Fla. Stat. § 95.11

Section 95.11 provides a five-year limitations period for breach-of-contract claims and a one-year period for specific-performance claims against a contract party, while contract-based declaratory relief uses the five-year period.

AFFCO New Zealand, Ltd. v. American Fine Foods Corp. · filed 2012-12-20(2)(b) and (5)(a)

The Florida Statutes expressly indicate that the limitations period is five years for a breach of contract claim, Fla. Stat. § 95.11(2)(b), and one year for specific performance against a party to a contract, Fla. Stat. § 95.11(5)(a). Because AFFCO’s request for declaratory relief seeks a declaration of its rights under the Undertaking, there is a five-year statute of limitations for this claim.

Subsections 95.11(3)(j) and (3)(p) provide four-year limitations periods for fraud and fiduciary-duty claims, while subsection 95.11(2)(b) provides a five-year period for contract claims.

Becnel v. Deutsche Bank, AG · filed 2013-01-11(3)(j), (3)(p), (2)(b)

Florida’s statute of limitations is four years for fraud and fiduciary duty claims and five years for contract claims. See Fla. Stat. §§ 95.11(3)(j), 95.11(3)(p), 95.11(2)(b) (2012). ... Appellants’ accounts with Deutsche Bank were closed on or about May 15, 2000. The instant suit was filed on March 9, 2011. As a result, appellants’ contract and fiduciary duty claims are time-barred.

Subsections 95.11(3)(a) and (e) provide a four-year limitations period for the product-liability claims at issue.

Mendez v. Jarden Corporation · filed 2013-01-17(3)(a), (e)

It is undisputed that Mendez’s amended complaint raising claims against Coleman was filed on March 16, 2011, and that Florida’s statute of limitations for product-liability claims expired on October 28, 2009, four years after Mendez was allegedly injured on October 28, 2005. Fla. Stat. § 95.11(3)(a), (e). Thus, her claims against Coleman are barred by Florida’s statute of limitations unless they relate back to the date she filed her initial complaint against Jarden in state court on October 22, 2009.

Section 95.11(3)(e) gives product-liability actions a four-year limitations period.

Kravitz v. EVANS MEDICAL LTD. · filed 2010-09-27(3)(e)

Florida has a four-year statute of limitations for product liability actions.

Section 95.11(3)(e) gives plaintiffs four years to bring a products liability action.

Eghnayem v. Boston Scientific Corporation · filed 2017-10-19(3)(e)

Under Florida law, plaintiffs have four years to bring a products liability action. Fla. Stat. §§ 95.11(3)(e), 95.031.

Section 95.11(3)(e) provides a four-year limitations period for personal-injury claims arising from product defects.

Tonge v. Novartis Pharmaceuticals Corporation · filed 2020-06-04(3)(e)

Florida law allows a four-year statute of limitations for personal injury claims arising from product defects.2 Fla. Stat. § 95.11(3)(e).

Section 95.11 provides a five-year limitations period for written-contract claims and a four-year limitations period for the other claims described here.

Nguyen v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, NA · filed 2013-02-22(2), (3)

Florida’s statute of limitations for breach of contract (for contracts in writing) is five years. Fla. Stat. § 95.11(2). The statute bars that claim because more than five years elapsed between March 2, 2006, and March 22, 2011, the day she filed suit. Nguyen’s other claims are subject to Florida’s four-year statute of limitations, Id. § 95.11(3), and are also barred.

Section 95.11(3)(p) provides the four-year limitations period applicable to § 1983 actions in Florida.

Jones v. Gadsden County Schools · filed 2018-12-14(3)(p)

Even if he had not waived review, however, the magistrate judge correctly concluded that claims based on events five to nine years before Jones filed the instant suit were time-barred under § 1983. See Chappell v. Rich, 340 F.3d 1279, 1283 (11th Cir. 2003) (explaining in Florida, the statute of limitations for a § 1983 action is four years); Fla. Stat. § 95.11(3)(p).

Section 95.11(3)(o)-(p) provides a four-year limitations period for personal-injury torts.

Tillman v. Orange County · filed 2013-05-17(3)(o)-(p)

Florida has a four-year statute of limitations for personal-injury torts.

Section 95.11(3) supplies a four-year limitations period for personal injury actions in Florida.

Silva v. Baptist Health South Florida, Inc. · filed 2017-05-08(3)

Neither the ADA nor RA provides a statute of limitations, so we apply the most analogous state statute of limitations. See Everett v. Cobb Cty. Sch. Dist., 138 F.3d 1407, 1409 (11th Cir. 1998). The most analogous state limitations period comes from personal injury actions, id., which in Florida is a four-year period, Fla. Stat. § 95.11(3); see also City of Hialeah v. Rojas, 311 F.3d 1096, 1103 n.2 (11th Cir. 2002). Plaintiffs filed this lawsuit on May 16, 2014, so according to the district court and Defendants, any events occurring before May 16, 2010, are time-barred.

Section 95.11(3)(p) sets Florida’s residual personal-injury statute of limitations at four years.

Munchak v. Ruckno · filed 2017-07-05(3)(p)

Moreover, any federal § 1983 claims arising from Munchak’s medical treatment are subject to Pennsylvania’s two-year statute of limitations applicable to personal injury actions, see 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 5524; Bougher v. Univ. of Pittsburgh, 882 F.2d 74, 78-79 (3d Cir. 1989), and Florida’s four-year residual personal injury statute of limitations, see Fla. Stat. § 95.11(3)(p). As Munchak’s complaint was filed some six years after the treatments in question, dismissal was proper, and amendment as to Munchak’s § 1983 claims would be futile.

Section 95.11(3) provides a four-year limitations period for personal injury actions, which applies to constitutional claims brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in Florida.

John W. Wood, Jr. v. Kelly · filed 2017-12-14(3)

In Florida, the limitations period for a personal injury action is four years. Fla. Stat. § 95.11(3); see Chappell v. Rich, 340 F.3d 1279, 1283 (11th Cir. 2003). ... These constitutional claims are subject to the four-year limitations period in Florida for personal injury actions. See McNair v. Allen, 515 F.3d 1168, 1173 (11th Cir. 2008) (“All constitutional claims brought under § 1983 are tort actions, subject to the statute of limitations governing personal injury actions in the state where the § 1983 action has been brought.”).

Section 95.11(1) gives a judgment creditor twenty years to enforce a judgment and permits restarting that period by obtaining a new judgment before the period expires.

Nat'l Enters. Inc. v. Hughes · filed 2014-02-04(1)

Florida law, on the other hand, imposes a twenty-year statute of limitations period for an action to enforce a judgment. Fla. Stat. § 95.11(1) (2002). If the statute of limitations period has not yet expired on a judgment, “the judgment creditor can start the limitation period anew by bringing an action upon the judgment and obtaining a new judgment.” ... While the ten-year statute of limitations period in North Carolina had expired when plaintiff sought to enforce the 1995 judgment in 2007, the twenty-year statute of limitations period had not yet run on the judgment in Florida. As a result, plaintiff properly filed a new action based upon the 1995 judgment in 2012 in Florida to start the limitations period anew. See Adams, 22 Fla. L. Weekly at D650, 691 So. 2d at 11.

Section 95.11(2)(b) imposes a five-year limitations period on actions to enforce restrictive covenants.

Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc. v. Dolgencorp, LLC · filed 2014-03-05(2)(b)

Florida applies a five-year limitations period to actions to enforce a restrictive covenant. Fla. Stat. § 95.11(2)(b); Pond Apple Place III Condo. Ass’n v. Russo, 841 So. 2d 526, 527 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003).

Section 95.11(5)(g) requires a prisoner's action relating to the conditions of confinement to be filed within one year after the cause of action accrues.

Rogers v. Judd · filed 2010-07-29(5)(g)

“[A]n action brought by or on behalf of a prisoner . . . relating to the conditions of the prisoner’s confinement” must, however, be commenced within one year of when the cause of action accrued.

Section 95.11(2)(b) provides a five-year limitations period for breach of contract, and an insured's action against an insurer accrues when the claim is denied.

Kelly v. Balboa Insurance · filed 2012-05-29(2)(b)

The applicable statute in this action is Florida Statutes § 95.11(2)(b). Florida Statutes § 95.11(2)(b) provides for a five year statute of limitations for a breach of contract. Florida Statutes § 95.031(1) states that a “cause accrues when the last element constituting the cause of action occurs.” Therefore, a cause of action by an insured against insurers does not accrue until the denial of the claim, based upon the application of § 95.11(2)(b) and § 95.031.

For these quantum meruit and unjust enrichment claims, the four-year limitations period begins when the plaintiff performs the services and confers the benefit, even if the benefit’s ultimate value depends on future events.

Merle Wood and Associates, Inc. v. Trinity Yachhts, LLC · filed 2013-04-15(3)(k), (3)(p)

Under Florida law, a benefit is conferred for purposes of quantum meruit when the plaintiff performs his services, even if it is uncertain when—or whether—the defendant will enjoy the ultimate value of those services.

Section 95.11(3)(j) supplies a four-year limitations period when an unjust-enrichment claim is based on fraud.

State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance v. B&A Diagnostic, Inc. · filed 2015-11-16(3)(j)

Here, State Farm’s claims for unjust enrichment are based on fraud with a corresponding statute of limitations of four years. Fla. Stat. § 95.11(3)(j).

Section 95.11(2)(b) provides a five-year statute of limitations for an action on a contract, obligation, or liability founded on a written instrument.

Aprigliano v. American Honda Motor Co. · filed 2013-10-28(2)(b)

Furthermore, Florida law provides a five-year statute of limitations on claims arising under “[a] legal or equitable action on a contract, obligation, or liability founded on a written instrument....” Fla. Stat. § 95.11(2)(b).

Section 95.11(2)(b) provides a five-year limitations period for breach-of-contract claims based on written instruments, including claims for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.

Wilchfort v. Knight · filed 2018-03-30(2)(b)

Florida imposes a five-year limitations period for breach of contract actions. ... Therefore, as acknowledged by AHR Defendants, the Florida Statutes § 95.11(2)(b) and its five-year period applies to the claims for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.

Section 95.11(2)(c) imposes a five-year limitation period on mortgage-foreclosure claims, applied to each payment default separately.

