Fla. Stat. § 95.11

Section 95.11(4)(a)'s two-year limitations period for legal malpractice begins when the claimant discovers the alleged malpractice after suffering damage, even if the full extent of the damage is uncertain.

Sawyer v. Earle · filed 1989-02-10(4)(a)

We are bound to follow the clear statutory language of section 95.11(4)(a) which provides Sawyer's cause of action accrued when he discovered his attorney's alleged malpractice. That discovery occurred at the very latest in March of 1981 when Sawyer obtained a different attorney, which was also after Sawyer subsequently claimed he had suffered damages because of the alleged malpractice.

Section 95.11(4)(a)'s two-year period for accounting malpractice does not begin until the client suffers redressable harm; when challenged tax deductions are at issue, that harm occurs upon an adverse tax court judgment.

Lane v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co. · filed 1989-04-04(4)(a)

The Lanes did not suffer redressable harm until the tax court entered judgment against them. Until that time, the Lanes knew only that Peat Marwick might have been negligent; however, if the tax court did not uphold the deficiency, the Lanes would not have a cause of action against Peat Marwick for accounting malpractice.

Under the 1971 version of section 95.11(4), the four-year period for a malpractice claim is measured from notice of the negligent act or the resulting physical injury.

Bogorff ex rel. Bogorff v. Koch · filed 1989-04-18(4)

Section 95.11(4), Florida Statutes (1971) (amended 1974, 1975), governs the limitations question before us. ... In malpractice lawsuits governed by this section, timeliness of filing is measured from the date a plaintiff has notice of the negligent act giving rise to the cause of action, or notice of the physical injury resulting from the negligent act.

For legal malpractice committed during litigation, the limitations period generally begins when that litigation ends in a final judgment or, if appealed, a final appellate decision, unless the malpractice was or should have been discovered earlier.

Zakak v. Broida and Napier, PA · filed 1989-05-31(4)(a)

Unless the facts of the case clearly show that the legal malpractice was or should have been discovered at an earlier date[1], when a cause of action for legal malpractice is predicated on errors or omissions committed in the course of litigation, the statute of limitations does not begin to run until that litigation is concluded by final judgment, or if appealed, until a final appellate decision is rendered.

Section 95.11(4)(a)'s limitations period for legal malpractice begins when an appeal is decided if reversal could eliminate the client's malpractice claim; otherwise, it begins when the client knew or should have known of the alleged malpractice.

Drake v. Simons · filed 1991-07-11(4)(a)

The threshold question can be stated as follows: If the lower court's ruling, which was adverse to the client, was reversed on appeal, would the client still have a legal cause of action for malpractice? Where the response to this question is in the negative, the statute of limitations begins to run at the time an appellate decision is rendered; otherwise, the applicable statute of limitations would begin when the client knew or should have known of the alleged malpractice.

Section 95.11(4)(a)’s two-year period for legal malpractice begins when a redressable injury exists and the plaintiff knows or should know of the injury or negligent act; a criminal defendant need not await the outcome of postconviction proceedings.

Martin v. Pafford · filed 1991-07-23(4)(a)

While the purpose of the subsequent postconviction proceeding was to obtain relief from her criminal conviction on the ground of ineffective assistance of counsel, we find no basis for the contention that Martin had to await the outcome of this proceeding in order to initiate her suit for malpractice. A suit for malpractice accrues when the existence of a redressable harm or injury has been established and the injured party knows or should know of either the injury or the negligent act.

Section 95.11(4)(a) gives a client two years to bring a legal malpractice claim; replacing the attorney after learning of the alleged malpractice starts the limitations period and ends tolling based on continuous representation.

Hampton v. Payne · filed 1992-05-12(4)(a)

The statute of limitations would have begun to run when she replaced Payne with a new attorney. ... After 1982, Hampton could no longer avail herself of the continuous representation rule to toll the two-year statute of limitations.

Section 95.11(4)(b)’s medical malpractice limitations period is triggered by discovery of the injury, and a factual dispute about when that occurred precludes summary judgment.

Kahler v. Kent · filed 1993-04-07(4)(b)

In Barron the court held that it was the discovery of an injury alone that triggered the statute of limitations. That is surely the law, but in our case the facts are not nearly so crystallized as to when plaintiff discovered the fact of injury.

Section 95.11(4)(a)'s two-year period for legal malpractice begins when the client suffers redressable harm.

Spivey v. Trader · filed 1993-06-02(4)(a)

Under Peat, Marwick, we believe the cause of action accrued, at the earliest, at the time the judgment on supplementary proceedings was entered. Spivey then had two years to bring an action. Under this analysis, his May 20, 1986 filing was timely.

Section 95.11(4)(a)'s two-year period for legal malpractice does not begin before the client suffers a redressable injury.

ROGER ZITRIN, MD, PA v. Glaser · filed 1993-06-30(4)(a)

We find that these two factors were not present when Dr. Zitrin and Dr. Glaser executed the agreement in 1987. Instead, we find that Dr. Zitrin's injury was not established until June of 1990, when Dr. Glaser actually left the employment of Dr. Zitrin. See Kellermeyer v. Miller, 427 So.2d 343 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983). Thus, the statute of limitations commenced in June of 1990, when Dr. Glaser "breached" the agreement.

Section 95.11(4)(b)’s two-year medical malpractice period may require a factual determination of when the plaintiff had reason to suspect malpractice if the injury could have occurred naturally.

