Fla. Stat. § 768.79

Section 768.79 does not apply to offers of judgment when the underlying cause of action accrued before the statute’s effective date.

Mudano v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. · filed 1989-05-31

However, we conclude that the statute, by its terms, does not apply to offers of judgment where the underlying cause of action accrued prior to its effective date. Further, the statute, in any event, affects substantive rights, and therefore may only be applied prospectively.

Section 768.79 does not apply to offers of judgment when the underlying cause of action accrued before July 1, 1986.

Metropolitan Dade County v. Jones Boatyard, Inc. · filed 1993-01-07

The court therefore held that, "the statute [section 768.79], by its terms, does not apply to offers of judgment where the underlying cause of action accrued prior to its effective date." Id. We approve this reasoning and adopt it as the proper interpretation of the applicability of section 768.79.

Section 768.79 allows attorney’s fee awards to prevailing defendants only for insurance policies issued or renewed after October 1, 1990.

STATE FARM MUT. AUTO. INS. v. Malmberg · filed 1994-07-07

Section 768.79, Florida Statutes (1991), allows attorney's fee awards to prevailing defendants, but only for policies issued or renewed after October 1, 1990. This statute obviously does not apply to the Malmbergs' 1987 accident.

Section 768.79 fee and cost determinations use the version in effect when the action accrued.

Versprill v. School Bd. of Orange County · filed 1994-07-08

Although the issue of the jury instruction is dispositive, we note that any determination of attorney's fees and costs pursuant to section 768.79, Florida Statutes must be determined based upon the 1986 version of the section. This version of the statute was the one in effect at the time the action accrued.

A motion for costs and fees based on a rejected offer of judgment is governed by the version of section 768.79 in effect when the underlying incident occurred.

Carlow v. Blenman · filed 1995-03-24

We note, however, that the appellant’s complaint is based on an incident allegedly occurring on July 18, 1988. Thus, any subsequent motion for costs and fees based on the rejection of an offer of judgment must be determined in accordance with the statute in effect on that day and the case law interpreting that statute.

Section 768.79 does not apply to offers of judgment when the underlying causes of action accrued before July 1, 1986.

Baker Protective Services v. FP INC. · filed 1995-07-19

Moreover, Florida Statutes, Section 768.79 is not applicable in the instant case since that section does not apply to offers of judgments where the underlying causes of actions accrued prior to July 1, 1986, the effective date of that section.

Section 768.79 authorizes an award of attorney’s fees and costs when its requirements are met.

Ferman Motor Car Co. v. Lamb · filed 1990-10-03

We reverse the denial of attorney’s fees and costs in this case and remand for imposition of such costs under Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.442, and section 768.79, Florida Statutes (1989).

Section 768.79 permits an eligible plaintiff to recover reasonable costs and attorney's fees incurred in successfully defending a judgment on appeal.

Mark Arnold Constr. v. Nat'l Lumber · filed 1994-08-12

We align ourselves with the Fourth [2] and Fifth [3] District Courts of Appeal in granting, on the same grounds, the appellee's motion for an award of reasonable costs and attorney's fees incurred in successfully defending the judgment on appeal. § 768.79, Fla. Stat. (1993).

Section 768.79 permits an award of appellate attorney's fees and costs when a qualifying demand for judgment is rejected.

Westfield Ins. Co. v. Mendolera · filed 1994-09-28

We now align ourselves with the First, Fourth and Fifth District Courts of Appeal in granting Mendolera's motion for appellate attorney's fees and costs based on section 768.79.

An attorney’s fee award under section 768.79 is reversed when the underlying judgment is reversed on the merits.

Rodriguez v. Pino · filed 1994-03-08

Pursuant to section 768.79, Florida Statutes (1989), the appellee made a pretrial demand for judgment in the amount of $250,000. The appellants rejected this demand and now also appeal a final cost judgment awarding attorney's fees under the statute. Because we reverse on the merits in this case, the final cost judgment is also reversed.

Section 768.79 requires an award of attorney's fees when its requirements are met unless the court finds that the offer was not made in good faith.

Stunkel v. Hanley Landscape, Inc. · filed 1994-03-16

The trial court did not have the benefit of Schmidt v. Fortner, 629 So.2d 1036 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993), in which this court concluded that an award of attorney's fees is mandatory under section 768.79, where the requirements of the statute are met, unless the trial court determines the offer was not made in good faith. Since there was no finding that the offer was not made in good faith, we reverse on the authority of Schmidt and remand for the court to award attorney's fees.

Section 768.79 makes attorney’s fees available when a defendant rejects a plaintiff’s settlement offer and the judgment is at least 25% greater than the offer.

Hellmann v. City of Orlando · filed 1994-03-25

When the appellant, plaintiff below, offered to settle his case he did so in accordance with the statute. When the defendant city rejected his offer it put itself in jeopardy of having to pay attorney fees if the ultimate judgment was at least 25% greater than the offer. That is what occurred here.

Section 768.79 permits a counter-defendant to recover reasonable attorney’s fees and costs when a rejected offer of judgment exceeds the counter-plaintiffs’ award by at least 25%.

Florida Drilling & Sawing v. Fohrman · filed 1994-04-27

After the jury awarded counter-plaintiffs an amount that was at least 25% less than the offer of judgment, counter-defendant sought reasonable attorney’s fees and costs under section 768.79, Florida Statutes (1991). Contrary to counter-plaintiffs’ contention, however, the stipulation clearly did not refer to the counterclaims, but only applied to the plaintiffs claim. Since the stipulation did not apply to the counterclaims, the trial court erred in denying counter-defendant’s motion for attorney’s fees and costs based on its offer of judgment.

Section 768.79 permits an award of attorney fees and costs to defendants.

McCoy v. Stein Mart, Inc. · filed 1995-04-26

We also affirm the trial court’s order granting attorney fees and costs based on section 768.79, Florida Statutes, as to these defendants.

Section 768.79(1), together with section 59.46, supports an award of appellate attorney’s fees and costs.

Metropolitan Dade County v. Cerezo · filed 1996-04-24(1)

We write only to address the appellee’s motion to tax attorney’s fees pursuant to section 768.79, Florida Statutes (1989), and to note that we align ourselves with the First, Second, Fourth and Fifth District Courts of Appeal, and grant the appellee’s motion for appellate attorney’s fees and costs based on sections 768.79(1) and 59.46, Florida Statutes (1989).

Section 768.79 entitles a defendant to reasonable costs and attorney's fees when the plaintiff's judgment is at least twenty-five percent less than the defendant's rejected offer of judgment.

Hannah v. Newkirk · filed 1996-06-06(1)

In light of our decision here, Hannah will recover a judgment that is over fifty percent less than Newkirk's offer for judgment. Thus, both prerequisites have been met and Newkirk is entitled to reasonable costs and attorney's fees pursuant to section 768.79.

Section 768.79 authorizes an award of attorney’s fees.

Yacht & Country Club, Inc. v. Craig · filed 1995-12-27

We reverse the order denying attorney’s fees and remand for an award pursuant to section 768.79, Florida Statutes (1991).

Section 768.79 makes an award of attorney's fees and costs dependent on the judgment obtained by the plaintiff.

Emory v. Florida Freedom Newspapers · filed 1997-01-02

Having reversed the underlying judgment, we also reverse the trial court's award of attorney's fees and costs to Florida Freedom as the statutory basis for the award of fees and costs is dependent upon the judgment obtained by the plaintiff. See § 768.79, Fla. Stat. (1989).