Kaan v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. · filed 2013-11-05(2)(c)

While any claims relating to individual payment defaults that are now more than five years old may be subject to the statute of limitations, each payment default that is less than five years old, i.e., since October, 2008, created a basis for a subsequent foreclosure and/or acceleration action.

Section 95.11 imposes a five-year limitations period on mortgage-foreclosure claims; defaults within the last five years can support separate foreclosure or acceleration actions, and the limitations period does not extinguish the mortgage lien or debt.

Rodriguez v. Bank of America, N.A. · filed 2014-09-30(2)(b)-(c)

In Florida, the statute of limitation to bring an action to foreclose real property is five years. ... “While any claims relating to individual payment defaults that are now more than five years old may be subject to the statute of limitations, each payment default that is less than five years old” creates “a basis for a subsequent foreclosure and/or acceleration action.” ... The five-year limitations period provided in § 95.11(2)(b)-(c) “does not affect the life of the lien or extinguish the debt; it merely precludes an action to collect the debt after five years.”

Section 95.11(2)(b) and (c) impose a five-year limitation period on actions founded on written instruments and mortgage foreclosures, but the period does not continue to run after dismissal of a foreclosure action that accelerated the debt.

Manyoma v. Bank of New York · filed 2018-01-26(2)(b), (c)

Applying Bartram to the facts of this case, we conclude that the statute of limitations did not continue to run after the state court dismissed BONY’s foreclosure action because the dismissal in effect revoked the bank’s declaration that the mortgage had been accelerated. That is, the parties were placed back in the same contractual relationship as before with the residential mortgage as an installment loan. We thus cannot say that the statute of limitations bars BONY from enforcing the mortgage or from foreclosing on the property based on a separate and distinct default.

For a mortgage, the five-year foreclosure limitations period stops when dismissal revokes acceleration and starts again upon a later acceleration or when the loan reaches maturity.

The Bank of New York Mellon as Trustee for Nationstar Home Equity Trust 2007-A v. Pederson · filed 2017-08-25(2)(b)–(c)

Florida's statute of limitations for mortgages states that an action to foreclose on a mortgage must be commenced within five years of the date on which the cause of action accrues. ... Similarly, the statutes of limitations and repose did not bar suit because the revocation of acceleration by the previous dismissal halted the statute of limitations until there was another acceleration or the loan reached maturity.

Section 95.11’s four-year limitations periods begin when the applicable breach and resulting damages occur; delayed discovery does not apply to breach-of-fiduciary-duty claims, but fraudulent concealment may toll the period.

American Home Assurance Co. v. Weaver Aggregate Transport, Inc. · filed 2013-12-26(3)(o), (3)(a), (3)(p)

Claims for breach of fiduciary duty in Florida are subject to a four-year statute of limitations, which begins to run after the breach and resulting damages have occurred. ... In the present case, the actual damage Weaver suffered clearly occurred in 2005 and 2006, when it made the allegedly excessive payments to Beacon for worker’s compensation insurance premiums, and when Beacon purportedly provided false information to American Home. ... The doctrine of fraudulent concealment will operate to toll the statute of limitations “when it can be shown that fraud has been perpetrated on the injured party suffieient to place him in ignorance of his right to a cause of action or to prevent him from discovering his injury.”

Section 95.11(3) bars personal-injury and related loss-of-consortium claims filed more than four years after the cause of action accrues, with accrual when the injured party or a reasonable person should know the acts caused damage.

Elkins V. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. · filed 2014-11-04(3)

For personal .injury claims similar to those underlying Mr. Elkins’ claims, Florida’s statute of limitations bars claims filed more than four years after the cause of action began to accrue. ... “A cause of action accrues under Florida law the moment the injured party or a reasonable person in the injured party’s situation knew or should have known that the acts complained of caused damage.” ... These accrual principles apply to loss of consortium claims.

Section 95.11(3) generally sets a four-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions.

Alvarez v. U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement · filed 2016-03-24(3)

Florida courts generally apply a four-year statute of limitations to personal injury actions. Fla. Stat. § 95.11(3).

Section 95.11(4)(b) generally requires medical-malpractice actions to be filed within two years of the incident or its discovery and imposes a four-year repose period, subject to a fraud-based extension capped at seven years.

Byrnes v. Small · filed 2014-11-18(4)(b)

This action, which was brought in June 2014, therefore does not, as Byrnes asserts, fall within two years of the date of the incident or occurrence out of which the cause of action accrued. This action also clearly was not brought within the maximum four-year limit from the date of the incident or occurrence. ... Accordingly, because December 2013 is more than seven years after October 2006, the claims against Dr. Small and MIC are time-barred even if there were fraud or concealment.

Section 95.11(4)(a) provides a two-year limitations period for lawyer-malpractice claims.

Hastings v. Wilbur Smith Law Firm · filed 2020-01-09(4)(a)

Florida has a two-year statute of limitations for lawyer malpractice. Fla. Stat. § 95.11(4)(a). Because this case was not filed until July 2018, the claim would be time barred.

Under § 95.11(4)(a) and (4)(b), the discovery date can control when the limitations period begins, and unresolved allegations about when the plaintiff discovered the malpractice create a factual issue that defeats dismissal at the pleading stage.

Bustetter v. Armor Correctional Health Services, Inc. · filed 2013-01-23(4)(a), (4)(b)

The flaw in Diamond’s argument, however, is that assuming that § 95.11(4)(a) provides the applicable limitations period, ... the two-year limitations period does not begin to run until the cause of action is discovered or should have been discovered with the exercise of due diligence. ... Therefore, based on the allegations in the amended complaint, it is not clear whether the limitations period set forth in § 95.11(4)(a) expired prior to the filing of this lawsuit. Accordingly, the Court rejects Diamond’s argument that dismissal is warranted based on the limitations period.

Section 95.11(3)(j) gives fraud actions a four-year statute of limitations.

Muhammad v. CitiMortgage, Inc. · filed 2015-01-15(3)(j)

Under Florida law, the statute of limitations for fraud actions is four years. Fla. Stat. § 95.11(3)(j).

Section 95.11(3)(o) provides a four-year limitations period for false-arrest claims in Florida.

Harris v. Goderick · filed 2015-04-22(3)(o)

In Florida, where Harris brought this action, the applicable period for false arrest claims is four years. Fla. Stat. § 95.11(3)(o).

In Florida, the residual personal-injury limitations period applicable to a section 1983 claim is four years.

Barcelona v. Detective Lisa K. Fogelgren · filed 2016-11-29(3)(p)

Section 1983 claims are governed by the forum state’s residual personal injury statute of limitations, which in Florida is four years. ... Thus, “[p]laintiffs must bring a section 1983 claim arising in Florida within four years of the alleged unlawful [conduct].”

Section 95.11(3)(f) provides a four-year limitations period for FDUTPA claims, and the same period applies to declaratory-relief claims based on FDUTPA rights.

Padilla v. Porsche Cars N. Am., Inc. · filed 2019-05-21(3)(f)

Thus, the limitations period for a declaratory relief claim premised on rights protected by FDUTPA is also four years under Florida Statute Section 95.11(3)(f).

Section 95.11(3)(o) supplies a four-year limitations period for the applicable § 1983 false-arrest claims in Florida.

OU v. Melnikov · filed 2021-06-10(3)(o)

Although § 1983 is a federal cause of action, the court looks to the law of the State in which the action arose for the applicable statute of limitations. ... In Florida, the statute is four years. Fla. Stat. § 95.11(3)(o). Accrual of a cause of action, however, is governed by federal law. ... But Defendants incorrectly mark the accrual of the cause of action from the date of the arrest. ... Taking the allegations of the First Amended Complaint as true and drawing all reasonable inferences in Plaintiff’s favor, the Court cannot conclude as a matter of law that the statute of limitations has run on the false arrest/prosecution claims (Counts I, II, and II).

Section 95.11 imposes a five-year limitations period on breach-of-contract claims and a four-year limitations period on fraud claims.

Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. v. Drew Mortgage Associates, Inc. · filed 2017-04-21(2)(b), (3)(j)

Under Florida law, breach of contract claims must be brought within five years of the alleged breach. Fla. Stat. § 95.11 (2) (b). ... Accordingly, Count I of the third-party complaint will be dismissed. ... The statute of limitations for fraud claims under Florida law is four years. Fla. Stat. § 95.11(3)(j). ... Because Drew filed its third-party complaint four months later, in April, 2016, the fraud claim is well within the four-year limitations period.

Section 95.11(3)(j) imposes a four-year limitations period on fraud actions, with accrual tied to when the fraud was discovered or should have been discovered through due diligence.

Kresch v. Miller · filed 2019-07-29(3)(j)

Under Florida law, an action for fraud generally must be brought within four years. Fla. Stat. § 95.11(3)(j). This period of time begins to run “from the time the facts giving rise to the cause of action were discovered or should have been discovered with the exercise of due diligence.” Id. § 95.031(2); see also First Fed. Savings & Loan Ass’n of Wisconsin v. Dade Fed. Savings & Loan Ass’n, 403 So.2d 1097, 1100 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981). Until the plaintiff discovers or should have discovered that the defendant’s representations were false, the limitations period does not start to run.

Section 95.11(2)(b)–(c) gives mortgage-foreclosure claims a five-year limitations period measured from accrual, and a later missed installment may trigger a new period.

Gomez v. Household Finance Corporation, III · filed 2017-05-12(2)(b)–(c)

Florida’s statute of limitations states that an action to foreclose a mortgage must be commenced within five years of the date on which the cause of action accrues. Fla. Stat. § 95.11(2)(b)–(c), § 95.031(1). ... The Florida Supreme Court rejected Bartram’s argument. First, it held that “a subsequent and separate alleged default create[s] a new and independent right in the mortgagee to accelerate payment on the note in a subsequent foreclosure action,” thus causing a new limitations period to begin to run from the date of each new default. ... Given the near-identical postures of this case and Bartram, we conclude that Gomez’s complaint fails to state a claim for the declaratory relief sought because it fails to allege that Gomez’s Note and Mortgage are not enforceable as to payment defaults that occurred subsequent to Household’s initial foreclosure filing.

Section 95.11(2)(b) sets a five-year statute of limitations for breach of warranty claims.

