months to 100 years at hard labor. That range is provided for in the 2017 amendments to La. R.S. 15:529.1. Because Martin's offense was committed in 2015, the 2017 amendments do not apply and the applicable sentencing range for Martin is 25 to 100 years at hard labor. Nonetheless, Martin's sentence falls within the proper range.

For a third felony offender, the version of § 15:529.1 in effect when the offense was committed set the sentence at two-thirds to twice the longest first-offense term, while the later amendment lowered the minimum to one-half and did not retroactively apply.

State of Louisiana v. Youngblood · filed 2019-07-31(A)(3), (A)(3)(a), and (A)(1)(3)

As a third felony offender, pursuant to the provisions of La. R.S. 15:529.1A(3) in effect at the time of the offense, defendant faced a sentence of “not less than two-thirds of the longest possible sentence prescribed for a first conviction and not more than twice the longest possible sentence prescribed for the first conviction.” Accordingly, as applied to defendant, the statute provided for a minimum sentence of 10 years and a maximum sentence of 30 years. Thus, the twenty-seven year sentence imposed by the trial court is within the statutory limits in effect at the time. ... In addition, under the amended provisions of La. R.S. 15:529.1(A)(3)(a), a third felony offender shall be sentenced to not less than one-half the longest possible sentence and not more than twice the longest possible sentence for a first conviction. Thus, under the amended penalty provisions applicable to defendant’s conviction and third felony offender status, the statute now provides a sentencing range of two and a half years to ten years. ... We also find no merit to defendant’s contention that the trial court misunderstood the maximum sentencing range under the habitual offender statute. ... pursuant to La. R.S. 15:529.1(A)(1)(3), the maximum sentence as a third felony offender was not more than twice that for the first conviction, or 30 years. Therefore, we find no error in the trial court’s sentencing and no basis to remand this matter for clarification.

Section 15:529.1(A)(1) sets a second-felony offender’s sentence at one-half to twice the longest term prescribed for the first conviction when that offense is punishable by less than natural life imprisonment.

State of Louisiana v. Harris · filed 2019-08-14(A)(1)

In 2016, when Harris committed the second degree rape, La. R.S. 15:529.1(A)(1), the applicable Habitual Offender Law provision, stated: “If the second felony is such that upon a first conviction the offender would be punishable by imprisonment for any term less than his natural life, then the sentence to imprisonment shall be for a determinate term not less than one-half the longest term and not more than twice the longest term prescribed for a first conviction.” Therefore, the applicable sentencing range for Harris, a second-felony offender convicted of second degree rape, is 20 to 80 years at hard labor with at least the first 2 years to be served without the benefit of parole.

For a third-felony offender, § 15:529.1 requires a determinate term between two-thirds and twice the longest first-offense sentence, bars probation and suspension, and leaves parole eligibility to the underlying offense.

State of Louisiana v. Lee · filed 2020-04-22(G)

Under the amended effective provisions of La. R.S. 15:529.1, a third-felony offender “shall be sentenced to imprisonment for a determinate term not less than two-thirds of the longest possible sentence for the conviction and not more than twice the longest possible sentence prescribed for a first conviction[.]” The sentence shall be imposed without the benefit of probation or suspension of sentence. The benefit of parole shall be determined by the sentencing provisions of the underlying offense. La. R.S. 15:529.1(G); State v. Hopkins, 52,660 (La. App. 2 Cir. 4/10/19), 268 So. 3d 1226, 1230, writ denied, 2019-0841 (La. 9/24/19), 278 So. 3d 978. We again note that armed robbery does not allow the benefit of parole.

Section 15:529.1(A)(4) provides a sentencing range of not less than fifty years to not more than one-hundred years imprisonment for a fifth felony offender.

State of Louisiana v. Moore · filed 2020-11-12(A)(4)

Further, Defendant’s PSI listed him as a fifth felony offender. Under La.R.S. 15:529.1(A)(4), Defendant’s sentencing range would be not less than fifty years to not more than one-hundred years imprisonment.

Section 15:529.1(A)(1) requires a second-felony habitual offender whose new felony carries less than life imprisonment to receive a determinate sentence between one-half and twice the longest term prescribed for a first conviction.

State of Louisiana v. Horton · filed 2020-11-18(A)(1)

La. R.S. 15:529.1, which provides for the sentencing of a second-felony habitual offender, in pertinent part, as follows: ... (1) If the second felony is such that upon a first conviction the offender would be punishable by imprisonment for any term less than his natural life, then the sentence to imprisonment shall be for a determinate term not less than one-half the longest term and not more than twice the longest term prescribed for a first conviction. ... This Court finds that the trial court appropriately considered all factors in the second prong of sentencing Horton and that the imposition of 24 years’ hard labor on Horton as a second felony habitual offender is not constitutionally excessive.

For a fifth felony offender, § 15:529.1(A)(4)(a) provides a determinate sentence of at least the longest first-offense term, but not less than 20 years and not more than life, while § 15:529.1(G) requires hard labor without probation or suspension of sentence.

State of Louisiana v. Ellender · filed 2019-06-05(A)(4)(a) (G)

However, Defendant was adjudicated a fifth felony offender under La.R.S. 15:529.1(A)(4)(a), which held “[t]he person shall be sentenced to imprisonment for the fourth or subsequent felony for a determinate term not less than the longest prescribed for a first conviction but in no event less than twenty years and not more than his natural life.” Furthermore, La.R.S. 15:529.1(G) specifically stated “[a]ny sentence imposed under the provisions of this Section shall be at hard labor without benefit of probation or suspension of sentence.” Under La.R.S. 15:529.1(A)(4)(a) as it stood at the time of Defendant’s offense, Defendant faced a sentencing range of thirty years to life. Accordingly, Defendant’s fifty-year sentence represents the relative low-end of his potential sentencing range.

For a defendant classified as a fifth felony offender, subsection (A)(4) provides a sentencing range of 50 to 100 years’ imprisonment.

State of Louisiana v. Moore · filed 2020-11-12(A)(4)

Further, Defendant’s PSI listed him as a fifth felony offender. Under La.R.S. 15:529.1(A)(4), Defendant’s sentencing range would be not less than fifty years to not more than one-hundred years imprisonment. In light of Defendant’s status as a multiple-felony offender, we conclude the trial court did not abuse its considerable discretion in imposing a maximum sentence.

Section 15:529.1(A)(1) requires a second-felony offender whose new felony carries a sentence less than life to receive a determinate sentence between one-half and twice the longest term authorized for the first conviction.

State of Louisiana v. Horton · filed 2020-11-18(A)(1)

The sentence enhancement arises from La. R.S. 15:529.1, which provides for the sentencing of a second-felony habitual offender, in pertinent part, as follows: ... A. Any person who, after having been convicted within this state of a felony, or who after having been convicted under the laws of any other state or of the United States, or any foreign government of a crime which, if committed in this state would be a felony, thereafter commits any subsequent felony within this state, upon conviction of said felony, shall be punished as follows: ... (1) If the second felony is such that upon a first conviction the offender would be punishable by imprisonment for any term less than his natural life, then the sentence to imprisonment shall be for a determinate term not less than one-half the longest term and not more than twice the longest term prescribed for a first conviction. ... This Court finds that the trial court appropriately considered all factors in the second prong of sentencing Horton and that the imposition of 24 years’ hard labor on Horton as a second felony habitual offender is not constitutionally excessive.

For a second felony offender whose underlying crime is punishable by less than life imprisonment, Section 15:529.1(A)(1) sets a sentencing range from half to twice the longest term allowed for a first conviction.

State v. Gibson · filed 2016-03-16(A)(1)

Thus, the statutorily provided- sentencing range for a double felony offender at the time of the Mr. Gibson’s firearm possession is not less than ten years (one-half the maximum) and not more than forty years (twice the maximum). Because Mr. Gibson was sentenced to imprisonment at hard labor for ten years (the minimum), his sentence clearly falls within the authorized sentencing range and is therefore a legal sentence.

For a second felony punishable by a term less than life imprisonment, Section 15:529.1(A)(1) sets a sentence between one-half and twice the longest term prescribed for a first conviction.

State v. Hall · filed 2017-07-19(A)(1)

Relator was adjudicated a second felony offender. Pursuant to the Habitual Offender Law, in pertinent part, as it existed at the time of the offense: If the second felony is such that upon a first conviction the offender would be punishable by imprisonment for any term less than his natural life, then the sentence to imprisonment shall be for a determinate term not less than one-half the longest term and not more than *917twice the longest term prescribed for a first conviction. La.R.S. 15:529.1(A)(1). Relator's sentence was a legally imposed sentence.

Section 15:529.1(A)(2)(a) sets the imprisonment range for a third felony offender at one-half to twice the longest term for the underlying offense.

State v. Young · filed 1983-05-17(A)(2)(a)

Under the Habitual Offender Law, defendant shall be sentenced to at least one-half the longest possible sentence (2½ years), and not more than twice the longest possible sentence (10 years).

For a second felony punishable on a first conviction by less than life imprisonment, § 15:529.1(A)(1) sets a prison term between one-third and twice the longest term prescribed for a first conviction.

State v. Scott · filed 1986-10-15(A)(1)

He had a previous felony conviction for simple bur*576glary and thus was subjected to punishment under La.R.S. 15:529.1(A)(1), which provides: If the second felony is such that upon a first conviction the offender would be punishable by imprisonment for any term less than his natural life, then the sentence to imprisonment shall be for a determinate term not less than one-third the longest term and not more than twice the longest term prescribed for a first conviction; Therefore, defendant was subject to a term of imprisonment, with or without hard labor, for a minimum of two years and a maximum of twelve years.

Section 15:529.1 permits a maximum sentence of twelve years for a second offender convicted of attempted simple burglary of an inhabited dwelling.

State v. Perkins · filed 1992-01-30

Under the provisions of La.R.S. 15:529.1, the maximum sentence defendant could have received was twelve years, twice the sentence actually imposed. Defendant’s argument that he received the maximum sentence is without merit.

For a second felony punishable by less than life imprisonment on a first conviction, § 15:529.1(A)(1) sets a sentencing range from one-half to twice the longest first-conviction term.

State v. Hall · filed 1992-10-06(A)(1)

Therefore, the sentencing range for defendant was from twenty-five years to one hundred years. Defendant was sentenced to one hundred years on each count, the sentences to run consecutively.

Subsection (D)(1)(a) permits the district attorney to file a habitual-offender information at any time after a person's felony conviction or sentence when the person has qualifying prior felony convictions.