Cardenas ex rel. Cardenas v. Godbold · filed 1993-10-08(4)(b)

The type of damage suffered by Victoria Cardenas — i.e., viral attack and resulting brain damage — is such as may readily occur in the absence of medical malpractice. We believe in this ease, as in Tanner, the point at which the statute began to run can only be determined after all of the pertinent facts have been developed.

Section 95.11’s limitations period for legal malpractice generally begins when the underlying lawsuit has been finally lost on appeal.

Willoughby v. Dowda and Fields, Chartered · filed 1994-09-30

In the first place, the statute does not generally begin to run until the underlying lawsuit in which the claimed malpractice took place has been finally lost on appeal.

For a legal malpractice claim, the limitations period begins when the plaintiffs knew or should have known they had a cause of action; a defendant seeking summary judgment must conclusively establish when it began and that it expired before the claim was filed.

Abbott v. Friedsam · filed 1996-10-25(4)(a)

These statements do not conclusively show when all the plaintiffs knew or should have known that they had a cause of action so as to trigger the running of the statute of limitations. Until Friedsam by competent proof conclusively showed when the statute began to run and that it had in fact expired before the appellants filed their amended complaint, the appellants had no obligation to come forward with any proof.

Section 95.11(4)(a)’s two-year period for legal malpractice begins when appellate review of the underlying proceeding is complete and the alleged harm is conclusively established.

Ramsey v. Jonassen · filed 1997-07-30(4)(a)

A cause of action for legal malpractice does not accrue until the appellate court has completed its review of the underlying legal proceeding because, until that time, the existence of actionable error by the attorney has not been definitively established. ... Ramsey's malpractice claim, brought within two years of this court's affirmance, was within the statute of limitations period for professional malpractice. § 95.11(4)(a), Fla. Stat. (1995).

Section 95.11(4) gives a plaintiff two years to bring a medical negligence claim; the period began when the plaintiff knew of her injury and the reasonable possibility that negligence caused it.

Goradesky v. Hickox · filed 1998-11-25(4)

The record reflects that the two-year statute of limitations period under section 95.11(4), Florida Statutes (1993), for the Go-radeskys’ bringing their claim for negligence against Hickox began running in August, 1993.1 ... Because the record reflects that the statute of limitations had long expired by the time the court entered the final order, we affirm dismissal of this action.

Section 95.11(4)(a)’s two-year limitations period for litigation-related malpractice begins when the final judgment becomes final.

Silvestrone v. Edell · filed 1998-12-17(4)(a)

We therefore hold, in those cases that proceed to final judgment, the two-year statute of limitations for litigation-related malpractice under section 95.11(4)(a), Florida *1176 Statutes (1997), begins to run when final judgment becomes final.

Section 95.11(4)(a)’s limitations period for malpractice by a criminal defense attorney begins when the defendant successfully obtains post-conviction relief.

Rowe v. Schreiber · filed 1999-01-27(4)(a)

We believe that the correct rule under section 95.11(4)(a), is that a defendant must successfully obtain post-conviction relief for the cause of action to accrue in a case involving the legal malpractice of a criminal defense attorney.

Section 95.11(4)(a)’s two-year period for litigation-related legal malpractice begins when the underlying judgment becomes final, including resolution of a timely petition for Florida Supreme Court review.

Watkins v. GILBRIDE HELLER & BROWN, PA · filed 2000-03-08(4)(a)

These conundrums can best be avoided by basing the result on the reality that a final judgment is not final until a timely filed appeal to, or petition for review by, the supreme court is resolved. ... Watkins v. NCNB became final in the supreme court and thus the instant case is not time barred by section 95.11(4)(a), Florida Statutes (1997).

Section 95.11(4)(a)’s two-year period for legal malpractice does not begin until the underlying proceeding is final and the client knows or should know of the injury or negligent act.

Clemente v. Freshman · filed 2000-06-21(4)(a)

Thus, a cause of action for professional negligence, under this statute, does not accrue until redressable harm or injury has been established and the injured party knows or should know of either the injury or the negligent act. See Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co. v. Lane, 565 So.2d 1323, 1324 (Fla.1990); Edwards v. Ford, 279 So.2d 851, 853 (Fla.1973). In claims for legal malpractice, Florida law is well-settled that redressable harm or injury is not established until the underlying legal proceeding giving rise to the malpractice claim has been finalized or completed by appellate review.

Section 95.11(4)(a) provides a two-year limitations period for legal malpractice actions, measured from the adverse conclusion of the underlying action.

Slapikas v. Llorente · filed 2000-08-30(4)(a)

The period of limitations for legal malpractice is two years. § 95.11(4)(a), Fla. Stat. (1997). In this case, the action for legal malpractice was timely, because it was filed in March 1998, less than two years after the cause of action accrued, which was when the copyright case was dismissed in April 1996.

Section 95.11(4)(a)’s two-year period for transactional legal malpractice begins after the appeal when the client continues to defend the attorney’s advice and has no redressable harm before the appellate decision.

Robbat v. Gordon · filed 2000-12-06(4)(a)

In the instant case, since Robbat's harm exists, if at all, solely because of the invalidity of the postnuptial agreement, then, as in Peat, Marwick, since the client was defending the advice given him, the statute of limitations did not begin to run until after this court rendered its decision on appeal; until that time, there was no redressable harm.

The limitations period for a negligence or malpractice claim begins when the client incurs damages at the conclusion of related proceedings or, if none are filed, when the right to bring them expires.

