La. Stat. Ann. § 15:529.1

Section 15:529.1 requires the State, after a defendant denies the habitual-offender allegations, initially to prove only that the defendant was represented by counsel when entering the guilty plea for the predicate conviction; further proof is required only upon affirmative evidence of a rights infringement or procedural irregularity.

State v. Drummer · filed 1999-12-22

If the defendant denies the allegations of the habitual offender bill of information, the State must prove only that defendant was represented by counsel at the taking of a guilty plea in order to meet its initial burden of proving a prior conviction for sentence enhancement under La. R.S. 15:529.1. State v. Shelton, 621 So.2d 769, 779 (La.1993); State v. Guy, 97-1387, p. 12 (La.App. 4 Cir. 5/19/99), 737 So.2d 231, 238. Only if the defendant comes forward with some affirmative evidence showing an infringement of his rights or a procedural irregularity in the taking of the plea will the State have to prove more. Guy, supra.

Section 15:529.1(D) requires the trial court, before accepting a defendant’s admission as a multiple offender, to advise the defendant of the rights to a formal hearing, to require the State to prove identity, and to remain silent; failure to give the advisement is harmless when the State instead establishes habitual-offender status with competent evidence.

State of Louisiana v. McKeever · filed 2023-09-27(D)

Before accepting a defendant’s admission that he is a multiple offender, the trial court must specifically advise the defendant of his right to a formal hearing, his right to require the state to prove his identity as a multiple offender and his right to remain silent. La. R.S. 15:529.1(D); State v. Nobles, 53,453 (La. App. 2 Cir. 5/20/20), 296 So. 3d 1192; State v. Grimble, 51,446 (La. App. 2 Cir. 7/5/17), 224 So. 3d 498; State v. Odom, 34,054 (La. App. 2 Cir. 11/1/00), 772 So. 2d 281. The failure to advise a defendant of these rights is considered harmless error when the defendant’s habitual offender status is established by competent evidence offered by the State at the hearing rather than by admission of the defendant.

Section 15:529.1A(1) requires the predicate felony conviction to occur before the defendant commits the subsequent felony for habitual-offender enhancement.

State v. Gilbert · filed 2000-04-25(A)(1)

The Louisiana Supreme Court has determined that La. R.S. 15:529.1 contains a sequential requirement for enhanced penalties in the sentencing of habitual offenders.[6] ... The court reasoned, "[t]he cornerstone of that scheme is that felons graduate to second offender status, not by committing multiple crimes, but by committing a crime or crimes after having been convicted."[7] ... Since the conviction for the predicate offense did not occur prior to the commission of the instant offense, the required sequential order is not in place. Although Gilbert admitted to being a habitual offender, he is not in fact a habitual offender under the provisions of La. R.S. 15:529.1 and the prior conviction cannot be used to enhance his sentence.

Section 15:529.1(C) permits an adult felony conviction to serve as a predicate for habitual-offender enhancement, while a juvenile delinquency adjudication cannot serve that role.

State of Louisiana Versus Juan Canales · filed 2025-08-14(C)

Upon review of Relator’s application we find that … [t]he use of Relator’s 2000 conviction … as a predicate offense to enhance his sentence for sexual battery of a juvenile in 2015 was authorized by La. R.S. 15:529.1(C), then and now. ... In Brown, the Louisiana Supreme Court held that a prior juvenile adjudication of delinquency cannot be used as a predicate offense, under La. R.S. 15:529.1, to enhance the sentence on an adult felony conviction. ... The relator’s predicate felony conviction was not a juvenile conviction and was properly charged in the multiple bill to which he pled guilty.

Section 15:529.1 permits a court to adjudicate a defendant a habitual offender based on prior felony convictions and impose an enhanced penalty as part of sentencing, rather than treating the proceeding as a separate criminal charge.

State of Louisiana Versus Noel Austin · filed 2025-09-12

As “a multiple offender proceeding is not the trial of a criminal charge” but instead is “merely part of sentencing and allows enhanced penalties for repeat offenders,” the trial court’s adjudication of relator’s habitual offender status pursuant to La. R.S. 15:529.1 does not run afoul of Erlinger’s holding.

The cleansing period applicable to a multiple-offender enhancement is the period in effect when the current offense was committed, and a defendant has no vested right to an earlier, shorter period.

State v. Richardson · filed 2001-02-07

The cleansing period of ten years of La. R.S. 15:529.1 in effect at the time Mr. Richardson committed his most recent crime (simple burglary) controls the penalties that the trial court must apply to the conviction on the multiple bill. ... That is, the applicable enhancement statute is the one existing at the time of the commission of the offense for which the sentence is to be enhanced.

Section 15:529.1 permits a habitual-offender enhancement when the predicate conviction used to establish a current second-offense drug conviction is not also used in the chain of prior convictions for the habitual-offender proceeding.

State v. Iverson · filed 2003-09-24(D)(1)(a)

His argument that the state is trying to enhance the penalty as a third offender using a conviction that has already been enhanced is without merit. Because the 1997 conviction for possession of a controlled dangerous substance was used only once to support the status conviction and is not included in the chain of convictions used in the subsequent habitual offender proceeding, defendant's position is incorrect. His argument would only be correct if the state had attempted to charge him as a fourth felony offender using the 1997 conviction as one of those four convictions. Here, the state properly charged the defendant as a third felony offender, and the trial court was correct in denying the motion to quash. This assignment of error lacks merit.

Section 15:529.1 permits a felony conviction to support habitual-offender enhancement when the same underlying felony was not also used to establish the predicate status offense; that circumstance is not impermissible double enhancement.

State v. Baker · filed 2006-06-28

The habitual offender law, La. R.S. 15:529.1, does not expressly define restrictions on which crimes may serve as predicates for certain status crimes. ... Using his December 16, 1996, conviction of aggravated battery, the state charged Baker with possession of a firearm by a convicted felon in violation of La. R.S. 14:95.1, and Baker entered a guilty plea. Based upon Baker’s firearm violation and the September 13,1999, conviction for felony possession of stolen things, Baker was adjudicated an habitual offender pursuant to La. R.S. 15:529.1. No impermissible double enhancement occurred in Baker’s case.

Section 15:529.1 permits habitual-offender enhancement of a sentence for a La. R.S. 14:95.1 conviction when the prior felony used as an element of the firearm offense is not also used in the habitual-offender bill.

State v. Baker · filed 2008-01-07

Instead, we hold that, in order to give a genuine construction to La. R.S. 14:95.1, according to the fair import of the words of the statute, taken in their usual sense, and in connection with the context and with reference to the purpose of the provision, a sentence imposed under La. R.S. 14:95.1 may be enhanced under the habitual offender law, as long as the prior felony conviction used as an element in the firearms conviction is not also used as a prior felony conviction in the habitual offender bill of information.

Section 15:529.1 permits a sentence for third-offense marijuana possession to be enhanced under the habitual-offender law so long as none of the marijuana convictions used in the offense is also used as a predicate felony in the habitual-offender bill.

State v. Brooks · filed 2008-10-29(A)(1)

Applying that reasoning to the instant case, we conclude that a sentence for possession of marijuana, third offense, can be enhanced under the habitual offender law as long as none of the marijuana convictions are used as prior felony convictions in the habitual offender bill of information. Thus, there is no prohibition of enhancement in the instant case.

Section 15:529.1 provides for post-conviction sentence enhancement through a multiple-offender proceeding before the judge, after the required allegations are proven or acknowledged, and the jury has no role in that enhancement.

State of Louisiana v. Guidry · filed 2017-03-15(D)(1)(a), (D)(3)

The procedure under the Habitual Offender Law, La. R.S. 15:529.1, allows for a sentence to be enhanced based on the degree of a defendant’s recidivism. ... It is only “when the judge finds” the defendant has been convicted of a prior felony or felonies, or the defendant acknowledges such status, that the court “shall sentence him to the punishment prescribed in this Section.” La. R.S. 15:529.1(D)(3). ... A multiple offender bill is generally not filed until after conviction, such that it does not logically constitute the “law of the case” for the subject offense at trial as it pertains to the scope of the jury’s duty as the factfinder. The jury has no role in the enhancement of a sentence under the Habitual Offender Law, because once the multiple offender bill is filed after conviction, the adversarial hearing is conducted before the judge and the State must prove to the judge the allegations in the multiple offender bill. ... We thus hold that to allow such disclosure constitutes error. ... because the jury has no constitutional or statutory role in the enhancement of a sentence under the Habitual Offender Law, we find the trial court erred in allowing a jury to be informed of the possible sentence should the defendant be convicted and his sentence enhanced under the Habitual Offender Law. Accordingly, the district court’s ruling is reversed, the stay issued by this court is hereby lifted, and the matter is remanded to the district court for further proceedings.

Section 15:529.1 enhances the sentence for the underlying offense after a habitual offender adjudication; it does not impose a separate sentence.

State v. LeBlanc · filed 1987-10-07

Initially, defendant argues that he was sentenced twice; once under the habitual offender statute, La.R.S. 15:529.1 and once under La.R.S. 14:52 for simple arson with damage amounting to more than $500.00. The record does not substantiate these allegations. Defendant was adjudicated to be an habitual offender and his sentence for the crime of simple arson was enhanced because of his habitual offender status.

Section 15:529.1A(3)(a) authorizes a fourth felony offender convicted of the specified offense to receive a sentence ranging from 20 years to life, and the maximum sentence is upheld when the trial court does not abuse its sentencing discretion.

State v. Green · filed 1983-08-15(A)(3)(a)

He was found guilty of possession of a Schedule II controlled dangerous substance, preludin, and sentenced to life imprisonment as a fourth felony offender under La.R.S. 15:529.1A(3)(a). This section of the habitual offender statute provides for a term of imprisonment of not less than 20 years nor more than the offender's natural life. ... We therefore find this assignment of error is without merit.

Section 15:529.1 permits a defendant in a multiple-offender proceeding to challenge a prior guilty plea with other substantial evidence of a Boykin defect when the plea transcript is unavailable through no fault of his own.

State v. Jennings · filed 1983-06-03

However, we find that he has presented sufficient proof that a transcript of his 1976 guilty plea to robbery is missing from the records of the Circuit Court for Mobile County, Alabama, and is unavailable through no fault of his own. He was therefore entitled to have the trial court consider at the multiple offender hearing other evidence of a substantial Boykin defect in that plea colloquy, including his own testimony. State v. Smith, 415 So.2d 930 (La.1982) (on rehearing). Accordingly, we set aside defendant’s adjudication as a second offender, vacate his sentence to five years at hard labor, and remand this case to the trial court for resentencing in accord with law.

Section 15:529.1 authorizes a proceeding to enhance the sentence for a subsequent offense, rather than prosecute a separate criminal charge.

State v. Belton · filed 1983-11-28

A proceeding pursuant to the habitual offender law is not a prosecution for a separate criminal charge. It is to enhance the penalty for the subsequent offense; it only involves the sentencing for that crime.

Section 15:529.1(D)(1)(b) bars appellate review of a challenge to a prior guilty plea when the defendant did not file the required written response and did not preserve the issue at the multiple-offender hearing.

State v. Rice · filed 2000-02-16(D)(1)(b)

Defendant did not file a written response as required by La. R.S. 15:529.1, and he orally objected at hearing only to the trial court’s finding regarding the “not guilty” language in the above-mentioned minute entry. Therefore, this issue is not preserved for review on appeal.

A sentencing court must presume a mandatory minimum habitual-offender sentence constitutional and may depart from it only on clear and convincing evidence that rebuts that presumption.

State v. Armstrong · filed 2000-02-16(A)(1)(c)(ii)

a sentencing judge must always start with the presumption that a mandatory minimum sentence under the Habitual Offender Law is constitutional. A court may only depart from the minimum sentence if it finds that there is clear and convincing evidence in the particular case before it which would rebut this presumption of constitutionality.

For a fourth felony offender whose current and two prior felonies do not fall within the offenses listed in Subparagraph (b) and are not punishable by more than twelve years, Subparagraph (a) permits a sentence ranging from twenty years to life imprisonment.

State v. Thomas · filed 1984-02-27(A)(3)(a)-(b)

Defendant's prior convictions were for crimes other than those enumerated in subparagraph (b): (1) theft and receiving stolen things, LSA-R.S. 14:67 and LSA-R.S. 14:69; (2) attempted simple burglary, LSA-R.S. 14:62 and LSA-R.S. 14:27; and (3) theft, LSA-R.S. 14:67. None of these offenses carry a possible sentence in excess of twelve years. Therefore, defendant, as a fourth offender, could have been sentenced from a minimum of twenty years to a maximum of life imprisonment and he received the maximum.