State v. Cretian · filed 2018-01-24(D)(1)(a)

The discretion to charge a defendant under the habitual offender statute lies with the district attorney. La. C.Cr.P. art. 61 ; La. R.S. 15:529.1.6 A defendant may be charged as an habitual offender at any time, even after conviction and sentence. La. R.S. 15:529.1(D).

A multiple-offender bill may be filed after conviction or sentence, but the proceedings must be completed within a reasonable time evaluated under the length of delay, its reason, assertion of the right, and prejudice.

State v. Richardson · filed 2014-11-26(D)(1)(a)

This court has recognized that in considering whether a delay in holding a multiple bill hearing is reasonable, the four factors articulated in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972), may be considered, “which are: the length of delay, the reason for the delay, an assertion of the right, and prejudice to the defendant.”

Section 15:529.1(D) permits a defendant to be charged as a habitual offender after conviction and sentencing, including after the conviction is affirmed on appeal, but the charge must be filed within a reasonable time after the State learns of a prior felony conviction.

State v. Miskell · filed 1989-01-30(D)

A defendant may be charged as an habitual offender at any time, even after conviction and sentence. La.R.S. 15:529.1(D). This means he may be charged even after his conviction is affirmed on appeal. La.R.S. 15:529.1(D) does not limit the time for filing habitual offender charges. The only limitation is that it must be done within a reasonable time after the State learns of a prior felony conviction.

A prior conviction based on a guilty plea may be used to enhance a sentence under § 15:529.1 only when a contemporaneous record establishes that the plea was valid and included a knowing waiver of constitutional rights.

State v. Thomas · filed 1989-02-28

Only when there is such a contemporaneous record establishing a valid guilty plea can the prior conviction be used to enhance a sentence under La.R.S. 15:529.1.

Section 15:529.1 does not require a court to advise a defendant that a guilty plea may later be used to file a multiple-offender bill.

State v. Madison · filed 1999-10-27

However, a court is not required to inform a defendant that his guilty plea may be used as a basis for the filing of a future multiple offender bill.

Section 15:529.1 permits enhanced punishment based on a prior guilty plea when the State proves the conviction and counsel representation or waiver, after which the defendant must show a significant procedural defect.

State v. Zachary · filed 2002-10-25(A)(1)(a)

Under the court's present jurisprudence, to use a prior guilty plea to enhance punishment under La. R.S. 15:529.1, the State need prove only the fact of conviction and that the defendant was represented by counsel (or waived counsel) at the time he entered his plea. Thereafter, the defendant bears the burden of proving a significant procedural defect in the proceedings.

Section 15:529.1 does not permit a predicate felony conviction to be counted for habitual-offender enhancement when the offense being enhanced predates the commission of that predicate offense.

State v. Favors · filed 2009-06-12

The enhanced offense in this case, which occurred on June 4, 1999, predated not only the conviction in the first alleged predicate, but also the commission of the offense in that particular predicate. The enhanced offense occurred over eight months prior to the commission of the offense alleged in predicate one. Therefore, the conviction in the Fourteenth Judicial District Court case number 6522-00 cannot be used in the tabulation of the defendant's previous felonies for purposes of the habitual offender act. See State v. Johnson, 2003-2993, p. 18 (La. 10/19/04), 884 So.2d 568, 578 (for sentencing enhancement purposes, the subsequent felony must have been committed after the predicate conviction or convictions). Thus, defendant could not have been legally adjudged a fifth-felony offender by counting that predicate conviction. ... The record lacks a basis for concluding defendant is a fifth-felony offender, but his status as a fourth-felony habitual offender was established beyond a reasonable doubt. Because the penalty for a "fourth or subsequent" felony offender is the same under the habitual offender statute, the enhanced sentence is affirmed.

Section 15:529.1 permits a prior conviction to enhance a defendant’s status from a second to a third offender for sentencing, but the same prior conviction may not be used to enhance both the underlying offense and those enhanced penalties.

State v. Foster · filed 2009-11-25

However, in the present case, although the state used the prior conviction for second offense possession of marijuana twice, double enhancement for purposes of Baker (ie., enhancement of enhanced penalties) did not occur because the state used that conviction only once on the count charging third offense possession of marijuana (to enhance the status of the crime and punishment from a second to third offense) and only once on the separate conviction for possession of cocaine with intent to distribute, to enhance defendant’s status from a second to third offender for sen*886tencing purposes under the habitual offender law in La.R.S. 15:529.1.

When a defendant challenges a Louisiana guilty plea entered after December 8, 1971, the state must prove through a contemporaneously recorded transcript that the plea was voluntary and made with awareness of its consequences before using it to enhance punishment.

State v. Sharp · filed 1980-11-10

In order to use a Louisiana state court plea of guilty made after December 8, 1971, as a prior conviction to enhance punishment in a habitual offender proceeding, the state must, if objection is made to its voluntariness or to its being a knowing plea, affirmatively show through a contemporaneously recorded transcript that the plea was voluntary and made with an awareness of its consequences.

When multiple convictions are entered on the same date, they count as one conviction for applying the habitual-offender sentencing enhancement, so only one of the counts may be enhanced.

State v. Townley · filed 1989-03-15(A)(1)

Convictions on more than one count entered on the same date should be treated as one conviction for applying the habitual offender statute. State v. Scherer, 411 So.2d 1050 (La.1982) and the cases cited therein; State v. Lambert, 475 So.2d 791 (La.App. 3 Cir.1985). The application of this principle requires that any one of the two counts of this conviction, either for simple burglary or for simple criminal damage to property, could have been enhanced by sentencing the defendant under the habitual offender bill. The record does not reflect that the trial judge enhanced either the sentence for the simple burglary conviction or the sentence for the simple criminal damage to property conviction. In fact, the sentence imposed does not exceed the statutory maximum sentence for either crime even without enhancement of sentence as a habitual offender.

For habitual-offender sentencing, multiple convictions obtained on the same date count as one conviction.

State v. Williams · filed 2006-05-18(B)

Defendant argues, and the state concedes, that the three previous convictions arising from guilty pleas entered on the same day should count as only one conviction under the applicable jurisprudence on the date of the commission of the instant offense. We agree. ... La. R.S. 15:529.1 was amended effective August 15, 2005, now requiring that multiple convictions obtained on the same date only count as one conviction, for multiple offender purposes. Accordingly the habitual offender adjudication is amended to reflect that this appellant is a third felony offender, and we remanded for re-sentencing as a third felony offender.

Section 15:529.1 does not bar applying the habitual-offender law to more than one conviction obtained on the same date.

State v. Wright · filed 2008-10-22A(1)(a)

For the reasons stated in State v. Shaw, 2006-2467 (La. 11/27/2007), 969 So.2d 1233, we note that there is no statutory bar that would have prevented the trial court from applying the habitual offender law in Wright's sentencing for more than one conviction obtained on the same date.

Section 15:529.1(B) requires multiple convictions obtained on the same day before October 19, 2004, to be counted as one conviction for habitual-offender enhancement, so a conviction used as the predicate for the firearm offense cannot also be used for that enhancement.

State v. Law · filed 2010-08-11(B)

Because La. R.S. 15:529.1 dictates that the three convictions obtained on July 12, 2001, are to be considered as one conviction for purposes of the multiple offender adjudication, and the state used at least one of the convictions for simple burglary of an inhabited dwelling as the predicate offense for the charge of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, the July 12, 2001, convictions cannot be used for enhancement purposes in the multiple offender adjudication.

Multiple convictions obtained on the same day before October 19, 2004, count as one conviction for purposes of the Habitual Offender Law, requiring sentencing under § 15:529.1(A)(4)(a) when that provision applies.

State v. Blueford · filed 2014-03-05(B), (A)(4)(a)

Because Blueford’s two convictions for simple burglary of an inhabited dwelling were entered on the same day prior to 2004, they can only be counted as one conviction. Accordingly, the district court correctly imposed the sentence for both offenses under La. R.S. 15:529.1(A)(4)(a).

Section 15:529.1 permits enhancement of only one count when multiple convictions are entered on the same day.

State v. Stack · filed 1998-04-15

Pursuant to La. R.S. 15:529.1, only one count of a multi-count indictment/information can be used to enhance the penalty when the convictions were entered on the same day.

Section 15:529.1(A)(3)(a) gives a trial judge discretion to impose life imprisonment on a fourth or subsequent felony and calls for a statement of the factual basis and considerations supporting that choice.

State v. Thompson · filed 1989-05-02(A)(3)(a)

As R.S. 15:529.1(A)(3)(a) is discretionary as to whether a trial judge should sentence an habitual offender to life imprisonment, a trial judge should state the factual basis and considerations taken into account in imposing sentence.

The habitual offender law requires the trial court to find a defendant to be a habitual offender and sentence the defendant accordingly when the State adequately proves the alleged prior conviction.

State v. Dean · filed 1994-09-15

In State v. Dean, supra, 588 So.2d at 709, this Court held that once the State has produced adequate evidence to prove its accusation that defendant has a previous conviction, the trial court has no discretion to decline to find defendant to be an habitual offender. In the present case, the State presented sufficient evidence of the previous conviction to sustain their allegation that defendant is an habitual offender. The defendant must be so sentenced.

Section 15:529.1(A) allows a federal conviction to serve as a predicate for a Louisiana multiple-offender adjudication only when the underlying offense was a Louisiana felony when committed; the federal conviction may still bear only on whether subsection (C)'s five-year cleansing period has elapsed.

State v. Wills · filed 1989-06-21(A) (C)

La.R.S. 15:529.1(A) requires that in order for a federal conviction to be used by the state as the basis of a multiple offender adjudication, the offense giving rise to the conviction must constitute a felony under the laws of this state. ... The federal convictions cannot be considered a prior felony for the purposes of the defendant’s adjudication as a fourth felony offender. To the extent that the defendant was sentenced to penal servitude for his federal crimes, the federal convictions have a bearing only on the question of whether the five-year cleansing period in La.R.S. 15:529.1(C) has elapsed since the defendant’s second felony conviction, as alleged in the multiple offender bill of information, and his subsequent Louisiana felony conviction.

Section 15:529.1 requires the State to prove the prior felony, the defendant's identity as the person previously convicted, and the applicable cleansing-period facts, while permitting a multiple bill to be filed after sentence.

