Fla. Stat. § 95.11

Section 95.11(3)(j) gives four years to bring a fraud action, measured from when the last element of the claim accrues.

Faw v. Wiles (In Re Wiles) · filed 1994-05-03(3)(j)

The last element of the cause of action accrued, at the earliest, April 21, 1988, thus the four-year limitation period had not run and the adversary proceeding is not barred by Florida statute § 95.11(3)(j).

Section 95.11(3)(j) gives constructive fraud claims a four-year limitations period.

Halkey-Roberts Corp. v. MacKal · filed 1994-08-12(3)(j)

As a recognized species of fraud, constructive fraud is controlled by section 95.11(3)(j), Florida Statutes (1991), a four-year limitations period, and the discovery rule of section 95.031(2) applies.

Section 95.11(3)(j) sets a four-year limitations period for actions founded on fraud.

Brugiere v. Credit Commerciale France · filed 1996-09-20(3)(j)

Section 95.11, Florida Statutes (1995) specifies the applicable period in which a cause of action founded on fraud must be commenced. It provides: (3) WITHIN FOUR YEARS.— . . . . (j) A legal or equitable action founded on fraud.

Section 95.11(3)(j) governs the timeliness of actual-fraud claims.

Campo v. Tafur · filed 1998-01-14(3)(j)

Since a tort claim arises "where the last event necessary to make the defendant liable for the tort took place," Tucker v. Fianson, 484 So.2d 1370, 1371 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986), we find that Campo's allegations, on the face of the amended petition, are both timely and sufficient to state a cause of action for actual fraud. See § 95.11(3)(j), Fla. Stat. (1995).

Section 95.11(3)(j) provides a four-year limitations period for fraud claims; a complaint that plausibly alleges discovery within that period cannot be dismissed as time-barred.

Ambrose v. Catholic Social Services, Inc. · filed 1999-07-02(3)(j)

The next question is whether Ms. Ambrose's claims of fraud are barred under Florida's four-year statute of limitations relating to fraud, section 95.11(3)(j), Florida Statutes (1997). ... These allegations are sufficient to raise the issue of whether Ms. Ambrose's cause of action for fraud accrued in April 1998. Thus, dismissal of this claim as time-barred by Florida's four-year statute of limitations was also improper.

Section 95.11(3)(j) gives a claimant four years to bring a fraud action; dismissal on limitations grounds requires the complaint to conclusively show that the claim is untimely.

McLeod v. Barber · filed 2000-07-21(3)(j)

The next question is whether the McLeods' claim of fraud is barred under Florida's four-year statute of limitations, section 95.11(3)(j), Florida Statutes (1997).[2] ... The face of the instant complaint does not conclusively show that Mr. Barber's fraudulent conduct was or should have been discovered by the McLeods within four years prior to the date they filed their complaint. On the contrary, the complaint avers that all of the elements of fraud did not occur until at least October 7, 1996. The complaint was filed one month later. Based upon these facts, the trial court's ruling that Florida's statute of limitations bars the McLeods' fraud claim against Mr. Barber must also be reversed.

Section 95.11(3)(j) sets a four-year limitations period for fraud actions.

Lopez-Infante v. Union Cent. Life Ins. Co. · filed 2002-01-16(3)(j)

According to Section 95.11(3)(j), Florida Statutes, the statute of limitations for a fraud action is four years.

Section 95.11(3)(j) governs a fraud claim against a home’s owner and seller and contains no repose period.

Snyder v. Wernecke · filed 2002-04-03(3)(j)

We find that the applicable statute of limitations for the Werneckes' fraud claim is that found in section 95.11(3)(j), which, as previously noted, contains no limiting repose period.

Section 95.11(3)(j) sets a four-year limitations period for fraud in the inducement claims.

Tyson v. Viacom, Inc. · filed 2005-01-12(3)(j)

The statute of limitations for a fraud in the inducement claim is four years. See § 95.11(3)(j), Fla. Stat.

The four-year limitations period for fraud does not apply to an action to recover real property that does not allege fraud.

Bistricer v. Palmer · filed 2012-08-10(3)(j)

Although the complaint to quiet title may be poorly drafted, and although Mr. Bistricer and the limited partnership may have been defrauded by a third party, this is an action to recover real property. It does not allege fraud in law or equity. Therefore, it cannot be barred by this statute of limitations.

Section 95.11(3)(j) sets a four-year limitations period for fraud claims.

Xavier v. Leviev Boymelgreen Marquis Developers, LLC · filed 2012-11-21(3)(j)

The statute of limitations for fraud is four years. § 95.11(3)(j), Fla. Stat. (2009).

Section 95.11(3)(j) provides a four-year limitations period for a fraud-based insurance rescission claim.

Metropolitan Life Insurance Company v. Liebowitz · filed 2022-01-11(3)(j)

Both parties agree that the applicable statute of limitations for MetLife’s rescission claim is four years because MetLife’s claim is based in fraud. See Fla. Stat. § 95.11(3)(j). ... MetLife’s April 15, 2020 complaint was timely.

Section 95.11(3)(j) sets a four-year limitations period for fraud claims.

IT'S A NEW 10, LLC, IT'S A 10, INC, and CAROLYN ARONSON v. WILSON · filed 2023-08-02(3)(j)

The fifth amended complaint’s Count VII for fraud in the inducement claimed the alleged fraudulent misrepresentations occurred no later than November 22, 2013. Thus, the four-year limitations period for the fraud in the inducement claim would have expired four years later, by November 22, 2017.

Section 95.11(3)(j) and (3)(a) provide four-year limitations periods for fraud and negligence claims, respectively.

DONALD v. BARRERA · filed 2023-10-25(3)(j), (3)(a)

Because the summary judgment evidence establishes that Donald was aware she held no ownership interest in the corporations earlier than four years from the December 31, 2020 filing of Donald’s lawsuit, her claims are barred by the applicable statutes of limitation. See §§ 95.031(2)(a), 95.11(3)(j), Fla. Stat. (2020) (fraud); § 95.11(3)(a), Fla. Stat. (2020) (negligence).

Section 95.11(3)(j) provides a four-year limitations period for fraud in the inducement claims.

Abecassis v. Eugene M. Cummings, P.C. · filed 2012-02-15(3)(j)

Because Nissim did not file its complaint until June 2009, a period beyond the four year statute of limitations, its fraud in the inducement claim is time barred.

Section 95.11(5)(a) provides a three year limitations period for an action on a liability created by statute.

Shanks v. Brothers · filed 1970-01-09(5)(a)

We believe the court erred in applying Section 95.11 (6), Fla.Stat., F.S.A., and we reverse. ... The statute quoted above creates an indemnification right brought about by that particular statute and since the right of indemnification did not arise until Allstate paid Mrs. Shanks her award, the statute of limitations did not begin to run until then. At that point Allstate had three years pursuant to Section 95.11(5) (a), Fla.Stat., F.S.A., in which to bring its action. Therefore, to apply the wrongful death statute of limitations was error.

Section 95.11(3)'s four-year limitations period does not support summary judgment when a material factual dispute remains about whether reasonable diligence would have revealed a products-liability claim more than four years before filing.

Brown v. Armstrong World Industries, Inc. · filed 1983-11-01(3)

The trial court entered final summary judgment for the defendants on the ground that the action, commenced July 31, 1979, was barred by the applicable statute of limitations, Section 95.11(3), Florida Statutes (1979).[1] We reverse because there *1099 remains a material factual issue as to whether claimant, prior to July 31, 1975, in the exercise of reasonable diligence should have known that he had a cause of action against product manufacturers for injuries caused by exposure to asbestos.

Section 95.11(3) requires a products liability action to be filed within four years after the facts giving rise to it were or should have been discovered with due diligence.

MacRae v. Cessna Aircraft Co. · filed 1984-09-27(3)

Sections 95.11(3) and 95.031(2) provide that products liability actions must be commenced within four years of the time the facts giving rise to the cause of action were discovered or should have been discovered with the exercise of due diligence, but that in any event such actions must be commenced within 12 years after the date of delivery of the completed product to its original purchaser, without regard to the date the defect in the product was or should have been discovered.

Section 95.11(3) provides a four-year limitations period for product liability claims; an expired period cannot be avoided by reviving an earlier action through a Rule 1.540(b)(5) motion.

Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. Diaz · filed 1987-06-02(3)

Thus, even were the Supreme Court of Florida to decide that the statute of repose did not operate to extinguish the plaintiff's cause of action, the action was nevertheless barred by the statute of limitations, the operation of which cannot be avoided by a revival of an earlier action through the vehicle of a Rule 1.540(b)(5) motion.

Section 95.11(3)(e) applies to all product liability theories, including a failure to warn of a defect.

Wallis v. Grumman Corp. · filed 1987-12-03(3)(e)

Section 95.11(3)(e) applied to all theories of product liability, including the duty to warn.

Section 95.11(3) provides a four-year limitations period for products liability actions.

Acosta v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. · filed 1991-06-11(3)

Section 95.11(3), Florida Statutes (1987), in turn, provides a four-year limitations period for products liability actions.

Section 95.11(3)(e) gives a claimant four years to bring a products liability action.

