Fla. Stat. § 95.11

Section 95.11(3) bars claims tied to the opening of the accounts as untimely, but does not bar negligence damages that accrued from later illicit transactions.

Anderson v. Branch Banking & Trust Co. ex rel. BankAtlantic, LLC · filed 2015-07-28(3)

Although the Court has determined that the Negligence Plaintiffs may not pursue those claims related to the opening of the Disputed Accounts as they are barred by the applicable statute of limitations, Fla. Stat. § 95.11(3), the totality of the negligence alleged will not be cast aside. ... Thus, the Negligence Plaintiffs’ claims accrued when the Disputed Accounts were opened, as well as when monies were transferred out of them for allegedly improper purposes.

The three year limitation applies to the cause of action, and when a claim arises after the defendant's death, the period begins when administration is granted.

Berger v. Jackson · filed 1945-07-20(5)(e)

That section of the statute of limitations applies to the “cause of action” only. The court below was evidently of the opinion, and so are we, that where a cause of action accrues after the death of the person against whom it lies, the limitation does not begin to run until there is a grant of administration of the estate.

The limitations period for an oral contract claim begins when the debt is due; when payment is postponed until death, it begins at the promisor's death absent earlier repudiation.

Schenkel v. Atlantic National Bank of Jacksonville · filed 1962-05-17(5)(e)

On the authority of this case we think that the Circuit Court correctly struck the second defense but erred in assigning it as a ground for the new trial.

Section 95.11(7)(b) gives a one-year period to sue for wages, beginning when continuous employment ends if no payment date is fixed.

Miami Beach First National Bank v. Borbiro · filed 1967-08-01(7)(b)

If a contract, express or implied, is an entire one for continuous services over an indefinite period of time and does not fix a time when compensation shall be payable, the Statute of Limitations does not run until the employment is ended, because the action does not accrue until the termination of the employment. ... The plaintiff was thus entitled to recover for the value of the services she rendered for the full period of her employment. Consequently, the one year Statute of Limitations would not bar her claim for the reasonable value of the services she rendered to the decedent during the three year period of her employment.

The five-year limitation period begins when the insured's liability is finally determined by judgment.

Gilbert v. American Casualty Company of Reading, Pennsylvania · filed 1969-02-18(3)

... the instant law suit is barred by the five year statute of limitations set forth in § 95.11(3) Fla. Stat., F.S.A. ... We hold that the five year statute of limitation began to run with the rendering of that order.

For a contract claim not under seal, the five year limitation period begins when the cause of action accrues; here, accrual occurred when the third-party litigation ended.

Continental Casualty Co. v. Florida Power & Light Co. · filed 1969-04-22(3)

Continental's remaining point urges that the court erred in not finding that Florida Power & Light's action was barred by the statute of limitations, § 95.11 (3), Fla. Stat., F.S.A. ... We hold that Florida Power & Light's cause of action, a right to recover expenses incurred in defending a third-party action resulting from Continental's refusal to defend the third-party action in violation of its contractual duty, did not accrue until the third-party litigation ended.

The limitations period for a personal injury action based on an implied warranty begins when the defect is discovered or reasonably should have been discovered.

Creviston v. General Motors Corporation · filed 1969-07-02(5)(e)

From the rationale of the three cases discussed above, we conclude in an action on implied warranty for personal injury under the facts of this case, the three-year statute of limitations, F.S. Section 95.11(5) (e), F.S.A., begins to run from the time Petitioner first discovered, or reasonably should have discovered the defect constituting the breach of warranty.

Section 95.11(6) starts the limitations period for a usury action when the borrower makes a payment.

Financial Fed. Sav. & L. Ass'n v. Burleigh House, Inc. · filed 1974-11-12(6)

A borrower at a usurious interest is given a cause of action for the imposition of a penalty or forfeiture upon the occurrence of a payment, and it is from the date of such a payment the Statute of Limitations begins to run.

Section 95.11(5)(c) gives three years for actions involving taking, detaining, or injuring goods or chattels, with accrual potentially depending on when the claimant discovered or should have discovered the cause of action.

Hart v. Hart · filed 1970-04-21(5)(c)

In the case at bar the jury, not the court in this summary judgment proceeding, was the trier of the fact as to when the statute of limitations began to run, so the circuit court erred in holding as a matter of law that the plaintiff’s cause of action was barred by the statute of limitations.

For a wrongful death action, subsection (6) requires commencement within two years of accrual.

Walker v. Beech Aircraft Corp. · filed 1975-10-14(6)

It is our opinion that the intent of § 95.11(6), Fla. Stat., F.S.A., is to limit the commencement of actions to two years from the time of their accrual. Here, appellant's cause of action accrued at the date of her husband's death, which fact was known to appellant as of the date of death, and the two year statute of limitations commenced to run on that date.

Section 95.11(3)'s limitations period for a written-contract claim begins when the underlying money liability is finally and fully adjudicated.

EMPLOYERS'FIRE INS. CO. v. Continental Ins. Co. · filed 1976-01-07(3)

For these reasons, we hold that the time period for measuring a statute of limitations commences at the time a litigant's liabilities or rights have been finally and fully adjudicated.

For a breach of a covenant of warranty involving an undisclosed sovereign interest, the limitations period begins when the grantee becomes aware of that interest.

Rowell v. All · filed 1977-11-22(2)

There being no Florida precedent requiring that ruling, we decline to run the statute of limitations against a grantee in possession who is unaware of the sovereign's undisclosed interest and of his own constructive eviction. Rather, we adopt the view of cases holding that the statute of limitations for such a breach of the covenant of warranty does not begin to run until the grantee becomes aware of the sovereign's theretofore undisclosed interest.

Section 95.11's two-year medical malpractice limitations period begins when the wrongful act occurs or when it becomes known or should have become known.

Lustig v. McCormick · filed 1978-05-02

The two-year statute of limitations commences to run when the wrongful act occurs or when it becomes known or should have become known.

Section 95.11(4) starts the medical malpractice limitations period when the plaintiff is put on notice of an invasion of legal rights, subject to tolling in specified circumstances.

Almengor v. Dade County · filed 1978-05-30(4)

It is the established law of this state that the statute of limitations in a medical malpractice action begins to run when the plaintiff has been put on notice of an invasion of his legal rights.

The two year limitations period for professional malpractice begins when the plaintiff knows or should have known of the alleged malpractice through due diligence.

Hill v. Virgin · filed 1978-06-20(6)

The meaning of this statute is clear, that it begins to run when the plaintiff knows, or by the exercise of due diligence under the circumstances, should have known of the alleged malpractice.

Section 95.11(3)(h) applies a four-year limitation period to actions for injury to personal property, beginning when the injury makes the plaintiff aware of the right of action.

Neff v. General Development Corp. · filed 1978-02-15(3)(h)

Even though the alleged negligence occurred in 1969 it was not until the personalty was damaged that appellant was made aware of his right to bring this action and that his cause of action arose. The complaint was filed within the time period applicable to any action for injury to personal property under the applicable statute, Section 95.11(3)(h), Florida Statutes (1975).

For negligence claims, the four-year limitations period begins when the injury is first inflicted, even if its full extent is learned later.

Carter v. Cross · filed 1979-07-24(3)(a)

We hold that the action accrues and the statute of limitations begins to run from the time the injury sustained was first inflicted on the plaintiff and not from the time the full extent of such injuries has been ascertained.

For uninsured or underinsured motorist claims, the limitations period begins on the accident date; compliance with policy conditions precedent does not delay its start.

State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Kilbreath · filed 1982-09-02

The statute of limitations thus begins to run on the date of the accident rather than on the date of compliance with the conditions precedent contained in the insuring agreement.

Section 95.11(3)(c)'s limitations period does not begin to run on an indemnity claim until the underlying litigation ends or the liability is settled or paid.

CASTLE CONST. CO. v. Huttig Sash & Door Co. · filed 1982-12-15(3)(c)

The statute of limitations for an action seeking indemnity does not begin running until the litigation against the third-party plaintiff has ended or the liability, if any, has been settled or discharged by payment.