State v. Bass · filed 2000-07-12(D)(1)(b), (D)

The state has the burden of proving the date of defendant's discharge from state supervision. However, if less than the cleansing period has elapsed between the defendant's conviction on a predicate felony and his commission of a subsequent predicate felony, the State need not prove the date of discharge on the earlier sentence in the multiple offender proceedings. ... To obtain a multiple offender conviction, the State is required to establish both the prior felony conviction and that the defendant is the same person convicted of that felony. ... Establishing that the defendant's name and that of the person previously convicted is the same is insufficient evidence of identity under R.S. 15:529.1. ... Thus, the statute allows filing a multiple bill of information after sentence is imposed.

Section 15:529.1(D)(1)(b) places the initial burden of proving factual issues in a habitual-offender proceeding on the State, then shifts the burden to the defendant to prove factual issues raised in a challenge to a prior conviction.

State v. Dunn · filed 2000-09-13(D)(1)(b)

Except as otherwise provided in this Subsection, the district attorney shall have the burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt on any issue of fact. The presumption of regularity of judgment shall be sufficient to meet the original burden of proof. If the person claims that any conviction or adjudication of delinquency alleged is invalid, he shall file a written response to the information. ... These documents reveal that the State met its burden of proving the validity of the guilty pleas. At that point, the burden of proof was transferred to the defendant to show that there was an infringement of his rights and/or a procedural irregularity in the plea. The defendant has not produced any evidence to meet this burden of proof. Therefore, the trial court did not err when it adjudicated the defendant to be a third felony offender.

Section 15:529.1(B) requires only that each prior conviction precede commission of the principal offense; it does not require sequential commission and conviction of the predicate felonies.

State v. Mallett · filed 1989-11-08(B)

However, we decline to follow the First Circuit's holding in Harris, finding that the 1982 amendment to La.R.S. 15:529.1(B) was a repudiation of Simmons, insofar as that case required a sequence of crimes committed and convictions for the use of prior crimes for enhancement purposes. The only sequential requirement in the statute, as it now reads, is that in order to be available for a defendant's adjudication as a multiple offender, a prior conviction must precede the commission of the principal offense.

Section 15:529.1(A) requires a defendant to commit and be convicted of one felony before committing and being convicted of the subsequent felony used for habitual-offender enhancement.

State v. Merrill · filed 1995-01-31(A)

The emphasized portions of the statute clearly require that a defendant must commit a crime and be convicted of that crime and then commit and be convicted of another crime before the multiple offender law becomes applicable.

A prior felony conviction must occur before the defendant commits the principal felony for which an enhanced multiple-offender sentence is sought.

State v. Roshell · filed 2005-12-14(A)(1)

The habitual offender provisions found in La. R.S. 15:529.1(A)(1) provide, in pertinent part, "Any person who, after having been convicted within this state of a felony ..., thereafter commits any subsequent felony within this state, upon conviction of said felony, shall be punished as follows...." (Emphasis added.) This statute and jurisprudence require that prior convictions must precede the commission of the principal offense in order for use to enhance a defendant's status as a multiple offender.

Three prior convictions entered on the same date count as one conviction for habitual offender classification.

State v. Johnson · filed 2006-12-28

The three simple burglary convictions were treated as one conviction for purposes of the habitual offender statute.

A prior conviction may be used in a habitual offender adjudication despite the prosecutor’s earlier representation of the defendant when he shows no conflict of interest affecting that conviction.

State v. Gay · filed 2014-02-26

Accordingly, the defendant has not shown a conflict of interest which would raise an issue regarding the 2000 carjacking conviction. He has shown no need for a perfect transcript of the conviction under Shelton. Therefore, we conclude that the trial court did not err when it included the fifth conviction in the habitual offender adjudication.

Section 15:529.1 counts prior felony convictions entered on the same date as only one offense for habitual offender sentencing, even when the crimes occurred on different dates.

State v. Robertson · filed 1993-03-05

An examination of the bills of information contained in State Exhibits 2, 3, and 4 indicates that defendant committed three separate offenses on three different dates. Nevertheless, since these three convictions were entered on the same date, they lacked the proper sequencing to constitute more than one offense for purposes of La.R.S. 15:529.1.

Section 15:529.1 requires a habitual-offender bill to identify the particular conviction being enhanced when several convictions are at issue.

State v. Parker · filed 1989-11-14

If the defendant is again adjudicated a second felony habitual offender, the habitual offender bill of information must specifically state which conviction is being enhanced and the trial court should impose a separate sentence for each conviction.

Section 15:529.1 permits an habitual-offender bill to be filed within a reasonable time after the prosecution learns of a prior felony, bars a defendant who fails to file the required written response from directly attacking prior convictions on appeal, and authorizes a life sentence for a third felony when the triggering offense is a crime of violence.

State v. Ball · filed 1999-12-15(D); (D)(1); (A)(b)(ii)

Although the above statute does not impose a specific prescriptive period in which the district attorney must file an habitual offender information, it has been held that it does not allow an indefinite time for filing the information once the necessary information is available. ... Rather, the district attorney must file an habitual offender bill within a reasonable time after the prosecution knows that a defendant has a prior felony record. ... In the instant case, the district attorney filed the third felony offender bill of information after learning about a felony that had been left off of the defendant's rap sheet. That felony was access device fraud, a violation of La. R.S. 14:70.4. The necessary information with regard to this prior felony conviction was apparently not available to the district attorney at the time of the filing of the original multiple felony bill of information in March 1996. Thus, the district attorney did not unreasonably delay in filing this third felony offender bill of information. The state clearly offers justification for its delay in instituting the habitual offender proceedings. Under these circumstances, the district attorney acted reasonably. ... As to his further claims that the evidence failed to prove that the prior offenses were valid, we note that in order to challenge the validity of any of his prior convictions, the defendant was required to file a written response denying the allegations set forth in the bill of information within 15 days of arraignment. La. R.S. 15:529.1 D(1). The defendant failed to file a written response. Because of his failure to comply with the statute, the defendant is barred from directly attacking the validity of prior offenses on appeal. ... As a third felony offender, the defendant was subject to a sentence of life imprisonment because the third felony, first degree robbery, was defined under La. R.S. 14:2(13) as a crime of violence. La. R.S. 15:529.1(A)(b)(ii). The defendant argues that imposition of a life sentence, given his personal history, was constitutionally excessive.

Section 529.1 requires the enhanced multiple-offender sentence to identify which conviction is being enhanced when a defendant has multiple convictions.

State of Louisiana Versus Perry J. Haydel, Jr. · filed 2025-09-24

This Court has held that a sentence is indeterminate when the trial court does not clearly designate which conviction is being enhanced under the habitual offender statute. ... Therefore, we find the multiple offender sentence is indeterminate as Haydel was convicted of seven counts of simple burglary yet only a single sentence was imposed. We find that the trial court erred since the record fails to indicate which of Haydel’s seven convictions was enhanced. Thus, we accordingly vacate that sentence and remand the case to the trial court for resentencing, with the instruction that the trial court specify which of Haydel’s seven sentences are to be enhanced.

A habitual offender bill need not identify which underlying charge is being enhanced when the defendant was convicted of multiple separate felonies on the same day.

State v. Freeman · filed 2000-10-11

Furthermore, La.R.S. 15:529.1 does not require that a habitual offender bill specify which underlying charge is being enhanced when the defendant has been convicted of multiple separate felonies on the same day.

Subsection (D)(1)(a) requires the court to inform a defendant charged as a habitual offender of the allegations, the right to have the allegations tried, and the duty to answer whether they are true; the statute also implicitly requires advice of the right to remain silent.

State v. Scott · filed 2000-11-02(D)(1)(a)

After a habitual offender information is filed, the court in which the instant conviction was had shall cause the defendant to be brought before it, shall inform him of the allegation contained in the information, shall inform him of his right to be tried as to the truth thereof according to law, and shall require the defendant to say whether the allegations are true.

Before a defendant admits a prior felony conviction in a multiple-offender proceeding, the court must advise him of his right to remain silent and to a formal hearing where the State must prove the habitual-offender allegations.

State v. East · filed 1989-11-30(D)

This section of the statute clearly recognizes that the defendant, if he chooses, has the right to remain silent. Once the defendant chooses to remain silent the state must then by competent evidence prove the elements of R.S. 15:529.1 before the defendant can be sentenced as an habitual offender. Before the defendant chooses to acknowledge or confess in open court that he has been previously convicted of a felony, the statute requires that he first be cautioned by the trial court as to his rights. R.S. 15:529.-1(D) specifically provides that defendant be advised by the court of his right to a ‘formal hearing’ and to have the state prove its case. State v. Martin, 427 So.2d 1182 (La.1983). Further, this section implicitly provides that the defendant should be advised, by the court, of his statutory right to remain silent.

Section 15:529.1 allows a defendant to plead guilty to a multiple-offender bill only after being advised of the rights to require proof of identity, receive a formal hearing, and remain silent.

State v. Edgar · filed 1990-10-30

Louisiana Revised Statute 15:529.1 provides that a defendant may plead guilty to a multiple bill only after being duly cautioned of his rights. These rights include the right to require the state to prove his identity as a multiple offender, the right to a formal hearing and the right to remain silent.

Section 15:529.1(D) requires the court to advise a defendant of the right to a formal hearing, the State's burden of proof, and the right to remain silent before accepting a guilty plea or admission in a multiple-offender proceeding.

State v. Smith · filed 1991-12-11(D)

At most multiple offender hearings the only factual issue is whether the defendant is the same individual previously convicted of a felony as alleged in the bill. Thus, it is error to accept a stipulation or a plea before advising the defendant of his rights, because an admission of identity at such a hearing is the equivalent of a plea of guilty.

Section 15:529.1(D) requires advising a defendant of the right to a formal hearing, to have the State prove the multiple-offender allegation, and to remain silent before an admission, but a defense counsel's identity stipulation made after a contested hearing does not require vacating the multiple-offender adjudication.

State v. Breaux · filed 1992-05-28(D)

Because at most multiple offender hearings the only factual issue is whether the defendant is the same individual previously convicted of a felony as alleged in the bill, it is error to accept a stipulation before advising the defendant of his rights. An admission of identity at such a hearing is the equivalent of a plea of guilty. ... In this case defendant did not acknowledge or confess in open court that he was a multiple offender. There was a trial of the issue.

Subsection (D) requires the trial court, after a multiple-offender bill is filed, to advise the defendant of the allegations, the right to have their truth tried, the obligation to answer, and the right to remain silent.