Section 15:529.1(A)(1) sets the applicable sentencing range for a second felony offender, including a minimum sentence of 33 years at hard labor without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension for this armed-robbery conviction.

State v. Phillips · filed 1984-04-03(A)(1)

As a second felony offender, defendant could have received a maximum sentence of 198 years imprisonment at hard labor without probation, parole or suspension of sentence and a minimum sentence of not less than 33 years at hard labor without probation, parole or suspension of sentence. La.R.S. 14:64 and La.R.S. 15:529.1(A)(1); State v. Bruins, 407 So.2d 685 (La.1981).

Section 15:529.1(A)(1) mandates the enhanced sentencing range for a second felony offender convicted of armed robbery, and the habitual-offender statute validly limits the sentencing considerations otherwise listed in La.Code Crim.P. art. 894.1.

State v. Richardson · filed 1984-10-09(A)(1)

As an habitual offender, whose second felony conviction was for armed robbery, defendant's sentencing exposure was from a minimum period of incarceration of 33 years at hard labor without benefit of probation, parole or suspension of sentence to a maximum sentence of 198 years imprisonment at hard labor without benefit of probation, parole or suspension of sentence. La.R.S. 14:64; La.R.S. 15:529.1(A)(1). Defendant was sentenced to the statutorily mandated minimum period of incarceration. La.R.S. 15:529.1, which provides enhanced penalties for multiple offenders based on repetition of criminal conduct, has been upheld against attacks that it deprived the trial judge of control over sentencing. See, State v. Lawson, 410 So.2d 1101 (La.1982). La.R.S. 15:529.1 is a valid limitation on the sentencing considerations listed in La.Code Crim.P. art. 894.1. Id.

Section 15:529.1 permits a constitutionally valid prior guilty plea and resulting conviction to serve as the basis for enhancing a defendant’s sentence.

State v. Britton · filed 1984-05-10

We find that this language was adequate to inform the defendant that he had a right to a trial by jury, which right was waived with the entry of his plea of guilty. Since the defendant’s 1979 guilty plea was constitutionally valid, it formed the proper basis for an enhancement of his sentence in this case. La.R.S. 15:529.1. For these reasons, this assignment of error lacks merit.

A guilty plea obtained in violation of an accused's constitutional rights is invalid and may not be used as the basis for enhancing punishment under La. Stat. Ann. § 15:529.1.

State Ex Rel. Martin v. State · filed 1985-01-18

A guilty plea obtained in violation of an accused's constitutional rights is invalid, and may not serve as a basis for enhancing punishment under La.R.S. 15:529.1.

Section 15:529.1(D)(1)(b) bars a defendant from directly attacking the validity of alleged prior offenses after failing to challenge them before sentencing, while Section 15:529.1(A)(1)(b)(ii) makes life imprisonment without benefits mandatory for a third-felony offender when the present or a prior conviction is a crime of violence.

State v. Rice · filed 1999-03-31(D)(1)(b); (A)(1)(b)(ii)

The defendant made no written objection to the petition filed, no objection to the previous convictions prior to sentencing and no motion to quash the habitual offender bill of information. Therefore, the defendant is barred under La. R.S. 15:529.1(D)(1)(b) from directly attacking the validity of the prior offenses on appeal. ... Pursuant to the Habitual Offender Law, if the present or previous conviction is defined as a crime of violence, a third-felony offender shall be imprisoned for the remainder of his natural life without the benefit of parole, probation, or the suspension of sentence. La. R.S. 15:529.1(A)(1)(b)(ii).

Subsection (F) provides a non-exclusive method for proving multiple-offender status; to make a prima facie showing, the state must establish the actual sentence served and the defendant's date of discharge.

State v. Killion · filed 1986-02-14(F)

La. R.S. 15:529.1(F) provides a non-exclusive method by which the state may show that the defendant is a multiple offender. The state may introduce a statement of the court in which the defendant was originally convicted, the date and time of the sentence, the length of time of imprisonment, and date of discharge, all of which are prima facie evidence of imprisonment and discharge of the person. ... By failing to show the actual sentence served by defendant, however, the state has not proved a prima facie case against defendant on his multiple bill hearing. The state should have proven defendant's date of discharge. Because the state did not make a prima facie showing of defendant's imprisonment and discharge, the trial court was in error in adjudicating the defendant a third offender.

Section 15:529.1 requires the State to prove both the prior felony conviction and that the defendant is the same person convicted of it before imposing habitual-offender enhancement.

State v. Powell · filed 2001-01-24

To obtain a multiple bill conviction, the State is required to establish both the prior felony conviction and that the defendant is the same person convicted of that felony. State v. Hawthorne, 580 So.2d 1131 (La.App. 4 Cir.1991).

Subsection (F) provides a prima facie method for proving a prior felony conviction, but it does not exclude proof by other competent evidence.

State v. King · filed 2006-06-28(F)

Prima facie proof of a prior felony conviction may be established by compliance with La. R.S. 15:529.1(F). However, this provision is not the exclusive method of proving a prior felony conviction: any other competent evidence may be used to establish such proof.

Section 15:529.1(F) permits a qualified corrections-records custodian to certify DOC pen-pack records for use in a habitual-offender proceeding, and does not require the pages to be numbered or the affidavit to list its attachments.

State of Louisiana v. Hood · filed 2012-10-03(F)

Likewise, in the instant case, the affidavit of Ella Peterson indicates that she was employed as the custodian of records for the Louisiana Department of Public Safety and Corrections (Corrections Services, at the Office of Probation and Parole), and that the attached documents were true copies of the records of the Louisiana Department of Public Safety and Corrections regarding Michael Hood #402384. The affidavit was signed by Ms. Peterson, notarized, and dated May 4, 2009. In light of this court’s ruling in Stewart, we find that Ms. Peterson was qualified under La.R.S. 15:529.1 to sign the affidavit certifying the records in the Defendant’s pen pack. Since this affidavit accompanied the Defendant’s pen pack, the court finds it was properly admitted into evidence. ... The Defendant does not refer this court to any statutory requirement, nor are we aware of any statutory requirement, that the pages of a pen pack be numbered and/or that a list of the attachments be included in the affidavit.

Section 15:529.1 does not set a specific filing period for a multiple bill; it requires filing within a reasonable time after the prosecution learns of the defendant's prior felony record.

State v. Patterson · filed 1984-11-14

La.R.S. 15:529.1 (The Habitual Offender Law) does not prescribe a specific period in which the district attorney must file a multiple bill. The courts, however, have held it must be filed within a reasonable time after the prosecution becomes aware a defendant has a prior felony record. ... In the instant case, the multiple bill was filed on May 7, 1984, three months from the original sentencing of February 9, 1984. After a careful reading of the record, we find no manifest error in the trial judge's finding that the delay in filing was reasonable and with good reason.

Section 15:529.1(D) permits, but does not require, the district attorney to file a multiple-offender information when a defendant has a qualifying prior felony conviction; the filing decision is subject to prosecutorial discretion.

State v. Gray · filed 1984-12-10(D)

According to La.R.S. 15:529.1(D): D. If, at any time, either after conviction or sentence, it shall appear that a person convicted of a felony has previously been convicted of a felony under the laws of this state, or has been convicted .under the laws of any other state or of the United States; or any foreign government or country of a crime, which, if committed in this state would be a felony, the district attorney of the parish in which subsequent conviction was had may file an information accusing the person of a previous conviction. ... This testimony did not support the defendant’s assertion that it is the policy of the District Attorney’s office to file a multiple bill in all cases in which the convicted individual is eligible as a multiple offender. Rather, this testimony indicated that multiple bills are not filed in all cases and that certain considerations are taken into account in every case. Furthermore, this particular case certainly warrants the filing of a multiple bill against the defendant in light of the fact that both his prior conviction and his more recent conviction stemmed from violations of La.R.S. 14:69, *391and more particularly, both cases involved the possession of a stolen automobile.

Subsection (D) requires the judge, before accepting a multiple-offender admission, to advise the defendant of the right to a hearing with State proof and the right to remain silent; it sets no fixed filing deadline, but the bill must be filed within a reasonable time.

State v. Walker · filed 1999-05-12(D)

Thus, before accepting a defendant's admission that he is a multiple offender, the trial judge must specifically advise the defendant of his right to a formal hearing and to have the State prove its case. ... The trial judge must also advise the defendant of his right to remain silent. ... Thus, the record indicates that the defendant was advised that he was relinquishing his privilege against self-incrimination before the trial court accepted his plea and found him to be multiple offender. The trial court followed the procedure set out in La. *841 R.S. 15:529.1(D), and there is no merit in this assignment. ... The multiple offender statute, La. R.S. 15:529.1(D), does not provide a time period in which a multiple bill should be filed and the matter adjudicated except to note that a defendant may be charged as a multiple offender if "at any time, either after conviction or sentence, it shall appear that a person convicted of a felony has previously been convicted" of another felony. ... In the instant case, the State gave the defendant notice at the revocation of his probation that a multiple bill of information would be filed. ... Although nothing in the record indicates why the six-month delay occurred, we find the delay was not unreasonable.

Section 15:529.1(D) allows a district attorney to exercise discretion over whether to file a multiple offender bill, including through a general filing policy that permits exceptions.

State v. Hawkins · filed 1987-06-03(D)

In the instant case, the assistant district attorney’s testimony indicating that “other good reason[s]” are considered when deciding whom to multiple bill is sufficient to show that the statute is applied with discretion.

Section 15:529.1's escalating minimum sentences and maximum-sentence structure, as applied to armed-robbery recidivists, did not violate due process or equal protection by allegedly punishing second offenders more harshly than fourth offenders.

United States ex rel. Curtis v. Blackburn · filed 1984-12-20

It is obvious that the minimum sentence for armed robbery increases with each seri-atim offense, from 5 years to 33 years to 49 years to 99 years. A second offender faces a minimum sentence of 33 years. A fourth offender faces a minimum sentence three times greater, 99 years. In light of that reality, the maximum sentence for a fourth offender is of purely academic interest. Neither a second or fourth offender receiving the statutory maximum sentence will ever be released unless they secure a pardon recommendation from the Pardon Board and a pardon from the Governor. La.R.S. 15:572-574.1. Absent such discretionary pardon action by both the Pardon Board and the Governor, neither will ever be eligible for parole consideration. La. R.S. 15:574.2-574.16. As we perceive the matter, Louisiana’s sentencing scheme does not, in actuality, treat a second offender more severely than a fourth offender. What is urged as a lighter penalty is more appearance than reality. ... Considering the substantial difference in the minimum sentences, and the realities of the maximum sentences, we are not persuaded. We find no meaningful constitutional infraction.

Section 15:529.1 does not itself require that any part of an habitual-offender sentence be served without probation, parole, or suspension of sentence; that restriction comes from the statute defining the underlying offense.

State v. Williams · filed 1985-02-26

The Habitual Offender Law does not, however, have any requirement that any part of the sentence be imposed without probation, parole or suspension of sentence separate from the requirement by the statute under which the defendant is being sentenced.

Section 15:529.1(A)(2)(b) mandates the applicable habitual-offender sentence and leaves the sentencing judge no discretion to consider mitigating circumstances.

State v. Jones · filed 1985-01-30(A)(2)(b)

The defendant was sentenced to a term of life imprisonment in accordance with La.R.S. 15:529.1.A.(2)(b). This is a mandatory sentence, leaving the judge without discretion to consider mitigating circumstances.

Section 15:529.1 provides enhanced penalties for repeat felony offenders and validly limits ordinary sentencing considerations; its mandatory sentence, as applied here, is not cruel and unusual punishment.

State v. Thomas · filed 1985-01-30

The courts of this state have consistently upheld the constitutionality of La.R.S. 15:529.1. ... Accordingly, we hold that the two consecutive 99-year sentences imposed on the defendant are not a cruel and unusual punishment.

Section 15:529.1's mandatory sentence generally controls, but a court may depart downward when clear and convincing evidence shows that applying it to a particular offender would be constitutionally excessive, a rare and atypical circumstance.

State v. Burns · filed 1998-11-10(A)(1)(c)(ii)

The trial court has the authority to reduce the mandatory minimum sentence provided by the statute for a particular offense and offender when such a term would violate the defendant's constitutional protection against excessive punishment. ... a downward departure from the mandatory sentences of La. R.S. 15:529.1 is only available in truly rare situations and cannot be premised solely on the nonviolent nature of the current or prior offenses. Rather, the defendant must be atypical in that the legislature did not meaningfully circumscribe a proper sentence tailored to accommodate the circumstances of the particular case. ... In view of the underlying facts of this case, we are unable to conclude that this life sentence is not excessive under the constitutional standard. We therefore affirm defendant's conviction and habitual offender adjudication, vacate the sentence and remand for resentencing in accordance with the views expressed herein.

