Fla. Stat. § 95.11

Section 95.11(4)(b)'s two-year medical malpractice limitations period applies to claims against a hospital for negligent selection and retention of doctors when the claims arise from negligent medical treatment.

Martinez v. LIFEMARK HOSPITAL OF FLA. · filed 1992-10-13(4)(b)

The appellants' claims are barred by the two-year medical malpractice statute of limitations. The selection and review of health care personnel is a duty of hospitals under Florida's medical malpractice statute. Since this case arises out of a breach of that duty, the medical malpractice statute applies. The appellants' entire case arises out of negligent medical treatment. Such negligent treatment is both necessary to the claims against the appellee and inextricably connected to them. Therefore, this entire case should be handled under the medical malpractice statute. See Section 95.11(4)(b), Florida Statutes (1991).

Section 95.11(4)(b)’s two-year medical malpractice limitation does not cover independent intentional torts unrelated to legitimate medical diagnosis, treatment, or care.

Stackhouse v. Emerson · filed 1993-01-22(4)(b)

We hold that the above counts, as alleged, do not fall within the ambit of section 95.11(4)(b). The causes of action stated in these counts do not allege medical malpractice, but instead, involve independent intentional acts committed upon appellant by appellees while appellant was a patient at Humana Hospital.

Section 95.11(4)(b)’s four-year medical malpractice repose period runs from the incident regardless of when the injury is discovered and does not apply to blood banks.

Whigham v. SHANDS TEACHING HOSP. · filed 1993-01-27(4)(b)

Florida's statute of repose, applicable here, was "triggered" by the incident occurring in 1983, that incident being Whigham's receipt of AIDS-tainted blood. Knowledge of the injury or negligence is not a factor affecting the running of the four-year period of repose. ... However, in Silva v. Southwest Florida Blood Bank, 601 So.2d 1184 (Fla. 1992), the Florida Supreme Court held that the medical malpractice statute of repose does not apply to blood banks, as they do not render diagnosis, treatment, or care, and are not providers of health care. Therefore, the final order must be reversed with regard to Civitan, a blood bank.

Section 95.11(4)(b)’s medical malpractice limitations period begins when the patient is on notice of injury and possible negligent care; it is not tolled while the patient awaits a possible cancer recurrence.

Swain v. Curry · filed 1992-02-19(4)(b)

We conclude that the statute of limitations has begun to run as to the Swains' cause of action, since they are undoubtedly on notice as to both injury and possible breach of care. We can find no support in the facts of this case, or in the case law provided to us, to suggest that the statute, having commenced to run, is now somehow tolled until Mrs. Swain discovers, or (even more enigmatically), should discover, a recurrence of cancer.

Section 95.11(4)(b)'s medical malpractice limitations period may present a factual question about when it began to run.

Davis v. Green · filed 1993-10-20(4)(b)

Applying Tanner to the instant facts, we find that there is a genuine issue of material fact concerning when the medical malpractice statute of limitations began to run in this case.

Section 95.11(4)(b)’s medical malpractice limitations period begins to run only when the injured person has the capacity for conscious awareness of the injury or alleged negligence.

Arthur v. Unicare Health Facilities, Inc. · filed 1992-06-19(4)(b)

In choosing the words "from the time the incident is discovered, or should have been discovered" in section 95.11(4)(b), Florida Statutes (1987), we conclude that the legislature anticipated and intended an ability of conscious awareness on the part of a victim of alleged malpractice to trigger the statute running.

Section 95.11(4)(b)'s medical malpractice limitations period begins when the claimant knows of the injury and a reasonable possibility that medical malpractice caused it.

Tanner v. Hartog · filed 1993-05-13(4)(b)

We hold that the knowledge of the injury as referred to in the rule as triggering the statute of limitations means not only knowledge of the injury but also knowledge that there is a reasonable possibility[4] that the injury was caused by medical malpractice.

Section 95.11(4)(b)'s four-year medical malpractice repose period runs from the negligent advice, even when a wrongful birth claim accrues later.

Kush v. Lloyd · filed 1992-12-03(4)(b)

Petitioners argue that this language means the statute runs from the date negligent advice was given, not from the date of Brandon David Lloyd's birth. We agree.

Section 95.11(4)(b)’s medical malpractice limitations period begins when the plaintiff has notice of the negligent act or knows of the injury and the reasonable possibility that medical malpractice caused it.

Hillsborough Community Mental Health Ctr. v. Harr · filed 1993-05-20(4)(b)

In the meantime, however, this Court reinterpreted the Nardone rule to hold that the statute of limitations in a medical malpractice suit commences either when the plaintiff has notice of the negligent act giving rise to the cause of action or when the plaintiff has knowledge of the injury and knowledge of the reasonable possibility that the injury was caused by medical malpractice. Tanner v. Hartog, 618 So.2d 177 (Fla. 1993). Under this interpretation, there can be no question that the court below made the right decision.

Section 95.11(4)(b)'s medical malpractice limitations period begins when the plaintiff learns that the injury resulted from the defendant's treatment, but fraudulent concealment may toll it.

Rogers v. Ruiz · filed 1992-02-27(4)(b)

We conclude, consistent with the trial court's ruling, that the running of the statutory period had been triggered at the time plaintiff was informed of her husband's death from the surgery by defendant physician at defendant hospital, which was more than two years prior to the service of the presuit notice. However, we also conclude that the summary judgment should have been precluded by fact questions to be decided by a jury as to whether the running of the statutory period had been tolled by fraudulent concealment by defendants so that the period had not expired at the time of the service of the presuit notice.

Section 95.11(4)(b) extends the medical malpractice repose period when fraud, concealment, or intentional misrepresentation prevents discovery of the injury, but never beyond seven years from the malpractice.

Arango v. Orr · filed 1995-06-09(4)(b)

When fraud, concealment, or intentional misrepresentation of fact prevented discovery of the injury, the repose period is extended two years from the time that the injury is discovered or should have been discovered but will never be extended more than seven years from the date of the malpractice.

Under § 95.11(4)(b), a misdiagnosis can create a factual question about when a patient knew an injury might have been caused by medical malpractice, precluding summary judgment on limitations.

Higgs v. Florida Dept. of Corrections · filed 1995-05-05(4)(b)

A misdiagnosis, therefore, would in most cases raise an issue of material fact concerning a plaintiff's knowledge thereby precluding summary judgment.

Section 95.11(4)(b)'s seven-year medical malpractice repose period may apply when a complaint alleges that a provider's fraud, concealment, or intentional misrepresentation prevented discovery of the injury within four years.

Hernandez v. AMISUB (AMERICAN HOSP.) · filed 1995-09-06(4)(b)

In distinguishing between the application of the four and seven-year repose periods, the determinative factor is whether the plaintiff's complaint contains allegations that the medical provider, either by way of fraud, concealment, or intentional misrepresentation of fact, prevented the plaintiff from discovering the injury within the initial four-year repose period.

Section 95.11(4)(b)'s two-year medical malpractice limitations period does not apply to a sheriff's alleged negligence in carrying out custodial duties that do not involve medical diagnosis, treatment, or care.

Kelley v. Rice · filed 1996-03-22(4)(b)

In the performance of his custodial duties, appellee was not necessarily providing "diagnosis, treatment or care" as contemplated by the medical malpractice statute of limitations, section 95.11(4)(b).

Section 95.11(4)(b) requires a medical malpractice action to be filed within four years of the incident, regardless of when the injury is discovered.

Damiano v. McDaniel · filed 1996-04-10(4)(b)

Applying section 95.11(4)(b), as interpreted by the above cited authority, in order to preserve Appellants’ cause of action, suit was required to be commenced by June 1990, regardless of when Appellants, in fact, discovered that Mrs. Damiano had AIDS.

Section 95.11(4)(b)’s four-year medical malpractice repose period is tolled by service of a notice of intent to initiate litigation.

Wood v. Fraser · filed 1996-06-14(4)(b)

In making his argument, the appellee acknowledged the opinion of this court in Moore v. Winter Haven Hospital, 579 So.2d 188 (Fla. 2d DCA), review denied, 589 So.2d 294 (Fla.1991), in which we clearly held that the four-year statute of repose in section 95.11(4)(b), Florida Statutes (1983), was tolled by the service of a notice of intent to *17 initiate medical malpractice litigation as provided for in section 768.57(4), Florida Statutes (1987).[1] ... Accordingly, in conformity with the holding in Moore, we reverse the trial court's entry of final summary judgment on behalf of the appellee and remand this case with instructions to reinstate appellant's complaint.