Blumberg v. USAA Cas. Ins. Co. · filed 2001-07-12(3)(a)

Consistent with Peat, Marwick, we hold that, in the circumstances presented here, a negligence/malpractice cause of action accrues when the client incurs damages at the conclusion of the related or underlying judicial proceedings or, if there are no related or underlying judicial proceedings, when the client's right to sue in the related or underlying proceeding expires.

Section 95.11(4)(a)'s two-year period for legal malpractice begins when the client suffers redressable harm; when an underlying dispute ends in settlement, the claim may accrue on the settlement date.

Glucksman v. PERSOL NORTH AMERICA, INC. · filed 2002-02-27(4)(a)

The cause of action against Lott accrued when the underlying dispute between Persol North America and Persol Italy came to an end with the execution of the settlement agreement on June 1, 1995. ... Accordingly, the suit was timely filed within the time prescribed by the applicable two-year statute of limitations. See § 95.11(4)(a), Fla. Stat. (1997).

Section 95.11(4)'s limitations period for criminal-defense legal malpractice begins when the defendant obtains final appellate or postconviction relief.

Schreiber v. Rowe · filed 2002-03-21(4)

We further held that the statute of limitations in a malpractice action does not commence until the criminal defendant has obtained final appellate or postconviction relief. Accordingly, the conflict in the present case has been resolved by our decision in Steele. We approve the decision below and disapprove Martin.

Section 95.11(4)(a)'s two-year period for legal malpractice does not begin before the plaintiff has a redressable injury; when counsel advised that a default judgment would be dischargeable, the period did not begin until the plaintiff learned it was not dischargeable.

Brooke v. Shumaker, Loop & Kendrick, LLP · filed 2002-10-25(4)(a)

Until he learned that the judgment against him was not dischargeable in bankruptcy, he had no more than an expectancy of a cause of action. Therefore, we reverse the dismissal of Brooke's complaint based on the trial court's determination that the statute of limitations barred his action and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Section 95.11(4)(a) gives legal malpractice claims a two-year limitations period; a claim for damages caused by sanctions does not accrue before the sanction judgment becomes final when those damages did not exist at final judgment in the underlying litigation.

INTEGRATED BROADCAST SERVICES v. Mitchel · filed 2006-07-05(4)(a)

The period of limitations for legal malpractice is two years, section 95.11(4)(a), Florida Statutes (2003). ... Because the damages caused by the sanctions did not exist at the time the judgment became final in the underlying litigation, the trial court erred in concluding that the cause of action for legal malpractice for the sanctions accrued before the judgment for sanctions became final.

Section 95.11(4)(a)’s two-year period for legal malpractice arising from a lawsuit begins when the underlying summary judgment becomes final after the time to appeal expires.

Reeves v. Barrett · filed 2007-09-21(4)(a)

However, the limitations time did not commence until the summary judgment became final by expiration of the time for appeal.

Section 95.11(4)(a)’s two-year period runs separately for legal malpractice claims based on an adverse judgment and on later sanctions, beginning when each loss becomes final and discoverable.

Larson & Larson, P.A. v. TSE Industries, Inc. · filed 2009-11-05(4)(a)

The discrete occurrence of damage — marked by a separate final judgment or the equivalent— gives rise to the discrete discovery of loss and the discrete accrual of separate causes of action for malpractice.

For litigation-related legal malpractice, the two-year limitations period begins when the order dismissing the underlying litigation becomes final, even if the parties settled earlier.

Arrowood Indemnity Co. v. Conroy, Simberg, Ganon, Krevans, Abel, Lurvey, Morrow & Schefer, P.A. · filed 2014-01-08(4)(a)

Consistent with the bright-line rule firmly set forth in Silvestrone, we find that the statute of limitations period began to run when the trial court’s order dismissing the underlying Estoril litigation became final.

Section 95.11(4)(a)'s two-year period for litigation-related legal malpractice begins when the underlying judgment becomes final.

Otero v. Arcia · filed 2019-02-22(4)(a)

Here, Appellants met the bright-line requirement of Silvestrone because they established "some loss" as a result of the negligence alleged in their complaint-that loss being a foreclosure judgment against them in which they lost rights to the subject property. Because the consent final judgment was never the subject of a motion for rehearing or a direct appeal, the judgment was final and their claim for malpractice was ripe.

Section 95.11(4)(a)'s two-year period for legal malpractice does not necessarily begin when the client is served with a complaint in a related lawsuit; whether reasonable diligence would reveal the claim can be a jury question.

Rosen v. Sparber · filed 1978-12-05(4)(a)

We must respectfully differ from this reasoning because, in our opinion, the mere filing of the lawsuit against appellant did not necessarily start the running of the statute of limitations. ... This question was one properly for *962 the jury to determine and could not be resolved on appellees' motion for summary judgment.

Section 95.11(2)(e) imposes a five-year limitations period on breach-of-contract claims, measured here from when the insured became liable for ordinance-or-law costs rather than from the hurricane’s landfall.

Kingseal, LLC v. Arch Specialty Insurance Company · filed 2023-04-27(2)(e)

And consistent with binding Florida case law, the Court also concludes that Kingseal did not incur its loss until the AHCA (and, later, DeSoto County) notified Kingseal it was liable for additional repairs and renovations required by the AHCA, the FBC, and the Code. ... Kingseal’s “loss” here did not result from Hurricane Irma, nor was it triggered by the storm’s landfall. Instead, Kingseal incurred a loss when the AHCA and DeSoto County required Kingseal to undertake additional repairs and renovations to bring its facility into compliance with applicable standards and to satisfy the FBC and the Code. Kingseal’s Ordinance or Law endorsement was intended to address just such a loss. And because Kingseal sued within five years of that loss, this case does not run afoul of § 95.11(2)(e)’s five-year limitation period.

