Fla. Stat. § 95.11

Section 95.11(1) allows twenty years to commence an action on a judgment.

Palm Coast Recovery Corp. v. Moore · filed 2007-07-03(1)

Under Florida law, an action on a judgment may be commenced within twenty years, Fla. Stat. § 95.11(1), rather than the ten year period provided for in North Carolina.

Section 95.11(2)(a) gives a judgment creditor five years from entry of judgment to seek enforcement against an alleged alter ego of the judgment debtor.

Mike Mitchell & Assocs. v. Reine · filed 2008-12-15(2)(a)

Applying § 95.11(2)(a), the statute of limitations ran on January 13, 2002, five years after the district court entered judgment against Omni-Miss. Bell filed his motion to enforce the judgment on November 5, 2002. Because Bell can point to no authority in disagreement with Turner Murphy, his attempt to impose liability on Appellees is barred by § 95.11(2)(a).

Section 95.11(1) gives a creditor twenty years to bring an action on a judgment domesticated under Florida’s Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act.

Desert Palace, Inc. v. Wiley · filed 2014-08-22(1)

Under section 95.11(1), Florida Statutes, the statute of limitations applicable to an action on a judgment in Florida is twenty years.1 ... We agree with the reasoning in these cases and hold that the twenty-year limitations’ period in this case would not have run until October 17, 2011, and Desert Palace timely filed its amended complaint on October 12, 2011.

Section 95.11(2)(a)’s five-year limit for an action on a foreign judgment does not apply to a judgment recorded and enforced under FEFJA.

Hess v. Patrick · filed 2015-04-01(2)(a)

But recording a foreign judgment and seeking to enforce it under FEFJA is not an action on a foreign judgment, and thus the five-year limitation period in section 95.11(2)(a) is inapplicable here.

Section 95.11(1)’s twenty-year limitation period applies to a foreign judgment domesticated under the Florida Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act and runs from the date of the original judgment.

Hess v. Patrick · filed 2015-05-20(1)

The practical result is that by domesticating the Arizona judgment under FEFJA, Florida's twenty-year statute of limitations applies and begins to run from the date of the Arizona judgment.

Section 95.11(1)’s 20-year period applies to actions on judgments or decrees of Florida courts of record, not to a § 1983 suit that is not such an action.

Lewis v. Regional Director for Broward County · filed 2013-06-05(1)

Lewis argues that the appropriate statute of limitations is Fla. Stat. § 95.11(1), which provides a 20-year statute of limitations for “[a]n action on a judgment or decree of a court of record in this state.” Because this case is not such an action, his argument fails.

Section 95.11(1) sets a twenty-year limit for an action on a judgment, and the limitations defense is waived unless pleaded.

Corzo Trucking Corp. v. West · filed 2011-06-01(1)

Although it appears that the *128920 year statute of limitations on an action on a judgment3 had run by 2006 when the case was filed, that defense “is waived unless pleaded.” ... West thus could not attempt to resurrect that defense in this current and separate action.

Section 95.11(3)(p)'s four-year limit for civil actions does not apply to administrative license revocation proceedings absent specific legislative authority.

Landes v. DEPT. OF PROFESSIONAL REG. · filed 1983-10-26(3)(p)

Appellants argued that the revocation proceedings were barred by the four year statute of limitations for civil actions pursuant to section 95.11(3)(p), Florida Statutes (1981), because the incidents which gave rise to the proceedings occurred some seven years previously. However, we agree with the First District that "In the absence of specific legislative authority, civil or criminal statutes of limitations are inapplicable to administrative license revocation proceedings." Donaldson v. Department of Health & Rehabilitative Services, 425 So.2d 145, 147 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983).

Section 95.11(3)(p) does not bar administrative disciplinary proceedings against physicians absent legislative intent to apply Chapter 95 to those proceedings.

Farzad v. DEPT. OF PROFESSIONAL REG. · filed 1983-12-30(3)(p)

We hold that this administrative disciplinary proceeding is not barred by Section 95.11(3)(p), Florida Statutes (1981).

Section 95.11(4)(e)’s two-year limitations period for Florida Securities Act violations does not apply to administrative proceedings.

Winkelman v. Department of Banking & Finance · filed 1988-10-11(4)(e)

We affirm the order of the Comptroller of the State of Florida and Head of the Department of Banking and Finance revoking the registration of Charles Wink-elman as an associated person under the Florida Securities and Investor Act upon holdings that (1) Section 95.11(4)(e), Florida Statutes (1987), the two-year limitations period which controls violations of the Florida Securities Act, is not applicable to these administrative proceedings, see Farzad v. Department of Professional Regulation, 443 So.2d 373 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983); Landes v. Department of Professional Regulation, 441 So.2d 686 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983); Donaldson v. State Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, 425 So.2d 145 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983); see generally Canney v. Board of Public Instruction, 278 So.2d 260 (Fla.1973); and (2) Winkelman’s conviction upon his plea of guilty to willfully assisting in the preparation of a false income tax return in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 7206(2) is the conviction of a crime which involves moral turpitude and as such adequately supports the revocation of his license.

Section 95.11(3)(j) bars an untimely claim for affirmative relief but allows it to be raised as a defense to reduce a mortgage balance.

Hilsenroth v. Kessler · filed 1984-03-26(3)(j)

Furthermore, as a claim for affirmative relief, Hilsenroth's counterclaim for compensatory damages would have been barred by the applicable statute of limitations. § 95.11(3)(j), Fla. Stat. (1981). Nonetheless, it is an established principle that even after an action for affirmative relief is barred by the statute of limitations, *150 it may be asserted by way of defense to a claim against him. Payne v. Nicholson, 100 Fla. 1459, 131 So. 324 (1930); Horace Mann Insurance Co. v. DeMirza, 312 So.2d 501 (Fla. 3d DCA 1975). Thus, we conclude that Hilsenroth is not precluded from raising these issues as affirmative defenses in reduction of the aggregate unpaid balance on the mortgages.

Section 95.11(3)(l)'s time bar prevents affirmative recovery on an untimely claim but permits recoupment as a defense up to the amount sought by the opposing party.

Allie v. Ionata · filed 1985-02-07(3)(l)

We agree with Judge Smith's dissent in Cherney that nothing in the Florida Statutes or the rules creates an affirmative right of recovery, whether pleaded by recoupment or set-off, once it is barred by the statute of limitations. Accordingly, we hold that while Ionata is not entitled to the affirmative relief of rescission and restitution granted by the trial court, he is entitled to assert his defense of recoupment against Allie in regard to the amounts claimed.

Section 95.11(3)(i) sets a four-year limit for recovering specific personal property when law enforcement did not seize it as evidence or pursuant to a lawful investigation.

Adams v. State · filed 2019-05-10(3)(i)

Section 95.11(3)(i), under which Adams moved, governs actions to recover specific personal property and imposes a four-year statute of limitations for such actions. ... Section 95.11(3)(i) applies where law enforcement did not seize the property as evidence or pursuant to a lawful investigation, such as where a defendant's property is held for safekeeping upon arrest.

Section 95.11(3)(i) sets a four-year limitations period for recovery of specific personal property.

Auto Electric, Inc. v. Helton · filed 1984-06-15(3)(i)

The statute of limitations for recovery of specific personal property is four years. § 95.11(3)(i), Fla.Stat.(1981).

Section 95.11(3)(i) provides a four-year limitations period for replevin actions.

Crutchley v. Brevard County Sheriff's Office · filed 1997-01-24(3)(i)

The sheriff responded that the replevin action was barred by the four year statute of limitation in section 95.11(3)(i), Florida Statutes. We affirm. ... In the instant case, because the record shows that ownership of the property seized pursuant to the warrant vested in the sheriffs department at least by April 1989, and because Cratchley did not file the replevin action until 1993, Crutchley has demonstrated no error in the judgment in favor of the sheriff.

Section 95.11(3) sets a four-year limitations period for actions to recover personal property.

Poux v. State · filed 2008-07-09(3)

We can discern no reason not to apply section 95.11(3), Florida Statutes, mandating a four year civil statute of limitations for actions to recover personal property.

Section 95.11(3)(i) gives a person four years after a criminal prosecution concludes to bring an action for return of property seized in that prosecution.

Parker v. State Department of Corrections · filed 2011-03-16(3)(i)

Further, the statute of limitations for bringing an action for return of *319property expired long ago in 1998, four years after the prosecution in which the property was seized concluded.

