Fla. Stat. § 95.11

Section 95.11(3)(f)’s four-year limit for actions arising from statutory liability does not apply to a quasi-judicial administrative proceeding to recover Medicaid overpayments.

Lee Memorial Health System etc. v. State of Florida, Agency For Agency For Health etc. · filed 2019-02-27(3)(f)

We hold the statute of limitations does not apply, because the instant case is a quasi-judicial administrative proceeding.

Section 95.11(5)(h)’s deadline for deficiency judgments applies only to notes secured by mortgages on residential properties with one to four dwelling units; vacant property does not qualify merely because it is zoned residential.

LONGMAN vs ATLANTIC COAST BANK, ROBERT J. MCKAY, WHITFIELD DEVELOPMENT CORP., DREAMFIELDS EQUESTRIAN COMMUNITY HOMEWONERS ASSOCIATION, INC. AND TDMA, LLC · filed 2023-08-18(5)(h)

The trial court found, and we agree, that the plain language of that section applies only to deficiency judgments “related to a note secured by a mortgage against a residential property that is a one-family to four-family dwelling unit.” The subject property, while zoned residential, was vacant at all material times.

Section 95.11(5)(h)’s one-year limitations period applies to a motion for a deficiency judgment filed within an existing mortgage foreclosure action.

ACCARDI v. REGIONS BANK · filed 2020-12-09(5)(h)

For these reasons, the bank’s motion for deficiency fell within the broad definition of a section 95.011 “proceeding” that our supreme court identified in Salinas, making it an “action to enforce a claim of a deficiency” under section 95.11(5)(h), so that the one-year statute of limitations applies.

Section 95.11(5)(h)’s one-year limit applies to a residential second-mortgage deficiency claim after foreclosure by the first mortgagee, even if the second mortgagee received no sale proceeds.

Virginia S Hornaday · filed 2020-04-09(5)(h)

Nothing in § 95.11(5)(h) excepts the Creditor from the one-year limitation period based upon the fact that its mortgage was a second mortgage or the fact that the Creditor did not receive funds from the foreclosure sale.

Section 95.11(5)(h) sets a one-year limit for certain residential mortgage deficiency actions but does not create an affirmative cause of action.

Owens-Benniefield v. BSI Financial Services · filed 2020-03-31(5)(h)

Under Florida law, an action to enforce a claim of a deficiency related to a note secured by a mortgage against a residential property that is a one-family to four-family dwelling unit has a limitations period of one year. Fla. Stat. § 95.11(5)(h). ... Further, because an FDCPA claim has its own statute of limitations, any attempt by Owens to assert an affirmative cause of action under the statute of limitations is futile.

Section 95.11(5)(h) applies to deficiency claims following a foreclosure judgment and sale; such a claim does not accrue before the judgment and sale.

DYCK-O'NEAL, INC. v. TERESA NORTON & SAMUEL NORTON · filed 2019-03-15(5)(h)

As a matter of law, DONI's deficiency claim could not accrue for purposes of the statute of limitations until the entry of a foreclosure judgment and subsequent foreclosure sale. Therefore, DONI's action was timely under section 95.11(5)(h), and the trial court's entry of summary judgment on the basis that the statute of limitations had expired was incorrect.

Section 95.11 does not govern the filing deadline for a Federal Tort Claims Act action because the FTCA preempts it.

Dotson v. United States · filed 2020-12-08

This Court has previously found that the FTCA preempts section 95.11 of the Florida Statutes.

Section 95.11(7) does not limit claims based on abuse to claims against the perpetrator.

Doe v. St. John's Episcopal Parish Day School, Inc. · filed 2014-02-12(7)

Moreover, it is persuasive that section 95.11(7), on which both Heamdon and Cisko partly rely, contains no limitation that the claim be one against the perpetrator in order for it to apply.

Section 95.11(7) applies to intentional torts founded on child abuse committed by institutions as well as individuals.

JOHN DOE 1 v. ARCHDIOCESE OF MIAMI, INC. · filed 2023-03-22(7)

Based on the plain language of the two relevant, broad definitions of abuse concerning children, we conclude that § 95.11(7) broadly applies to any act of abuse, which includes acts of abuse committed by individuals and institutions.

Section 95.11(2)(b) gives a party five years to bring an action to enforce an easement founded on a written instrument.

City of Parker v. Wilson · filed 2025-06-25(2)(b)

Wilson’s claim is in the nature of an action to enforce an easement, and is subject to a five-year statute of limitations. § 95.11(2)(b), Fla. Stat. (2022) (setting five-year limit on a “legal or equitable action on a contract, obligation, or liability founded on a written instrument”); ... Once Wilson became aware of (or was legally chargeable with knowledge of) the issues, she had to file suit within five years, or be forever barred.

Section 95.11 bars an action to enforce a public-use easement when the applicable limitations period has expired.

Daugherty v. McDavid · filed 2024-06-12

But because Appellants failed to bring their action before the statute of limitations expired, see Estate of Johnston v. TPE Hotels, Inc., 719 So. 2d 22, 26 n.9 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998) (holding that an action to enforce an easement is subject to the statute of limitations under sections 95.11(2)(b), 95.11(3)(p), Florida Statutes); Conrad v. Young, 10 So. 3d 1154, 1157 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009) (applying section 95.11(2)(b), Florida Statutes), we agree with the trial court that final judgment in Appellees’ favor was appropriate.

Section 95.11(2)(e) gives a claimant five years from the date of loss to bring an action for breach of a property insurance contract.