A Florida breach-of-contract claim based on a written instrument must be brought within five years after the breach.

Bei Jing Han Tong San Kun Ke Ji You Xian Gong Si v. Atlantic Medical Products, LLC · filed 2023-09-07(2)(b)

In Florida, the statute of limitations for a breach of contract based upon a written instrument is five years from the date of breach. Fla. Stat. § 95.11(2)(b); Tech. Packaging, Inc. v. Hanchett, 992 So.2d 309, 313 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008) (citations omitted). AMP alleges that HemaTone breached the Distribution Agreement by failing to satisfy its minimum order commitments at the end of 2013, 2014, and 2015. Thus, the statute of limitations for the claim expired, at the latest, on December 31, 2020. AMP did not file its counterclaim until March 8, 2022. Doc. 55. Accordingly, this breach of contract claim is time-barred and cannot be the basis of a default judgment.

Section 95.11(2)(b) provides a five-year statute of limitations for breach-of-contract claims.

BRUNNEMER · filed 2026-03-04(2)(b)

In determining whether to transfer or dismiss, the Court first considers that Brunnemer's claims would not be time barred under Florida law—the state law which expressly governs the Note. Florida's statute of limitations for breach of contract is five years. Fla. Stat. § 95.11(2)(b). Moreover, a cause of action for breach of contract accrues at the time of the alleged breach. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Lee, 678 So. 2d 818, 820 (Fla. 1996); Med. Jet, S.A. v. Signature Flight Support – Palm Beach, Inc., 941 So. 2d 576, 578 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006). Brunnemer's complaint alleges that Bautech first breached the contract on March 1, 2024 (Filing No. 1 at 4). Accordingly, Florida's statute of limitations will not bar Brunnemer's claims until at least March 1, 2029, nearly three years from the date of this Order.

The five-year limitations period for an express-warranty claim begins when the plaintiff discovers or should have discovered the breach.

First, Etc. v. Dade Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n. · filed 1981-09-16(2)(b)

The statute of limitations for causes of action based on breach of an express warranty begins to run when plaintiff discovers or should have discovered, the breach of the express warranty.

Section 95.11(2)(b) gives a challenge to a written lease’s rent escalation clause five years from the first enforcement of the clause, rather than a new period for each later escalation.

Garden Isles Apartments No. 3, Inc. v. Connolly · filed 1989-06-28(2)(b)

We find that section 95.11(2)(b), Florida Statutes, is the applicable statute of limitation to apply and reject the associations’ contention that the subject lease is itself a mortgage or other encumbrance against the real property which would require section 95.281, Florida Statutes, to be the applicable statute of limitation. The subject escalation clauses were first enforced in 1975 and 1976 respectively. Contrary to appellants’ argument that a new cause of action arose each time a new five-year escalation clause became effective, we hold that the cause of action in this case accrued at the time of the first escalation and that the complaint filed in 1986 was well beyond the applicable five-year statute of limitation periods which commenced in 1975 and 1976.

Section 95.11(2)(b) bars a breach of contract claim five years after it accrues, even if the plaintiff has not discovered the breach.

Beck v. Lazard Freres & Co., LLC · filed 1999-05-13(2)(b)

Since the limitations period began to run, whether or not the breach had been discovered, the trustee's claim for breach of contract is barred by the statute of limitations.

Section 95.11(2)(b) bars a breach of contract claim filed more than five years after the breach causes injury, even if the initial damages are nominal.

Abbott Labs., Inc. v. General Elec. Capital · filed 2000-05-19(2)(b)

Because GECC filed its action in 1998, more than five years after Abbott materially breached the VPA, and thereby caused injury to GECC, GECC's breach of contract claim against Abbott is barred by section 95.11(2)(b).

Section 95.11(2)(b) provides no discovery rule for written-contract actions, even when the plaintiff sues as a receiver.

Florida Department of Insurance v. ADP Totalsource, Inc. · filed 2000-10-11(2)(b)

We disagree and find the recent supreme court case of Federal Insurance Co. v. Southwest Florida Retirement Center, Inc., 707 So.2d 1119 (Fla.1998), controlling. Federal Insurance Co. held that the legislature did not provide for a discovery rule in the statute of limitations for actions based on a written contract. ... We also find that the appellant’s status as receiver does not change this result after Federal Insurance Co.

Section 95.11(2)(b) bars a breach-of-contract claim brought about ten years after it accrued.

White Construction Co. v. Jones · filed 2009-06-03(2)(b)

The trial court correctly determined that the applicable statute of limitations, section 95.11(2)(b), Florida Statutes (1997), barred White’s counterclaim for breach in this case. According to White’s own pleadings, arguments, and evidence at trial, the company’s case against Jones rested on the theory that Jones breached the mining agreement in 1997 — not that Jones anticipatorily repudiated his contractual obligations, as White argues on appeal. White’s cause of action for breach accrued in 1997; the statute of limitations barred the company’s claim of breach some ten years later.

For a continuing contract breach, the five-year limitations period under subsection (2)(b) can run from later breaches while the contract remains in effect.

City of Quincy v. Womack · filed 2011-03-02(2)(b)

The ap-pellee’s cause of action was not limited to the City’s initial breach, and the section 95.11(2)(b) statute of limitations had not expired when the ap-pellee filed his lawsuit which encompassed the City’s continuing breach.