Section 95.11(3)(h) sets a four-year limitations period for an action to recover specific personal property, including a motion for return of seized property.

Gaitor v. the State of Florida · filed 2025-02-12(3)(h)

There appears to be little doubt, even by Gaitor himself, that he sought relief outside the four-year statute of limitations. See § 95.11(3)(h), Fla. Stat. (setting forth four-year limitation on an action seeking “to recover specific personal property”).

Section 95.11 provides a four-year limitations period for claims against sureties on common law construction bonds.

Florida Keys Comm. Coll. v. Ins. Co. of North Am. · filed 1984-09-25

Finding that the bonds in question were common law bonds which were not subject to the one year limitation, we hold that the claims against the sureties were filed within the four year limitation period applicable to common law bonds. § 95.11, Fla. Stat. (1977).

Section 95.11(2)(b) sets a five-year limitations period for suits on common law performance bonds.

National Fire Ins. Co. v. LJ Clark Const. Co., Inc. · filed 1991-04-03(2)(b)

It is well established that a suit on a common law performance bond is subject to the five year limitation period in section 95.11(2)(b), Florida Statutes (1990 Supp.).

Section 95.11(2)(b) provides a five-year limitations period for an action on a common law performance bond. A claim filed within five years of discovering a latent defect was timely where the bond and contract assumed liability for such defects when discovered.

Ins. Co. of No. Amer. v. Metro. Dade Co. · filed 1997-10-29(2)(b)

Therefore, as provided in section 95.11(2)(b) Florida Statutes (1995) the proper limitations period for bringing this action was five years. However, because the bond by its terms tracked the language of the construction contract and because that contract assumed liability for latent defects, as discovered, the limitations period did not bar the instant claim, brought in 1996 on a defect discovered in 1992.

Section 95.11(2)(b) provides a five-year limitation period for an action on a common law performance bond.

Centex-Rooney Const. Co., Inc. v. Martin County · filed 1997-12-31(2)(b)

Therefore, we agree with the trial court's findings that the bond was a common law bond, and that the County's action was timely filed within the five year limitation period in section 95.11(2)(b), Florida Statutes (1995).

Section 95.11(2)(b) gives an action on a performance bond five years from acceptance of the construction project; discovery of latent defects does not defer accrual.

Federal Ins. v. SOUTHWEST FLORIDA · filed 1998-02-12(2)(b)

As to the statute of limitations for latent defects, we agree with the stipulation of the parties and with the district court that the applicable statute of limitations is the five-year period provided in section 95.11(2)(b), Florida Statutes (1981). However, we do not agree with the district court's majority that the five-year period would begin to accrue at a time other than acceptance of the construction. ... As the Fifth District pointed out, section 95.11(2)(b), Florida Statutes (1981), makes no reference to a discovery rule for latent defects.

Section 95.11 governs the limitations period for claims on a public construction bond that violates mandatory notice provisions.

American Home Assurance Co. v. APAC-FLA., INC. · filed 2003-01-10

If a bond violates the mandatory notice provisions, it is governed by the longer statute of limitations in section 95.11, Florida Statutes (1995).

Section 95.11(2)(b)'s five-year limitations period for a performance bond claim begins when construction is accepted as complete, even if the bond includes indemnity obligations.

CLARK CONST. GROUP, INC. v. Wentworth Plastering of Boca Raton, Inc. · filed 2003-03-05(2)(b)

Even if we accept Clark's contention that, here, the language of the bond and the subcontract impose separate and distinct indemnity obligations, this does not alter the fact that Clark's claim against Wausau is still one for breach of a performance bond. Insofar as the running of the statute of limitations is concerned, we see little material distinction between the warranty obligation arising out of the performance bond in Federal *360 Insurance and the "indemnity" obligation involved here. Consequently, like the trial court, we find that the case is governed by Federal Insurance and, thus, affirm.

For a performance bond covering subcontracted work, the five-year limitations period accrues when the subcontractor finishes work that the contractor accepts and pays for in full.

BDI Const. Co. v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co. · filed 2008-10-15(2)(b)

We hold that in the context of a subcontract, where a contractor accepted the work of the subcontractor and paid in full for that work, the action accrued when the subcontractor finished its work.

Section 95.11 governs the limitations period for claims against individual state employees when the state agency is immune from suit.

Cliffin v. State, Department of Health & Rehabilitative Services · filed 1984-10-11

Where, as here, the State agency is immune from suit for injuries or death of a State employee incurred in the course of employment, plaintiff may not claim the benefit of the four-year statute of limitations found in Section 768.28 as to parties remaining in the case. The causes of action against individual defendants must meet the requirements of Section 95.11.

Section 95.11(1) provides a twenty-year limitations period for an action to enforce a judgment.

Preudhomme v. Bailey · filed 2017-02-01(1)

Additionally, the statute of limitations for an action to enforce a judgment is twenty years, and, thus, it does not appear that Appellant is barred from seeking to collect on the judgments awarded in favor in the dissolution of marriage proceedings.

Section 95.11(1) gives a creditor twenty years to enforce a foreign judgment after it is recorded under the Florida Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act.

Patrick v. Hess · filed 2017-02-16(1)

Therefore, we hold that the twenty-year statute of limitations found in section 95.11(1) applies to the enforcement of a foreign judgment after it is recorded under FEFJA.

Section 95.11(1) gives a judgment a twenty-year life; execution proceedings on that judgment must cease when the period expires.

Marsh v. Patchett · filed 2001-06-13(1)

The life of the original judgment was twenty years. § 95.11(1), Fla. Stat. (Supp.1980). Upon expiration of that period, execution proceedings directed to that judgment must cease.

Section 95.11(1) requires execution on a judgment to cease 20 years after the judgment is rendered.

COMMERCEBANK, NA v. Taylor · filed 2007-09-19(1)

The trial court properly found that all execution directed at a judgment must cease at the expiration of 20 years from rendition of that judgment.

Section 95.11(1) provides twenty years to enforce a judgment, including through a paying co-debtor's subrogation claim against another co-debtor.

Jones v. Williams Steel Indus., Inc. · filed 1984-12-20(1)

North v. Albee, 155 Fla. 515, 20 So.2d 682, 157 A.L.R. 490 (1945), relied on by the trial judge, holds that where a judgment is against several co-debtors who are each jointly and severally and primarily liable thereon, the payment of the judgment by one co-debtor constitutes an equitable assignment of the judgment to the paying debtor; the paying debtor's cause of action against the other debtors for their proportionate share is, in effect, an enforcement of the assigned judgment and the applicable statute of limitations is not that applicable to the cause of action against the joint debtors that resulted in the judgment but the statute of limitations applicable to the enforcement of the judgment, which is twenty years under section 95.11(1), Florida Statutes.

Section 95.11(3)(a)'s four-year period does not require substitution of a deceased defendant's estate when the negligence action was timely commenced and a claim against the estate was timely filed.

Notar v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. · filed 1983-09-30(3)(a)

Dombrowsky's insurer, State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, contends that Notar should be precluded from bringing an action against its insured's estate because she took no action to substitute the estate as a party in her original suit until after section 95.11's four-year limitations' period had expired. Neither statute nor case law requires such substitution. Having timely commenced her action against Dombrowsky and having timely filed a claim against his estate, Notar was required to do nothing further to preserve her claim.

Section 95.11's four-year limit bars a suit on an old loan when the complaint pleads only the original loan, even if later repayment promises could support a separately pleaded claim.

Wassil v. Gilmour · filed 1985-03-12(3)(k)

On the undisturbed complaint which was before the court, the 1970 loan sued upon was barred by the statute of limitations.

Section 95.11(2) does not bar a URESA proceeding to enforce child support arrearages for minor children because the proceeding is equitable.

Wood v. Hunter · filed 1987-04-08(2)

Furthermore, URESA is an equitable proceeding and the statute of limitations is not applicable in such proceedings.

Section 95.11(6) does not bar claims for periodic alimony or child support based on delay alone, though laches may apply when supported by other facts.

Frazier v. Frazier · filed 1993-04-02(6)

Although section 95.11(6), Florida Statutes (1991), allows laches to bar any equitable action that is not commenced within the time provided for "legal actions concerning the same subject," the courts have not applied this statute to bar claims for periodic alimony or child support. Implicitly, the courts have decided that periodic alimony and child support do not have a legal counterpart for purposes of statutory laches.