Section 15:529.1's mandatory minimum sentence is presumed constitutional, and a downward departure is permissible only in rare cases where the defendant clearly and convincingly proves that the sentence is constitutionally excessive.

State v. Gass · filed 1999-01-20

The determination of an appropriate minimum sentence by the legislature should be afforded great deference by the judiciary. ... Finally, it must be emphasized that the departure downward from the minimum sentence prescribed under the Habitual Offender Law should occur only in rare instances. ... In summary, though the trial judge set forth reasons which would support a sentence at the lower end of the range prescribed by the Habitual Offender Statute, the reasons did not support the result that a deviation was warranted. In short, the trial court did not articulate, and the defendants did not show by clear and convincing evidence, that they were the rare defendants envisioned by State v. Johnson for which the mandatory minimum sentence for attempted armed robbery as adjudicated second felony offenders was constitutionally excessive. State v. Johnson, supra.[3] As such, *901 this court vacates the sentence and remands this case for re-sentencing within the prescribed range.

Section 15:529.1(A)(1)(b)(ii) authorizes a life sentence without benefits for a qualifying third felony or prior felony, but the court must depart from that mandate when the resulting sentence is constitutionally excessive.

State v. Randall · filed 1999-06-09(A)(1)(b)(ii)

Where the third habitualizing felony or either of the prior two felonies is one defined as a crime of violence, La.R.S. 15:529.1(A)(1)(b)(ii) provides: ... (ii) If the third felony or either of the two prior felonies is a felony defined as a crime of violence under R.S. 14:2(13) or as a violation of the Uniform Controlled Dangerous Substances Law punishable by imprisonment for more than five years or any other crime punishable by imprisonment for more than twelve years, the person shall be imprisoned for the remainder of his natural life, without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence. ... While defendant unquestionably deserves imprisonment, a life sentence without benefit of parole, probation or suspension of sentence, would defeat any rehabilitative goal of our penal system; and in this rare instance, it is fundamentally excessive. ... Accordingly, we affirm defendant's conviction and habitual offender adjudication, vacate the sentence and remand for resentencing in accordance with the views expressed herein.

Section 15:529.1 requires enhanced punishment for qualifying repeat felony offenders, including life imprisonment for a third offender whose current or prior offense is a crime of violence, but that sentence may be found constitutionally excessive on the particular facts.

State v. Hayes · filed 1999-06-25A(1)(b)(ii)

For all the reasons above, and after a review of the facts and circumstances of this particular defendant and the instant crime, we find clear and convincing evidence that this "defendant is a victim of the legislature's failure to assign sentences *304 that are meaningfully tailored to the culpability of the offender, the gravity of the offense, and the circumstances of the case." Young, 94-1636 at pp. 5-6, 663 So.2d at 531 (Plotkin, J., concurring). A sentence of life imprisonment for this defendant, on this record, is "disproportionate" to the harm done and shocks "one's sense of justice." State v. Chaisson, 507 So.2d 248, 250 (La.App. 1st Cir.1987). Thus, the life sentence is constitutionally excessive.

Section 15:529.1's mandatory life sentence may be reduced when, as applied to the defendant's circumstances, it is constitutionally excessive.

State v. Webster · filed 1999-11-10(A)(1)(b)(ii)

The life sentence imposed in the instant case is clearly excessive. Although purse snatching, La.Rev.Stat. 14:65.1, is regarded as a violent felony, thus triggering the "three strikes" provision of La.Rev. Stat. 15:529.1(A)(1)(b)(ii), it appears the least heinous of those enumerated in La. Rev.Stat. 14:2(13), which defines "violent felony" for the purpose of the multiple offender statute. Furthermore, the defendant committed the underlying crime in the least reprehensible manner. He was unarmed, the criminal act was limited to reaching out to snatch the purse, the victim was not harmed, and her property was recovered immediately following the offense. Finally, the defendant's prior convictions for simple burglary were nearly ten years old when he committed the instant offense. In view of the circumstances, we find the life sentence imposed by the trial court to be grossly out of proportion to the severity of the crime.

Section 15:529.1 permits a downward departure from its mandatory minimum only in rare cases when the defendant clearly and convincingly shows that the minimum sentence is unconstitutionally excessive, and the judge must give specific reasons for the lesser sentence.

State v. Warren · filed 1999-09-08

If a sentencing judge finds clear and convincing evidence which justifies a downward departure from the minimum sentence under La. R.S. 15:529.1, he is not free to sentence a defendant to whatever sentence he feels is appropriate under the circumstances. The judge must sentence the defendant to the longest sentence which is not constitutionally excessive. This requires that a | ^sentencing judge articulate specific reasons why the sentence he imposes instead of the statutory mandatory minimum is the longest sentence, which is not excessive under the Louisiana Constitution. Id.

Section 15:529.1's mandatory minimum penalties are subject to established judicial sentence-review principles, which are not limited to sentences imposed under this statute.

State v. Fobbs · filed 1999-09-24

Our observation in State v. Dorthey, 623 So.2d 1276, 1280 (La.1993), that "the review of sentencing, including sentencing under R.S. 15:529.1, is a long established function of the judicial branch," does not, nor did we intend it to, restrict the sentence review principles espoused in that decision solely to the mandatory minimum penalties provided by La.R.S. 15:529.1.

Section 15:529.1's minimum sentence for a recidivist is presumed constitutional, and a court may depart from it only when the defendant clearly and convincingly proves exceptional circumstances showing that the sentence is not meaningfully tailored to the offender, offense, and case.

State v. Owens · filed 1999-10-27

Yet, even were we to review this sentence, we would find no error. First, we recognize that because the sentence imposed for the habitual offender adjudication is statutorily prescribed, the trial court's compliance with La.C.Cr.P. art. 894.1 is not mandated.[1]State v. Carlos Johnson, 31,448 (La.App.2d Cir.03/31/99), ___ So.2d ___, 1999 WL 173970. Furthermore, as noted by the supreme court, inasmuch as the habitual offender law is constitutional in its entirety, the minimum sentences it imposes upon recidivists are also presumed to be constitutional. State v. Walter Johnson, 97-1906 (La.03/04/98), 709 So.2d 672. A court may only depart from the minimum sentence if it finds that there is clear and convincing evidence in the particular case before it which would rebut this presumption of constitutionality. Id. In order to rebut this presumption, the defendant must clearly and convincingly show that he is exceptional, which in this context means that because of unusual circumstances this defendant is a victim of the legislature's failure to assign sentences that are meaningfully tailored to the culpability of the offender, the gravity of the offense, and the circumstances of the case. Id. No such evidence exists in this record.

The mandatory minimum sentences imposed by Section 15:529.1 are presumed constitutional, and a sentencing court may depart downward only when the defendant shows that the minimum is constitutionally excessive as applied.

State v. Milton · filed 2000-02-01

However, the Habitual Offender law has been held to be constitutional in its entirety; the mandatory minimum sentences provided therein are therefore presumed to be constitutional.

Section 15:529.1 does not authorize the trial court to enhance a sentence after an order of appeal has been entered because appellate jurisdiction has attached.

State v. Felton · filed 1986-01-15

The issue of whether the trial court was divested of jurisdiction to enhance the defendant's sentence pursuant to La.R.S. 15:529.1, the multiple offender statute, after the order of appeal had been signed was referred to the court en banc for its consideration. This panel found that the particular language of 15:529.1 authorizing the filing of the multiple bill "at any time, either after conviction or sentence" suggests that the trial court is vested with jurisdiction to conduct a multiple bill regardless of whether an appeal has been taken by the defendant. This interpretation conflicts with Article 916 which states that "[t]he jurisdiction of the trial court is divested and that of the appellate court attaches upon the entering of the order of appeal." ... By majority vote en banc on this matter, the court chose not to adopt this reasoning and, instead, followed State ex rel, Tuesno v. Maggio, 441 So.2d 1226 (La.1983) and State v. Sharper, 383 So.2d 1248 (La.1980), which holds that the court is without jurisdiction to enhance after an order of appeal has been entered. For this reason, we are constrained to hold under Tuesno and Sharper the trial judge erred in sentencing the defendant. Accordingly, the enhanced sentence is set aside and the original sentence of two (2) years is reinstated.

Subsection (F) provides a prima facie method of proving a prior felony conviction and discharge, but that method is nonexclusive; certified records may also establish the five-year period under subsection (C).

State v. Anderson · filed 1986-03-25(F), (C)

La.R.S. 15:529.1 permits the establishment of prima facie proof of a prior felony conviction by compliance with subsection F. Nevertheless, jurisprudence has established that necessary facts which permit enhanced punishment may be proved by other competent evidence. State v. Curtis, 338 So.2d 662 (La.1976). ... In State v. Barrow, 352 So.2d 635 (La.1977), the court also found that 15:529.1(F) is a nonexclusive method of proof. It further found that evidence similar to that introduced in the case at hand was sufficient to establish multiple offender status. ... Additionally, the contents of the certified rap sheet constituted prima facie proof that defendant’s discharge from the sentence for the predicate conviction was May 7,1977, rendering his discharge within the five year period prior to the commission of the instant offense.

Section 15:529.1 permits habitual-offender enhancement of only one sentence when a defendant is convicted of multiple counts at the same time.

State v. Hayes · filed 1986-05-12

The sentence is in error because (1) defendant was sentenced as a habitual offender on each of the three counts when the sentence should have been enhanced on only one conviction, State v. Sherer, 411 So.2d 1050 (La.1982), and (2) because of this illegal enhancement, the sentence on two of the three counts exceeds the maximum allowable by law.

Section 15:529.1 permits a prior guilty-plea conviction to be used to charge a defendant as a third offender when the plea was knowingly and voluntarily made.

State v. Payton · filed 1986-06-05

Similarly, in the instant case, we find that defendant-appellant Payton knowingly and voluntarily waived his rights in pleading guilty in his 1982 conviction. Therefore, the plea was valid and could be used as a basis for charging appellant as a third offender.

A second-offense prostitution conviction is a felony because it is a second offense, and it may serve as the predicate for enhancement under the Multiple Offender Law when it is not an enhancement of a prior felony conviction.

State v. King · filed 1986-06-05

However, in the instant case, the previous offense, namely second offense prostitution, is a felony by virtue of the fact that it is a second offense, not because the defendant already stands adjudicated a felon. Defendant's prior status was a misdemeanor offender. Thus the violation of R.S. 14:82 a second time becomes the first felony offense. Clearly, that violation is not an enhancement of a prior felony conviction. We therefore hold that in this case the felony offense of second offense prostitution can serve as the basis for enhancement under the Multiple Offender Law.

Section 15:529.1 permits separate habitual-offender enhancements for same-day convictions arising from separate criminal episodes, but convictions from one criminal episode count as one conviction for enhancement.

State v. Ward · filed 1996-02-29

Thus under the Supreme Court's most recent pronouncement in State ex rel. Porter v. Butler, 573 So.2d 1106 (La.1991) only multiple convictions arising out of the same criminal act or episode and obtained on the same date will be considered as a single conviction for purposes of the habitual offender law. ... Applying the rule of Porter to the instant case, the defendant's multiple convictions arose out of three separate and distinct criminal episodes on different dates and against three different victims, even though the convictions were obtained on the same date. Additionally, defendant's prior felony conviction was for a different criminal event than the ones presently before us and was final prior to the commission of these crimes. Accordingly, the trial court correctly sentenced her as a multiple offender on all three counts.

Section 15:529.1 does not itself bar parole eligibility for a defendant adjudicated a second offender.

State v. James · filed 1991-02-28

As to the denial of parole eligibility, the sentence for a conviction of manslaughter does not prohibit parole eligibility. La. R.S. 14:31. Although defendant was adjudicated a second offender, La.R.S. 15:529.1 does not prohibit parole eligibility. But La.R.S. 15:574.4 A(l) provides that upon conviction of a second felony offense, a defendant is eligible for parole after serving one-half of his sentence.

Section 15:529.1 requires a sentence imposed under its provisions to be without benefit of probation or suspension of sentence, but it does not itself bar parole.

State v. Montgomery · filed 1992-04-14

La.R.S. 15:529.1 merely says the sentence imposed under the provisions of this Section shall be without benefit of probation or suspension of sentence.