Escalona v. People's Trust Insurance Company · filed 2025-04-16(2)(e)

Because Escalona’s wife failed to bring her breach of contract action within the required five-year period, we find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s denial of the motion for leave to file the second amended complaint as untimely.

Section 95.11(2)(e) sets a five-year period from the date of loss for breach of a property insurance contract; dismissal at the pleading stage is improper when the complaint alleges facts that could support equitable avoidance of that period.

Hypoluxo Mariner's Cay Condominium Association, Inc. v. Underwriter's at Lloyd's London · filed 2026-04-01(2)(e)

Section 95.11(2)(e), Florida Statutes (2022), requires that an action for breach of a property insurance contract be brought within five years of the date of loss. ... Because the amended complaint alleged ultimate facts suggesting the possibility that the Association could plead facts in avoidance of the statute of limitations, dismissal on that ground was improper.

Section 95.11(5)(d)’s one-year limit for actions against guaranty associations does not displace the five-year limits in subsections (2)(b) and (2)(e) when FIGA may assert the insolvent insurer’s limitations defense.

Condominium Association of Golf Villas II, Inc. v. Florida Insurance Guaranty Association, Inc. · filed 2025-04-30(2)(b), (2)(e), (5)(d)

We also agree with FIGA’s argument that sections 95.11(5)(d) and 631.68 were intended to provide protections against FIGA’s financial liability for claims in addition to other limitation provisions that might apply under section 95.11. ... We conclude the trial court properly applied sections 95.11(2)(b) and (2)(e) and section 631.57(1)(b) in determining Golf Villas’ suit against FIGA was time-barred.

Section 95.11(2)(b)’s five-year limitations period for a claim seeking to invalidate or reform a recorded condominium declaration begins when the declaration is recorded.

Terrace Gallery, LLC v. Gallery One Condominium Association · filed 2025-05-28(2)(b)

Given the nature of the relief sought, the statute of limitations began to run when the Declaration was recorded, as opposed to when Terrace took title to its units. ... Based on the nature of the relief which Terrace sought, we hold that Terrace’s declaratory judgment action was barred by both the statute of repose set forth in section 718.110(1), Florida Statutes (2005), and the applicable statute of limitations set forth in section 95.11(2)(b), Florida Statutes (2005).

Section 95.11(2)(b)’s five-year limitations period for an action challenging a recorded condominium declaration’s validity or seeking its reformation begins when the declaration is recorded.

Gallery One Condominium Association, Inc. v. Terrace Gallery, LLC · filed 2025-05-28(2)(b)

Given the nature of the relief sought, the statute of limitations began to run when the Declaration was recorded, as opposed to when Terrace took title to its units. ... Based on the nature of the relief which Terrace sought, we hold that Terrace’s declaratory judgment action was barred by both the statute of repose set forth in section 718.110(1), Florida Statutes (2005), and the applicable statute of limitations set forth in section 95.11(2)(b), Florida Statutes (2005).

Section 95.11(9) allows negligence claims connected to sexual battery of a victim under 16 to be brought at any time if they were not time-barred on or before July 1, 2010.

D.L. v. Community Based Care of Brevard, Inc., D/B/A Brevard Family Partnership, the Devereaux Foundation, Inc., D/B/A Devereaux Florida and Barbara Jones · filed 2026-02-13(9)

And this connection between the claimed negligence of Appellees and the alleged sexual abuse suffices for purposes of section 95.11(9) such that D.L.’s claims can be brought at any time.

A movant seeking summary judgment under section 95.11(3) must establish when the limitations period began and conclusively show that it expired before the complaint was filed.

Colas v. Lexington National Insurance Corporation · filed 2026-05-13(3)

Here, in moving for summary judgment, Lexington argued that counts VII–X were time barred under the four-year statute of limitations set forth in section 95.11(3), Florida Statutes (2019), because they were “newly asserted” and did not relate back to any prior pleading. This was the extent of its argument. Lexington citied to no materials in the record and made no argument as to when the limitations period began to run on any of the individual negligence counts. Thus, Lexington, as the movant, did not meet its initial burden on summary judgment to show “conclusively that there was no genuine issue of fact that the statute of limitations had expired before the filing of the [third amended complaint]” against it.

Section 95.11(3)(f)'s four-year limitations period does not apply to a motion for a civil restitution lien filed in the sentencing court under section 960.292.

Baez v. State of Florida, Department of Corrections · filed 2026-06-05(3)(f)

Therefore, the general four-year statute of limitations period for civil actions under section 95.11(3)(f) has no place in this proceeding.

Section 95.11 does not set a deadline for beginning post-judgment discovery because that discovery is not an action.

Salinas v. Ramsey · filed 2018-02-05(2)(a)

The Florida Supreme Court also explained that “post-judgment discovery is not an ‘action,’ and section 95.11 does not establish when it must begin.” Id. at *3. That being the case, post-judgment discovery “is appropriate as long as the judgment is enforceable,” which under Florida law is for twenty years. Id. With the benefit of the guidance from Florida’s highest court, we now know that Mr. Salinas and Ms. Fuentes’s motion to compel post-judgment discovery was timely.

Section 95.11(3)(o) gives a plaintiff four years from the favorable termination of a prosecution to bring a malicious prosecution claim.

Clyde J. Holliday, III v. Markel Syndicate 3000 at Underwriters at Lloyds · filed 2020-01-30(3)(o)

As previously noted, the statute of limitations for malicious prosecution under Florida law is four years, and ... the statute of limitations begins to run when the prosecution is terminated in the plaintiff’s favor. See Fla. Stat. § 95.11(3)(o). Holliday filed his claim after the four-year period had expired.