Section 95.11(2)(a) does not bar enforcement of alimony arrearages under a divorce decree, even when the payments accrued more than five years before suit.

Popper v. Popper · filed 1992-02-07(2)(a)

However, with regard to Count I, the domestication of the Mexican decree of divorce and its enforcement as a Florida judgment, the statute of limitations is not applicable to the alimony arrearages which have accrued since 1972.[2] Florida courts take the position that enforcement of periodic alimony and child support orders are equitable proceedings in nature and such obligations are not barred by the running of the statute of limitations.

Section 95.11(3)(k)'s four-year limitation does not limit a minor child's claim for support from her unwed father.

Fowhand v. Piper · filed 1992-12-31(3)(k)

We decline to hold that the four year statute of limitations provided by section 95.11(3)(k), specifically addressing an action for the sale and delivery of goods, wares and merchandise, applies to limit the claim of a minor child for support from her unwed father.

Section 95.11(6) does not bar equitable claims for periodic alimony or child support because those obligations have no legal counterpart for statutory laches.

Brumby v. Brumby · filed 1994-12-21(6)

Furthermore, the courts have recognized that while section 95.11(6), Florida Statutes (1993), allows laches to bar any equitable action that is not commenced within the time provided for "legal actions concerning the same subject," the courts have not applied this statute to bar claims for periodic alimony or child support because, "the courts have decided that periodic alimony and child support do not have a legal counterpart for purposes of statutory laches." Frazier, 616 So.2d at 579 (citations omitted). ... Therefore, the former husband's arguments regarding the statute of limitations and statutory laches are not persuasive.

Section 95.11(4)(e) was improperly applied to dismiss an action for contribution.

Alex v. Sloan · filed 1987-04-15(4)(e)

We conclude that the trial court erred in applying said statute and remand with direction that the trial court consider whether appellees’ defense that they were protected from contribution by a contractual release has merit and rule thereon.

Section 95.11’s four-year limitations period for negligence actions does not govern a contribution claim arising from a settlement.

Carpenter v. Bachman Enterprises Inc. · filed 1995-06-28

Thus, the statute of limitations for a negligence claim is not at issue in this case; the applicable statute of limitations is the one-year time period provided in section 768.31 for contribution.

Section 95.11(3)(k) sets a four-year limitation period for an equitable contribution claim that arises by law rather than from a promise in a written guaranty.

Schrank v. Pearlman · filed 1996-10-23(3)(k)

We conclude, therefore, that the plaintiffs' cause of action for equitable contribution is governed by the four-year limitation period of paragraph 95.11(3)(k), Florida Statutes (1989).

Section 95.11(3)(f) bars a proceeding contesting denial of a reimbursement request if the relevant six-month reimbursement interval ended more than four years before the proceeding was requested.

Assoc. Coca Cola v. Spec. Disability Tr. · filed 1987-06-17(3)(f)

We therefore modify the order appealed to state that any proceeding to contest denial of a reimbursement request, based on benefits paid by the e/c during any six-month intervals designated in section 440.49(2)(g), that ended more than four years prior to the date the e/c requested the proceeding, is barred by section 95.11(3)(f), Florida Statutes.

Section 95.11(3)(f) bars a hearing request contesting denial of reimbursement for benefits paid in a six-month interval if the request is made more than four years after that interval ended.

Special Disability Trust Fund, Department of Labor & Employment Security v. Orange County Board of Commissioners · filed 1997-02-20(3)(f)

Accordingly, the court held that any request for hearing to contest denial of a reimbursement request, based on benefits paid by the employer during any six-month interval that ended more than four years prior to the date the employer requested the proceeding is barred by section 95.11(3)(f). This holding is fatal to Orange County’s reimbursement request for July 8, 1988.

Section 95.11(3)(f) provides a four-year limitations period for an employer or carrier’s petition for reimbursement or contribution.

City of Pembroke Pines v. Villasenor · filed 2005-01-05(3)(f)

The JCC applied the four-year statute of limitations found in section 95.11(3)(f), Florida Statutes. This, rather than the two years mentioned in section 440.19, Florida Statutes, is the correct limitations period because the wording of section 440.19(1) indicates that 'it applies to “employee petitions for benefits” and not to an employer/carrier’s petitions for reimbursement or contribution, and because League’s reliance on Skip’s Shoes and Western Boots v. Green, 578 So.2d 439 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991), is misplaced.

Section 95.11(3)(f)'s four-year period does not impose an additional deadline for proof supporting a timely filed, pending initial claim for reimbursement from the Special Disability Trust Fund.

Special Disability Trust Fund v. Rescare Home Health, Inc./Liberty Mutual Group · filed 2006-05-04(3)(f)

Proof of claim is nothing more than evidence required or requested in support of the initial claim for reimbursement filed by an e/c. We decline, as did the JCC, to adopt additional statutes of limitations for the first step in the reimbursement process.

Section 95.11(5)(d) does not apply to a first-party action filed against an insurer before it becomes insolvent.

Morrison v. Homewise Preferred Insurance Co. · filed 2017-02-10(5)(d)

We conclude that section 631.68 and section 95.11(5)(d) do not apply to first-party actions filed against the insurer prior to its insolvency.

Section 95.11(5)(d), read with section 631.68, imposes a one-year limit on claims against an insolvent insurer’s insured or the guaranty association, but bars recovery only to the extent of the covered claim.

Queen v. Clearwater Elec., Inc. · filed 1990-01-26(5)(d)

Therefore, the only rational construction which can be accorded those statutes when read together is that an action against the insured and/or[4] the association arising out of the coverage provided by the insolvent carrier is barred if not instituted within the one-year time. ... These statutes do not restrict Queen's claim for damages against the insureds beyond the $1,250,000 covered claim amount.

A defense under section 95.11(6) is waived if it is not pleaded.

Fisher v. Fisher · filed 1993-02-17(6)

After the mother rested her case, the father moved for a directed verdict on the basis that section 95.11(6), Florida Statutes (1989) required dismissal because the mother did not commence this action within five years of the date of the Indiana judgment. ... It was error for the trial court to direct the verdict based on statutory laches because the father waived that defense. The affirmative defense of laches or statute of limitations must be pleaded. Fla. R.Civ.P. 1.110(d). The father’s failure to plead statutory laches waived that defense. Fla.R.Civ.P. 1.140(h).

Section 95.11(9) allows an action related to sexual battery of a child under 16 to be brought at any time if the action was not already time barred on July 1, 2010.

Doe No. 3 v. Nur-Ul-Islam Academy, Inc. · filed 2017-03-22(9)

Because we have determined the cause of action did not begin to accrue until Doe’s parents knew or should have known of the abuse (or she reached age eighteen) and the statute of repose would not have extinguished the cause of action until 2011, her cause of action was still viable on July 1, 2010, when section 95.11(9) became effective.

Section 95.11(7) applies to intentional tort claims against perpetrators of abuse, while subsection (9) permits certain claims related to sexual battery of a child under 16 only if they were not time-barred on or before July 1, 2010.

W.D. v. Archdiocese of Miami, Inc. Archdiocese of Miami, a Corporation Sole Archbishop Wenski, etc. · filed 2016-06-01(7), (9)

Simply put, section 95.11(7) applies to intentional torts against perpetrators of abuse, not to the vicarious liability of the principal for the act of its agents. ... Section 95.11(9), therefore, provides that an action related to an act of sexual battery involving a victim under 16 has no statute of limitations as long as it is not time barred on or before July 1, 2010.

An extension of section 95.11’s filing period for abuse and incest claims cannot revive a cause of action already barred by the earlier limitations period.

Wiley v. Roof · filed 1994-06-23

The legislature may appropriately determine and modify the period of time for filing actions in abuse and incest cases. This does not mean, however, that it may revive a cause of action that has already been barred by the expiration of the pre-existing statute of limitations.

Section 95.11(7)'s discovery period does not revive childhood abuse claims already barred before its enactment.

Hearndon v. Graham · filed 1998-04-14(7)

Further, even though the Legislature has provided in section 95.11(7) that an action founded on alleged abuse may be commenced "within four years from the time of discovery by the injured party of both the injury and the causal relationship between the injury and the abuse," Wiley precludes the application of that statute here.

Section 95.11(7) does not extend the filing period when the plaintiff had notice of the abuse and injury more than four years before filing suit.

Tobin v. Damian · filed 2000-08-02(7)

Because appellant had notice of the abuse, incest, and injury more than four years before she filed suit, section 95.11(7), Florida Statutes, did not extend the limitations period.