Babush v. American Home Products Corp. · filed 1991-11-27(3)(e)

The statute of limitations applicable to this products liability case is four years. § 95.11(3)(e).

Section 95.11(3)(e) sets a four-year limitations period for personal injury actions founded on the design, manufacture, distribution, or sale of personal property.

Carter v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. · filed 2000-11-22(3)(e)

Section 95.11(3)(e), Florida Statutes (1981), states that "[a]n action for injury to a person founded on the design, manufacture, distribution, or sale of personal property... shall be commenced ... [w]ithin four years." ... Thus, the applicable limitations period in the present case is four years.

For a tobacco-related creeping disease, the four-year period begins when symptoms or effects disclose the disease and its causal connection to tobacco use sufficiently to support a lawsuit.

Frazier v. Philip Morris USA Inc. · filed 2012-04-11(3)

Rather, the “manifestations” that are pertinent are symptoms or effects that actually disclose that the prospective claimant is suffering from a disease or medical condition caused by tobacco use, and which are thus sufficient to assert a cause of action against the responsible manufacturer(s).

Section 95.11(3)’s four-year limitations period does not bar a smoking-related lung cancer claim merely because the smoker knew earlier of a different smoking-related injury.

Philip Morris USA, Inc. v. Barbanell · filed 2012-10-17(3)

PM argues the action was time barred under the statute of limitations by virtue of the “first-injury rule.” We reject that argument as did the First District in R.J. Reynolds Tobacco v. Webb. ... Therefore, the unspecified injury that the jury determined that Mrs. Barbanell was aware of prior to May 5, 1990, was not COPD nor was it the lung cancer.

Section 95.11(3)(d) gives four years to bring a personal injury action based on the design, manufacture, distribution, or sale of qualifying personal property.

McCormick v. IGIA, Inc. · filed 2024-07-03(3)(d)

Under Florida law, “[a]n action for injury to a person founded on the design, manufacture, distribution, or sale of personal property that is not permanently incorporated in an improvement to real property, including fixtures” must be brought within 4 years. Fla. Stat. § 95.11(3)(d).

Section 95.11(4)(d) sets a two-year limitations period for wrongful death actions.

Edwards v. Okaloosa County · filed 1993-11-03(4)(d)

The Florida statute of limitations for Edwards’s pendent wrongful death claim expired on October 11, 1988, two years after Molbert’s death. Fla.Stat. § 95.11(4)(d) (Supp.1992); Walker v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 320 So.2d 418 (Fla. 3d DCA 1975), cert. dismissed, 338 So.2d 843 (Fla.1976).

Section 95.11(3)(j) gives fraud actions a four-year limitations period, running from when the facts giving rise to the claim were discovered or should have been discovered with due diligence.

Fuddruckers, Inc. v. Fudpucker's, Inc. · filed 2006-05-25(3)(j)

Third, if Plaintiffs had exercised “due diligence,” they should have discovered the facts giving rise to their fraud claim before the expiration of the four-year limitations period in § 95.11(3)(j).

Section 95.11(3)(p) supplies a four-year limitations period for these Florida § 1983 claims.

Keith Vanbenthuysen, Beverly Vanbenthuysen v. State of Florida · filed 2011-06-01(3)(p)

In a § 1983 action, federal courts apply the forum state’s residual statute of limitations for personal injury actions. Burton v. City of Belle Glade, 178 F.3d 1175, 1188 (11th Cir. 1999). In Florida, the applicable limitations period is four years. Id.; Fla.Stat. § 95.11(3)(p).

Section 95.11(4)(d) imposes a two-year statute of limitations on wrongful-death actions.

Taylor v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. · filed 2011-09-26(4)(d)

As the district court properly observed, the Florida statute of limitations for a wrongful-death action is two years. Fla. Stat. § 95.11(4)(d).

Section 95.11(4)(d) provides a two-year limitations period for wrongful-death actions, which may be equitably tolled in extraordinary circumstances such as a court-imposed stay that prevented timely filing.

Starling v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. · filed 2011-11-02(4)(d)

The Court finds the two-year statute of limitations period was equitably tolled between October 30, 2008, when the Court imposed stay took effect, and December 22, 2010, when it lifted the stay on the activated cases. ... and Mrs. Starling would still have over fifteen months left on the two-year statute of limitations provided by Section 95.11(4)(d).

Section 95.11(9) allows an action such as a claim for sexual abuse to be commenced at any time, but its new limitations period does not apply to actions that were time-barred on or before July 1, 2010.

Lewis v. The Broward County School Board · filed 2012-06-11(9)

We recognize that Florida law was revised to allow an action such as Lewis’s to be commenced at any time. See Fla. Stat. § 95.11(9) (2010). The new limitations period does not apply, however, to actions that would have been time-barred on or before July 1, 2010. See id. Because the statute of limitations for Lewis’s claim ran in 2004, the new limitations period would not apply to his claim.

Section 95.11(4)(d) imposes a two-year limitations period for wrongful-death actions running from the date of death.

Homaday v. Smith & Nephew, Inc. · filed 2014-01-07(4)(d)

The statute of limitations for a wrongful death action in Florida is two years and runs from the date of death.

Section 95.11(4)(d) requires a wrongful-death action to be filed within two years after the death, subject here to the applicable tolling period.

Thomas v. City of Jacksonville · filed 2018-04-23(4)(d)

A plaintiff must bring a wrongful-death action within two years of the death, Fla. Stat. § 95.11(4)(d); Thomas died on July 30, 2010, and Plaintiffs filed their claims on June 21, 2013, well over two years after Thomas’ death. ... Even with the 90-day tolling period, Florida’s statute of limitations bars Plaintiffs’ claim.

Section 95.11(4)(g) gives defamation actions a two-year limitations period that accrues when the defamatory statement is published.

Hollis v. Western Academy Charter, Inc. · filed 2019-08-08(4)(g)

In Florida, the statute of limitations for a defamation action is two years and accrues upon the publication of the defamatory statement.

Section 95.11(10) extends the limitations period for wrongful-death claims based on criminal murder or manslaughter acts and does not create a separate private cause of action under those criminal statutes.

Haegele v. Judd · filed 2020-04-02(10)

Haegele mistakenly contends that Section 95.11(10), Fla. Stat., creates an independent civil cause of action for violation of criminal manslaughter or murder statutes. That provision says nothing about private rights of action. Instead, it “extend[s] the statute of limitations for wrongful death claims based on the criminal acts of murder or manslaughter.” ... Because Section 95.11(10) does not create a private right of action derived from the manslaughter statute that is separate from a traditional wrongful death claim, Haegele may assert only one wrongful death claim against each Defendant and Count III must be dismissed.

Section 95.11(3)(j) gives fraud actions a four-year limitations period.

Luther Arthur Horn, III v. Estate of Lauren Camacho · filed 2020-06-22(3)(j)

In Florida, the statute of limitations for fraud actions is four years. Fla. Stat. § 95.11(3)(j). This limitations period begins running from the time when “the facts giving rise to the cause of action were discovered or should have been discovered with the exercise of due diligence.” Fla. Stat. § 95.031(2)(a).

Section 95.11 bars commencing an action on a judgment after the judgment is twenty years old.

Young v. McKenzie · filed 1950-05-05

Even if we turn to Section 55.16, Florida Statutes 1941, and F.S.A., enacted in 1937, we find that an execution "shall be valid and effective during the life or effective period of the judgment on which issued * * *," and this sends us back to Section 95.11, which seems to fix the "life" of a judgment by providing, to state it in the negative, that after it is twenty years of age no action upon it may be commenced.

Section 95.11(6) gives wrongful death actions a two-year limitations period, including actions against municipalities.

Parker v. City of Jacksonville · filed 1955-07-20(6)

It goes without saying that repeals by implication are not favored; and in view of the strict construction which this court has heretofore placed on charter provisions relating to "notice of claim" in suits against municipalities, we are constrained to hold that it was not the legislative intent to repeal Section 95.11(6) insofar as actions for wrongful death against municipalities are concerned, and that the lower court was, therefore, in error in holding that the plaintiff's suit was barred by Section 95.24, supra.

Section 95.11(6) sets a limitation period for usury actions, and that limitation does not preempt the federal bankruptcy extension in 11 U.S.C.A. 29, sub. e.

Thomas W. Dower and Nordic Development Corporation v. Thomas J. Bomar, Trustee for Kitimat Corporation · filed 1963-04-22(6)

The general limitation statute-of Florida affecting usury, § 95.11(6) Florida Statutes, F.S.A., is preceded, (as-are other of Florida’s limitation statutes), with the words, “Actions other than those for the recovery of real property can only be commenced as follows."' ... We do not believe the-Florida Statute of Limitations as to-usury preempts the wording of 11 U.S.C.A. 29, sub. e.

Section 95.11(6) imposes a two year limitation on wrongful death actions, but it does not govern claims against a decedent's estate when the Probate Law controls the filing period.