Section 95.11(2)(b)’s five-year limit for written-contract actions does not justify dismissal when alleged continuing breaches leave the time bar unproven on the face of the complaint.

Hernando County, Florida v. Hernando County Fair Association, Inc. · filed 2024-05-03(2)(b)

As such, under the “continuing breach” doctrine, ... we conclude that the trial court erred in dismissing the action with prejudice because the complaint does not conclusively show that the statute of limitations bars this action.

Section 95.11(4)(a) gives two years to bring a legal malpractice action, measured from rendition of the final order on appeal.

VEGA v. RIER · filed 2021-05-26(4)(a)

The statute of limitations in a legal malpractice action begins to run from the rendition of the final order on appeal and ends two years later.

Section 95.11(4) requires professional-negligence and legal-malpractice actions to be filed within two years after the cause of action is discovered or should have been discovered with due diligence.

Dolores Rose Peers v. Brown · filed 2023-05-24(4)

Under Florida law, plaintiffs must bring professional negligence or legal malpractice3 actions within two years from the time the cause of action is discovered or should have been discovered with the exercise of due diligence. See Larson & Larson, P.A. v. TSE Indus., Inc., 22 So. 3d 36, 41 (Fla. 2009); Fla. Stat. § 95.11(4).

Section 95.11(4)(a) gives a legal malpractice claim a two-year limitations period that begins when the claimant is on inquiry notice of the claim.

Cherney v. Moody · filed 1982-05-12(4)(a)

We begin our consideration by noting our agreement with the trial court's conclusions that the amended counterclaim sounded in malpractice; that the Cherneys' letter of November, 1977, clearly evidenced that they were on inquiry notice of the accrual of a cause of action against Moody as of November, 1977, and that this notice commenced the running of the statute of limitations. The Cherneys' cause of action for legal malpractice, as an independent cause of action, was barred by the running of the two year limitations period by the time Moody filed his suit in January, 1980.

Section 95.11(4)(a) provides a two-year limitations period for attorney malpractice claims.

Howard v. Minnesota Muskies, Inc. · filed 1982-10-19(4)(a)

We affirm the summary final judgment entered in favor of the defendant Eugene E. Stearns on the attorney malpractice claim because it was time barred by the applicable two-year statute of limitations. § 95.11(4)(a), Fla.Stat. (1981).

Section 95.11(4)(a) sets a two-year limitations period for a legal malpractice action.

Arrow v. Faye · filed 1982-11-02(4)(a)

Therefore, to the extent that appellants’ amended complaint was dismissed below as being without the two-year limitations period fixed for such an action,' see § 95.11(4)(a), Fla.Stat. (1979), such dismissal was error.

Section 95.11(4)'s professional malpractice limitations period does not apply to a land surveyor merely because surveying is regulated by the Department of Professional Regulation; the four-year period in Section 95.11(3) applies.

Toledo Park Homes v. Grant · filed 1984-02-29(4)

We agree with this proposition and reject appellee's hypothesis that every activity subject to the jurisdiction of the Department of Professional Regulation constitutes a "profession" within the scope of the malpractice statute of limitations, Section 95.11(4), Florida Statutes (1981). To hold otherwise would bring activities such as embalming and cosmetology within the professional malpractice statute of limitations. We are confident the legislature had no such intention. Accordingly, we hold that the four year statute of limitations in Section 95.11(3), Florida Statutes (1981) (actually its predecessor) applies here.

Section 95.11(4)(a) gives a professional malpractice claimant two years from when the cause of action is or should have been discovered through due diligence; a complaint cannot be dismissed as untimely unless its allegations establish the limitations bar.

Hofer v. Ross · filed 1985-12-20(4)(a)

Section 95.11(4)(a), Florida Statutes (1983), provides that a professional malpractice action must be commenced within two years from the time the cause of action is, or should have been, discovered with the exercise of due diligence. ... In this case there is nothing in the pleadings which discloses when the Hofers learned of the alleged negligence of Ross, or when they should have discovered it by the exercise of due diligence. Consequently, it cannot be determined as a matter of law that the statute of limitations has run against the Hofers solely on the allegations in their second amended complaint.

Section 95.11(4)(a)’s two-year professional malpractice limit covers land surveys and applies to intended beneficiaries of the surveying contract.

Cristich v. Allen Engineering, Inc. · filed 1984-11-01(4)(a)

We conclude that the preparation of a survey, involving as it does such intricate knowledge of mathematics, geography and the physical sciences, is a "professional act." Therefore, it is encompassed within section 95.11(4)(a), Florida Statutes. ... Appellants, as intended and known beneficiaries of the surveying contract, stand in the shoes of the party contracting for them and can have no greater right than a party to the contract. ... We hold that the court correctly applied the two year statute of limitations.

Section 95.11(4)(a)'s two-year professional malpractice period applies to an insurance agent's negligent advice about coverage.

Pierce v. AALL INS. INC. · filed 1987-08-13(4)(a)

If one alleges a cause of action sounding in professional malpractice then the statute of limitations requires the suit to be filed within two years of the discovery of malpractice. 95.11(4)(a), Florida Statutes (1983). ... Because the acts claimed to be tortious involve alleged professional negligence or misconduct, the two-year statute applies and the trial judge correctly so ruled.

Section 95.11(4)(a)’s two-year professional malpractice limitation applies to claims that an insurance agent failed to advise a client and obtain coverage.