Section 95.11(7)’s delayed discovery period applies only to intentional torts, and subsection (9) does not revive claims that would have been time barred on or before July 1, 2010.

Firestone v. Temple Beth Sholom · filed 2016-01-20(7), (9)

By the express language of the statute, however, this tolling is limited to “intentional torts,” and Ms. Firestone’s theory of liability is not that the Temple committed an intentional tort, but that the Temple is either vicariously liable or the Temple breached its fiduciary duty. ... Without reaching the issue of whether this provision covers the theories of liability relied upon by Ms. Firestone, we note that this provision does not apply to causes of action that accrued and would be time barred on or before July 1, 2010.

Section 95.11’s four-year limitation period does not bar a fiduciary’s action to recover a preferential transfer of estate assets when the action begins before the estate closes.

Bailey v. Capital Bank · filed 1994-06-01

I. Whether a four-year limitation period will time bar a fiduciary from recovering assets preferentially transferred to an estate creditor where the action to recover the assets is commenced prior to the estate being closed. We conclude it will not.

Section 95.11's four-year limitations period bars an inverse condemnation claim based on a taking that occurred more than four years before suit; continued opposition to the government action does not delay accrual.

City of Pompano Beach v. Yardarm Restaurant, Inc. · filed 1994-09-09

The statute of limitations issue in this case first requires consideration of when the City took any action that deprived Yardarm of substantially all use of its land. Assuming arguendo that the answer is something other than "never," it is at least clear that, on the date suit was filed, September 15, 1987, the statute of limitations had run as to any "taking" that occurred earlier than September 15, 1983. Any "taking" occurred when the permit was denied and Yardarm lost its right to develop, Vatalaro, 601 So.2d at 1229, and ended in 1981 when the permit was reissued.

Section 95.11(3)(p) provides a four-year limitations period for inverse condemnation actions.

Sarasota Welfare Home v. Sarasota · filed 1995-11-29(3)(p)

We affirm the trial court's ruling that the applicable statute of limitations for an inverse condemnation action is four years pursuant to section 95.11(3)(p), Florida Statutes (1991).

Section 95.11(4) can bar an inverse condemnation claim under the statute of limitations.

Poppell v. Board of Trustees of the Internal Improvement Trust Fund · filed 1999-09-28(4)

We affirm the ruling that the inverse condemnation claim is barred by the statute of limitations. See § 95.11(4), Fla. Stat. (1969); Sarasota Welfare Home, Inc. v. City of Sarasota, 666 So.2d 171 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995).

Section 95.11(3)(p) imposes a four-year limit on inverse condemnation claims, including stale challenges to a completed land dedication when third-party rights are unaffected.

New Testament Baptist Church v. DOT · filed 2008-10-22(3)(p)

It is not disputed that a four-year statute of limitations applies to inverse condemnation claims. ... We conclude that where the rights of third parties, such as in homestead, are not affected, a stale claim is limited by the statute.

Section 95.11(3)(p) gives an as-applied inverse condemnation claim four years from the government's final decision on the property's use.

Shands v. City of Marathon · filed 2008-12-31(3)(p)

As this is not a claim for a facial taking, but an as applied taking, it follows that the statute of limitations did not begin to run until February 27, 2007, when the City of Marathon rejected with finality the Special Master's BUD recommendation and denied the Shands' BUD application,[22] and thus the *727 Shands' state claim was timely filed within the four-year statute of limitations provided by section 95.11(3)(p), Florida Statutes (2007).

Section 95.11(3)(p) provides a four-year limitations period for inverse condemnation claims; for an as-applied claim under Monroe County’s Beneficial Use Determination ordinance, the period begins when the county renders its final decision.

Collins v. Monroe County · filed 2008-12-31(3)(p)

The Landowners' claims for inverse condemnation were ripe in 2002 when the BOCC rendered *718 its BUD Resolutions, and the cause of action was timely filed within the four-year statute of limitations.

Section 95.11(3)(p)’s four-year limitations period for an as-applied taking claim begins when the government makes its final beneficial use determination.

Beyer v. CITY OF MARATHON · filed 2010-06-09(3)(p)

The trial court eventually granted summary judgment against the Beyers, finding that they had exceeded the four-year statute of limitations imposed by section 95.11(3)(p), Florida Statutes. ... We find that the City’s adoption of the special master’s recommended BUD denial on September 27, 2005 effectively started the limitations period on the Bey-ers’ as-applied taking claim and, therefore, the inverse condemnation complaints against the City and the State of Florida were timely filed.

Section 95.11(3)(p)’s four-year limit on an inverse condemnation claim begins when flooding makes the property unusable and the extent of the taking is known; a later promise to repair the flooding does not delay it.

Judkins v. Walton County · filed 2013-07-15(3)(p)

When the flooding allegedly caused by Walton County’s improvements to Holiday Road invaded Jud-kins’ property in 2002, the property was no longer improvable and thus had been taken, regardless of whether the county promised to repair the problem. The statute of limitations began to run at that time, and had elapsed well before suit was filed in 2009.

Section 95.11(3)(p)’s four-year period for an inverse condemnation claim began when the challenged restriction took effect and became enforceable.

State v. Basford · filed 2013-07-24(3)(p)

The State first argues that the trial court erroneously ruled that Appellee’s inverse condemnation claim was not barred *482by the four-year statute of limitations provided for in section 95.11(3)(p). However, contrary to the State’s argument that any taking occurred in 2002 when the Amendment was passed or in 2003 when Appellee shut down his business, the government had no enforcement authority to prohibit the use of gestation crates prior to the Amendment’s effective date in 2008. We, therefore, agree with the trial court that Appellee’s inverse condemnation claim accrued in November 2008.

Section 95.11(3)(f) bars assessment of a public defender fee-and-cost lien when proper notice is filed more than five years after sentencing.

Platt v. State · filed 1994-12-16(3)(f)

Furthermore, since over five years had elapsed from the time of the appellant's sentencing until the proper notice was filed regarding the assessment of the lien, the statute of limitations had run pursuant to section 95.11(3)(f), Florida Statutes (1985).

Section 95.11(3)(k) requires an action on an open account to be filed within four years; a later cash transaction posted to the account does not defer the limitations period.

Hawkins v. Barnes · filed 1995-10-27(3)(k)

Section 95.11(3)(k), Florida Statutes (1987) provides that an action on an open account must be filed within four years and more than four years have elapsed since the last payment fell due on the account. ... The narrow issue of law for our determination is whether a cash transaction posted to an open account defers the starting date of the statute of limitations for an action on the account. We conclude that it does not.

Section 95.11(8) bars challenges to prisoner disciplinary proceedings filed more than thirty days after the proceedings.

Stephens v. Department of Corrections · filed 2022-09-28(8)

We affirm because none of the challenged proceedings occurred within thirty days of the date that Appellant filed his petition as required by section 95.11(8), Fla. Stat. (2020) (“Any action challenging prisoner disciplinary proceedings shall be barred by the court unless it is commenced within the time period provided by this section.”).

Section 95.11(8) bars an action challenging prisoner disciplinary proceedings if it is commenced more than thirty days after final disposition of those proceedings.

Hagins v. Mark S. Inch, Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections · filed 2021-09-22(8)

July 15, 2020, the presumptive filing date of Hagins’s complaint challenging his disciplinary proceedings, is more than thirty days after the final denial of his administrative appeal on June 12, 2020. The trial court correctly dismissed the complaint as time barred. See § 95.11(8), Fla. Stat. (2020) (barring action “challenging prisoner disciplinary proceedings” that is commenced more than thirty days “after final disposition” on those proceedings); see also Jackson v. Dep’t of Corr., 303 So. 3d 1014 (Fla. 1st DCA 2020).

A disputed factual issue about receipt of a grievance response requires an evidentiary hearing before a mandamus petition is dismissed as untimely under section 95.11(8).

Stephens v. Florida Department of Corrections · filed 2019-10-01(8)

He claims that the filing of his petition was timely under section 95.11(8), Florida Statutes, and that the trial court erred in dismissing his action without holding an evidentiary hearing on the issue of whether Stephens received the response to his grievance appeal (it appears to have been sent to the incorrect facility). Because a disputed issue of fact exists, the dismissal of Stephens’ petition is erroneous, see Owens v. Crews, 131 So. 3d 799 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013), and we remand for an evidentiary hearing.

