Fla. Stat. § 768.28

Section 768.28’s waiver of sovereign immunity does not apply to claims against a school board arising from incidents before January 1, 1975.

School Board of Dade County v. Scott ex rel. Scott · filed 1975-05-20

The plaintiffs make the further argument that because the legislature had by general rule provided for the absence of *52immunity under the circumstances listed in Fla.Stat. § 768.28, that we should apply that law as of the date of this appeal. ... This argument is erroneous in view of the fact that the law, as it exists as of the date of this appeal, precludes the application of the legislative act to cases arising prior to January 1, 1975.

Section 768.28 waives sovereign immunity in tort actions but applies only from its effective date.

Smith ex rel. Walker v. Metropolitan Dade County · filed 1977-03-01

It is to be noted that the waiver of immunity statute, § 768.28, Fla.Stat. (1973) became effective on January 1, 1975 [§ 768.30, Fla.Stat. (1973)] and, thus, is not applicable to the instant case.

Section 768.28’s waiver of sovereign immunity does not apply to an accident that occurred before its effective date.

Rajchl v. City of Miami · filed 1977-12-20

It should be noted that the automobile accident, out of which plaintiff’s claim against the City arose, occurred prior to the effective date of Section 768.28, Florida Statutes (1975), which waives immunity of the State in certain tort actions.

Section 768.28 provides a limited waiver of sovereign immunity, but does not apply to wrongful deaths occurring before its effective date.

Jackson v. Palm Beach County · filed 1978-04-10

It should be noted that the limited waiver of sovereign immunity allowed by Section 768.28, Florida Statutes, is not applicable in this case since the alleged wrongful death occurred before the effective date of the statute.

Section 768.28 provides a limited waiver of sovereign immunity for tort claims against Florida governmental entities, subject to its effective date.

McPhee v. Dade County · filed 1978-08-15

It should be noted that the limited waiver of sovereign immunity allowed by Section 768.28, Florida Statutes (1974) is not applicable in this case, since the alleged wrongful death occurred before the effective date of the statute.

Section 768.28 waives sovereign immunity for qualifying tort claims occurring on or after January 1, 1975.

Infande v. Seligman of Florida, Inc. · filed 1980-03-12

The effective date of Section 768.28 Florida Statutes (1975) as a waiver of the City of Margate’s immunity was January 1, 1975. Neither the complaint nor the record reveals that the incident giving rise to the cause of action occurred on or after this date.

Section 768.28’s waiver of sovereign immunity does not apply to causes of action that accrued before its effective date.

Davis v. Tedder · filed 1980-09-10

The cause of action herein accrued prior to the effective date of the waiver of sovereign immunity contained in Section 768.28, Florida Statutes (1975). As such this case is governed by the dictates of Modlin v. City of Miami Beach, 201 So.2d 70 (Fla.1967).

Section 768.28’s 1981 venue amendment applies only to causes of action accruing on or after October 1, 1981.

State, Department of Corrections v. Edwards · filed 1982-03-01

Chapter 81-317, Laws of Florida, amends Section 768.28, Florida Statutes, to provide that an action in tort may be brought in the county where the cause of action accrued “if the affected agency or subdivision has an office in such county for the transaction of its customary business.” Even if this amendment were otherwise applicable, which we do not decide here, it would not be applicable to this cause of action because it was made explicitly effective only as to causes of action accruing on or after October 1, 1981.

Section 768.28 applies prospectively to incidents arising after January 1, 1975.

Green v. City of Tampa · filed 1980-12-10

That section was specifically made prospective only, applying to incidents arising after January 1, 1975. Thus, section 768.28 could not be applied to save Green’s cause of action.

The 1980 amendment to § 768.28(9) is unconstitutional to the extent it applies retroactively.

Talmadge ex rel. Talmadge v. District School Board of Lake County · filed 1981-05-27(9)

To the extent that Chapter 80-271, Laws of Florida, amended section 768.28(9), Florida Statutes (Supp. 1980), to apply retroactively, it is unconstitutional.

The 1980 amendment to Section 768.28(9) cannot retroactively extinguish a vested ordinary-negligence claim against a government employee.

Bryant v. School Bd. of Duval County, Fla. · filed 1981-06-03(9)

Accordingly, the cause of action against Rupp and Stasco for ordinary or simple negligence cannot be permitted to fall based on the amendment to the sovereign immunity statute. Were the statute's provisions to be prospectively applied, the outcome might be different. However, the legislature's retroactive application of the statute cannot be permitted to displace appellant's vested constitutional rights.

Section 768.28(9)'s 1980 amendment cannot be applied retroactively to shield public employees from personal tort liability because doing so violates due process.

Rupp v. Bryant · filed 1982-07-15(9)

In conclusion, we find that appellants Rupp and Stasco are not entitled to assert immunity as public officials or employees under these circumstances, that the legislature's attempt to shield these employees from personal tort liability by retroactive application of section 768.28(9), Florida Statutes (Supp. 1980), is unconstitutional as violative of due process, that the Bryants have successfully stated a cause of action in negligence against all the appellants, but have failed to state a cause of action against the employees for wanton and willful negligence.

Section 768.28’s recovery limit is governed by the version in effect when the cause of action accrued.

Griffin v. City of Quincy · filed 1982-01-11(10)

We have determined that the trial court was correct in applying the statute that was in effect at the time appellant's cause of action accrued. Retrospective application of the statute would adversely affect appellant's right to recover the policy limits of the City's insurance, which right vested when appellant suffered the injury. Thus, the statute in existence at the time of the incident should be applied.

Section 768.28(9)(a) cannot be applied retroactively to bar a negligence claim that accrued before the subsection took effect.

Stillwell v. Thigpen · filed 1983-02-14(9)(a)

The complaint in the present case alleges simple negligence, and the action was filed after July 1, 1980, but relates to a cause of action which accrued prior to July 1, 1980. In these circumstances constitutional considerations of due process preclude the retroactive application of § 768.28(9)(a).

Section 768.28(6)(b)'s change to when a claim accrues applies prospectively only.

Department of Transp. v. Soldovere · filed 1984-04-03(6)(b)

Nor do we find any evidence of legislative intent to have Section 768.28(6)(b) operate retroactively. Further, Section 768.28(6)(b) changes the definition of "accrue" as interpreted by Keith v. Dykes, 430 So.2d 502 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983). As a result, the periods of limitation provided in Section 768.28, Florida Statutes (1983), may begin running sooner. In the absence of manifest legislative intent to make changes in periods of limitation retroactive, the change is presumed prospective only.

Section 768.28(9)(a) does not apply to causes of action that accrued before it took effect.

Arney v. DEPT. OF NATURAL RESOURCES · filed 1984-04-11(9)(a)

In Stillwell, we held, based on due process considerations, that Section 768.28(9)(a) does not apply to causes of action accruing before the effective date of that provision. ... In light of Stillwell, it was error for the trial court to grant summary judgment for DNR on Counts I and II.

Section 768.28(9)(a) does not apply retroactively to causes of action accruing before its effective date.

Mann v. Grolock · filed 1984-08-16(9)(a)

In view of the Arney decision, the trial court should not have dismissed the counts of the complaint based on a retroactive application of Section 768.-28(9)(a), Florida Statutes (Supp.1980).

Section 768.28(14) applies to a contribution claim against a state agency based on when that claim accrues, rather than when the underlying accident occurred.

Department of Transportation v. General Portland, Inc. · filed 1983-12-20(14)

Section 768.28(14), Florida Statutes (1981), provides that section 768.28 shall apply only to causes of action which accrue on or after October 1, 1981. ... It is the date the action accrued against appellant that is controlling in this case, not the date of the incident giving rise to the claims, as is urged by appellant.

Section 768.28’s waiver of sovereign immunity does not apply retroactively.

Miller v. City of Fort Lauderdale · filed 1987-06-24

The waiver of immunity statute, section 768.28, Florida Statutes (1985), does not apply retroactively.

The 1987 amendment to § 768.28(5) does not apply to a cause in which final judgment was entered before the amendment took effect.

Escambia County v. Stichweh · filed 1988-10-28(5)

Appellant asserts that the Legislature has overruled Avallone by its passage of Chapter 87-134, Section 3, Laws of Florida, which amends Section 768.28(5), Florida Statutes (Supp. 1986) and states in part: ... We find it unnecessary to consider this contention in light of Section 5 of Chapter 87-134, which states: ... The amendment is, by its own terms, inapplicable to this case in which final judgment was rendered well in advance of the June 30, 1987 effective date of Chapter 87-134.