Section 15:529.1 does not itself authorize sentencing a defendant without benefit of parole; parole eligibility is left to the Department of Corrections under § 15:574.4.

State v. Honeycut · filed 1995-07-26

Donald Honeycut was sentenced under La. R.S. 14:65 and La.R.S. 15:529.1. Neither statute provides that the sentence be served without benefit of parole. Mr. Honeycut’s eligibility for parole should be left to the determination of the Department of Corrections in accordance with La.R.S. 15:574.4.

Section 15:529.1(G) requires habitual-offender sentences to be without probation or suspension of sentence, but it does not prohibit parole eligibility.

State v. Brual · filed 1999-01-26(G)

Finally, we note that the trial court erred in imposing defendant's June 5, 1998 multiple offender sentence without the benefit of parole. La. R.S. 15:529.1 G provides that "[a]ny sentence imposed under the provisions of this Section shall be without benefit of probation or suspension of sentence." The statute does not prohibit parole eligibility for multiple offenders.

For a second felony offender, the habitual-offender statute increases the sentence by reference to the underlying offense, so the underlying offense's parole restrictions also apply.

State v. Rowell · filed 1999-02-10(A)(1)(a)

After all is said and done, although this defendant was sentenced as a habitual offender, the penalty provisions of the underlying offense (by La. R.S. 14:27 and 14:30) are the reference provisions on which the penalty increase is calculated. As stated by the Louisiana Supreme Court in State v. Bruins, 407 So.2d 685 (La. 1981), "It is not a crime to be a habitual offender. The statute increases the sentence for a recidivist. The penalty increase is computed by reference to the sentencing provisions of the underlying offense. Similarly, the conditions imposed on the sentence are those called for in reference statute." Id. at 687.

Neither § 15:529.1(A)(1)(b)(i) nor § 15:529.1(G) gives the trial court additional authority to restrict a third offender's parole eligibility.

State v. Watts · filed 1999-01-29(A)(1)(b)(i), (G)

La.R.S. 14:69 does not deny parole eligibility on any sentence imposed for possession of stolen things and neither La.R.S. 15:529.1(A)(1)(b)(i) nor La.R.S. 15:529.1(G) gives the trial court any additional authority to place restrictions on the parole eligibility of a third offender.

For parole-eligibility calculations, the Department need not follow the district court’s habitual-offender adjudication under § 15:529.1.

Lay v. La. Dept. of Correction · filed 1999-04-01

Lay further contends that because he was adjudicated a second-felony habitual offender, he should be treated as a second, and not third, offender for parole eligibility. The supreme court addressed *786this exact issue in Townley v. Department of Public Safety and Corrections,8 stating: [T]his court has never held that the Department is bound in its calculations by all of the rules governing sentencing determinations made earlier at the district court. Thus, the Department is not bound by the district court’s adjudication of [defendant’s] habitual offender status under La.R.S. 15:529.1 when the Department is making its calculations to determine parole eligibility under La. R. S. 15:574.49 This assignment of error has no merit.

Subsection (G) does not impose a restriction on parole eligibility for a habitual-offender sentence.

State of Louisiana v. Bradford · filed 2026-05-20(G)

The minutes reflect that the sentence of 25 years is to be served without benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence, but neither the aggravated battery statute nor the habitual offender statute carry a parole restriction. See La. R.S. 15:529.1(G). ... Consequently, we order that the trial court minutes be amended to reflect that the sentence was imposed without any restriction on parole eligibility.

Subsection (G) does not itself restrict parole eligibility, although restrictions from the underlying offense may apply.

State v. Hunter · filed 2000-09-27(G)

However, La. R.S. 15:529.1(G) does not place any restrictions on parole eligibility. State v. Tate, 99-1483 (La.11/24/99), 747 So.2d 519. Nevertheless, additional restrictions may be imposed on the sentence provided those additional restrictions are provided in the underlying offense of conviction.

Section 15:529.1 does not require an enhanced sentence to be served without the benefit of parole.

State v. Handy · filed 2000-11-08

Neither La. R.S. 14:60 nor La. R.S. 15:529.1, the two statutes under which defendant was sentenced, requires that the sentence be served without the benefit of parole. The defendant’s eligibility for parole should be left to the determination of the Department of Corrections in accordance with La. R.S. 15:574.4.

Section 15:529.1 does not require that a sentence imposed under it be served without the benefit of parole.

State v. Handy · filed 2000-11-08

Neither La. R.S. 14:60 nor La. R.S. 15:529.1, the two statutes under which defendant was sentenced, requires that the sentence be served without the benefit of parole.

Section 15:529.1(G) requires a habitual-offender sentence to be without benefit of probation or suspension of sentence, but it does not restrict parole eligibility.

State v. Young · filed 2003-01-22(G)

The multiple offender statute does not restrict parole eligibility; it restricts only probation and suspension of sentence. See La. R.S. 15:529.1(G)(providing that "[a]ny sentence imposed under the provisions of this Section shall be without benefit of probation or suspension of sentence.") Restrictions on parole eligibility must be based on the sentencing provision for the underlying conviction.

Subsection (G) requires habitual-offender sentences to be imposed without probation or suspension of sentence, but does not authorize withholding parole eligibility.

State v. Holloway · filed 2003-05-16(G)

La. R.S. 15:529.1(G) provides that sentences imposed under the habitual offender provisions are to be imposed "without benefit of probation or suspension of sentence." As such, it was not within the trial court's authority to impose the sentence without benefit of parole, and the sentence is not legally correct.

When a sentence under § 15:529.1 may prohibit parole eligibility, the Department of Corrections—not the trial court—has authority to impose the parole prohibition.

State v. Poirrier · filed 2004-12-01

Thus, we amend Mr. Poirrier's sentence by deleting the prohibition on parole eligibility and note that, pursuant to La.R.S. 15:574.4, the determination of the relator's parole eligibility is to be made by the Department of Corrections. We direct the district court to make an entry in the minutes reflecting this change.

To adjudicate a defendant as a habitual offender, the state must prove the prior felony conviction and show that an earlier guilty plea was counseled, understood, and voluntary as to the rights waived.

State v. James · filed 1986-06-11

They also object to being found second felony offenders under the purview of the habitual offender statute. La.R.S. 15:529.1. We note that neither defendant objected to the trial court's finding of second felony offender status at the conclusion of the habitual offender hearing. See La.C.Cr.P. Article 841. In fact, defendant James stipulated to his prior felony conviction and evidence presented against both James and Washington included certified copies of the prior felony bills of information, court minutes and transcript of the guilty pleas. In the alternative, defendants complain there was no showing they were properly Boykinized at these earlier proceedings. We find the exhibits reveal both defendants were represented by counsel, stated they understood the nature of the charges against them, discussed the charges with counsel and understood the rights they were waiving by pleading guilty. Accordingly, the state did meet its burden of proving both defendants were habitual offenders.

Granting an order of appeal divests the trial court of jurisdiction to conduct proceedings under La. Stat. Ann. § 15:529.1, including adjudicating and resentencing a defendant as a multiple offender.

State v. Williams · filed 1986-08-06

This court has previously held that granting an order of appeal divests the trial court of jurisdiction to conduct proceedings under the provisions of La.R.S. 15:529.1. State v. Felton, 482 So.2d 191 (La.App. 4th Cir.1986); State v. Sparks, 483 So.2d 1246 (La.App. 4th Cir.1986). We must conclude, therefore, that when the trial judge adjudicated and resentenced defendants as multiple offenders, he was without jurisdiction to do so, because he had previously granted defendants’ orders of appeal.

Section 15:529.1 permits a defendant's penalty to be further enhanced as a multiple offender even when the underlying offense statute provides enhanced penalties, because the underlying statute is not itself a recidivist statute.

State v. Collins · filed 1986-09-12

We likewise reject Collins’ argument that the Trial Court erred in sentencing him as a multiple offender under La. R.S. 15:529.1. Collins argues La.R.S. 40:967—the statute prohibiting possession of cocaine—provides enhanced penalties for that crime, and consequently the Trial Court should have sentenced him under that statute. La.R.S. 40:967, however, is not a recidivist statute. Thus, the Trial Court properly used La.R.S. 15:529 to further enhance Collins’ penalty. See State v. Sanders, 337 So.2d 1131 (La.1976).

Section 15:529.1 authorizes enhanced penalties for adjudged habitual offenders and does not apply when a court merely corrects an illegal suspended sentence rather than adjudicating the defendant a habitual offender.

State v. Aucoin · filed 1986-10-08(D)

La.R.S. 15:529.1 is entitled the Habitual Offender Law and authorizes the imposition of enhanced penalties for those who have been adjudged habitual offenders. Such is not the case in the situation before us, and hence the statute relied on by the defendant is inapplicable. ... The defendant was not sentenced as a habitual offender pursuant to La.R.S. 15:529.1 but was only denied a suspended sentence pursuant to La.C.Cr.P. art. 893. See State v. Mangano, 464 So.2d 1032 (La. App. 1st Cir.1985). Accordingly, the assignments are without merit.

Section 15:529.1 requires a proper written multiple-offender charge before a defendant may be adjudicated and sentenced as an habitual offender.

State v. Scott · filed 1986-12-09

No multiple bill was filed on the other two counts; yet the sentences (double the statutory maximum) indicate that the multiple offender statute, La.R.S. 15:529.1, was used. ... Because the defendant was not properly charged as a multiple offender, his adjudication and sentence as an habitual offender is invalid and the ten year concurrent sentences must be vacated.

Section 15:529.1(B) requires a prior conviction used for third-offender enhancement to precede commission of the principal offense; a conviction entered afterward cannot support that enhancement.

State v. Franklin · filed 1987-01-12(B)

Since the legislature could have clearly stated its intention if it chose to do so, and since it did not repudiate the rule established in the Simmons case by the 1982 amendment, for the reasons stated by Justice Dennis in the Wimberly case we adhere to the rule established by the prior jurisprudence. Thus, the defendant here cannot be sentenced as a third offender because he was not convicted of the second offense (the first committed armed robbery) until after the commission of the armed robbery for which he was convicted in this case.

Section 15:529.1(D) permits a represented defendant to waive formal arraignment on the habitual-offender bill, and § 15:529.1(F) permits uncontroverted “pen pack” evidence to prove prior offenses without independent proof.

State v. Johnson · filed 1999-03-31(D), (F)

Johnson next argues that he was not arraigned in accordance with La. R.S. 15:529.1(D), not advised of his constitutional right to remain silent prior to the hearing on the habitual offender bill, and that the state failed to prove Johnson's identity by linking him with the properly proven "pen pack" documentation. We find no merit to any of these claims. ... Regarding Johnson's arraignment, the court minutes of December 15, 1997, show that Johnson, present with counsel, waived formal arraignment. ... Additionally, the uncontroverted "pen pack" evidence, submitted in compliance with La. R.S. 15:529.1(F), adequately proves Johnson's prior offenses without the necessity of independent proof. ... Therefore, because adequate proof exists as to both identity and the prior offenses, and the record shows that Johnson remained silent throughout the proceedings, he cannot show prejudice.

Section 15:529.1(D)(1)(b) requires a defendant challenging the validity of a prior conviction in a habitual-offender proceeding to file a written response stating the claim and its factual basis before sentencing, or the challenge is barred.

State v. Guy · filed 1999-05-19(D)(1)(b)

Further, La. R.S. 15:529.1(D)(1)(b) mandates that, if a defendant clams that any conviction is invalid, he must file a written response to the habitual offender bill of information, setting forth his claim and the factual basis therefor. "Any challenge to a previous conviction or adjudication of delinquency which is not made before sentence is imposed may not thereafter be raised to attack the sentence." There is no indication defendant filed such a written objection setting forth his claim that the prior conviction was invalid and the factual basis therefor. Accordingly, defendant cannot now raise the validity of the conviction.

Section 15:529.1(D)(1)(b) requires a defendant challenging an alleged prior conviction to file a written, particularized response before sentencing and bars a later challenge that was not timely raised.

State v. Greenwell · filed 1999-08-18(D)(1)(b)

La. R.S. 15:529.1(D)(1)(b) provides the procedural mechanisms by which a defendant can object to the use of deficient prior conviction: ... Any challenge to a previous conviction or adjudication of delinquency which is not made before sentence is imposed may not thereafter be raised to attack the sentence. ... This defendant did not make a written objection to the bill of information before the habitual offender hearing. Further, he made no objections that the prior guilty plea was flawed at the habitual offender hearing. Instead, the defendant stipulated that his fingerprints were on the earlier bill of information, thus conceding the previous conviction contained in the habitual offender bill of information.