Section 95.11(8)’s thirty-day limit for challenging prisoner disciplinary proceedings does not violate the separation of powers doctrine.

Kalway v. Singletary · filed 1998-02-26(8)

This interplay between rule 1.630 and section 95.11(8) is not anomalous and does not constitute a separation of powers violation.

Section 95.11(8)’s 30-day limit does not apply to a prisoner’s challenge to placement in close management rather than to a disciplinary proceeding.

Norris v. Florida Department of Corrections · filed 1998-12-21(8)

Before this court, the department’s appellate counsel moves to relinquish jurisdiction to the trial court to consider the merits of Norris’ petition, properly conceding that section 95.11(8) is not applicable since Norris challenged his placement in close management, rather than a disciplinary proceeding. We elect to treat the department’s motion to relinquish jurisdiction as a confession of error, and in accordance therewith we quash the order denying Norris’ petition on statute of limitations grounds, and remand for further proceedings.

Section 95.11(8)'s thirty-day deadline for challenging prisoner disciplinary proceedings was constitutionally permissible, but the Court's adoption of a matching rule did not give the Legislature control over filing times for extraordinary writs.

Allen v. Butterworth · filed 2000-04-14(8)

Thus, it is clear that the Court agreed with the time limitations in section 95.11 and therefore adopted a rule of procedure that was consistent with those deadlines. It is important to note that, unlike the DPRA, which poses equal protection and due process problems, there were no constitutional infirmities with the thirty-day deadline at issue in Kalway. However, we clarify our holding in Kalway in order to make it clear that this Court did not cede to the Legislature the power to control the time in which extraordinary writ actions must be commenced.

Section 95.11(8)'s 30-day filing period for a mandamus petition following the Department of Corrections’ grievance process is satisfied when a prisoner gives the petition to prison officials for mailing within that period.

Doss v. Florida Department of Corrections · filed 2000-06-12(8)

The circuit court denied relief because it found the petition for writ of mandamus was untimely under section 95.11(8), Florida Statutes, and Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.100(c)(4), which require the petition to be filed within 30 days of conclusion of the Department of Corrections’ administrative grievance process. However, the documents provided to this court in the appendix and Doss’s sworn statement reveal that the Secretary’s response was mailed to Doss on March 9, 1998, and the mandamus petition was given to prison officials for mailing on April 6, 1998. As *700Doss was entitled to benefit of the “mailbox rule” in accordance with Haag v. State, 591 So.2d 614 (Fla.1992), we cannot agree with the circuit court’s conclusion that the mandamus petition was untimely.

Section 95.11(8) makes the thirty-day deadline to challenge a Department of Corrections order jurisdictional.

Gundlah v. Moore · filed 2002-12-04(8)

We find no error in the circuit court's denial of the petition for writ of mandamus as untimely. A claimant's failure to challenge an order of the Department of Corrections within thirty days of its rendition produces a jurisdictional defect and precludes the court from exercising jurisdiction. See § 95.11(8), Fla. Stat. (2000); Fla. R.App. P. 9.100(c).

Section 95.11(8)'s thirty-day period for challenging a prison disciplinary order runs from rendition of the order.

Savery v. State · filed 2004-10-01(8)

Here, D.O.C. concedes that the Secretary’s March 24, 2004 order, which refused to consider Savery’s administrative appeal, was not rendered as defined by the rule until March 29, 2004. As a result, Sav-ery’s petition for writ of mandamus, filed in the circuit court on April 27, 2004, was timely. See § 95.11(8), Fla. Stat. (2004); Fla. RApp. P. 9.100(c)(4).

Section 95.11(8) sets the time for commencing the mandamus proceeding at issue.

Hill v. McDonough · filed 2006-12-01(8)

We reverse the first order because, as the appellee concedes, the mandamus proceeding was commenced within the time prescribed by section 95.11(8), Florida Statutes.

A prisoner's mandamus petition is timely under section 95.11(8) when given to prison officials for mailing before the limitation period expires.

Thompson v. McDonough · filed 2007-10-24(8)

Appellant seeks review of an order of the circuit court which dismissed his mandamus petition as having been filed outside the time limitation for such claims provided for by section 95.11(8), Florida Statutes. ... This court is satisfied that the petition was timely filed and accordingly, we REVERSE and RE*972MAND to the circuit court for further proceedings on the merits of the petition.

Section 95.11(5)(f)'s one-year limit for a prisoner's mandamus petition challenging a DOC decision begins when the administrative grievance process is exhausted.

Canete v. Florida Dept. of Corrections · filed 2007-10-26(5)(f)

In short, Canete's claim for mandamus relief did not become ripe for judicial review until the administrative grievance process was exhausted, and because he invoked the circuit court's jurisdiction well within one year of that date, his claim was not barred by section 95.11(5)(f).

Section 95.11(5)(f) gives a prisoner one year after exhausting administrative remedies to seek an extraordinary writ challenging a gain-time determination; subsection (8)’s thirty-day period applies to prison disciplinary proceedings.

Head v. McNeil · filed 2008-02-28(5)(f)

Appellant did not argue against a disciplinary proceeding or his conviction. Therefore, the thirty-day time period set forth in section 95.11(8) is inapplicable, and section 95.11(5)(f), which sets forth a one-year time period, is the provision governing Appellant's petition.

Section 95.11(8)’s thirty-day period for challenging a prison disciplinary action runs from the final response to the grievance appeal raising the ground presented in the petition; a separate grievance does not start the period for that ground.

Roberts v. McNeil · filed 2009-08-21(8)

The petition for writ of mandamus, to the extent it challenged the denial of grievance 07-0837 on the ground that the chairman of the disciplinary team which heard the DR was improperly allowed to respond to the grievance, was timely filed within thirty days of the November 26, 2007, rendition of the response denying the appeal on that ground (07-6-27465).

Section 95.11(8) gives an inmate thirty days after a response on the merits to an amended grievance appeal to seek mandamus relief in circuit court.

Spence v. Tucker · filed 2012-12-10(8)

Once appellee responded to appellant’s amended grievance appeal on the merits, appellant had thirty days under section 95.11(8) to seek mandamus relief in the circuit court.

Section 95.11(8) imposes a jurisdictional 30-day deadline for filing a court challenge to a prisoner disciplinary proceeding after its final disposition.

Whitfield v. Department of Corrections · filed 2013-02-22(8)

This time period is jurisdictional and, thus, a mandamus petition filed more than 30 days after the final disposition of a disciplinary proceeding must be dismissed.

Section 95.11(8) requires a court action challenging a prisoner disciplinary proceeding to begin within 30 days after final disposition through the administrative grievance process; the deadline is jurisdictional.

Crews v. Malara · filed 2013-10-11(8)

This time period is jurisdictional and, thus, a mandamus petition filed more than 30 days after the final disposition of a disciplinary proceeding must be dismissed.

Section 95.11(8) allows 30 days after final disposition of the relevant administrative grievance to file a court action challenging a prisoner disciplinary proceeding.

Purrier v. Department of Corrections · filed 2015-05-28(8)

Purrier’s petition in the circuit court, which sought review of the Department’s denial of his second grievance and the one at issue in this appeal, was filed within 30 days of the Department’s final disposition; it was thereby timely.

Section 95.11(8) sets a time limit for a prisoner's mandamus petition seeking review of a prison disciplinary decision.

Eastman v. State · filed 2004-10-01(8)

By this time his petition in Hillsborough County had two defects: First, it was untimely pursuant to section 95.11(8), Florida Statutes (2003), which became the basis for its eventual dismissal; and second, Hillsborough County was not a proper venue in which to raise the matter.

Section 95.11(8) requires an action challenging a prisoner disciplinary proceeding to begin within 30 days after final disposition through the administrative grievance process; timeliness depends on when the final grievance order is rendered.

Ortiz v. Moore · filed 1999-08-25(8)

Similarly, section 95.11(8), Florida Statutes, requires that a court action challenging a prisoner disciplinary proceeding must be commenced within 30 days after final disposition of the proceeding through the administrative grievance process under chapter 33, Florida Administrative Code. ... As the circuit court's order suggests, the timeliness of an inmate petition challenging a prison disciplinary proceeding is dependent upon the date of rendition of the "order" constituting final disposition of the inmate's grievances concerning the proceeding.

Section 95.11(8) sets a 30-day jurisdictional time limit for actions challenging prisoner disciplinary proceedings.