The 1987 amendment to section 768.28(5) cannot retroactively limit recovery on a pending tort claim when the claimant had a vested right to recover up to the city's insurance policy limits.

City of Winter Haven v. Allen · filed 1989-03-17(5)

We agree with appellee that application of section 768.28(5), Florida Statutes (1987), to limit the collectability of any judgment appellee might obtain would be an unconstitutional abrogation of appellee's right to full tort recovery.

The 1987 amendment to § 768.28(5) limiting recoveries against sovereign entities does not apply retroactively to accrued causes of action that have not been reduced to judgment.

Cox v. COMMUNITY SERVICES DEPT. · filed 1989-04-27(5)

By Chapter 87-134, Laws of Florida, effective June 30, 1987, the legislature amended the statute partially waiving sovereign immunity (§ 768.28(5), Fla. Stat.) by placing specific dollar denoted limitations on recoveries that the statute permits against sovereign entities. ... The trial court was also in error in holding that Chapter 87-134 applied retroactively to limit the amount of appellant's claim against the county.

Section 768.28 waives sovereign immunity for tort claims; whether the waiver applies to an alleged fraud depends on when the fraud was or should have been discovered.

State ex rel. Division of Administration v. Oliff · filed 1977-09-13

As to the question of tort immunity, she alleged in her complaint the construction of the drainage easement was not completed until on or after January 15, 1975. She contends it was not until that time that she could have known of any cause of action she may have against the Department. This, of course, would be after the effective date of Section 768.28. This cause of action, sounding as it does in fraud,1 accrues when the fraud or deceit was or should have been discovered. Section 95.031(1), Florida Statutes (1975); Tullo v. Horner, 296 So.2d 502 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1974). The question of discovery is a factual one, not appropriately passed upon at the pleadings stage.

The 1980 amendment to section 768.28(9) does not provide retroactive sovereign immunity protection.

Stanley v. Crawford · filed 1981-08-18(9)

Department of Transportation v. Knowles (Fla. 1981) (Case No. 59,870, opinion filed June 25,1981) clearly states that appellees do not enjoy retroactive sovereign immunity protections under the 1980 amendment to section 768.28(9), Florida Statutes (Supp. 1980).

Section 768.28 waives Florida’s sovereign immunity for property loss caused by a state employee’s negligent or wrongful act within the scope of employment, providing a tort remedy for unauthorized seizures.

Ailep v. McDonald · filed 2021-09-29

And Florida state tort law provides such a remedy for unauthorized seizures of personal property by state officers. See Fla. Stat. § 768.28 (waiving sovereign immunity for “loss of property . . . caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee” of a state agency while acting within the scope of employment); see also Case v. Eslinger, 555 F.3d 1317, 1331 (11th Cir. 2009).

Section 768.28 waived the State’s sovereign immunity for tort liability as to the executive branch before September 13, 1974.

Florida Department of Revenue v. Norville · filed 1975-10-31

This was subsequent to the date that Fla.Stat. § 768.28 (Supp. 1974), which waived the State’s sovereign immunity for tort liability, became effective as to the executive branch of government. Thus, the issue before us must be decided adversely to appellant’s contention.

Section 768.28 partially waives Florida’s sovereign immunity for tort damages suits against state agencies.

Burch v. Apalachee Community Mental Health Services, Inc. · filed 1986-12-03(1)

Even though Burch alleges that ACMHS is a state agency, the State has partially waived its sovereign immunity in state courts, thus eliminating that possible obstacle to a lawsuit.

Section 768.28 waives sovereign immunity for negligent retention and supervision claims based on the operational functions of a sheriff’s office.

Battista v. Cannon · filed 1996-07-24

According to the facts alleged in the complaint, which address the operational function of the Pasco County Sheriffs Office, Counts II and III of the complaint have been waived of sovereign immunity under Florida Statute § 768.28.

Section 768.28 did not support dismissal of a negligence claim against a school board where the complaint alleged that it failed to protect students in its care.

Doe v. Faerber Ex Rel. Estate of Faerber · filed 2006-08-14

Given the allegations in the Second Amended Complaint, the School Board’s argument under Fla. Stat. § 768.28 cannot be upheld on a motion to dismiss, if at all.

Section 768.28(5) waives sovereign immunity in tort actions for the state, its agencies, and subdivisions to the same extent as for a private person under like circumstances.

Greer v. Ivey · filed 2017-03-14(5)

Section 768.28(5), Florida Statutes, “waived sovereign immunity for the State, its agencies, and its subdivisions in tort actions, rendering the State responsible ⅛ the same manner and to the same extent as a private individual under like circumstances.’ ”

Section 768.28(1) provides a meaningful post-deprivation remedy for property loss caused by a government employee’s negligent or wrongful act.

Loor v. Bailey · filed 2017-09-14(1)

The existence of § 768.28 provides Loor with a meaningful, post-deprivation remedy to challenge the loss of property.

Section 768.28 waives sovereign immunity for an officer’s intentional tort committed within the scope of employment, unless the officer acted in bad faith or with malicious purpose.

Jean-Baptiste v. Jones · filed 2019-12-02(9)(a)

Under Florida Statutes § 768, the State of Florida and its subdivisions have waived sovereign immunity for any intentional tort committed in the scope of an officer’s employment, unless that officer acted in bad faith or with malicious purpose.

Section 768.28 waives Florida’s sovereign immunity for certain torts in state court but does not waive its immunity from suit in federal court.

Telasco v. The Florida Bar · filed 2021-04-28(18)

Florida has waived its sovereign immunity in its own courts for certain torts, Fla. Stat. § 768.28(1), but has not waived its immunity to suit in federal court, id. § 768.28(18) (“No provision of this section . . . shall be construed to waive the immunity of the state or any of its agencies from suit in federal court, as such immunity is guaranteed by the Eleventh Amendment . . . .”).

Section 768.28’s waiver of sovereign immunity for tort claims does not waive Florida’s immunity from constitutional claims under § 1983.

Blaxton v. State of Florida · filed 2023-05-07

Citing to Fla. Stat. § 768.28, Plaintiff additionally argues that the State waives immunity, and therefore is liable, for tort claims in the same manner and to the same extent as private individuals. However, Plaintiff's asserted claims are constitutional violations under § 1983. Specifically, Plaintiff alleged violations of his Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, Thirteenth, and Fourteenth Amendments (Doc. | at 3), not tort claims. And, as this Court previously stated, there has been no express waiver by the State of Florida as to a plaintiffs § 1983 claims against it.

Section 768.28(1) provides a meaningful postdeprivation remedy for property loss by waiving sovereign immunity for tort claims against Florida and its agencies or subdivisions.

Ash v. JPay · filed 2023-03-27(1)

Since Fla. Stat. § 768.28(1) provides Plaintiff with a “meaningful postdeprivation remedy for [his] loss,” he has failed to state a procedural due process claim against Defendant under § 1983.

Section 768.28(1) waives governmental tort immunity only where a private person would be liable under Florida law.

Irving v. St. John · filed 2022-08-09(1)

Although the State of Florida and its subsidiaries such as municipalities are generally immune from tort liability, Florida has waived its immunity “under circumstances in which the state agency or subdivision, if a private person, would be liable to the claimant, in accordance with the general laws of this state.” Lewis v. City of St. Petersburg, 260 F.3d 1260, 1262 (11th Cir. 2001) (quoting Fla. Stat. § 768.28(1)).

Section 768.28(9)(a) does not immunize a city at the pleading stage when the alleged facts permit a finding that its employee committed a tort without bad faith, malice, or wanton and willful disregard.

Strong v. City of Naples · filed 2022-10-24(9)(a)

Pertinent here, § 768.28(9)(a) creates a bifurcated tort liability scheme for public entities and their employees. ... But the City is incorrect that sovereign immunity can be resolved on the pleadings here. ... It remains possible that Officer Craig acted wrongfully but without bad faith, malice, or wonton and willful disregard.

Section 768.28 requires a court considering a negligence claim against a Florida governmental entity to determine whether a private person would owe the plaintiff a duty of care and be similarly liable.

Doss v. Holder · filed 2023-09-28

The Sheriff’s office is thus entitled to sovereign immunity against Plaintiff's tort claims subject to applying § 768.28. When a Florida governmental entity is sued for negligence, a court first determines whether, pursuant to § 768.28, a private person would have a duty of care and be similarly liable to the Plaintiff.