Section 95.11(3)'s four-year period does not begin to run against a minor's claim until the parent knew or reasonably should have known the facts supporting it.

Drake v. ISLAND COMMUNITY CHURCH · filed 1984-09-25(3)

It follows, then, that the statute of limitations could not begin to run against the minor child in the present case until the parent knew or reasonably should have known those facts which supported a cause of action. ... The complaint must be reinstated because, even applying the four-year period of limitation in Section 95.11(3), Florida Statutes (1983), from the face of the complaint (which alleges that the parent had no knowledge of the cause of action until July 1981) the suit is not time-barred.

The four-year limitations period for a minor’s claim does not begin until a parent knows or reasonably should know the facts supporting the claim.

Drake ex rel. Fletcher v. Island Community Church, Inc. · filed 1984-09-25(3)

It follows, then, that the statute of limitations could not begin to run against the minor child in the present case until the parent knew or reasonably should have known those facts which supported a cause of action. Since the complaint in this action alleges that the parent did not have this knowledge, the statute did not commence to run as a matter of law against the minor child.

Section 95.11(3)(c)’s four-year limitations period for a trustee-negligence action began, under these circumstances, when successor trustees replaced the allegedly negligent trustee.

Flagship Bank v. REINMAN, HARRELL, SILBERHORN, MOULE & GRAHAM, PA · filed 1987-01-29(3)(c)

Second, Flagship argues that the applicable four year statute of limitations (§ 95.11(3)(c), Fla. Stat. (1981)) barred these actions against it because they were not filed until December, 1982, and January, 1983, and its alleged negligence occurred on January 6, 1977. ... The trial court determined that under these circumstances the statute of limitations did not begin to run until substitution of the present trustees for Flagship. We agree.

Section 95.11(3)’s four-year period for negligent construction claims runs from the latest applicable statutory event; a defendant seeking summary judgment must account for all four events or show that some do not apply.

Lemelin v. Gensler · filed 1990-12-11(3)

In the absence of competent evidence as to the date of occurrence for each of the four events, or evidence that one or more of the statutory events is inapplicable, there is no way to determine which event occurred last.

Section 95.11(3)(a)’s four-year period for negligent removal of lateral support does not begin until actual harm occurs; notice of possible harm is insufficient.

Stokes v. Huggins Construction Co. · filed 1993-11-17(3)(a)

We cannot agree with the trial court that the limitations period started to run on June 3, 1986, as at that point, the Stokes had suffered no actual harm due to the excavation.

Questioning trust distributions does not establish that a beneficiary knew of adverse possession and that the limitations period for an accounting began to run.

Nayee v. Nayee · filed 1998-01-23(3)(p)

The record also fails to conclusively demonstrate actual knowledge by the appellants of Jay's alleged adverse possession of trust assets. Jay's contention that the statute began to run no later than July 1987, when plaintiffs questioned Jay's distribution of proceeds from the sale of the hotel, is belied by the minutes themselves, in which he expressly affirmed the continuing existence of the trust.

Section 95.11(3)(f)’s four-year limitations period does not begin to run for continuing hazardous-substance contamination until the harm is abated.

State Environ. Reg. v. Ctl Distribution · filed 1998-02-25(3)(f)

We hereby follow and adopt the reasoning of the Fourth District's recent decision in State, Department of Environmental Protection v. Fleet Credit Corp., 691 So.2d 512 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997). The Fleet Court held that because contamination of the soil and groundwater by a hazardous substance is a continuing harm (until it is cleaned up), the statute of limitations does not begin to run until the harm is abated. Fleet, 691 So.2d at 514. Here, too, the same injury, the contamination of the soil and groundwater by a hazardous substance, has not yet been abated (by a cleanup), thus the statute of limitations does not bar the DEP's action.

Section 95.11(3)(k) provides a four-year limitations period; a family relationship alone does not establish special circumstances extending the time to demand repayment of a loan.

DeSouza v. DeSouza · filed 1998-03-25(3)(k)

Appellant contends that’ special circumstances extended his time to demand payment beyond the four year statute of limitations in section 95.11(3)(k), Florida Statutes (1995). ... We hold that a family relationship standing alone does not establish special circumstances as contemplated in Stoudenmire.

Section 95.11(3)'s four-year period begins when a person knows or should know of a smoking-related injury and its probable cause; medical confirmation is unnecessary.

Brown & Williamson Tobacco v. Carter · filed 1998-12-31(3)

We conclude that the evidence shows beyond dispute that Grady Carter knew or should have known, before February 10, 1991, that his lungs were injured, and he was on notice that the injury was probably caused by smoking. Therefore, by the time he filed suit on February 10, 1995, the four year statute of limitations had run. Neither absolute knowledge nor medical confirmation is required for a cause of action to accrue.

Section 95.11(3)(a)'s limitations period for personal injury begins when the injury is first inflicted, even if its full severity is discovered later.

Kolnick v. FOUNTAINVIEW ASS'N, INC. · filed 1999-07-21(3)(a)

In Carter v. Cross, 373 So.2d 81 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979), this Court held that an action for personal injury accrues and the statute of limitation begins to run against the injured party from the time the injury was first inflicted, not from the time the full extent of such injuries has been ascertained. ... The fact that the full extent or "severity" of Kolnick's illness was not allegedly discovered by Kolnick until August 26, 1993, when he felt as though he could not get out of bed, went to a doctor, and received a diagnosis concerning his allergies, does not change this result.

Section 95.11(2)(b) requires a claim to be brought within five years after the claimant knows of the dispute and resulting harm.

Biscayne Developments Ltd. v. Venetian Isle Condominium, Inc. · filed 1999-07-28(2)(b)

We agree with the trial judge that the statute of limitations, section 95.11(2)(b), Florida Statutes (1995), bars the Appellants’ claim here. Appellants knew of the disagreement regarding parking spaces in 1987, at the latest. ... The Appellants should have brought this action in 1987 (or within five years thereafter), when it was clear that the Association was not going to reassign or reallocate the parking just to please the Appellants.

The four-year limitations period for a personal representative’s claim to recover estate-paid attorney’s fees begins when the representative is appointed.

Onofrio v. Johnston & Sasser, P.A. · filed 2001-04-27(3)(f)

We conclude that the four year statute of limitations began running when Onofrio was appointed as personal representative. It was only at the time of appointment that the personal representative of the estate under the 1979 Will could first became aware of the fees paid to J & S because PR Onofrio did not exist prior to the date of appointment.

In a medical malpractice case involving misdiagnosis, the limitations period begins when the plaintiff learns the correct diagnosis, rather than on the date of the alleged negligent treatment.

Woods v. Sapolsky · filed 2002-07-09(4)(b)

The statute of limitations did not begin to run on the date of Dr. Sapolsky’s diagnosis and treatment. Rather, the statute of limitations began to run when appellant acquired knowledge of the correct diagnosis on a subsequent date not specified in the complaint.

Section 95.11 gives four years to bring trespass and nuisance claims, and successive flooding may support claims for injuries within that period when the flooding is recurring and abatable.

Carlton v. Germany Hammock Groves · filed 2002-01-02(3)(g), (3)(p)

Both an action for nuisance and an action for trespass on real property shall be commenced within four years from the time the cause of action accrues. ... Carlton alleged sufficient facts with regards to the flooding and resulting damage occurring in the four years preceding the date suit was filed so as to urge application of the continuing torts doctrine and preclude summary judgment.

Under section 95.11(2)(b), an insurer’s claim for a final premium based on an audit accrues when the amount owed is liquidated.

Kennedy Contracting, Inc. v. Traveler's Insurance Co. · filed 2004-02-25(2)(b)

The issue presented by this appeal is when does a cause of action accrue for purposes of applying the statute of limitations on an insurer’s claim for a final premium based on an audit. We affirm a judgment holding that it is not until the amount is liquidated. ... After Kennedy refused to pay, Traveler’s filed this suit and Kennedy raised the five year statute of limitations for breach of written contract, section 95.11(2)(b), Florida Statutes. ... We agree with that decision. Applying it, we conclude that Traveler’s suit in this case was timely and affirm.