State v. Young · filed 1993-07-02(D)

La.R.S. 15:529.1(D) provides that, upon the filing of a multiple offender bill of information, the trial court shall cause the defendant to be brought before it and "shall inform him of the allegation contained in the information and of his right to be tried as to the truth thereof according to law and shall require the offender to say whether the allegations are true." The statute further implicitly provides that the defendant should be advised by the court of his right to remain silent.

Section 15:529.1(D) requires the court to advise a defendant of the right to remain silent before accepting the defendant’s admission to a multiple bill.

State v. Holmes · filed 1996-02-29(D)

La.R.S. 15:529.1(D) provides that the trial court shall inform the defendant of the allegations contained in the multiple bill of information and of his right to be tried as to the truth thereof according to law prior to asking the defendant whether the allegations are true. Furthermore, if a defendant pleads guilty to the multiple bill or "if he acknowledges or confesses in open court ... that he has been so convicted", the trial court must first duly caution him as to his rights. ... There is no indication, however, that the trial court advised the appellant of his right to remain silent prior to accepting his admission on the multiple bill of information. Applying the rule of Johnson, supra, the appellant's acknowledgement of his prior felony conviction is therefore invalid. This assignment of error has merit.

Subsection (D) requires the trial court, before accepting a defendant's guilty plea to a multiple bill or admission of the prior convictions, to inform the defendant of the bill's allegations, the right to a hearing, and the applicable rights.

State v. Lavigne · filed 1996-05-22(D)

La.R.S. 15:529.1(D) provides that the trial court shall inform the defendant of the allegations contained in the multiple bill of information and to his right to be tried as to the truth thereof according to law prior to asking the defendant whether the allegations are true. Furthermore, if a defendant pleads guilty to the multiple bill or "if he acknowledges or confesses in open court ... that he has been so convicted", the trial court must first duly caution him as to his rights. Appellant was informed of the allegations contained in the multiple bill of information, his right to a hearing on the matter, and his right to remain silent. Accordingly, his claim is without merit.

Before accepting a defendant's admission to a multiple bill, the trial court must inform him of the allegations and his right to a hearing, and caution him as to his rights.

State v. Egana · filed 1997-12-03(D)

R.S. 15:529.1(D) provides that the trial court shall inform the defendant of the allegations contained in the multiple bill of information and to his right to be tried as to the truth thereof according to law prior to asking the defendant whether the allegations are true. Furthermore, if a defendant pleads guilty to the multiple bill or "if he acknowledges or confesses in open court ... that he has been so convicted", the trial court must first duly caution him as to his rights. The trial court in this case meticulously advised Egana of his rights. Although at one point Egana stated he did not understand how he could be multiple billed, once the trial court explained the situation, he indicated that he understood.

Before accepting a defendant's guilty plea to a multiple bill, the sentencing court must advise the defendant of the right to a formal hearing at which the State must prove the prior-offender allegations and of the constitutional right to remain silent.

State v. Donaldson · filed 1999-01-06(D)(1)

The jurisprudence has clearly recognized that this section of the multiple offender statute requires that before allowing a defendant to plead guilty to a multiple bill, the sentencing court must advise the defendant of his right to a formal hearing to have the State prove its case. Implicit in this requirement is the additional requirement that the defendant be advised of his constitutional right to remain silent.

Section 15:529.1 D(1)(a) requires the trial court to advise a defendant who admits habitual-offender allegations of the right to a hearing and the right to remain silent.

State v. Jones · filed 1999-02-10(D)(1)(a)

Louisiana jurisprudence has consistently held that in an habitual offender proceeding in which defendant pleads or admits to any allegation in the bill of information, the trial court must advise a defendant of his right to a hearing at which the state is required to prove the allegations of the habitual offender bill, and of his right to remain silent. La.R.S. 15:529.1 D(1)(a); State v. Cummings, 95-1377 (La.2/28/96), 668 So.2d 1132, 1135; State v. Rose, 97-943 (La.App. 5th Cir. 1/27/98), 708 So.2d 1093, writ denied, 98-0673 (La.8/28/98),723 So.2d 416, 1998 WL 755080. The failure to so advise a defendant is generally reversible error when defendant pleads to any of the allegations in the habitual offender bill of information. ... In this case, the state failed to produce any evidence as to the alleged prior convictions. Additionally, there is nothing in the record to indicate that defendant understood he was entitled to a trial and to remain silent. ... Since the record lacks any evidence that defendant knowingly and voluntarily waived his rights, we find that the habitual offender adjudication must be vacated and remanded.

Before accepting a guilty plea to a multiple bill, the sentencing court must advise the defendant of the right to a formal hearing and the constitutional right to remain silent.

State v. Donaldson · filed 1999-01-06(D)(1)

The jurisprudence has clearly recognized that this section of the multiple offender statute requires that before allowing a defendant to plead guilty to a multiple bill, the sentencing court must advise the defendant of his right to a formal hearing to have the State prove its case. Implicit in this requirement is the additional requirement that the defendant be advised of his constitutional right to remain silent.

Section 529.1(G) does not authorize the trial court to deny parole eligibility, while § 529.1(D) requires advisement of the multiple-bill allegations and the defendant's rights before accepting a plea or admission.

State v. Davis · filed 1999-03-24(G), (D)

The trial court erred in imposing the sentences without benefit of parole because neither La. R.S. 14:65.1 nor La. R.S. 15:529.1(G) prohibit parole eligibility.[1] Moreover, eligibility for parole is to be determined by the Department of Public Safety and Corrections, not the trial court. La. R.S. 15:574.4; St. Amant v. 19th Judicial Dist. Court, 94-0567 (La.9/3/96), 678 So.2d 536. Therefore, this prohibition is hereby deleted from their sentences. ... La. R.S. 15:529.1(D) provides that the trial court shall inform the defendant *713 of the allegations contained in the multiple bill and of his right to be tried as to the truth thereof before asking the defendant if the allegations are true; and, if a defendant pleads guilty to the multiple bill or acknowledges in court that he has a previous conviction, the court must first duly caution him as to his rights. Implicit in this requirement is that the defendant be advised of his constitutional right to remain silent.

Subsection (D) requires the court to advise a multiple-offender defendant of the right to a hearing, the State's burden to prove the allegations, and the right to remain silent before accepting an admission.

State v. Hannon · filed 1999-05-26(D)

The trial judge must also advise the defendant of his right to remain silent. ... The record indicates that thedefendant was advised that he was relinquishing his privilege against self-incrimination before the trial court found him to be a multiple offender. The trial court followed the procedure set out in La. R.S. 15:529.1(D), and there is no merit in this assignment.

Section 529.1(D) requires the court, before accepting a defendant’s admission or guilty plea in a multiple-offender proceeding, to advise the defendant of the right to a formal hearing, to require the state to prove identity, and to remain silent.

State v. Musgrove · filed 2000-12-15(D)

At a multiple offender hearing, an admission of identity is the equivalent of a plea of guilty. Because at most multiple offender hearings the only factual issue is whether the defendant is the same individual previously convicted of the felony alleged in the bill, it is error to accept a stipulation or a plea of guilty before advising the defendant of his right to a formal hearing, his right to require the state to prove his identity as a multiple offender, and his right to remain silent. La. R.S. 15:529.1(D); State v. Johnson, supra; State v. Manning, 30,809 (La.App.2d Cir.6/24/98), 715 So.2d 668; State v. Breaux, 599 So.2d 917 (La.App. 4th Cir. 1992).

Section 15:529.1 requires a direct court-to-defendant colloquy advising the defendant of the statutory rights before the court accepts an acknowledgment, confession, or guilty plea to habitual-offender allegations; advisement at a different hearing through counsel is insufficient.

State v. Tyrone · filed 2001-02-16D(3)

The underlying purpose of the court’s duty to initiate a personal colloquy with the defendant, in which the court verbally reviews statutorily specified legal rights and options available to defendant, serves to insure that defendant makes an informed plea. In the instant matter, the fact that the court’s verbalization of defendant’s rights and defendant’s plea occurred at two completely different hearings, stretches the statutory directive to the point that it fails to satisfy the requirement that the defendant’s acknowledgment or confession shall occur “in open court, after being duly cautioned as to his rights[J” La. R.S. 15:529.1D(3). The disjunctive impartation of the statutorily required rights by the court in this case blurs the concept of direct interaction between the court and the defendant to insure that defendant is making an informed decision. Moreover, in this particular instance, there was no direct colloquy between defendant and the court because defendant’s counsel was the intermediary in communications at both hearings. Such a dilution of the dictates of La. R.S. 15:529.1 clearly does not comply with a strictly construed interpretation of the statute.

Section 15:529.1(D)(1)(a) requires that a defendant be advised of the right to a hearing and the right to remain silent before stipulating to a multiple bill.

State v. Bradley · filed 2001-06-27(D)(1)(a)

However, the record does not indicate that defendant was advised of his right to a hearing and right to remain silent in connection with the multiple bill as required by La. R.S. 15:529.1(D)(1)(a). The failure of a defendant to be advised of these rights before stipulating to the multiple bill is reversible error.

Section 15:529.1 requires the trial court to advise a defendant before accepting an admission to a habitual offender bill of the rights to remain silent and to a hearing at which the State must prove the allegations.

State v. Williams · filed 2003-04-08(D)(1)(a)

In a habitual offender proceeding, a trial court must advise a defendant of his right to remain silent, and of his right to a hearing, at which the state is required to prove the allegations in the habitual offender bill of information. La. R.S. 15:529.1 D(1)(a); State v. Johnson, 432 So.2d 815, 817 (La.1983); State v. Jones, 99-972, p. 7 (La.App. 5th Cir.2/29/00), 757 So.2d 110, 114, writ denied, 00-1186 (La.9/21/01), 797 So.2d 58.

Section 15:529.1(D)(1)(a) requires advising a defendant who admits the habitual-offender allegations of the specific allegations, the right to a formal hearing at which the State must prove its case, and the constitutional right to remain silent; failure to give those advisements makes an admission-based adjudication reversible error.

State v. Mason · filed 2003-12-10(D)(1)(a)

La. R.S. 15:529.1(D)(1)(a) requires that the Defendant be advised of the specific allegations contained in the habitual offender bill of information and his right to a formal hearing at which the State must prove its case. Implicit in this requirement is the additional requirement that the Defendant be advised of his constitutional right to remain silent.

Before accepting a defendant's admission as a multiple offender, the court must advise him of the rights to a formal hearing, to require the state to prove his identity as a multiple offender, and to remain silent.