Section 768.28(1) waives sovereign immunity for ordinary negligence claims against jail officials acting within the scope of their employment.

Seaman v. Fleurjean · filed 2025-07-11(1)

Florida has waived sovereign immunity for torts committed by government employees, including ordinary negligence claims against jail officials.

Section 768.28(1) does not waive sovereign immunity for tortious interference claims seeking only economic damages.

Bonati v. State of Florida Agency for Health Care Administration · filed 2024-12-04(1)

As a threshold matter, both parties assume that § 768.28’s waiver applies to the instant claim, but it does not. The tortious interference claims do not allege any “personal injury, wrongful death, or injury or loss of property” as required by § 768.28, but instead seeks economic damages in the form of compensatory damages, lost profits, reputational harm, and special damages.

Section 768.28(1)’s limited tort immunity waiver requires injury or loss of property, personal injury, or death; the alleged data breach harms here did not establish a waiver.

Mack v. Lee Memorial Health System · filed 2025-09-24(1)

The thrust of Plaintiff’s purported injuries here is not in line with section 768.28(1)’s plain language, which provides a limited waiver of sovereign immunity.

Section 768.28(1) waives sovereign immunity for tort claims involving state employees’ negligent or wrongful acts that cause property loss, providing a post-deprivation remedy.

Roberts · filed 2026-01-23(1)

Florida law provides such a remedy. Fla. Stat. § 768.28(1) waives sovereign immunity in tort actions for negligent or wrongful acts of employees that cause injury or loss of property.

Section 768.28 provides a limited waiver of the state's sovereign immunity, with specified effective dates for executive departments and other state agencies and subdivisions.

CIRCUIT COURT, ETC. v. Dept. of Nat. Resources · filed 1976-11-24

Section 768.28, Florida Statutes, constitutes a limited waiver of the state's sovereign immunity, effective July 1, 1974, for executive departments of the State of Florida and January 1, 1975, for all other agencies and subdivisions of the state.

Section 768.28 waives sovereign immunity only to the extent specified in the act and does not create governmental tort liability when the employee would not be liable under the same circumstances.

Cheney v. Dade County · filed 1977-12-20(1)

We adhere, therefore, to the holding in Modlin v. City of Miami Beach, 201 So.2d 70 (Fla. 1967); and we further hold that the Florida statute with regard to Waiver of Sovereign Immunity in Tort Actions, Section 768.28, Florida Statutes (1975), does not create a liability in the State where the act complained of does not give rise to liability in the agent committing the act, because the duty claimed to be violated is a duty owed to the citizens of the state in general and is not a duty owed to a particular person or persons.

Section 768.28 waives the state's sovereign immunity for tort injury or death caused by an employee's negligent act within the scope of employment when a private person would be liable, subject to the section's limits.

Department of Health & Rehabilitative Services v. McDougall · filed 1978-05-25

It should be noted that sovereign immunity has been waived only to the extent specified in the act, and the act states that such immunity is waived for injury or death caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee while acting within the scope of his office or employment under circumstances in which the state or such agency or subdivision, if a private person, would be liable. It is obvious that a private person would never be liable for his failure to apprehend a dangerous escaped mental patient under the circumstances involved in this case. Thus, sovereign immunity has not been waived by the state as it relates to the actions of the Leon County Sheriff’s Office in this instance. ... Operators of a private hospital who negligently allowed a dangerous mental patient to escape would be liable for the resulting injury that such patient did to another person if the injury was a foreseeable result of the negligence. The state would likewise be liable under the same circumstance by virtue of its waiver of sovereign immunity.

Section 768.28 waives sovereign immunity for tort actions, and subsection (6) requires claim notice as a condition precedent to suit.

Hutchins v. Mills · filed 1978-08-22(6)

However, by enacting F.S. 768.28 the legislature provided for waiver of sovereign immunity in tort actions. Therefore, pursuant to that statute, courts do now have subject matter jurisdiction to consider suits which fall within the parameters of the statute. ... We reach such result not because the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction of the claim but because appellant failed to plead a compliance with F.S. 768.28(6) which is in the nature of a condition precedent and which must be plead by appellant in order to state a cause of action.

Section 768.28(1) waives a county's sovereign immunity for tort damages caused by an employee acting within the scope of employment when a private person would be liable under Florida law.

Welsh v. Metropolitan Dade Cty. · filed 1979-01-23(1)

Section 768.28(1), Florida Statutes (1975), merely renders the county liable in tort for damages caused by the act or omission of one of its employees while acting within the scope of his office or employment "under circumstances in which [the county], if a private person, would be liable to the claimant in accordance with the general laws of this state ..." This clearly means that the plaintiff must still plead and prove a recognized cause of action against the county under the state's established principles of tort law in order to recover.

Section 768.28 waives sovereign immunity for tort liability by the state and its agencies or subdivisions, subject to the statute's limits.

Pitts v. METROPOLITAN DADE CTY. · filed 1979-09-06

The opinion sets forth that a plain reading of the statute refutes the proposition that the Legislature intended to codify the rules of sovereign immunity by predicating municipal liability upon "governmental" versus "proprietary" functions and the "special duty" versus the "general duty" dichotomy, when the legislators enacted § 768.28. ... In light of the holding in Commercial Carrier Corporation/Cheney, we believe that the duty of the appellee which was allegedly breached, falls within the category of an "operational level" act or omission.

Section 768.28 waives sovereign immunity and makes a county subject to suit for the alleged negligence.

Daniele v. BOARD OF COUNTY COMMR. · filed 1979-10-03

It appears to us that the waiver of sovereign immunity contained in Section 768.28, Florida Statutes (1975), renders the county subject to suit for the type of negligence alleged in this case.

Section 768.28 waives sovereign immunity for tort claims arising from operational negligence, including contribution and indemnity claims, subject to the statute's limits.

Commercial Carrier Corp. v. Indian River Cty. · filed 1979-04-19

While we are not prepared to embrace the notion that all acts or omissions by governmental authorities will subject them to liability in tort under the statute, nevertheless we conclude that the district court has ascribed much too narrow a field of operation to section 768.28. ... Like the federal courts, we find no logical reason to limit application of our waiver statute to direct actions. Actions for contribution or indemnity grounded on the tortious conduct of the state or its agencies and subdivisions are no less tort claims for purposes of section 768.28 than direct actions.

Section 768.28 waives the State's sovereign immunity so remedies available against private individuals, including injunctions for continuing nuisances, are available against the State.

Department of Transp. v. Burnette · filed 1980-06-11

If the sovereign's immunity was ever a serious impediment to a suit for injunction to secure relief from action by the State having that effect — but see Jones v. Brown, 82 So.2d 889 (Fla. 1955)[11] — it is no longer. Every remedy which would be available against an individual for such a repeated trespass or continuing nuisance, including an injunction to prevent a multiplicity of damage suits, is now available against the State. Section 768.28, Florida Statutes (1979).

Section 768.28’s waiver of sovereign immunity is subject to Section 325.29’s exception for motor vehicle inspectors and inspection stations.

Betancourt v. Metropolitan Dade County · filed 1981-01-06

The question before us is whether the Legislature has, by the adoption of Section 325.29, Florida Statutes (1977), withdrawn inspectors and inspection stations from the waiver of immunity effected by the adoption of Section 768.28, Florida Statutes (1977). Finding that it has, we affirm the order which dismissed the appellant’s plaintiff below, complaint with prejudice.

Section 768.28 conditionally waives the state's immunity to tort actions, including claims for damage to property.

State v. Donahoo · filed 1982-03-25

We think Darby to be inapplicable to the facts before us since it was decided long before the legislature conditionally waived the state's immunity to tort actions by enacting Section 768.28, Florida Statutes (1975).

Section 768.28(10) waives a city's sovereign immunity to the extent it has purchased excess insurance coverage.

Ranger Ins. Co. v. Travelers Indem. · filed 1980-10-07(10)

Secondly, appellee's contention in this respect overlooks Section 768.28(10), Florida Statutes (1975), which provides for waiver of sovereign immunity to the extent that the City has purchased excess coverage.

Section 768.28 does not abrogate judicial immunity for acts performed in a judge’s judicial capacity unless the judge acts with a clear absence of all jurisdiction.

Berry v. State · filed 1981-06-03

In summary, we hold that the enactment of Section 768.28 did not abrogate the common law principle of judicial immunity, and, consequently, judges continue to enjoy absolute immunity from damages liability for acts performed in the course of their judicial capacities unless such acts are undertaken with a clear absence of all jurisdiction.