Section 95.11(3) gives four years to bring an action based on a repudiated promise to convey specific property, measured from when the cause of action accrues.

Collinson v. Miller · filed 2005-04-13(3)

Any cause of action seeking to impress that property with a constructive trust based upon that promise accrued in 1982 or 1983. When the cause of action accrued, the Miller children had four years to bring a claim based upon that breach against Mrs. Miller. See § 95.11(3), Fla. Stat. (1981). This action, which was not filed until 1999 and sought recovery of the property from Mrs. Collinson, was barred by the statute of limitations.

Section 95.11’s five-year period for written contracts and four-year period for unwritten contracts apply to equitable accounting actions, but the limitations period does not begin to run before repudiation of the duty to provide a final accounting.

Cassedy v. Alland Investments Corp. · filed 2008-04-14(2)(b), (3)(k)

So, the current action would be untimely if the cause of action arose in 1999, under either section 95.11(2)(b), Florida Statutes, which provides that a legal or equitable action on a written contract shall be commenced within five years, or section 95.11(3)(k), Florida Statutes, which provides that such an action on an unwritten contract shall be commenced within four years. However, the limitations period did not begin to run in 1999 because there has been no repudiation of the duty to provide a final accounting.

Section 95.11(5)(f) does not bar a mandamus claim filed within a year of its accrual.

Hill v. Crews · filed 2013-02-27(5)(f)

We are satisfied, however, that Appellant exhausted his administrative remedies concerning the bank book and that his claim concerning the loss of his legal documents did not accrue until at least January 2010, less than a year before the filing of his petition for writ of mandamus.

Civil conspiracy and abuse of process claims have four-year limitations periods under § 95.11(3)(o) and (3)(p); claims based on an allegedly wrongful foreclosure judgment accrue no later than entry of that judgment.

Coursen v. Shapiro & Fishman, GP · filed 2014-10-07(3)(o), (3)(p)

Because the complained-of injury was the 2006 foreclosure judgment, Coursen’s claims accrued, at the latest, on 27 November 2006, when final judgment was entered against her.

Section 95.11(3) gives conversion claims a four-year limitations period, which begins when the conversion occurs because delayed discovery does not apply, unless fraudulent concealment tolls the period.

Wachovia Bank N.A. v. Tien · filed 2016-07-27(3)

A cause of action for conversion under Florida law is subject to a four-year statute of limitations. See Fla. Stat. § 95.11(3); Bove v. PBW Stock Exch., Inc., 382 So. 2d 450, 452-53 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980). Florida recognizes a “delayed discovery” doctrine, in certain circumstances, which delays the accrual of a cause of action until the party knows or reasonably should know of the act that supplies the cause of action. Raie v. Cheminova, Inc., 336 F.3d 1278, 1280 (11th Cir. 2003). However, the delayed discovery doctrine does not apply to conversion claims. Davis v. Monahan, 832 So. 2d 708, 709 (Fla. 2002). Therefore, the statute of limitations for a conversion claim begins to run when the conversion occurs, unless the conversion was fraudulently concealed. See Bove, 382 So. 2d at 452-53. Fraudulent concealment tolls the statute of limitations when the defendant willfully concealed the cause of action using fraudulent means. Raie, 336 F.3d at 1282 n.1.

Section 95.11(5)(c) gives three years to sue for taking, detaining, or injuring goods or chattels, and a disability does not toll that period when the statute contains no saving clause.

Gottesman v. Gottesman · filed 1969-03-25(5)(c)

Thus the cause of action alleged by appellant was one which arose more than three years prior to suit, and as the statute of limitations contained no saving clause, a disa*214bility of Sam Gottesman, if such existed, would not have operated to toll the applicable three year statute of limitations.

For conversion claims, the limitations period is four years and begins when the conversion occurs, unless the conversion is fraudulently concealed.

Bove v. PBW Stock Exchange, Inc. · filed 1980-04-18(3)

The statute of limitations is four years (§ 95.11(3), Fla. Stat.) and it begins to run at the time of the conversion, except where the latter is fraudulently concealed.

Section 95.11(3)(o)'s four-year period for conversion begins when the owner discovers or reasonably should discover the conversion.

Senfeld v. Bank of Nova Scotia Trust Co. · filed 1984-05-01(3)(o)

We conclude, therefore, that the discovery rule applied to the Trust Company's action for conversion and that there was substantial evidence to support a jury's determination, under proper instructions, that the Trust Company neither discovered nor should have discovered the conversion, even assuming such conversion occurred in 1975, until, at the earliest, 1978.

Section 95.11(3)(h) bars a conversion claim when its limitations period has expired.

Bilic v. New Fairways Investment of Florida, Inc. · filed 1989-05-25(3)(h)

The plaintiff's original cause of action against Royal Bank for conversion is barred by the statute of limitations.

Section 95.11(3)(i) allows the personal representative enough time to sue for return of the decedent’s personal property.

Holcomb v. Lee County · filed 2011-04-01(3)(i)

The personal representative of Mr. Warner’s estate still has time to file such a lawsuit. See § 95.11(3)(i), Fla. Stat. (2008).

Section 95.11(3) gives Engle personal injury claims a four-year limitations period; for a plaintiff who opts out of the class and is not readmitted, that period begins running upon opting out.

Uffner v. Philip Morris USA Inc. · filed 2014-09-22(3)

Applying Gaff, the absence of any evidence that Mrs. Uffner’s petition for readmission to the class was affirmatively granted means that Mr. Uff-ner’s claims are not graced by Engle class membership status; consequently, the four-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions began running when Mrs. Uffner opted out of the Engle class on July 15, 1997 — expiring well before the filling of the current action in 2008.

Section 95.11 applies a four-year limitation period to malpractice claims sounding in tort and a three-year period to claims based on an unwritten contract.

Manning v. Serrano · filed 1957-10-09(4), (5)(e)

We, therefore, recede from Palmer v. Jackson, supra, 57 So. 240, and Slaughter v. Tyler, supra, 171 So. 320, insofar as they hold that a malpractice suit must be brought within the statutory period provided for an action "upon [an `obligation or liability not founded upon an instrument of writing,'" and hold that the statutory period applicable to a malpractice suit depends upon the claim for relief stated by plaintiff — whether he sues for and seeks the damages applicable to a breach of contract or a tort.

Section 95.11(5)(e) applies to actions clearly contractual in nature, while a consumer's implied-warranty action against a manufacturer is governed by the four-year limitations period in § 95.11(4).

Barfield v. United States Rubber Company · filed 1970-04-01(5)(e)

Therefore, in answer to the question certified to this court, we hold that the cause of action ordered to be reinstated by our decision in Barfield v. Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Co., Fla.App. 1967, 197 So.2d 545, is governed by the four year statute of limitations set forth in Fla. Stat. § 95.11 (4), 1967, F.S.A.

Section 95.11(3)(k) gives a party four years to bring a warranty action.

RA Jones & Sons, Inc. v. Holman · filed 1985-06-04(3)(k)

Because a party has four years to bring an action based upon warranty, see § 95.11(3)(k), Fla. Stat. (1975), the suit brought by Jones in 1978 was timely.

Section 95.11(5)(e) gives an implied warranty claim three years from the date of sale.

Braniff Airways, Inc., Phillip Addabbo, and Morton D. Stein, as of the Estate of Maurice Berg, Deceased v. Curtiss-Wrigh · filed 1969-05-19(5)(e)

The action was not timely under the Florida statute of limitation, Fla. Stat. § 95.11(5) (e) (1967), F.S.A., as construed in Creviston v. General Motors Corp., 210 So.2d 755 (Fla.Dist.Ct. App.1968) — a case that had not yet been published when the district court ruled that the action was timely. Creviston holds that the period of limitation in an implied warranty action is three years and that the action accrues at the time of sale.

For a fraud claim, the limitations period ordinarily begins when the fraud is discovered or should have been discovered.