Section 768.79 allows a defendant to recover attorney’s fees and costs after an unaccepted offer of judgment when the judgment finds no liability.

Brooks v. South Seminole Community Hospital · filed 1998-06-05(1)

Ms. Brooks also argues that the hospital is not entitled to an award of fees and costs because it did not obtain a judgment in its favor as required by section 768.79, Florida Statutes. That argument also must fail because the statute was amended in 1990 to allow an award of fees and costs when judgments of no liability are rendered.

Section 768.79 requires a final judgment on liability, or its equivalent, before entitlement to attorney’s fees is triggered.

Saye v. Pieschacon · filed 2000-02-09

Appellant correctly contends that the order awarding attorney's fees and costs, pursuant to the offer of judgment statute, must be reversed because such an award requires the entry of a final judgment on the issue of liability, or its equivalent, in order to trigger entitlement under the statute. See § 768.79, Fla. Stat. (1997).

Section 768.79 permits a defendant to recover attorney’s fees and costs after its settlement offer is refused and a favorable summary judgment is affirmed.

E.T. Plastering, Inc. v. Pacheco · filed 2001-03-14

This is an appeal by E.T. Plastering, Inc., a defendant below, from an order denying its claim for attorney’s fees and costs under section 768.79, Florida Statutes (1999) based upon the plaintiffs refusal of an offer of settlement. ... Since we have done just that in ... the order under review is reversed and the cause remanded "with directions to determine the amounts recoverable.

Section 768.79 entitles a defendant to reasonable costs and attorney's fees when the plaintiff rejects an offer of judgment and the resulting judgment is one of no liability.

Smiley v. Nelson · filed 2001-09-14

Section 768.79, Florida Statutes (1993), provides that a defendant is entitled to recover reasonable costs and attorney's fees if the defendant files an offer of judgment which is not accepted by the plaintiff, and the judgment is one of no liability. Because the judgment in this case is one of no liability under the no-fault law, the Smileys are entitled to fees and costs.

Section 768.79(1) entitles a defendant to reasonable fees and costs after an unaccepted offer of judgment if the judgment finds no liability.

USAA Casualty Insurance v. Auffant (In Re Auffant) · filed 2001-10-16(1)

When a party serves a demand or offer for judgment and that party recovers at least 25 percent less than the demand or offer, the party is entitled to reasonable fees and costs; the statute similarly allows an award of fees in cases where a judgment of no liability is entered.

Section 768.79(1) entitles a defendant to attorney's fees when its offer of judgment is rejected and it obtains a judgment of no liability, unless the offer was made in bad faith.

Florida Gas Trans. v. Lauderdale Sand & Fill Inc. · filed 2002-04-03(1)

We have consistently held that, pursuant to this statute, once an offer of judgment has been made and rejected and a judgment of no liability has been entered, the defendant has a right to an award of attorney's fees unless the offer was found to have been made in bad faith.

Section 768.79 entitles a defendant who makes a qualifying offer to attorney’s fees after a judgment of no liability unless the court finds that the offer was not made in good faith.

Mesa v. Ocean Enterprises, Inc. · filed 2002-01-09(1), (7)(a)

We find that appellants met the statutory requirements entitling them to their attorney’s fees. As the trial court made no finding that appellants’ offer was not made in good faith, the trial court was required to enter an order awarding appellants their attorney’s fees.

Section 768.79 permits appellate attorney's fees when a defendant makes a timely offer of judgment in the trial court and later obtains a qualifying judgment.

Disney v. Vaughen · filed 2002-01-18

Vaughen's argument that section 768.79, Florida Statutes, does not apply to appeals lacks merit.

Section 768.79(1) does not justify an attorney's fees award when the plaintiff's recovery is significantly less than his rejected offer of judgment.

Gill v. McGuire · filed 2002-02-06(1)

Moreover, because his recovery will now be significantly less than his $10,000 offer of judgment, we reverse the attorney's fees award as no longer justified under the offer of judgment statute.

Section 768.79 applies to appellate attorney's fees, which are mandatory when its requirements are met.

Motter Roofing, Inc. v. Leibowitz · filed 2002-03-13(1)

This Court, along with all district courts in Florida, has ruled that Section 768.79 also applies to fees incurred on appeal. ... Under Sections 768.79 and 59.46, Florida Statutes (2001), attorney's fees are not discretionary.

Section 768.79 does not permit an attorney's fee award while factual questions remain about which plaintiffs are entitled to judgment.

DeCarlo v. Griffin · filed 2002-10-02

Until there are answers to these unresolved questions, there can be no award of attorney's fees, pursuant to section 768.79, Florida Statutes (2001).

Section 768.79(6) requires a party seeking fees under an offer of judgment to move within thirty days after entry of judgment; a final summary judgment starts that period.

Graef v. Hegedus · filed 2002-10-11(6)

Because Dames & Moore did not file its motion for attorney’s fees within thirty days of the June 9, 1999, order, its motion for fees was untimely filed. The trial court erred in awarding attorney’s fees under this untimely motion.

Section 768.79(6) permits entitlement to attorney’s fees only after entry of judgment or voluntary or involuntary dismissal.

Escambia County v. Stanberry · filed 2002-04-16(6)

Under section 768.79(6), Florida Statutes (2001), entitlement to attorney’s fees arises, if at all, only “after the entry of judgment or after voluntary or involuntary dismissal.”

Section 768.79 permits appellate attorney's fees for successfully defending an appeal.

Matalon v. Lee · filed 2003-06-11

Lee is entitled to his appellate attorney's fees for successfully defending this appeal pursuant to section 768.79.

Entitlement to attorney fees under section 768.79 is determined after final judgment on remand when the existing fee award is vacated.

Escambia County v. Stanberry · filed 2004-02-02

The award of attorney fees and costs based on section 768.79, Florida Statutes, is VACATED and the trial court is ordered to determine, after a final judgment has been rendered on remand, whether the appellee is entitled to attorney fees.

Section 768.79(1) requires an award of postoffer attorney's fees and costs after a no-liability judgment on a rejected offer, absent a finding that the offer was not made in good faith.

Vines v. Mathis · filed 2004-02-27(1)

The use of the disjunctive "or" in section 768.79(1) between the phrase "the judgment is one of no liability" and the phrase "the judgment obtained by the plaintiff is at least 25 percent less than such offer," indicates that no further analysis of the judgment need occur when a no liability judgment is entered. Absent a finding that Mr. Vines' offer of judgment was not made in good faith, the trial court's entry of a no liability judgment mandated an award of attorneys' fees and costs incurred after the date the offer was served.

Section 768.79 entitles a defendant who made an offer of judgment to reasonable fees and costs when the judgment finds no liability.

Norris v. Treadwell · filed 2005-06-23(6)(a)

Since the judgment was one of "no liability," the statute entitles Treadwell to an award of reasonable fees and costs.

Section 768.79 authorizes an attorney’s fee entitlement that a procedural rule cannot alter, amend, or eliminate.

Heymann v. Free · filed 2005-09-08

A rule of procedure cannot alter, amend or eliminate an entitlement to an award of attorney's fees authorized in Section 768.79, Florida Statutes.

An attorney’s fee award in a settlement proposal case under section 768.79 cannot include a 2.5 multiplier.