State v. Martin · filed 2005-08-17(D)

Before accepting a defendant's admission that he is a multiple offender, the trial judge must specifically advise the defendant of his right to a formal hearing, his right to require the state to prove his identity as a multiple offender, and his right to remain silent. La. R.S. 15:529.1(D). A trial court's failure to properly advise a defendant of his rights under the habitual offender law constitutes patent error on the face of the record and requires that the habitual offender's adjudication and sentence be vacated. State v. Mason, 37,486 (La.App. 2 Cir. 12/10/03), 862 So.2d 1077. The habitual offender adjudication and sentence must be vacated and the matter remanded to the trial court for further proceedings.

Before accepting a defendant's stipulation to multiple-offender status, the trial court must advise the defendant of the rights to remain silent, to a formal hearing, and to require the State to prove its case.

State v. Schnyder · filed 2006-06-28(D)

Therefore, a trial court must advise a defendant of his rights to remain silent, to a formal hearing, and to have the State prove its case under the multiple offender statute. State v. Jones, 00-1259 (La.App. 5 Cir. 12/13/00), 777 So.2d 563, 568-569.

Section 15:529.1(D) requires the court to advise a defendant of specified habitual-offender hearing rights, including the right to remain silent, before accepting an admission or stipulation; the omission may be harmless when the record shows an informed written waiver.

State of Louisiana v. Badeaux · filed 2012-06-06(D)(1)(a), (D)(3)

Before a defendant stipulates to the charges in a habitual offender bill of information, the trial court must advise the defendant of the specific allegations contained in the multiple bill, his right to be tried as to the truth thereof, and his right to remain silent. LSA-R.S. 15:529.1(D)(1)(a) and (3). ... However, we find that this error was harmless in light of the fact that defendant executed a Waiver of Rights--Plea of Guilty as Multiple Offender under LA R.S. 15:529.1 form, in which he acknowledged with his initials and signature that he had reviewed a copy of the bill of information for the multiple bill and understood that he had a right to a hearing as well as the right to remain silent throughout such a hearing. ... Consequently, this court finds that the trial court’s error of not advising Defendant of his right to remain silent was harmless.

Section 15:529.1 requires the court to advise a defendant of the rights to a formal hearing, proof by the prosecution, and silence before the defendant admits the multiple-bill allegations, but does not require that advisement when the defendant denies the allegations and proceeds to a formal hearing.

State v. Jones · filed 2015-04-01(D)(3)

A criminal defendant need not be informed of these rights, however, following that defendant’s decision to deny the allegations contained in the multiple bill and to proceed to a full adjudication by formal hearing of the defendant’s habitual offender status. ... The Habitual Offender Law only affords the protections that Mr. Jones seeks to those defendants that confess their statuses as habitual offenders. ... We find no error in the trial judge’s failure to advise Mr. Jones of his right to remain silent as Mr. Jones was not entitled to such advisement as a matter of law.

Section 15:529.1(D)(3) requires that a defendant be advised of the right to a formal multiple-offender hearing and to remain silent before admitting the multiple bill; a rights colloquy and waiver form may establish a knowing and intelligent waiver.

State v. Cuza · filed 2019-04-24(D)(3)

If the record reflects that the defendant was advised of his multiple offender rights by the trial judge and/or his attorney, then the defendant intelligently waived his rights.

Before a defendant admits a multiple-offender bill, § 15:529.1(D)(3) requires the court to caution him about his right to a formal hearing, the State's burden to prove the allegations, and his right to remain silent.

State v. Cuza · filed 2019-04-24(D)(3)

If the record reflects that the defendant was advised of his multiple offender rights by the trial judge and/or his attorney, then the defendant intelligently waived his rights.

Section 15:529.1(D) requires the court to advise a defendant who admits multiple-offender status of his rights to a formal hearing, to require the state to prove his identity as a multiple offender, and to remain silent.

State of Louisiana v. Nobles · filed 2020-05-20(D)(1)(a)

Before accepting a defendant’s admission that he is a multiple offender, the trial court must specifically advise the defendant of his right to a formal hearing, his right to require the state to prove his identity as a multiple offender and his right to remain silent. La. R.S. 15:529.1(D); State v. Grimble, 51,446 (La. App. 2 Cir. 7/5/17), 224 So. 3d 498; State v. Odom, 34,054 (La. App. 2 Cir. 11/1/00), 772 So. 2d 281. A trial court’s failure to properly advise a defendant of his rights under the habitual offender statutes constitutes patent error on the face of the record and requires that the habitual offender’s adjudication and sentence be vacated.

Section 15:529.1(D)(1)(a) requires the court to advise a defendant facing habitual-offender allegations of the allegations, the right to contest them at a hearing, and the constitutional right to remain silent before accepting an admission.

State v. Hart · filed 2011-05-10(D)(1)(a)

LSA-R.S. 15:529.1 D(1)(a) provides that the trial court shall inform a defendant of the allegations contained in the bill of information and of his right to be tried as to the truth thereof according to law. Implicit in this directive is the additional requirement that the defendant be advised of his constitutional right to remain silent.

Section 15:529.1(D) requires the court to advise a defendant of the allegations, the right to contest them, and the right to remain silent before accepting a habitual offender stipulation.

State v. Griffin · filed 1988-05-17(D)

However, the trial court did not advise defendant of the specific allegations contained in the multiple offender bills of information, his right to be tried as to the truth of the allegations, and his right to remain silent, before obtaining his stipulation to the provisions thereto. These failures of the trial court constitute error patent on the face of the record and require that the habitual offender sentences adjudications and sentences be vacated.

Section 15:529.1 permits only one of multiple convictions entered on the same day to be enhanced under the habitual offender statute.

State v. Leagea · filed 1989-12-19

At the habitual offender adjudication hearing, the trial court did not specify which conviction was being enhanced as a second felony under La.R.S. 15:529.1. Therefore, we must conclude that both convictions were enhanced as second felonies under this statute. Such a result is prohibited by the so-called "one day, one conviction, rule." ... When two or more convictions are entered on the same day, only one such conviction can be enhanced under the habitual offender statute.

Section 15:529.1 permits an enhanced sentence based on a prior conviction only after that conviction has become final, and the offender classification made under it does not control the Department’s separate parole-eligibility calculations.

Townley v. DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY & CORR. · filed 1996-11-01

This court has previously held that a conviction must have become final before it can serve as a basis for an enhanced sentence under La.R.S. 15:529.1. ... Therefore, as Townley's 1988 convictions for simple burglary and criminal damage to property were not final, they could not be used under the Habitual Offender Law, La.R.S. 15:529.1, to enhance his sentence. ... Thus, the Department is not bound by the district court's adjudication of Townley's habitual offender status under La.R.S. 15:529.1 when the Department is making its calculations to determine parole eligibility under La.R.S. 15:574.4.

Section 15:529.1 treats a multiple-offender proceeding as part of sentencing for enhanced penalties, not as a separate criminal trial.

State Of Louisiana v. Smith · filed 2025-11-03

As “a multiple offender proceeding is not the trial of a criminal charge” but instead is “merely part of sentencing and allows enhanced penalties for repeat offenders,” the trial court’s adjudication of relator’s habitual offender status pursuant to La. R.S. 15:529.1 does not run afoul of Erlinger’s holding.

Section 15:529.1 permits separate habitual-offender counting of multiple prior felony convictions arising from the same date or occasion, but a felony used as the predicate for a felon-in-possession conviction cannot also be used to enhance that sentence.

State of Louisiana v. Allen · filed 2025-12-22

Codified under La. R.S. 15:529.1, the statute applies enhanced sentences for defendants who have committed multiple felonies. The language of the statute must be strictly construed. ... To hold that Defendant’s prior convictions arising from a single incident do not count separately would defy the purpose of the Habitual Offender Statute. ... As already discussed, the Louisiana Habitual Offender Statute, as interpreted by our jurisprudence, allows for convictions arising from the same occasion to be counted separately. ... However, both cannot be counted to enhance his felon in possession sentences because at least one formed the basis for the predicate offense to convict him.

Section 15:529.1 permits multiple convictions obtained on the same date, including convictions arising from a single criminal act or episode, to be counted as separate predicate offenses for habitual-offender sentence enhancement.

State of Louisiana v. Jones · filed 2026-03-17(B)

As recognized by this Court in Allen, the Louisiana Supreme Court in Shaw expressly held that La. R.S. 15:529.1 contains no prohibition against enhancing multiple sentences obtained on the same date, even where the convictions arise from a single criminal act or episode. Accordingly, Defendant’s attempt to distinguish Shaw lacks merit.

For habitual-offender enhancement, convictions arising from a single criminal episode count as only one predicate conviction.

State v. Cass · filed 2009-08-19(A)(1)

Convictions arising out of a single criminal episode may be counted as only one predicate conviction for purposes of La. R.S. 15:529.1.

Section 15:529.1 requires the predicate conviction to precede the felony being enhanced and counts multiple convictions obtained on the same day before October 19, 2004, as one conviction.

State of Louisiana v. Carl J. Webb, Jr. · filed 2014-10-01(A), (B)

We find that Defendant is correct in his assertion that the trial court erroneously used his instant convictions for illegal possession of stolen firearms as predicates to enhance his instant sentence for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. By doing so, the trial court violated the sequencing procedure set forth in La.R.S. 15:529.1(A)—conviction of the predicate offense and then commission of the offense being enhanced. ... Thus, the only remaining prior convictions listed on the habitual offender bill were Defendant’s two prior convictions for simple burglary on May 3, 2001, in Cameron Parish. Consequently, it was legal error for the trial court to adjudicate Defendant as a fourth felony offender.

For habitual-offender purposes, felony convictions on the same day count as only one felony conviction, so they do not trigger mandatory life imprisonment under § 15:529.1(A)(4)(b).

State v. Modique · filed 2016-01-27(A)(4)(b), (B)

The nature of the defendant’s prior felonies did not qualify him for mandatory life imprisonment under La. R.S. 15:529.1(A)(4)(b) because his 1999 felony convictions for armed robbery and burglary were on the same day, and under La. R.S. 15:529,1(B), only counted as one felony conviction for the purposes of the habitual offender statute.

Section 15:529.1(A) treats a person who, after a prior felony conviction, commits a subsequent Louisiana felony as a habitual offender.