Section 768.28 provides an additional remedy for existing causes of action but does not create a new cause of action.

Airport Sign Corp. v. Dade County · filed 1981-07-07

Section 768.28, Florida Statutes (1979), does not create a new cause of action but provides an additional remedy for causes of actions which otherwise exist.

Section 768.28 does not waive Florida’s sovereign immunity from civil rights damages suits in federal court.

Ostroff v. State of Fla., Dept. of Health · filed 1983-01-31

Consequently, the Court is unable to conclude that § 768.28 was intended to authorize civil rights damages suits to be brought in federal court against the State of Florida.

Section 768.28 does not preserve sovereign immunity when prison officials negligently give an inmate preferential treatment and place him in inadequately supervised confinement.

Smith v. Dept. of Corrections · filed 1983-06-17

After consideration of these cases, we conclude that there is no sovereign immunity when an inmate is negligently given preferential treatment and placed in inadequately supervised confinement.

Section 768.28 impliedly repeals § 402.34 insofar as it would immunize HRS from tort liability.

DeBolt v. Dept. of Health & Rehab. Services · filed 1983-02-14

An application of the above principles convinces us that the enactment of section 768.28, a general revision of Florida's law of sovereign immunity, impliedly repealed section 402.34 insofar as it purports to immunize HRS, a particular agency, from tort liability.

Section 768.28(1) does not waive sovereign immunity for prisoner transfer decisions because private persons do not ordinarily perform that function.

Reddish v. Smith · filed 1985-04-04(1)

But the decision to transfer a prisoner from one corrections facility to another is an inherently governmental function not arising out of an activity normally engaged in by private persons. Therefore the statutory waiver of sovereign immunity does not apply.

Section 768.28(1) does not bar a suit to construe an easement granted to the state or a rescission suit based on adequately pleaded fraud, even though its express waiver does not mention those claims.

Kempfer v. St. Johns River Water Management · filed 1985-08-08(1)

However, we do not think a suit for declaratory relief to construe an easement granted to the state or a suit for rescission, had fraud been properly pleaded, is barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity, despite the fact that the express waiver in section 768.28(1) does not specifically mention these causes of action.

For state medical services, the scope of duty and sovereign immunity under section 768.28 are measured by the Commercial Carrier test.

Miller v. State, Department of Health & Rehabilitative Services · filed 1985-08-22

We must take the majority opinion in Trianon at its word and measure the scope of duty and sovereign immunity in this case by the Commercial Carrier test.

Section 768.28 waives sovereign immunity for existing common law tort claims but creates no new causes of action.

Trianon Park Condominium v. City of Hialeah · filed 1985-04-04

In summary, we first emphasize that section 768.28, Florida Statutes (1975), which waived sovereign immunity, created no new causes of action, but merely eliminated the immunity which prevented recovery for existing common law torts committed by the government.

Section 768.28(1) allows a conversion claim against a state agency for wrongfully seizing a boat without subsequent forfeiture proceedings despite sovereign immunity.

Springer v. FLA. DEPT. OF NATURAL RESOURCES · filed 1986-03-11(1)

First, Count I of the counterclaim states a valid cause of action sounding in conversion against the counter-defendant Florida Department of Natural Resources based on an alleged wrongful seizure of the counter-plaintiff Robert S. Springer's boat by the said counter-defendant, unaccompanied by any subsequent forfeiture proceedings. We specifically hold, in this connection, that this claim is not barred by the defense of sovereign immunity. See Trianon Park Condominium Association v. City of Hialeah, 468 So.2d 912 (Fla. 1985); Commercial Carrier Corp. v. Indian River County, 371 So.2d 1010 (Fla. 1979); § 768.28(1), Fla. Stat. (1983); accord City of Miami Beach v. Bules, 479 So.2d 205 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985).

Section 768.28 waives political subdivisions' sovereign immunity for torts regardless of whether they purchase liability insurance.

Avallone v. Bd. of County Com'rs Citrus Cty. · filed 1986-07-10(1), (5)

Sovereign immunity is waived and political subdivisions are liable for torts in the same manner as a private individual would be, except as noted below, regardless of whether liability insurance is purchased.

Section 768.28 waives sovereign immunity to permit tort suits against the state and its subdivisions, and the legislature may place conditions on that waiver.

Smith v. Department of Ins. · filed 1987-04-23

This argument fails to recognize that section 768.28 waived sovereign immunity and its primary effect was to permit suits which had previously been prohibited. The right of the legislature to waive sovereign immunity and to place conditions on the waiver is plenary under article X, section 13, Florida Constitution.

Section 768.28 waives Florida’s sovereign immunity for state tort actions, but not for federal civil rights actions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Hill v. Dept. of Corrections · filed 1987-09-24(1)

The recovery ceilings in section 768.28 were intended to waive sovereign immunity for state tort actions, not federal civil rights actions commenced under section 1983.

Section 768.28’s waiver of sovereign immunity requires an underlying common law or statutory duty of care before a governmental entity can be liable in tort.

Alderman v. Lámar · filed 1986-08-07

The initial inquiry in sovereign immunity cases is whether the governmental entity was under either a common law or statutory duty of care with respect to the alleged negligent conduct.

Section 768.28 creates no new cause of action where the government owes no underlying duty of care.

Zieja v. Metropolitan Dade County · filed 1987-06-23

Since there has never been a common law duty of care with respect to these types of activities, and since section 768.28 does not create any, the governmental entity cannot be held liable for its negligence arising out of such conduct.

Section 768.28(2) includes special taxing districts as independent establishments of the state.

Eldred v. North Broward Hosp. Dist. · filed 1986-11-26(2)

In our view, the legislature clearly intended the provisions of section 768.28(2) to include special taxing districts within the phrase "independent establishments of the state."

Section 768.28(1)’s waiver of sovereign immunity for torts does not impose strict liability on the state.

Schick v. Florida Dept. of Agriculture · filed 1987-03-18(1)

The Act expressly provides that sovereign immunity is waived only to the extent specified in the act, that is, liability will attach to the government in the same manner and to the same extent as to a private individual under like circumstances. s. 768.28, Fla. Stat. (1985); 28 Fla.Jur.2d, Government Tort Liability, s. 11. Thus, the removal of sovereign immunity in tort actions does not impose strict liability in its place.

Section 768.28 removes governmental immunity for existing common law torts but creates no new causes of action against governmental entities.

City of Tarpon Springs v. Garrigan · filed 1987-08-12

Section 768.28 created no new causes of action against governmental entities. It merely eliminated the government's immunity from existing common law torts.

Section 768.28’s waiver of sovereign immunity does not create a new duty of care.

Slemp v. City of North Miami · filed 1987-11-10

Under the rule enunciated in Trianon, there is no governmental tort liability for the action or inaction of governmental officials or employees in carrying out the discretionary governmental functions [of enforcing the laws and protecting the public safety] because there has never been a common law duty of care with respect to these ... police power functions, and the statutory waiver of sovereign immunity did not create a new duty of care.

Section 768.28(13) permits municipalities to self-insure against tort liability without a certificate of self-insurance.

Gabriel v. Travelers Indem. Co. · filed 1987-11-17(13)

Section 768.28(13), Florida Statutes (1979),[2] authorizes municipalities to obtain any of four types of tort liability coverage: (a) self-insurance, (b) risk management program, (c) liability insurance, or (d) any combination of the stated methods. ... The certificate is not the sole means of demonstrating self-insurance because section 324.031 does not supersede other statutorily authorized methods of proving financial responsibility.

Section 768.28(1) waives immunity for operational government activities even when private persons do not perform those activities; basic policy making decisions at the planning level remain immune.

Dept. of Health & Rehab. Servs. v. Yamuni · filed 1988-06-02(1)

We recede from any suggestion in Reddish that there has been no waiver of immunity for activities performed only by the government and not private persons. The only government activities for which there is no waiver of immunity are basic policy making decisions at the planning level.

Section 768.28 permits a negligence suit against a city for unsafe maintenance of a courthouse floor when a private property owner would be liable for the same conduct.

Durrance v. City of Jacksonville · filed 1988-08-31

Since recovery would be allowed against a private person or landlord for the same conduct as that allegedly committed by the City of Jacksonville in this case, the city is not immune from suit under section 768.28.

Section 768.28(5)'s comparison to a private individual does not preserve sovereign immunity for inmate supervision merely because private individuals do not supervise inmates.