Nationwide Mutual Fire Insurance Co. v. Robinson · filed 2005-12-07

However, because application of a 2.5 multiplier to the fee award was not appropriate in this settlement proposal case, under Sarkis v. Allstate Insurance Co., 863 So.2d 210 (Fla.2003), or as a sanction for discovery violations, we reverse and remand to the trial court to reduce the amount of attorneys’ fees awarded by the amount of the multiplier.

A fee and cost award under section 768.79 depends on the underlying judgment and must be reversed when that judgment is reversed.

Sanchez v. Nerys · filed 2007-02-14

As we are remanding for a new trial, we necessarily reverse the final judgment for attorneys' fees and costs since the statutory basis for the award of fees and costs is dependent on the underlying judgment obtained by the plaintiff.

A fee judgment under section 768.79 based on a plaintiff’s verdict must be vacated when that verdict is reversed and final judgment is ordered for the defendant.

Florida Department of Environmental Protection v. Green · filed 2007-06-20

Appellant, Florida Department of Environmental Protection (FDEP), appeals the entry of a final judgment for attorney’s fees and costs pursuant to section 768.79, Florida Statutes (2005), and Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.442, based on a proposal for settlement that was rejected by FDEP. ... In that appeal, this Court reversed the final judgment entered on the jury verdict and remanded the case for entry of a final judgment in favor of FDEP. Accordingly, we reverse and remand this appeal with directions to vacate the judgment for attorney’s fees and costs in favor of Green.

Section 768.79 does not entitle a party to appellate attorney's fees when she has not prevailed on appeal and her judgment must be reduced.

Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Voigt · filed 2008-01-04

Given that Ms. Voigt has not prevailed in this appeal and that the judgment must now be reduced, we deny Ms. Voigt's motion for appellate attorneys' fees pursuant to section 768.79, Florida Statutes (2005).

Section 768.79 fixes a qualifying plaintiff’s entitlement to attorney’s fees and costs when the plaintiff obtains a judgment at least 25 percent greater than the offer, even if objections are resolved later.

Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. French · filed 2009-05-06(1)

The language in the rule and statute on settlement offers is clear that when the qualifying conditions have occurred ((1) a written offer has been made in accordance with Rule 1.442 and “an applicable Florida law”, and (2) in the case of a plaintiff that is an offeror under section 768.79, the plaintiff “recovers a judgment in an amount at least 25 percent greater than the offer”), then the offeror is “entitled” to the award of attorney’s fees and costs.

Section 768.79(7)(b) requires a court assessing reasonable attorney’s fees to consider the damages awarded and their relationship to the settlement proposal.

Segundo v. Reid · filed 2009-09-30(7)(b)

Although we disagree with the defendant that any of the listed factors contained in section 768.79(7)(b) apply, we agree with the defendant that the trial court should have considered the actual damages awarded by the jury and the relationship between the award and the plaintiffs proposal for settlement under the “all other relevant criteria” provision contained in section 768.79(7)(b).

Section 768.79 makes an award of attorney’s fees mandatory when a settlement proposal meets the statutory prerequisites.

Donovan Marine, Inc. v. Delmonico · filed 2010-07-07

An award of attorney’s fees is mandatory when the statutory prerequisites have been met.

Section 768.79 does not entitle a party that rejected an offer of judgment to attorney's fees merely because its recovery was at least 75% of the offer.

Baptiste v. FREMENICH · filed 2008-02-20(1)

The rule is that a party who files an offer of judgment can recover attorney's fees if the offer of judgment is rejected and the party who rejected the offer receives less than 75% of the offer of judgment. There is no basis for the party who rejected the offer to recover attorney's fees if the party who rejected the offer recovers at least 75% of the rejected offer of judgment.

Section 768.79 provides an independent basis for attorney's fees when its requirements are met, even if the underlying contract has no attorney's fee provision.

DuPont Builders, Inc. v. Baker · filed 2008-07-11(6)(a)

We can find no authority supporting the trial court's conclusion that an award of attorney's fees pursuant to section 768.79 and rule 1.442 may not be had if the underlying contract fails to contain a provision for attorney's fees. To the contrary, we conclude that section 768.79 creates an independent, substantive, and statutory basis for the award of attorney's fees when the requirements of the statute have been met.

A fee award under section 768.79 must be reversed when the judgment on which it depends is reversed.

Hickman v. BARCLAY'S INTERNATIONAL REALTY, INC. · filed 2009-07-15

Charles and Carol Hickman, the plaintiffs below, appeal the trial court’s order awarding attorney’s fees and costs to Bjorn Q. Aaserod, the defendant below, pursuant to section 768.79, Florida Statutes. ... In Hickman v. Barclay’s International Realty, Inc., 5 So.3d 804 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009), we reversed the trial court’s order granting final summary judgment in favor of Aaserod. Therefore, we reverse the fees award as well.

A fee and cost award based on a proposal for settlement must be reversed when the underlying judgment is reversed and the case is remanded for a new trial.

Packaging Corp. of America v. DeRycke · filed 2010-10-15

Pursuant to Mrs. DeRycke’s proposal for settlement, the trial court entered a judgment awarding her $400,000 in fees and $110,000 in costs. Because we are reversing and remanding for a new trial, we must, necessarily, reverse the award of fees and costs.

Section 768.79 does not cut off a prevailing party’s contractual right to attorney’s fees incurred after an opposing party’s settlement offer.

Tierra Holdings, Ltd. v. Mercantile Bank · filed 2011-05-18(1)

Further, nothing in the language of section 768.79 authorizes the modification of a contractual right to attorney’s fees.

Section 768.79 permits recovery of appellate costs and attorney’s fees if its requirements are ultimately satisfied.

State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Rembrandt Mobile Diagnostics, Inc. · filed 2012-08-01(1)

If the proposal for settlement statute ultimately is satisfied, then the petitioner shall be entitled to recover its appellate costs and attorney’s fees.

Section 768.79 fee claimants must allocate fees to the claim for which fees are available or show that the claims are too intertwined to allocate.

Blanton v. Godwin · filed 2012-08-01

As the party moving for fees, Mr. Godwin had the burden to allocate them to his consortium claim or to show that the issues were so intertwined that allocation is not feasible.

Section 768.79(1) entitles a defendant to attorney’s fees when its good-faith settlement offer exceeds the plaintiff’s zero recovery against it.

Allstate Insurance Co. v. Staszower · filed 2011-05-25(1)

Finally, the trial court erred in denying Allstate’s motion for attorney’s fees under section 768.79(1), Florida Statutes (2010). ... In light of Dunn’s underlying liability coverage and the resulting verdict, the proposals for settlement of $100.00 each for Staszower and Conn was manifestly made in good faith. Thus, the trial court erred when it denied Allstate’s motion for attorney’s fees.

Section 768.79(6) authorizes attorney’s fees after a plaintiff’s voluntary dismissal only when the dismissal is with prejudice or is a second voluntary dismissal.

Bright v. Baltzell · filed 2011-06-22(6)

Thus, the dismissal was not a second dismissal as contemplated by the offer of judgment statute, and fees were not authorized under the statute.

Section 768.79 supports an award of attorney’s fees when a plaintiff obtains a judgment at least 25% greater than a compliant settlement offer and the trial court makes no determination that the offer lacked good faith.