State v. Ford · filed 2019-06-19A

Pursuant to La. R.S. 15:529.1 A, a habitual offender is "[a]ny person who, after having been convicted within this state of a felony, or who, after having been convicted under the laws of any other state or of the United States, or any foreign government of a crime which, if committed in this state would be a felony, thereafter commits any subsequent felony within this state." ... To prove that a defendant is a habitual offender, the State must establish by competent evidence defendant's prior felony convictions and that defendant is the same person who was convicted of the prior felonies. ... We find the State presented competent evidence at the hearing that defendant was a fourth-felony offender.

Section 15:529.1 does not enhance a sentence when the state files no habitual offender bill and the trial court makes no habitual offender finding.

State v. Golden · filed 2017-06-02

The minute entry from defendant’s sentencing indicates that , these sentences have been enhanced pursuant to La. R.S. 15:529.1, but the state did not file a habitual offender bill of information, and the trial court made, no habitual offender finding at the time of sentencing. ... Therefore, there is no habitual offender adjudication in the instant case, and the sentences imposed are legal under the applicable sentencing provisions.

The version of § 15:529.1 in effect when the offense was committed governs the sentencing range, rather than a later amendment that took effect before sentencing.

State v. Latiolais · filed 1990-05-30

La.R.S. 15:529.1 was amended by Acts 1989, No. 482, § 1. This act became effective September 8, 1989. However, the offense herein took place on September 8, 1988. Therefore, the provisions of La.R.S. 15:529.1 on the length of sentences for second and subsequent felony offenders as it read prior to the above amendment were applicable.

Section 15:529.1 requires a habitual-offender sentence to be imposed under the version of the law in effect when the defendant committed the underlying offense.

State v. Kennon · filed 2019-05-22(K)(1)

Thus, the punishment to be imposed on a habitual offender is that provided by La. R.S. 15:529.1 as it exists on the date a defendant commits the underlying offense.

For a qualifying pre-June 15, 2001 offense, the ameliorative amendments to § 15:529.1 apply retroactively when the defendant committed, was convicted of, and was sentenced for the offense before that date, replacing the former mandatory-life provision with the applicable determinate range.

State of Louisiana Versus · filed 2019-09-04(A)(1)(b)(i), (A)(1)(b)(ii)

Under the version of La. R.S. 15:529.1(A)(1)(b)(ii) in effect in 1999, at the time of the commission of the underlying offense of armed robbery, defendant faced a sentence of life imprisonment without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence due to his underlying conviction of armed robbery and his predicate conviction of sexual battery, both crimes of violence. ... Therefore, defendant falls within the class of persons where retroactive application under La. R.S. 15:308(B) of the 2001 legislative changes ameliorates his circumstances.

A defendant is not entitled to resentencing under the 2017 amendments when the predicate conviction falls within both the former and amended cleansing periods and the imposed habitual-offender sentence falls within both versions' sentencing ranges.

State of Louisiana Versus Delcome David Evans · filed 2020-06-03(C), (C)(1), (A)(1), (G)

Thus, we find defendant is not entitled to resentencing based upon the 2017 changes to La. R.S. 15:529.1. This assignment of error is without merit.

Section 15:529.1’s 2001 sentencing amendment does not apply to habitual offender sentences for crimes committed before the amendment took effect.

State v. Nichols · filed 2004-03-30(A)(1)(b)

However, the Louisiana Supreme Court has held that the changes mandated by Act 403 do not apply to sentences imposed for crimes committed before the act’s effective date. State v. Barnes, 02-2059 (La.4/4/03), 845 So.2d 354. This rule extends to habitual offender sentences imposed pursuant to La. R.S. 15:529.1. State v. Barnes.

Subsection G governs the sentencing consequences imposed by the trial court after a defendant is adjudicated a multiple offender, including prohibitions on probation or suspension of sentence.

State v. Smith · filed 1990-10-30(G)

Additionally, the prohibition against probation or suspension of sentence under La.R.S. 15:529.1 G is different from the prohibition against good time under La.R.S. 15:571.3 for certain classes of defendants. La.R.S. 15:529.1 deals with sentencing guidelines for the trial court once it has adjudicated a defendant as a multiple offender. R.S. 15:571.3 deals with the authority of the sheriff and the director of corrections as to when they can and cannot grant good time.

Section 15:529.1 enhances the penalty for a person previously convicted of a felony, and ordinarily leaves the court no discretion to sentence a repeat felony offender outside its provisions once the prior conviction is established.

State v. McFarland · filed 1991-04-16

The Habitual Offender Law, La.R.S. 15:529.1, provides for enhancement of penalties for persons previously convicted of one or more felony offenses. ... Ordinarily, once an offender is convicted of a subsequent felony, and the State files its habitual offender bill of information and meets its burden of establishing the previous conviction(s), the court has no discretion to sentence the offender other than in accordance with the provisions of La.R.S. 15:529.1.

Subsection (G) limits a court's ability to suspend or probate a habitual offender's sentence but does not prevent applying sentence conditions required by the underlying substantive criminal statute, including parole ineligibility.

State v. Demouchet · filed 1992-03-11(G)

It is clear that La.R.S. 15:529.1(G), as part of the enhancement statute, was enacted to limit a judge's ability to suspend or probate the sentence of a habitual offender. The statute was not meant to limit the implementation of the sentence provisions found in the individual substantive criminal statutes of Title 14. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in sentencing defendant to confinement "without benefit of parole" since the underlying substantive criminal statute, La.R.S. 14:64, contains such a sentence provision.

Section 15:529.1 precludes probation or suspension of sentence for a person sentenced under the multiple offender statute, but it does not preclude parole.

State v. Lewis · filed 1999-02-03

La. R.S. 15:529.1, however, precludes probation or suspension of sentence for a person sentenced under the multiple offender statute. Thus, the trial court erroneously denied the defendant the possibility of parole.

Section 15:529.1 does not require a second habitual-offender hearing when a prior hearing established the defendant as a second habitual offender and the State does not seek to prove a third-offender enhancement on remand.

State v. Kennerson · filed 1998-06-03

Defendant asserts the trial court should have conducted another habitual offender hearing to establish that he was a second habitual offender. This court thoroughly reviewed the habitual offender proceeding and confirmed that the State had in fact proven that Defendant was a second habitual offender. The trial court was not required to conduct another habitual offender hearing in order to establish Defendant was a second habitual offender. This court vacated Defendant's sentence as a third habitual offender, not as a second habitual offender. This court instructed the trial court that they could sentence Defendant as a second habitual offender if the State chose not to attempt to prove Defendant was a third habitual offender. The trial court, in sentencing Defendant as a second habitual offender, complied with the mandates of this court. A second habitual offender hearing was not necessary since the State did not try to enhance Defendant's sentence as a third habitual offender. Therefore, this assignment lacks merit.

Before imposing a habitual-offender sentence under § 15:529.1, the court must vacate the defendant's original sentence.

State v. Taylor · filed 1998-07-29(D)(3)

The trial court must vacate the original sentence before imposing sentence under the multiple bill. La.R.S. 15:529.1(D)(3).

Section 15:529.1(D)(3) requires the trial court to vacate the defendant's original sentence when resentencing the defendant as a habitual offender.

State v. Walton · filed 1999-03-24(D)(3)

Similarly, in cases involving habitual offender hearings, La.R.S. 15:529.1(D)(3) requires the trial court to vacate the originally imposed sentence when resentencing defendant as an habitual offender.

Section 15:529.1 enhances the sentencing range for a second felony offender, and the court may impose less than the mandatory minimum only in the rare case where that minimum is clearly and convincingly excessive under the constitution.

State v. Carter · filed 1999-10-27

Because defendant was adjudicated a second felony offender, he was subject to an enhanced sentence under La. R.S. 15:529.1 of not less than 15 nor more than 60 years. Thereafter, the trial court sentenced defendant to the minimum term of 15 years hard labor, 5 years less than what he had received before he was adjudicated an habitual offender. ... It would have been error if the trial court had imposed a lesser sentence than the minimum mandated by law. To do otherwise would have been a usurpation of the Legislature's intent to deter and punish recidivism.

Subsection (D)(3) does not require the court to impose a sentence for the latest conviction before imposing the enhanced sentence for a multiple offender.

State v. Burton · filed 1999-09-01(D)(3)

Finally, Burton argues that the trial court violated La. R.S. 15:529.1(D)(3) by sentencing him as a multiple offender without first imposing an underlying sentence. However, the statute merely provides that the court "shall vacate the previous sentence if already imposed ..." (emphasis added). The statute thus prevents an offender from having two sentences: one for the most recent conviction by itself and one for that conviction as enhanced by the statute's primary provisions. Contrary to Burton's contention, the plain language of the statute does not require that a sentence for the most recent conviction be imposed before the sentence required for a multiple offender is imposed.

For a third felony offender whose third felony would carry less than life imprisonment upon a first conviction, the statute requires a determinate sentence of at least two-thirds of the longest possible first-offense sentence and no more than twice that maximum.

State of Louisiana v. Muse · filed 2023-09-27(3)(a)

Any sentence by the trial court for a habitual offender must fall within the sentencing requirements of the habitual offender statute.

Section 15:529.1 applies according to the sentencing law in effect when the underlying offense was committed, but a mandatory habitual-offender sentence may still be reduced when imposing it would be constitutionally excessive under Dorthey.

State v. Houston · filed 2003-10-01

Therefore, considering the Supreme Court's specific approval of this Court's prior decision in this case, the defendant's contention that the 2001 amendments to La. R.S. 15:529.1 should have been applied to reduce his mandatory minimum sentence to less than life imprisonment has no merit. ... Accordingly, as in Wilson and Rice, we find that this assignment of error has merit. We vacate the defendant's sentence and remand the matter to the district court for consideration of sentence as permitted in Dorthey and in consideration of La.C.Cr.P. art. 894.1.

Section 15:529.1 permits a second felony offender convicted of unauthorized use of a motor vehicle to be sentenced to five to twenty years' imprisonment.

State v. Pitre · filed 2006-03-01

The defendant admitted that he was convicted on October 30, 2003, of simple burglary. Accordingly, he was adjudicated a habitual offender. Pursuant to La.R.S. 15:529.1 and La.R.S. 14:68.4, the defendant could have been sentenced to a term of imprisonment from five to twenty years with or without hard labor. The defendant was sentenced to serve six years at hard labor.

Section 15:529.1(G) requires a habitual-offender sentence to be served at hard labor without probation or suspension of sentence, and those conditions are added to—not substituted for—the sentence conditions required for the underlying felony.