Seaberg v. Atlas Roofing Corp. · filed 2017-06-09(2)(b)

Under Florida law, the statute of limitations for breach of warranty claims is five years.

Section 95.11(2)(b) gives breach-of-express-warranty claims a five-year limitations period, while section 95.11(3)(f) gives FDUTPA claims a four-year period accruing at purchase or lease rather than discovery of the defect.

Lessin v. Ford Motor Company · filed 2020-11-06(2)(b), (3)(f)

Florida provides a five-year statute of limitations for breach of express warranty claims. See Fla. Stat. § 95.11(2)(b); Speier–Roche v. Volkswagen Group of America, Inc., No. 14–20107, 2014 WL 1745050, *1 (S.D. Fla. April 30, 2014). Plaintiff Jensen’s claim was not filed until twelve years after Plaintiff Jensen presented her Vehicle to Ford in 2007 and was aware that Ford could not remedy the issues. Therefore, Plaintiff Jensen’s express warranty claim must be DISMISSED WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND as time-barred. ... Third, a Florida Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act (“FDUTPA”) claim is to be brought within four years, and accrues “at the time of purchase or lease of a product, not upon discovery of an alleged defect.” Fla. Stat. § 95.11(3)(f). While Plaintiff Jensen does not provide the date of when she purchased her 2005 Model Year, it is likely she purchased it no later than August 2007, the date of when she presented the car for the first repair. (FAC ¶¶ 62, 66.) However, she did not file suit until September 2019—at least twelve years after her purchase. Her claim is therefore time-barred as well. Accordingly, the Alaska, Connecticut, and Florida consumer protection claims are DISMISSED WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND.

Section 95.11 sets the statute of limitations for various causes of action and does not itself prohibit conduct or create a private right of action.

Owens-Benniefield v. Nationstar Mortgage LLC · filed 2017-06-15

Nationstar argues Owens-Benniefield has not plausibly alleged it owed her any duty. (Doc. #23 at 11-12). Nationstar is correct that section 95.11,, Fla. Stat., does not establish that it owed Owens-Bennie-field a duty. That statute sets the statute of limitations for various causes of action. Fla. Stat. § 95.11. It does not prohibit any conduct or create any private right of action. Thus, to the extent her claim relies on section 95.11, the negligence claim is dismissed with prejudice.

Under the four-year limitations period in section 95.11(3), a creeping-disease claim accrues when the disease's effects manifest in a way that supplies some evidence of a causal relationship to the product, and constructive knowledge can trigger accrual even without a medical diagnosis.

Hecht v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company · filed 2017-09-25(3)

At trial, a dispositive issue was whether Hecht’s lawsuit was filed within the applicable four-year statute of limitations. See Fla. Stat. § 95.11(3). ... We see no material difference between Hecht’s case and Jewett, and we conclude that the instruction given represented a correct statement of Florida law. ... The jury instruction correctly advised that a diagnosis of COPD was not needed to begin the limitations clock. ... To assist the jury in determining whether Hecht “knew, or by the exercise of reasonable care should have known” before May 5, 1990, that he had COPD that was caused by smoking cigarettes, the district court instructed the jury that “having the means to obtain knowledge is ordinarily equivalent in law to knowledge.” ... This language was proper.

The five-year limitations period for a mortgage foreclosure is not triggered by a lender’s notice of intent to foreclose or a dismissed foreclosure action unless the lender obtains a foreclosure judgment in its favor.

Espinoza v. Countrywide Home Loans Servicing, LP · filed 2017-09-26(2)(b),(c)

Applying Bartram to the facts of this case, neither Countrywide’s notice of intent to foreclose nor its prior foreclosure action that was dismissed without prejudice triggered the statute of limitations, as neither resulted in a foreclosure judgment in Countrywide’s favor. Id.

When a mortgage with an optional acceleration clause is accelerated, the full debt, including installments that came due more than five years earlier, is treated as due upon acceleration, so the five-year limitations period begins then.

Green v. Specialized Loan Servicing LLC · filed 2019-03-11(2)(c)

Accordingly, the debt payment sought by SLS in the Foreclosure Complaint was not time-barred as a matter of law. In compliance with the mortgage and note, based on a July 1, 2010 default by Green, SLS accelerated the debt on June 30, 2015, and the entire outstanding amount of the loan “came due” on that date. It was only then that the statute of limitations period began to run for the full accelerated amount due.

Section 95.11(2)(b) gives breach-of-contract claims a five-year limitations period, while section 95.11(3)(j) gives fraud claims a four-year limitations period.

Mortgage Resolution Servicing, LLC v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. · filed 2019-09-27(2)(b), (3)(j)

In Florida, where MRS is incorporated and has its principal place of business, breach of contract claims must be filed within five years, and fraud actions must be filed within four years of accrual. Fla. Stat. §§ 95.11(2)(b), 95.11(3)(j). Thus, C.P.L.R. § 202 requires application of the shorter Florida limitations periods to MRS’s fraud and breach of contract claims.

Section 95.11(3)(o) provides a four-year limitations period for the federal and Florida claims at issue when no more specific period applies.

Harris v. Wingo · filed 2019-11-05(3)(o)

The statute of limitations for a federal false arrest claim is governed by Florida’s four-year statute of limitations. Boyd v. Warden, Holman Corr. Facility, 856 F.3d 853, 872 (11th Cir. 2017); Fla. Stat. § 95.11(3)(o). ... Count VIII also includes an excessive force claim under § 1983, and Count XI asserts a claim for assault and battery under Florida law. These claims are both subject to Florida’s four-year statute of limitations. Boyd, 856 F.3d at 872; Scullock v. Gee, 161 So. 3d 421, 422 (Fla. 2d DCA 2014); Fla. Stat. § 95.11(3)(o). ... Count IX asserts a claim for malicious prosecution under § 1983 and Count X asserts a malicious prosecution claim under Florida law. Both malicious prosecution claims are governed by Florida’s four-year statute of limitations. Uboh v. Reno, 141 F.3d 1000, 1002 (11th Cir. 1998); Olson v. Johnson, 961 So. 2d 356, 359 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007); Fla. Stat. § 95.11(3)(o). ... Because Counts VIII, IX, X, and XI in the Amended Complaint relate back to the original Complaint, and since the original Complaint was filed within the applicable four-year statute of limitations, the Court finds Counts VIII, IX, X, and XI are timely.

Section 95.11(3)(k) gives four years to sue on an oral contract, so a breach of a June 2016 agreement fell within the limitations period.

ZSR Patlayici Sanayi A.S. v. Sarac Distributors LLC · filed 2020-03-05(3)(k)

As ZSR asserts, the contract at issue in the Complaint was the agreement struck in June 2016—within the four-year limitations period. See Fla. Stat. § 95.11(3)(k). So any breach of that agreement necessarily fell within the statute of limitations. And the Court denies the Motion as it relates to this issue.

Section 95.11(3)(j) provides a four-year statute of limitations for a fraud claim in Florida.

Doye L. Heard v. Publix Supermarkets Inc. · filed 2020-04-06(3)(j)

Regarding Heard’s state law fraud claims, the statute of limitations for a fraud claim in Florida is four years, Fla. Stat. § 95.11(3)(j) (2019), and the limitations period begins to run when the “facts giving rise to the cause of action were discovered or should have been discovered with the exercise of due diligence.” Fla. Stat. § 95.031(2)(a) (2019).

Section 95.11 provides a five-year limitations period for breach-of-contract claims and a four-year limitations period for unjust-enrichment claims.

Employers Insurance Company of Wassau v. Redlands Christian Migrant Association, Inc. · filed 2020-04-14

The statute of limitations for breach of contract is five years. Fla. Stat. §95.11. ... The statute of limitations for a claim for unjust enrichment is four years. Fla. Stat. § 95.11. It is apparent on the face of the Complaint that, absent the allegation of additional facts or incidents, the cause of action for unjust enrichment would be barred by the statute of limitations.

Section 95.11(3)(p) provides a four-year limitations period for a Florida § 1983 claim, running from the allegedly unconstitutional or otherwise illegal act.

Mathis v. Vizcarrondo · filed 2019-12-02(3)(p)

In Florida, “a plaintiff must commence a § 1983 claim . . . within four years of the allegedly unconstitutional or otherwise illegal act.” Id.; see also Fla. Stat. § 95.11(3)(p).

Section 95.11(3)(p) gives § 1983 claims arising in Florida a four-year limitations period.

Betts v. Hall · filed 2017-02-09(3)(p)

Claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 “are governed by the forum state’s residual personal injury statute of limitations, which in Florida is four years.” ... A plaintiff must therefore “bring a section 1983 claim arising in Florida within four years of the alleged unlawful [conduct].”

Section 95.11(3) provides a four-year limitations period for § 1983 actions arising in Florida.

Philippeaux v. United States Of America · filed 2020-06-02(3)

In § 1983 actions, federal courts borrow the statute of limitations from the most analogous state law. ... For cases arising in Florida, “the four-year statute of limitations under Fla. Stat. § 95.11(3) applies to § 1983.” ... Given Philippeaux’s nearly five-year delay, his claims are barred by Florida’s four-year statute of limitations.

Section 95.11(3) provides a four-year statute of limitations for fraud actions.

Zenteno v. Bank of America, N.A. · filed 2020-08-19(3)

Under Florida law, there is a four-year statute of limitations for fraud. Fla. Stat. § 95.11(3). Traditionally, a cause of action accrues “when the last element constituting the cause of action occurs.” Id. § 95.031(1). “However, actions sounding in fraud do not accrue until ‘the facts giving rise to the cause of action were discovered or should have been discovered with the exercise of due diligence.’” Simony v. Fifth Third Mortg. Co., No. 2:14-CV-387-FTM-29DNF, 2014 WL 5420796, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Oct. 22, 2014) (quoting Fla. Stat. § 95.031(2)(a)). “Accordingly, fraud causes of action are barred four years after the plaintiff knew or should have known that the fraud occurred.” Id.

Section 95.11(4)(g) gives defamation claims a two-year statute of limitations.

Watkins v. Sergeant M. Bigwood · filed 2019-12-11(4)(g)

Plaintiff’s claims for defamation are subject to Florida’s two-year statute of limitations. See Fla. Stat. § 95.11(4)(g). ... The district court, thus, dismissed properly Plaintiff’s defamation claims as time-barred.