Knecht Properties, LLC v. Carreira · filed 2012-09-27

We reverse the denial of Knecht’s motion for attorney’s fees because the record before us reflects that: (1) the judgment obtained by Knecht was at least twenty-five percent greater than the amount offered in the settlement proposal; (2) Knecht’s settlement proposal, on its face, complied with the requirements of section 768.79 and rule 1.442; and (3) in its written order, the trial court made no determination that Knecht’s offer was not made in good faith.

A fee award under section 768.79 must be reversed when the judgment supporting it is reversed.

Hodge v. Cichon · filed 2012-02-24

Appellants, the plaintiffs below, appeal the lower court’s orders awarding attorney’s fees and costs to Appellees, the defendants below, pursuant to section 768.79, Florida Statutes. The attorney’s fees award was based on the lower court’s order entering final summary judgment in favor of Appellees. We have since reversed the final summary judgment and remanded for further proceedings. ... Under these circumstances, we must also reverse the fee award entered in Appellees’ favor.

A fee award under section 768.79 that depends on a final judgment must be reversed when that judgment is reversed.

Graney v. Caduceus Properties, LLC · filed 2012-08-10

The lower court also awarded attorneys’ fees to Caduceus pursuant to section 768.79, Florida Statutes (2011), based on the final judgment entered in favor of Caduceus against KTD. We have since reversed the final judgment. ... We now reverse the trial court’s award of costs and fees entered in appellees’ favor.

Section 768.79 permits appellate attorney’s fees based on a qualifying proposal for settlement, even when the fees may be de minimis.

Braxton v. Grabowski · filed 2013-05-24(1)

Ms. Grabowski’s motion for appellate attorney’s fees is granted as to fees under section 768.79 and rule 1.442 only. The circuit court shall make a determination of entitlement under the proposal for settlement. If entitlement is found, the circuit court shall also determine the amount of appellate attorney’s fees.

Section 768.79 does not support an award of appellate attorney fees when appellate activity is de minimis.

Magic Tinting Window & Car Alarm, Inc. v. Scottsdale Insurance Co. · filed 2014-10-08

Scottsdale’s claim for fees is based upon section 768.79, Florida Statutes (2013) (Florida’s “Offer of judgment and demand for judgment” statute); Scottsdale served a proposal for settlement on Magic Tinting Window & Car Alarm, Inc. (Magic Tinting) on or about March 21, 2006. ... We deny Scottsdale’s amended motion for appellate attorney fees. See Sanchez v. State Farm Fla. Ins. Co., 997 So. 2d 1209, 1209 (Fla. 3d DCA 2008) (denying motion for appellate attorney fees when appellate record reflected “de minimis” activity).

Section 768.79 allows recovery of appellate attorney’s fees when the terms of a rejected offer of judgment are ultimately satisfied.

United Automobile Insurance Co. v. Comprehensive Health Center · filed 2015-08-05

We also quash the appellate division’s order denying United’s motion for appellate attorney’s fees under the offer of judgment statute, section 768.79, Florida Statutes (2012). If the terms of the offer of judgment statute are ultimately satisfied, then United shall be entitled to recover its appellate attorney’s fees.

Section 768.79 does not authorize attorney’s fees based on a settlement proposal that fails to state whether attorney’s fees are part of the legal claim, as rule 1.442(c)(2)(F) requires.

Deer Valley Realty, Inc. v. SB Hotel Associates, LLC · filed 2016-04-27

Section 768.79 and rule 1.442 control attorney’s fees awards based on a proposal for settlement. ... In conclusion, the proposals for settlement failed to strictly comply with rule 1.442(c)(2)(F) because they failed to state whether the attorney’s fees were part of the legal claim. They therefore cannot form a basis for the attorney’s fees award.

Section 768.79(1) does not require an insurer sued as a defendant to identify a policy provision authorizing attorney’s fees it incurred on its own behalf.

United Automobile Insurance Co. v. John S. Virga, D.C., P.A. · filed 2013-07-24(1)

Section 768.79(1) does not require a policy provision regarding attorney’s fees in actions where, as here, the insurer is the defendant, incurring attorney’s fees on its own behalf.

Section 768.79(1) permits a named defendant to make a settlement proposal, and that defendant’s later corporate conversion does not extinguish its right to fees based on the proposal.

Vanguard Car Rental USA, LLC v. Suttles · filed 2016-04-27(1)

Thus, under section 768.79, only Vanguard Inc. could serve a proposal for settlement. ... This did not change the identity of the “party” making the settlement proposal (Vanguard Inc.) nor deprive Vanguard LLC of the right to recover fees based on that proposal.

Section 768.79 permits appellate attorneys' fees based on an enforceable joint settlement proposal, even when the proposal does not apportion payment to an offeree who is solely vicariously liable.

Saterbo v. Markuson · filed 2016-09-21

Consequently, apportionment was not necessary pursuant to rule 1.442(c)(4), and Markuson's proposal was sufficient to meet the requirements contained in the rule. ... Under the unique facts of this case, we conclude that the trial court erred by determining that Markuson was not entitled to an award of appellate attorneys' fees pursuant to section 768.79 and rule 1.442(c) as against Erik and his insurer.

Section 768.79(1) entitles a defendant to attorney’s fees when the plaintiff declines a settlement offer and obtains a judgment at least 25 percent below the offer.

Sherman v. Savastano · filed 2017-06-21(1)

Section 768.79 of the Florida Statutes creates a substantive right to attorney’s fees where a plaintiff does not accept a proposal for settlement (also known as an offer of judgment) from the defendant and “the judgment is one of no liability or the judgment obtained by the plaintiff is at least 25 percent less than such offer.”

Section 768.79 allows attorney’s fees when a party rejects a valid settlement proposal and the statutory requirements are met.

GOLISTING.COM, INC., etc. v. JOHN PAPERA and CHRISTINE PAPERA · filed 2017-10-11

Therefore, they are liable for attorney’s fees under section 768.79 and rule 1.442.

Section 768.79(6)(a) awards attorney's fees to the plaintiff, not personally to the plaintiff's attorney.

Fournier v. Calvo · filed 2018-07-25(6)(a)

Appellee was the plaintiff in the case, not his attorney. Therefore, a plain reading of the statute compels us to conclude that Appellee's attorney cannot personally be awarded fees under section 768.79(6)(a).

Section 768.79(1) permits an award of appellate attorney’s fees when the judgment far exceeds the plaintiff’s proposal for settlement.

Gwendolyn E. Odom, etc. v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company · filed 2018-09-20(1)

Finally, we award Odom attorney’s fees for the appeal of this case in an amount to be determined by the trial court because the judgment in this case far exceeds the proposal for settlement filed by Odom, pursuant to section 768.79(1), Florida Statutes (2014), in the amount of $100,000.

Section 768.79 permits an award of attorney’s fees and costs in addition to fees and costs awarded under a lease agreement.

Marshall Cassedy, Jr. v. Monique Wood, Nikki Clark and Darcy Cavell · filed 2019-02-11

Stated another way, an award of attorney’s fees and costs to a party under the terms of a lease agreement does not preclude an award of additional fees and costs under section 768.79.

Section 768.79(1) limits recoverable attorney’s fees to amounts incurred and actually paid or payable from service of the proposal through the order granting fee entitlement.

Suarez v. Citizens Property Ins. Corp. · filed 2019-05-08(1)

On remand, the Insurer shall only recover those attorney’s fees incurred and actually paid or payable to its attorneys by the Insurer, from service of the 2016 proposal for settlement through the date of the order granting entitlement to fees.