Panther Air Boat Corp. v. MacMillan-Buchanan & Kelly Insurance Agency · filed 1988-02-25(4)(a)

In this instance, Panther bases its claim on the MacMillan's failure to properly advise and obtain the necessary coverage for its business. It therefore becomes obvious that Panther was relying on the special skill and training of MacMillan and its claim is caught squarely by the statute.

Section 95.11(4)(a)’s two-year professional malpractice limitation applies only to occupations requiring a four-year degree in the relevant field for licensure, so it does not cover insurance agents.

Pierce v. AALL Ins. Inc. · filed 1988-07-14(4)(a)

Therefore, for purposes of the professional malpractice statute of limitations, we define a profession as a vocation requiring, as a minimum standard, a college degree in the specific field. In other words, if, under the laws and administrative rules of this state, a person can only be licensed to practice an occupation upon completion of a four-year college degree in that field, then that occupation is a profession.

An insurance agent’s failure to obtain requested coverage is subject to the four-year limitations period in section 95.11(3)(a) and (k), rather than the two-year professional malpractice period in (4)(a).

Hardy Equipment Co., Inc. v. Travis Cosby & Assoc., Inc. · filed 1988-09-08(3)(a), (3)(k), (4)(a)

Since no degree in any field is required to sell insurance, an insurance agent is not a professional for purposes of the professional malpractice statute of limitations. As noted, the trial court in the instant case applied the professional malpractice statute of limitations, and therefore, reversal is required. The four-year statute of limitations as provided in section 95.11(3)(a) and (k), applies to this action. Since Hardy Equipment filed this suit within four years from the time the cause of action arose, the action was timely.

Section 95.11(4)(a) sets a two-year limit for filing a contract claim for legal malpractice.

Santos v. Sacks · filed 1988-09-30(4)(a)

Plaintiffs’ contract claim was also timely filed under Pennsylvania and Florida law. ... Florida allows two years. Fla.Stat. § 95.11(4)(a) (1986).

Section 95.11(4)(a)’s professional malpractice limitations period does not apply to MAI real estate appraisers.

Security First Fed. S & L Ass'n v. Broom · filed 1990-04-18(4)(a)

Finally, the trial judge also erred in finding that MAI appraisers fall within the definition of "professionals" for purposes of the professional malpractice statute of limitations found in Section 95.11(4)(a), Florida Statutes, based on the language found in Pierce v. AALL Insurance, Inc., 531 So.2d 84 (Fla. 1988).

Section 95.11(4)(a)'s two-year professional malpractice limitations period applies only to persons in privity with the professional.

PENSACOLA EXEC. H. CONDO. ASS'N, INC. v. Baskerville-Donovan Engineers, Inc. · filed 1990-08-30(4)(a)

Notwithstanding, the legislature in enacting section 95.11(4)(a) chose to limit its application only to those "in privity" with the professional.

Section 95.11(4)(a)’s two-year professional malpractice period applies to a claim against a pharmacy corporation arising from its pharmacist’s erroneous prescription label, even when pleaded as products liability.

Sheils v. Jack Eckerd Corp. · filed 1990-04-27(4)(a)

We need not rely, however, only on a strict versus liberal construction argument in order to agree with the trial judge that the specific professional malpractice two-year limitation of section 95.11(4)(a) applies and that the more general products liability limitation of section 95.11(3) does not apply.

Section 95.11(4)(a)’s two-year period for professional malpractice does not apply to real estate appraisers because Florida does not require a four-year degree in a related field to practice appraisal.

FIRST ST. SAV. BANK v. Albright & Assocs. of Ocala, Inc. · filed 1990-05-31(4)(a)

For purposes of this statute of limitation, a "profession" is a calling requiring, as a minimum for licensing under the laws of Florida, specialized knowledge and academic preparation amounting to at least a four-year university level degree in the field of study specifically related to that calling. ... Accordingly, Albright was not a professional for purposes of the professional malpractice statute of limitations.

Section 95.11(4)(a)’s limitations period for accounting malpractice begins when the Tax Court enters judgment if the accountant does not acknowledge error and the client challenges the IRS deficiency.

Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co. v. Lane · filed 1990-07-26(4)(a)

We hold that, under the circumstances of this case, where the accountant did not acknowledge error, the limitations period for accounting malpractice commenced when the United States Tax Court entered its judgment.

Section 95.11(4)(a)’s two-year professional malpractice limitation applies to land surveyors because land surveying is a profession under the statute.

Garden v. Frier · filed 1991-05-30(4)(a)

Since the alternative licensing requirement under the laws of Florida for the profession of *875engineering is similar to the alternative licensing requirements for the profession of land surveying, we determine that land surveying is a profession for the purposes of the professional malpractice statute.

Section 95.11(4)(a)'s two-year limit for professional malpractice applies only when the plaintiff and professional are in direct contractual privity.

Baskerville-Donovan Eng's, Inc. v. Pensacola Exec. House Condominium Ass'n, Inc. · filed 1991-06-13(4)(a)

Thus, we conclude that the legislature intended privity in section 95.11(4)(a) to apply only to malpractice suits where direct privity is found to exist.

Section 95.11(4)(a) treats a vocation as a profession when Florida licensure requires at least a four-year college degree; an equivalent qualification does not suffice.

Garden v. Frier · filed 1992-07-02(4)(a)

Accordingly, in harmony with the central thrust of Pierce, we hold that a "profession" is any vocation requiring at a minimum a four-year college degree before licensing is possible in Florida. There can be no equivalency exception.