Section 95.11(10) permits a wrongful-death action against a natural person for an intentional tort resulting in death to be commenced at any time, while section 95.11(4)(b) provides a two-year period for medical-negligence wrongful-death claims subject to the discovery rule and a seven-year outer limit.

Groover v. Polk County Board of County Commissioners · filed 2020-05-08(10), (4)(b)

First, all of the wrongful death claims based on manslaughter brought against the Individual Defendants are not bound by any statute of limitations. “[A]n action for wrongful death . . . brought against a natural person for an intentional tort resulting in death [manslaughter] may be commenced at any time.” Fla. Stat. § 95.11(10). So these claims may proceed. For the other wrongful death claims there is a two-year statute of limitations. Fla. Stat. § 95.11(4)(b).2 But that limitations period begins either when the incident giving rise to the claim occurred or, in the case of “fraud, concealment, or intentional misrepresentation of fact prevented the discovery of the injury,” when the claim “is discovered or should have been discovered with the exercise of due diligence, but in no event to exceed 7 years from the date the incident giving rise to the injury occurred[.]” Id. ... At this point in the lawsuit Plaintiffs’ allegations must be accepted as true; therefore, the wrongful death and manslaughter Counts will not be dismissed for being outside the statute of limitations.

Section 95.11(4)(e) gives Chapter 517 securities claims a two-year discovery-based limitations period, subject to a five-year outer limit from the violation.

Friedman v. Hammer · filed 2020-05-20(4)(e)

The Florida Securities and Investor Protection Act carries these same limitations. See Fla. Stat. § 95.11(4)(e). Plaintiffs purchased their securities in 2017 and 2018, so Sugimoto must establish that the two-year bar applies to Plaintiffs’ claims to prevail on her argument. ... Because Sugimoto does not establish that Plaintiffs knew or should have known of the fraudulent acts and omissions alleged at the time they made their purchases, she has not demonstrated that the conditional statute of limitations period has run.

Section 95.11(3) sets a four-year statute of limitations for fraud claims.

Blanco v. Bank of America, N.A. · filed 2020-08-19(3)

Next, BOA argues that Mr. Blanco’s claim is barred under the statute of limitations. Dkt. 145 at 9. Under Florida law, there is a four-year statute of limitations for fraud. Fla. Stat. § 95.11(3). Traditionally, a cause of action accrues “when the last element constituting the cause of action occurs.” Id. § 95.031(1). “However, actions sounding in fraud do not accrue until ‘the facts giving rise to the cause of action were discovered or should have been discovered with the exercise of due diligence.’” Simony v. Fifth Third Mortg. Co., No. 2:14-CV-387-FTM-29DNF, 2014 WL 5420796, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Oct. 22, 2014) (quoting Fla. Stat. § 95.031(2)(a)). “Accordingly, fraud causes of action are barred four years after the plaintiff knew or should have known that the fraud occurred.” Id.

Section 95.11(3)(j) imposes a four-year limitations period on fraud claims.

Kresch v. Miller · filed 2021-01-26(3)(j)

A four-year limitations period is applicable to claims of fraud under Florida law. See Fla. Stat. § 95.11(3)(j). ... Where fraud is alleged, the action “accrues when ‘the facts giving rise to the cause of action were discovered or should have been discovered with the exercise of due diligence.’” Id. (quoting Fla. Stat. § 95.031(2)(a)). ... If Plaintiffs were not aware of the possible invasion of their legal rights as of September 2012, they certainly should have been when UCS defaulted on the loan on March 7, 2013, or when Plaintiffs learned in September 2013 that UCS had been dissolved. ... As Plaintiffs filed this lawsuit more than four years after even this last date, the misrepresentation claims are time-barred.

Section 95.11(2)(b) supplies a five-year limitations period for Florida breach-of-warranty claims, and section 95.11(3)(f) supplies a four-year period for Florida consumer-fraud claims, subject to potential tolling or estoppel based on concealment.

Bowes v. PACCAR Inc · filed 2020-06-11(2)(b) and (3)(f)

Florida law assigns a five-year statute of limitations to such claims. See Fla. Stat. § 95.11(2)(b). ... Washington, South Dakota, and Florida set four-year statutes of limitations to claims of consumer fraud while Illinois sets a three-year statute of limitations, all of which begin to run after a cause of action accrues. See Wash. Rev. Code. § 19.86.120; S.D. Codified Laws § 37-24-33; Fla. Stat. § 95.11(3)(f); Ill. Comp. Stat. § 505/10a(e). ... Thus, Plaintiffs have asserted that Defendants knowingly and actively misrepresented the nature of the Engines’ alleged defect well beyond the time Plaintiffs purchased the Vehicles. Such allegations establish a plausible claim that Plaintiffs were precluded from discovering the facts underlying their consumer fraud claims and that Plaintiffs’ claims did not begin to accrue until after their purchase of the Vehicles at issue. See Supermail Cargo, 68 F.3d at 1207; Reeves, 881 F.2d at 1501; Leonel & Noel Corp., 758 F. Supp. 2d at 604; S.D. Codified Laws § 37-24-33; Nardone, 333 So.2d at 39. Accordingly, Defendants’ motion to dismiss is DENIED on this ground.

Section 95.11(3) provides a four-year limitations period for fraud claims, applied with Florida’s rule delaying accrual until the fraud was or should have been discovered.

Cruz v. Bank of America, N.A. · filed 2020-08-19(3)

Under Florida law, there is a four-year statute of limitations for fraud. Fla. Stat. § 95.11(3). ... “Accordingly, fraud causes of action are barred four years after the plaintiff knew or should have known that the fraud occurred.” ... As such the statute of limitations for those inspections began when the fees were incurred by the Plaintiffs and they reasonably could have checked that they were being charged.

Section 95.11 imposes claim-specific limitations periods, including four years for fraud and certain torts, five years for breach of contract, and two years for defamation, with accrual rules applied to the claims addressed here.

De Rothschild v. Serlin · filed 2021-03-08(2)(b), (3)(a), (3)(j), (3)(o), and (4)(g)

In Florida, the limitations period is four years, Fla. Stat. § 95.11(3)(j), and begins to run “when the plaintiff knew or should have known of the defendant’s misrepresentations.” ... Under Florida law, assuming arguendo that Plaintiff did not discover, and should not have reasonably discovered, the alleged fraudulent activity until January 2014, the statute of limitations expired in January 2018. ... Accordingly, Plaintiff’s fraud claims are time-barred under both New York and Florida law. ... Because the Operating Agreement provides that it is governed by Florida law, Plaintiff’s breach of contract claim is subject to Florida’s five-year statute of limitations for breach of contract claims. See Fla. Stat. § 95.11(2)(b); Cmplt., Ex. B (Dkt. No. 1) at 69. ... Tortious interference and negligent infliction of emotional distress claims are subject to a three-year statute of limitations in New York and a four-year statute of limitations in Florida. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. §§ 214(4), 214(5); Fla. Stat. §§ 95.11(3)(a), 95.11(3)(o). ... Defamation claims are subject to a one-year statute of limitations in New York and a two-year statute of limitations in Florida. See N.Y. § C.P.L.R. 215(3); Fla. Stat. § 95.11(4)(g). In both states, defamation claims accrue when the alleged defamation occurs. See Norkin v. The Florida Bar, 311 F. Supp. 3d 1299, 1304 (S.D. Fla. 2018); Wilson v. Erra, 94 A.D.3d 756, 756 (2d Dept. 2012) (citing Gigante v. Arbucci, 34 A.D.3d 425, 426 (2d Dept. 2006); Teneriello v. Travelers Cos., 226 A.D.2d 1137, 1138 (4th Dept. 1996)).

Section 95.11(3)(o) provides a four-year limitations period for assault and false-imprisonment claims, running from the date of the shooting that caused the claims.

Banuchi v. City of Homestead · filed 2021-06-08(3)(o)

There appears to be no dispute that the statute of limitations for the assault and false imprisonment claims began to run in July 2015, when Foster was shot and killed. See Fla. Stat. § 95.11(3)(o). There is also no dispute that the limitations period then expired four years later, in 2019. Banuchi voluntarily dismissed the initial action on April 9, 2020, at which point, then, the new claims were already time barred.

Section 95.11(3)(o) requires an action for intentional infliction of emotional distress to be brought within four years.

Otero v. NewRez, LLC · filed 2024-01-29(3)(o)

An action for IIED must be brought within four years under Florida law. Fla. Stat. § 95.11(3)(o).

Section 95.11(3)(n) imposes a four-year limitations period on actions for assault and other intentional torts.

Johnson v. Jones · filed 2024-07-24(3)(n)

... Plaintiff is mistaken. “An action for assault, battery, false arrest, malicious prosecution, malicious interference, false imprisonment, or any other intentional tort” is subject to a four-year statute of limitation. Fla. Stat. § 95.11(3)(n).

Section 95.11(3)(o)–(p) provides a four-year limitations period for most intentional torts.

Toussaint v. U.S. Attorney's Office · filed 2025-08-06(3)(o)–(p)

Florida has a four-year statute of limitations for most intentional torts.

Section 95.11(4)(b) generally gives a medical-malpractice claimant two years from the incident or from when the incident was, or should have been, discovered with due diligence to bring the action.

Macauley v. Collier County Sheriff Office · filed 2021-10-25(4)(b)

The statute of limitations for medical malpractice is “2 years from the time the incident giving rise to the action occurred or within 2 years from the time the incident is discovered, or should have been discovered with the exercise of due diligence.” Fla. Stat. § 95.11(4)(b). ... Accordingly, the statute of limitations has now expired, and the Court need not grant leave to amend.

Section 95.11(4)(b) bars medical-malpractice actions filed more than four years after the incident, subject to an extension for fraud, concealment, or intentional misrepresentation that cannot exceed seven years.

Jones v. United States · filed 2022-09-09(4)(b)

Pursuant to this statute, no action for medical malpractice may be commenced “later than 4 years from the date of the incident or occurrence out of which the cause of action accrued[.]” Fla. Stat. § 95.11(4)(b). However, where fraud, concealment, or intentional misrepresentation of fact prevented discovery of the injury, the statutory period of repose may be extended but that period cannot “exceed 7 years from the date the incident giving rise to the injury occurred[.]” Id.