Section 95.11(4)(b)'s medical malpractice limitations period does not begin while an unconscious patient lacks notice of the injury and possible malpractice; a spouse's knowledge is not imputed to the patient absent a representative duty to bring suit.

Stone v. Rosenthal · filed 1995-11-22(4)(b)

We reject Appellees' argument that Appellant's notice and knowledge during that period could be imputed to Stone merely because she was his wife; the record does not reflect that Appellant stood in a representative capacity charged with a duty to file actions to protect Stone's property rights at any time prior to her appointment as personal representative of his estate.

Section 95.11(4) allows a medical malpractice action within two years of when the claimant discovered or should have discovered the injury and facts indicating a reasonable possibility of malpractice.

Borne v. Lawnwood Regional Medical Center · filed 1996-07-03(4)

Reading the amended complaint and attached papers, we conclude that plaintiff would be able to offer evidence from which a jury could reasonably conclude that he was not chargeable with discovery of the incident until November 11, 1993. This action was commenced in April 1995 but dismissed August 21, 1995 — or well within the limitations period.

Section 95.11(4)(b) does not require the concealment that extends the medical malpractice limitations period to be separate from the alleged negligence.

Mangoni v. Temkin · filed 1996-09-25(4)(b)

Nevertheless, the plain language of section 95.11(4)(b) does not suggest that the negligence and the concealment which extends the statute must be separate.

Section 95.11(4)(b)’s limitations period does not begin merely because a patient knows surgery occurred; the patient must know or have reason to know of a possibility of medical malpractice.

Hanano v. Petrou · filed 1996-12-02(4)(b)

Here, the occurrence of surgery alone, however, would not have “communicate[d] the possibility of medical malpractice.” Tanner, 618 So.2d at 181-82. Thus, the statute did not begin to run simply by virtue of Hanano’s knowledge of the surgery.

Section 95.11(4)(b)’s medical malpractice statute of repose begins with the alleged incident of malpractice and can bar a suit before the injury is discovered.

Damiano v. McDaniel · filed 1997-03-13(4)(b)

While the Damianos' cause of action for purposes of the statute of limitations would not have accrued until they learned that Ms. Damiano was HIV-positive, their suit was nevertheless barred by operation of the statute of repose, which began to run with the alleged incident of malpractice.

Section 95.11(4)(b)’s medical malpractice limitations period does not begin until the plaintiff has reason to believe the injury may have resulted from medical negligence; when that occurred can be a question of fact.

Stephens v. Bay Medical Center · filed 1997-04-14(4)(b)

Pursuant to Tanner, the limitations period would not begin to run until there was reason to believe that medical negligence may have occurred. ... Therefore, we conclude a genuine issue of material fact exists as to when appellant had knowledge of the anoxic encephalopathy and knowledge of the reasonable possibility that his injury was caused by medical negligence.

The medical malpractice statute of repose in section 95.11(4)(b) is extended by the limitations extensions in sections 766.104(2) and 766.106(4).

Parham v. Balis · filed 1997-11-12(4)(b)

The issue raised in this appeal is whether the extensions of the statute of limitations allowed by sections 766.104(2)[2] and 766.106(4),[3] Florida Statutes (1989), also extend the statute of repose. We hold that they do and, therefore, reverse the order of dismissal.

Section 95.11(4)(b)’s two-year medical malpractice limitation does not cover regimented urine collection that requires no medical skill or judgment.

Lynn v. Mount Sinai Medical Center, Inc. · filed 1997-05-07(4)(b)

The regimented collection of urine samples is not a "medical service." Consequently, the claims were improperly dismissed as being time barred under the two year limitation for medical malpractice.

Section 95.11(4)(b)'s medical-malpractice period begins when the injury and the reasonable possibility that it was caused by malpractice are discovered.

Ondo v. F. GARY GIESEKE, PA · filed 1997-07-23(4)(b)

In this case, November 16, 1992, was the date it was discovered that the rods in the decedent's back were infected and the date which appellant stated in one set of interrogatories was the date that she and her husband "were more than aware that this procedure should not have been done."

Section 95.11(4)(b) requires a medical malpractice action to be filed within two years of the incident or its discovery.

Rothschild v. NME Hospitals, Inc. · filed 1998-03-25(4)(b)

Pursuant to section 95.11(4)(b), Florida Statutes (1995), a plaintiff must file a medical malpractice action within two years from the time the incident giving rise to the action occurred or the date it was discovered.

Section 95.11(4)(b)’s medical malpractice limitations and repose periods apply only when the claimant is in privity with a health care provider.

Archey v. Government Healthcare Services · filed 1998-08-25(4)(b)

This notion, the existing caselaw, and a plain read-. ing of section 95.11(4)(b) all lead to the conclusion that a privity relationship between the claimant and a health care provider is essential for application of the limitations and repose periods in the statute.

Section 95.11(4)(b)’s medical malpractice limitations period does not necessarily begin when a patient receives a correct diagnosis after an alleged misdiagnosis; whether the patient had notice of possible malpractice may be a jury question.

Cunningham v. Lowery · filed 1999-01-08(4)(b)

We do not believe that the discovery of the infection on November 16, 1993 suggested that Dr. Lowery’s failure to diagnose the infection previously or to order additional tests when Dr. Lowery first saw Mr. Cunningham on October 11, 1993 was notice of malpractice as a matter of law. Identification of the infection did not “speak for itself.”

Section 95.11(4)(b)’s two-year medical malpractice period begins when an injury communicates the possibility of medical negligence.

Hazen v. Kaplan · filed 1999-04-30(4)(b)

We hold, under the facts of this case, Hazen’s paralysis following the myelogram was sufficient to “communicate[ ] the possibility of medical negligence.” Tanner. Therefore, the two-year statute of limitations began to run on or about 26 June 1994. As such, service of the notice of intent on 3 January 1997 occurred beyond the limitations period, and Hazen’s medical malpractice action against the appellees herein is barred.

Section 95.11(4)(b)’s two-year medical malpractice limitations period is suspended during the ninety-day presuit tolling period and any extension agreed to by the parties under section 766.106(4).

Hankey v. Yarian · filed 2000-03-16(4)(b)

Accordingly, we hold the two-year statute of limitations under section 95.11(4)(b) is suspended ("tolled") for ninety days under section 766.106(4) and any extended time agreed to by the parties under that same section.

Section 95.11(4)(b) treats a petition for the automatic presuit extension or service of a notice of intent as commencement of a medical malpractice action for purposes of the statute of repose, and the corresponding tolling provisions apply to that repose period.

Musculoskeletal Institute v. Parham · filed 1999-03-11(4)(b)

We therefore hold that solely for the purpose of the statute of repose, an action for medical malpractice is commenced with the service of a notice of intent to initiate litigation pursuant to section 766.106 or on petition to the clerk of the court filed pursuant to section 766.104(2) and that the tolling provisions of these statutes and Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.650(d) applicable to the statute of limitations are equally applicable to the statute of repose in section 95.11(4)(b).

Section 95.11(4)(b) does not extend the medical malpractice repose period to seven years for a negligent misdiagnosis or failure to diagnose alone.

Myklejord v. Morris · filed 2000-08-31(4)(b)

We hold that a negligent misdiagnosis or failure to diagnose does not constitute concealment as contemplated by the statute.

Section 95.11(4)(b)’s two-year medical malpractice limitations period does not apply to a hospital’s wrongful disposal of a deceased child’s remains after an autopsy.

Bell v. Indian River Mem. Hosp. · filed 2001-02-07(4)(b)

Given the rationale in Lynn and the Florida Supreme Court's construction of section 95.11(4)(b) in Silva, the wrongful disposal of the deceased patient did not fall within the plain ordinary meaning of diagnosis, treatment or care. The fact that the disposal of the child's remains took place in the hospital does not mean that it constituted medical malpractice.

Section 95.11(4)(b)’s four-year statute of repose does not support summary judgment when the physician has not established the absence of a material factual issue about involvement within four years before suit.

Kasbar v. Elias · filed 2001-05-30(4)(b)

The trial court granted Dr. Elias’ motion for summary judgment on the ground that it was barred by the four year statute of repose, section 95.11(4)(b), Florida Statutes (1995). ... Although plaintiff may not ultimately be able to establish the involvement of Dr. Elias within four years of the filing of this suit, it was premature for the trial court to enter a summary judgment at this stage of the proceedings as Dr. Elias did not establish the absence of material issues of fact. We therefore reverse.