Section 15:529.1(D)(1)(b) requires a defendant challenging the validity of a prior conviction used for habitual-offender enhancement to file a written response within 15 days of arraignment; failing to do so bars a direct attack on that conviction on appeal.

State v. Louis · filed 1999-10-27(D)(1)(b)

In order to challenge the validity of any of his prior convictions, Defendant was required to file, within 15 days of arraignment, a written response denying the allegations set forth in the bill of information. Defendant neither filed a written response nor objected at the hearing to the introduction into evidence of the State's exhibits. Since he failed to comply with the statute, Defendant is barred from directly attacking the validity of prior offenses on appeal. This assignment of error lacks merit.

The statute permits a qualifying out-of-state conviction to be used as a predicate for habitual-offender enhancement, and subsection (D) permits a defendant to plead not guilty to the habitual-offender bill by remaining silent at arraignment.

State v. Flanagan · filed 1999-10-29(A)(1)(c)(ii), (D)

Thus, pursuant to La. R.S. 15:529.1, this conviction may be used to enhance Defendant's habitual offender bill. ... Thus, Defendant was arraigned on the habitual offender bill of information and was permitted to plead not guilty by his silence to the allegations contained therein.

Before a defendant admits or confesses in open court to a prior felony conviction, the court must advise the defendant of the right to remain silent and to a formal hearing at which the state must prove the allegations.

State v. Jones · filed 1987-03-04(D)

Under the statute, before the defendant chooses to acknowledge or confess in open court that he has been previously convicted of a felony, he must first be cautioned by the trial court as to his rights. La.R.S. 15:529.1(D); State v. Johnson, 432 So.2d 815 (La.1983). Specifically, defendant must be advised by the court of his right to a "formal hearing" and to have the state prove its case. State v. Johnson, supra at 817. Further, this section implicitly provides that the defendant should be advised by the court of his statutory right to remain silent. State v. Johnson, supra at 817.

Section 15:529.1(D) requires the court, before accepting a defendant’s admission or confession as a habitual offender, to advise him of his right to a formal hearing, to require the State to prove the prior conviction, and to remain silent.

State v. Ray · filed 1989-07-12(D)

Before the defendant chooses to acknowledge or confess in open court that he has been previously convicted of a felony, the statute requires that he first be cautioned by the trial court as to his rights. R.S. 15:529.1(D) specifically provides that defendant be advised by the court of his right to a `formal hearing' and to have the state prove its case. State v. Martin, 427 So.2d 1182 (La. 1983). Further, this section implicitly provides that the defendant should be advised by the court, of his statutory right to remain silent.

When a defendant admits an allegation in a habitual offender bill, subsection D(1)(a) requires the trial court to advise him of his right to a hearing at which the State must prove the allegations and of his right to remain silent.

State v. Jones · filed 1999-02-10D(1)(a)

Louisiana jurisprudence has consistently held that in an habitual offender proceeding in which defendant pleads or admits to any allegation in the bill of information, the trial court must advise a defendant of his right to a hearing at which the state is required to prove the allegations of the habitual offender bill, and of his right to remain silent. La.R.S. 15:529.1 D(1)(a); ... The failure to so advise a defendant is generally reversible error when defendant pleads to any of the allegations in the habitual offender bill of information. ... Since the record lacks any evidence that defendant knowingly and voluntarily waived his rights, we find that the habitual offender adjudication must be vacated and remanded.

Section 15:529.1(D)(1)(a) requires advising a defendant of the habitual offender bill's specific allegations, the right to a formal hearing, and the constitutional right to remain silent before the defendant admits the allegations; failing to do so is reversible error.

State v. Walker · filed 2001-08-28(D)(1)(a)

La. R.S. 15:529.1(D)(1)(a) requires that a defendant be advised of the specific allegations contained in the habitual offender bill and his right to a formal *463 hearing at which the State must prove its case for the habitual offender status. Implicit in this requirement is the additional requirement that defendant be advised of his constitutional right to remain silent. State v. Johnson, 432 So.2d 815, 817 (La. 1983). Where the defendant pleads or admits the allegations in the habitual offender bill of information, the failure to advise the defendant of his rights is reversible error.

Section 15:529.1 requires a court to set aside a prior sentence imposed before a habitual-offender adjudication, but does not require sentencing before the enhancement adjudication.

State v. Seals · filed 2006-03-08

Under the provisions of La. R.S. 15:529.1, a court is obligated to set aside a prior sentence if. one had been imposed prior to .the habitual offender adjudication, but is not required to impose sentence before the enhancement adjudication.

Section 15:529.1(D) requires the record to affirmatively show that a defendant admitting a habitual offender allegation was advised of the right to be tried on it.

State v. Vincent · filed 1983-10-06(D)

A ruling that the judge must personally advise the defendant of his right (or perhaps that the record must at least affirmatively show, by counsel's specific recital of the rights in open court in the presence of defendant, that "the court" through counsel has advised defendant of his rights) is required not only by La.R.S. 15:529.1(D) but probably also by the requirement of Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 23 L.Ed.2d 274 (1969), that a guilty plea not be accepted without an affirmative showing in the record of an intelligent and voluntary waiver of the constitutional rights thereby yielded.

Section 15:529.1 does not authorize the sentencing judge to award or forfeit good-time credit when imposing a habitual-offender sentence.

Jackson v. Phelps · filed 1987-03-04

Under the habitual offender law, La.R.S. 15:529.1, the awarding or forfeiting of good time credit is not an authorized function of the trial court when imposing sentence.

The habitual offender statute can increase the maximum sentence for manslaughter to forty-two years.

State v. Scott · filed 1987-03-04

The maximum sentence for manslaughter is twenty-one years. With the habitual offender statute, La.R.S. 15:529.1, the maximum sentence the defendant could receive is forty-two years. The defendant, therefore, received the maximum sentence under law.

Section 15:529.1 does not prohibit good-time eligibility for a sentence imposed under the habitual-offender statute.

State v. Armstead · filed 1990-12-20

Neither R.S. 14:69 nor R.S. 15:529.1 prohibits good time eligibility.

Subsection (D)(1)(b) places the burden of proving habitual-offender predicates on the State, so the trial court may not introduce evidence on its own to establish the prior convictions.

State v. Young · filed 2000-04-17(D)(1)(b)

We find that the trial court had no authority to present evidence pertaining to the habitual offender proceeding. First, we note that La. R.S. 15:529.1(D)(1)(b) specifically provides that the state has the burden of proof in a habitual offender proceeding.

Section 15:529.1(D) requires a defendant admitting the allegations in a multiple bill to be advised of the right to have the State prove its case.

State v. Dunn · filed 1987-06-03(D)

In this case, although the record reflects that the defendant was advised of his right to a hearing on the multiple bill, it does not appear from the record that he was advised of his right to have the State prove its case against him. As such, the defendant was not adequately advised of his rights under R.S. 15:529.1 before admitting to the allegations contained in the multiple bill.

Section 15:529.1(F) provides a prima facie method of proving a prior felony conviction in a habitual-offender proceeding, but it is not exclusive; other competent evidence may establish the conviction.

State v. Moten · filed 1987-06-23(F)

To prove a defendant an habitual offender, the state must prove, among other things, that the defendant was convicted of a prior felony. State v. Chaney, 423 So.2d 1092 (La.1982). Prima facie proof of a prior felony conviction may be established by compliance with La.R.S. 15:529.1(F). However, La.R.S. 15:529.1(F) is not the exclusive method of proving a prior felony conviction; any other competent evidence may be used to establish such proof. State v. Curtis, 338 So.2d 662 (La. 1976). The Texas records are not authenticated in accordance with La.R.S. 15:529.1(F). They are properly authenticated pursuant to 28 U.S.C.A. § 1739. This authentication is valid, and the records are admissible in a Louisiana habitual offender trial. State v. Bernard, 366 So.2d 1294 (La.1978); State v. Glenn, 493 So.2d 806 (La.App. 2nd Cir.1986). These records are adequate proof of the prior felony conviction.

Section 15:529.1 requires further hearings and a renewed adjudication of multiple-offender status before a defendant may be resentenced under its provisions.

State Ex Rel. Robinson v. Blackburn · filed 1987-08-11

We find that this Court's order of October 11, 1985, set aside defendant's adjudication and sentencing as a multiple offender and required that defendant be resentenced after further hearings were held to determine his multiple offender status. No further hearings were ever held, and defendant was resentenced apparently on the sole basis of his conviction for attempted burglary. There is nothing in the record to indicate otherwise. Although the trial judge may have intended and thought that he resentenced defendant as a multiple offender, he could not have done so without first conducting further hearings and again adjudging defendant to be a multiple offender. Since this was not done, defendant's sentence imposed on November 25, 1985, could not have been, and we find was not imposed pursuant to La.R.S. 15:529.1.

Section 15:529.1(D) requires the court to advise a multiple-offender defendant of the right to remain silent before an acknowledgment or confession and to vacate any prior sentence for the final felony when imposing the habitual-offender sentence.

State v. Poole · filed 1990-08-22D

La.R.S. 15:529.1 D states, in pertinent part, that if a defendant charged as a multiple offender acknowledges or confesses in open court, after being duly cautioned as to his rights, that he has been previously convicted of a felony, the court shall sentence him to the punishment prescribed in this Section, and shall vacate the previous sentence if already imposed. This statute provides that a defendant must be advised by the trial court of his right to remain silent.

Subsection (D) permits charging a felony defendant as a multiple offender after conviction or sentence when a prior felony appears, but the bill must be filed and adjudicated within a reasonable time.

State v. Williams · filed 1992-03-17(D)

La.R.S. 15:529.1, the multiple offender statute, does not provide a time period in which such bill should be filed and the matter adjudicated except to note that a defendant may be charged as a multiple offender if "at any time, either after conviction or sentence, it shall appear that a person convicted of a felony has previously been convicted" of another felony. La.R.S. 15:529.1(D). ... Here, the State filed the multiple bill two months after the defendant was originally sentenced. ... However, based upon Louisiana jurisprudence, the multiple offender proceedings were not unreasonably delayed.

Section 15:529.1 requires a multiple-offender sentencing proceeding to be completed before the defendant serves the sentence that is to be enhanced.

State v. Lewis · filed 1992-04-09

A proceeding to have the defendant sentenced as a multiple offender under La. R.S. 15:529.1 must be completed before the defendant serves the sentence which is to be enhanced.

Section 15:529.1 requires a fundamentally fair habitual-offender hearing, including advising the defendant of the right to remain silent before an admission when the State has introduced no independent evidence proving the predicate convictions and the defendant’s identity.

State v. Roberson · filed 1995-11-02

The state is required to prove both the prior convictions and that the defendant is the same person previously convicted of the other offenses. ... In this case, no evidence, except the testimony of the defendant himself, was presented to show that a Ray Roberson was convicted of any prior offenses. No independent evidence or testimony was introduced to prove the defendant's identity. Because no competent evidence was introduced against the defendant, and because he was not specifically informed of his right to remain silent before his admission, the defendant was denied a fundamentally fair hearing. Accordingly, the defendant's sentence is vacated and the case remanded for a new habitual offender hearing and resentencing.

Section 15:529.1(D)(1)(b) places the burden on the district attorney to prove beyond a reasonable doubt factual issues in a multiple-offender proceeding, including the existence of prior guilty pleas and counsel representation when the pleas were entered.

State v. Raymond · filed 1997-05-28(D)(1)(b)

In addition, LSA-R.S. 15:529.1D(1)(b) sets forth the burden of proof as follows: ... Except as otherwise provided in this Subsection, the district attorney shall have the burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt on any issue of fact. ... In the present case, the transcript indicates that the arrest registers and the bills of information from the three prior convictions were introduced at the multiple offender hearing. ... However, there is no indication that these exhibits were introduced at the multiple bill hearing. If, in fact, these exhibits were not introduced, then the state failed in its burden of proving the existence of the prior guilty pleas and that defendant was represented by counsel when the pleas were entered. Accordingly, the habitual offender adjudication is vacated and the matter remanded for further proceedings.

Section 15:529.1(D) requires the court to advise a defendant of the multiple-bill allegations, the right to contest their truth at a hearing, and applicable rights before accepting a guilty plea or admission, including the constitutional right to remain silent.