Tullo v. Horner · filed 1974-06-25(5)(d)

In cases of fraud, however, the statute ordinarily begins to run with the discovery of the fraud. See Fla. Stat. § 95.11(5)(d), F.S.A. We hold that there is a genuine issue of material fact as to when the plaintiff discovered, or should have discovered, the alleged fraud.

Section 95.11(5)(d) gives a plaintiff three years to bring a fraud claim, measured from when the plaintiff discovered or through due diligence should have discovered the fraud.

Cyril M. HUDAK, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ECONOMIC RESEARCH ANALYSTS, INC., and Richard W. McIntyre, Defendants-Appellants · filed 1974-08-26(5)(d)

Though the law of fraud does not endorse a hear no evil, see no evil approach, neither does it require that an aggrieved party have proceeded from the outset as if he were dealing with thieves. The action was timely filed.

A new limitations period may govern a pre-existing cause of action prospectively when the plaintiff receives the entire new period to sue.

Foley v. Morris · filed 1976-01-14(6)

Therefore, we conclude that where the plaintiff has had the benefit of the entire new period of limitations to file suit on a pre-existing cause of action, application of the new statute is prospective in that the statutory change relates only to procedures to occur in the future. No substantive right has been impaired. Accordingly, we hold the trial court was correct in holding the plaintiff's cause was governed by the new two-year statute of limitations, Fla. Stat. § 95.11(6) (1973), which became effective July 1, 1972.

For an implied-warranty personal-injury claim by a plaintiff not in privity with a building contractor, § 95.11(4)’s four-year limitations period applies instead of § 95.11(5)(e)’s three-year period for unwritten contract claims.

Smith v. Continental Insurance Company · filed 1976-01-30(5)(e) and (4)

We conclude that an action recovery for personal injuries against a building contractor based on a theory of implied warranty by a plaintiff not in privity with the contractor does not fall within the three year limitations period of Fla. Stat. § 95.11(5)(e)(1973), which governs an action upon a contract, obligation or liability not founded upon an instrument in writing. Rather, it is governed by the four year limitations period prescribed by Fla. Stat. § 95.11(4) (1973), which controls actions for relief not otherwise specifically provided for in Fla. Stat. Ch. 95 (1973).

Section 95.11(4)(a) applies retroactively to general malpractice claims when the savings clause provides a reasonable time to file suit.

Nash v. Asher · filed 1977-02-18(4)(a)

Section 95.022 clearly demonstrates the legislative intent to make 95.11(4)(a) retroactive, since it is a saving clause providing a reasonable time in which suits may be filed. Certainly the Plaintiff had a reasonable time in which to file his action after the passage of the statute.

Section 95.11(2)(b) sets a five-year limitations period for actions on written instruments and may be applied retroactively when a reasonable filing period is provided.

Carpenter v. Florida Cent. Credit Union · filed 1979-02-22(2)(b)

Sections 95.11(2)(b) and 95.022 Florida Statutes (1975), are retrospective in nature and constitutional as applied to promissory notes under seal.

Section 95.11(4)(b)’s four-year limit does not apply to a medical malpractice claim arising from an incident before the provision took effect.

Dade County v. Ferro · filed 1980-06-12(4)(b)

Accordingly, we hold that section 95.11(4)(b), Florida Statutes (1975), evinces no express, clear or manifest intent that it be applied retroactively and, therefore, the four-year limitation period contained therein may not be applied to a medical malpractice claim where the occurrence or incident out of which the claim arose predates the effective date of the statute.

Section 95.11(3)(k)’s four-year period applies to a claim whose earlier three-year limitations period had not expired when the period was extended.

Birnholz v. Steisel · filed 1981-02-24(3)(k)

The opposite is true when, as in this instance, the period is enlarged before the earlier statute has expired. ... The claim involved in count 3 was not barred by the three-year limitations period when it was lengthened to four years on January 1, 1975.

The 1975 revisions to § 95.11 do not apply retroactively; former subsection (10) governs claims against professional engineers and architects that arose before the revisions.

Stuyvesant Insurance v. Square D. Co. · filed 1981-06-23(10)

Appellee Cook’s reliance upon the two-year limitation period set forth in section 95.11(4)(a); Florida Statutes (1975) is untenable since the 1975 revisions of section 95.11 are not retroactive. ... Accordingly, we hold that section 95.11(10), Florida Statutes (1973), pertaining to actions against professional engineers and architects, governs appellant’s cause of action against Cook.

Section 95.11(6) (1973) sets a two-year limitation period for medical-treatment injury claims; later amendments do not apply to accrued claims without clear legislative intent to make them retroactive.

Homemakers, Inc. v. Gonzales · filed 1981-07-02(6)

The impact of our holding in the instant case is that the statute of limitations applicable to Mrs. Gonzales' claim for all purposes is section 95.11(6), Florida Statutes (1973), which provides a two-year period of limitation. Neither of the subsequent amendments to chapter 95 disrupted the application of section 95.11(6) since there is no evidence of legislative intent of retroactivity. In the final analysis, Mrs. Gonzales' claim accrued on April 3, 1973, but no action was taken thereon within two years, so her action is barred by section 95.11(6).

Section 95.11(3)(c), as enacted in 1980, applies only to causes of action that occur or accrue on or after July 3, 1980.

Durring v. Reynolds, Smith & Hills · filed 1985-06-18(3)(c)

We find nothing in the lengthy preamble to chapter 80-322 or the statutory language which amounts to an express, clear or manifest intent to make the new statute retroactive to causes of action in existence on the effective date of the statute. Accordingly, section 95.11(3)(c), as enacted by chapter 80-322, does not apply to bar the plaintiffs' cause of action.

The 1980 reenactment of section 95.11(3)(c) does not apply retroactively to bar a cause of action that accrued before it took effect.

Paige v. Florida Department of Transportation · filed 1987-02-12(3)(c)

We hold that Pullum does not expressly or impliedly overrule Overland, and that the 1980 reenactment of section 95.11(3)(c), Florida Statutes, does not apply retroactively to bar appellant’s cause of action in this case.

The amended limitations period in section 95.11(4)(a) does not apply retroactively to an accrued legal malpractice claim.

Meir v. KIRK, PINKERTON, McCLELLAND, SAVARY & CARR, PA · filed 1990-05-09(4)(a)

We agree with the trial court that the statute of limitations, section 95.11(4)(a), Florida Statutes (Supp. 1974), is not retroactive.

The 1992 amendment to section 95.11 did not create a child abuse cause of action or revive a time-barred claim.

Zlotogura v. Geller · filed 1996-09-25

We agree with the trial court that Chapter 92-102, section 2, Laws of Florida, which was the 1992 amendment to section 95.11, Florida Statutes (1991), did not create a new cause of action for child abuse. An amendment extending the time for pursuing a cause of action does not create a new cause of action, and such an amendment cannot revive a time-barred cause of action.

Section 95.11(8) does not apply to prisoner disciplinary proceedings whose operative events occurred before its June 15, 1995 effective date.

Singletary v. Van Meter · filed 1998-02-26(8)

Section 95.11(8), Florida Statutes (1995), became effective June 15, 1995.[2] As noted above, all the operative events in the instant case took place long before that date. Accordingly, we agree with both Van Meter and Secretary Singletary that the statute is inapplicable.

Section 95.11(7)’s delayed discovery provision took effect on April 8, 1992, and did not apply to a childhood sexual abuse action filed in 1991.

Hearndon v. Graham · filed 2000-09-14(7)

Subsection (7) became effective on April 8, 1992, pursuant to the Legislature's enactment of chapter 92-102, section 1 of the Laws of Florida. Petitioner's action precedes the effectiveness of the above statute since the abuse alleged in this case occurred from 1968 to 1975 and the abuse was not recalled until approximately 1988, and since petitioner filed her complaint in 1991.

Section 95.11(5)(f) does not time-bar a mandamus petition challenging Florida Parole Commission action that occurred before the subsection took effect.

Bryant v. Florida Parole Commission · filed 2007-09-25(5)(f)

Because the action of the Florida Parole Commission that was the subject of appellant's petition for writ of mandamus occurred prior to the effective date of section 95.11(5)(f), Florida Statutes, the circuit court erred in concluding that the petition was time-barred under the statute.