Green v. Moore · filed 2000-12-22(8)

This error had no bearing on these proceedings, however, as both remedies are subject to a 30 day jurisdictional time limit. See Fla.R.App.P. 9.100(c)(1) and Fla.R.Civ.P. 1.630(c) (certiorari); § 95.11(8), Fla. Stat. (2000) (actions challenging prisoner disciplinary proceedings).

Section 95.11(8) requires a court challenge to a prisoner disciplinary proceeding within 30 days after final disposition of the administrative grievance; a pro se inmate's timely certified mailing can satisfy that deadline.

Ortiz v. Moore · filed 2001-01-17(8)

Similarly, section 95.11(8), Florida Statutes, requires that a court action challenging a prisoner disciplinary proceeding must be commenced within 30 days after final disposition of the proceeding through the administrative grievance process under chapter 33, Florida Administrative Code. ... We determine that the petition for writ of mandamus should be deemed to be timely filed in the circuit court. ... Here, the petition for writ of mandamus contains a timely certificate of service showing service on DOC, the lower tribunal, on May 5, 1997. Thus the petition for writ of mandamus was timely filed to seek review of DOC's April 11, 1997, order.

Section 95.11(3)(a) gives four years to bring a negligent retention claim arising from abuse, while subsection (7) applies only to intentional torts based on abuse.

Doe v. Dorsey · filed 1996-11-22(3)(a)

Section 95.11(3)(a), Florida Statutes, limits an action for negligence to four years. This period is tolled until a minor plaintiff reaches majority. Section 95.051(1)(h). Although plaintiff urges that section 95.11(7) is the appropriate statute of limitations to apply in this case, we find that such section applies only to causes of action for "intentional torts based on abuse." Even though the priest's abusive conduct prompted this action against the church and the bishop, the alleged cause of action against them is a negligence action based on the alleged improper selection or retention policies and practices of the church in relation to its priests, not any active abuse by the appellees. We, therefore, find that section 95.11(3)(a), and not 95.11(7), is the applicable statute of limitations in this case, and that it started running when plaintiff turned eighteen.

Section 95.11(7)'s extended limitations period for intentional torts based on abuse does not apply to negligence claims against a governmental entity.

Doe ex rel. Doe's Mother v. Sinrod · filed 2012-05-30(7)

As a result, section 95.11(7) is inapplicable as to Doe’s claims against the School Board and, accordingly, cannot be used to toll the times in which she must have given notice to the School Board of her claims and in which she must have filed, those claims.

Section 95.11(7) extends the limitations period for intentional torts based on childhood sexual abuse, but not for negligence claims.

Cisko v. Diocese of Steubenville · filed 2013-09-04(7)

Here, as in Davis, there is no statutory endorsement. In fact, in more than ten years since enacting section 95.11(7), the legislature has not extended the limitations period to causes of action other than intentional torts.

Section 95.11 gives invasion of privacy claims a four-year limitations period, but a false light claim based on the same false facts as a libel or slander claim is subject to the two-year period.

Heekin v. CBS Broadcasting, Inc. · filed 2001-02-16(3)(p), (4)(g)

We agree and hold that the four-year statute of limitations provided for in section 95.11(3)(p) applies to all causes of action for invasion of privacy. We do, however, recognize one exception to this general rule. When a plaintiff has a cause of action for libel or slander and alleges a claim for false light invasion of privacy based on the publication of the same false facts, the false light invasion of privacy action is barred by the two-year statute of limitations.

Section 95.11(4)(g)'s two-year limitations period for defamation governs false light invasion of privacy claims rather than the four-year period for unspecified torts.

Gannett Co., Inc. v. Anderson · filed 2006-10-20(4)(g)

In summary, we conclude that an invasion of privacy case based on the false light theory is governed by the two-year statute of limitations that applies to defamation actions and not the four-year statute that applies to unspecified torts.

Section 95.11(3)(g) sets a four-year limitations period for trespass actions; when a landowner has consented to an object's presence, the period begins when the landowner withdraws that consent.

Garden Street Iron & Metal, Inc. v. Tanner · filed 2001-06-29(3)(g)

If so, Garden Street's suit would have been barred by the four-year limitations statute applicable to trespass actions. § 95.11(3)(g), Fla. Stat. (1995). But the record contained evidence that Garden Street consented to the presence of the remaining tires and did not withdraw its consent until August 1995, when it sent its demand for their removal. Under the reasoning of Merrill Stevens, only then did the limitations period begin. See also § 95.031, Fla. Stat. (1995). Therefore, Garden Street's October 1997 trespass count should have survived Tanner's motion for summary judgment.

Section 95.11(3)(g) sets a four-year period for trespass to real property; continuing harmful effects of a completed trespass do not restart that period.

Suarez v. City of Tampa · filed 2008-02-01(3)(g)

"An action for trespass on real property" is subject to a four-year limitations period. § 95.11(3)(g). ... Here, however, there was no continuing tort of trespass. Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the appellants, the cause of action for trespass accrued no later than 1988 when the City was informed about the concerns of the property owners regarding the contamination of the *686 property.

Section 95.11(3)(p) imposes a four-year limitation period on civil conspiracy claims.

Young v. Ball · filed 2003-01-29(3)(p)

Thus, Young’s 1999 action was barred under the four-year limitation period in section 95.11(3)(p), Florida Statutes (1989).

Section 95.11(2)(b) provides a five-year limitations period for an injunction to enforce a negative condominium covenant.

POND APPLE PLACE III CONDOMINIUM ASS'N, INC. v. Russo · filed 2003-02-26(2)(b)

Where the contractual provision sought to be enforced is negative in nature, injunctive relief is the proper vehicle for judicial enforcement. Seaboard Oil Co. v. Donovan, 99 Fla. 1296, 1304, 128 So. 821 (1930). The applicable statute of limitations for injunction proceedings of the type here under consideration is five years. § 95.11(2)(b), Fla. Stat. (2002). The Association delivered its first official notice of violation by letter dated May 16, 1996. The Association's Complaint for Injunctive Relief was filed on March 8, 2000, well *528 within the time allowed by section 95.11(2)(b).

Section 95.11(2)(b) provides a five-year limitations period for a mandatory injunction enforcing a restrictive covenant on real property.

Fox v. Madsen · filed 2009-07-01(2)(b)

Similarly, the mandatory injunction was the appropriate means of enforcing the restrictions in this case, and the five-year statute of limitations applied.

Section 95.11(4)(b)'s exception to the medical malpractice statute of repose for actions brought on behalf of a minor applies only when the child was injured by the malpractice, not when the child sues for a parent's wrongful death.

Childers v. Cape Canaveral Hosp., Inc. · filed 2005-03-04(4)(b)

As to Jason's claim, the issue on appeal is whether the statute of repose in section 95.11(4)(b), Florida Statutes, for cases "brought on behalf of a minor," applies only to cases brought on behalf of a child injured by medical malpractice or also extends to cases brought on behalf of a child for the wrongful death of a parent. We believe it applies only to the former and therefore affirm.

Section 95.11(4)(b) extends the four-year period of repose for a child's medical malpractice claim until the child's eighth birthday, but its two-year limitations period can bar the claim earlier if the malpractice is or should have been discovered.

Germ v. St. Luke's Hosp. Ass'n · filed 2008-10-24(4)(b)

Accordingly, the statute's plain language extends the four-year period of repose that commences the date an incident of malpractice occurs. Thus, if a child under the age of eight is injured by an incident of malpractice, and the malpractice has not and should not have been discovered, the statute's four-year period of repose extends up to the child's eighth birthday. Conversely, the statute's plain language does not extend the two-year period of limitations that commences the date an incident of malpractice is or should have been discovered. Thus, if a child under the age of eight is injured by an incident of malpractice, and the malpractice is or should have been discovered prior to the child's eighth birthday, the statute's two-year period of limitations begins to run and may extinguish the claim prior to the child's eighth birthday.

Section 95.11(3)(c) does not apply to administrative code enforcement proceedings brought under part I of chapter 162.

Sarasota County v. CITY BANK OF CLEVELAND · filed 2005-05-13(3)(c)

We grant relief, holding that section 95.11(3)(c), Florida Statutes (2001), has no application to such administrative enforcement proceedings.

Section 95.11(3)(f) gives a claimant four years to file a Harris Act complaint.