Dunagan v. Seely · filed 1988-10-28(5)

We also reject appellee's argument that sovereign immunity attaches because of the provision in section 768.28(5) that the state and its agencies and subdivisions shall be liable for tort claims "in the same manner and to the same extent as a private individual under like circumstances." Appellee contends that since private individuals do not engage in the supervision of inmates, sovereign immunity cannot be considered waived in that regard. That argument has been rejected in Commercial Carrier, Yamuni, and Durrance.

Section 768.28 waives Florida's sovereign immunity for traditional state tort actions, but not for section 1983 suits in state court.

Howlett Ex Rel. Howlett v. Rose · filed 1989-02-01

We decide appellant's first issue on the authority of Hill v. Department of Corrections, State of Florida, 513 So.2d 129 (Fla. 1987), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 108 S.Ct. 1024, 98 L.Ed.2d 989 (1988), and hold that the State of Florida has not waived its sovereign immunity from suits against it in its own state courts except to the extent provided in section 768.28, Florida Statutes (1985) for traditional state tort actions.

Section 768.28 waives sovereign immunity for acts that would make an individual liable in similar circumstances, without distinguishing among kinds of governmental acts.

Kaisner v. Kolb · filed 1989-03-30

The state of Florida has waived sovereign immunity for any act for which an individual in similar circumstances could be held liable. § 768.28, Fla. Stat. (Supp. 1980). On the face of the statute, this waiver does not attempt to distinguish between particular kinds of governmental acts.

A sovereign hospital district waives § 768.28's liability limit to the full extent of its liability insurance coverage.

Lower Fla. Keys Hosp. Dist. v. Littlejohn · filed 1988-01-26

Second, we conclude that although the defendant Hospital, as a special hospital taxing district, is a sovereign entity under Section 768.28, Florida Statutes (1981), Eldred v. North Broward Hosp. Dist., 498 So.2d 911 (Fla. 1986), the said defendant is not entitled to the $100,000 limitation of liability contained in said statute because it, admittedly, has purchased liability insurance coverage for the attorney's fee award in issue, and, accordingly, has waived its sovereign immunity to the full extent of its insurance coverage.

Section 768.28 waives the state's tort immunity for injury caused by a state employee's negligent or wrongful act within the scope of employment when the state would be liable under the general laws applicable to a private person.

STATE, DEPT. OF HLT. & REHAB. SERV. v. Whaley · filed 1988-06-29

On the basis of the foregoing analysis we conclude that sovereign immunity does not shield HRS from liability in the instant suit.

Section 768.28 waives sovereign immunity for operational negligence by police officers.

State v. Robinson · filed 1990-06-22

First, the state has waived sovereign immunity for the operational negligence of police officers. § 768.28, Fla. Stat. (1989); Kaisner v. Kolb, 543 So.2d 732 (Fla. 1989).

Section 768.28(1) applies to tort actions at law against the state seeking money damages for property loss, personal injury, or death.

Revell v. Paschal · filed 1990-07-11(1)

We reject appellee’s argument that section 768.28(1), Florida Statutes (1981), abrogated the common law privilege of home venue. Since that section specifically refers to actions at law against the state to recover damages in tort for money damages for injury or loss of property, personal injury or death, it does not apply to the instant case.

Section 768.28(5) waives sovereign immunity for tort claims against the state and its agencies and subdivisions to the same extent as liability for a private individual under like circumstances.

First American Title Ins. Co. v. Dixon · filed 1992-07-15(5)

In sum, we believe that public policy considerations favor accountability by the clerk for negligence, and we hold that the doctrine of sovereign immunity is not a bar to a civil suit.

Section 768.28 waives sovereign immunity for tort liability of the state and its agencies or subdivisions, including negligence arising from operational activities.

Nanz v. Southwest Florida Water Management District · filed 1993-03-31

In the instant case, liability is subject to traditional tort analysis under section 768.28 since the complaint alleges negligence on the part of SWFMD through its operational level activities.

Section 768.28 permits recovery under duties the government would owe as a private person but does not create new governmental duties.

Dennis v. City of Tampa · filed 1991-05-29

It is now well established, however, that section 768.28, Florida Statutes (1989), does not create new duties owing by the government, but rather permits recovery under duties the government would owe if it were a "private person."

Section 768.28 waives sovereign immunity in tort actions but does not create new duties of care.

STATE, OFFICE, STATE ATTY. v. Powell · filed 1991-09-11

The state's waiver of sovereign immunity in section 768.28, Florida Statutes, does not create new duties of care.

Subsection (5) makes the state and its agencies and subdivisions liable for tort claims in the same manner and to the same extent as a private individual under like circumstances.

Parrotino v. City of Jacksonville · filed 1992-12-15(5)

The duty is not in any way limited by the defendant's status as a governmental entity, because section 768.28(5), Florida Statutes, expressly provides that "[t]he state and its agencies and subdivisions shall be liable for tort claims in the same manner and to the same extent as a private individual under like circumstances[.]"

Section 768.28(1) waives sovereign immunity only when a private person would be liable; it does not cover a claim based solely on the Florida Constitution’s privacy provision.

Tucker v. Resha · filed 1994-03-30(1)

The statutory waiver of sovereign immunity provided by section 768.28, Florida Statutes (1987), applies "if a private person [] would be liable," id. at 768.28(1), but the privacy provision of the Florida Constitution obviously creates no cause of action against private persons.

Section 768.28 permits liability suits alleging failure to warn of or correct a known dangerous condition, or failure to properly maintain existing improvements.

Freeman v. Taylor County · filed 1994-09-22

A liability suit under section 768.28 is not barred by sovereign immunity where plaintiffs allege failure to warn or correct a known dangerous condition, or failure to properly maintain existing improvements.

Section 768.28 does not waive sovereign immunity for fraud in the inducement causing only economic loss.

County of Brevard v. Miorelli Engineering, Inc. · filed 1996-06-28

The legislature has waived sovereign immunity in tort for personal injury, wrongful death, and injury or loss of property. See § 768.28, Fla. Stat. (1995). Fraud in the inducement causing only economic loss does not fit within any of those categories of injury or loss enumerated in the statute.

Section 768.28’s waiver of sovereign immunity does not create a duty of care where none otherwise exists.

Thompson v. Department of Highway Safety & Motor Vehicles · filed 1997-04-25

Because there has never been a common law duty of care for the discretionary governmental function of revoking and renewing driver’s licenses and the statutory waiver of sovereign immunity did not create a new duty of care, appellee is, as a matter of law, not tortiously liable in this case.

Section 768.28 does not waive sovereign immunity for a state constitutional damages claim where no corresponding duty applies to private citizens.

Garcia v. Reyes · filed 1997-07-09

To allow Garcia to bring a cause of action based on a violation of our state's constitution, where no concomitant duty arises for private citizens, would extend the waiver of sovereign immunity beyond the stated intent of the statute.

Section 768.28 treats wrongful injunction as a wrongful act within its waiver of sovereign immunity.

City of Treasure Island v. PROVIDENT MGMT. · filed 1999-06-11

Although we conclude that the claim is in the nature of strict liability, we also conclude that wrongful injunction is a "wrongful act" for purposes of the waiver in section 768.28.

Section 768.28 does not apply to an independent action or motion for relief from judgment because neither is an action to recover tort damages.

Bony v. Public Health Trust · filed 1999-09-24(1)

We concur with Ms. Bony that section 768.28 has no application here. The statute by its terms applies to an action “to recover damages in tort for money damages against the state or its agencies or subdivisions_” Id. § 768.28(1). Neither an independent action for relief from judgment, nor a motion for relief from judgment, fits within the scope of section 768.28.

Section 768.28(5) waives sovereign immunity for tort claims against governmental entities to the same extent as for private individuals, subject to an underlying common law duty of reasonable care.

Layton v. DEPT. OF HWY SAFETY & MOTOR VEH. · filed 1996-07-02(5)

Section 768.28(5), Florida Statutes (1989), imposes liability upon governmental entities "for tort claims in the same manner and to the same extent as a private individual under like circumstances" would be subject to an underlying common law duty to exercise reasonable care.

Section 768.28(5)’s damages cap, as cross-referenced by the Florida Civil Rights Act, supports a waiver of sovereign immunity for state-court damages actions under that Act.

Jones v. Brummer · filed 2000-08-16(5)

We reverse because we believe that a fair reading of Florida's Civil Rights Act as a whole, together with section 768.28, Florida Statutes, which is cross-referenced in the Act, evidences a sufficiently clear legislative intent that sovereign immunity for public employers, such as the appellee in this case, is waived for causes of action brought in state court under the Act.