Section 95.11(2)(e) cannot be applied retroactively without evidence that the legislature intended retroactive application.

Donovan v. Florida Peninsula Insurance Company · filed 2014-07-09(2)(e)

In sum, the court erred in applying section 95.11(2)(e) retroactively in the absence of evidence of the legislature’s intent for such application.

Section 95.11(f) provides a four-year limitations period for claims under the Florida Retail Installment Sales Act.

Brown v. SCI Funeral Services of Florida, Inc. · filed 2003-01-15(f)

The statute of limitations governing Plaintiffs’ RISA claims is four years. See Fla. Stat. § 95.11(f) (2002). Thus, for class-wide RISA claims, the class period would be September 26,1997 through September 25, 2001.

Section 95.11(3)(k) carries forward the U.C.C. four-year limitations period for an action involving a contract for the sale of goods.

Lake Wales Pub. Co., Inc. v. Florida Visitor, Inc. · filed 1976-07-14(3)(k)

If the 1971 contract was for the sale of "goods," then appellant which filed suit on January 15, 1975, was entitled to the benefit of the four-year U.C.C. statute effectively continued by § 95.11(3)(k) (1975), since the U.C.C. limitation period generally prevails over that contained in a general statute of limitations. ... We conclude that production of printed pamphlets and related materials are goods within the meaning of U.C.C. and that appellant's action was therefore governed by the four-year statute of limitations.

The Florida fraud limitations period is four years and runs from when the facts giving rise to the claim were discovered or should have been discovered with due diligence.

Carmen Felicita Arrieta-Gimenez, Etc. v. Arrieta-Negron · filed 1988-10-18(3)(j)

Even if the argument had not been waived, we are by no means persuaded that if the Florida statute of repose were found to be unconstitutional, Puerto Rico courts would then turn to Puerto Rico statutes of limitations. ... In the absence of any directly supporting precedent, we think it at least as likely that, under these circumstances, Puerto Rico courts would apply Florida’s four-year statute of limitations for fraud, Fla.Stat. § 95.11(3)(j) (1987). ... We hold that if the Florida statute of repose is unconstitutional, the relevant statute of limitations of Florida, not Puerto Rico, applies.

Section 95.11(2) supplies a four-year limitations period for the civil-rights claims at issue when no federal limitations period applies.

Lake Lucerne Civic Ass'n v. Dolphin Stadium Corp. · filed 1992-07-31(2)

“Since there is no federal statute of limitations which applies to civil rights actions, the applicable statute of the state forum controls.” Kittrell v. City of Rockwall, 526 F.2d 715, 716 (5th Cir.1976). Viewed in the light most favorable to the Plaintiffs, the longest possible statute of limitations applicable to Counts II, III, and IV is four years. See Newberger v. United States Marshals Service, 751 F.2d 1162 (11th Cir.1985) (4 year statute of limitation applied to action for conspiracy to commit civil rights violation); Fla.Stat. § 95.11(2).

Section 95.11(3) gives Florida products-liability actions a four-year statute of limitations, which runs from discovery of the facts giving rise to the cause of action.

Fields v. Mylan Pharmaceuticals, Inc. · filed 2009-10-27(3)

Products liability actions in Florida are subject to a four year statute of limitations. Fla. Stat. § 95.11(3X2008). ... Because Plaintiff discovered the facts giving rise to the cause of action more than four years prior to filing this action, and because no facts exist that could toll the statute of limitations, Defendants are entitled to summary judgment.

Section 95.11(3)(p) provides a four-year limitations period for the relevant personal-injury claims in Florida.

Sneed v. Pan American Hospital · filed 2010-03-18(3)(p)

In Florida, where Sneed filed his complaint and the alleged wrongs occurred, the governing limitations period is four years. See Fla. Stat. § 95.11(3)(p); Henyard v. Sec’y, DOC, 543 F.3d 644, 647 (11th Cir. 2008).

Section 95.11(3)(p) provides a residual four-year statute of limitations for personal injury tort claims.

Baker v. Sanford · filed 2012-06-04(3)(p)

Florida law provides for a residual four-year statute of limitations. Fla. Stat. § 95.11(3)(p) (2011). However, federal law controls when the underlying cause of action accrued, triggering this limitations period to begin. ... Here, we conclude from the record that the district court erred in dismissing Baker’s complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted because his claims were not barred by the four-year statute of limitations.

Section 95.11(3) supplies a four-year statute of limitations for a federal ADA claim arising in Florida when the ADA has no limitations period.

Nestor v. VPC3 II, LLP · filed 2021-08-16(3)

The statute of limitations on a federal ADA claim arising in Florida is four years. See Everett v. Cobb County Sch. Dist., 138 F.3d 1407, 1409 (11th Cir. 1998); Ross v. Jim Adams Ford, Inc., 871 So.2d 312, 314 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004); Fla. Stat. § 95.11(3) (2020).

Section 95.11(3)(p) provides a four-year limitations period running from accrual for the applicable Florida claims.

Simon v. DeSantis · filed 2023-02-13(3)(p)

The applicable statute of limitations in Florida provides for a four-year limitations period from accrual of the cause of action. Fla. Stat. § 95.11(3)(p) (2011); see also Sneed, 370 F. App’x at 47 (stating same). ... Although the allegations set forth in Simon’s complaint are difficult to parse, it appears the events upon which his case is based establish that his complaint is clearly time barred.

Section 95.11(3) supplies Florida’s four-year limitations period for general personal-injury actions, including § 1983 claims arising in Florida.

Valsaint v. City of Miami Beach, Florida · filed 2024-06-17(3)

Constitutional claims under § 1983 are subject to the forum’s statute of limitations for general personal injury actions. McNair v. Allen, 515 F.3d 1168, 1173 (11th Cir. 2008). In Florida, the action must be brought within four years. See Fla. Stat. § 95.11(3). ... He filed his complaint over four years later, beyond the statutory period for his § 1983 claims. See Fla. Stat. § 95.11(3).

Section 95.11(3)(e) gives products-liability actions a four-year limitations period.

Redding v. Coloplast Corp. · filed 2024-06-20(3)(e)

Under Florida’s statute of limitations, a plaintiff has four years to initiate a products liability suit. Fla. Stat. §§ 95.11(3)(e), 95.031(2)(b) (2014). The four-year period begins to run “from the date that the facts giving rise to the cause of action were discovered, or should have been discovered with the exercise of due diligence[.]” Id. § 95.031(2)(b). ... As a result, Redding’s claims were not time barred under Florida’s four-year statute of limitations.

Section 95.11(3) provides a four-year limitations period for personal-injury actions in Florida, which applies to claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Taylor, Alan v. Dade Correctional Institution · filed 2025-06-29(3)

Personal injury actions in Florida have a four-year statute of limitations. See Fla. Stat. § 95.11(3).

Section 95.11(3)(p) provides a four-year catchall limitations period for an action not specifically covered by another limitations provision.

Miller v. ANHEUSER BUSCH, INC. · filed 2008-12-29(3)(p)

Under Florida law, because Fla. Stat. § 540.08 does not provide its own statute of limitations and does not fall within any of the specific categories provided in Fla. Stat. § 95.11 (entitled “Limitations other than for the recovery of real property”), the four-year catchall statute of limitations applies.

Section 95.11(5)(c) gives actions for damage to goods a three-year limitations period.

Coquette Originals, Inc. v. Canadian Gulf Line of Florida, Inc. · filed 1970-11-17(5)(c)

Under § 95.11(5) (c) Fla.Stat., F.S.A., the limitation period for actions for damage to goods is three years.

Section 95.11(3)(k) provides a four-year limitations period applicable to the pleaded contract and unjust-enrichment claims.

Venditti-Siravo, Inc. v. City of Hollywood, Fla. · filed 1982-09-08(3)(k)

As to the Statute of Limitations, one of the City's affirmative defenses, we believe that Section 95.11(3)(k), Florida Statutes (1980), to be applicable to Counts I and II, and it provides a four year period. The contract was made on November 11, 1976, and suit was filed on September 19, 1979, with less than four years intervening.