RUSSO ASSOCIATES v. City of Dania Beach · filed 2006-02-08(3)(f)

Under section 95.11(3)(f), Florida Statutes, Russo had four years to file his complaint under the Harris Act.

Section 95.11(3)(f) provides a four-year period to file a Harris Act action, subject to applicable tolling.

Wendler v. City of St. Augustine · filed 2013-03-15(3)(f)

Consequently, under section 95.11(3)(f), Florida Statutes (2010), the Wendlers had four years (plus any tolling time) to file their complaint under the Harris Act.

Section 95.11(3)(f) gives a property owner four years to file a Harris Act suit, beginning when governmental action inordinately burdens the property.

Hussey v. Collier County · filed 2014-11-14(3)(f)

The limitations period for filing a Harris Act suit is four years, and it begins on the date that the governmental action inordinately burdens the property.

A habeas petition alleging continued unlawful detention is within § 95.11(5)(f)'s one-year limit when filed during that detention.

Martin v. FLORIDA PAROLE COM'N · filed 2007-03-13(5)(f)

Inasmuch as Martin alleged that he continued to be unlawfully detained, his claim was necessarily filed within the one-year time limitation established by the statute.

Section 95.11(5)(f) did not supply a valid time bar for this habeas corpus petition against the Florida Parole Commission.

Small v. Florida Parole Commission · filed 2007-05-31(5)(f)

Ronald Davis Small appeals an order of the circuit court which denied his habeas corpus petition as time-barred under section 95.11(5)(f), Florida Statutes. The Parole Commission correctly concedes error in light of this court’s decision in Martin v. Florida Parole Comm’n, 951 So.2d 84 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007). We accordingly reverse and remand for further proceedings.

Section 95.11(5)(f) does not time-bar a habeas petition challenging revocation of conditional release.

Carpenter v. Florida Parole Commission · filed 2007-06-20(5)(f)

We agree with Carpenter that his habeas petition was not time-barred by section 95.11(5)(f), Florida Statutes (2004), based on the reasoning set forth by the First District in Martin v. Florida Parole Commission, 951 So.2d 84 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007).

Section 95.11(5)(f) did not bar the habeas corpus petition as untimely.

Ressler v. McNeil · filed 2008-06-16(5)(f)

Appellant appeals the circuit court's order denying his habeas corpus petition as time-barred under section 95.11(5)(f), Florida Statutes (2005). Appellee correctly concedes error in light of this court's decision in Martin v. Florida Parole Commission, 951 So.2d 84 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007). We accordingly reverse and remand.

Section 95.11(5)(f) does not automatically bar a habeas corpus petition as untimely.

Kelley v. McNeil · filed 2008-08-07(5)(f)

Appellant seeks review of an order of the circuit court which denied his habeas corpus petition as time-barred under section 95.11(5)(f), Florida Statutes. In light of this court's decision in Martin v. Florida Parole Commission, 951 So.2d 84 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007), we reverse and remand for further proceedings.

Section 95.11(5)(f) does not time-bar a petition styled as mandamus when the petition should be treated as one for habeas corpus.

Barrera v. Florida Parole Commission · filed 2008-08-12(5)(f)

Appellant appeals the circuit court’s order denying his petition for writ of mandamus as time-barred under section 95.11(5)(f), Florida Statutes (2005). ... We conclude that the circuit court should have treated the petition for writ of mandamus as a petition for writ of habeas corpus, see Rowe v. State, 765 So.2d 94 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000), and thus it was erroneous to deny the petition as time-barred.

Section 95.11(5)(f)’s one-year limitation cannot constitutionally be applied to petitions for writs of habeas corpus.

Jones v. Florida Parole Commission · filed 2010-10-14(5)(f)

Accordingly, we again apply Florida’s constitutional provisions and hold that the application of section 95.11(5)(f) to petitions for writs of habeas corpus is unconstitutional.

Section 95.11(5)(g)’s one-year limit does not govern a prisoner’s claim for physical injury caused by government employees’ negligence; the four-year limit in section 768.28(14) governs.

Jerry Layne Rogers, Sr. v. Julie L. Jones, Secretary, etc. · filed 2017-10-05(5)(g)

As such, Appellant’s negligence claim should not have been dismissed under section 95.11(5)(g).

Section 95.11(5)(g)’s one-year limit does not govern a prisoner’s claim for physical injury caused by the negligence of government employees; the four-year limit in section 768.28(14) applies.

Rogers v. Jones · filed 2017-10-06(5)(g)

However, the Florida Supreme Court quashed our decision in Green, determining that the four-year statute of limitations under section 768.28(14), Florida Statutes (2011), governs actions where a prisoner alleges “physical injury due to the negligent or wrongful acts or omissions of the employees of a government entity.” Green v. Cottrell, 204 So.3d 22, 29 (Fla. 2016). As such, Appellant’s negligence claim should not have been dismissed under section 95.11(5)(g).

Section 95.11(5)(g)’s one-year limit does not apply to a prisoner’s action alleging physical injury caused by negligent or wrongful acts or omissions of government employees.

Green v. Cottrell · filed 2016-11-10(5)(g)

Based upon the foregoing, we hold that where, as here, a prisoner files an action alleging that he suffered physical injury due to the negligent or wrongful acts or omissions of the employees of a government entity, the one-year statute of limitations period in section 95.11(5)(g)—a provision enacted as part of a chapter law that was intended to curb frivolous filings by prisoners—does not apply.

Section 95.11(5)(g)’s one-year limitations period applies to prisoner claims about both ongoing and isolated conditions of confinement.

Nicarry v. Eslinger · filed 2008-09-12(5)(g)

In light of the clear and unambiguous language of section 95.11(5), Florida Statutes (2004), and mindful of the United States Supreme Court decisions interpreting similar statutory language, we conclude that the one-year statute of limitations applies to both ongoing and isolated conditions of a prisoner's confinement.

Section 95.11(6) does not bar a partition action because no equivalent legal action exists.

McFall v. TRUBEY · filed 2008-10-03(6)

Section 95.11(6), which states that laches "shall bar any action unless it is commenced within the time provided for legal actions concerning the same subject matter," is likewise inapplicable. As we observed in Corinthian Investments, Inc. v. Reeder, 555 So.2d 871, 874 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989), the term "the same subject matter" in that statute means "the same cause of action." There is no legal action that is equivalent to a partition action. Accordingly, section 95.11(6) cannot bar the McFalls' suit.

Section 95.11(3)(p)'s limitations period for an equitable subrogation action begins when the subrogee pays the underlying claim.

Villa Maria Nursing & Rehabilitation Center, Inc. v. South Broward Hospital District · filed 2009-04-08(3)(p)

For an equitable subrogation action such as this one, the limitations period did not begin to run until the nursing home made payment to Sanders.

Section 95.11(5)(f) does not bar a mandamus petition filed within one year of the Commission’s action.

Blue v. Florida Commission on Offender Review · filed 2016-10-10(5)(f)

Appellant challenges a circuit court order denying his petition for writ of manda*809mus as time barred under section 95.11(5)(f), Florida Statutes, and also finding that appellant did not establish an entitlement to mandamus relief. We conclude that the petition was timely, as it was filed within one year of the Florida Commission on Offender Review’s December 13, 2012 action.

Section 95.11(5)(f) bars a prisoner's action for extraordinary relief filed more than one year after the Florida Parole Commission's agency action becomes final.

MOGER v. Florida Parole Commission · filed 2009-11-17(5)(f)

Because the trial court properly classified Appellant’s action below as one for non-habeas corpus extraordinary relief, and because Appellant, a prisoner, sought extraordinary relief more than one year after the agency action of the Florida Parole Commission became final, the trial court’s denial of the writ of mandamus as time-barred under section 95.11(5)(f), Florida Statutes, was correct and no error has been shown by Appellant.

Section 95.11(5)(f) imposes a one-year limit on mandamus petitions challenging presumptive parole release dates, and that limit does not violate the separation of powers doctrine.

Lewis v. Florida Parole Commission · filed 2013-03-06(5)(f)

Because of this interplay of rule and law, section 95.11(5)(f) does not violate the separation of powers doctrine.

Section 95.11(5)(f) bars an untimely petition challenging the initial establishment of a presumptive parole release date.

Barreiro v. Florida Commission on Offender Review · filed 2015-06-10(5)(f)

Not only was the petition untimely as it relates to that decision, see § 95.11(5)(f), Fla. Stat.; Moger v. Fla. Parole Comm’n, 22 So. 3d 138, 139 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009), but any challenge to the initial establishment of the PPRD is also barred by res judicata based on Barreiro I.