State v. Davis · filed 1999-03-24(D)

La. R.S. 15:529.1(D) provides that the trial court shall inform the defendant of the allegations contained in the multiple bill and of his right to be tried as to the truth thereof before asking the defendant if the allegations are true; and, if a defendant pleads guilty to the multiple bill or acknowledges in court that he has a previous conviction, the court must first duly caution him as to his rights. Implicit in this requirement is that the defendant be advised of his constitutional right to remain silent.

Section 15:529.1(D)(1)(b) places on the district attorney the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt any factual issue in a multiple-offender proceeding, with the presumption of regularity of the judgment satisfying the initial burden.

State v. Preston · filed 2000-02-15(D)(1)(b)

LSA-R.S. 15:529.1(D)(1)(b) states that the district attorney has the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt any issue of fact and that the presumption of regularity of judgment shall be sufficient to meet the original burden of proof. The State must establish the prior felony and that the defendant was the same person convicted of that felony. State v. Neville, 96-0137 (La.App. 4 Cir. 5/21/97), 695 So.2d 534, writ denied 97-1637 (La.12/12/97), 704 So.2d 1180. There are various methods available to prove that the defendant is the same person convicted of the prior felony offense, such as testimony from witnesses, expert opinion regarding the fingerprints of the defendant when compared with those in the prior record, or photographs in the duly authenticated record. State v. Henry, 96-1280 (La.App. 4 Cir. 3/11/98), 709 So.2d 322. The mere fact that the defendant and the person previously convicted have the same name does not constitute sufficient evidence of identity. Id.

Before a defendant pleads guilty to a multiple bill, the court or defense counsel must advise the defendant of the rights to a trial and to remain silent; failure to do so is reversible error.

State v. Crane · filed 2001-03-14(D)(1)(a)

However, the record does not indicate that defendant was advised of her right to a trial and right to remain silent in connection with the multiple bill as required by LSA-R.S. 15:529.1(D)(l)(a). The failure of a defendant to be advised these rights, by either the court or his attorney, before entering a guilty plea to the multiple bill is reversible error.

Section 15:529.1 permits a multiple-offender charge after conviction or sentence when a felony defendant has a prior felony conviction, but the multiple-bill proceeding must be initiated and completed within a reasonable time.

State v. Grimes · filed 2001-05-02

The same considerations which underlie the constitutional right to a speedy trial compel a conclusion that upon conviction a defendant is entitled to know the full consequences of the verdict within a reasonable time. Since the enhancement of penalty provision is incidental to the latest conviction, the proceeding to sentence under the provision should not be unduly delayed.

Section 15:529.1(D)(l)(b) places on the district attorney the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt any factual issue in a multiple-offender proceeding, while the presumption of regularity of the judgment satisfies the initial burden of proof.

State v. Gustavis · filed 2001-05-30(D)(l)(b)

La. R.S. 15:529.1(D)(l)(b) states that the district attorney has the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt any issue of fact and that the presumption of regularity of judgment shall be sufficient to meet the original burden of proof.

When documentation supporting a multiple-offender bill is inadequate, the court must find against the habitual-offender allegation, but that determination does not bar renewed proceedings on the prior convictions.

State v. Brown · filed 2001-07-25

A hearing on a multiple offender bill is a mere inquiry into a defendant’s prior criminal convictions as a part of the sentencing process. Inadequacies of documentation at the hearing require a negative determination by the court of “guilt” under the Habitual Offender Law, La. R.S. 15:529.1. The determination is not conclusive and the defendant is not protected by principles of double jeopardy from being “tried” again on the question of the prior felony convictions. ... Accordingly, we are required to remand for further proceedings pursuant to La. R.S. 15:529.1.

Section 15:529.1(D)(1)(b) allocates the burdens for proving and challenging prior convictions in a multiple-offender proceeding, requiring the State to prove factual issues beyond a reasonable doubt and the defendant to make a timely, particularized written challenge.

State v. Howard · filed 2002-01-23(D)(1)(b)

The presumption of regularity of judgment shall be sufficient to meet the original burden of proof.

Section 15:529.1 requires a multiple-offender proceeding to be completed within a reasonable time and before the defendant has served the underlying sentence and been discharged from custody.

State v. Burks · filed 2003-03-19

La. R.S. 15:529.1, the multiple offender statute, does not provide a time period in which a multiple bill should be filed and the matter adjudicated except to state that a defendant may be charged as a multiple offender if “at any time, either after conviction or sentence, it shall appear that a person convicted of a felony has previously been convicted” of another felony. ... Like the defendants in Williams and Glynn, Burks’ sentence had been served prior to her adjudication as a multiple offender, and the district court erred in sentencing her under the Habitual Offender Law.

Section 15:529.1 does not impose a fixed deadline for completing a habitual-offender proceeding; timeliness is determined case by case, with inordinate or bad-faith delay subject to scrutiny.

State v. Muhammad · filed 2004-05-25(D)(1)(a)

Review of the statute reveals the absence of a prescriptive time period for completion of the habitual offender proceeding. Wording of the statute indicates the legislature contemplated the multiple offender proceeding could be brought against an individual who was not incarcerated. ... In lieu of a bright line rule which has no statutory basis, we find an evaluation of the circumstances surrounding the multiple offender proceeding should be conducted on a case by case basis. In the process, the court can assure that defendant's due process rights are protected. Any inordinate delays or bad faith on the part of the State to prejudice the defendant in any fashion would be subject to the scrutiny of the court. ... Following a thorough review of the provisions of the statute, as well as the cases of George, State ex rel. Williams v. Henderson, and State ex rel. Glynn v. Blackburn and the facts of the present case, we conclude there is no reason for this court to jurisprudentially provide a bright line deadline by which the habitual offender proceeding must be completed.

Section 15:529.1 requires the trial court to advise a multiple offender of the allegations, the right to a hearing, and the right to remain silent; failure to give those advisements requires reversal when the defendant stipulated to his identity.

State v. Babineaux · filed 2009-01-13

Pursuant to La. R.S. 15:529.1, the trial court shall inform defendant of the allegations contained in the information and of his right to be tried as to the truth thereof according to law, and shall require the offender to say whether the allegations are true.

Section 15:529.1(D) requires the court to advise a multiple-offender defendant of the statutory rights involved in contesting the prior convictions, including the right to a hearing and to remain silent, before accepting an acknowledgment or confession of those convictions.

State v. Brown · filed 2011-06-29(D)

However, we find that, because Brown was never informed of his statutory rights under La. R.S. 15:529.1(D), his acknowledgment or confession of his prior felony convictions is invalid.

Section 15:529.1 requires the trial court to advise a defendant of the multiple bill's allegations, the right to a hearing, and the right to remain silent; failure to do so is harmless when the State proves multiple-offender status with competent evidence rather than the defendant's admission.

State v. Pollard · filed 2012-12-18

A trial court is required to advise a defendant of the allegations contained in the multiple bill of information, his right to a hearing, and his right to remain silent. La. R.S. 15:529.1; State v. Haywood, 00-1584 (La.App. 5 Cir. 3/28/01), 783 So.2d 568, 582. The trial court’s failure to advise a defendant of his right to a trial and to remain silent is harmless when the defendant’s multiple offender status is established by competent evidence offered by the State at a hearing, rather than by the admission of the defendant. Id. at 582-83. Defendant denied the allegations of the multiple bill, and the State presented competent evidence at the hearing to establish his multiple offender status. Therefore, the trial court’s failure to advise defendant of the specific allegations against him, his right to a hearing, and his right to remain silent was harmless error.

Although the statute sets no specific deadline, it requires the State to file the multiple bill and hold the hearing within a reasonable time.

State v. Simmons · filed 2013-10-16(D)

Although La. R.S. 15:529.1(D) provides no specific guidance regarding the time limit for filing a multiple bill of information, La.C.Cr.P. art. 874 and the jurisprudence require that the State file the multiple bill of information and conduct the hearing on it in a reasonable time.

Section 15:529.1(D)(1)(a) requires the court to advise a defendant of the habitual-offender allegations, the right to have their truth tried, and the right to remain silent; subsection (D)(1)(b) requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt of the alleged prior conviction and the defendant’s identity as the prior offender.

State v. Martin · filed 2014-05-28(D)(1)(a), (D)(1)(b)

La. R.S. 15:529.1(D)(l)(a) states that upon the district attorney filing a habitual offender bill of information the trial court shall inform the defendant of the allegation contained in the information and of his right to be tried as to the truth thereof, and shall require the defendant to say whether the allegations are true. ... The requirements of R.S. 15:529.1(D)(l)(a) that the court inform a defendant of the allegations in a habitual offender bill of information, and of his right “to be tried as to the truth thereof according to law,” should not serve as technical traps for an unwary but otherwise conscientious judge. ... While the record reflects that the trial court advised the defendant’s counsel, in his presence, of his right to a multiple offender hearing, it did not address the defendant directly or discuss his right to remain silent. ... Both the identity and the prior conviction alleged must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. La. R.S. 15:529.1(D)(l)(b). ... Given these facts, we find the State proved the defendant’s multiple offender status beyond a reasonable doubt despite the trial court’s harmless error.

Section 15:529.1 requires the trial court to advise a multiple offender of the allegations and of the rights to a hearing and to remain silent, and a written waiver can satisfy that advisal.

State v. Oliver · filed 2014-11-25

La. R.S. 15:529.1 requires the trial court to advise a defendant of the allegations contained in the information, his right to a hearing, and his right to remain silent. ... In the present case, although defendant was not advised verbally of his right to remain silent by the trial judge during the colloquy, the waiver of rights form, which is signed by defendant, his counsel, and the judge, does reflect that defendant was advised of his right to remain silent, and defense counsel makes specific reference to the waiver of rights form prior to the judge’s accepting of defendant’s stipulation to the multiple bill. ... Upon review, we find that the record clearly established that defendant and his counsel had completed the waiver of rights form prior to the stipulation in the colloquy; thus, we find that there was an adequate advisal provided via the written waiver of rights form dated the same date as defendant’s stipulation and offered into the record prior to the pertinent colloquy.

In a multiple-offender proceeding, the district attorney must prove factual issues beyond a reasonable doubt, and the presumption that the judgment is regular satisfies the initial burden of proof.

State v. Brazell · filed 2018-04-18(D)(1)(b)

In order to establish a defendant's status as a multiple offender, pursuant to La. R.S. 15:529.1(D)(1)(b), the district attorney has the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt any issue of fact and the presumption of regularity of judgment shall be sufficient to meet the original burden of proof.

Section 15:529.1 treats multiple convictions entered on the same day as a single conviction when they are used as predicate offenses in a multiple-offender proceeding.

State v. Kelson · filed 1987-09-15

Convictions on more than one count entered on the same day are treated as one conviction when utilized as a predicate offense during a multiple offender proceeding. La.R.S. 15:529.1. State v. Sherer, 411 So.2d 1050 (La., 1982); State v. Juegain, 478 So.2d 542 (La.App., 4th Cir., 1985). ... The defendant was adjudicated a multiple offender based on convictions entered on the same day on two counts arising from the same bill of information. It was error for the trial court to sentence the defendant as a multiple offender on both counts. For this reason we will vacate the sentence imposed and remand for resen-tencing in accordance with the dictates of this opinion.

Section 15:529.1 does not authorize enhanced sentencing when the offender’s first conviction would already subject the offender to life imprisonment.

State v. Pegg · filed 1987-09-15

Furthermore, where upon a first conviction, the offender would be subject to life imprisonment, enhanced sentencing under La.R.S. 15:529.1 is not authorized.

Section 529.1 enhances the sentencing range for a repeat felony offender but does not independently require that any part of the enhanced sentence be served without parole, probation, or suspension.

State v. Glenn · filed 1987-09-23

However, the qualification that the sentence is to be served without benefit of parole is patently illegal. ... The Habitual Offender Law does not, however, *449have any requirement that any part of the sentence be imposed without probation, parole or suspension of sentence separate from the requirement by the statute under which the defendant is being sentenced.

Section 15:529.1(D)(1)(b) requires a defendant to challenge the validity of prior convictions in a written response before sentencing, with the claims and factual bases stated particularly, or the challenge is barred.

State v. Hayes · filed 1998-05-15(D)(1)(b)

However, a thorough review of the record indicates that the defendant failed to preserve the instant challenges to the predicate offenses charged against him in the state's habitual offender information. The defendant failed to file a written response to the information attacking the validity of the predicate offenses charged therein and setting forth, with particularity, his claims and the factual bases therefor. See La. R.S. 15:529.1(D)(1)(b). "Any challenge to a previous conviction ... which is not made before sentence is imposed may not thereafter be raised to attack the sentence." La. R.S. 15:529.1(D)(1)(b).