Section 95.11(3)(e) gives four years to bring a personal injury action arising from the design, manufacture, distribution, or sale of personal property.

Copeland v. Armstrong Cork Co. · filed 1984-04-25(3)(e)

The applicable statute of limitations in Florida plainly provides that "[a]n action [in tort] for injury to a person founded on the design, manufacture, distribution, or sale of personal property ...," as here, "shall be commenced ... [w]ithin four years." § 95.11(3)(e), Fla. Stat. (1981).

Section 95.11(3) provides a four-year limitations period for a freight-damage action when the carrier has not established a shorter period.

Aetna Insurance Co. v. Ryder Truck Lines, Inc. · filed 1987-06-11(3)

There being no evidence in the record that the carrier has provided by rule, contract, or otherwise a limitation of two years for the bringing of an action against it under 49 U.S.C. § 11707(e), the applicable statute of limitations is the four year period set forth in § 95.11(3), Fla.Stat. Therefore, Aetna’s suit was timely filed.

Section 95.11(3)(a) provides four years from accrual to file a negligence action; that period governed these product liability claims while the twelve-year statute of repose was invalid.

Frazier v. Baker Material Handling Corp. · filed 1990-01-18(3)(a)

In 1980, Battilla invalidated the twelve-year statute of repose in product liability cases. Thus, at the time petitioner's cause of action accrued, the only time constraint applicable to the filing of a law suit was the four-year statute of limitations.

Section 95.11(3)(a) permits four years to file an action covered by its limitations period.

Cueto v. Caribco Enterprises, Inc. · filed 1991-04-16(3)(a)

The plaintiff filed her complaint within the four year period permitted by the statute of limitations. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s order finding that this action was not timely brought. See § 95.11(3)(a), Fla.Stat. (1985).

Section 95.11(3) applies a four-year limitations period to conversion, breach of fiduciary duty, negligent bailment, constructive fraud and conspiracy claims.

Behar v. SunBank/Miami, N.A. · filed 1991-12-10(3)

Beyond that, we conclude that the plaintiff's conversion, breach of fiduciary duty, negligent bailment, constructive fraud and conspiracy claims were time barred, in any event, by the applicable four-year statute of limitations. Chidiac v. Cadillac Gage Co., 541 So.2d 650 (Fla. 3d DCA), rev. denied, 551 So.2d 460 (Fla.1989); § 95.11(3), Fla.Stat. (1989).

Section 95.11(3)(k) provides a four-year limitations period for an action on an oral contract; disputed payment due dates can prevent summary judgment on whether that period expired.

Moneyhun v. Vital Industries, Inc. · filed 1993-01-11(3)(k)

The contract action is controlled by Section 95.11(3)(k), Florida Statutes (1981), which prescribes a four-year period for any "legal or equitable action on a contract, obligation, or liability not founded on a written instrument."[3] ... Without a factual determination as to the meaning of the date of sale on this document, it is impossible for us to determine how such dates relate to the 30-day/60-day provision of the alleged oral agreement.

Section 95.11(3)(p) provides a four-year limitations period for an action seeking declaratory and injunctive relief concerning prior judgments when no specific limitations period governs.

HOLLYWOOD LAKES CIVIC ASS'N v. Hollywood · filed 1996-07-03(3)(p)

The action was also untimely as to the 1981 judgment because the complaint was not filed within the four-year timeframe provided for by section 95.11(3)(p), Florida Statutes (1995). The complaint sought declaratory and injunctive relief in connection with prior judgments entered in the 1972 case. As no specific statute of limitation governs such an action, it is controlled by the four-year provision of section 95.11(3)(p). See Sarasota Welfare Home, Inc. v. City of Sarasota, 666 So.2d 171, 172-73 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995). Therefore, the complaint was untimely with respect to the 1981 judgment.

Section 95.11(3)(p)'s four-year catch-all limitations period bars a late challenge to a municipal special assessment.

Keenan v. City of Edgewater · filed 1996-11-22(3)(p)

We need not decide that issue because we agree with the trial court that, in any event, the four-year, catch-all statute of limitations bars appellants' suit. § 95.11(3)(p), Fla. Stat. (1995).

Section 95.11(3) provides a four-year limitations period; claims based on conduct within that period are not barred.

Law v. City of Ormond Beach · filed 1998-02-20(3)

Counts VI and XIII should not have been dismissed because they contain allegations pertaining to actions on the part of the City occurring in 1992. As a result, these counts are not barred by the four-year statute of limitations.

Section 95.11(3) sets a four-year limitations period for claims founded in oral contracts, fraud, and the taking of property.

Helton v. Gunderson · filed 1998-04-08(3)

We find that the trial court properly dismissed with prejudice the counts of the plaintiffs complaint that were founded in oral contracts, fraud, and the taking of property as they are barred by the four-year statute of limitations. § 95.11(3), Fla. Stat. (1991).

Section 95.11(3)(f) provides a four-year limitations period for Florida Civil Rights Act actions when the Commission does not make a reasonable cause determination within 180 days.

Joshua v. City of Gainesville · filed 2000-08-31(3)(f)

We hold that the statute of limitations for causes of action based on statutory liability, section 95.11(3)(f), applies to situations where the Commission has not made a reasonable cause determination within 180 days.

Section 95.11(3)'s four-year limitations period bars claims when the plaintiff knew or should have known of the injury and its possible cause more than four years before filing.

Liggett Group, Inc. v. Engle · filed 2003-05-21(3)

According to the jury, Amodeo knew or should have known, more than four years before the suit was filed, that he was addicted to smoking and that his cancer could have been caused by smoking. Amodeo's knowledge thus barred his claims under the four-year statute of limitations. See § 95.11(3), Fla. Stat. (2001).

Section 95.11(3) sets a four-year limitations period for invasion of privacy and negligence claims.

Haskins v. City of Ft. Lauderdale · filed 2005-03-30(3)

In Florida, the statute of limitations period for an invasion of privacy claim and for an action founded on negligence is four years.

Section 95.11(3)(a) supplies a four-year limitations period that can bar an untimely Engle claim.

Rearick v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. · filed 2011-08-17(3)(a)

This is more than four years after the statute of limitations period for Engle class membership. Rearick’s lawsuit was thus time-barred.

Section 95.11(3)(o) sets a four-year limitations period for false-arrest claims and excessive-use-of-force claims treated as battery.

Scullock v. Gee · filed 2014-03-12(3)(o)

An excessive-use-of-force claim is properly considered a battery. ... As such, it is subject to a four-year statute of limitations. See § 95.11(3)(o), Fla. Stat. (2010). ... The cause of action for false arrest accrued on the day of the arrest, May 14, 2007. ... This claim, too, is subject to a four-year statute of limitations. See § 95.11(3)(o), Fla. Stat. (2010).

Section 95.11(3) imposes a four-year limitations period on negligence claims and actions not otherwise specified; claims arising from later unauthorized transfers are timely if they accrued within that period.

Anderson v. Branch Banking & Trust Co. · filed 2014-10-31(3)

Section 95.11(3), Florida Statutes, provides that both “action[s] founded on negligence ... [or] [a]ny action not specifically provided for in these statutes” must be commenced within four years from the time the cause of action accrues. ... However, those claims accruing after October 31, 2009, are not prohibited under the statute.

Section 95.11(3)’s four-year limitations period does not support dismissal when the complaint does not show on its face that the claims are untimely.

Marcantonio v. Carol Marcantonio Sansone, Individually and as Successor Trustee for the Joseph and Mary · filed 2024-09-30(3)

Here, a review of the Amended Complaint reveals that several of the dismissed counts were based on conduct alleged to have occurred after January 28, 2016, the cut-off date under the applicable four-year statute of limitations based on the filing date. ... In short, limiting our review to the four corners of the Amended Complaint as we must when considering a motion to dismiss, it was not apparent that counts twelve, thirteen, sixteen, seventeen, nineteen, and twenty were untimely on the face of the Amended Complaint.