Section 95.11(4)(c) imposes a four-year outer deadline for medical-malpractice actions, extended to seven years when fraud, concealment, or intentional misrepresentation prevented discovery of the injury.

Nurquez v. United States · filed 2024-06-13(4)(c)

Medical-malpractice claims in Florida are subject to a statute of repose, now codified at Fla. Stat. § 95.11(4)(c). Kush v. Lloyd, 616 So. 2d 415, 418 (Fla. 1992). This provision states that “in no event shall the action [for medical malpractice] be commenced later than 4 years from the date of the incident or occurrence out of which the cause of action accrued.” Fla. Stat. § 95.11(4)(c). If a plaintiff can show that “fraud, concealment, or intentional misrepresentation of fact prevented the discovery of the injury,” the deadline is extended to “7 years from the date the incident giving rise to the injury occurred.” Id.

Before the 2023 amendment, section 95.11(3)(a) supplied a four-year statute of limitations for the medical-device tort claim at issue.

Horne · filed 2026-03-30(3)(a)

Texas applies a two-year statute of limitations in medical device tort cases such as this one, whereas Florida courts apply a four-year statute of limitations. See Shepherd v. Danek Med., 1999 WL 1129705, at *1 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 13, 1999); Compare Tex. Code Civ. Prac. & Remedies, § 16.003, with Fla. Stat. § 95.11(3)(a) (before amendment).

Subsection (6) does not apply retroactively to an earlier malpractice act absent a definite filing period, and its term “medical” includes osteopathic medicine.

DeLuca v. Mathews · filed 1974-07-26(6)

There is reasonable doubt concerning the legislative intention to provide retroactive effect to the newly added statute of limitations, § 95.11(6), and the benefit of this doubt should here be given to the appellant-plaintiff, whose cause of action was dismissed. ... We hold that the word "medical" as used in F.S. 95.11(6), connotes the healing art of medicine and includes the practice of osteopathy and osteopathic medicine.

Section 95.11(6) applies to this medical malpractice claim and runs from discovery of the injury, while Section 95.11(4) does not apply retroactively to claims arising before its effective date.

Brooks v. Cerrato · filed 1978-01-24(4), (6)

We hold that the applicable statute is Section 95.11(6), Florida Statutes (1973), and find that there are genuine issues of fact which preclude summary judgment. ... Therefore, in the absence of any express, clear or manifest legislative intent to apply Section 95.11(4) retroactively, we conclude that it does not apply to causes of action occurring prior to its effective date. We hold that the applicable statute of limitations in this case is Section 95.11(6), Florida Statutes (1973). ... We conclude that genuine issues of fact exist as to when the statute of limitations started to run and that summary judgment should not have been entered.

Section 95.11(4)(b) gives tort or contract medical malpractice actions a two year statute of limitations.

Enfield v. Held · filed 1978-04-21(4)(b)

Section 95.11(4)(b), Florida Statutes (1975) provides a two year statute of limitations for actions in tort or contract for alleged medical malpractice.

A medical malpractice action is barred if it is not brought within two years after the negligent incident is discovered or should have been discovered through reasonable care.

MacMurray v. Board of Regents · filed 1978-09-07(4)(b)

The only question before the trial court and the question here considered is whether or not the complaint of Diane S. MacMurray was barred by the applicable Statute of Limitations, Section 95.11(4)(b). If her action was not brought within two years after she discovered or through the use of reasonable care should have discovered the incident (negligent interpretation of x-rays) which is the subject matter of the litigation, she cannot prevail.

Section 95.11(4)(b) bars a medical malpractice action when the plaintiff knew of the claimed damage more than two years before filing.

Robinson v. Sparer · filed 1978-12-19(4)(b)

The *439summary final judgment was entered on the basis of a holding that the evidentiary matters before the court upon the motion demonstrated without genuine issue of material fact that the cause of action was barred by the statute of limitations. The record demonstrates without conflict that the plaintiff was aware of, and claimed damage because of, treatment and consultation with another physician more than two years prior to the filing of the complaint. The judgment is affirmed upon the basis of Steiner v. Ciba-Geigy Corporation, 364 So.2d 47 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978); Buck v. Mouradian, 100 So.2d 70 (Fla. 3d DCA 1958); and Section 95.11(4)(b), Florida Statutes (1977).

The former subsection 95.11(6) applied a two-year limitations period to injuries arising from medical treatment.

Gonzales v. Jacksonville General Hospital, Inc. · filed 1978-12-22(6)

The act of administering the shot by the nurse, we hold, was a medical act. Accordingly, F.S. 95.11(6), Florida Statutes 1973, was applicable to appellees as well as the hospital.

For medical malpractice actions, the two-year limitations period runs from when the cause of action was discovered or should have been discovered with due diligence, and the defendant must prove the action was filed later.

Glass v. Camara · filed 1979-03-20(4)(b)

We hold that a defendant invoking the two-year limitation period prescribed by Section 95.11(4)(b) for medical malpractice actions must demonstrate that the action was commenced beyond two years after "the time the cause of action [was] discovered or should have been discovered with the exercise of due diligence." Section 95.11(4)(a).

For a medical malpractice claim, the limitations period is tolled when the physician fails to disclose known facts about the nature or cause of the patient's condition.

Tetstone v. Adams · filed 1979-06-13(6)

Mrs. Tetstone was not on notice as to either the negligent act or the injury caused thereby where she had no actual knowledge of either fact because the physician, Dr. Adams, failed to reveal to her facts [as distinguished from mere possibilities or conjecture] known to him relating to the nature and/or cause of her adverse physical condition. ... The statute of limitations is tolled upon the happening of this event.

The medical malpractice limitations period turns on when the patient discovered, or with due diligence should have discovered, the incident giving rise to the cause of action.

Tobin v. Dannheisser · filed 1979-06-22(4)(b)

However, we agree with appellant's contention that a genuine issue of material fact existed which precluded entry of summary judgment with respect to when appellant discovered or, with the exercise of due diligence, should have discovered the incident giving rise to the cause of action.

Section 95.11(4)(b) requires medical malpractice actions to be filed within two years, subject to discovery and outer-limit rules.

Garofalo v. Community Hospital of South Broward · filed 1980-03-05(4)(b)

Since, in accordance with Brooks v. Cerrato, supra, we find the saving clause (Section 95.022) not to express a clear or manifest legislative intent to apply Section 95.11(4), (Supp.1974), retroactively, the statute did not apply to plaintiff’s cause of action which accrued prior to its effective date.

Section 95.11(4)(a) gives professional malpractice actions a two-year limitation period running from when the cause of action was discovered or should have been discovered with due diligence.

Burnside v. McCrary · filed 1980-03-11(4)(a)

The established case and statutory law is that the statute of limitations with regard to attorney malpractice does not commence to run at the time the services are rendered by the attorney, but rather when the attorney's act of negligence becomes known or should have become known to the client. See Section 95.11(4), Florida Statutes (1977);[4]Edwards v. Ford, 279 So.2d 851 (Fla. 1973); Pinkerton v. West, 353 So.2d 102 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977).

Section 95.11(6) starts the two-year medical malpractice limitation period when the plaintiff discovers, or should have discovered through reasonable care, the malpractice.

Johnson v. Szymanski · filed 1979-02-09(6)

Plaintiff's argument is refuted by the express language of § 95.11(6), which says that a cause of action shall not "be deemed to have accrued" until the plaintiff discovers, or should have discovered, the act of malpractice. ... We agree with the Stoner majority that the date upon which the defendant's malpractice is discovered (or should have been discovered) by the plaintiff is the point at which the statute of limitations attaches. ... In the instant case the two-year limitation period of § 95.11(6) was in effect when the plaintiff should reasonably have discovered the defendant's malpractice (October 1973); therefore, we think that statute was controlling.

Section 95.11(4)(b)'s two-year limit applies only to claims arising from medical, dental or surgical diagnosis, treatment or care by a health care provider; ordinary negligence falls under the four-year limit in subsection (3)(a).

Durden v. Am. Hosp. Supply Corp. · filed 1979-09-18(4)(b)

Construing Section 95.11(4)(b) in its plain and ordinary sense, it is apparent that more than just the fact that a party defendant is a health care provider is required to bring a cause of action within this two-year statute of limitations. In addition, the claim for damages must arise as a result of medical, dental or surgical diagnosis, treatment or care on the part of the health care provider. ... Durden's third amended complaint is grounded upon allegations of ordinary negligence and, therefore, the four-year statute of limitations, Section 95.11(3)(a), Florida Statutes (1977), is applicable.

For medical malpractice claims, the two-year limitations period runs from when the incident was discovered or should have been discovered with due diligence.

Wimpey v. Sanchez · filed 1980-07-22(4)(b)

In order for the defendants, invoking Section 95.11(4)(b), Florida Statutes (1977), to be entitled to dismissal of the plaintiffs' action, they were required to conclusively show from the complaint that the cause of action was discovered or should have been discovered with the exercise of due diligence before September 5, 1974. Glass v. Camara, 369 So.2d 625 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979). It is clear that no such showing has been made. That being the case, a dismissal of the Wimpeys' complaint on the ground that the applicable statute of limitations had run was precluded.

Section 95.11(4)(a)'s two-year malpractice limitations period begins when the plaintiff discovers, or with due diligence should discover, an injury caused by the alleged malpractice.

Johnson v. Mullee · filed 1980-06-06(4)(a)

The subsequent statute which was in effect at the time the bone scan revealed injury, provides that the period of limitation shall run from the time the cause of action is discovered or should have been discovered with the exercise of due diligence. Here, since no injury was discovered until the bone scan and since there is no evidence that injury should have been discovered by decedent prior thereto with the exercise of due diligence, the cause of action likewise was not discovered until that time.

Under § 95.11(4)(b), when a patient discovered or should have discovered a medical malpractice incident can be a fact question if the physician continued to assure the patient that the resulting condition was temporary.

Swagel v. Goldman · filed 1981-02-03(4)(b)

Under these circumstances, a genuine issue, precluding summary judgment, was presented as to whether the plaintiff discovered or should have discovered the incident which caused his injury — that is, the now-alleged surgical malpractice — prior to the later date, which was within the statutory period, that the defendant finally informed him that the incontinence was permanent.