Under § 95.11(4)(b), negligent diagnosis alone does not establish concealment that extends the four-year medical malpractice repose period.

Nehme v. Smithkline Beecham Clinical Laboratories, Inc. · filed 2002-06-28(4)(b)

We agree that Mykle-jord is not binding precedent; however, it cannot be ignored that the sole issue in Myklejord was whether negligent diagnosis can constitute concealment for purposes of the statute of repose and this court did affirm the trial court’s dismissal of the action on statute of repose grounds. We thus affirm the instant case in accordance with Myklejord, but because we recognize that language in Nardone can be read to support a conclusion either way, as evidenced by Myklejord, we certify to the Florida Supreme Court the following question as one of great public importance: DOES THE TERM CONCEALMENT AS USED IN SECTION 95.11(4)(b), FLORIDA STATUTES, ENCOMPASS NEGLIGENT DIAGNOSIS BY A MEDICAL PROVIDER?

Section 95.11(4)(b) gives a plaintiff two years to bring a medical malpractice action after learning of the injury and the reasonable possibility that malpractice caused it.

Gumbs v. Guerra · filed 2002-03-06(4)(b)

It held, as a matter of law, that the plaintiff had “knowledge of the injury and knowledge of the reasonable possibility that the injury was caused by medical malpractice,” Hillsborough Community Mental Health Center v. Harr, 618 So.2d 187, 189 (Fla.1993); Tanner v. Hartog, 618 So.2d 177 (Fla.1993), more than the two years prior to the commencement of the action provided by section 95.11(4)(b), Florida Statutes (1995). There is no error in this ruling.

Section 95.11(4)(b) does not charge an asymptomatic patient with constructive notice of an undisclosed positive test result when the provider has not fulfilled special statutory duties to notify the patient.

Doe v. HILLSBOROUGH COUNTY HOSP. AUTHORITY · filed 2002-05-22(4)(b)

In this case, however, we hold only that patients without existing symptoms of a disease are not on constructive notice of a positive diagnostic test concerning that disease, when a health care provider has not fulfilled special statutory obligations designed to assure that the patient is notified of the positive result.

Section 95.11(4)(b) gives a claimant two years from the incident to commence a medical malpractice action.

Cortes v. Williams · filed 2003-07-24(4)(b)

The alleged malpractice occurred September 30, 1999. Section 95.11(4)(b), Florida Statutes, requires, in relevant part, “[a]n action for medical malpractice shall be commenced within 2 years from the time the incident giving rise to the action occurred.... ” Accordingly, respondent’s statute of limitations was set to expire on September 30, 2001.

Section 95.11(4)(b) extends the medical malpractice repose period when intentional acts prevent discovery of an injury; a negligent diagnosis alone is not concealment.

Nehme v. Smithkline Beecham Clinical Laboratories, Inc. · filed 2003-09-25(4)(b)

Applying the doctrine of noscitur a sociis, because both "fraud" and "intentional misrepresentation of fact" involve a level of knowledge or intent, we conclude that the legislative intent was to extend the repose period when intentional acts prevent discovery of the injury. A negligent diagnosis, without more, does not constitute concealment.

Section 95.11(4)(b) sets a two-year limitations period for medical malpractice actions.

Waterman v. Stoll · filed 2003-10-03(4)(b)

The statute of limitations for a medical malpractice action is two years. § 95.11(4)(b), Fla. Stat. ... Had the Hospital raised these concerns in its motion, the Stolls could have complied before the statute of limitations expired, that is, by December 13, 2000.

Under Section 95.11(4)(b), whether medical records give a malpractice plaintiff constructive knowledge of a possible negligent act depends on the facts of the case.

Overholt v. Neto · filed 2002-08-09(4)(b)

Thus, we conclude that the constructive knowledge rule applied in Nardone must be applied on a case-by-case basis within the context of the applicable facts.

Section 95.11(4)(b) gives a dental malpractice claimant two years from discovery to file, subject to a four-year limit from the incident.

Nichols v. Preiser · filed 2003-07-18(4)(b)

The applicable statute of limitations is contained in section 95.1 l(4)(b), Florida Statutes (2000), which requires that the claim be filed within two years from the time the incident is discovered, or should have been discovered with the exercise of due diligence. That section also provides that in no event shall the action be commenced later than four years from the date of the incident or occurrence out of which the cause of action accrued.

Under § 95.11(4)(b), a jury may need to decide when a patient should have known there was a reasonable possibility that an injury was caused by medical malpractice.

Rodriguez v. Saenz · filed 2004-02-20(4)(b)

Heeding the warning that "courts should take care not to impute sophisticated medical analysis to a lay person struggling with the fact of a crippling or horrifying illness,"[2] we conclude that the date that Ms. Rodriguez should have known that there was a reasonable possibility that her second myocardial infarction was caused by medical malpractice is an issue that should be placed before a jury for resolution.

Section 95.11 provides a two-year limitations period for medical malpractice claims; timely pre-suit notices can toll that period, including as to potential defendants who did not receive the first notice.

Cora Health Services, Inc. v. Steinbronn · filed 2004-03-05

Notice to Daytona extended the two-year period prescribed by section 95.11, Florida Statutes, as to CORA because the statute of limitations is tolled as to all potential defendants when a notice of intent to initiate litigation is served upon any prospective defendant. ... All of Steinbronn’s pleadings were filed within those times so that the action was not time barred.

Section 95.11(4)(b) permits concealment or intentional misrepresentation to toll the medical malpractice limitations period, even when the patient knows of the physical injury.

Bryant v. Adventist Health Systems Sunbelt, Inc. · filed 2004-04-02(4)(b)

Nevertheless, concealment or intentional misrepresentation of fact, if proven, would toll the running of the statute. Applying this rule to the instant case requires us to quash the dismissal orders because the second amended complaint clearly raised the issues of concealment and intentional misrepresentation.

The medical malpractice limitations period begins when the plaintiff knows of the injury and its possible cause by medical negligence, even if the plaintiff has not identified the person to sue.

Lee v. Simon · filed 2004-10-27(4)(b)

Contrary to Lee's argument, the statute of limitations does not commence when he discovers a person to be sued but instead commences when he has notice of the injury and its possible cause by medical negligence.

Section 95.11(4)(b) bars a medical malpractice action filed more than seven years after the injury, even when fraud or concealment delayed discovery.

Aristide v. JACKSON MEMORIAL HOSP. · filed 2005-12-14(4)(b)

Section 95.11(4)(b) provides litigants with a maximum period of seven years from the date of the injury to commence a medical malpractice case. The statute bars actions filed outside that time period even if the malpractice was not timely discovered due to fraud or concealment.

Section 95.11(4)(b)’s two-year period for medical malpractice claims turns on when the patient knew or should have known of a reasonable possibility that the injury was caused by malpractice.

Beck v. Holloway · filed 2006-04-27(4)(b)

Accordingly, a genuine issue of material fact existed as to when the Holloways first had reason to know that Dr. Beck had negligently punctured Mr. Holloway’s skull, and the trial court properly denied Dr. Beck’s motion for summary judgment on this ground, allowing the question of when “the incident ... should have been discovered” to be determined by the jury.

Section 95.11(4)(b) treats a knowing failure to disclose information that a physician has a duty to disclose as concealment that can extend the medical malpractice repose period.

Todd v. Johnson · filed 2007-09-14(4)(b)

If "concealment" has any meaning and effect distinct from "intentional misrepresentation" and "fraud," "concealment" must at least encompass the knowing failure to disclose information which there is a duty to disclose.

Section 95.11(4)(b) starts the medical malpractice limitations period when the plaintiff actually knows of a possible claim or reasonably should discover it through due diligence.

Thomas v. Lopez · filed 2008-04-18(4)(b)

Section 95.11(4)(b), codifying the discovery rule in Florida, establishes both a subjective component, what the plaintiff actually knew, and an objective component, what an objectively reasonable plaintiff should have discovered with the exercise of due diligence. A plaintiff's cause of action accrues when either component of the discovery rule is satisfied.

Section 95.11(4)(b) treats a medical malpractice action as accruing when the malpractice occurs; converting a personal injury action to a wrongful death action does not change that date.

Raphael v. Shecter · filed 2009-09-23(4)(b)

The fact that Mr. Raphael’s personal injury action was converted into a wrongful death action when he died does not change the date on which the cause of action in this case accrued, because both causes of action accrued when the malpractice occurred.