State v. Nickles · filed 2011-04-13(G)

La. R.S. 15:529.1(G) provides that any sentence imposed under the provisions of this section shall be at hard labor without benefit of probation or suspension of sentence. Regarding the imposition of a sentence without benefit of parole, the conditions imposed on the sentence are those called for in the sentencing provisions for the underlying felony offense. See State v. Bruins, 407 So.2d 685 (La.1981); State v. Richard, 550 So.2d 300 (La.App. 2d Cir.1989). The sentence conditions required by La. R.S. 15:529.1(G) are additions to, rather than replacements of, those conditions required by the sentencing provisions for the underlying offense.

Section 15:529.1 A(4)(a) authorizes a fourth felony offender to receive twenty years to life, while Subsection G bars probation or suspension of sentence.

State v. Fontenot · filed 2012-02-22A(4)(a), G

The prosecution established, and Mr. Fontenot did not contradict, that the current conviction is his fourth felony conviction. Although only 29 years old at the time of this conviction, Mr. Fontenot has already been convicted of the crimes of simple robbery, possession of cocaine, and manufacturing and/or delivering a controlled dangerous substance. Thus, he was eligible for punishment for a period of not less than twenty years up to a life sentence. La. R.S. 15:529.1 A(4)(a). He was not eligible for probation or suspension of sentence. La. R.S. 15:529.1 G.

Section 15:529.1(G) requires enhanced sentences to be imposed without probation or suspension of sentence, but does not itself authorize denial of parole; parole restrictions come from the reference statute.

State of Louisiana v. Guilllory · filed 2015-10-07(G)

Although Section G of La.R.S. 15:529.1 requires all enhanced sentences to be imposed without benefit of probation or suspension of sentence, it does not authorize the trial court to impose enhanced sentences without benefit of parole.

Section 15:529.1 sets the enhanced sentencing ranges for second-felony habitual offenders based on the longest sentence for the underlying offense.

State of Louisiana v. Bryant · filed 2020-03-04(A)(2)(a), (A)(1)

As a second-felony habitual offender under La. R.S. 15:529.1(A)(2)(a), Bryant faced a potential sentence of two-thirds to three times the longest sentence, or 33 to 150 years, because he had a prior conviction for sexual assault. ... Under La. R.S. 15:529.1(A)(1), Bryant faced a potential sentence of one-half the longest sentence to two times the longest sentence, or 49.5 to 198 years.

Under the pre-Act 482 version of § 15:529.1(A)(1), a second-felony offender whose new felony carries a sentence of less than life imprisonment must receive a determinate term of at least one-third and no more than twice the longest term prescribed for a first conviction.

State v. Patterson · filed 1990-12-18(A)(1)

As a Second Felony Habitual Offender, defendant's penalty exposure for the instant armed robbery was imprisonment at hard labor without benefit of parole, probation or suspension of sentence for a minimum term of thirty-three years and a maximum term of one hundred ninety-eight years. La.R.S. 15:529.1 A(1).[6] Herein, defendant received the mandatory minimum sentence of thirty-three years at hard labor.

Section 15:529.1(A)(1) makes a person with a second felony conviction subject to imprisonment of no more than twice the longest term prescribed for a first conviction.

State v. Jones · filed 1992-10-06(A)(1)

Pursuant to La.R.S. 15:529.1, upon Jones’ second felony conviction, he is subject to imprisonment of not more than twice the longest term prescribed for a first conviction. See La.R.S. 15:529.1(A)(1).

When a habitual offender bill is filed under § 15:529.1(A)(1), a second felony offender's punishment for vehicular homicide is enhanced to 7½ to 30 years.

State v. Guillory · filed 1994-04-27(A)(1)

Because a habitual offender bill was filed under LSA-R.S. 15:529.1(A)(1), defendant's punishment on count one must be enhanced to not less than 7½ years nor more than 30 years in accordance with the provisions of that statute.

Section 15:529.1 provides the applicable habitual-offender sentencing range of 15 to 60 years for this second felony offender.

State v. Davis · filed 2004-10-27

While the habitual offender bill cited both La. R.S. 15:529.1 and 40:982, the trial court noted this error during the proceedings and elected to proceed solely under La. R.S. 15:529.1. Therefore, defendant’s sentence was enhanced only once under the habitual offender statute. ... Under the habitual offender statute, La. R.S. 15:529.1, defendant, as a second felony offender, faced a sentence range of 15 to 60 years.

Section 15:529.1(G) requires a sentence imposed under the habitual offender law to be served without probation or suspension of sentence, but it does not authorize denial of parole.

State v. Schroeder · filed 1990-12-20(G)

However, La.R.S. 15:529.1(G) provides that a sentence imposed under the habitual offender law be served without benefit of probation or suspension of sentence. The statute does not provide for the denial of parole.

For a multiple offender, any sentence imposed under § 15:529.1 cannot include probation or suspension of sentence.

State v. Stansberry · filed 1996-02-29(G)

Under La.C.Cr.P. art. 893 a trial court is allowed to suspend a sentence “where suspension is allowed under the law_” According to La.R.S. 15:529.1 a multiple offender’s sentence “shall be without the benefit of probation or suspension of sentence.” The trial court erred by suspending the defendant’s sentence. The sentence is vacated and the case remanded for resentencing in accordance with La.R.S. 15:529.1.

Section 15:529.1(G) makes sentences imposed under the Habitual Offender Law ineligible for probation or suspension.

State v. Patrick · filed 1998-10-28(G)

The penalty range for attempted first degree robbery as a second felony offender is thus 10 years to 40 years imprisonment at hard labor. Although this section does not by its terms prohibit parole for a second felony offender, the disability against parole carries over from the underlying sentencing provision. See State v. Bruins, 407 So.2d 685 (La.1981). Sentences imposed under the Habitual Offender Law are not subject to probation or suspension. La. R.S. 15:529.1(G).

Section 15:529.1 requires a habitual-offender sentence to be served without benefit of probation or suspension of sentence.

State v. Arrington · filed 1999-04-21

However, the trial court failed to state that the sentence was to be served without benefit of probation or suspension of sentence as required by La. R.S. 15:529.1.

Subsection (G) requires a habitual-offender sentence to be served without benefit of probation or suspension of sentence.

State v. Curtis · filed 1999-06-01(G)

Further, it fails to require the sentence be served without benefit of probation or suspension of sentence as required by the habitual offender statute, La.R.S.15:529.1(G). However, the appellate courts are prohibited from acting to correct illegally lenient sentences where the prosecution has failed to preserve the issue for appeal by a motion or objection in the trial court.

Subsection (G) requires multiple-offender sentences to be without probation or suspension of sentence, but imposes no parole restriction; parole limits come from the reference statute and cannot be applied to the entire enhanced term.

State v. Tate · filed 1999-11-24(G); (A)(1)(a)

La.R.S. 15:529.1(G) provides that any sentence imposed under the statute's multiple offender provision "shall be without benefit of probation or suspension of sentence." ... La.R.S. 15:529.1(G) does not place any restrictions on parole eligibility. However, La.R.S. 40:967(G) requires that a defendant serve without eligibility for parole the mandatory minimum terms provided by the legislature if convicted of an offense under La.R.S. 40:967(F). In addition, the restrictions on parole eligibility imposed on multiple offender sentences under La.R.S. 15:529.1 "are those called for in the reference statute." ... Because La.R.S. 40:967(G) allows and requires the district judge to deny parole eligibility only for the minimum terms provided by La.R.S. 40:967(F), the district judge erred in denying parole eligibility for the entire second offender term imposed under La.R.S. 15:529.1(A)(1)(a).

Subsection (G) bars the trial court from suspending or probating any portion of a sentence imposed under the habitual-offender statute.

State v. Coleman · filed 2000-06-21(G)

In accordance with La.R.S. 15:529.1(G), the trial court could not suspend or probate any portion of the sentence.

Subsection (G) requires a habitual-offender sentence to be without benefit of probation or suspension of sentence, but it does not itself make the entire sentence ineligible for parole.

State v. Toca · filed 2000-09-06(G)

Section G provides that with respect to any person to whom the provisions of Section F apply, the sentence shall not be suspended and the defendant shall not be eligible for parole or probation prior to serving the minimum sentence. La. R.S. 15:529.1(G) provides that any sentence shall be without benefit of probation or suspension of sentence. Thus, the sentence imposed on defendant improperly provides that the entire sentence is to be without benefit of parole when parole ineligibility should have been limited to the first ten years of the sentence.

Subsection (G) requires a sentence imposed under the habitual-offender statute to be without benefit of probation or suspension of sentence.

State v. Bowman · filed 2001-06-20(G)

The trial court failed to impose the sentence without benefit of probation or suspension of sentence in accordance with La. R.S. 15:529.1(G). Because the state has failed to appeal this sentencing error, this court may not correct this illegally-lenient sentence, nor may we remand for resentencing.

Subsection (G) makes the entire habitual-offender sentence unavailable for probation or suspension of sentence.

State v. Ricks · filed 2003-02-19(G)

Under La. R.S. 40:967(B)(4)(b), the first two years of the sentence are without benefits; however, under La. R.S. 15:529.1(G), the entire sentence is without benefit of probation or suspension of sentence.

Section 15:529.1(G) requires a habitual-offender sentence to be served without benefit of probation or suspension of sentence.

State v. Howard · filed 2003-03-19(G)

As part of the first assignment, the defendant maintains that an error patent occurred in that he was sentenced for his entire term without benefit of parole, probation or suspension of sentence. However, the transcript of sentencing on May 10, 2002, indicates that his eighteen and one-half year term was imposed without probation or suspension of sentence as mandated by La. R.S. 15:529.1(G). The defendant's parole eligibility was not considered although under La. R.S. 40:967(B)(4)(b) a sentence must be imposed without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence for five years. Thus, the sentence appears to be illegally lenient because parole was not restricted.

In a habitual-offender proceeding, the court must advise the defendant of the multiple-bill allegations and the rights to a hearing and silence; failure to do so is harmless when the State proves the offender status with competent evidence and the defendant does not testify.

State v. Ruffin · filed 2002-12-30(D)(1)(a)

Therefore, the trial court's failure to advise the defendant of the specific allegations against him and of his right to be tried and to remain silent was harmless error.

Subsection (G) requires a habitual-offender enhanced sentence to be imposed without benefit of probation or suspension of sentence.