Section 768.79(1) entitles a defendant to reasonable attorney’s fees incurred after a rejected offer of judgment when the judgment finds no liability.

Landi v. Home Depot USA, Inc. · filed 2020-06-03(1)

Fla. Stat. § 768.79 is such a fee-shifting statute. ... Thus, the Court will award Defendants $189,501.00 in attorneys’ fees.

Section 768.79 does not support a fee award when the judgment on which the award depends is reversed.

Kempton v. McComb · filed 2019-03-15

William Kempton appeals the trial court's order awarding attorney's fees and costs to Lawrence McComb, pursuant to section 768.79, Florida Statutes (2015), and Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.442. ... Given our reversal of the final judgment, we must reverse the trial court's order awarding attorney's fees and costs in Mr. McComb's favor.

An attorney’s fee and cost award under section 768.79 must be reconsidered after a new trial on damages is ordered.

GUTIERREZ v. DE LEON · filed 2022-01-05

Finally, as we are reversing for a new trial as to all economic damages, we reverse the agreed order granting attorney’s fees and costs to Florida Westside Trucking, with instructions for the trial court to reconsider Florida Westside Trucking’s motion for attorney’s fees and costs following the new trial on all past economic damages.

Section 768.79 permits an otherwise eligible party to recover attorney’s fees without prevailing at trial or on appeal.

Brinda Coates, etc. v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company · filed 2023-06-15(1)

Based on the analysis above, we hold that the text of section 768.79 shows that it is not a prevailing-party statute.

Section 768.79 permits only a defendant that made a compliant settlement offer to recover attorney’s fees.

Endurance American Specialty Insurance Company v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Company · filed 2023-09-27(1)

By its terms, Section 768.79 only provides relief to defendants who make compliant offers of settlement.

Section 768.79 permits a court to impose a monetary sanction and enter an amended judgment for that amount.

Ange's Auto Repair Service, Inc. v. Century Surety Company · filed 2024-03-01

The Court imposes a Fla. Stat. § 768.79 sanction in the amount of $15,894.93.

Section 768.79 permits a defendant to recover attorneys’ fees and costs incurred from the date it serves an offer of judgment.

AM CRESPI MIAMI, LLC v. Century Surety Company · filed 2024-03-07

Judge Torres applied the statute in effect when the Policy was issue and concluded that Defendant is entitled to attorneys’ fees and costs incurred from March 31, 2023, the date Defendant’s Offer of Judgment was served, pursuant to Fla. Stat. § 768.79. ... The Court agrees with the analysis in the R&R and concludes that Defendant’s Motion must be granted for the reasons set forth therein.

Section 768.79 entitles defendants to attorney’s fees when a plaintiff rejects a qualifying settlement proposal and the final judgment is at least 25% less than the offer.

Lemartec Corporation v. East Coast Metal Structures Corp. · filed 2024-05-15(1)

Accordingly, as the total amount awarded to Subcontractor ($36,304.51 inclusive of interest) was at least 25% less than the total proposal amount ($62,000), Defendants were entitled to an award of attorney’s fees under section 768.79, Florida Statutes (2021).

An award of attorney’s fees and costs under section 768.79 must be reversed when the underlying final judgment is reversed.

Geico General Insurance Company v. Brooke Tsao and BenjaminTsao · filed 2025-03-28

Because we reversed the final judgment, we must reverse the trial court’s order awarding attorney’s fees and costs to Tsao.

Section 768.79 entitles a defendant to costs and attorney’s fees when its compliant offer is not accepted and the judgment is one of no liability.

Corrales v. Walmart Stores East, LP · filed 2025-09-24(1)

Walmart’s offer (Doc. 63) complied with the statute, and the judgment was one of no liability.

Section 768.79 entitles a defendant to attorney’s fees when the plaintiff rejects a compliant offer of judgment and the judgment is one of no liability.

Andrews v. Wal-Mart Stores East, LP · filed 2025-09-26(1)

Stevens’s offer (Doc. 34-1) complied with the statute, and the judgment as to Stevens was one of no liability. Stevens is entitled to sanction Andrews for not accepting the offer.

Attorney’s fees under section 768.79 are subject to reconsideration in light of Schmidt v. Fortner.

Aitken v. Gajadha · filed 1994-03-23

Reversed and remanded for reconsideration of attorney’s fees under section 768.79, Florida Statutes (1989), in light of Schmidt v. Fortner, 629 So.2d 1036 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993).

Section 768.79 provides for attorney’s fees when a defendant rejects a plaintiff’s offer and the judgment exceeds the offer by at least 25%, but a county’s payment remains subject to its sovereign immunity limit.

Pinellas County ex rel. Board of County Commissioners · filed 1995-09-08

The trial court awarded attorney’s fees to the plaintiff pursuant to section 768.79, Florida Statutes (1989), which provides for the award of attorney’s fees when an offer of judgment is made by the plaintiff, rejected by the defendant, and the subsequent judgment is at least 25% more than the offer. ... To the extent the trial court’s order awarding attorney’s fees requires the County to make payment beyond the limits of its liability, that was error.

Section 768.79 permits a defendant to recover attorney’s fees and costs.

Morejon v. Metropolitan Dade County · filed 1998-05-20

On cross-appeal, however, we find no cognizable basis for the denial of the defendant’s motion for attorney’s fees and costs under section 768.79, Florida Statutes (1997).

Section 768.79(1) requires a valid final judgment before attorney’s fees may be awarded under the offer of judgment statute.

Haney v. Sloan · filed 2017-03-03(1)

Because the appellant, Brittany Haney, has prevailed in the main appeal, the trial court’s award of attorneys’ fees and costs in Ms. Sloan’s favor must also be reversed. ... see also § 768.79(1), Fla. Stat. (an attorneys’ fees award under the offer of judgment statute is predicated on a valid final judgment).

Under section 768.79, a reasonable rejection of an offer does not bar attorney's fees; once the section's prerequisites are met, fees may be denied only if the offer was made in bad faith.

Government Employees Ins. Co. v. Thompson · filed 1994-08-19

After an offer of judgment is made, the entitlement to attorney's fees under section 768.79 is established by the finding of no liability. The trial court erred in considering whether appellee was reasonable in rejecting GEICO's offer, because an unreasonable rejection is not a prerequisite to an award of attorney's fees under section 768.79. In fact, after the prerequisites of section 768.79 have been met, an award of attorney's fees may be denied only upon a finding of "bad faith" on the part of the offering party.

Section 768.79(2)(a) allows a court to disallow attorney's fees when a demand for judgment was made in bad faith.

Bridges v. Newton · filed 1990-01-30(2)(a)

In order to avoid an internal inconsistency within paragraph 768.79(2)(a), we conclude that the bad faith exception applies, as the language indicates, to any party entitled to claim an award of attorney's fees and costs pursuant to subsection (1), and that the "offer of judgment" phraseology employed in paragraph (2)(a) is a shorthand reference which includes both offers of, and demands for, judgment.

Section 768.79 requires an attorney's fee award when its prerequisites are met unless the court determines that the offer was not made in good faith.