Section 95.11(3)(o) does not apply to actions for breach of trust.

Taplin v. Taplin · filed 2012-05-09(3)(o)

Because Andrew Taplin’s second amended complaint cannot fairly be read to invoke any of the triggers found in section 737.307, Florida Statutes, and section 95.11(3)(o), Florida Statutes, does not apply to actions for breach of trust, the trial court erred in dismissing the complaint with prejudice.

Section 95.11(2)(b) gives a party five years from recording to challenge the validity or enactment of a recorded association amendment.

Harris v. Aberdeen Property Owners Ass'n · filed 2014-01-22(2)(b)

Accordingly, any challenge to the validity/enactment of the amendment itself is barred by the applicable statute of limitations which, in this case, is section 95.11(2)(b), Fla. Stat. (2010) (imposing a five-year limitation on any “legal or equitable action on a contract, obligation, or liability found on a written instrument”).

Section 95.11(3) does not bar a tortious-interference claim at the pleading stage when the complaint does not show that the limitations period has expired.

Dick's Sporting Goods, Inc. v. Forbes/Cohen Florida Properties, L.P. · filed 2020-03-30(3)

It is not apparent from the face of the Complaint that the statute of limitations bars Plaintiff's claims.

Untimeliness under section 95.11(4)(b) ordinarily should be pled as an affirmative defense and is not appropriate for disposition on the face of a complaint.

Exposito v. Public Health Trust of Miami-Dade County · filed 2014-06-18(4)(b)

A bar based on accrual and alleged untimeliness, whether under section 768.28(6) or section 95.11(4)(b), ordinarily should be pled as an affirmative defense and is not appropriate for disposition on the face of a complaint.

A general allegation of compliance with § 95.11(3)(a) is sufficient to plead timeliness at the motion-to-dismiss stage.

Williams v. The City of Jacksonville (County of Duval) · filed 2016-05-06(3)(a)

Our review of the complaint shows that the general allegations of compliance with sections 95.11(3)(a) and 768.28(6)(a), Florida Statutes, were sufficient to allege compliance with the conditions precedent to the lawsuit.

Section 95.11(2)(b) gives an action to collect on a worthless check five years to be filed when the action is not founded on the statutory liability in section 68.065.

Sarras v. Mills-Sarras · filed 2014-08-08(2)(b), (3)(f)

We conclude that the time frame within which Sarras was required to bring suit was the five-year limitation period set forth in section 95.11(2)(b), Florida Statutes (2007), not the four-year limitation period set forth in section 95.11(3)(f), Florida Statutes (2007).

Section 95.11(3)(h) allows four years to bring an action for injury to personal property.

GEICO General Insurance Company v. Farag · filed 2015-01-26(3)(h)

But, Gould’s potential claim concerning property damage would have been barred by the statute of limitations as of November 2012 -- four years from the date of the accident.

Section 95.11(3) provides a four-year limitations period for personal injury claims, which applies to Title IX damages claims in Florida.

Doe No. 6 v. School Board of Highlands County Florida · filed 2020-08-28(3)

Florida’s personal injury statute of limitations is four years. Baker v. Gulf & W. Indus., Inc., 805 F.2d 1480, 1482 (11th Cir. 1988) (citing Fla. Stat. § 95.11(3)). ... Under either federal law or Florida law on the accrual of causes of action, summary judgment on Defendant’s statute-of-limitations defense is inappropriate.

Section 95.11(5)(b) requires an equitable lien claim arising from improvements to real property to be filed within one year after labor, services, or materials were last furnished.

Jax Utilities Management, Inc. v. Hancock Bank, A Foreign Corp. · filed 2015-06-10(5)(b)

By its plain language, section 95.11(5)(b) requires that a claim for equitable lien be brought within one year of the last furnishing of labor, services, or material for the improvement of real property.

Section 95.11(5)(f) allows one year from the Commission’s action to file a mandamus petition challenging it.

Wyndell Blue v. Florida Commission on Offender Review · filed 2016-10-09(5)(f)

We conclude that the petition was timely, as it was filed within one year of the Florida Commission on Offender Review’s December 13, 2012 action.

Section 95.11(5)(b)’s one-year limit applies to equitable liens arising from furnishing labor, services, or materials to improve real property; providing funds alone does not trigger it.

GABRIJI, LLC v. HOLLYWOOD EAST, LLC · filed 2020-09-30(5)(b)

Gabriji provided funds, not labor, services, or materials. Based on the four corners of the amended complaint, section 95.11(5)(b) does not apply.

Section 95.11(3)(o) gives a plaintiff four years to bring a breach of fiduciary duty claim after the alleged breach causes damage.

Reuss v. Orlando Health, Inc. · filed 2015-10-21(3)(o)

Once Dr. Reuss was damaged by the Hospital’s alleged misconduct on April 16, 2009, the four-year statute of limitations for breach of fiduciary- duty for the 2005 refund was triggered, and in April, 2013 — more' than two years before Dr. Reuss filed this case — the limitations period elapsed.

Section 95.11(3)(o) gives a claimant four years to bring a breach of fiduciary duty claim.

HOME TITLE COMPANY OF MARYLAND, INC. v. LASALLA · filed 2018-11-16(3)(o)

However, the trial court correctly ruled that that portion of LaSalla's claim was barred by the statute of limitations because the complaint was not filed until December 2013.

Section 95.11(3)(p)’s four-year limitations period does not displace an applicable ordinance deadline for challenging a voidable special assessment.

CITY OF COOPER CITY v. WALTER S. JOLIFF, BARBARA JOLIFF & BRENDA J. KEZAR · filed 2017-09-27(3)(p)

And the Plaintiffs fail to demonstrate why the deadline imposed in the ordinance, an ordinance duly passed by the local government authority at a public hearing after notice was given, should not be given effect. Instead, they argue that the general catch-all statute of limitations found in section 95.11(3)(p), Florida Statutes (2011), should apply to their challenge. ... Therefore, the challenge was waived; their lawsuit barred.

Section 95.11(3)(p)’s four-year period for challenging a stormwater utility fee akin to a special assessment runs from the original imposition of the fee, rather than restarting with each annual assessment.

City of Fort Pierce v. Australian Properties, LLC WTC, LLC Ted Glasrud Associates FL, LLC William D. McKnight and Kathryn A. McKnight, etc. · filed 2015-11-12(3)(p)

The parties agree that a four-year statute of limitations applies. They disagree on when the statute of limitations began to run. ... Because the utility fee is more akin to a special assessment, Fredrick, Keenan, and H & B Builders control. The trial court abused its discretion in finding the plaintiffs were not barred by the statute of limitations.

Section 95.11(3)(p)’s four-year limitations period began anew when the city repealed the ordinance that had eliminated its fire service fees.

Discount Sleep of Ocala, LLC v. City of Ocala · filed 2016-06-17(3)(p)

Appellants contend that they timely filed their complaint within the four-year limitations period set forth in section 95.11(3)(p), Florida Statutes (2014). We agree and reverse. ... Therefore, while Ordinance 2010-43 repealed Ordinance 6015, it also triggered a new four-year limitations period beginning on May 4, 2010. Accordingly, Appellant’s complaint was timely and the trial court erred in granting the motion to dismiss on statute of limitations grounds.

Section 95.11(4)(a)’s limitations period for litigation-related legal malpractice begins when the underlying proceedings are complete through appellate review.

YULIA v. FOREST v. L. LISA BATTS and STUART LAW GROUP, P.A. · filed 2017-10-25(4)(a)

The supreme court’s consistent reliance on a bright-line rule that a cause of action for legal malpractice in litigation does not accrue until the underlying legal proceedings are complete through appellate review compels us to reverse the trial court’s summary judgment.

Section 95.11(4)(b)’s medical malpractice limitations period begins when the plaintiff knows or reasonably should know of a reasonable possibility that the injury was caused by medical malpractice.

ISRAEL REYES, etc. v. BAPTIST HEALTH SOUTH FLORIDA FOUNDATION, INC., etc. · filed 2023-03-29(4)(b)

The main issue before this Court concerns the date on which Garcia knew that there was a reasonable possibility that S.G.’s injuries were caused by medical malpractice. This date is when the statute of limitations began to run pursuant to section 95.11(4)(b), Florida Statutes (2005).