Section 95.11(4) permits dismissal with prejudice of a malpractice action when the complaint shows it was filed beyond the limitations period and the record reveals no disputed factual issue about timeliness.

Scott v. Morris · filed 1993-06-18(4)

The appellant’s malpractice action was properly dismissed with prejudice, as it appears from the face of the complaint that *1050the action was filed beyond the limitations period in section 95.11(4), Florida Statutes, and the record does not otherwise suggest the existence of any disputed factual issue in this regard.

Section 95.11(4) gives a plaintiff two years to bring a professional malpractice claim, measured from when the claim is or should have been discovered through due diligence.

Robbins v. Hess · filed 1995-08-10(4)

The limitations period for professional malpractice is two years "from the time the cause of action is discovered or should have been discovered with the exercise of due diligence." § 95.11(4), Fla. Stat. (1987). ... We conclude the evidence supports the view that the limitations period began to run on July 28, 1988, when appellant discovered that the City was in the process of removing the motel and restaurant structures. Therefore, the complaint filed July 27, 1990, was within the limitations period.

Section 95.11(4)(a) gives a plaintiff two years to bring a professional malpractice action, beginning when the cause of action is discovered or should have been discovered with due diligence.

Jelenc v. Draper · filed 1996-08-30(4)(a)

Paragraph 95.11(4)(a), Florida Statutes (1995) provides a two year statute of limitation for professional malpractice actions, with the period of limitation running "from the time the cause of action is discovered or should have been discovered with the exercise of due diligence."

Section 95.11(4)(a) requires legal malpractice actions to be brought within two years.

Kozich v. Shahady · filed 1997-09-24(4)(a)

Legal malpractice actions must be brought within two years. § 95.11(4)(a), Fla. Stat. (1995).

Section 95.11(4)(a) applies a four-year limitations period to professional malpractice actions brought by persons who are not in direct privity with the professional.

Hickey v. Dunn & Corey · filed 2000-07-12(4)(a)

However, section 95.11(4)(a)1 excludes from the two-year period those actions where persons are not in direct privity with the professional, thus the limitations period for such exclusions is four years.

Section 95.11(4)(a)'s two-year professional-malpractice limitation does not apply when the attorney was not acting as the plaintiff's counsel in the transaction.

Beach Higher Power Corp. v. Rekant · filed 2002-11-13(4)(a)

In sum, considering the undisputed facts before us, we can easily observe that Rekant could not be considered BHP's attorney for the purposes of the instant suit, *834 and accordingly, the two year limitations period did not control.

Section 95.11(4)(a) sets a two-year limitations period for legal malpractice suits.

Lussy v. Damsel · filed 2004-12-29(4)(a)

Thus the trial court properly found Lus-sy’s suit for legal malpractice barred by the two-year statute of limitations. See § 95.11(4)(a), Fla. Stat. (2004); Slapikas v. Llorente, 766 So.2d 440 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000).

Section 95.11(4)(a)'s two-year period for litigation malpractice begins when the underlying litigation concludes, including resolution of a pending attorney's-fee claim.

Tse Industries, Inc. v. Larson & Larson, Pa · filed 2008-02-01(4)(a)

Accordingly, we conclude that the statute of limitations did not begin to run in this case until October 10, 2002, the date on which the parties filed the stipulation to dismiss the underlying action with prejudice. Thus, the trial court erroneously interpreted Silvestrone to require a determination that the statute of limitations began to run when the judgment on the merits of the patent infringement action became final.

Section 95.11(4)(a) sets a two-year limitations period for professional malpractice actions and bars a legal malpractice complaint after the period has expired.

Gonzalez v. Stern · filed 2018-04-23(4)(a)

The long-expired statute of limitations bars her complaint. See § 95.11(4)(a), Fla. Stat.

Section 95.11(4)(a) gives a legal malpractice claim a two-year limitations period that runs from when the claim is discovered or should have been discovered with due diligence.

Enlow v. E.C. Scott Wright, P.A. · filed 2019-06-14(4)(a)

The statute of limitations for legal malpractice is two years "provided that the period of limitations shall run from the time the cause of action is discovered or should have been discovered with the exercise of due diligence." § 95.11(4)(a), Fla. Stat. (2014).

Section 95.11(4)(a)’s two-year limit for professional malpractice actions applies only when the parties are in direct contractual privity.

Beachway Restaurants 2 and James Wigg v. Santo & June, Inc. · filed 2024-05-29(4)(a)

The two-year statute of limitations for professional malpractice actions applies only where a suit alleges professional malpractice, and the parties to the suit are in direct contractual privity.

Section 95.11(4)(a) gives a claimant two years to bring a legal malpractice action after the claim is discovered or should have been discovered through due diligence.

McLeod v. Bankier · filed 2011-06-08(4)(a)

The statute of limitations governing legal malpractice actions is section 95.11(4)(a), Florida Statutes (2008). ... McLeod did not commence his action against Elk Bankier until almost four years later, well beyond the two-year limitations period when he knew or should have known of his claims against his former attorneys.

Section 95.11(4)(a) gives professional malpractice claims a two-year limitations period; later recovery of a loss does not postpone accrual after the plaintiff has suffered injury.