Hayes v. Thomas · filed 1964-02-26(6)

Appellant points to § 95.11(6), Fla. Stat., F.S.A., which places a two year limitation on an action arising from an act causing a wrongful death, and contends that under that statutory provision the action for damages for wrongful death could be filed any time within such two year period, and appellant argues that where the Probate Law which specifies a shorter limitation, and the two year statute of limitations for wrongful death actions are in conflict, the latter should prevail. We can not agree. They operate in different areas. The statute of limitation (§ 95.11(6) makes no reference to actions against the estate of a deceased or his appointed representative. Clearly, the validity and enforcement of claims against estates are controlled by provisions with reference thereto as contained in the Florida Probate Law. The statute of nonclaim as contained in the Probate Law specifies the conditions and controls the period in which such actions for damages may be filed.

Section 95.11(6) gives a plaintiff no more than two years after death to bring a wrongful death action, or the action is barred.

Grissom v. North American Aviation, Inc. · filed 1971-05-11(6)

This Court believes the more reasonable application of § 95.11(10) and the only correct interpretation is that a professional engineer or architect is susceptible to suit for a period of only twelve (12) years, and that a plaintiff, once death occurs, has not more than two (2) years in which to bring suit or have the action barred.

Section 95.11(6) requires a usury action to be commenced within two years, with the period running from the date of payment.

Vance v. Florida Reduction Corp. · filed 1972-04-18(6)

Application of the statute as construed by the court in the Wenck case thus gives a borrower at usurious interest a cause of action for the imposition of a penalty or declaration of forfeiture upon the occurrence of a payment, and it is from the date of such a payment that the statute of limitations provided in Section 95.11(6), Florida Statutes, begins to run. Since this action was brought within two years from the payment of the $53,074.60 to the bank, which of course included interest, the action was not barred.

Section 95.11(4)(d) gives a wrongful death claimant two years to sue; when the last day falls on a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday, the deadline extends to the next day that is none of those.

Moorey v. Eytchison & Hoppes, Inc. · filed 1976-10-20(4)(d)

The statute of limitations on a wrongful death action is two years. Section 95.11(4)(d), Florida Statutes. Where the last day of a limitation period falls on a Saturday, Sunday or legal holiday the period runs until the end of the next day which is neither a Saturday, Sunday nor a legal holiday.

Section 95.11(4)(d) requires a wrongful death action to be commenced within two years, and filing the complaint commences the action for limitations purposes.

Pratt v. Durkop · filed 1978-03-15(4)(d)

Based on these authorities, we hold that the requirement of the Florida statute of limitations is met when an action is commenced within the applicable limitations period, and that, under our rules of civil procedure, an action is commenced by the filing of a complaint.

Subsection (4)(d) requires a wrongful death action to be brought within two years after the death.

Hambrick v. Beard · filed 1978-12-08(4)(d)

Section 95.11(4)(d) of the Florida Statutes dictates that a wrongful death action shall be brought within two years of the date of the death at issue. ... The complaint was timely filed under Section 95.11, Florida Statutes.

Section 95.11 allows a beneficiary of a resulting trust to wait to act until the trustee repudiates the trust or begins holding the property adversely with the beneficiary's knowledge.

Bradbury v. Fuller · filed 1980-06-27

A beneficiary of a resulting trust is not bound to act until the trustee repudiates the trust or begins to hold the property adversely with knowledge on the part of the beneficiary.

Section 95.11(4)(d)'s two-year wrongful death limit does not apply when another statute prescribes a different time.

Dubose v. Auto-Owners Insurance Co. · filed 1980-08-15(4)(d)

It should further be noted that Chapter 95, Fla.Stat., which provides limitations of actions for various categories of actions and which sets forth a limitation of two years within which an action for wrongful death may be brought [§ 95.-ll(4)(d), Fla.Stat.], provides that if a different time is provided elsewhere in the statutes within which an action may be brought, the action must be brought “within the time prescribed elsewhere.”

Section 95.11(4)(d) requires a wrongful death action to be brought within two years of the injured person's death, rather than the injury.

Perkins v. Variety Children's Hosp. · filed 1982-01-12(4)(d)

Section 95.11(4)(d), Florida Statutes (1979) provides that an action for wrongful death be brought within two years. Since the right does not exist until death occurs, the only reasonable interpretation is that wrongful death actions must be brought within two years from the time of the death of the injured party and not within two years from the time of injuries of that party.

Section 95.11(4)(c)’s two-year wrongful death limitation does not apply to actions brought under section 768.28; those actions have a four-year limitation period.

Beard v. Hambrick · filed 1981-03-05(4)(c)

The action was brought under Florida's wrongful death act and filed within the two-year statute of limitations period prescribed in section 95.11(4)(c), Florida Statutes (Supp. 1974). ... The petitioning sheriff contends that, because this statutory provision is applicable only if a private person would be liable, the two-year statute of limitations for wrongful death actions applies rather than the four-year statute of limitations contained in section 768.28(12). We reject this contention. We believe that the legislature intended that there be one limitation period for all actions brought under section 768.28.

Section 95.11(4)(d) requires a wrongful death action to be filed within two years; a later amendment to the damages sought is not the filing of a new action.

Dye v. Houston · filed 1982-11-09(4)(d)

Under the applicable statute of limitations [95.11(4)(d)], only the personal representative may bring the action, and, here, such action was filed within the two-year period. The filing of the second amended complaint was not the filing of the action but was merely an amendment as to damages.

Section 95.11(4)(b)'s two-year period for wrongful death actions based on medical malpractice commences upon death, with the discovery provision postponing the period for undiscovered causes of action.

Bruce v. Byer · filed 1982-11-17(4)(b)

Based on the foregoing, it appears that the two-year period for wrongful death actions based on medical malpractice commences upon death, and that the 1975 legislation which included in section 95.11(4)(b) actions based on death from medical malpractice postpones the running of the period on undiscovered causes of action for wrongful death by medical malpractice.

Section 95.11(4)(b) does not bar a wrongful death action brought within two years after the injured party’s death.

Stella v. Ash · filed 1982-12-28(4)(b)

The trial court, finding that the appellants’ wrongful death action was limitations-barred under Section 95.11(4)(b), Florida Statutes (1979), entered summary judgment for Dr. Ash. We reverse upon holdings that (1) a wrongful death action, when, as here, brought within two years from the time of death of the injured party, is not limitations-barred, Perkins v. Variety Children’s Hospital, 413 So.2d 760 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982); see also Bruce v. Byer, 423 So.2d 413 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982); and (2) even if, arguendo, the action were required to be brought within two years from the time the incident giving rise to the action was discovered or should have been discovered with the exercise of due diligence, the fact that Mrs. Stella’s malignancy was correctly diagnosed two years and several days prior to the commencement of the action does not conclusively establish as a matter of law that she then should have known that Dr. Ash misdiagnosed her condition in 1975, since Mrs. Stella’s knowledge of her true condition is but a factor among others in evaluating whether she should have discovered the defendant’s asserted malpractice. Nolen v. Sarasohn, 379 So.2d 161 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980); Schalm v. Mount Clemens General Hospital, 82 Mich.App. 669, 267 N.W.2d 479 (1978).

Section 95.11(4)(d)’s two-year wrongful-death period begins at death, even when a posthumous child is born later.

Rahn v. AMP INC. · filed 1984-03-06(4)(d)

We find no error in the trial court holding that the two-year statute of limitations for wrongful death commenced upon the date of the death of the deceased. ... This is true notwithstanding the fact that a posthumous child is not born until five and a half months after his father's death.

Section 95.11(3)(a) provides a four-year limitations period for negligence actions.

Askew v. County of Volusia · filed 1984-04-05(3)(a)

Under section 95.11(3)(a), Florida Statutes (1981), the plaintiff had until April 13, 1983, to file suit. He filed within that time.

Section 95.11(3)(j) may bar an action on summary judgment when its limitations period applies.

Calder v. Uwanawich · filed 1984-04-24(3)(j)

Having examined the record before us we conclude that the trial court did not err in granting a summary judgment premised upon a determination that the appellant’s action was barred by the applicable statute of limitation, § 95.11(3)(j), Fla.Stat. (1979).

Section 95.11(4)(d) bars a wrongful-death claim filed against a defendant after the two-year period when the plaintiff knew or should have known of that defendant’s potential liability before the period expired.

Parmenter v. Davey Tree Expert Co. · filed 1984-12-21(4)(d)

In this particular case, we find that there was clearly sufficient evidence for the trial court to determine that appellant knew or should have known of appel-lee’s potential liability prior to the running of the limitation period in section 95.-ll(4)(d).

Section 95.11(4)(d) gives a wrongful death action based on an allegedly defective product a two-year limitations period.

Phlieger v. Nissan Motor Co., Ltd. · filed 1986-03-27(4)(d)

Thus by its very language, section 95.031(2) does not apply and, rather, the two year statute of limitations for wrongful death actions found in section 95.11(4)(d) applies.

Section 95.11(4)(d) provides the two-year limitations period for wrongful death actions, including those arising from allegedly defective products.

Nissan Motor Co., Ltd. v. Phlieger · filed 1987-05-28(4)(d)

Section 965.031(2) makes no reference to wrongful death actions under section 95.11(4)(d); nor does either section 95.11(3) or section 95.031(2) refer to actions for damages because of death.

Section 95.11(3)(a) requires a negligence action to be commenced within four years of accrual.