When evidence conflicts about when a patient reasonably should have known of possible medical negligence, the accrual date under section 95.11(4)(b) is for a jury to decide.

Cohen v. Cooper · filed 2009-10-28(4)(b)

As a clear issue of fact exists as to the date on which the limitations period accrued, the determination of that date should be made by a jury.

Section 95.11(4)(b)’s two-year medical malpractice limit does not govern an ordinary negligence claim against a psychiatric facility that does not arise from medical diagnosis, treatment, or care.

Joseph v. University Behavioral LLC · filed 2011-10-07(4)(b)

Joseph’s suit is not barred by the failure to comply with the medical malpractice presuit requirements or the two-year statute of limitations.

Section 95.11(4)(b) gives each discrete incident of medical malpractice its own four-year repose period.

Woodward v. Olson · filed 2013-02-22(4)(b)

Because these constituted three discrete acts of malpractice by Dr. Olson, each act was subject to its own four-year statute of repose.

Section 95.11(4)(b)’s medical malpractice limitations period turns on when the patient discovered or should have discovered a reasonable possibility that malpractice caused the injury.

Baxter v. Northrup · filed 2013-12-20(4)(b)

The dispositive question in this case is when Mr. Baxter discovered or should have discovered that there was a reasonable possibility that medical malpractice caused his injury.

An emergency temporary guardian’s knowledge of possible medical malpractice does not start the limitations period for an incapacitated ward; that knowledge may be imputed after a permanent guardian of the ward’s property is appointed.

Barrier v. JFK Medical Center Ltd. Partnership · filed 2015-06-17(4)(b)

We hold that appellant’s knowledge, if any, of the possibility of medical negligence could not be imputed to the ward for purposes of the running of the statute of limitations during the period of her appointment as ETG. Such imputation of knowledge could not occur until the ward was declared incompetent and a permanent guardian of the property was appointed.

Section 95.11(4)(b)’s two-year medical malpractice limitations period does not apply to a negligence claim arising from disclosure of a patient’s medical information to third parties.

Doe v. Baptist Primary Care, Inc · filed 2015-10-20(4)(b)

Thus, appellant’s complaint, likewise, does not state a cause of action for medical malpractice, and neither the two-year statute of limitations period in section 95.11(4)(b), nor the pre-suit notice requirement in chapter 766 apply to defeat appellant’s claim.

For an incapacitated adult, an emergency temporary guardian’s knowledge of possible medical malpractice does not start the limitations period; that knowledge may be imputed when a permanent guardian of the property is appointed.

Barrier v. JFK Medical Center Limited Partnership · filed 2015-06-17(4)(b)

Knowledge may be imputed from the date a permanent plenary guardian of Chad’s property is appointed.

Section 95.11(4)(b)'s two-year medical malpractice limitations period can be measured from the date a claimant admits becoming aware of possible medical negligence in a notice of intent.

Bove v. Naples HMA, LLC · filed 2016-04-01(4)(b)

We hold Mrs. Bove was bound by her admission in her notice of intent that she became aware of the appellees' possible medical malpractice on February 26, 2012, and, that as a result, the trial court properly determined the issue of the timeliness of her complaint.

Section 95.11(4)(b)’s two-year limitations period bars a medical malpractice claim when the plaintiff knew or should have known of a reasonable possibility of malpractice more than two years before filing.

Townes v. National Deaf Academy, LLC · filed 2016-06-17(4)(b)

The trial court correctly concluded that the medical malpractice statute of limitations had expired before suit was filed. Thus, final summary judgment was properly entered on Counts III and IV.

Section 95.11(4)(b)’s medical malpractice limitations period does not support dismissal with prejudice when the complaint sufficiently pleads ordinary negligence.

TORRES v. KENDALL HEALTHCARE GROUP, LTD., etc. · filed 2021-10-13(4)(b)

In order to determine whether Mr. Torres’ failure to comply with the statute of limitations for medical malpractice claims and the pre-suit requirements in chapter 766 is fatal to his claim, a determination needs to be made as to whether this suit is for medical malpractice or ordinary, which is an intensively fact based analysis. ... Because Mr. Torres alleged sufficient facts to plead his action as one sounding in ordinary negligence, a dismissal with prejudice was not warranted at this juncture.

Section 95.11(4)(b) gives a plaintiff two years after discovering medical negligence to bring a claim.

RAMSAY vs SOUTH LAKE HOSPITAL, KERRY L. NEALL, M.D., AND HOLLY B. SAUNDERS, M.D. · filed 2023-02-17(4)(b)

Ramsay’s initial complaint, filed just under four years after she discovered the alleged negligence, was well outside the two-year statute of limitations of section 95.11(4)(b) to bring a medical negligence claim.

Section 95.11(4)(c)’s medical malpractice statute of repose is a substantive limit on liability that the FTCA does not preempt.

Jones v. United States · filed 2024-02-28(4)(c)

In sum, we hold that the Florida statute of repose for medi- cal-malpractice claims, Fla. Stat. § 95.11(4)(c), is not preempted by the FTCA and that it operates to bar Jones’s complaint.

Section 95.11(3)(f) gives FDUTPA claims a four-year limitations period; delayed discovery does not extend it even when the claim is based on fraud.

Brexendorf v. Bank of Am., N.A. · filed 2018-07-30(3)(f)

FDUTPA claims are subject to a four-year statute of limitations applicable to lawsuits based on statutory liability. Fla. Stat. § 95.11(3)(f). Unlike fraud actions, the Delayed Discovery Doctrine does not apply to FDUTPA claims, even those founded on fraud.

Section 95.11(3)(f) gives FDUTPA claims a four-year limitations period that runs from purchase or lease, and mere nondisclosure of a defect does not toll it through fraudulent concealment.

Straub v. Ford Motor Company · filed 2021-11-02(3)(f)

“The statute of limitations” for the Ranums’ “claim under FDUPTA is four years.” ... A FDUTPA claim accrues at the time of purchase or lease of a product, not upon discovery of an alleged defect. ... Like the plaintiffs in the above cases, the Ranums’ allegations amount to a claim of mere non-disclosure of the alleged defect (see First Am. Compl. at 27-29), which is insufficient under Florida law to toll the statute of limitations under a fraudulent concealment theory.

Section 95.11(3)(f) gives FDUTPA claims a four-year limitations period that begins at the product's sale.

Simmons v. Ford Motor Company · filed 2023-09-13(3)(f)

FDUTPA claims are subject to a four-year statute of limitations. Fla. Stat. § 95.11(3)(f). As this Court has previously held, “[w]hen a FDUTPA claim is based on a product purchase, the statute begins to run from the date of sale.”

Section 95.11(3)(e) gives FDUTPA claims a four-year limitations period and makes them accrue at purchase or lease rather than discovery of an alleged defect.

HARDY v. VOLKSWAGEN GROUP OF AMERICA, INC. · filed 2025-05-14(3)(e)

FDUTPA claims are subject to a four-year statute of limitations. Fla. Stat. § 95.11@)¢e). Florida courts have held that a “FDUTPA claim accrues at the time of purchase or lease of a preduct, not upon discovery of an alleged defect.”

Section 95.11(7)(b) provides a one-year limitations period for actions seeking damages or penalties under laws concerning payment of wages.

Metropolitan Dade County v. Peterson · filed 1975-04-22(7)(b)

The statute of limitations for actions at law which seek damages or penalties under laws respecting the payment of wages is one year. See, Fla. Stat. § 95.11(7)(b), F.S.A.

Section 95.11(4)(c) bars claims for compensatory damages for wages withheld during a period of suspension after the applicable limitations period expires.

Gow v. County of Dade · filed 1979-05-08(4)(c)

That count in the complaint demanding compensatory damages for wages withheld during appellant’s period of suspension was properly barred by the statute *494of limitations. See Section 95.11(4)(c), Florida Statutes (1977).

Section 95.11(3)'s four-year period applies to undue influence claims; the facts giving rise to such a claim are not discoverable through reasonable diligence until the influence ends.

In Re Guardianship of Rekasis · filed 1989-06-21(3)

We agree with appellant and disagree with the Hogans' argument and the holding of the trial judge. Undue influence is a species of fraud. ... Section 95.031(2), Florida Statutes (1987), provides that an action based upon fraud must be begun within the time periods prescribed in section 95.11(3), with the period running from the time the facts giving rise to the cause of action were discovered or should have been discovered with the exercise of due diligence but, in any event, within twelve years after the date of the commission of the alleged fraud. ... Courts in other jurisdictions have held that as a matter of law, facts giving rise to a cause of action based on undue influence do not become discoverable by the exercise of reasonable diligence until the termination of the influence. ... We agree and, therefore, reverse and remand this cause for further proceedings consistent herewith.