Section 95.11(3)(o) provides a four-year limitations period for claims within its scope.

Green v. Wilkinson · filed 2025-05-09(3)(o)

Green’s claims are all barred by Florida’s four-year statute of limitations.

Section 95.11(3)(p) imposes a four-year limitations period on a challenge to an ordinance, measured from its enactment.

Nichols v. City of Miami Beach · filed 2025-10-01(3)(p)

In addition, Nichols’ claim is barred by the four-year statute of limitations. See § 95.11(3)(p), Fla. Stat.; see also Milan Inv. Grp., Inc. v. City of Miami, 50 So. 3d 662 (Fla. 3d DCA 2010) (holding that the owner’s challenge to the city's imposition of the tax levy accrued on the date the ordinance was enacted).

Section 95.11(3) supplies a four-year limitations period for personal injury actions.

Brown v. City of Pompano Beach · filed 1997-06-23(3)

In Florida, the statute of limitations ... for a personal injury action is four years. Fla. Stat. § 95.11(3).

Section 95.11(3)(o) gives a plaintiff four years to file a Fourth Amendment excessive force claim.

Samuel Lee Smith, Jr. v. Valdivia · filed 2024-12-16(3)(o)

Florida’s limitations statute requires an action asserting a Fourth Amendment excessive force claim to be filed within four ... years.

Section 95.11(3) provides a four-year limitations period for § 1983 claims arising in Florida.

Innova Investment Group, LLC v. Village of Key Biscayne · filed 2020-11-18(3)

A plaintiff “must bring a section 1983 claim arising in Florida within four years of the alleged unlawful . . . practice.” ... Fla. Stat. § 95.11(3) (detailing actions which are subject to a four-year statute of limitation period). ... Because Plaintiff filed this action in state court on November 14, 2018, [ECF No. 1-1], Counts I and III would be time-barred under any of the four dates.

Section 95.11(3) supplies the four-year limitations period for Section 1983 claims brought in Florida.

Doe v. Swearingen · filed 2022-10-21(3)

In Florida, the parties agree, such an action must be commenced within four years. See Baker v. Gulf & W. Indus., Inc., 850 F.2d 1480, 1482 (11th Cir. 1988) (citing Fla. Stat. § 95.11(3)).

Section 95.11(3)(a) and (g) set four-year limitations periods for negligence and trespass actions, which the court measured from the cancer diagnosis.

Santiago v. Raytheon Technologies Corporation · filed 2020-08-31(3)(a), (3)(g)

Florida law required Cynthia to file her lawsuit within four years of her cancer diagnosis. See Fla. Stat. § 95.11(3)(a), (g). Because she did not, her claims are time barred.

Section 95.11 sets a five-year filing period for breach of contract claims and a four-year period for fraud claims.

Mortgage Resolution Servicing, LLC v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. · filed 2022-01-25(2)(b), (3)(j)

Florida’s relevant statute of limitations requires a breach of contract claim to be filed within five years of accrual, and an action based in fraud to be filed within four years. Fla. Stat. § 95.11(2)(b), (3)(j).

Section 95.11 provides a four-year limitations period for these claims; each election that renews the alleged injury starts a new period for that injury.

JACOBSON v. LEE · filed 2019-11-15(3)(f), (3)(p)

Florida law provides a four-year limitation period for “action[s] founded on statutory liability,” § 95.11(3)(f), Fla. Stat. (2019), and for “[a]ny action not specifically provided for in these statutes,” id. § 95.11(3)(p). ... As things stand, however, irrespective of how many times Plaintiffs allege their rights have been violated in the past, their rights are violated anew each time an election is held and the candidates’ names are arranged in their respective office blocks in the order prescribed by section 101.151(3)(a).

Section 95.11(2)(b) provides a five-year limitations period for written-contract actions, while § 95.11(3)(k) provides a four-year period for actions for the sale and delivery of goods.

International Graphics, Inc. v. MTA-Travel Ways, Inc. · filed 1976-07-15(2)(b), (3)(k)

According to Fla.Stat. § 95.11, “a legal or equitable action on a contract, obligation, or liability not founded on a written instrument” is valid for five years. The action on the promissory note is therefore within the statute. However, “a legal or equitable action on a contract, obligation, or liability not founded on a written instrument, including an action for the sale and delivery of goods, wares, and merchandise, and on store accounts” must be brought within four years. Plaintiff’s invoices show that the goods involved — printed materials — were sold and delivered between May 30, 1970 and December 29, 1972. The complaint was filed on September 8, 1975. Therefore, this Court finds that the statute of limitations has tolled with respect to a portion of the plaintiff’s second, third, and fourth causes of action: the action for the sale and delivery of goods cannot predate September 8, 1971.

Section 95.11(3) provides a four-year statute of limitations for a civil conspiracy action.

Benjamin Harrison Williams, Jr. v. Charlie Rhoden, Charles Tompkins, J. S. Padgett · filed 1980-11-06(3)

Thus, this conspiracy claim is clearly not barred by the Florida statute of limitations. Under Florida law, the statute of limitations for a civil conspiracy action is four years. ... See ... Fla.Stat. § 95.11(3); ... Faulk v. Allen, 152 Fla. 413, 12 So.2d 109, 110-11 (1943); ... Timmins v. Firestone, 283 So.2d 63, 65 (Fla. 4th Dist.Ct.App.1973).

Section 95.11's four-year limitations period did not bar the FDIC's claim to the escrow fund when applied from its appointment as receiver.

American National Bank of Jacksonville v. Federal Deposit Insurance · filed 1983-08-04

Even assuming, for the purpose of argument, that SFC did not waive its right to present the statute of limitations bar as a defense, we would still concur in the decision of the district court that SFC’s argument fails on the merits. The best possible case SFC could muster for applying a statute of limitations bar would be invocation of the shortest of the several statutes of limitations it suggests might apply, four years (Fla.Stat. § 95.11 (1981)) to commence running immediately upon the FDIC’s appointment as receiver on April 18, 1970. Even under this scenario, the FDIC’s claim would not be barred.

The Florida limitations period applicable to a federal claim is determined by the state limitations statute in effect when the claim accrued; the later amendment from three years to four years did not apply.

Fleetwing Corp. v. Mobil Oil Corp. · filed 1983-12-22(5)(a)

Also without merit is Fleetwing’s complaint that the district court erred in applying Florida’s three-year limitations statute, Fla.Stat. § 95.11(5)(a) (1973), to its claim. That statute was amended effective January 1, 1975, by Fla.Stat. § 95.11(3)(f) (1975), which enlarged the limitations period to four years. Under federal law, however, the relevant time for identifying the most analogous state period of limitations is the date of accrual. Vigman v. Community Nat. Bank & Trust Co., 635 F.2d 455, 458 n. 8 (5th Cir.1981); McNeal v. Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, Inc., 598 F.2d 888, 892-93 *771n. 9 (5th Cir.1979). The three-year limitations statute was in effect when Fleetw-ing’s cause of action accrued in 1974, and thus provided the time limitation for bringing suit. In any event, since we have held that the limitations period began to run in January, 1974, appellant’s actions would be time-barred even under the amended statute.

Section 95.11(6) applies prospectively and does not govern causes of action accruing before its effective date unless the Legislature clearly expresses a retroactive intent.

Foley v. Morris · filed 1976-11-04(6)

Nothing in the language of the act manifests an intention by the Legislature to do otherwise than prospectively apply the new two-year statute of limitations. ... Since the legislative intent to provide retroactive effect to Section 95.11(6), Florida Statutes, is not express, clear, or manifest, we conclude that it does not apply to causes of action occurring prior to its effective date.

Section 95.11(5)(e) establishes a three year period of limitation.

Prescott v. Kreher · filed 1960-09-30(5)(e)

We find not tenable an additional argument advanced by Kreher that this suit for accounting was barred by the three year period of limitation under section 95.11(5) (e), Florida Statutes, F.S.A.

Section 95.11(5)(e) gives actions on unwritten contracts a three-year limitation period.