N.G. ex rel. M.G. v. Arvida Corp. · filed 1993-12-21(3)(a)

This negligence action must have been commenced within four years of the accrual date, or by August 9, 1988. See § 95.11(3)(a), Fla.Stat. (1983).

The two-year wrongful death limitation does not bar a survivor’s counterclaim arising from the same accident when the opposing party initiated the action; that waiver does not extend to other parties or the estate’s separate claim.

Ding v. Jones · filed 1996-02-07(4)(d)

In conclusion, we hold that when appellee Jones instituted his action against appellant Ding in regard to the accident that occurred on July 14, 1990, Jones waived any statute of limitation defenses that he may have had against Ding. Appellant Ding was then entitled to pursue any defenses or affirmative claims growing out of that accident that Ding individually may have had against Jones, including Ding's survivor rights under the Wrongful Death Act. We also hold that while Jones' actions against Ding revived Ding's rights that may have previously been barred by the statute of limitations, Jones' actions did not waive those statute of limitation defenses that Walden and Coca Cola may have had against Ding. ... Jones' actions against Ding, individually, did not revive the statute-of-limitation-barred claims of the estate.

Section 95.11(3)(a) sets a four-year limitations period for this injury action.

Bice v. METZ CONST. CO., INC. · filed 1997-08-20(3)(a)

Pursuant to section 95.11(3)(a), *747 Florida Statutes (1991), the statute of limitations for Bice's action ran on January 23, 1995.

Section 95.11(4)(d) sets a two-year limitations period for wrongful death actions.

Lee v. CSX Transp., Inc. · filed 2007-06-22(4)(d)

Section 95.11(4)(d), Florida Statutes (1995), establishes a two-year limitations period with respect to wrongful death actions.

Section 95.11(4)(d) requires a wrongful death action to be filed within two years of the death.

Capone v. Philip Morris U.S.A. Inc. · filed 2010-12-01(4)(d)

The statute of limitations for a wrongful death action is two years from the date of death. § 95.11(4)(d), Fla. Stat. (2008). ... The trial court correctly dismissed the amended complaint because Frank Capone’s personal injury claim had abated upon his death and Karen Capone was required to file a separate Wrongful Death claim, which she did not do prior to the expiration of the two-year statute of limitation for that cause of action.

Section 95.11(4)(d) gives wrongful death claims a two-year limitations period, but an amendment arising from the same transaction as the original complaint can relate back and avoid that time bar.

Roden v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. · filed 2014-08-13(4)(d)

The statute of limitations on a wrongful death claim is two years. § 95.11(4)(d), Fla. Stat. (2013). ... Roden however, argues that the wrongful death claim relates back to the filing of the complaint and is therefore not time-barred. We agree that the claim relates back.

Section 95.11(4)(d) sets a two-year limitations period for wrongful death claims.

Engle Cases 4432 Individual Tobacco v. Various Tobacco Companies · filed 2014-09-10(4)(d)

As any lawyer worth his salt knows, ... and claims brought pursuant to the ... Florida Wrongful Death Act are subject to a two-year limitations period, Fla. Stat. § 95.11(4)(d).

Section 95.11(4)(d) sets a two-year limitations period for wrongful death actions.

In re Engle Cases · filed 2017-10-18(4)(d)

Florida law imposes a two-year SOL on wrongful death actions.

Section 95.11(3)(a) (2022) gives a plaintiff four years to bring a negligence claim for an injury that occurred in 2022.

Broton v. Walmart, Inc. · filed 2024-08-26(3)(a)

The injury occurred in 2022, and Florida’s four-year statute of limitations has not run on any negligence claim Plaintiff may have against Whipple. § 95.11(3)(a), Fla. Stat. (2022).

Section 95.11(4)(d) allows a wrongful death action to be brought within two years of the decedent’s death.

Walls v. Armour Pharmaceutical Co. · filed 1993-07-19(4)(d)

I conclude that Florida’s wrongful death statute of limitation applies to the wrongful death action presently before the court, and that Mrs. Walls brought this wrongful death action well within the statute of limitation for such actions.

Section 95.11(4)(d) gives plaintiffs two years from the date of death to file a wrongful death action.

Foxworth Ex Rel. Estate of Durden v. Kia Motors · filed 2005-03-30(4)(d)

Therefore, pursuant to the two years limitations period provided by § 95.11(4)(d), absent tolling or some other delay, Plaintiffs in this matter would have had until October 16, 2001, in which to file their wrongful death actions.

Section 95.11(4)(d) gives wrongful death claims two years from the date of death; claims brought later are time barred unless they relate back to a timely complaint.

In re Engle Cases · filed 2014-09-12(4)(d)

Wrongful death actions, including those in Engle cases, are subject to a two-year statute of limitations. ... The limitations period begins to run at the date of death.

Section 95.11(4)(b)'s two-year medical-malpractice limitations period applies only when the injury arises from the provider's medical diagnosis, treatment, or care of the injured person.

JB v. Sacred Heart Hosp. of Pensacola · filed 1994-04-21(4)(b)

The key inquiry under the statute is whether the action "aris[es] out of any medical, dental, or surgical diagnosis, treatment, or care." ... According to the allegations in J.B.'s complaint, at the time the Hospital contacted him to drive his brother to Alabama, J.B. had no medical condition for which he sought medical services at the Hospital. His injury arose solely through the Hospital's use of him as a transporter. The simple question we must decide is whether this injury arose from the Hospital's medical diagnosis, treatment, or care of J.B. [3] Applying the law as set forth in Silva, we conclude that it did not. Accordingly, this suit is not a medical malpractice action for chapter 95 purposes and the two-year statute of limitations is inapplicable.

Section 95.11(3)(p) provides the applicable four-year limitations period when an action does not fall within one of the statute’s specific categories.

Epic Metals Corp. v. Condec, Inc. · filed 1994-08-01(3)(p)

Because section 540.08 does not provide its own limitations period and the action does not fall within any of the specific categories provided in Florida Statute § 95.11, the four year all inclusive statute of limitations is applicable. See Fla.Stat. § 95.11(3)(p).

Section 95.11(3) provides a four-year limitations period for actions other than recovery of real property, and the real-property-recovery exception does not cover a regulatory-taking compensation claim where the owner remains in possession.

Daugherty v. Sarasota County · filed 1994-09-20(3)

To provide consistency in all claims based on 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the state statute of limitations used for personal injury is applied. See, e.g., Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 275-276, 105 S.Ct. 1938, 1946-47, 85 L.Ed.2d 254 (1985). In Florida, this period is four years. Fla.Stat. § 95.11(3) (1993). Plaintiff argues that a four year statute of limitations under Florida Statutes, § 95.11, is not applicable in this case because it is entitled “Limitations other than for the recovery of real property.” Fla.Stat. § 95.11 (1993) (emphasis added). Plaintiff argues that this case involves recovery of real property and, therefore, is governed by a seven year statute of limitations, as specified in Florida Statutes § 95.12. However, as clarified in other sections of Florida Statutes, chapter 95, the “recovery of real property” contemplated as an exception to § 95.11 are actions such as adverse possession, wherein the real property is actually being occupied by a party other than the true owner. Such is not the case here. Rather, this case involves just compensation for a regulatory taking, with the true owner still occupying the property. Furthermore, should the personal injury statute of limitations not apply in this case, there would be great uncertainty regarding which statute of limitations is applicable. This is precisely the uncertainty the United States Supreme Court sought to avoid when it held that the state’s statute of limitations for personal injury governs claims brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Wilson, 471 U.S. at 275-276, 105 S.Ct. at 1946-47. Hence, the four year statute of limitations specified in Florida Statutes 95.11(3) is applicable in this case. Fla.Stat. § 95.11 (1993).

Section 95.11(3) provides the four-year limitations period borrowed for § 1983 actions in Florida; the court applied that period from the claim’s accrual date.

Rowe v. City of Fort Lauderdale · filed 1998-05-06(3)

The statute of limitations for § 1983 actions is borrowed from the forum state’s general (or residual) statute of limitations. ... In Florida, the applicable statute of limitations period is four years. Fla.Stat. § 95.11(3). According to the Amended Complaint, Rowe was convicted on December 14, 1984, and incarcerated thereafter. All conduct on the part of the City of which Rowe complains occurred before this conviction date. Hence, Rowe’s § 1983 claim, to the extent that it invokes the Fourth and Eighth Amendments, against the City expired with the end of the four year limitations period and cannot be raised thirteen years later in this 1997 action.

Section 95.11(3)(f) and (3)(p) impose a four-year limitations period on statutory-liability actions and actions without a specifically provided period.

Miller v. Anheuser Busch, Inc. · filed 2009-10-13(3)(f), (3)(p)

Florida Statute § 540.08 does not provide its own limitations period, so claims under the statute are governed by the four-year “catch-all” provision in Fla. Stat. § 95.11(3); see also Fla. Stat. §§ 95.11(3)(f) (four year limitations period for actions founded on a statutory liability), 95.11(3)(p) (four year limitations period for any action not specifically provided for in the statute). This limitation period begins to run on the date of the alleged unauthorized publication, not on the date such publication is discovered.