Section 768.28 waives sovereign immunity for state tort actions but does not extend that waiver to civil rights actions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Board of Regents of State v. Snyder · filed 2002-07-19

Although this state has waived its sovereign immunity for state tort actions, that waiver does not extend to civil rights actions.

Section 768.28 does not waive the quasi-judicial immunity enjoyed by the Parole Commission and Department of Corrections.

Andrews v. Florida Parole Com'n · filed 2000-10-18

We think the same reasoning applies with equal effect here; we are therefore confident that the legislature in enacting section 768.28 could not and did not intend to waive any quasi-judicial immunity enjoyed by the Commission and DOC.

Section 768.28(9)(a) sets requirements for governmental waiver of sovereign immunity but does not create a tort cause of action.

Hollingsworth v. Brown · filed 2001-06-05(9)(a)

On the contrary, section 768.28(9)(a) does not provide a cause of action in tort, but simply states the requirements for governmental waiver of sovereign immunity.

Section 768.28 does not waive sovereign immunity for a sheriff’s claim against a state agency for the expense of housing incompetent defendants, whether the claim is called damages, reimbursement, or recovery.

Palm Beach County Sheriff v. State · filed 2003-09-17

We agree with the trial court’s reliance on Miller, which rejected a request by various cities for money damages from the Department for expenses incurred as a result of the Department’s failure to meet its responsibility to take custody and care for prisoners who had been declared mentally incompetent to stand trial. ... For the purpose of applying sovereign immunity, there is no distinction between the “damages” sought in Miller and the “reimbursement” or “recovery” of expenses pursued in this case.

Section 768.28 applies to nuisance and trespass claims against a county.

Escambia County v. Stanberry · filed 2004-02-02

We reject the argument of the cross-appellant regarding the applicability of section 768.28, Florida Statutes, to the claims of nuisance and trespass.

Section 768.28 permits governmental tort liability only if a statutory or common law duty of care exists; an act’s operational character does not itself establish that duty.

Pollock v. Florida Dept. of Highway Patrol · filed 2004-06-10(1)

As reiterated throughout this opinion, a determination that a governmental actor owed a duty of care with regard to the allegedly negligent conduct is a prerequisite to proceeding with a sovereign immunity analysis and ultimately determining whether governmental tort liability exists. Therefore, characterizing a governmental action or omission as operational or discretionary in nature has no bearing on the initial duty analysis.

Section 768.28’s limits on tort liability do not control a municipal agency’s contractual agreement to indemnify a private party.

American Home Assur. v. NAT. RR CORP. · filed 2005-07-07(1)

The second question asks whether, given that the Kissimmee Utility Authority, a municipal agency, contractually agreed to indemnify a private party, the agreement is controlled by the restrictions on waiver of sovereign immunity found in section 768.28, Florida Statutes (1997). We answer "no" to this question.

Section 768.28 waives sovereign immunity for tort liability comparable to a private person's but creates no new duty of care for governmental entities.

DEPT. OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION v. Hardy · filed 2005-07-29

The State of Florida has waived sovereign immunity from liability in tort actions under section 768.28 "for any act for which a private person under similar circumstances would be held liable." Pollock v. Fla. Dep't of Highway Patrol, 882 So.2d 928, 932 (Fla.2004). But the statute did not establish any new duty of care for governmental entities.

Section 768.28 provides sovereign immunity to a Department of Transportation agent when there is no evidence of intentional misconduct or gross negligence.

Routon v. PBS & J CONSTRUCTION SERVICES, INC. · filed 2008-01-04

After a thorough review of the entire record before us in this tragic case, we are compelled *253 to agree with the circuit court that there is no material issue of fact that PBS & J was an agent of the Department, and there is no evidence of intentional misconduct or gross negligence.

Section 768.28 does not apply to claims under Florida's Public Whistle-blower's Act.

Florida Dept. of Education v. Garrison · filed 2007-04-19

Rather, we view this as an indication that there was no legislative intent that any of the provisions of section 768.28 apply to a cause of action under the Act, which, like the Florida Civil Rights Act, is a "stand-alone statutory scheme" designed to provide an aggrieved party with a remedy against the state or its agencies or subdivisions under certain, specified conditions.

Section 768.28(9)(a) controls over the workers’ compensation exception when allegations that a public employer’s conduct was virtually certain to cause injury or death amount to wanton and willful disregard for employee safety.

Estate of Smith v. Florida Department of Children & Families · filed 2010-05-06(9)(a)

Unfortunately, this ease, like ... is one in which the provisions of sections 440.11(1) and 768.28(9)(a) conflict, and when that occurs “it is the provisions of section 768.28(9)(a) which control.”

Section 768.28’s waiver for common law tort claims does not cover statutory unfair and deceptive trade practices or misleading advertising claims.

Curcio v. State of Florida Department etc. · filed 2015-05-26

These claims are not common law tort claims subject to the waiver of sovereign immunity in section 768.28, Florida Statutes; they are statutory claims arising under part II of chapter 501 (unfair and deceptive trade practices) and section 817.41 (misleading advertising), respectively.

Section 768.28 gives a state agency limited immunity from liability while allowing it to be sued.

Florida Fish & Wildlife Conservation Commission v. Jeffrey · filed 2015-10-20

By contrast, any harm resulting from the erroneous denial of FWCC’s motion for summary judgment is not irreparable because, by virtue of the waiver of sovereign immunity in section 768.28, Florida Statutes, FWCC has only limited immunity from the liability that may result from Respondent’s suit, not immunity from the suit itself.

Section 768.28’s waiver of sovereign immunity permits a false arrest suit against a governmental agency.

FLOREZ v. BROWARD SHERIFF'S OFFICE and HOWARD FORMAN, in his official capacity, etc. · filed 2019-04-24

Having determined that there was potential tort liability for false arrest, the next question is whether sovereign immunity bars such liability. On this point, Jibory is also instructive and provides that sovereign immunity does not bar a false arrest suit against the government.

Section 768.28(1) does not waive sovereign immunity for claims seeking only economic damages without personal injury, wrongful death, or injury or loss of property.

CITY OF PEMBROKE PINES v. CORRECTIONS CORPORATION OF AMERICA, INC. · filed 2019-05-29(1)

The waiver of sovereign immunity has not been extended to include the claim upon which CCA relies here – economic damages framed in counts for declaratory relief, promissory estoppel, tortious interference with contract, and tortious interference with advantageous business relationship.

Section 768.28 provides a limited waiver of sovereign immunity for tort claims, including negligence claims against a city.

CITY OF FORT LAUDERDALE v. DON NICHOLS and LOBBAN CONSTRUCTION, INC. · filed 2018-04-25

The Florida Legislature has expressly provided for limited waiver of sovereign immunity in tort. See § 768.28, Fla. Stat. (2017). Thus, the court correctly denied the City’s motion for summary judgment as to the negligence claims.

Section 768.28 waives a municipality’s sovereign immunity for a medical monitoring claim grounded in negligence.

CITY OF FORT LAUDERDALE v. HINTON · filed 2019-07-24(1)

The Hintons also contend that the denial of sovereign immunity to this claim should be affirmed where negligence is a necessary element for medical monitoring, and because the claim is grounded in negligence, the statute waiving sovereign immunity for tortious conduct (section 768.28) applies and the City is thus not immune from suit as a matter of law. We agree. Accordingly, although the trial court did not base its ruling on this basis, we affirm the denial of sovereign immunity as to this claim.

Section 768.28(1) waives sovereign immunity for tort damages but does not cover declaratory judgment claims.

University of Florida Board of Trustees, and The Florida Board of Governors v. Browning, Boisse · filed 2024-04-03(1)

Section 768.28 by its plain language waives sovereign immunity only for “liability for torts,” “to recover damages in tort”; it does not waive immunity for declaratory judgment claims.

Section 768.28(1) does not waive sovereign immunity for a tort claim alleging only generalized economic damages without injury or loss of property.

The Florida International University Board of Trustees v. Signal Safe, Inc., a Florida Corporation · filed 2024-05-22(1)

FIU contends that the allegations in the negligence count were insufficient to overcome sovereign immunity because Signal Safe failed to identify any injury or loss of property, as is statutorily required, in the operative complaint. We agree. Signal Safe alleged only that it suffered generalized economic damages as the result of the suspension of use of its product.