Rea v. Outboard Marine Corp. · filed 1965-07-13(5)(e)

Such an action is one upon contract not in writing for which the statute of limitations is three years, §95.11(5) (e), Florida Statutes. ... Our statute specifies the particular limitation for actions on contract, obligation or liability not in writing, as aforesaid — but actions for negligence resulting in personal injury fall into a catch-all provision which fixes the limitation at four years for “any action for relief not specifically provided for in this chapter.” (§95.11(4), F.S.). ... Said statute began to run when the act or event occurred which gave the right of action, though all the damages therefrom may not have fully accrued or materialized until a later date.

Section 95.11(2) bars an action on a judgment or decree when it is commenced more than seven years after the judgment.

Markham v. Gottsegen · filed 1965-10-15(2)

Section 95.11(2), Florida Statutes, F.S.A., provides that actions other than those for recovery of real property can be commenced only within seven years upon a judgment or decree of any court of the United States, or of any state or territory within the United States or of any foreign country. ... Our section 95.11(2) prevails as a bar to the Florida action.

Section 95.11(4) gives invasion of privacy actions a four-year limitations period and does not postpone the period until the plaintiff learns of the invasion.

Houston v. Florida-Georgia Television Company · filed 1966-12-08(4)

Since the statute of limitations (Section 95.11(4) applicable to actions for invasion of privacy does not provide that the four-year period begins only when the injured party obtains knowledge or notice of the invasion, the burden is upon the appellants to demonstrate that, under the decisional law and in the absence of such a postponement provision in the statute, such a provision should be read into the statute of limitations.

Section 95.11 imposes a four-year limit on unspecified actions and a three-year limit on actions based on a statutory liability, excluding penalties or forfeitures.

Campbell v. Honorable J. E. Weatherford, County Judge, Nassau County, Florida · filed 1970-07-07(4) and (5)(a)

We need not discuss the merits of these contentions since it is clear that the district court correctly held that the action was barred by the applicable state statute of limitations. Section 95.11, Florida Statutes (1967), F.S.A. provides: ... (4) Within Four Years. — Any action for relief not specifically provided for in this chapter. ... (5) Within Three Years.— (a) An action upon a liability created by statute, other than a penalty or forfeiture. ... Our concern in the present case, however, is clearly academic since the action is time barred under either section of the statute.

Section 95.11 sets deadlines for actions, including five years for written contract claims, four years for fraud and certain other claims, and laches within the corresponding legal-action period.

Buckley Towers Condominium, Inc. v. Buchwald · filed 1978-08-11(2)(b), (3), and (6)

This action is governed by the Florida Limitations Statute, Chap. 95, Fla. Stat. Section 95.011, Fla. Stat., provides that a civil action shall be barred unless begun within the time prescribed in Chap. 95. Section 95.11(2) (b), Fla. Stat., requires that a legal or equitable action on a contract, obligation, or liability founded on a written instrument shall be commenced within five years. Section 95.11(3), Fla. Stat., requires that an action founded on statutory liability, a legal or equitable action founded on fraud, an action to rescind a contract, and any action not specifically provided for in the limitations statutes, shall be commenced within four years.

Section 95.11 bars an otherwise permissive counterclaim when the applicable limitations period has run.

DuBreuil v. James · filed 1978-11-28

Inasmuch as it affirmatively appears from the pleadings that the attempted counterclaim is permissive and not compulsory, see Barrett v. Pickard, 85 So.2d 630 (Fla.1956); McDonald Air Conditioning v. 1041 Corporation, 251 So.2d 319 (Fla. 1st DCA 1971); and Florida Rules of Civil Procedure 1.170(b), and that the time specified by the statute of limitations, Section 95.11, Florida Statutes (1973), had run, the judgment is affirmed.

Section 95.11(3)'s four-year limitations period is tolled when the plaintiff files the complaint.

Szabo v. Essex Chemical Corp. · filed 1984-11-13(3)

Section 95.11(3), Florida Statutes (1981), provides that actions other than for recovery of real property shall be commenced within four years (from the time the cause of action accrues, § 95.031, Fla. Stat. (1981)). Thus, the filing of the plaintiffs' complaint tolled the statute of limitations.

Section 95.11(4)(b), rather than subsection (4)(d), supplies the applicable limitations period for the claim.

Cardona v. Scheerer · filed 1986-11-26(4)(b)

We also note that the applicable statute of limitations is Section 95.11(4)(b), Florida Statutes (1985) rather than section 95.11(4)(d) which was applied by the trial court.

Section 95.11(3) does not bar a claim premised on the April 1987 conversation because it falls within the limitations period.

Mm v. Mps · filed 1989-12-12(3)

Appellees maintain that section 95.11(3), Florida Statutes (1986), bars the action. Insofar as the complaint is premised on the April 1987 conversation between M.P.S. and M.M., it is well within the period of limitation.

Section 95.11(3) supplied the limitations provisions applicable to the facts of this action.

Murphy v. Tucker · filed 1997-03-05(3)

We hold that the trial court did not err in applying the provisions of section 95.11(3), Florida Statutes (1995), to the facts of the case.

Section 95.11 bars beneficiaries’ claims to void a trust settlement agreement filed nearly nine years after the agreement was made.

Frymer v. Brettschneider · filed 1997-07-02

We affirm the trial court's determination that the beneficiaries' causes of action were time barred, see section 95.11, Florida Statutes (1995), and, thus, do not reach the issue of the propriety of the trial court's findings on the merits of appellants' claims.

Section 95.11’s four- and five-year periods do not bar an easement claim filed shortly after the claimant is denied use of the easement.

Estate of Johnston v. TPE Hotels, Inc. · filed 1998-09-11(2)(b), (3)(p)

In this case the Johnstons were not denied use of the access easement until shortly before this lawsuit was filed in 1994. Thus her claim was timely under any possibly applicable statute of limitations.

When there is reasonable doubt whether the five-year contract period or one-year specific-performance period applies to an action enforcing a condominium declaration, the longer period applies.

Sheoah Highlands, Inc. v. Daugherty · filed 2003-02-14(2)(b), (5)(a)

Applying the foregoing analysis to the matter before us, we conclude that because there is a reasonable question as to which statute of limitations should apply to Daugherty's claim, we resolve the doubt in favor of the application of the statute containing the longer limitation period.

Section 95.11(3)(a)'s four-year limitations period is satisfied when a negligence complaint is filed on time, even if summonses have not been obtained or served.

Brown v. Ameri Star, Inc. · filed 2004-10-15(3)(a)

The failure to obtain summonses and to serve them after the filing of the complaint does not warrant dismissal of the action with prejudice, since filing of the complaint with the court within the statute of limitations period commences the action for purposes of compliance with the statute of limitations.

Section 95.11(3)(a) allows four years to bring a general negligence action, and a defendant asserting that limit need not submit an undisputed filing date to the jury.

Elmore v. Florida Power & Light Co. · filed 2005-02-09(3)(a)

It is well settled that "[a] cause of action for general negligence must be commenced within four years." Nale v. Montgomery, 768 So.2d 1166, 1167 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000); § 95.11(3)(a), Fla. Stat. (1999). ... There is no requirement that a defendant has to prove the date a claim is filed when asserting a statute of limitations affirmative defense. It was not an element that needed to be submitted to the jury.

Section 95.11(5)(a)'s one-year limit does not support dismissal when the complaint does not conclusively establish that the claim is time-barred.

Walters v. Ocean Gate Phase I Condominium · filed 2006-04-07(5)(a)

Because the second amended complaint failed to set forth with particularity when Walters discovered the buyers' intent not to assume liability for the assessments, the trial court erred in ruling that the complaint conclusively established that the statute of limitations barred Count III.

A party seeking summary judgment on a Section 95.11 limitations defense must establish when the limitations period began and show that its timing is undisputed.

Key v. Trattmann · filed 2007-05-25

As regards the limitations defense, it was incumbent on him to establish when the statute began running and, since he sought summary judgment, to demonstrate the absence of any dispute about the timing of the breach of the fiduciary duty alleged.