Section 95.11(2)(b) provides a five-year limitations period for obligations founded on written instruments, while section 95.11(3)(k) provides a four-year period for oral contracts.

In Re Whittaker · filed 1994-08-12(2)(b), (3)(k)

The statute of limitations on an obligation “founded on a written instrument” is five years. Fla.Stat. § 95.11(2)(b). ... Debtor/Husband defaulted on the second promissory note in May, 1983, the stated maturity date of the note, by failing to pay it. The limitations period began to run on the second note when the cause of action accrued in May, 1983, also more than five years prior to commencement of this case. Fla.Stat. § 95.031. Therefore, any claim based on this promissory note is likewise barred by the statute of limitations. ... In Florida, the statute of limitations on oral contracts is four years. Fla. Stat. § 95.11(3)(k). The limitations period begins to run from the time the cause of action accrues. Fla.Stat. § 95.031. Evidence introduced at the hearing indicates that repayment under the oral contracts was conditioned on the Debtor’s ability to pay, and that the Debtor has not yet satisfied this condition. Therefore, no cause of action has yet accrued, and the statute of limitations has not yet begun to run on the oral agreements.

Section 95.11(4)(b)'s two-year medical malpractice limitation does not apply to a physician's sexual battery of a patient when the act is unrelated to medical diagnosis, treatment, or care.

Buchanan v. Lieberman · filed 1988-05-26(4)(b)

Since the act complained of is not medical malpractice for the purposes of the medical malpractice statute of limitations, the two-year statute should not have been applied to bar this action.

Section 95.11 applies the four-year limitation for independent torts to alleged false imprisonment and battery in a medical setting, rather than the two-year medical malpractice limitation.

Garcia v. Psychiatric Institutes of America · filed 1994-05-13(3)(o), (4)(b)

Even though arising in a medical setting, the conduct alleged, if proven, constitutes the torts of false imprisonment and battery and thus is subject to the four year statute of limitations.

Section 95.11(4)(b) defines a medical malpractice action to include a tort or contract claim for monetary loss arising from medical diagnosis, treatment, or care.

Virginia Ins. Reciprocal v. Walker · filed 2000-08-01(4)(b)

Section 95.11(4)(b), Florida Statutes states, "An `action for medical malpractice' is defined as a claim in tort or in contract for damages because of the death, injury, or monetary loss to any person arising out of any medical, dental, or surgical diagnosis, treatment, or care by any provider of health care." When section 95.11 and 766.106 are read together, the definition of medical malpractice is broader, not narrower, than the definition in the former statute, section 768.44(1)(a).

Section 95.11(4)’s two-year medical malpractice limitations period cannot support dismissal when the complaint does not establish that the defendant rendered medical care or services.

Lane v. Health Options, Inc. · filed 2001-10-10(4)

A claim for medical malpractice is a “claim arising out of the rendering of, or the failure to render, medical care or services.” § 766.106(l)(a), Fla. Stat. (1999). There are no allegations in this complaint from which it could be determined as a matter of law, as the trial court did, that the HMO was “rendering” medical care or services. The allegation in the complaint that the decision by the HMO was a “negligent medical decision” was merely con-clusory. The dismissal on the ground that this is a medical malpractice case, based solely on the allegations of the complaint, was accordingly error.

Section 95.11(4)(b)'s two-year medical malpractice limitations period does not apply to a facility's negligent hiring, supervision, or retention claim based on a doctor's sexual assault unrelated to medical treatment.

Burke v. Snyder · filed 2005-03-02(4)(b)

As we explained above, the claim of sexual misconduct in this case is not a claim arising out of negligent medical treatment (malpractice). Therefore, the presuit requirements and two-year statute of limitations of the medical malpractice statute do not apply to appellant's claim against Nova for negligently hiring, supervising, or retaining Dr. Snyder.

Section 95.11 requires an action on a judgment or decree of a court outside Florida to be commenced within five years after entry of the judgment or it is barred by the statute of limitations.

In Re Ballato · filed 1995-08-21

According to the Trustee the applicable law is Florida Statute § 95.11 which provides that an action on a judgment or decree of any court, not of record of the State of Florida must be commenced within five years from the entry of the judgment or be barred by the statute of limitations. The underlying judgment in the present instance was a money judgment and was entered in 1974. The Debtor subsequently established his residence in the state of Florida in 1979. The F.D.I.C. did not take any collection action on the judgment until 1989, well beyond the five years provided by § 95.11. This being the case, this Court is satisfied that the claim of the F.D.I.C. is unenforceable, and by virtue of § 502(b) must be disallowed.

Section 95.11(2)(a) requires an action on a United States court judgment to be commenced within five years of entry, including an action seeking a writ of garnishment.

Kilby v. Ilgen (In Re Kilby) · filed 1996-06-04(2)(a)

Fla.Stat. § 95.11 provides, “Actions other than for the recovery of real property shall be commenced as follows: (1) Within twenty years — An action on a judgment or decree of a court of record in this state. (2) Within five years — (a) An action on a judgment or decree of any court, not of record, of this state or any court of the United States, any other state or territory in the United States, or a foreign country.” ... Therefore, an action on a federal judgment in Florida must be commenced within five years of entry. ... Procedurally, the Court finds that seeking a writ of garnishment is an “action on a judgment.” ... Therefore, the act of seeking a writ of garnishment is an “action on a judgment.”

Section 95.11(2) does not bar an action without evidence establishing that the attached judgment is a judgment in personam.

Pennsylvania Co. for Insurances on Lives & Granting Annuities v. Watt · filed 1945-11-14(2)

In any event, it was error to hold that the action was barred by Section 95.11 (2) of the Florida Statutes Annotated without evidence to establish beyond doubt that the judgment annexed to the complaint was a judgment in personam.

Section 95.11 bars a claim based on a foreign judgment when it is not commenced within the applicable seven year period, subject to tolling under section 95.07.

Cicurel v. Galton · filed 1976-09-21

Appellant’s first affirmative defense set forth that appellee’s claim, based on the foreign judgment, was barred by Section 95.11, Florida Statutes (1974), because the cause of action was not commenced within the seven year period allowed by the statute of limitations. However, Section 95.07, Florida Statutes (1974), provides that this seven year period will be tolled during any period of time, after a cause of action has accrued against a person, if he is out of the State of Florida. Our review of the record indicates that, at the time the trial court entered summary judgment in favor of appellee, it was unclear as to what period of time appellant has been in the State of Florida. Therefore, this question presented a genuine issue of a material fact that was not sufficiently resolved to entitle appellee to a summary judgment.

Section 95.11(2)(a) requires an action on a judgment or decree of any court of the United States to be commenced within five years of the judgment or decree.

Kiesel v. Graham · filed 1980-09-10(2)(a)

We, therefore, conclude that Section 95.11(2)(a), Florida Statutes, is controlling in this cause.

Section 95.11(4)(a) gives professional-malpractice claims a two-year discovery-based limitations period, but a corporation is not charged with an officer’s knowledge when the officer acts entirely adversely to the corporation.

Beck v. Deloitte & Touche · filed 1998-06-23(4)(a)

This Florida limitation period runs from “the time the cause of action is discovered or should have been discovered with the exercise of due diligence.” Id. In normal circumstances, the knowledge of a corporation’s directors (and therefore their discovery of malpractice) is imputed to the corporation. ... As the Florida courts have recognized, “an exception to the imputation rule exists where an individual is acting adversely to the corporation. In that situation, the officer’s knowledge and conduct are not imputed to the corporation.”

For a professional-malpractice claim, the limitations period begins when the injury is discovered or should have been discovered with due diligence and the claimant has reason to believe that malpractice may possibly have occurred; actual knowledge of the particular defendant's negligence is not required.

Arrington v. Walgreen Co. · filed 2011-03-02(4)(a)

Florida law provides that an action seeking to recover damages caused by professional malpractice must be brought within two years. Fla. Stat. § 95.11(4). This “period of limitations shall run from the time the cause of action is discovered or should have been discovered with the exercise of due diligence.” Fla. Stat. § 95.11(4)(a). ... In light of these holdings, we agree with the district court that Arrington’s action is barred by Florida’s two-year statute of limitations. Arrington does not dispute that the prescription was improper or whether she knew that the prescription caused her mother’s injury. Indeed, the only information Arrington did not know was whether Walgreen engaged in any negligent conduct in dispensing the medication. But Arrington was aware that some negligence likely occurred, and in fact met with an attorney and ultimately brought timely malpractice claims against other potential tortfeasors. ... Under these circumstances, she thus had “reason to believe that [professional] malpractice may possibly have occurred,” and accordingly the statute of limitations commenced at that time. Tanner, 618 So. 2d at 182.

Section 95.11(4)(a)'s two-year professional malpractice period runs from when the claimant discovers, or with due diligence should discover, an accrued cause of action; notice of possible negligence alone does not establish notice of injury or damages.

Birnholz v. Blake · filed 1981-05-19(4)(a)

The relevant provisions of Section 95.11(4)(a) provide: "that the period of limitations shall run from the time the cause of action is discovered or should have been discovered with the exercise of due diligence." ... In the present case, though Birnholz knew of the existence of our decision in Steisel I which ordered dismissal of his cause of action for want of prosecution, that knowledge alone was not dispositive of the question. Birnholz was only put on notice of the possible negligence of his attorneys and not of his injury or damages.