Section 768.28 waives sovereign immunity for tort claims only when the government owed a duty of care comparable to one owed by a private person; a duty benefiting the general public does not support liability.

Clerk of Circuit Court and Comptroller, Hillsborough County v. Manhattan Palms Association One, LLC · filed 2025-07-23

Section 768.28, Florida Statutes (2008), waives the State's immunity from tort claims as to acts for which a private person under similar circumstances would be held liable. ... The Clerk's obligation to maintain a general alphabetical index under section 28.222(2) was to the benefit of the general public and not any specific individual or identifiable class; therefore, the Clerk's sovereign immunity bars this action, and the trial court denied the Clerk's motion to dismiss in error.

Section 768.28(1)’s limited waiver of sovereign immunity does not cover economic damages from the use of personal and health information when no tangible property was damaged.

Beck v. North Broward Hospital District · filed 2026-01-14(1)

Consistent with Pembroke Pines II, we hold that the damages the plaintiffs claim from the use of their personal and health information involve economic damages falling outside of the section 768.28(1) limited waiver of sovereign immunity, because there was no actual damage to tangible property.

Section 768.28(5) extends sovereign immunity to governmental entities even if they lacked it before July 1, 1974.

Hillsborough County Hospital & Welfare Board v. Taylor · filed 1988-08-10(5)

When the legislature amended section 768.28 by general law in chapter 77-86, the legislature expressly created sovereign immunity for all governmental entities, even if they possessed no immunity prior to July 1, 1974. The hospital was one of those governmental entities that was cloaked with sovereign immunity by chapter 77-86, and thereafter the public was placed on notice as to its sovereign immunity.

Section 768.28, read with the Florida Civil Rights Act, waives public employers’ sovereign immunity from claims brought under the Act in state court.

Diaz v. Florida Highway Patrol · filed 2000-11-29

In Brummer, we concluded that a fair reading of FCRA, together with section 768.28, Florida Statutes (1999) which is cross-referenced in the Act, evidences a sufficiently clear legislative intent that sovereign immunity for public employers is waived for causes of action brought in state court under the Act. ... However, relying on Brummer, we reverse the order under review.

Section 768.28(9)(a) gives a governmental employer sovereign immunity when its employee acts with wanton and willful disregard of human rights, safety, or property.

Martin v. Snyder · filed 2023-10-10(9)(a)

He thus acted “in a manner exhibiting wanton and willful disregard of human rights, safety, or property”—entitling Defendant Sheriff to sovereign immunity pursuant to Fla. Stat. § 768.28(9)(a).

Section 768.28(9) does not bar a tort claim against a municipality at the pleading stage when the alleged officer conduct cannot only be characterized as malicious, in bad faith, or willful and wanton.

Doe v. City of Miami, Florida · filed 2024-06-18(9)

The facts, as alleged by Plaintiff, do not support that Officer Garcia’s actions can only be characterized as “malicious”, done “in bad faith”, or in a willful or wanton manner. ... Accordingly, the Court finds the City is not entitled to sovereign immunity at this stage, and denies the motion to dismiss on that ground.

Section 768.28 does not waive a municipality’s sovereign immunity for an officer’s acts committed in bad faith or with malicious purpose.

Ghandour v. CITY OF MIAMI DADE · filed 2024-01-09(9)(a)

Taking Plaintiff’s allegations as true, and drawing all reasonable inferences in Plaintiff’s favor, the officer’s conduct can only be described as “committed in bad faith or with malicious purpose.” Fla. Stat. § 768.28(9)(a). Since Plaintiff’s claims against the City are not pleaded in the alternative, Counts IV and V are dismissed.

Section 768.28(9)(a) does not immunize an officer from an individual-capacity tort claim when the complaint sufficiently alleges malicious or bad-faith conduct.

Bowen v. Blais · filed 2024-05-28(9)(a)

Section 768.28(9)(a) establishes sovereign immunity for officers, employees, and agents of the state for acts or omissions done in the scope of their employment, “unless such act or omission was committed in bad faith or with malicious purpose or in a manner exhibiting wanton and willful disregard of human rights, safety, or property[.]” See Fla. Stat. § 768.28(9)(a). ... Therefore, Lemma’s motion to dismiss claims against him in his individual capacity is denied.

Section 768.28(9)(a) shields a county from tort liability when the pleaded facts show that its employee acted with wanton and willful disregard of human rights, safety, or property.

Williams v. Miami-Dade County · filed 2024-07-13(9)(a)

In summary, the Court concludes that, based upon the facts alleged in the operative Complaint, § 768.28(9)(a) of the Florida Statutes applies to the allegations concerning Officer Rodriguez’s conduct. As a result, sovereign immunity shields the County from liability on Counts II and III, which are both dismissed without prejudice and with leave to amend.

Section 768.28(9)(a) bars vicarious tort liability against the state and its subdivisions for an employee’s malicious or wanton and willful conduct.

John Doe by and through A.W. v. Hernando County School District · filed 2024-08-26(9)(a)

Under Florida’s sovereign immunity statute, “[t]he state or its subdivisions shall not be liable in tort for the acts or omissions of an…employee…committed while acting outside the scope of his or her employment or committed with malicious purpose or in a manner exhibiting wanton and willful disregard of human rights, safety, or property.” Fla. Stat. § 768.28(9)(a). Count VII expressly alleges that Defendants’ conduct was “wanton, malicious, and designed to inflict physical, emotional and mental harm[.]” Doc. 25 ¶ 120. Accordingly, HCSD and Explorer cannot be held vicariously liable for it.

Section 768.28(9)(a) bars tort liability against a government entity for an employee’s wanton and willful conduct.

Moore v. Williams · filed 2024-08-28(9)(a)

As such, accepting the factual allegations in the Complaint as true, the Moores allege the required mental state to bar this claim under section 768.28(9)(a).

Section 768.28(9)(a) permits an official-capacity tort claim against a sheriff for an employee’s intentional acts within the scope of employment if the employee did not act in bad faith, with malicious purpose, or with wanton and willful disregard of the plaintiff’s rights.

Shaffer v. Scarborough · filed 2025-01-23(9)(a)

However, Florida agencies or subdivisions—here, Sheriff Judd in his official capacity—may be sued and “held liable for an employee’s intentional act(s) as long as the employee is acting within the course and scope of his employment and the act or omission is not committed in bad faith, with malicious purpose, or in a manner exhibiting wanton and willful disregard of the plaintiff’s rights.” ... As such, Sheriff Judd could be held vicariously liable for Defendant Scarborough’s tortious actions.

Section 768.28(9)(a) bars an intentional-infliction-of-emotional-distress claim against a city because the claim’s reckless-conduct element constitutes willful and wanton conduct.

Gilliam v. Fort Myers Police Department (Chief of Police) · filed 2025-03-17(9)(a)

That’s because the reckless conduct element of IIED “‘would at least constitute willful and wanton conduct’ under § 768.28(9)(a)[.]” Id. (quoting Williams v. City of Minneola, 619 So. 2d 983, 986 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993)). Accordingly, the Court dismisses Count VIII against the City.

Section 768.28(9)(a) bars claims against the state and its subdivisions for intentional infliction of emotional distress because that claim requires willful and wanton conduct.

King · filed 2025-11-04(9)(a)

Florida courts have long recognized that Fla. Stat. § 768.28(9)(a)—which provides that the State and its subdivisions “shall not be liable in tort for the acts or omissions of an officer, employee, or agent ... committed ... in a manner exhibiting wanton and willful disregard of human rights, safety, or property”—bars claims for both intentional infliction of emotional distress and malicious prosecution. ... The “reckless” requirement of the first element of an IIED claim constitutes willful and wanton conduct. ... Thus, the IIED claim against Sheriff Marceno is legally barred.

Section 768.28 waives municipal sovereign immunity for torts committed by nonemployee agents acting within the scope of their agency.

Rauen v. City of Miami · filed 2007-09-17(9)(a)

While the plain language of the statute does not adequately address the issue of whether a municipality may be held liable in tort for the actions of its non-employee agents, read as a whole, the undersigned concludes that it does so cover that arrangement.

Section 768.28(9)(a) permits each governmental entity to be held liable when an officer acts as its agent or employee, including when the officer serves more than one entity.

Keating v. City of Miami · filed 2009-01-20(9)(a)

Under the plain reading of this statute, if an individual were acting as an officer or an agent of more than one governmental entity all governmental entities for which he or she was employed could be held liable.