Dvorak v. TGI FRIDAY'S INC. · filed 1994-04-27(7)(a)

As this court noted, section 768.79 does not give the trial court discretion to deny attorney's fees, once the prerequisites of the statute have been fulfilled, except if the court determines under section 768.79(7)(a) that "an offer was not made in good faith." In the present case the trial court made no finding that plaintiff's offer to settle under section 768.79 was not made in good faith, nor did defendant make that contention. We therefore conclude, as this court did in Schmidt, that the trial court had no discretion to deny attorney's fees as a result of the offer of judgment under section 768.79.

Section 768.79 does not require an unreasonable rejection of an offer before attorney's fees may be awarded.

TGI Friday's, Inc. v. Dvorak · filed 1995-08-24

It is also clear that the Legislature understands how to write a reasonable test requirement because such a requirement is included in section 45.061. It chose not to include such a provision in section 768.79. We find that the district court correctly held that Dvorak was entitled to attorney's fees pursuant to section 768.79. Accordingly, we approve the decision of the district court. We approve the opinion in Schmidt and disapprove the opinion in Bridges to the extent it held that section 768.79 requires an unreasonable rejection of an offer.

Section 768.79(7)(a) permits a court to deny attorney's fees when an offer lacks a reasonable relationship to damages and a realistic assessment of liability.

Eagleman v. Eagleman · filed 1996-05-22(7)(a)

In cases where liability is reasonably and realistically disputed, the offer of judgment need not equate with the total amount of damages. The offer should bear a reasonable relationship both to the amount of damages and a realistic assessment of liability.

Section 768.79 permits a court to deny fees on a qualifying offer only if the offer was not made in good faith; a reasonable rejection alone does not justify denial.

Segarra v. Mellerson · filed 1996-05-29

The sole basis for the trial court's denial of the motion, filed pursuant to Section 768.79, Florida Statutes (1993), was that the plaintiffs' rejection of the offer was "not unreasonable." However, the Florida Supreme Court has recently held that the trial court has the discretion to "disallow an award of attorney's fees, but only if it determines that a qualifying offer `was not made in good faith. '" TGI Friday's, Inc. v. Dvorak, 663 So.2d 606, 612 (Fla.1995). The trial court did not have the benefit of the Supreme Court's opinion when it ruled on McCarthy's motion for fees; accordingly, we remand the issue of fees to allow the trial court to reconsider the motion in light of the standard announced in Dvorak.

Section 768.79(7)(a) allows a nominal offer made in good faith when the offeror has a reasonable basis to expect no liability.

Peoples Gas System v. Acme Gas Corp. · filed 1997-01-15(7)(a)

We conclude that where the undisputed record strongly indicated that they had no exposure in this case, Metrogas and Siegal Gas had such a reasonable basis to make nominal offers to Peoples Gas.

A demand for judgment against a governmental entity can support attorney fees when it exceeds the statutory liability cap but remains within the entity’s insurance coverage.

Tramel v. Bass · filed 1998-03-03

As section 768.28(5) expressly authorized Tramel to accept Bass’ demand, the demand was not in bad faith, and Bass was entitled to attorney fees.

Section 768.79 permits an award of attorney's fees after a qualifying settlement offer made in good faith is rejected.

LUMBERMENS v. Sunrise Club · filed 1998-04-22

It is clear as a matter of law—considered in the light of all of the surrounding circumstances, particularly the relative strength of the respective parties' cases and the fact that the proposal in essence included foregoing the very arguable right to a return of the amounts the company had previously paid, see Wong Ken, 685 So.2d at 1004 n. 1—that the $300,000.00 offer was made "in good faith" within the meaning of the statute.

A nominal offer can satisfy section 768.79’s good-faith requirement when the offeror has a reasonable basis to believe it has no liability.

Weesner v. United Services Auto. Ass'n · filed 1998-04-24(7)

Review of the record in the instant case indicates that USAA had a reasonable basis to conclude that it had no liability after deposing Mr. Weesner who clearly admitted that UM coverage was discussed and made available when he originally applied for the umbrella policy. The $100 offer was a statement by USAA that it believed it had no liability and would ultimately prevail in the litigation. The fact that the offer of $100 was a nominal offer is not necessarily determinative of the issue of good faith.

A nominal offer of judgment can be made in good faith when the offeror has a reasonable foundation for the offer.

Allstate Ins. Co. v. Silow · filed 1998-07-29(7)(a)

Similarly, we believe that under the circumstances of the case before us, Allstate has demonstrated that it made its offer of judgment in good faith. The offer met the Schmidt test in that there was "some reasonable foundation on which to base an offer."

Section 768.79 does not make a nominal offer automatically bad faith; the trial judge determines good faith from the circumstances surrounding the offer.

Fox v. McCaw Cellular Communications · filed 1998-12-09(7)

We stress that the question of good faith in making an offer under section 768.79 involves an inquiry into the circumstances shown by the entire record of the case. Each case requires its own analysis, and must be considered on its own facts. Whether an offer was made in bad faith involves a matter of discretion reposed in the trial judge to be determined from the facts and circumstances surrounding the offer. That determination is not controlled by a legal imperative requiring a finding of bad faith merely because the offer was nominal.

Section 768.79 requires a court assessing an offer’s good faith to consider potential damages and the risk of liability; a small offer may be justified by those factors.

Evans v. Piotraczk · filed 1998-12-11

Instead Eagleman recognizes that depending on the circumstances of a particular case, a minimal offer might well be justified and thus the court must look to the relative amount of potential damage and factor in the risk of liability in determining whether the offer is in good faith.

Section 768.79(7)(a) permits denial of fees after statutory entitlement is established only if the offeree shows that the offer was not made in good faith.

Allstate Ins. Co. v. Manasse · filed 1998-08-12(7)(a)

Once entitlement to fees is established, it is lost only if the offeree succeeds in persuading the trial court that the offeror acted without good faith.

Once section 768.79’s prerequisites are met, the court must award attorney’s fees unless it finds the offer was made in bad faith.

Mateo v. Rubiales · filed 1998-09-09(7)(a)

After the prerequisites of section 768.79 are met, an award of attorney’s fees may be denied only upon a finding of “bad faith” on the part of the demanding party.

Section 768.79(7)(a) does not make an otherwise valid offer bad faith merely because the offeror plans a later claim against an insurer or seeks to obtain attorney's fees.

Lieff v. Sandoval · filed 1999-01-20(7)(a)

However, it is clear that this action against Sandoval would have terminated had Sandoval accepted Lieff's offer, thus accomplishing the intent of section 768.79 of bringing about earlier conclusions to litigation. ... The creation of the right to attorney's fees is the reason, or among the reasons, why any litigant makes an offer under section 768.79. It is the carrot held out by the statute to encourage early settlements. If we were to conclude that it is bad faith to utilize section 768.79 to obtain the right to attorney's fees, then the legislative inducement, the reason section 768.79 exists, disappears into a judicial black hole.

Section 768.79 does not treat a nominal offer as prima facie evidence of bad faith; the party receiving the offer bears the burden of proving bad faith.

Quest Air South, Inc. v. Weisman · filed 1999-01-20

In our recent decision in Fox v. McCaw Cellular Communications of Fla., 23 Fla. L. Weekly D2687 (Fla. 4th DCA Dec.9, 1998), we held that nominal offers are not prima facie evidence of bad faith and that the offer-ee has the burden of proving that the offer was not made in good faith by evidence reasonably tending to show that fact. ... We therefore remand for reconsideration in light of Fox.

Section 768.79 does not require a finding that an offer was made in good faith before fees are awarded; the offeree bears the burden of proving the absence of good faith.