Section 95.11 provides a four-year limitations period for tortious interference and a two-year limitations period for defamation.

Primerica Financial Services, Inc. v. Mitchell · filed 1999-01-13(3)(o), (4)(g)

The applicable statute of limitations for a claim of tortious interference is , four years, Fla.Stat. § 95.11(3)(o); see also Farish v. Bankers Multiple Line Ins. Co., 425 So.2d 12, 16 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982), while defamation is covered by a two-year statute of limitations. See Fla.Stat. § 95.11(4)(g).

Section 95.11(4)(g) gives defamation claims a two-year limitations period, accruing when the allegedly defamatory material is published.

Kalmanson v. Nofziger (In Re Nofziger) · filed 2006-11-27(4)(g)

Florida has a two-year limitations period for defamation actions. Fla. Stat. § 95.11(4)(g). Florida courts have held that a cause of action for defamation accrues on publication of the allegedly defamatory material. ... Accordingly, the time period in which Kalmanson may bring a defamation action against Nofziger was tolled until 30 days after the expiration of the automatic stay, which had not occurred as of the date Kalmanson initiated this adversary proceeding. As such, based upon the sketchy information pled in the Amended Complaint, it does not appear, at least upon a motion to dismiss, that the statute of limitations has expired. Of course, upon introduction of evidence, this ruling may change, depending upon the dates the various statements were made.

Section 95.11 sets four-year limitation periods for several tort and warranty-related claims and a five-year period for breach of express warranty.

Senger Bros. Nursery, Inc. v. E.I. Dupont De Nemours & Co. · filed 1999-02-05(2)(b), (3)(a), (3)(b), (3)(e), (3)(j), (3)(k), and (3)(p)

Florida Statutes require claims for strict liability, negligence, fraud, breach of implied warranty, and breach of oral contracts to be commenced within four (4) years. See Fla.Stat. § 95.11(3)(a), (e), (j), (k), and (p). Florida Statutes, further, require claims for breach of express warranty to be brought within five (5) years. See Fla.Stat. § 95.11(2)(b).

Section 95.11(4)(g) sets a two-year statute of limitations for defamation claims under Florida law.

Bloom v. Peacock · filed 2012-11-19(4)(g)

The statute of limitations for a defamation cause of action under Florida law is two years. Fla. Stat. § 95.11(4)(g).

Section 95.11(4)(g) imposes a two-year statute of limitations on defamation claims.

Barbuto v. Miami Herald Media Company · filed 2021-09-17(4)(g)

Under Florida law, a two-year statute of limitations applies to claims for defamation. See Fla. Stat. § 95.11(4)(g).

Section 95.11(5)(h) imposes a two-year statute of limitations on defamation claims.

Lakatos v. Envision Healthcare · filed 2025-04-28(5)(h)

Florida law imposes a two-year statute of limitations on defamation claims, Fla. Stat. § 95.11(5)(h), the limitations period begins to run from the time the cause of action accrues, Fla. Stat. § 95.031, and a defamation cause of action accrues on the date of publication, Fla. Stat. § 770.07.

Section 95.11(4)(g) sets a two-year limitations period for defamation claims.

Bloom v. Miami-Dade County · filed 2011-09-16(4)(g)

the statute of limitations for defamation claims is two years. Fla. Stat. § 95.11(4)(g). ... As the present complaint does not reveal any specific defamatory or libelous or slanderous statements by Sergeant DiBernardo or Officer Peacock within the relevant period, i.e., two years prior to May 9, 2009, dismissal is required.

Section 95.11(4)(g) gives defamation claims a two-year limitations period, even when the claims are reasserted as fraud claims.

Weeks v. Town of Palm Beach · filed 2018-07-25(4)(g)

The statute of limitations for a defamation suit is two years. See § 95.11(4)(g), Fla. Stat. (2012) ; Wagner, Nugent, Johnson, Roth, Romano, Erikson & Kupfer, P.A. v. Flanagan , 629 So.2d 113, 114 (Fla. 1993). ... The application of the two-year statute of limitations, as opposed to the four-year statute of limitations as argued by Weeks, is based upon our prior determination that the second amended complaint is nothing more than a reassertion of the defamation claims in the guise of fraud claims.

Section 95.11(4)(g) sets a two-year limitations period for defamation suits.

JASON WEEKS v. TOWN OF PALM BEACH · filed 2018-07-25(4)(g)

The statute of limitations for a defamation suit is two years.

Section 95.11(4)(g)’s two-year period for libel and slander claims based on an NPDB report begins when the report is issued; later releases do not start a new period.

Ashraf v. Adventist Health System/Sunbelt, Inc. · filed 2016-07-01(4)(g)

We adopt Pierson and hold that the two-year statute of limitations begins to run when a report is issued to the NPDB; any subsequent issuance of that report to legally authorized entities does not accrue a new limitations period.

Section 95.11(4)(g) imposes a two-year limitations period on Florida libel and slander actions that begins when the defamatory statement is published, rather than when the plaintiff discovers it.

Molenda v. Hoechst Celanese Corp. · filed 1999-03-16(4)(g)

Actions for libel and slander brought under Florida law are limited by a two year statute of limitations. ... The two-year limitation period begins to run on the publication of the allegedly defamatory statement, not on the discovery of the statement by the plaintiff.

Section 95.11(2)(a) applies a five-year limitations period when a federal district court judgment is enforced in the same district court.

Beatty v. Raton · filed 1999-03-25(2)(a)

We therefore hold that, under such circumstances, the five-year limitations period set forth in Fla. Stat. Ann. §95.11(2)(a) controls.

The five-year limitations period in § 95.11(2)(a) does not bar a proceeding to enforce a judgment through registration and a writ of execution, including a garnishment proceeding.

Milliken & Co. v. HAIMA GROUP CORP. · filed 2009-08-18(2)(a)

Upon review of the pleadings and the applicable law, this Court finds that Plaintiffs action is not time barred by Fla. Stat. § 95.11(2)(a).

Section 95.11 requires an action for libel or slander to be commenced within four years of publication.

Bair v. Palm Beach Newspapers, Inc. · filed 1982-06-01

Section 95.11, Florida Statutes, provides that an action for libel or slander must be commenced within four years. On January 22, 1979, the plaintiff filed an amended complaint against Palm Beach Newspapers, Inc. adding, for the first time, a count for defamation against the defendant based upon the news article which appeared in the Daily News. Since this claim was commenced more than four years from publication it is barred by the statute of limitations.

Section 95.11(4)(g) sets a two-year limitations period for defamation claims; a factual dispute about when publication occurred can prevent a finding that the claim is barred.

Hager v. Venice Hospital, Inc. · filed 1996-10-30(4)(g)

There is an issue of fact as to when publication of the alleged defamatory statements occurred. Therefore, the Court finds that Hager’s Count VIII is not barred by the two-year statute of limitations provided in Section 95.11(4)(g), Fla.Stat. (1995).

Section 95.11(4)(g)'s two-year limitations period for credit slander begins anew each time the allegedly slanderous credit report is republished.

Musto v. Bell South Telecommunications · filed 1999-07-14(4)(g)

In summary, we join those jurisdictions which have held the two-year statute of limitations in credit slander cases begins to run anew on each republication of the allegedly slanderous credit report.

Section 95.11(4)(g) gives defamation claims a two-year limitations period; equitable estoppel does not bar the limitations defense absent conduct inducing the plaintiff to forbear timely suit.

Ovadia v. Bloom · filed 2000-03-01(4)(g)

The two-year statute of limitations on Dr. Ovadia's defamation action expired on February 5, 1995.[1] ... Here, however, there is no record evidence that Dr. Ovadia was induced by defendants' actions to forebear filing his suit in state court. ... Based on this reasoning, the trial court correctly entered summary judgment in defendant's favor on the defamation claim, as the statute of limitations on that claim had run, and none of Dr. Ovadia's arguments were availing to revive the action.

Section 95.11(4)(g)'s two year limitations period applies to disparagement or slander of title, including when raised as a permissive counterclaim.

Callaway Land & Cattle Co., Inc. v. Banyon Lakes C. Corp. · filed 2002-12-04(4)(g)

In light of the fact that a permissive counterclaim is subject to the applicable statute of limitations, the trial court correctly held that the action for disparagement of title was barred by the two year statute of limitations under section 95.11(4)(g), Florida Statutes (1999).

Section 95.11(4)(g) sets a two-year limitations period for libel and slander actions.

Diaz v. KAPLAN UNIVERSITY · filed 2008-07-31(4)(g)

Florida law imposes a two-year statute of limitations for actions of libel or slander. Fla. Stat. § 95.11 (4)(g). Plaintiff states that he learned of his slander cause of action on February 23, 2006, during his conversation with Ms. Dufrene. Plaintiff's Amended Complaint, which added this cause of action, was filed one day before the statute of limitations expired.

Section 95.11(4)(g) sets the limitations deadline for defamation actions; a claim is barred after that deadline expires.