Section 95.11(6) gave the plaintiffs two years to bring a medical malpractice action after they were on notice of the alleged negligence or injury.

MOORE BY AND THROUGH MOORE v. Morris · filed 1983-01-04(6)

With these admissions in the record, as a matter of law they were on notice from the time of the birth of the alleged negligence or of injury to the infant and therefore, the trial judge was correct in granting a summary judgment based on the statute of limitations. ... The applicable statute of limitation is Sec. 95.11(6) Florida Statutes (1973) and the applicable time to commence the action was within 2 years of the infant's birth.

Section 95.11(4)(b) sets a two-year limit for medical malpractice actions, but the four-year limit in section 768.28(11) applies to tort actions against state agencies.

Whitney v. Marion County Hosp. Dist. · filed 1982-07-07(4)(b)

The statute of limitations for a medical malpractice action under section 95.11(4)(b), Florida Statutes (1977), is two years from the date the incident occurred or was discovered, but no more than four years from the date of the incident. However, Chapter 95 also specifically provides that where a different statute of limitations is provided elsewhere in dhe statutes, that different statute of limitations will apply. § 95.011, Florida Statutes (1977). On its face, therefore, because the Hospital is admittedly a State agency, chapter 95 unambiguously requires application of the limitation period provided in § 768.28(11) for tort actions against the state.

Section 95.11(4)(b)'s extension for fraud, concealment, or intentional misrepresentation applies only when the injury is discovered more than four years after it occurred.

Carlton v. Ridings · filed 1982-12-01(4)(b)

According to the plain language of the statute, however, this last sentence is applicable only in cases where the injury is not discovered within four years of the date of injury.

Section 95.11(4)(b) does not require a medical malpractice plaintiff to plead when the alleged malpractice was discovered or discoverable.

Estate of James v. Martin Memorial Hosp. · filed 1982-12-01(4)(b)

The complaint in this case did not, and we now hold it need not, contain an allegation that the alleged medical malpractice was discovered or discoverable at a particular time. Thus the complaint was not vulnerable to a motion to dismiss based upon the statute of limitations.

Section 95.11(4)(b) requires a medical malpractice plaintiff to prove that the action was commenced within two years of the incident or its discovery through due diligence.

Alford v. Summerlin · filed 1982-12-14(4)(b)

Yet, even though we consider that we are bound by our former opinion, it was incumbent, under the accrual provisions of Section 95.11(4)(b), Florida Statutes (1975), for appellant to prove that his action was "commenced within two years from the time the incident occurred giving rise to the action, or within two years from the time the accident is discovered, or should have been discovered with the exercise of due diligence... ."

Section 95.11(4)(b)’s four-year limit on medical malpractice actions is constitutional as applied when the claimant has a reasonable time to sue after discovering the alleged malpractice; the court upheld its application where five months remained.

CATES EX REL. CATES v. Graham · filed 1983-02-22(4)(b)

The Court finds that when applied to the facts in this case, F.S. 95.11(4)(b) is constitutional and that Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment should be and is hereby granted. ... We affirm upon the Supreme Court reasoning contained in Bauld v. J.A. Jones Construction Company, 357 So.2d 401 (Fla. 1978). ... In performing that function the court may determine, under the facts of the case, whether or not the party was afforded a reasonable time in which to act before being barred under the applicable statute.

Section 95.11(4)(b) applies when a person sued over medical care is in privity with the health care provider, even if that person is not in privity with the claimant.

Burr v. Florida Patient's Compensation Fund · filed 1984-03-02(4)(b)

It is clear to us that section 95.11(4)(b) applies when there is privity not only between the claimant and the health care provider, but also when anyone connected with the incident against whom the claimant alleges damages is in a privity relationship with the health care provider.

Section 95.11(4)(b) is constitutional as applied when a medical malpractice injury is discovered with five to six months remaining to file suit.

Cates v. Graham · filed 1984-05-31(4)(b)

The real question is whether a five- to six-month period remaining after the discovery of any injury is so short that to enforce the terms of the statute would result in a denial of access to the courts and hence make subsection 95.11(4)(b) unconstitutional as applied. ... Admittedly, this is a short period; however, we cannot say that Cates was denied access to the courts by the time constraints. Therefore, the statute is constitutional as applied.

Section 95.11(4)(b)'s two-year medical malpractice period begins when a patient learns that an earlier diagnosis missed cancer; later discovery of the disease's full consequences does not delay it.

Wilhelm v. Traynor · filed 1983-07-21(4)(b)

If he were negligent in failing to recognize and advise Wilhelm of the existence of cancer, this omission was known at the latest when Dr. Sawyer informed Wilhelm of the existence of cancer in March, 1979. From that date Wilhelm had two years to institute suit, which he failed to do. ... The fact that the full extent of Wilhelm's disease and its ultimate consequences were not known at that time, in our opinion, did not postpone the commencement of the nonclaim period.

Section 95.11(4)(b)’s two-year limitations period applies to the Florida Patient’s Compensation Fund because the Fund is in privity with the health care provider.

Taddiken v. FLA. PATIENT'S COMP. FUND · filed 1984-05-08(4)(b)

Thus, we hold that the Florida Patient's Compensation Fund is in privity with the health care provider so that the two-year statute of limitations provision is applicable.

The two-year period for a medical malpractice claim begins when the misdiagnosis is actually discovered, even if the plaintiff recognizes only later that it was negligent.

Lipshaw v. Pinosky, Pinosky, P.A. · filed 1983-11-08(4)(b)

As to the medical malpractice survival claim, we have no trouble in affirming the dismissal of same as being time barred by the applicable two-year statute of limitations for medical malpractice actions. § 95.11(4)(b), Fla.Stat. (1979). Plainly, this action accrued when — as the plaintiffs allege in their third amended complaint, their proffered fourth amended complaint, and *994their affidavits filed in support of the motion for rehearing — the medical misdiagnosis sued upon was actually discovered by the plaintiffs on February 25, 1977. On that date, the plaintiffs, by their own admission, were fully aware that the defendants herein had completely misdiagnosed and had rendered inappropriate medical treatment to their son — the acts now sued upon in the third amended complaint. The assertion that the plaintiffs, as claimed, did not realize until much later that these known acts of misdiagnosis and mistreatment were acts of negligence is plainly of no avail to the plaintiffs, as they were long ago on actual notice as to the acts of negligence now sued upon.

Section 95.11(4)(b) extends the medical malpractice limitations period for fraud, concealment, or intentional misrepresentation only when it prevents discovery of the injury within four years.

Cobb v. Maldonado · filed 1984-01-25(4)(b)

In this case, the discovery having been made within the four-year period, appellant failed to overcome the hurdle we have emphasized in the foregoing statute which plainly contemplates successful fraud, concealment or intentional misrepresentation; i.e., prevention of discovery of the injury within the four-year period.

Section 95.11(4)(b)’s seven-year period for fraud or concealment applies only when the injury was not discovered within four years of its infliction.

PISUT BY PISUT v. Sichelman · filed 1984-09-12(4)(b)

By the terms of the statute, this last sentence applies only in cases where the injury is not discovered within four years of its infliction. ... There is no dispute that appellants discovered the injury within the four-year period, rendering the seven-year limitations period inapplicable in this case.

Section 95.11(4)(b)’s seven-year period for fraud or concealment applies only when the injury was not discovered within four years of its infliction.

Pisut ex rel. Pisut v. Sichelman · filed 1984-09-12(4)(b)

By the terms of the statute, this last sentence applies only in cases where the injury is not discovered within four years of its infliction.

Section 95.11(4)(b) extends the medical malpractice limitations period when fraud, concealment, or intentional misrepresentation hides either the negligent incident or the resulting injury.

Phillips v. Mease Hosp. and Clinic · filed 1984-02-10(4)(b)

Reading the statute as a whole therefore requires, in our opinion, that both "incident" (or act) and "injury" must be known and that fraud, concealment or intentional misrepresentation of fact that conceals either will extend the limitations period as provided in section 95.11(4)(b).

Section 95.11(4)(b) bars a medical malpractice claim against the Florida Patient's Compensation Fund when the Fund is joined after the two-year limitations period; later discovery of its coverage does not start a new period.

Fabal v. FLORIDA KEYS MEMORIAL HOSP. · filed 1984-05-29(4)(b)

Appellants contend (1) that the trial court erred in failing to recognize that a claim against a non-tortfeasor insurance fund whose liability is solely derived from the negligent conduct of the tortfeasor is not barred by section 95.11(4)(b), Florida Statutes, and (2) the trial court erred in failing to recognize that section 95.11(4)(b) begins to run only upon discovery that the Florida Patient's Compensation Fund extended coverage to Florida Keys Memorial Hospital. We disagree and affirm in light of the views expressed in Taddiken v. Florida Patient's Compensation Fund, 449 So.2d 956 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984); Burr v. Florida Patient's Compensation Fund, 447 So.2d 349 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984); and Owens v. Florida Patient's Compensation Fund, 428 So.2d 708 (Fla. 1st DCA), pet. for review denied, 436 So.2d 100 (Fla. 1983).

Section 95.11(4)(b)'s medical malpractice limitations defense is unavailable to the Florida Patient's Compensation Fund.

Florida Patient's Comp. Fund v. Tillman · filed 1984-07-13(4)(b)

We disagree that the statute of limitations defense is available to Florida Patient's Compensation Fund in the present case.

Section 95.11(4)(b)’s two-year medical malpractice period does not apply to the Fund when the health care provider is a state agency subject to a four-year period.

Florida Patient's Compensation Fund v. S.L.R. ex rel. Moore · filed 1984-10-11(4)(b)

It would be illogical to have different statutes of limitations applied to the Fund and to the health care provider, whether the Fund’s is shorter or longer. See Burr. Therefore, because the applicable statute of limitations for the health care provider in this case is four years, we hold that the same statute applies to the Fund.

Section 95.11(4)(b)’s medical malpractice limitation turns on discovery of the incident giving rise to the claim; knowledge of a separate, corrected surgical error does not establish discovery of that incident.

Sewell v. Flynn · filed 1984-11-01(4)(b)

The limitation established by section 95.11(4)(b) is predicated on the “incident giving rise,” to the cause of action. The alleged incident giving rise to the present cause of action was not the separate incident of the misplaced tendon, but was Dr. Flynn’s installing the prosthesis upside down. The deposition testimony is far from conclusive that plaintiff discovered or should have discovered that fact in 1978.