Stofman v. World Marine Underwriters, Inc. · filed 1999-02-17(7)(a)

They have misread the statute; such a finding is not required to award fees. It is only when the court decides to find that an offer was not made in good faith that such a finding is necessary. ... Applying the methodology of Schmidt we conclude that World Marine had established an entitlement to fees and costs under section 768.79; the burden therefore was on the Stofmans to prove the absence of good faith.

Section 768.79(7)(a) permits a court to deny fees when an offer lacks good faith; the court assesses whether the offer had a reasonable foundation in the potential damages and risk of liability when made.

City of Neptune Beach v. Smith · filed 1999-03-26(7)(a)

Accordingly, the trial court in the present case should have applied this "reasonable foundation" test in determining whether the offers of judgment were made in good faith. And in applying this test, the trial court should have considered the amount of each of the offers in light of the amount of potential damage and risk of liability at the time each of the offers of judgment was made.

Section 768.79 does not require a defendant to be able to pay a demand for judgment for the demand to be made in good faith.

Alexandre v. Meyer · filed 1999-05-05

Section 768.79 does not require either ability to pay or payment in order to accept a demand for judgment. Defendants could have agreed to plaintiffs demand for judgment even if they did not have the ability to pay. The court would then have had the authority, under section 768.79(4), to "enforce the settlement agreement," presumably by entering a judgment. Plaintiffs demand, therefore, could have produced a settlement, and defendants' argument is without merit.

Section 768.79 permits a nominal offer made in good faith when the defendant has no liability, even if the plaintiff claims substantial damages.

Deltona House Rentals, Inc. v. Cloer · filed 1999-06-18

In light of the manifest lack of liability, Deltona was not obliged to offer more than a nominal amount for its offer to be in good faith.

Section 768.79(7)(a) places the burden of proving that an offer was not made in good faith on the party opposing attorney's fees.

Pacer Technology v. Lee Pharmaceuticals, Inc. · filed 1999-08-04(7)(a)

We reverse finding that the trial court abused its discretion by determining that Pacer's offer was not made in good faith. A review of the record shows that the third-party plaintiffs presented no evidence that met their burden of proving that Pacer's offer was not made in good faith.

Section 768.79(7)(a) permits a court to deny fees for an offer made without good faith; the offeree bears the burden of proving that the offer lacked a reasonable foundation.

Donohoe v. Starmed Staffing, Inc. · filed 1999-10-22(7)(a)

The statute places the burden on the offeree to prove the absence of good faith. ... As noted above, the obligation of good faith merely requires that the offeror have a reasonable foundation on which to base the offer. See Schmidt, 629 So.2d at 1039. It does not demand that the offeror possess, at the time he makes the offer, the kind or quantum of evidence needed to support a judgment. See id. ... Thus, the trial court abused its discretion in finding that the offer was not made in good faith.

Section 768.79’s good-faith requirement is satisfied when the offeror has a basis in known or reasonably believed facts to justify the offer, even if the amount is nominal.

DEPARTMENT OF HIGHWAY SAFETY v. Weinstein · filed 1999-12-15

As is true in this case, so long as the offeror has a basis in known or reasonably believed fact to conclude that the offer is justifiable, the "good faith" requirement has been satisfied.

Section 768.79(1) entitles a defendant to fees and costs after an unaccepted offer and a judgment of no liability, subject to disallowance if the offer lacked good faith.

Camejo v. Smith · filed 2000-09-15(1)

Pursuant to section 768.79(1), a defendant is entitled to an award of reasonable costs and attorney's fees if the defendant's offer of judgment is not accepted and if the judgment ultimately obtained is one of no liability or is at least twenty-five percent less than the offer. ... We conclude that there is nothing in the record upon which to base a finding that Camejo's proposal was not made in good faith and, therefore, the trial court abused its discretion in disallowing the award of fees and costs.

Section 768.79 permits a fee award when the offeror had a reasonable foundation for the proposal and intended to settle the claim if it was accepted.

Wagner v. Brandeberry · filed 2000-06-02(7)(a)

Rather, the question of whether a proposal was served in good faith turns entirely on whether the offeror had a reasonable foundation upon which to make his offer and made it with the intent to settle the claim against the offeree should the offer be accepted.

Section 768.79 does not authorize attorney’s fees based on a settlement proposal served before Rule 1.442’s 90-day waiting period, even if the early service caused no prejudice.

Grip Development, Inc. v. Coldwell Banker Residential Real Estate, Inc. · filed 2000-09-20

As Schussel suggests, prejudice or lack thereof should not be a topic for judicial inquiry in determining the applicability of section 768.79 and rule 1.442 (outside the "good faith" concept). Simply put, either the offer (or demand) complies with the rule and statute, or it does not. Moreover, Schussel supports that under rule 1.442 there is no difference between offers that are served prematurely and those that are served too late.

Section 768.79 permits attorney's fees on a joint settlement proposal despite omitted allocations among defendants unified by vicarious liability or among plaintiffs when those omissions do not impede settlement.

Safelite Glass Corp. v. Samuel · filed 2000-09-27

Pursuant to Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.442 and section 768.79, Florida Statutes (1997), the Samuels filed a joint proposal for settlement offering to settle the case for $400,000, including all attorney's fees and costs. ... There was no harmful error in the proposal's failure to allocate damages between two defendants whose interests were so unified under a theory of vicarious liability. ... Similarly, we find no error in the failure of the plaintiffs/offerors to specify the division of damages between them in their proposal for settlement.

Section 768.79 requires an award of attorneys' fees when an offer is made in good faith and the award is 25% less than the offer; good faith requires a reasonable foundation for the offer.

Dean v. Vazquez · filed 2001-05-23

As long as the offer is made in good faith and the award is 25% less than the offer, the court should award attorneys' fees. ... The obligation of good faith merely requires that the offeror have some reasonable foundation on which to base the offer.

Section 768.79 requires a defendant seeking fees after a rejected settlement offer to show an offer of judgment and a recovery at least 25% below the offer; the offeree bears the burden of showing the offer lacked good faith.

Schapiro v. Rubinson · filed 2000-11-01

As to the attorney's fees issue, under section 768.79 Florida Statutes (1999), a defendant moving for attorney's fees and costs based on a rejected offer of settlement is required to show that it has served an offer of judgment, and that it has recovered a judgment that is at least 25% less than the amount offered. ... However the trial court failed to hold a hearing and failed to require Rubinson to satisfy the burden of showing that the proposed settlement was not made in good faith.

Section 768.79 allows attorney's fees after a defense verdict when the defendant made an offer of judgment in good faith; even a minimal offer can qualify if the defendant reasonably expected only nominal exposure.

Nants v. Griffin · filed 2001-05-04(6)(a)

Moreover, a minimal offer can be made in good faith if the evidence demonstrates that, at the time it was made, the offeror had a reasonable basis to conclude that its exposure was nominal.

Section 768.79(7)(a) permits a nominal offer made in good faith when the offeror has a reasonable foundation for it.

Levine v. Harris · filed 2001-07-25(7)(a)

A review of the record reflects that Appellants had a reasonable foundation upon which to make a $500 offer despite the trial judge labeling it "the proverbial drop in the bucket." ... Under these circumstances, the trial court abused its discretion when it found that the $500 offer of judgment was not made in good faith.