Canonico v. Callaway · filed 2010-01-06(4)(g)

His lawsuit was thereafter barred by the applicable statute of limitations.

Section 95.11(4)(g) provides a two-year limitations period for defamation actions.

Green v. Palatka Daily News · filed 2013-03-08(4)(g)

Section 95.11(4)(g), Florida Statutes (2011), provides for a two-year limitations period for defamation actions. ... Green had until October 16, 2011, to bring a defamation claim and failed to do so.

Section 95.11(2)(b) gives a claimant five years from the date of the accident to file a PIP claim.

Fladd v. Fortune Ins. Co. · filed 1988-08-10(2)(b)

Appellant was injured on March 28, 1981. Appellant's cause of action accrued on that date. Appellant did not file suit against appellee until May 29, 1986. The five-year statute of limitations had run. Appellant's claim was barred.

Under Fla. Stat. § 95.11(2)(b), a breach-of-contract action on an insurance contract accrues when the contract is breached, so the limitations period does not run separately from each installment when the claim concerns the amount owed under the original policy.

Dinerstein v. Paul Revere Ins. · filed 1999-04-23(2)(b)

Under Florida law, a "legal or equitable action on a contract, obligation, or liability founded on a written instrument" must be commenced within five years. Fla. Stat. § 95.11(2)(b) (1995). The Florida Supreme Court has held that, under § 95.11(2)(b), a breach of contract action on an insurance contract accrues on the date the contract is breached.

Section 95.11(4)(e) requires a Chapter 517 action to be filed within two years after discovery and imposes an absolute five-year bar running from the violation date.

Medalie v. FSC Securities Corp. · filed 2000-02-01(4)(e)

This statute has been held to bar any action for violation of Chapter 517, Florida Statutes, commenced after the expiration of five years from the date of the violation regardless of whether the facts giving rise to the cause of action were known by the plaintiff. ... Moreover, the cases show that the cause of action accrues for purposes of the five year limitations period at the time the securities were purchased. ... Accordingly, because the allegedly fraudulent conduct was discovered more than two years after the complaint was filed and because the securities were purchased more than 11 years before the complaint was filed, Count I is barred by the statute of limitations in § 95.11(4)(e) and is therefore dismissed.

Section 95.11(3)(p) provides a four-year residual limitations period for personal-injury actions in Florida.

Erick v. Border Patrol of FL State · filed 2005-11-14(3)(p)

Florida law provides multiple statutes of limitations for personal injury actions, and a residual limitations period of four years. Fla. Stat. § 95.11(3)(p); Baker v. Gulf & W. Indus., 850 F.2d 1480, 1481-83 (11th Cir. 1988).

Section 95.11(3)(p) sets Florida’s residual statute of limitations for personal injury actions at four years, which applies to § 1983 claims.

Smith v. Belle · filed 2009-03-20(3)(p)

Florida is a state with multiple statutes of limitations for personal injury actions, and Florida’s residual limitations period is four years. Fla. Stat. § 95.11(3)(p).

Section 95.11(3)(p) gives actions not specifically provided for elsewhere a four-year limitations period, which begins when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury and who inflicted it; ignorance of legal rights does not toll the period.

Steven v. McKillop · filed 2006-08-10(3)(p)

Here, it is clear from the face of Steven’s complaint that her injury occurred on January 28, 2000, the date of her termination, and that she was aware of who inflicted the injury at that time. Thus, Steven’s cause of action against the defendants in this case accrued on January 28, 2000, and she had four years from that date in which to file her complaint. The fact that Steven may not have been aware of any possible legal recourse at that time does not change this fact or toll the limitations period.

Section 95.11(2)(b) gives breach-of-contract claims a five-year limitations period measured from accrual of the claim.

Tingley Systems, Inc. v. Healthlink, Inc. · filed 2007-05-08(2)(b)

The statute of limitations for breach of contract actions is five years from when the claim accrues, which is when “the last element constituting the cause of action accrues.” Fla. Stat. §§ 95.11(2)(b); 95.031(1).

For professional malpractice other than medical malpractice, the statute sets a two-year limitations period running from when the cause of action was discovered or should have been discovered with due diligence.

Design Pallets, Inc. v. Grayrobinson, P.A. · filed 2007-08-06(4)(a)

Under Fla. Stat. § 95.11(4)(a), the statute of limitations for an action for professional malpractice, other than medical malpractice, is set at two years “provided that the period of limitations shall run from the time the cause of action is discovered or should have been discovered with the exercise of due diligence.”

Section 95.11(4)(a) gives professional malpractice claims against pharmacists a two-year limitations period that begins when the cause of action is discovered or should have been discovered with due diligence.

Arrington v. Walgreen Co. · filed 2009-10-09(4)(a)

The statute of limitations for professional malpractice claims against pharmacists under Florida law is two years. ... However, the two-year clock for professional malpractice begins ticking “from the time the cause of action is discovered or should have been discovered with the exercise of due diligence.” Fla. Stat. § 95.11(4)(a).

Section 95.11(3)(f) requires an action founded on a statutory liability to be commenced within four years.

Sundance Apartments I, Inc. v. General Electric Capital Corp. · filed 2008-05-06(3)(f)

“Actions other than for recovery of real property shall be commenced ... [wjithin four years ... [if][a]n action [is] founded on a statutory liability.” Fla. Stat. § 95.11(3)(f) (2006). “It is axiomatic that under Florida law, a cause of action accrues, for statute of limitations purposes ‘when the last element constituting the cause of action occurs.’ ” ... Accepting the facts pleaded in the Amended Complaint as true, Sun-dance’s cause of action accrued within the applicable four-year statute of limitations.

Section 95.11 applies the limitations periods for legal actions to corresponding equitable claims, and a fraud-based legal or equitable action has a four-year limitations period.

In Re Biddiscombe Intern., LLC · filed 2008-08-13(6), (3)(j)

Under Florida law, the statutes of limitations for actions at law also will apply to the same subject matters at equity. Fla. Stat. § 95.11(6) (2007). The statute of limitations for a legal or equitable action founded upon fraud is four years. Fla. Stat. § 95.11(3)(j). A cause of action founded upon fraud accrues when the facts giving rise to the cause of action "were discovered or should have been discovered with the exercise of due diligence..." but must commence within 12 years of the date of commission of the fraud. Fla. Stat. § 95.031(2). The fraud in this case was discovered at some time after the sale on October 25, 2004. This action was commenced on July 28, 2006, well within four years of discovery. Therefore, neither laches nor the statute of limitations bar this action.

Section 95.11(2)(b) provides a five-year limitations period for contract actions, and a limitations period extinguishes the remedy rather than the underlying right.

Suntrust Bank v. Ritter · filed 2018-02-01(2)(b)

Florida law, on the other hand, requires that an action on a contract be commenced within five years or it will be barred. Fla. Stat. § 95.11(2)(b). ... Because statutes of limitations constitute procedural matters, the trial court should have applied Tennessee’s statute of limitations for actions on contracts.

Section 95.11(3)(k) gives four years to sue on a contract not founded on a written instrument, with the period generally running from the breach.

Rubio v. FEDCA Scrap Recycling Corp · filed 2022-03-25(3)(k)

Florida law provides a five-year limitation period for breaches of written contracts and a four-year limitation period for breaches of a contract not founded on a written instrument. Fla. Stat. § 95.11(2)(b), (3)(k). ... “Generally, a cause of action on a contract accrues and the statute of limitations begins to run from the time of the breach of contract.” ... Because it is not clear when the breach would accrue for purposes of the statute of limitations, it is not apparent from the face of the complaint that the statute of limitations bars recovery for breach of contract. ... Any claim premised on a breach which occurred within four years of February 17, 2021, would not be barred.

Section 95.11(2)(e) requires an action for breach of a property insurance contract to be filed within five years of the loss, and a later communication about that loss does not restart the limitations period.

Strimchuk · filed 2025-12-12(2)(e)

Under Florida law, “an action for breach of a property insurance contract[]” must be brought within five years, “with the period running from the date of the loss.” Fla. Stat. § 95.11(2)(e). ... To the contrary, the plain language of Section 95.11(2)(e) provides that the limitations period runs “from the date of the loss.” Fla. Stat. § 95.11(2)(e). Strimchuk’s decision to revisit the denial of his claims in 2025, or even to reassert the claims, does nothing to alter the “date[s] of the loss[es,]” which undisputably occurred in 2018. Communicating with Great American about a past loss does not constitute a new loss.

Section 95.11(2)(b) requires a contract action based on a written instrument to be filed within five years after the cause of action accrues.

Hood v. Hood · filed 1980-12-03(2)(b)

It is clear that the statute of limitations does not bar wife's claim. Section 95.11(2)(b), Florida Statutes (1977) provides that a legal or equitable action on a contract obligation or liability founded on a written instrument must be commenced within five years from the accrual of a cause of action. ... Since there is no indication that payments were not current as of the date of dissolution of the parties' marriage, May 25, 1976, no cause of action on behalf of wife for lack of payment existed as of that date. Thus, the limitation period would not expire until May, 1981.