State v. Rogers · filed 2003-06-19(G)

Further, we note that the trial judge failed to stipulate that defendant’s enhanced sentence would be without benefit of probation or suspension of sentence |12as required by La. R.S. 15:529.1(G). Pursuant to La. R.S. 15:301.1, the sentence is deemed to contain these restrictions. See, State v. Segura, 02-280, pp. 11-12 (La.App. 5 Cir. 9/30/02), 829 So.2d 587, 592, writ denied, 02-2696 (La.3/28/03), 840 So.2d 569. Accordingly, no corrective action is needed.

Subsection (G) makes a multiple-offender sentence subject to the restrictions of no probation or suspension of sentence, and those restrictions apply by operation of law even if the judge does not state them.

State v. Gardner · filed 2005-06-28(G)

In imposing the multiple offender sentence, the trial judge failed to state that this sentence was to be served without benefit of probation or suspension of sentence, pursuant to La. R.S. 15:529.1(G). This error patent does not require any action, because La. R.S. 15:301.1(C), as interpreted by State v. Williams, 00-1725 (La.11/28/01), 800 So.2d 790, 799, imposes these restrictions by operation of law. State v. Mitchell, 04-136 (La.App. 5 Cir. 6/29/04), 877 So.2d 1151, 1157.

Section 15:529.1(G) requires habitual-offender sentences to be imposed without benefit of probation or suspension of sentence.

State v. Roberts · filed 2007-09-19(G)

According to La. R.S. 15:529.1(G), all habitual offender sentences are to be imposed without benefit of probation or suspension of sentence.

Section 529.1(G) makes a sentence imposed under the Habitual Offender Law ineligible for probation or suspension of sentence.

State of Louisiana v. Dugas · filed 2012-04-25(G)

However, when Defendant was sentenced as a habitual offender, he was no longer eligible for probation, suspension of sentence, or diminution of sentence for good behavior. La.R.S. 15:529.1(G) and La.R.S. 15:571.3(C)(1).

Sentences imposed under La. R.S. 15:529.1 must be served without benefit of probation or suspension of sentence.

State v. Davis · filed 2013-01-16(G)

However, La. R.S. 15:529.1(G) provides that all sentences imposed under the statute are to be served without benefit of probation or suspension of sentence. However, paragraph A of La. R.S. 15:301.1 provides that in instances where the statutory restrictions are not recited at sentencing, they are included in the sentence given, regardless of whether or not they are imposed by the sentencing court.

Section 15:529.1 requires a multiple-offender sentence to be served without probation or suspension of sentence, and the restriction applies even if the sentencing court omits it.

State v. Breaux · filed 2013-02-27(G)

The multiple offender sentence imposed under La. R.S. 15:529.1 must be served without the benefit of probation or suspension of sentence. La. R.S. 15:529(G). The trial court omitted reference to the sentence being served without benefit of probation or suspension of sentence. However, La. R.S. 15:301.1(A) provides that in instances where the statutory restrictions are not recited at sentencing, they are deemed contained in the sentence, whether or not imposed by the sentencing court.

When the statute provides a sentencing range, a life-without-parole maximum should be imposed only when carefully articulated findings and reasons justify it.

State of Louisiana v. Daye · filed 2014-05-07(A)(4)(a)

If the applicable enhancement statute provides a range of sentences for the trial court to consider, then the maximum sentence of life without parole should not be levied unless carefully articulated findings and reasons for sentencing clearly justify its imposition.

(G) requires habitual-offender sentences to be served without probation or suspension of sentence.

State v. Garrison · filed 2017-03-29(G)

Our review of the record for errors patent reveals one. In sentencing Defendant as a second-felony offender, the district court failed to restrict Defendant's sentence in conformity with La. R.S. 15:529.1(G), requiring all sentences be served without benefit of probation or suspension of sentence. However, in light of this Court's finding that Defendant is a third-felony offender and must be resentenced; this patent error is rendered moot.

Subsection (G) requires every sentence imposed under the habitual-offender statute to be served at hard labor without benefit of probation or suspension of sentence.

State v. Harvey · filed 2017-05-02(G)

G. Any sentence imposed under the provisions of this Section shall be at hard labor without benefit of probation or suspension of sentence. Harvey was sentenced, as a third-felony offender, to 16 years at hard labor. The trial court did not impose Harvey’s sentence without the benefit of probation or suspension of sentence, as mandated by La. R.S. 15:529.1(G). We accordingly amend the sentence to require that it be served without benefit of probation or suspension of sentence.

Subsection (G) requires any sentence imposed under the habitual-offender statute to be at hard labor without probation or suspension of sentence.

State v. Obrien · filed 2018-04-04(G)

During sentencing, the trial court did not expressly specify whether Defendant's sentence was to be served with or without benefits. However, the trial court did state "[h]e" stands convicted of the offenses charged and he stands proven a multiple offender. Louisiana Revised Statutes 15:529.1(G) expressly provides: "[a]ny sentence imposed under the provisions of this Section shall be at hard labor without benefit of probation or suspension of sentence." Thus, Defendant's sentence is to be served without benefits.

For a second felony committed before the 2017 amendment, the habitual-offender sentence is one-half to twice the longest term for the underlying offense, and the entire sentence must be at hard labor without benefit of probation or suspension of sentence.

State of Louisiana v. Miller · filed 2020-04-22(A)(1), (G)

At the time of this offense, La. R.S. 15:529.1(A)(1) provided that if the second felony was such that upon a first conviction the offender would be punishable by imprisonment for any term less than his natural life, then the sentence to imprisonment would be for a determinate term not less than one-half the longest term and not more than twice the longest term prescribed for a first conviction. ... La. R.S. 15:529.1(G) requires that any sentence imposed under the provisions of this section shall be at hard labor without benefit of probation or suspension of sentence. The penalty range for vehicular homicide, after applying the habitual offender statute, would be imprisonment for not less than 15 years and not more than 60 years. Under La. R.S. 15:529.1(G), the entire sentence must be imposed without benefit of probation or suspension of sentence.

Under subsections (C) and (F), the five-year period runs from the defendant’s actual discharge from custody and supervision, and the State must prove that the period has not elapsed.

State v. Wheeler · filed 1990-12-20(C) and (F)

The five year period begins to run from the date the defendant is actually discharged from State custody and supervision. ... The burden of proof is on the State to show the five year period has not elapsed. ... The State must prove this fact as an element of a multiple offender adjudication. Thus it was error for the trial court to sentence defendant under the provisions of La.R.S. 15:529.1.

Section 15:529.1(C) bars using a prior conviction for habitual-offender enhancement when more than five years have elapsed between expiration of the prior conviction's maximum sentence and commission of the current felony.

State v. Williams · filed 1992-11-24(C)

Although not expressed, this court's earlier ruling in Williams was based on the conclusion that La.R.S. 15:529.1(C) prohibits the use of a conviction where more than five years have elapsed between the expiration of the maximum sentence on the prior conviction and the commission of the present offense.

When more than seven years separates the predicate conviction from the current felony, the State must prove the defendant's actual discharge date to establish that the prior felony falls within § 15:529.1(C)'s cleansing period; if the predicate falls within the period, discharge-date proof is unnecessary.

State v. Brown · filed 1999-03-10(C)

In Raymond, we also held the state must prove the predicate convictions fall within the cleansing period, which is calculated from the actual date of discharge from supervision by the Department of Corrections, if the time between the date of conviction of the predicate offense and the date the current crime was committed is more than the cleansing period. Id. at 1013. If the predicate offenses fall within the cleansing period, proof of the discharge dates on the predicate offenses is unnecessary. Id. ... As more than seven years elapsed between the date of the commission of the underlying felony offense (September 29, 1994) and the date of the previous felony conviction (November 19, 1981), the state had to prove the date of discharge for the defendant's original felony conviction in order to use the previous conviction as a predicate offense. ... Thus, the state did not prove that the defendant's prior felony fell within the cleansing period.

The seven-year cleansing period in § 15:529.1(C), as amended before the current felony, applies to prior convictions even when a shorter period was in effect when those convictions occurred, without violating ex post facto principles or fundamental fairness.

State v. Brady · filed 1999-03-16(C)

Howell was adjudicated a fourth felony offender based on predicate convictions in 1981, 1984, and 1993. La. R.S. 15:529.1(C) provided in 1995, at the time of the instant offenses, that the habitual offender statute would not be applicable in cases where more than seven years had elapsed since the expiration of the maximum sentence of the previous conviction and the present felony offense. ... The application of the seven-year cleansing period is not the application of an ex post facto law, nor is such application otherwise fundamentally unfair to defendant.

Section 15:529.1(C) does not apply when more than ten years have elapsed between expiration of the prior sentence and commission of the latest felony, excluding time served in prison; actual discharge from supervision marks expiration, and the State need not prove discharge dates when fewer than ten years separate the convictions.

State v. Collins · filed 2002-08-21(C)

This Section shall not be applicable in cases where more than ten years have elapsed since the expiration of the maximum sentence or sentences of the previous conviction or convictions, or adjudication or adjudications of delinquency, and the time of the commission of the last felony for which he has been convicted. In computing the period of time as provided herein, any period of servitude by a person in a penal institution, within or without the state, shall not be included in the computation of any of said ten-year periods.

Section 15:529.1(C) measures the five-year period from the expiration of the prior sentence to the commission of the new offense, including when the prior sentence was consecutive to another sentence.

State v. Lynch · filed 1977-03-18(C)

The present burglary offense was committed on June 23, 1974. It was within the requisite five years of “the expiration of *1063the maximum sentence, or sentences, of the previous conviction,” La.R.S. 15:529.1 C: ... Under the showing made, this consecutive sentence for the extortion conviction did not expire until 1972, thus within five years of the commission of the present burglary offense.

Section 15:529.1(F) permits properly certified penitentiary records to prove prior convictions, subsection (C) applies a five-year period that had not elapsed here, and subsection (A)(3)(b) requires life imprisonment for the qualifying fourth-offender conviction.

State v. Lewis · filed 1991-03-13(F), (C), and (A)(3)(b)

In this case, the record contains the affidavit of Ella M. Peterson, who is the Records Custodian for the Louisiana Department of Public Safety and Corrections, Corrections Service. This affidavit certifies that defendant's "penitentiary packet" contains true and correct copies of the records from the Louisiana Department of Public Safety and Corrections regarding the defendant. ... Since this affidavit accompanied defendant's "penitentiary packet," it was properly admitted into evidence. ... The dates listed above show that the five-year period provided in La.R.S. 15:529.1(C) had not elapsed. ... Therefore, defendant was properly convicted under the habitual offender statute. ... Therefore, under La.R.S. 15:529.1A(3)(b), the judge had no choice but to sentence defendant to life imprisonment.