Section 768.28(9)(a) makes an action against the governmental entity or an authorized official the exclusive remedy for state tort claims against its employees, unless the employee acted in bad faith, maliciously, or with wanton and willful disregard.

Vasconez v. Hansell · filed 2012-05-08(9)(a)

Under Florida law, the exclusive remedy for the Plaintiffs’ state law claims is an action “against the governmental entity, or the head of such entity in her or his official capacity, or the constitutional officer of which the officer, employee, or agent is an employee, unless such act or omission was committed in bad faith or with malicious purpose or in a manner exhibiting wanton and willful disregard of human rights, safety, or property.” Fla. Stat. § 768.28(9)(a). Thus, the state law official capacity claims against the deputies will be dismissed with prejudice.

Section 768.28(9)(a) makes a public employer and its employee mutually exclusive sources of liability for an employee’s tort, with the employer liable unless the employee acted in bad faith.

Perez v. School Board · filed 2013-01-17(9)(a)

As a preliminary matter, Florida’s sovereign immunity statute renders the liability of the officers and their respective employers mutually exclusive. See Fla. Stat. § 768.28(9)(a) (waiving sovereign immunity and making action against municipality sole cause of action for torts committed by municipal employees, unless employee acted in bad faith, in which case sovereign immunity is not waived). Therefore with respect to these counts, either the officer, or the employer, or neither is liable to Plaintiff, but both cannot be liable to Plaintiff.

Section 768.28 permits a municipality to be held vicariously liable for an employee’s torts only if the employee is liable.

Laster v. City of Tampa Police Department · filed 2014-08-22

To prevail on a theory of vicarious liability against the City under Fla. Stat. § 768.28, Laster had to show liability on the part of Barry, the City’s employee.

Section 768.28(9)(a) bars a sheriff’s vicarious liability for a deputy’s acts committed in bad faith or with malicious purpose.

Berry v. McGowan · filed 2018-07-25(9)(a)

Florida law recognizes vicarious liability for false arrest by a law enforcement officer; however, Sheriff Ivey cannot be held liable for the acts or omissions of Deputy McGowan that were committed in bad faith or with malicious purpose. See Fla. Stat. § 768.28(9)(a).

Section 768.28(9)(a) permits negligence claims against cities and counties for employees’ actions within the scope of their duties.

Groover v. Polk County Board of County Commissioners · filed 2020-05-08(9)(a)

In fact, the City and County have waived their sovereign immunity for actions based on negligence by their employees acting within the scope of their duties. Fla. Stat. § 768.28(9)(a). Plaintiffs’ negligence counts against the City (Count 23 & 24) and County (Count 21 & 22) may proceed.

Section 768.28(9)(a) permits a state agency to be sued in state court for the negligent acts of its employees or agents.

Eslinger v. State of Florida Department of Corrections · filed 2021-05-21(9)(a)

As a state agency, the FDOC can be sued in state court for the negligent acts of its employees or agents.

Section 768.28(9)(a) does not immunize a sheriff from a tort claim when the complaint sufficiently alleges that the deputy acted within the scope of employment.

Taylor v. Wagner · filed 2021-07-12(9)(a)

Because Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged that the Deputy was acting within the course and scope of his employment with the Pinellas County Sherriff’s Office, the claims against the Sherriff are not barred by sovereign immunity.

Section 768.28(9)(a) bars municipal liability for intentional infliction of emotional distress under Florida law.

Wing Kei Ho v. City of Boynton beach · filed 2023-03-01(9)(a)

Despite a waiver of tort immunity, Florida law bars municipal liability for acts by its agents “committed in bad faith or with malicious purpose or in a manner exhibiting wanton and willful disregard of human rights, safety, or property.” Fla. Stat. § 768.28(9)(a). We have explained that Florida courts have held that claims of intentional infliction of emotional distress are barred under this statute. ... Fifth, the district court properly dismissed their intentional infliction of emotional distress claim because it is barred by sovereign immunity under Florida law.

Section 768.28(9)(a) makes a sheriff liable for an officer’s torts committed within the scope of employment unless the officer acted in bad faith, with malicious purpose, or with wanton and willful disregard of rights, safety, or property.

OWEN v. SHERIFF OF OKALOOSA COUNTY, FL · filed 2023-03-30(9)(a)

Florida Statute § 768.28 holds a Sheriff liable for the torts of an officer committed in the course and scope of his employment, unless that conduct “was committed in bad faith or with malicious purpose or in a manner exhibiting wanton and willful disregard of human rights, safety, or property.”

Section 768.28(9)(a) does not automatically immunize a state agency when an employee’s use of force is excessive under § 1983; whether the employee acted with the required intent can be a jury question.

Rice v. Florida Department of Corrections · filed 2023-05-25(9)(a)

And force that is deemed excessive under § 1983 is not necessarily synonymous with force that is done with “bad faith, malicious purpose, or wanton [and] willful disregard of human rights [or] safety” as those terms are used in section 768.28(9)(a).

Section 768.28(9)(a) does not categorically bar a county from facing state-law vicarious liability claims for sheriff’s deputies’ conduct.

Andrade v. Rambosk · filed 2023-08-08(9)(a)

Collier County does not cite a single case that would support its argument that it cannot be held vicariously liable under section 768.28(9)(a).

Section 768.28(9)(a) bars government vicarious liability for intentional infliction of emotional distress when the alleged employee conduct is wanton and willful.

Neira v. Gualtieri · filed 2023-09-26(9)(a)

Accordingly, Gualtieri cannot be held vicariously liable. Counts V and VI are therefore due to be dismissed with prejudice as barred by Fla. Stat. § 768.28(9)(a).

Section 768.28 permits vicarious liability against governmental employers for their employees’ torts.

Lopez v. City of Opa-Locka · filed 2024-09-17(9)(a)

Indeed, Defendants fail to mention that both Florida courts and federal courts have concluded that section 768.28 imposes vicarious liability on governmental employers.

Section 768.28(9) preserves state agency immunity for claims alleging that a state officer, employee, or agent acted with malicious purpose.

Hambley v. STATE, DEPT. OF NAT. RESOURCES · filed 1984-11-14(9)

The potential liability of the department and the patrol is controlled in this action by section 768.28(9), Florida Statutes (1977), which waives the sovereign immunity of the state and its subdivisions, but only to the extent of acts of ordinary negligence. The state's sovereign immunity remains viable where it is alleged that the officer, employee, or agent of the state acted "`in bad faith or with malicious purpose ...'" District School Board of Lake County v. Talmadge, 381 So.2d 698 (Fla. 1980).[3] Since the entire thrust of Hambley's cause of action under count I is directed toward the defendants' alleged "malicious purpose," the trial court properly dismissed the count as to the state agencies.

Section 768.28(9) bars tort suits against municipalities for the malicious acts of their employees.

City of Coconut Creek v. Fowler · filed 1985-04-24(9)

This case must also be reversed under the authority of Section 768.28(9), Florida Statutes (1979). ... The statute now affirmatively disallows suits against municipalities for the malicious acts of their employees.

Section 768.28 does not make a school board liable for employees' acts committed in bad faith, with malicious purpose, or with wanton and willful disregard of human rights, safety, or property, even when the acts are within the scope of employment.

Stephenson v. SCHOOL BD., POLK CTY. · filed 1985-05-01

The pleadings and the proofs evidence that the acts of the school board's employees were, at best, committed within the scope of employment, but "in bad faith or with malicious purpose or in a manner exhibiting wanton and willful disregard of human rights, safety, or property." § 768.28, Fla. Stat. (1975).[1] The school board cannot be held liable for such acts; therefore, summary judgment in its favor was proper.

Section 768.28(9)(a) provides immunity to a public hospital’s employee doctor for conduct within the scope of employment, while the hospital may be liable for the employee’s omissions.

Public Health Trust of Dade Cty. v. Valcin · filed 1987-04-30(9)(a)

That party was left as the sole defendant in the case to answer for the doctor's carelessness because the operating doctor, an agent/employee of the public hospital, was properly dismissed under the immunity provisions of section 768.28(9)(a), Florida Statutes (Supp. 1980). In this clear employer/employee context, the hospital may properly be held liable for the significant omission of its employee doctors committed within the scope of their employment.

Section 768.28(9)(a) bars malicious prosecution suits against municipalities arising from their employees’ malicious acts.

Sebring Utilities Com'n v. Sicher · filed 1987-07-01(9)(a)

Therefore, section 768.28(9) affirmatively bars suits against municipalities for malicious prosecution arising from the malicious acts of their employees.