Section 95.11(2)(b) provides a five-year limitations period for a deficiency claim arising from an installment contract.

Barnett Recovery Corp. v. Fornasari · filed 1995-06-07(2)(b)

BRC’s cause of action derives entirely from the installment contract and is governed by the five year *1275period prescribed in section 95.11(2)(b), Florida Statutes (1993).

Section 95.11(4)(e) supplies a two-year limitations period for Florida securities claims, tolled until the alleged fraud is discovered or reasonably should have been discovered.

In Re Integrated Resources Real Estate Ltd. Partnerships Securities Litigation · filed 1993-02-11(4)(e)

A district court sitting in Florida, the relevant Eleventh Circuit state, would apply Florida’s two-year statute of limitations applicable to actions under Florida Statutes § 517.301(l)(a)(2) (1991). ... Byrne v. Gulfstream First Bank & Trust Co., 528 F.Supp. 692, 694 (S.D.Fla.1981) (applying Florida’s blue sky law, Fla.Stat. § 95.11(4)(e)), affd without op., 720 F.2d 686 (11th Cir.1983). The running of this statute of limitations is tolled until the alleged fraud is discovered or reasonably should have been discovered in the exercise of reasonable diligence.

Section 95.11(3)(f) provides a four-year limitations period for a Florida Civil Rights Act civil action.

Cisko v. Phoenix Medical Products, Inc. · filed 2001-07-27(3)(f)

In this case, the applicable statute of limitations was four years. § 95.11(3)(f), Fla. Stat. (1997).

Section 95.11(3) provides a four-year limitations period for negligence claims.

Mercado v. Fitell · filed 2004-06-30(3)

Because the appellant filed this negligence complaint within the four year statute of limitations contained in Section 95.11(3), Florida Statutes (2004), the trial court=s ruling to the contrary constitutes obvious error and requires reversal.

Section 95.11(3)(f) gives four years from the end of each periodic reimbursement interval to seek reimbursement, absent a contract.

Special Disability Trust Fund v. PALM BEACH COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT · filed 2006-12-06(3)(f)

In the absence of a contract, the statute of limitations is four years from the end of each interval of periodic reimbursement. See § 95.11(3)(f), Fla. Stat. (1999); Associated Coca Cola v. Special Disability Trust Fund, 508 So.2d 1305 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987).

Section 95.11(3) supplies the four-year period that the court applied to a Florida § 1983 claim.

Gant v. Sarasota Memorial North Port · filed 2024-10-04(3)

In Florida, the limitation for a personal injury, and derivatively for a Section 1983 claim, is four years. Fla. Stat. § 95.11(3).

Section 95.11(3)(o) imposes a four-year limitations period on § 1983 claims in Florida.

Green v. Wilkinson · filed 2025-02-11(3)(o)

Green’s claims un- der 42 U.S.C. § 1983 are all barred by Florida’s four-year statute of limitations on such claims.

Section 95.11 supplies a four-year limitations period for AWPA claims where the parties accept a state limitations period and the defendants abandon their argument for the two-year wage-action period.

Wales v. Jack M. Berry, Inc. · filed 1999-03-25

The defendants therefore will be deemed to have abandoned any contention that the two-year provision should apply. ... Accordingly, the plaintiffs’ AWPA claims will be treated as being subject to a four-year statute of limitations.

Section 95.11 provides a four-year limitations period for the § 1983 claim at issue.

Black v. Broward Employment & Training Administration · filed 1987-04-28

Since all parties agree that the applicable statute of limitations is four years, § 95.11 Fla.Stat., it is submitted that plaintiff’s § 1983 claim is time-barred by approximately one year.

Section 95.11(3)(f) provides a three-year limitations period for Florida Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act claims.

WILKINS v. GENZYME CORPORATION · filed 2022-09-14(3)(f)

• Three years for the Florida Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act. Fla. Stat. § 95.11(3)(f); Koski v. Carrier Corp., 347 F. Supp. 3d 1185, 1192 (S.D. Fla. 2017).

The four-year limitations period in subsection 95.11(3) may be affected by fraudulent concealment or equitable estoppel when the facts support applying those doctrines.

Kleiman v. Wright · filed 2021-11-22(3)

Lastly, Defendant seeks judgment as a matter of law on Counts I, V, and VI, arguing that they “are governed by the four-year limitations period of Fla. Stat. § 95.11(3), and all are time barred.” ... As the Court already set forth in the MSJ Order, “the Court cannot conclude as a matter of fact and law that November 6, 2013 triggered the relevant statutes of limitations.”

Section 95.11(3)(f) gives plaintiffs four years to bring their claims, and fraudulent concealment extends the deadline only when the concealment involves active fraud rather than mere nondisclosure.

Talley v. General Motors, LLC · filed 2021-11-26(3)(f)

In Florida, plaintiffs have four years to bring their claims. Fla. Stat. § 95.11(3)(f). The Loadholteses, two Florida residents, bought their Camaro in June 2016. D.I. 22 ¶ 61. But they joined this suit only in December 2020, six months past the deadline. And Florida law does not stop the filing clock simply because a consumer took a while to discover the violation. Licul v. Volkswagen Grp. of Am., 2013 WL 6328734, at *6 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 5, 2013). True, the deadline is extended by fraudulent concealment. But the concealment must involve more than “mere non-disclosure.” Id. Instead, such fraud must be active. Id. Here, the dealer made ineffective repairs. D.I. 22 ¶ 67–68. But that is not active fraud. So I will dismiss the Loadholteses’ consumer-protection claims.

For medical malpractice actions, fraudulent concealment tolls the limitations period until the concealment could be discovered through reasonable diligence.

Alford v. Summerlin · filed 1978-08-22(4)(b)

The fraudulent concealment of facts showing negligence will toll the statute of limitations until the fraudulent concealment can be discovered through the exercise of reasonable diligence. ... These allegations clearly show fraudulent concealment of negligent treatment and cause of death which toll the running of Section 95.11(4)(b).

Section 95.11(4)(b) imposes a two-year limit on medical malpractice actions, and fraudulent concealment may toll that period.

Walker v. Dunne · filed 1979-03-16(4)(b)

Accordingly there was a factual issue as to whether Dr. Dunne fraudulently concealed his negligence, and thus there was a factual issue as to whether his conduct tolled the statute of limitations.

Section 95.11’s limitations period is not tolled by continuing settlement negotiations, although deceptive negotiations may create an estoppel.

City of Brooksville v. HERNANDO CTY. · filed 1982-12-01(2)(b)

While continuing negotiations regarding settlement do not "toll" the running of a statute of limitations, such negotiations, if infected with an element of deception, may create an estoppel.

The limitations period for a fraud-based deed reformation claim is tolled when a fiduciary conceals the deed’s contents, at least until the claimant learns that the deed differs from the parties’ understanding.

Troiano v. Troiano · filed 1989-09-07(3)(j)

Consistent with the equitable principles found in Soud we hold that Troiano was under an affirmative obligation to inform Francolino of the contents of the deed, and having failed to do so the limitations period was tolled (notwithstanding any claim of constructive notice) at least until 1984 when Francolino actually learned that the deed did not reflect the understanding of the parties. Accordingly, Francolino’s reformation claim based upon fraud is timely under section 95.11(3)(j), Florida Statutes (1979).

Section 95.11(3)(j)'s limitations period is tolled until discovery when fraud is concealed.

Grossman v. Greenberg · filed 1993-06-01(3)(j)

Although this action was brought ten years after the sales transaction, section 95.11(3)(j), Florida Statutes (1991), does not bar the causes of action against the appellants. The statute of limitations does not begin to run where there has been a fraud or a fraudulent concealment.

Section 95.11(4)(d)’s two-year wrongful-death period is not tolled by fraudulent concealment of the defendant’s identity when the plaintiff knows the cause of action exists.

Sullivan v. Fulton County Adm'r · filed 1995-09-13(4)(d)

This court, *708 however, has concluded that concealment of identity does not toll the statute.

Fraudulent concealment can toll a limitations period under Section 95.11; whether it did so may depend on disputed facts.