Section 95.11(4)(b) treats a dental hygienist cleaning teeth as a provider of health care.

Estes v. Rockinson · filed 1984-12-17(4)(b)

In affirming the judgment, we hold that a dental hygienist, when cleaning teeth, is a provider of health care within the meaning of section 95.11(4)(b), Florida Statutes (1983).

Section 95.11(4)(b)'s two-year medical malpractice limit applies to a patient injured while descending from an examination table under hospital employees' care.

Neilinger v. Baptist Hosp. of Miami, Inc. · filed 1984-12-18(4)(b)

First, we are convinced that the claim filed by the plaintiffs herein is an "action for malpractice" because it is "a claim in tort *566... for damages because of ... injury ... to [a] person arising out of ... medical ... care by [a] provider of health care," § 95.11(4)(b), Fla. Stat. (1979), thereby making the claim against the defendant Florida Patient's Compensation Fund time-barred by the two-year statute for medical malpractice claims.

Section 95.11(4)(b)'s four-year medical malpractice repose period cannot bar a claim if the cause of action could not reasonably have been discovered before the period expired.

Phelan v. Hanft · filed 1985-06-25(4)(b)

We hold that where the record does not conclusively show that the alleged *649 medical malpractice was or should have been discovered within four years of its commission, the plaintiff's action, although brought after the expiration of the four-year statute of repose, is not barred as a matter of law. ... This rule, although first arising in the context of products liability and construction defects cases and their attendant statutes of limitations and repose, is equally applicable to medical malpractice cases and Section 95.11(4)(b), Florida Statutes.

Section 95.11(4)'s medical malpractice limitations period does not begin when a patient knows of an injury but does not know it resulted from negligence.

Schafer v. Lehrer · filed 1985-10-16(4)

Knowledge of a physical injury alone, without the knowledge that the injury resulted from a negligent act, does not trigger the limitations period.

Section 95.11(4)(b) bars recovery from the Florida Patient's Compensation Fund when it is sued after the two-year medical malpractice limitations period expires.

FLORIDA PATIENT'S COMP. FUND v. Tillman · filed 1986-02-27(4)(b)

Finally, we reach the issue of whether section 95.11(4)(b) bars recovery from the Fund in medical malpractice actions brought against the Fund after the two-year statute of limitations period has expired. We held in Taddiken that it does, and we therefore quash the decision of the district court on this point.

Section 95.11(4)(b)’s four-year medical malpractice statute of repose does not apply to claims arising from incidents before its effective date absent clear legislative intent to make it retroactive.

Hellinger v. Fike · filed 1986-11-06(4)(b)

We find that the four-year absolute bar in section 95.11(4)(b), Florida Statutes (1983) is not applicable to the facts of this case. Statutes of repose like the one involved in this case are presumed not to be retroactive absent a clear expression of legislative intent to the contrary.

Section 95.11(4)(b) applies to medical malpractice survival actions and can bar them under its limitations period.

Wagshul v. Lipshaw · filed 1985-02-21(4)(b)

The decision of the district court of appeal, 442 So.2d 992, affirming the trial court's dismissal of the medical malpractice survival action as barred by the applicable statute of limitations, section 95.11(4)(b), Florida Statutes (1979), is approved.

Section 95.11(4)(d) bars recovery from the Florida Patients Compensation Fund in a medical malpractice action brought against the Fund after the two-year limitations period expires.

Fast v. Florida Patients Compensation Fund · filed 1986-07-17(4)(d)

Relying on its decision in Burr v. Florida Patients Compensation Fund, 447 So.2d 349 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984), in which it held section 95.11(4)(d), Florida Statutes (1981) bars recovery from the Florida Patients Compensation Fund in medical malpractice actions brought against the Fund after the two-year statute of limitations has expired, the district court below affirmed a summary judgment in favor of the Fund. The district court’s decision is in accordance with our recent decisions in *1263Tillman, and Taddiken v. Florida Patients Compensation Fund, 478 So.2d 1058 (Fla.1985); accordingly, the decision below is approved.

Section 95.11(4)(b)'s medical malpractice limitations period begins when the patient discovers or should have discovered the incident giving rise to the action.

Scherer v. Schultz · filed 1985-05-15(4)(b)

The limitations period commenced when appellant discovered or should have discovered the incident giving rise to the action. § 95.11(4)(b), Fla.Stat. (1979).

Section 95.11(4)(b)’s two-year medical malpractice limitations period applies to the Florida Patient’s Compensation Fund because it is in privity with its participating health care providers.

Taddiken v. FLORIDA PATIENT'S COMP. FUND · filed 1985-10-24(4)(b)

We approve the decisions of the district court and hold that the Fund is in privity with its participating health care providers and is subject to the same two-year statute of limitations period.

Section 95.11(4)(b)'s two-year limitations period applies to medical malpractice complaints against the Florida Patient's Compensation Fund.

Florida Patient's Compensation Fund v. Cohen · filed 1986-04-24(4)(b)

The district court below held, inter alia, that the two-year statute of limitations for medical malpractice claims, section 95.11(4)(b), Florida Statutes (1983), was not applicable to complaints against the Florida Patient's Compensation Fund. Respondent concedes this was error. We disapprove this portion of the decision below on the authority of Taddiken.

Section 95.11(4)(b) covers dental malpractice, and its fraud exception does not extend the filing deadline when the patient discovers the alleged malpractice within four years of the incident.

MacDonald v. McIver · filed 1987-11-06(4)(b)

Section 95.11(4)(b), Florida Statutes (1987), which provides that a complaint for medical malpractice must be filed within two years of the incident giving rise to that complaint, specifically includes complaints of dental malpractice. ... We agree with MacDonald that, because the alleged tort was discovered within four years of the last possible date which could have given rise to a cause of action, the fraud exception to the statute of limitations is not applicable.

Section 95.11(4)(b) leaves disputed questions about when a medical malpractice plaintiff had notice or discovered the injury to the jury.

Leyte-Vidal v. Murray · filed 1988-04-28(4)(b)

Where there is a factual question as to notice or discovery in a medical malpractice action, it is for the jury to decide when the statute of limitation commences.

The medical malpractice limitations period begins when the plaintiff has notice of the negligent act or the resulting injury; an emergency at birth alone does not establish that notice as a matter of law.

Moore v. Morris · filed 1985-06-27(6)

This Court has held that the statute of limitations in a medical malpractice case does not begin to run until either "the plaintiff has notice of the negligent act giving rise to the cause of action or when the plaintiff has notice of the physical injury which is the consequence of the negligent act." Nardone v. Reynolds, 333 So.2d 25 (Fla. 1976). ... Serious medical circumstances arise daily in the practice of medicine and because they are so common in human experience, they cannot, without more, be deemed to impute notice of negligence or injury caused by negligence.

Section 95.11’s two-year medical malpractice limitations period begins when the plaintiff knows of the cause of action.

Abston v. Bryan · filed 1988-02-11

On appeal the plaintiffs first contend that the allegations on the face of the complaint (the pertinent consideration for motions to dismiss and for judgment on the pleadings) do not establish that the applicable statute of limitations began to run on January 24, 1984. We find this contention without merit in view of our reading of those allegations, which clearly show that the plaintiffs knew of their cause of action at the time of the second surgery.

Section 95.11(4)(b)’s two-year medical malpractice limitations period does not apply to the Florida Patient’s Compensation Fund.

Cohen v. Baxt · filed 1985-07-03(4)(b)

The issue in this appeal from a summary final judgment is the applicability of the two-year statute of limitations for medical malpractice claims (section 95.11(4)(b), Flor*1341ida Statutes (1983)) to a complaint against the Florida Patient’s Compensation Fund. The trial court found the statute applicable and held by implication that the allegations of the complaint established that the claim was time-barred. We reverse as to both conclusions.

Section 95.11(4)(b)’s two-year medical malpractice limitations period applies to claims against the Florida Patient’s Compensation Fund.

Florida Patient's Compensation Fund v. Isabella · filed 1985-10-24(4)(b)

The issue is whether the two-year statute of limitations of section 95.11(4)(b), Florida Statutes (1983), is applicable to the Florida Patient’s Compensation Fund. In Taddiken v. Florida Patient’s Compensation Fund, 478 So.2d 1058 (Fla.1985), released today, we held that the statute is applicable. Respondents in the present case did not amend their complaint to join the Fund until more than four and a half years after accrual of their claim for medical malpractice. On the authority of Taddiken we quash the decision below and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Section 95.11(4)(b)'s medical malpractice repose period withstands an access-to-courts challenge because the Legislature established an overriding public interest for it.

Carr v. Broward County · filed 1987-04-08(4)(b)

We here determine, subject to supreme court scrutiny in this or a later appropriate case, that the legislature has established an overriding public interest meeting the Kluger test as applied in Overland and that the statute was therefore validly applied to the Carr's causes of action by the trial court.

Section 95.11(4)(b)'s two-year medical malpractice limitations period cannot support summary judgment unless the defendant conclusively shows that the injury caused by malpractice should have been discovered more than two years before suit.

Williams v. Spiegel · filed 1987-09-15(4)(b)

The summary judgment for the Fund was grounded on the trial court's conclusion that the applicable two-year statute of limitations, § 95.11(4)(b), Fla. Stat. (1981), had run by September 27, 1985, the date upon which the Fund was sued.[1] Without belaboring the point, we reverse this judgment because we find that on the record before us, the defendant has not conclusively shown that the "incident," that is, an injury caused by medical malpractice, should have been discovered more than two years before suit was filed.

Section 95.11(4)(b) makes the date of discovery relevant to the limitations period for medical malpractice actions; a complaint that does not allege when the negligence was or should have been discovered cannot be dismissed as untimely on its face.

Commenos v. Family Practice Medical Group, Inc. · filed 1987-12-01(4)(b)

The critical dates for determining the statute of limitations period for medical malpractice actions are the date on which *38the negligent acts occurred and the date the acts were discovered or should have been discovered with the exercise of due diligence. Section 95.11(4)(b), Florida Statutes (1985). In the present case, the complaint alleges the treatment period but is silent as to the date on which the alleged negligent acts were discovered or should have been discovered. Without this latter information, the complaint was not vulnerable to a motion to dismiss based upon the statute of limitations.