Section 95.11(3)’s limitations period for an action on an insurance policy begins when required arbitration occurs or the insurer waives or denies it.

Kilbreath v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. · filed 1981-07-01(3)

Consequently, since an action on an insurance policy is a contract action, the statute of limitations on an action on the policy does not begin to run until arbitration has occurred or has been waived or denied by the insurance company.

Section 95.11(3)'s four-year limitations period for an insurer's indemnity claim begins when the insurer satisfies its indemnity liability.

Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. Rojas · filed 1982-02-16(3)

We hold that an insurer's indemnity claim accrues and the statute of limitations begins to run when the indemnity liability is satisfied. ... Since each of the provisions under subsection (3) defines a four year limitation period, the distinction is not crucial.

A timely negligence suit against the tortfeasor is not barred as to a later-joined liability insurer; the insurer’s derivative liability does not accrue until judgment against its insured.

State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Robinson · filed 1988-07-28(3)(a)

It does not change the established rule that a cause of action against a liability insurer by its insured does not accrue until the entry of judgment against the insured. The insurer’s liability is entirely derivative. It must indemnify its insured for any judgment rendered against him (here Lockley). That did not occur in this case until the final judgment was rendered. Therefore, the statute of limitations has not run against State Farm in this case, although it was properly joined as a real party in interest during the course of the proceedings against Lockley.

The five-year limitation period for a claim under a written insurance contract begins when the insurer specifically refuses to pay the claim.

Donovan v. ST. FARM FIRE AND CAS. CO. · filed 1991-02-13(2)(b)

In regard to insurance contracts, a specific refusal to pay a claim is the breach which triggers the cause of action and begins the statute of limitations running.

Section 95.11(2)(b)’s five-year limitations period for a PIP benefits contract claim begins when the insurer breaches the contract.

Levy v. Travelers Ins. Co. · filed 1991-04-10(2)(b)

We hold that the tolling of the five-year statute of limitations commences upon the breach of the insurance contract.

The five-year limitations period for an insurer’s breach of its duty to defend begins after all related claims against the insured have been finally resolved.

Grissom v. Commercial Union Ins. Co. · filed 1992-12-22(2)(b)

Grissom was entitled, indeed required, to await the final resolution of all cases and claims arising out of Grissom having blocked the watercourse drainage cases before suing Commercial Union to avoid splitting his cause of action.

The five-year limitation period for a life insurance claim based on a presumption of death begins no earlier than the end of the five-year presumptive-death period.

Hopper v. Dependable Life Insurance · filed 1993-03-10(2)(b)

Mrs. Hopper’s cause of action did not accrue earlier than the expiration of the five year period, February 6, 1985. ... Since Mrs. Hopper brought her action within five years of the accrual of her cause of action, the statute of limitations did not bar the action.

Section 95.11(2)(b) allows five years to sue for unpaid PIP benefits under a written insurance contract, beginning when the insurer breaches its obligation to pay.

State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Lee · filed 1996-08-22(2)(b)

After careful consideration, we adopt the Third and Fourth Districts' position on this issue. Using the date the insurance contract is breached is the most logical event to begin the running of the statute of limitations. Section 95.11(2)(b), Florida Statutes (1995), provides that a "legal or equitable action on a contract, obligation, or liability founded on a written instrument" should be commenced within five years.

Section 95.11(2)(b)'s five-year period for an action to compel appraisal begins when the policy conditions precedent have been performed or waived and appraisal is refused.

Chimerakis v. Sentry Ins. Mut. Co. · filed 2001-12-05(2)(b)

Pursuant to Section 95.11(2)(b), Florida Statutes (1995), a legal or equitable action on a contractual obligation or liability founded on a written instrument must be commenced within five years. ... Therefore, an action to compel appraisal does not accrue until the policy conditions precedent have been performed or waived, and appraisal is then refused.

Section 95.11(2)(b)’s five-year period for an insurance contract claim runs from the alleged breach; payments that leave supplemental claims open do not start it.

Rizo v. State Farm Florida Insurance Co. · filed 2014-02-05(2)(b)

On this record, the complaint did not allege any breach of the insurance policy until 2010. ... Measuring the five-year limitations period from the alleged 2010 breach regarding her supplemental claim, Ms. Rizo’s lawsuit was timely and was not barred.

Under § 95.11(2)(b), partial insurance payments that do not settle all claims do not start the five-year limitations period for a later breach claim; the breach occurs when the insurer denies that claim.

Juan Luciano and Vickie Luciano v. United Property & Casualty Insurance Company · filed 2015-01-28(2)(b)

Therefore, the checks issued by United in 2006 merely evidence performance under the insurance policy and United’s alleged breach did not occur until ... United denied the claim for roof replacement in 2010. ... Given that this action was commenced in 2011, the Homeowners’ lawsuit was timely.

Section 95.11(2)(b) requires an action for breach of a property insurance contract to be filed within five years after the cause of action accrues.

Nieve & Marisol Linares v. Universal Property & Casualty · filed 2014-07-02(2)(b)

The applicable statute of limitations provides that an action for breach of a property insurance contract must be filed within five years of the cause of action accruing. See § 95.11(2)(b), Florida Statutes (2010).

Section 95.11(2)(b) gives a claimant five years to sue on a written insurance contract, beginning when the insurer breaches it; later monthly underpayments do not restart the period when the dispute concerns coverage under the original policy.

Dinerstein v. Paul Revere Life Insurance · filed 1999-04-23(2)(b)

Under Florida law, a "legal or equitable action on a contract, obligation, or liability founded on a written instrument" must be commenced within five years. Fla. Stat. § 95.11(2)(b) (1995). ... The cause of action here is not for a debt payable by installments; it is rather a cause of action seeking to define the rights and obligations of the parties under the original insurance contract. The Florida Supreme Court has directly addressed this issue and held that a breach of contract action on an insurance contract accrues on the date the contract is breached.

Section 95.11(3)(o) provides a four-year limitations period for actions seeking relief for slander of title and intentional infliction of emotional distress.

Madura v. Lakebridge Condominium Associationi · filed 2010-06-14(3)(o)

Under Florida law, Plaintiffs had four years to commence suit for slander of title and intentional infliction of emotional distress, see Fla. Stat. § 95.11(3)(o); Plaintiffs had two years from the alleged violation to file suit under the Florida Consumer Collection Practices Act (“FCCPA”). See Fla. Stat. §559.77(4).

Section 95.11(3)(c) imposes a four-year limitations period on claims arising from construction of improvements to real property, accruing for latent defects upon construction and for patent defects upon discovery or when they should have been discovered with due diligence.

Traveler Indemnity Co. of Conn. v. Centimark Corp. · filed 2010-09-30(3)(c)

Under § 95.11(3)(c), a cause of action arising from a latent defect arises upon construction of the improvement, while a cause of action arising from a patent defect only arises “from the time the defect is discovered or should have been discovered with the exercise of due diligence.” ... The record conclusively demonstrates that Camilo had discovered defects in Defendant’s roofing work soon after its completion in 1993. Therefore, Plaintiffs claims are barred by the pertinent statute of limitations found in Section 95.11(3)(c), Florida Statutes.

Section 95.11(4)(a) imposes a two-year limitation period on professional-malpractice claims, subject to delayed discovery, so accrual depends on when the plaintiff discovered or should have discovered the claim.

Welt v. EfloorTrade, LLC (In Re Phoenix Diversified Investment Corp.) · filed 2010-11-01(4)(a)

The two year limitation period under Florida Statutes § 95.11(4)(a) applies to the Trustee’s professional negligence claim. ... A statutory exception known as the “delayed discovery doctrine” applies to certain causes of action, including professional malpractice claims. ... The period of limitations for an action for professional malpractice commences when the plaintiff either discovers the cause of action or should have discovered the cause of action with the exercise of due diligence.

Section 95.11(4)(a) imposes a two-year limitations period on professional malpractice claims, including breach-of-warranty claims arising from a pharmacist's negligent prescription filling.

Kasterowicz v. Walgreen Co. · filed 2014-12-22(4)(a)

Thus, claims of breach of warranty arising out of the alleged negligence of a pharmacist in filling a prescription must be brought within two years.

Section 95.11(4)(b) sets a two-year limitations period for medical-malpractice actions, but Florida's period does not apply when Florida law did not create the plaintiff's common-law causes of action.

Henderson v. Laser Spine Institute LLC · filed 2011-09-28(4)(b)

The foreign statutory enactment exception would permit application of Florida’s statute of limitations only if a Florida statute created the present cause of action. ... Florida statutory law did not create the right sought to be enforced here.

Section 95.11(3)(f) provides a four-year limitations period for actions founded on statutory liability.

Kaufman v. Swire Pacific Holdings, Inc. · filed 2011-12-27(3)(f)

First, Defendant argues that Plaintiff waited too long to bring his F.S. § 718.202 claims. Florida law provides a plaintiff with four years to bring an action founded on a statutory liability. Fla. Stat. § 95.11(3)(f). ... Furthermore, Plaintiffs F.S. § 718.202 claim does relate back to the original complaint. ... Thus, even if this Court accepts the dates offered by Defendant for when the statute of limitations began to run, Plaintiffs claim is timely.