Berisford v. Jack Eckerd Corp. · filed 1995-11-29

We reverse because there were issues of material fact as to whether an act of fraudulent concealment by the pharmacy tolled the limitations period.

Section 95.11(3)(k) gives four years to bring an action founded on an oral agreement, but equitable estoppel can prevent a defendant whose conduct delayed suit from invoking that limit.

Acoustic Innovations, Inc. v. Schafer · filed 2008-02-20(3)(k)

The statute of limitations applicable to actions founded upon oral agreements is four years. § 95.11(3)(k), Fla. Stat. (2006). ... Thus, Miller is equitably estopped from raising the statute of limitations to bar Schafer's claim that he is a fifty percent shareholder in Acoustic.

Section 95.11’s limitation periods are not tolled by fraudulent concealment when there is no active concealment and the facts could have been discovered with due diligence.

West Brook Isles Partner's 1, LLC v. Commonwealth Land Title Insurance Company · filed 2015-04-24

Where there was no active concealment and a party with the exercise of due diligence could have discovered the facts, the statute of limitations is not tolled. Jackson v. Georgopolous, 552 So. 2d 215, 216 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989). Accordingly, we affirm the final summary judgments based upon the expiration of the statutes of limitations.

Section 95.11(3)(p) provides a four-year limitations period for claims seeking a constructive trust or declaratory judgment over life insurance proceeds, beginning at the insured’s death.

Brown v. Poole · filed 2018-12-14(3)(p)

A four-year statute of limitations governs these claims. § 95.11(3)(p), Fla. Stat. (2015). This time did not begin to run until Dr. Poole's *711death.

Section 95.11(3)(p) imposes a four-year limitations period on claims not specifically provided for, including a non-real-property claim challenging a forged insurance-policy ownership transfer.

Katz v. GlobalVest Trust · filed 2022-03-15(3)(p)

Thus, the district court didn’t err in applying the four-year statute of limitations period that applies to claims “other than for the recovery of real property.” Fla. Stat. §§ 95.11, 95.11(3)(p).

Section 95.11(3)(k)'s four-year period for breach of contract applies to a physician's claim for payment of workers' compensation services when Section 440.19 does not cover the claim.

Rebich v. BURDINE'S & LIBERTY MUT. INS. CO. · filed 1982-07-16(3)(k)

Fabric essentially argues that because physicians are not specifically *285 mentioned in Section 440.19, his claims are governed by the four year statute of limitations for breach of contract contained in Section 95.11(3)(k), Florida Statutes, and are thus timely. We agree and reverse.

Section 95.11(3)(p) allows four years to bring an action not specifically provided for elsewhere in the limitations statutes.

Small v. Niagara MacH. & Tool Works · filed 1987-01-20(3)(p)

Since the remainder of the complaint did not deal with specific causes of actions listed under subsection 3, Mrs. Small's remaining counts were governed by subsection 3(p) which allowed four years for "[a]ny action not specifically provided for in these statutes." § 95.11(3)(p), Fla. Stat. (1979).

Section 95.11(3)(p) allows four years to challenge a special assessment; paying the assessment in installments does not restart the limitations period for each payment.

H & B Builders, Inc. v. City of Sunrise · filed 1999-02-24(3)(p)

However, we reject the notion that this general proposition is analogous to payments due on special assessment liens. ... We note that Keenan specifically recognizes that section 95.11(3)(p) bars any challenge to a special assessment brought more than four years after the governing board of the municipality equalizes and approves the special assessment by resolution, even if the improvements have not been completed.

Section 95.11(3)(p) gives four years to challenge these assessments and impact fees, with the period beginning when the taxes were authorized or the assessments and fees were created.

Fredrick v. NORTHERN PALM BEACH CTY. IMP. · filed 2008-01-02(3)(p)

Section 95.11(3)(p), Florida Statutes (2006) establishes a four year statute of limitations for any "action not specifically provided for in these statutes". Neither party contends that the four-year statute is inapplicable here. We agree with the parties and the trial court that the four-year statute of limitations should be applied. ... Keenan, H & B Builders and the other cases cited above all support the conclusion that the statute of limitations here began to accrue in 1990 when the drainage taxes were authorized by the District — a state created entity acting within the scope of its authority — or at the latest in 1993, when the assessments and impact fees were created by the District.

Section 95.11(3)(p) gives four years to challenge special assessments and impact fees, with the period beginning when the charges are authorized or created.

Fredrick v. Northern Palm Beach County Improvement District · filed 2008-01-02(3)(p)

Section 95.11(3)(p), Florida Statutes (2006) establishes a four year statute of limitations for any “action not specifically provided for in these statutes”. ... Keenan, H & B Builders and the other cases cited above all support the conclusion that the statute of limitations here began to accrue in 1990 when the drainage taxes were authorized by the District — a state created entity acting within the scope of its authority — or at the latest in 1993, when the assessments and impact fees were created by the District.

Section 95.11(3)(p) may provide a four-year limit for declaratory and injunctive claims not otherwise covered; a claim to enforce a decision filed within four years after that decision becomes enforceable is timely.

Park v. CITY OF WEST MELBOURNE · filed 2008-12-05(3)(p)

Section 95.11(3)(p),[4] which is a catchall provision, may apply to claims for declaratory relief and claims for injunctive relief not otherwise addressed in section 95.11. ... Assuming the statute of limitations on the claims presented here for declaratory and injunctive relief to obtain reinstatement or recover back pay[5] is four years, because this action was filed on July 2, 2003, Park's claims for enforcement of the hearing officer's decision are not barred by the statute of limitations.

The court found no support for treating the section's two-year limitation periods for medical-malpractice and wrongful-death claims as unconstitutionally short.

Hernandez v. Garwood · filed 1980-11-13

We find nothing to support or commend the trial court's finding that two years is "unconstitutionally too short" for a claim such as this.

Section 95.11(7) permits an abuse claim within seven years after majority, four years after leaving the abuser’s dependency, or four years after discovering the injury and its causal relationship to the abuse, whichever is later.

Sylk v. Rosenberg · filed 2000-04-05(7)

We also conclude that Sylk’s action does not fit into the structure of Section 95.11(7), Florida Statutes (1997), which reads: ... Sylk did not file suit within seven years after reaching the age of majority, and did not file suit within four years of becoming independent of Rosenberg in 1971. The suit was filed more than four years from the time (1963 or 1964) Sylk discovered her injury and the causal relationship between her injury and the abuse.

Section 95.11(3)(j) provides a three-year limitations period for fraud claims, while when claimants had reason to know of the alleged issues and whether equitable tolling applies may vary by claimant.

Weidman v. Ford Motor Company · filed 2022-06-23(3)(j)

For other statutes of limitations, e.g., Fla. Stat. § 95.11(3)(j) & Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 338(d) (3 years for fraud), individualized issues exist about (1) when different class members may have had reason to know of the alleged issues giving rise to their claims, and (2) application of equitable tolling doctrines.

Section 95.11(3)(p) supplies Florida's four-year residual personal-injury limitations period for Section 1983 claims borrowed from state law, beginning when the plaintiff knows or should know of the injury and who inflicted it.

Jackson v. Ken Scott · filed 2022-01-04(3)(p)

The statute of limitations for Section 1983 claims is borrowed from the forum state’s residual personal injury statute of limitations, which in Florida is four years. McGroarty v. Swearingen, 977 F.3d 1302, 1307 (11th Cir. 2020); see also Fla. Stat. § 95.11(3)(p).

Section 95.11(3) gives § 1983 claims a four-year limitations period in Florida.

Bilal v. Benoit · filed 2025-11-20(3)

Here, as the parties agree, Florida is the forum state. Florida subjects § 1983 claims to a four-year statute of limitations. Id. at 1303 (citing Fla. Stat. § 95.11(3)).

Section 95.11 bars the construction negligence claim under subsection (4) and the contract claim under subsection (3) after the applicable limitation periods expire.

2765 South Bayshore Drive Corp. v. Fred Howland, Inc. · filed 1968-07-30(3), (4)

Since these causes of action are treated dissimilarly under § 95.11, Fla.Stat., F.S. A., each must be discussed on its own merits. ... The complaint was filed herein some five years and two months subsequent to the completion of construction, exceeding by fourteen months the time allowed to bring such action within § 95.11(4), Fla.Stat., F.S.A., supra. ... Appellees again raised the defense of the statute of limitations, relying upon the provisions of § 95.11(3), Fla. Stat., F.S. A., supra, which bars actions upon contracts not under seal after a lapse of five years. ... appellant’s claim of breach of contract was asserted approximately two full months subsequent to expiration of the time allotted for the bringing of such actions under subsection (3) of § 95.11.