Section 95.11 does not support dismissal of a medical malpractice complaint that alleges discovery of the injury within two years before filing and does not show a time bar on its face.

Malunney v. Pearlstein · filed 1989-02-08

Finally, we also do not find the complaint at issue in this appeal was susceptible to being dismissed on the basis that the Malunneys' claim is barred by the statute of limitations. Paragraph nine in the complaint alleged the permanent injury from Pearlstein's negligence was not discovered until 1986. That paragraph brings the matter within two years of the date of the filing of the complaint. Since the complaint did not show on its face that this action was barred by the statute of limitations, it is not subject to a motion to dismiss on that ground. See B.B.S. v. R.C.B., 252 So.2d 837 (Fla. 2d DCA 1971). The factual determination of whether this action is barred by the statute of limitations remains an issue in the case to be decided by the trial court.

Section 95.11(4)(b)'s medical malpractice statute of repose does not violate Florida's access-to-courts provision because it addresses an announced public necessity that no less stringent measure would resolve.

Carr v. Broward County · filed 1989-03-16(4)(b)

We agree with the district court that section 95.11(4)(b) was properly grounded on an announced public necessity and no less stringent measure would obviate the problems the legislature sought to address, and thus the statute does not violate the access-to-courts provision.

Section 95.11(4)(b)’s four-year repose period for dental malpractice runs from the incident of malpractice and bars a claim filed after that period.

Shields v. Buchholz · filed 1987-12-09(4)(b)

Since the incident of malpractice giving rise to appellants' claim occurred after the enactment of the Medical Malpractice Reform Act and appellants failed to file suit within four years of the incident of malpractice, we hold that the statute of repose barred their claim.

Section 95.11(4)(b)’s medical malpractice limitations period begins when the patient knows or should know that an injury was caused by negligent conduct.

FLA. PATIENT'S COMP. FUND v. Sitomer · filed 1988-05-18(4)(b)

While the plaintiff may not have actual knowledge of the negligence, if the plaintiff should have known that the injury was caused by tortious conduct, through constructive notice, then the limitations period begins to run.

Under § 95.11(4)(b), knowledge of an incident alone does not automatically start the medical malpractice limitations period without knowledge that negligence caused an injury.

Elliot v. Barrow · filed 1988-06-03(4)(b)

Therefore plaintiff's knowledge of the fall on July 2, without further knowledge that it was caused by negligence or that it actually resulted in injury, is insufficient to automatically trigger the statute of limitations.

Section 95.11(4)(b)’s two-year medical malpractice period bars a suit when the plaintiff could have learned the relevant facts with due diligence but files too late.

Jackson v. Georgopolous · filed 1989-10-04(4)(b)

In this case, the plaintiff, with due diligence, could have determined what the death certificate meant, either from use of a dictionary or from consultation with someone familiar with that type of terminology. The plaintiff failed to pursue timely any action she may have had and is now barred because she filed her lawsuit six months late.

The two-year medical malpractice limitations period begins when the plaintiff should have known of either the injury or the negligent act.

Barron v. Shapiro · filed 1990-06-14(4)(b)

We believe that the reasoning of Nardone continues to be applicable to the current statute. Thus, the limitation period commences when the plaintiff should have known either of the injury or the negligent act.

Section 95.11(4)(b)’s four-year statute of repose bars a medical malpractice claim filed after that period when alleged concealment did not prevent discovery of possible negligence within it.

Menendez v. PUBLIC HEALTH TRUST OF DADE CTY. · filed 1990-07-24(4)(b)

Under the circumstances, the trial court did not err in applying the statute of repose contained in section 95.11(4)(b) to bar plaintiffs' action.

Under § 95.11(4)(b), the incident that starts the medical malpractice repose period in a wrongful-birth claim is the child's live birth, when the parents first suffer injury.

Lloyd Ex Rel. Lloyd v. North Broward Hosp. Dist. · filed 1990-12-18(4)(b)

Until Mrs. Lloyd gave birth to a live baby, Brandon, the Lloyds had suffered no injury. The relevant moment for purposes of the statute was the date of the child's birth. The lawsuit was therefore timely.

Section 95.11(4)(b)'s medical malpractice repose period applies to incidents predating its effective date when the claimant had a reasonable time to file suit.

University of Miami v. Bogorff · filed 1991-01-18(4)(b)

We have previously held that a statute of repose could be applied to a triggering incident which occurred before the effective date of the statute, provided that the plaintiff had a reasonable time remaining to bring suit. ... Thus, they had a reasonable time to file their complaint, and, by not bringing suit before January 1976, the repose period bars their claim.

Section 95.11(4)(b)’s four-year medical malpractice statute of repose is tolled by service of a notice of intent to litigate.

Moore v. Winter Haven Hosp. · filed 1991-04-12(4)(b)

The "statute of repose" is subsumed in the general term "statute of limitations" of section 95.11(4) and is tolled by the service of the notice of intent to litigate.

Section 95.11(4)(b) requires a medical malpractice claimant to act within two years of discovering the incident or when due diligence should have revealed it.

Goodlet v. Steckler · filed 1991-08-07(4)(b)

We conclude that the notice to Dr. Steckler was untimely because the plaintiff had discovered the "incident" or, with due diligence, should have discovered that incident prior to August 10, 1987. § 95.11(4)(b), Fla. Stat. (1987).

When a medical misdiagnosis causes no apparent injury until symptoms manifest, the four-year repose period runs from the manifestation of symptoms rather than the misdiagnosis.

Nemeth v. Harriman · filed 1991-08-07(4)(b)

Consistent with Lloyd we conclude the terms “incident” and “occurrence” in section 95.11(4)(b) must, under the circumstances of this case, refer to the manifestation of Mr. Nemeth’s symptoms in apparently 1988 and not the 1980 misdiagnosis by defendants.

Under § 95.11(4)(b), conflicting evidence about when a medical-malpractice plaintiff learned of the claim can create a fact issue as to whether the action falls within the two-year limitations period.

Vellanti v. Maercks · filed 1991-12-03(4)(b)

Vellanti’s signing of the purported release may prove that she had actual knowledge of her cause of action. However, Vellanti also presented evidence possibly indicating that she did not know of her cause of action against her psychiatrist until later. Therefore, there is a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether the action was brought within the two year statute of limitations. See § 95.11(4)(b), Fla.Stat. *496(1985).

Under § 95.11(4)(b), a factual dispute about when a patient discovered alleged medical malpractice can prevent summary judgment on a limitations defense.

Martin v. Drylie · filed 1990-04-25(4)(b)

We first direct our attention to the statute of limitations issue raised by Dr. Drylie, and finding that the instant factual scenario is analogous to that presented in Swagel, we affirm the trial court's denial of Dr. Drylie's motion for summary judgment on this ground without further comment.

Before October 1, 1988, section 95.11(4)(b)’s four-year statute of repose did not apply to medical malpractice actions against state agencies.

Lewis v. North Broward Hospital District · filed 1991-02-20(4)(b)

We conclude that it was error for the trial court to hold appellants’ claim against appellee barred by the four-year statute of repose in section 95.11(4)(b) Florida Statues.

Section 95.11(4)(b) does not govern medical malpractice actions against governmental hospitals arising before October 1, 1988; section 768.28 supplies the applicable time limit.

Public Health Trust v. Menendez · filed 1991-08-15(4)(b)

We recede from Carr to the extent it suggests that section 95.11(4)(b) provides the applicable statute of limitation in medical malpractice actions brought against governmental hospitals before October 1, 1988. Clearly, the applicable statute for such actions is contained in section 768.28.

Section 95.11(4)(b)’s two-year medical malpractice limitations period applies to claims by blood donors and recipients against blood banks because blood banks provide medical treatment, diagnosis, or care.

Silva v. Southwest Florida Blood Bank, Inc. · filed 1991-04-26(4)(b)

The two-year medical malpractice statute of limitations defines an action for medical malpractice "as a claim in tort or in contract for damages because of the death, injury, or monetary loss to any person arising out of any medical, dental, or surgical diagnosis, treatment, or care by any provider of health care." § 95.11(4)(b). ... Thus, we hold that the donors and the recipients of blood from blood banks are rendered treatment, diagnosis, or care by those health care provider blood banks.

Section 95.11(4)(b)’s medical malpractice limitations period applies to a blood bank that renders medical treatment, diagnosis, or care to a patient.

Smith v. Southwest Florida Blood Bank, Inc. · filed 1991-04-26(4)(b)

We find that Southwest is a health care provider that rendered medical treatment, diagnosis, or care to the Smiths' child, and we adopt our explanation of this finding as set forth in Silva v. Southwest Fla. Blood Bank, Inc. In light of our finding that Southwest is a health care provider, we do not find it necessary to reach the issue of privity. We affirm the trial court's dismissal of the Smiths' complaint.

Section 95.11(4)(b)’s two-year medical malpractice limitations period can be tolled by fraudulent concealment of negligence even when the plaintiff files before the four-year repose period expires.

Larocca v. Humana of Florida, Inc. · filed 1991-06-14(4)(b)

It follows that a plaintiff who files after two years from the incident but prior to the expiration of the period of repose, may avail themselves of the tolling provisions where a defendant’s successful, fraudulent concealment of negligence can be shown.

Section 95.11(4)(b)’s medical malpractice limitations period begins when the plaintiff knows enough facts to prompt an investigation into a possible claim against a health care provider; knowledge of the injury alone is insufficient.

Harr v. HILLSBOROUGH COMMUNITY MH CTR. · filed 1991-12-27(4)(b)

To trigger the running of the statute, it is necessary that the plaintiff have knowledge of the minimum facts essential to give notice that a timely investigation should commence to discover additional facts needed to support an action against a health care provider.

Section 95.11(4)(b)'s two-year medical malpractice period does not apply when a blood bank merely supplies blood and does not diagnose, treat, or care for the recipient.

Silva v. Southwest Florida Blood Bank, Inc. · filed 1992-05-28(4)(b)

Accordingly, we conclude that the medical malpractice statute of limitations under section 95.11(4)(b), is inapplicable in this case because the allegations of negligence against Southwest do not "aris[e] out of any medical, dental, or surgical diagnosis, treatment, or care."