For a conviction to serve as a predicate for an enhanced sentence under La. Stat. Ann. § 15:529.1, it must be final; a conviction on which the defendant was not yet sentenced could not support a third-felony habitual-offender adjudication.

State v. Bentley · filed 1998-10-21

Based on this Court's decision in Brass, and other cited jurisprudence, we conclude that Bentley should not have been adjudicated as a third felony habitual offender because his 1989 conviction had not become final at the time of his sentencing in the case sub judice. Therefore, Bentley's adjudication and sentence as a third felony habitual offender are vacated and set aside.

Section 15:529.1 permits an adult felony conviction to serve as a predicate for habitual-offender enhancement, while its limitation to certain felony-grade drug violations applies to juvenile delinquency adjudications.

State v. Davis · filed 1999-10-20

The subject statute provides for the enhancement of a sentence when the offender has a prior conviction within this state of a felony or has been adjudicated a delinquent for the commission of a "felony-grade" violation of the Controlled Dangerous Substances Law. Under a genuine construction of that statute, an offender who was convicted of a felony, as an adult, may have his sentence enhanced on a multiple bill. That portion which defines only certain drug violations as "felony-grade," applies only to an offender whose predicate offense was an adjudication of delinquency under the Children's Code.

Section 15:529.1(D) requires the court, after a multiple-offender bill is filed, to advise the defendant of the allegations and the right to be tried on their truth, and the statute implicitly requires advice of the right to remain silent.

State v. Perkins · filed 1987-11-10(D)

La.R.S. 15:529.1(D) provides that, upon the filing of a multiple offender bill of information, the trial court shall cause the defendant to be brought before it and "shall inform him of the allegation contained in the information and of his right to be tried as to the truth thereof according to law and shall require the offender to say whether the allegations are true." State v. Martin, 427 So.2d 1182 (La.1983). La.R.S. 15:529.1 further implicitly provides that the defendant should be advised by the court of his right to remain silent. State v. Johnson, 432 So.2d 815 (La.1983). The record reflects that on the date of defendant's multiple offender hearing the trial court asked the defendant if he wanted to change his previous not guilty plea to the allegation of the multiple offender bill of information and stipulate that he was a habitual offender. Defendant indicated this was correct. Although the record shows the trial court generally informed defendant that the state would have to prove he was "the same Larry Perkins that's been convicted of a previous felony and within the specific amount of time", the trial court did not inform defendant of the specific allegation contained in the multiple offender bill of information, his right to be tried as to the truth of the allegation, and his right to remain silent. These failures of the trial court constitute error patent on the face of the record and require the habitual offender sentence to be vacated. State v. Burge, 506 So.2d 759 (La.App. 1st Cir.1987); State v. Boston, 463 So.2d 783 (La.App. 2nd Cir.1985); State v. Vincent, 439 So.2d 1124 (La.App. 4th Cir.1983), writ denied, 472 So.2d 913 (La. 1985).

At a multiple-offender hearing, the defendant must be advised of the allegations and the right to contest them and remain silent.

State v. Sims · filed 1988-06-21(D)

La.R.S. 15:529.1(D) provides that, upon the filing of a multiple offender bill of information, the trial court shall cause the defendant to be brought before it and "shall inform him of the allegation contained in the information and of his right to be tried as to the truth thereof according to law and shall require the offender to say whether the allegations are true." La.R.S. 15:529.1 further implicitly provides that the defendant should be advised by the court of his right to remain silent. State v. Johnson, 432 So.2d 815 (La.1983). ... The trial court advised defendant that he had a right to a hearing in which the state was required to prove that he was the same person who had previously been convicted. However, the court did not advise defendant that he had a right to remain silent during the proceedings. This failure of the trial court constitutes error patent on the record and requires that the habitual offender sentence be vacated.

Section 15:529.1(D) requires that a defendant be advised of the right to a formal habitual-offender hearing, the right to require the State to prove identity, and the right against self-incrimination before admitting identity.

State v. Moffett · filed 1990-12-20(D)

By his sole assignment of error, defendant complains that the trial court erred in adjudicating him a second habitual offender based upon his admission of his identity at the habitual offender hearing because the trial court failed to advise him of his right to a formal hearing, his right to require the State to prove his identity, and his right against self-incrimination. In its brief on appeal the State admits that defendant was not advised of the first two of these rights as required by La.R.S. 15:529.1(D). See, State v. Martin, 427 So.2d 1182 (La.1983); State v. Covington, 522 So.2d 1168 (La.App. 4th Cir.1988). In addition, defendant was not advised of his right to remain silent (his right against self-incrimination) before admitting his identity. This too was reversible error. State v. Johnson, 432 So.2d 815 (La.1983); State v. Wheeler, 547 So.2d 12 (La.App. 4th Cir.1989).

Section 15:529.1(D) requires the court to advise a defendant of the right to a formal habitual-offender hearing, to have the State prove the allegations, and to remain silent before the defendant admits the allegations or stipulates to identity.

State v. Winborn · filed 1992-07-30(D)

In State v. Martin, 427 So.2d 1182, 1184-85 (La.1983), this section of the statute was interpreted to require that a defendant be advised of her right to a formal hearing and to have the State prove its case. Additionally, this section implicitly requires that a defendant be advised of her right to remain silent. State v. Johnson, 432 So.2d 815, 817 (La.1983). ... In the instant case, defendant, like the defendants in Wheeler and Desmond, was never informed by the trial court of her rights. Therefore, because defendant was not advised of her rights as required by La.R.S. 15:529.1(D), her habitual offender adjudication must be vacated and the case remanded for a new habitual offender hearing.

Section 15:529.1(D)(1) requires that a defendant be informed of the right to remain silent and the state's obligation to prove the prior convictions, but failure to give that advisement does not require remand when evidence of the prior conviction was introduced.

State v. Cole · filed 1995-02-01(D)(1)

Under La. R.S. 15:529.1(D)(1) and State v. Walker, 432 So.2d 1057 (La.App. 3 Cir.1983), he should have been informed of his right to remain silent and have the state prove its case. ... Because evidence was introduced to establish the prior conviction, the trial court's failure to comply with La. R.S. 15:529.1(D)(1) does not require remand of the case. Defendant was properly sentenced after being correctly adjudged a multiple offender.

Subsection (D) requires advising a defendant of his rights at a habitual-offender hearing before defense counsel stipulates to the defendant’s identity, but a failure to do so warrants post-conviction relief only if the proceedings as a whole were fundamentally unfair and denied due process, absent an involuntary admission.

State v. Harris · filed 1995-05-19(D)

On application for post-conviction relief, the court of appeal reversed petitioner's adjudication and sentence as a multiple offender on the grounds that the trial court failed to advise him of his rights at the habitual offender hearing pursuant to La.R.S. 15:529.1(D) before defense counsel stipulated to petitioner's identity. ... In the absence of any allegation or showing that the admission was involuntary, compare State v. Johnson, supra, the availability of post-conviction relief turns on whether the proceedings as a whole accorded the petitioner fundamental fairness and due process of law. ... A complete review of the transcript reveals that the petitioner was given a fundamentally fair hearing wherein the state proved the prior felony convictions.

Subsection (D) requires the court to advise a defendant in a multiple-offender proceeding of the right to a formal hearing, the State’s burden to prove the prior convictions, and the right to remain silent.

State v. Robinson · filed 1995-11-15(D)

The procedure to be followed at a multiple bill hearing is stated in La.R.S. 15:529.1(D) which, at the time of the defendant’s adjudication, provided in pertinent part: ... the court in which the subsequent conviction was had shall cause the person, whether confined in prison or otherwise, to be brought before it and shall inform him of the allegation contained in the information and of his right to be tried as to the truth thereof according to law and shall require the offender to say whether the allegation are true. ... In State v. Martin, 427 So.2d 1182 (La.1988), the above was interpreted to require that the defendant be advised of his right to a formal hearing and to have the state prove its case. Additionally, it implicitly requires that the defendant be advised of his right to remain silent. ... Failure to so advise a defendant is reversible error.

Subsection (D)(1) requires the defendant to be advised of the right to remain silent and that the state must prove its case at a habitual-offender proceeding.

State v. Payne · filed 1995-12-06(D)(1)

La.R.S. 15:529.1(D)(1) requires that a defendant be informed of his right to remain silent and have the state prove its case.

Section 15:529.1(D) requires the court to advise a defendant of the right to a formal habitual-offender hearing, the State's duty to prove its case, and the statutory right to remain silent.

State v. Smith · filed 1996-04-03(D)

The third error patent concerns defendant’s habitual offender hearing. La.R.S. 15:529.1(D) specifically provides that the defendant be advised by the court of his | aright to a “formal hearing” and to have the state prove its case. State v. Martin, 427 So.2d 1182 (La.1983). Further, this section implicitly provides that the defendant should be advised, by the court, of his statutory right to remain silent. See State v. Johnson, 432 So.2d 815 (La.1983), appeal after remand, 457 So.2d 1251 (La.App. 1 Cir.1984), appeal after remand, 471 So.2d 1041 (La.App. 1 Cir.1985). In the case sub judice, the transcript of the habitual offender hearing on June 21, 1995, reveals that the defendant waived arraignment and pled not guilty. The record does not reflect that the defendant was advised of his right to remain silent and have the state prove its case. Nevertheless, defendant did exercise his right to remain silent by not testifying. Therefore, the defendant has suffered no adverse affects to his right to remain silent sufficient to warrant a reversal. State v. Miles, 613 So.2d 1047 (La.App. 3 Cir.1993).

Section 15:529.1(D) requires the court to inform an alleged multiple offender of the allegations and the right to a hearing at which the State must prove the predicate offense and the defendant's identity, before accepting the admission.

State v. Payne · filed 1996-05-22(D)

Defendant was represented by counsel at the hearing, he was informed of the allegations in the multiple offender bill and he was advised of his right to a hearing wherein the state would have the burden of proving he was the same person previously convicted of the predicate offense. Furthermore, the admission was part of a plea agreement and defendant was fully apprised of the sentence he was to receive.

Section 15:529.1 requires the court to advise a defendant of the right to remain silent and the right to be tried on the truth of the habitual-offender allegations before accepting an admission.

State v. Fox · filed 1999-06-25D(1)(a), D(3)

In this regard, an implicit, and integral, aspect of the requirements of La. R.S. 15:529.1 is the court's duty to inform the defendant of his right to remain silent. State v. Griffin, 525 So.2d 705, 706 (La.App. 1st Cir.1988). A trial court's failure to properly advise a defendant of his rights under the Habitual Offender Law constitutes patent error on the face of the record and requires that the habitual offender adjudication and sentence be vacated. See Griffin, 525 So.2d at 707. In the instant case, the trial court never advised the defendant of his right to remain silent. It failed to properly, and timely, advise the defendant "of his right to be tried as to the truth" of the State's allegations in the habitual offender information according to law. Accordingly, the defendant's habitual offender adjudication and sentence are vacated.

Section 15:529.1(D) recognizes a habitual offender defendant’s right to remain silent and requires the court to advise the defendant of that right before accepting an admission.

State v. Roberson · filed 2002-02-27(D)

Although the right to remain silent is not specifically set forth in La.R.S. 15:529.1, in State v. Johnson, 432 So.2d 815(La.), writ granted on other grounds, 438 So.2d 1113 (La.1983), appeal after remand, 457 So.2d 1251 (La.App. 1 Cir.1984), appeal after remand, 471 So.2d 1041 (La.App. 1 Cir.1985), the Louisiana Supreme Court held this statute clearly recognizes a defendant has the right to remain silent and the statute implicitly provides a defendant should be advised by the court of his right to remain silent before he acknowledges or confesses his status as a habitual offender. The trial court erred in failing to advise Defendant of this right before accepting his admission. ... Accordingly, the trial court’s failure to advise Defendant of his rights was harmless in this instance and he was afforded a fair hearing.

Section 15:529.1(D)(l)(b) places the burden of proof on the State at a multiple-offender hearing.

State v. Young · filed 2003-12-10(D)(l)(b)

Under La. R.S. 15:529.1(D)(l)(b) the State bore the burden of proof at the multiple bill hearing.

At a habitual-offender proceeding, advice of the right to remain silent and the right to a formal hearing given at arraignment can satisfy the statute even if the defendant is not advised again before a later stipulation, so long as the proceedings as a whole are fundamentally fair and accord with due process.