Section 95.11 does not apply to the former wife’s entitlement to credits and setoff for her disbursements or to the partition action.

Joseph v. Estate of Joseph · filed 2012-03-21

And for essentially the same reason, the wife’s entitlement to credits and a setoff for her otherwise time-barred disbursements, and any partition action, is not subject to the statute of limitations, section 95.11, Florida Statutes (2010).

For an unjust enrichment claim, the four-year limitations period generally begins when the defendant receives the benefit, typically upon payment.

Innovative Vehicle Solutions West, LLC v. Renntech, Inc. · filed 2022-07-29(3)(k)

Finally, Defendant objects to the Report’s conclusion that the unjust enrichment claim is not barred by the four-year statute of limitations under Fla. Stat. § 95.11(3)(k) [ECF No. 45 pp. 12–14]. ... Under Florida law, an unjust enrichment claim accrues when the benefit is conferred, which, in this context, generally occurs when the defendant is paid. ... The statute of limitations does not bar the claim at this stage.

Section 95.11(3)(k) gives a plaintiff four years to bring a quantum meruit or unjust enrichment claim.

Beltran v. Vincent P. Miraglia, M.D., P.A. · filed 2013-04-10(3)(k)

The relevant statute of limitations for quantum meruit or unjust enrichment claims is four years. See § 95.11(3)(k), Fla. Stat. (2011) (providing for four-year statute of limitations for “[a] legal or equitable action on a contract, obligation, or liability not founded on a written instrument”).

Section 95.11(3)(k) sets a four-year limitations period for unjust enrichment claims.

State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance v. B & A Diagnostic, Inc. · filed 2015-04-06(3)(k)

The relevant statute of limitations for an unjust enrichment claim is four (4) years. Fla. Stat. § 95.11(3)(k).

Section 95.11(3)(e) sets a four-year limitations period for an action founded on statutory liability.

SLAVICA RAFFAY AND ATTILA RAFFAY v. LONGWOOD HOUSE CONDOMINIUM ASSOCIATION, INC. · filed 2023-09-20(3)(e)

The limitations period for “[a]n action founded on a statutory liability” is four years.

Section 95.11(3)(f) provides a four-year limitations period for an action founded on statutory liability, but dismissal at the pleading stage is improper unless untimeliness is apparent from the complaint.

Environmental Protection Commission of Hillsborough County, Florida v. Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC · filed 2022-09-20(3)(f)

The Court is still not convinced that the Commission’s claims are barred by the statute of limitations, given that the dates of the relevant post-sale software updates, field fixes, and recalls are still not alleged. See United States ex rel. Hunt v. Cochise Consultancy, Inc., 887 F.3d 1081, 1085 (11th Cir. 2018) (“A dismissal for failure to state a claim on statute of limitations grounds is appropriate ‘only if it is apparent from the face of the complaint that the claim is time-barred.’” (citation omitted)), aff’d, 139 S. Ct. 1507 (2019). Because it is not apparent from the face of the fourth amended complaint that the Commission’s claims are time-barred, the Court will not grant the motion to dismiss on the ground that the claims are barred by the statute of limitations.

Section 95.11(2)(a) imposes a five-year limitations period on an action on certain judgments, but it does not apply to this supplementary proceeding.

Supreme Fuels Trading FZE v. Sargeant, III · filed 2023-09-19(2)(a)

Florida’s statute of limitations provides, in relevant part, “[a]n action on a judgment or decree of any court [other than for the recovery of real property], not of record, of this state or any court of the United States, any other state or territory in the United States, or a foreign country” shall be commenced within five years. ... The Court is unpersuaded that section 95.11 applies to this proceeding and will not grant dismissal on that basis.

Section 95.11(3)(f) sets a four-year limitation period for actions founded on a statutory liability.

Town of Palm Beach v. Palm Beach County · filed 1984-12-11(3)(f)

Section 95.11(3)(f), Florida Statutes (1983), provides for a four-year limitation period for any “action founded on a statutory liability”. Each of the years for which recovery is here sought is within that four-year statutory period and, therefore, neither this action nor or any fact thereof, is barred by laches or estoppel.

Section 95.11(3)(f) provides a four-year limitations period for a breach of fiduciary duty action founded on a personal representative’s statutory liability.

Van Dusen v. Southeast First Nat. Bank · filed 1985-10-29(3)(f)

An action for breach of fiduciary duty is founded upon a statutory liability, § 733.609, Fla. Stat. (1983), and is, therefore, governed by a four-year statute of limitations. § 95.11(3)(f), Fla. Stat. (1983).

Section 95.11(3)(f) gives claims for retaliatory discharge under section 440.205 a four-year limitations period.

Scott v. Otis Elevator Company · filed 1988-04-28(3)(f)

Claims under section 440.205 must be brought within the four-year statute of limitations set forth in section 95.11(3)(f) for statutory causes of action.

Section 95.11(3)(f)'s general four-year limit does not apply to a Florida Civil Rights Act action governed by the specific filing deadline in section 760.11(5).

Joshua v. City of Gainesville · filed 1999-02-17(3)(f)

Therefore, as subsection (5) of the current Act specifically addresses the applicable time period for bringing a cause of action pursuant to the Act, the more general provisions of section 95.11(3)(f) do not apply.

Section 95.11(3)(f) requires an unauthorized-publication damages claim under section 540.08 to be brought within four years of accrual, rather than discovery of the publication.

Putnam Berkley Group, Inc. v. Dinin · filed 1999-05-26(3)(f)

Hence, because all of the statutory text points to the necessity to bring a damages claim under section 540.08 within 4 years of accrual of the cause of action, rather than within 4 years of discovery of the fact of publication, we conclude that plaintiffs' statutory claim under section 540.08 was time-barred.

Section 95.11(3)(f) covers FDUTPA claims as actions founded on a statutory liability.

SOUTH MOTOR CO. v. Doktorczyk · filed 2007-04-25(3)(f)

Section 95.11(3)(f), Florida Statutes (1996), covers "[a]n action founded on a statutory liability," which would apply to *1217 Doktorczyk's FDUTPA claim.

Section 95.11(3)(f) gives claims founded on statutory liability a four-year limitations period, including a claim for insurance benefits interest owed by statute rather than by the policy.

Stone v. Jackson National Life Insurance Co. · filed 2006-03-08(3)(f)

The trial court correctly found that Stone’s claim is founded on statutory liability and, as such, is governed by the statute of limitations period in section 95.11(3)(f), which states that actions founded on statutory liability must be commenced within four (4) years.

Section 95.11(3)(f) imposes a four-year limitations period on actions under the Florida Unfair Insurance Trade Practices Act.

Ibis Circle, LLC and Shlomo Rasabi v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, National Association and WAMU Insurance Services, Inc. · filed 2016-04-27(3)(f)

The statute of limitations to bring an action under the FUITPA is four years. § 95.11(3)(f), Fla. Stat. (2014). The facts giving rise to the Borrowers’ FUITPA claims occurred between 2005 and 2008, and the Borrowers did not plead their FUITPA claims until 2014. Thus the four-year statute of limitations bars the Borrowers’ FUITPA counterclaims as a matter of law.

Section 95.11(3)(f) sets a four-year filing period for actions founded on statutory liability.

In re Vitamins Antitrust Litigation · filed 2006-05-15(3)(f)

Appellant, in full knowledge of the basis for a cause of action, had ample time to file its claim before the statutory limitation period ended in March 2003.

Section 95.11(3) provides a four-year limitations period for claims of rescission, unjust enrichment, fraudulent inducement, and negligent misrepresentation.

The Bedtow Group II, LLC v. Ungerleider · filed 2017-04-06(3)(a), (j), (l), (p)

Under Florida law, Bedtow’s claims for rescission, unjust ... enrichment, fraudulent inducement, and negligent misrepresentation had to be brought within four years of the accrual of the claim. See Fla. Stat. § 95.11(3)(a), (j), (l), (p) (establishing a four-year time limit for filing actions “founded on negligence,” actions “founded on fraud,” actions “to rescind a contract,” and all actions “not specifically provided for in these statutes”).

Section 95.11(2)(b) provides a five-year statute of limitations for contract actions, while section 95.11(3)(j) provides a four-year statute of limitations for fraud actions.