Section 768.79 allows a court to deny attorney’s fees if an offer of judgment was not made in good faith.

Ostrich America Corp. v. Broward Water Consultants, Inc. · filed 2002-11-06(7)(a)

Also, appellees are entitled to an award of attorney’s fees under section 768.79(1), Florida Statutes (1994), unless the court determines that their offer of judgment was not made in good faith pursuant to section 768.79(7)(a) and the court exercises its discretion to “disallow an award of costs and attorney’s fees.”

A $2,500 defense offer of judgment is not in bad faith solely because of its amount.

Padilla v. Buell · filed 2003-04-02

We see no harmful procedural error, nor does the fact that the defense offer of judgment was $2,500 render it a bad faith offer.

Section 768.79 permits a nominal settlement offer made with a reasonable basis for expecting nominal liability; the factors in subsection (7)(b) concern the amount of fees, not entitlement.

Ryan v. De Gonzalez · filed 2003-02-26(7)(a)

Thus, there was evidence that Defendants had a reasonable foundation upon which to believe they had a viable limitations defense and made a $100 offer to each of the children on that basis. The children did not present substantial competent evidence to the contrary and there was no evidence that Defendants would not have in fact settled for the offered amount. Based on this evidence, the trial court abused its discretion when it found that the offers were not made in good faith, "as the offer did not bear a reasonable relationship to the amount of damages and a realistic assessment of liability." Further, the trial judge's statements at the conclusion of the hearing and in the Order on the motion indicate that the trial court improperly made its decisions based on an evaluation of the factors set out in subsection (7)(b), as urged by the children at the hearing.

A party opposing an offer of judgment bears the burden of showing that the offer was not made in good faith.

Kendall Village, Inc. v. U.S. Development, Ltd. ex rel. U.S. Development Corp. · filed 2003-04-30

A review of the record indicates that the plaintiff, U.S. Development, Ltd., by and through its general partner U.S. Development Corp., did not meet its burden of establishing that the offer of judgment made by Jeffrey Berkowitz pursuant to section 768.79, Florida Statutes (2001), was not made in good faith.

Under section 768.79, an offer is made in good faith when the offeror has a reasonable foundation for making it.

Hall v. Lexington Ins. Co. · filed 2005-02-16(7)(a)

The determination of whether an offer was served in good faith turns entirely on whether the offeror had a reasonable foundation upon which to make the offer. See id. ... A review of the record reveals no evidence that the trial court abused its discretion in finding that the offer was made in good faith.

Section 768.79 permits a court to disallow fees for a nominal offer made without a reasonable basis to believe the offeror's exposure was nominal.

Event Services America, Inc. v. Ragusa · filed 2005-08-10(7)(a)

Additionally, section 768.79 provides that a court may, in its discretion, determine that an offer was not made in good faith and disallow an award that a defendant would otherwise be entitled to by the statute. ... Therefore, a nominal offer should be stricken unless the offeror had a reasonable basis to conclude that its exposure was nominal. ... Here, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by striking the proposals because the Appellees' claim had merit and it appeared Event Services had at least some exposure at the time the offers were made.

Section 768.79(7)(a) permits a court to deny attorney fees when an offer of judgment was not made in good faith.

JES Properties, Inc. v. USA Equestrian, Inc. · filed 2006-03-17(7)(a)

The Court finds that given the novelty and difficulty of the issues in this case, and the timing and amount of the Burton Defendants and Stadium Jumping Defendants offers of judgment, that the offers of judgment were not in good faith. Accordingly, this Court declines to award the Burton Defendants and the Stadium Jumping Defendants attorneys’ fees pursuant to Fla. Stat. § 768.79.

Section 768.79 permits a nominal settlement offer when the offeror has a reasonable basis to believe its liability is minimal.

State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Sharkey · filed 2006-05-24

We find that State Farm had a reasonable basis for making a nominal settlement offer. ... Therefore, we find that the trial court abused its discretion in denying State Farm’s motion and reverse.

Section 768.79 allows a defendant to recover reasonable attorney's fees after an unaccepted offer and a judgment of no liability; a nominal offer can qualify if made in good faith.

Downs v. Coastal Systems Intern., Inc. · filed 2008-01-02(1)

Even nominal offers may be made in good faith. ... Likewise, in view of the fact that Downs never pled a legal duty upon which to rest his tort claim, Coastal Systems could reasonably conclude that the case was worth no more than a nuisance amount to settle. ... However, we reverse the trial court's finding that Coastal Systems' settlement offer was not made in good faith and remand the case to determine reasonable attorney's fees.

Section 768.79(7)(a) permits a court to deny fees for an offer made in bad faith, but a nominal offer may be made in good faith when the offeror has little prospect of liability.

Tiara Condominium Ass'n, Inc. v. Marsh USA, Inc. · filed 2010-03-22(7)(a)

The court finds that determination to be sound and well reasoned. Although Marsh’s $70,000 offer of judgment was essentially nominal, so too was the prospect of an adverse judgment against it given its significant, and ultimately meritorious, defenses.

Section 768.79 permits attorney’s fees for a nominal settlement offer when the offeror had a reasonable foundation for the offer.

Sharaby v. KLV Gems Co. · filed 2010-10-20

When defendant submitted his proposal for settlement, he had a reasonable foundation upon which to make the offer— nominal exposure. There existed no basis for finding defendant personally or individually liable to plaintiff. Thus, the trial court incorrectly determined that the proposal for settlement was not made in good faith and abused its discretion by denying defendant’s motion for an attorney’s fee award on this basis.

Section 768.79(7)(a) allows fees on a nominal settlement offer when the offeror had a reasonable basis at the time to believe its liability exposure was nominal.

Gawtrey v. Hayward · filed 2010-12-22(7)(a)

In assessing whether Ms. Gawtrey’s nominal offer was made in good faith, the trial court was required to look at whether Ms. Gawtrey had a reasonable basis when the offer was made to conclude that her exposure in the case was nominal.

A court assessing an offer of judgment’s good faith must consider the offeror’s subjective justification and may consider objective evidence in evaluating it.

Arrowood Indemnity Co. v. Acosta, Inc. · filed 2011-02-16(7)(a)

Rather, the trial court was required to consider Arrowood’s explanation and then determine whether, despite consideration of the objective factors cited by the court, Arrowood had a subjectively reasonable belief on which to base its offer.

Section 768.79(7)(b)(6) makes additional delay and litigation expense relevant to the amount of a fee award, not to whether an offer was made in good faith.

McGregor v. Molnar · filed 2012-02-17(7)(b)(6)

Third, the trial court found that Molnar’s failure to accept the offer caused no additional delay or litigation costs. But this is not a factor to be considered in determining good faith; it is one of the six factors to be considered in determining the reasonableness of the amount of the fee award. § 768.79(7)(b)(6); Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.442(h)(2)(F) (“[t]he amount of the additional delay cost and expense that the party making the proposal reasonably would be expected to incur if the litigation were to be prolonged”).

Section 768.79 permits a nominal offer when the undisputed record strongly indicates that the defendant had no exposure to liability.

General Mechanical Corp. v. Williams · filed 2012-12-17(7)(a)

To determine whether an offer was made in good faith, a court must consider whether the offeror had some reasonable basis to support the offer. In cases where only a nominal offer was made, a reasonable basis exists only where the undisputed record strongly indicates that the defendant had no exposure. A nominal offer should otherwise be stricken.