State v. Gonsoulin · filed 2004-06-25D(1)(a), (3)

We find that the defendant was sufficiently advised of his rights at his arraignment and that advice of rights was sufficient to comply with the requirements of LSA-R.S. 15:529.1 D(1) and (3). The defendant, who was represented by counsel, clearly understood those rights by choosing to remain silent at the arraignment hearing, which prompted the setting of the hearing concerning the habitual offender allegations. It would be unnecessarily redundant to advise him again of his right to remain silent at the second hearing, particularly because the only reason he was there was because he had exercised his right to remain silent, after being advised he had this right. The law does not expressly state that the court is required to inform the defendant of his rights at each phase of the habitual offender proceeding. The law requires that the record demonstrate that the proceedings as a whole were fundamentally fair and accorded the defendant due process of law.

Section 15:529.1(D) requires advising a habitual-offender defendant of the right to remain silent and to a formal hearing, but failure to give that advice may be harmless when the defendant voluntarily testifies at a full hearing with counsel.

State of Louisiana v. Samuel · filed 2008-05-28(D)

We find that, although the Defendant acknowledged his prior convictions without first being advised of his right to remain silent, unlike in Johnson, the Defendant’s testimony was voluntary; and, the Defendant was represented by counsel. Additionally, a full habitual offender hearing was held. Accordingly, we find that the trial court’s failure to advise the Defendant of his right to remain silent was harmless error in this instance and that he was afforded a fair hearing.

Section 15:529.1(D)(1)(a) requires the trial judge to advise a defendant of the multiple-offender allegations and the right to have their truth determined according to law; the statute also requires advising the defendant of the right to remain silent.

State v. Bourgeois · filed 2008-10-28(D)(1)(a)

La. R.S. 15:529.1(D)(1)(a) provides, in pertinent part, that the trial judge "shall inform [defendant] of the allegation contained in the [multiple offender bill of] information and of his right to be tried as to the truth thereof according to law and shall require the offender to say whether the allegations are true." ... La. R.S. 15:529.1 also implicitly requires that the trial court advise defendant of his right to remain silent. ... We find that defendant was not informed of his statutory rights under La. R.S. 15:529.1(D). Without such advice, defendant's acknowledgment or confession of his prior felony convictions is invalid. ... Since we have found that defendant was not informed of his rights pursuant to La. R.S. 15:529.1(D) and the State did not establish proof of the prior convictions by competent evidence, we must reverse defendant's multiple offender adjudication and vacate the enhanced sentence.

Section 15:529.1(D) requires the court to advise a defendant of the right to a formal habitual-offender hearing and to require the State to prove its case, but failure to give that advice may be harmless after a full hearing when the defendant neither testifies nor acknowledges habitual-offender status.

State of Louisiana v. Ruiz · filed 2009-02-04(D)

The court in Johnson, relying on State v. Martin, 427 So.2d 1182 (La.1983), further stated La.R.S. 15:529.1(D) specifically provides defendant shall be advised of his right to a formal hearing and to demand that the state prove its case. This court has found such error to be harmless when the defendant is adjudicated a habitual offender after a full hearing, and the defendant does not testify or acknowledge his status as a habitual offender. ... Accordingly, the sole procedural error concerning the original habitual offender hearing was harmless.

Failure to advise a habitual offender of the statutory rights required by subsection (D) is harmless when a full hearing is held and the defendant neither testifies nor acknowledges habitual-offender status.

State v. Ruiz · filed 2009-02-04(D)

In this case, although Defendant was not apprised of the foregoing rights prior to his original habitual offender proceeding, a full hearing was held, and Defendant did not testify or acknowledge his status as a habitual offender.

Section 15:529.1(D)(1)(a) requires the court to advise a defendant who admits the habitual-offender allegations of the right to remain silent and the right to a formal hearing, and failure to do so requires vacating the adjudication and sentence.

State v. LANDOR · filed 2009-05-13(D)(1)(a)

A trial court's failure to properly advise a defendant of his rights under the Habitual Offender Law requires that the habitual offender adjudication and sentence be vacated. Prior to accepting a defendant's acknowledgement, confession, or admission to its allegations, the trial court must advise the defendant of the right to remain silent and of the right to a formal hearing wherein the State would have to prove the allegations of the habitual offender bill. Furthermore, the language of the Habitual Offender Law must be strictly construed. In this regard, an implicit and integral aspect of the requirements of La. R.S. 15:529.1 is the court's duty to inform the defendant of his right to remain silent.

Failure to advise a habitual offender of the rights to remain silent and to a formal hearing is harmless when counsel is represented, a full hearing is held, and the State independently proves habitual-offender status.

State of Louisiana v. Gobert · filed 2009-12-09(D)

Therefore, we find that the Defendant was afforded a fundamentally fair hearing and that the error was harmless.

Before a multiple-offender hearing, the trial court must advise the defendant of the multiple-bill allegations and the rights to a hearing and to remain silent; omission is harmless when the State proves multiple-offender status with competent evidence rather than the defendant's admission.

State v. Lane · filed 2010-03-09

La. R.S. 15:529.1 requires the trial court to advise a defendant of the allegations contained in the information, his right to a hearing, and his right to remain silent.[13] In the instant case, the record does not disclose that Lane was advised of his rights prior to the multiple bill hearing. The failure of the trial court to advise a defendant of his right to a trial and to remain silent is harmless error when the multiple offender status is established by competent evidence offered by the State at a hearing, rather than by the admission of the defendant.[14] Here, Lane denied the allegations of the multiple bill, and the State presented competent evidence at the hearing to establish his multiple offender status. Therefore, the trial court's failure to advise him of the specific allegations against him and of his right to be tried and to remain silent was harmless error.

Section 15:529.1 requires the trial court to advise a multiple-offender defendant of the bill's allegations, the right to a hearing, and the right to remain silent, but failure to give that advice is harmless when the State proves the multiple-offender status with competent evidence at the hearing instead of through the defendant's admission.

State v. Lanieux · filed 2010-03-09

La. R.S. 15:529.1 requires the trial court to advise a defendant of the allegations contained in the information, his right to a hearing, and his right to remain silent. ... The failure of the trial court to advise a defendant of his right to a trial and to remain silent is harmless error when the multiple offender status is established by competent evidence offered by the State at a hearing, rather than by the admission of the defendant.

Section 15:529.1(D) requires that a defendant in habitual-offender proceedings be advised of the right to a formal hearing and to demand that the State prove its case; an omission in that advisement may be harmless when the proceedings are fundamentally fair and independent evidence supports the adjudication.

State of Louisiana v. Jasper · filed 2011-11-02(D)

The court in Johnson, relying on State v. Martin, 427 So.2d 1182 (La.1983), further stated La.R.S. 15:529.1(D) specifically provides defendant shall be advised of his right to a formal hearing and to demand that the state prove its case. ... Thus, we find that the trial court’s omission in advising the defendant of his rights was harmless error and he was afforded a fundamentally fair hearing.

Subsection (D) requires the trial court to advise a multiple-offender defendant of the bill's allegations and the rights to a hearing and to remain silent, but failure to do so is harmless when the State proves multiple-offender status by competent evidence at the hearing rather than by admission.

State v. Bryant · filed 2013-02-21(D)

We further note the record does not reflect that defendant was advised of his rights prior to the multiple bill hearing as required by La. R.S. 15:529.1(D), which requires the trial court to advise a defendant of the allegations contained in the information, his right to a hearing, and his right to remain silent. State v. Haywood, 00-1584 (La.App. 5 Cir. 3/28/01), 783 So.2d 568, 582. However, the failure of the trial court to advise a defendant of these rights is harmless when the defendant’s multiple offender status is established by competent evidence offered by the State at a hearing, rather than by the admission of the defendant. Id. at 583. Here, defendant denied the allegations of the multiple bill, and the State presented competent evidence at the hearing to establish his multiple offender status. Thus, we find the trial court’s failure to advise defendant of the specific allegations against him and of his right to be tried and to remain silent was harmless error and no corrective action is required.

Section 15:529.1 requires the trial court to advise a defendant of the multiple-offender allegations, the right to a hearing or trial, and the right to remain silent; failure to give that advisement is harmless when the State proves multiple-offender status with competent evidence rather than the defendant's admission.

State v. Ruffin · filed 2013-12-12

Second, the record in this case does not disclose that defendant was advised of his rights prior to the multiple bill hearing. This was in violation of La. R.S. 15:529.1 which requires the trial court to advise a defendant of the allegations contained in the information, his right to a hearing, and his right to remain silent. State v. Haywood, 00-1584, p. 19 (La.App. 5 Cir. 3/28/01), 783 So.2d 568, 582. While this is an error, it is harmless. The failure of the trial court to advise a defendant of his right to a trial and to remain silent is harmless error when the multiple offender status is established by competent evidence offered by the state at a hearing, rather than by the admission of the defendant. Id. Here, defendant proceeded to the multiple bill hearing, and the state presented competent evidence at the hearing to establish his multiple offender status. Therefore, we find that the trial court’s failure to advise him of the specific allegations against him and of his right to be tried and to remain silent were harmless errors.

Before accepting a defendant's admission to habitual offender status, the court must advise the defendant of the right to remain silent and to require the state to prove its case; an unwarned admission cannot alone establish that status.

State v. Coleman · filed 1998-10-07(D)

Since the defendant in the present case was not informed of his right to remain silent or his right to have the state prove its case before he admitted to *388 being a habitual offender, defendant's admission is invalid.

Section 15:529.1 requires the court to advise a defendant of the multiple bill allegations and the right to a hearing; failure to give that advice can be harmless when the evidence establishes the defendant’s identity as the prior offender.

State v. Hayes · filed 2013-01-23(D)

Louisiana Revised Statute 15:529.1 provides that the trial court shall inform a defendant of the allegations contained in the multiple bill of information and of his *368right to be tried as to the truth thereof according to law, and shall require the offender to say whether the allegations are true. ... We find that the district court properly took into account counsel’s detailed admission along with the State’s exhibits in finding that the evidence was sufficient to prove that defendant was the same person who had pled guilty to the Texas conviction. Therefore, we find no merit in this assignment of error.

For a 1989 aggravated escape conviction, § 15:529.1(A)(2)(b) did not apply because aggravated escape was not among its listed offenses, so the third-offender sentencing range under (A)(2)(a) was 5 to 20 years.

State v. Metoyer · filed 1999-11-10(A)(2)(a), (A)(2)(b)

Thus, the crime to which defendant was convicted, aggravated escape, was set out in La. R.S. 14:110(C) rather than La. R.S. 14:110(6), and carried a sentence of less that 12 years. As such it was not one of the listed offenses set out in La. R.S. 15:529.1(A)(2)(b). While the state argues that the legislature intended aggravated escape to be included within La. R.S. 15:529.1(A)(2)(b), it is well settled that criminal laws, which are penal in nature, are to be strictly construed and cannot be extended by analogy. State ex rel Mims v. Butler, 601 So.2d 649 (La.1992). ... Therefore, we find that defendant’s sentence as a third offender to life in prison was imposed in error. The sentencing range applicable in this case is provided in La. R.S. 15:529.1(A)(2)(a), with a 5 year minimum and a 20 year maximum.

Section 15:529.1(A)(1) sets a second-felony offender's sentencing range at one-half to twice the longest term prescribed for a first conviction, and sentencing within that range is mandatory.

State v. Martin · filed 2019-05-22(A)(1)

Thus, the applicable sentencing range for Martin as a second-felony offender was 25 to 100 years at hard labor without benefits.

Section 15:529.1(A)(1) supplied a second-felony offender sentencing range of twenty to eighty years under the 2015 version and 13.3 to eighty years under the 2017 version; the defendant's fifty-five-year sentence fell within either range.

State of Louisiana Versus Delcome David Evans · filed 2019-06-19(A)(1)

The 2015 version of La. R.S. 15:529.1 subjected defendant to a sentencing range of twenty to eighty years imprisonment, while the 2017 amended version subjects defendant to a sentencing range of 13.3 to eighty years imprisonment.

After a multiple-offender bill is filed, Section 15:529.1(D) requires the court to inform the defendant of the allegations and the right to have their truth tried according to law, and the statute also implicitly requires advice of the right to remain silent.

State v. Lapworth · filed 1987-12-22(D)

La.R.S. 15:529.1(D) provides that, upon the filing of a multiple offender bill of information, the trial court shall cause the defendant to be brought before it and "shall inform him of the allegation contained in the information and of his right to be tried as to the truth thereof according to law and shall require the offender to say whether the allegations are true." State v. Martin, 427 So.2d 1182 (La.1983). La.R.S. 15:529.1 further implicitly provides that the defendant should be advised by the court of his right to remain silent. State v. Johnson, 432 So.2d 815 (La.1983).