Bryan v. Fleetbank N.A. · filed 2022-10-12(2)(b), (3)(j)

The statute of limitations on a New York contract claim is six years; in Florida, it is five years. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 213(2); Fla. Stat. § 95.11(2)(b). The statute of limitations would be the same or even shorter if the complaint were construed to raise a fraud claim. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 213(8) (six years); Fla. Stat. § 95.11(3)(j) (four years).

Section 95.11(3) gives personal injury claims a four-year limitations period, including derivative Section 1983 claims in Florida.

Rushing v. Williamson · filed 2022-12-20(3)

In Florida, the limitation for a personal injury, and derivatively for a Section 1983 claim, is four years. Fla. Stat. § 95.11(3). Consequently, a claim based on an event that occurred before December 2018, is time-barred.

Section 95.11(3)(j) requires fraud actions to be brought within four years.

Otero v. Newrez LLC. · filed 2022-08-08(3)(j)

An action for fraud must be brought within four years under Florida law. Fla. Stat. § 95.11(3)(j).

Section 95.11(2)(e) imposes a five-year limitations period for breach-of-contract actions that runs from the date of loss.

TWJ 1101 LLC v. Westchester Surplus Lines Insurance Company · filed 2025-04-30(2)(e)

Florida has a five-year statute of limitations for breach of contract actions. Fla. Stat. § 95.11(2)(e). This limitations period ‘run[s] from the date of loss.” Fla. Stat. § 95.11(2)(e). Here, the Complaint alleges that the loss occurred on September 10, 2017. (Compl. § 8). As such, the statute of limitations deadline was September 12, 2022!.

Section 95.11(3)(i) gives fraud actions a four-year statute of limitations.

Malhotra v. Kumar · filed 2025-05-05(3)(i)

Under Florida law, actions for fraud are subject to a four-year statute of limitations. Fla. Stat. § 95.11(3)(i). ... Thus, the alleged fraud did not occur until 2024, and count I falls within the four-year limitations period.

For legal-malpractice claims, the two-year limitations period runs from discovery or when the cause of action should have been discovered with due diligence, and the redressable harm here occurred when the underlying litigation settled.

Azumi LLC v. Lott & Fischer, PL · filed 2022-12-27(4)(a)

As previously noted, legal malpractice actions are subject to a two-year statute of limitations, which “run[s] from the time the cause of action is discovered or should have been discovered with the exercise of due diligence.” Fla. Stat. § 95.11(4)(a). ... Here, based upon the damages alleged, the redressable harm did not occur until Plaintiffs settled with B.B. Kitchen in August 2019.

Section 95.11(4)'s four-year malpractice limitation begins when the injury is known, even if its cause is not yet known.

Nardone v. Reynolds · filed 1976-05-19(4)

We agree with the United States District Court that since in 1965 the nature of the child's condition was obvious and known to the plaintiffs, it was then that the cause of action accrued and the statute of limitations commenced to run as to the parents and legal guardians of the incompetent minor in their own right, as to the parents and legal guardians of the minor as next friends in behalf of the minor, and as to the incompetent minor in his own behalf.

Under the 1973 version of § 95.11(6), a claim for death caused by medical malpractice accrues on the date of death, rather than when the plaintiff discovers the negligence.

Worrell v. John F. Kennedy Mem. Hosp. · filed 1980-05-28(6)

We thus hold that Section 95.11(6), Florida Statutes (1973), applies to this case and that the cause of action for death due to medical malpractice herein accrued at the time of the death.

Section 95.11(4)'s limitations period for a subrogated malpractice claim begins when judgment is entered against the insured.

Don Reid Ford, Inc. v. Feldman · filed 1982-10-06(4)

We agree that the statute of limitations began to run on the malpractice action when the judgment was entered against the insured because of the alleged malpractice of the attorney.

Section 95.11(4)(a) sets a two year limitation period for legal malpractice claims.

Parker v. Gordon · filed 1983-11-23(4)(a)

If on the other hand it refers to legal malpractice — in which case the complaint is defective because negligence is not alleged — then on the face of the pleading the two year limitation period of Section 95.11(4)(a), Florida Statutes (1981), applies and the statute has run.

Section 95.11(4)(a) gives a plaintiff two years to bring a legal malpractice claim, measured from when the plaintiff discovered or should have discovered the claim.

Rosa v. Roth · filed 1983-12-06(4)(a)

This is an appeal from a summary final judgment entered in favor of the defendant attorney in a legal malpractice action on the basis that the action was, as a matter of law, barred by the applicable two-year statute of limitations. § 95.11(4)(a), Fla. Stat. (1981). We reverse and remand for further proceedings on the ground that a triable issue of fact was presented on this record as to whether the plaintiff discovered or should have discovered his cause of action against the defendant more than two years prior to the filing of the instant lawsuit.

Section 95.11(4)(a) gives a plaintiff two years to bring a legal malpractice suit from when the claim was discovered or should have been discovered with due diligence; a directed verdict on limitations requires proof of earlier discovery as a matter of law.

Daytona Development Corp. v. McFarland · filed 1984-08-24(4)(a)

This section provides that a suit for legal malpractice shall be commenced within two years “from the time the cause of action is discovered or should have been discovered with the exercise of due diligence.” ... Evaluating the evidence on the statute of limitations issue in a light most favorable to the plaintiffs, and indulging every reasonable inference adduced therefrom in their favor, it cannot be held that the evidence presented during the plaintiffs’ case proved as a matter of law that they discovered or should have discovered their cause of action with the exercise of due diligence before February 22, 1976.

Section 95.11(4)(b) allows a medical malpractice action within two years of when the alleged malpractice was or should have been discovered; an autopsy report may establish when discovery became possible.

Whack v. SEMINOLE MEMORIAL HOSP. · filed 1984-09-27(4)(b)

It is clear that the appellant could not have discovered this question without the autopsy report. *565 Appellant did file suit within two years of his receipt of the autopsy report. The summary judgment in favor of appellee Richards is also reversed and remanded for further proceedings in accord with this order.

Section 95.11(4)(b)’s limitations period does not necessarily begin when a patient receives a tentative diagnosis in a negligent failure-to-diagnose claim.

Ash v. Stella · filed 1984-10-11(4)(b)

We do not believe that, as a matter of law, a tentative diagnosis, however proper it may turn out to be in hindsight, starts the clock on an action for medical malpractice arising out of negligent failure to properly diagnose.

Section 95.11(4)(a)’s two-year period for legal malpractice does not begin at an adverse judgment when reversal on appeal would leave the client with no malpractice claim.

Richards Enterprises v. Swofford · filed 1986-10-02(4)(a)

If the appellate court had found that the court erred in refusing foreclosure, Swofford would not have been negligent. Hence, no cause of action for malpractice existed at the time of the judgment denying foreclosure and the statute of limitations did not begin to run from December 22, 1981.

Section 95.11(4)(a)’s two-year period for legal malpractice runs from when the claim is discovered or should have been discovered; absent conclusive proof, a jury decides when it should have been discovered.

Magic World, Inc. v. Icardi · filed 1986-02-20(4)(a)

Both the applicable statute — section 95.11(4)(a), Florida Statutes (1983)— and case law3 are clear that the two-year statute runs “from the time the cause of action is discovered or should have been discovered.” Generally, the issue of when a claimant should have discovered such malpractice is one for the jury, absent conclusive proof establishing such constructive knowledge.

Section 95.11(4)(a)’s two-year period for legal malpractice runs from when the plaintiff discovered or should have discovered the cause of action, a question that may require factual determination.

Freel v. Fleming · filed 1986-06-10(4)(a)

We find that the affidavit does not compel, or even permit, a conclusion that appellant “discovered or should have discovered with the exercise of due diligence” that a cause of action had accrued in his favor. Section 95.11(4)(a), Florida Statutes. The question of when appellant discovered or should have discovered his cause of action is a factual one which remains to be determined. The motion to dismiss should not have been granted on grounds that it affirmatively appeared from the face of the complaint and attachments that the action was barred by the statute.

The two-year limitations period for legal malpractice does not begin until damages are ascertainable; when liability depends on whether an option expired, it does not begin before final appellate determination of that issue.

Haghayegh v. Clark · filed 1988-01-26(4)(a)

We reverse and find that the trial court erred in ruling that the statute of limitations had expired. This court has previously held that the statute of limitations does not commence to run until the amount of damages, if any, are ascertained. ... It has also held that in circumstances such as those disclosed by this record, until there was a final determination by the appellate court that the appellant's option had expired the statute had not commenced to run.