MIKHAYLOV v. BILZIN SUMBERG BAENA PRICE & AXELROD LLP · filed 2022-09-07(4)(a)

Neither party disputes that Mikhaylov’s claim is governed by the two-year statute of limitations set forth in section 95.11(4)(a), Florida Statutes, which applies to a professional malpractice claim. ... Unlike cases relying upon the final accrual rule, the bankruptcy case provides, at best, mitigation of the loss that already occurred. But it wouldn’t change whether the alleged malpractice occurred, or when the action accrued.

Section 95.11(4)(a) gives a professional malpractice claim other than medical malpractice a two-year limitations period that begins when the claim is or should be discovered through due diligence.

FALISHA BELL v. SCOTT WAGNER & ASSOCIATES · filed 2020-12-16(4)(a)

Affirmed. See § 95.11(4)(a), Fla. Stat. (“An action for professional malpractice, other than medical malpractice, whether founded on contract or tort; provided that the period of limitations shall run from the time the cause of action is discovered or should have been discovered with the exercise of due diligence” must be brought “[w]ithin two years.”).

Section 95.11(5)(b) gives a client two years to bring a breach of fiduciary duty claim against an attorney or law firm when Florida law treats it as professional malpractice.

Weird Science LLC v. Renovaro Biosciences, Inc. · filed 2025-12-05(5)(b)

Florida imposes a two-year statute of limitations on fiduciary duty claims against law firms and attorneys, which the parties agree Florida law categorizes as professional malpractice claims.

Section 95.11 imposes a four-year limitations period on tortious-interference and equitable-accounting claims, which begins when the last element constituting the cause of action occurs.

Zausner Foods Corp. v. Blandin · filed 2023-08-16(3)(o), (k), and (p)

Defendants correctly acknowledge that Florida’s statute of limitations for tortious interference and equitable accounting claims is four years. See Fla. Stat. § 95.11(3)(o) (tortious interference); Fla. Stat. § 95.11(k) and (p) (equitable accounting). ... Plaintiff’s Complaint is timely under Florida law. The parties do not dispute that the relevant statute of limitations period is four years for the causes of action alleged in Plaintiff’s complaint. See (Defs.’ Mot. (DE [6] at 8)); (Pl.’s Opp. (DE [19] at 8)). The parties also agree that, under Florida law, “[a] cause of action accrues when the last element constituting the cause of action occurs.” (Defs.’ Reply (DE [20] at 8)) (citing Yoder v. Kuvin, 785 So. 2d 679, 681 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001)); (Pl.’s Opp. (DE [19] at 8–9)). ... The ABC proceedings commenced on the issue date of April 30, 2018, and this date is therefore the date that the statute of limitations period began running. ... Plaintiff filed the action one month later, on April 28, 2022, and the Court therefore determines that Plaintiff’s Complaint is timely.

Section 95.11 gives claims arising from a written contract five years; for installment payments, each payment has its own limitations period.

Kirkpatrick v. Hubman · filed 2022-05-06

Under Florida law, all “legal or equitable” actions arising from a written contract ... have a five-year statute of limitations. Fla. Stat. § 95.11 (2018). ... It is not the case, as Mr. Kirkpatrick implies, that all claims for breach of an installment payment are timely so long as some installments are due within the statute of limitations. Instead, each individual installment has its own expiration date.

Section 95.11(2)(b) imposes a five-year limitations period on actions founded on a written instrument, with each installment subject to the period from its due date when the debt has not been accelerated.

Franci Mara Keyes · filed 2023-08-22(2)(b)

Because Creditor asserts an unsecured claim against the Debtor’s estate based upon the Debtor’s default on the Note, the applicable statute of limitations is section 95.11(2)(b) of the Florida Statutes, which sets a five-year period for suits involving “[a] legal or equitable action on a contract, obligation, or liability founded on a written instrument[.]” Fla. Stat. § 95.11(2)(b). ... What is clear, however, is that Creditor is barred from collecting any installment payments and applicable late charges that came due more than five years prior to the Petition Date (i.e., installment payments and applicable late charges that became due before September 7, 2017).

For a contract requiring definite payments at stated intervals, the limitations period begins separately for each payment when it becomes due.

Isaacs v. Deutsch · filed 1955-04-29(3)

We hold, then, that where an express contract requires the father to pay a definite sum at stated intervals for the support of his minor child, the statute of limitations starts running against each payment as it becomes due; and that the lower court erred in allowing recovery for all weekly payments solely on the ground that the statute did not start running on such payments until the time of the termination of the contract, that is, the date when the minor child attained his majority.

Section 95.11(2)(b) sets a five year limitations period for actions on written contracts and applies accrual rules to installment promissory notes.

Central Home Trust Co. v. Lippincott · filed 1980-12-17(2)(b)

The statute of limitations begins to run a promissory note when a cause of action accrues against the maker or obligor.[3] The UCC provides that for a "time instrument"[4] a cause of action against the maker or acceptor accrues on the day after maturity.[5] Installments due at different times under a note mature or accrue the day after each is due to be paid, and the statute of limitations may run on some and not others.[6] Applying these rules to this case, the installments due in 1973 and some in 1974 may be barred by the statute of limitations, but the balance of the payments due in 1974, 1975 and 1976 would not be barred.

Section 95.11(2)(a)’s five-year limit bars enforcement of monthly payments under a separation agreement that fell due more than five years before suit was filed.

Popper v. Popper · filed 1992-02-07(2)(a)

The suit was premised on a contract calling for periodic monthly payments. Each payment became due on the first day of each successive month. Thus the five year statute of limitations bars the enforcement of any payment in default more than five years prior to the filing of this lawsuit.

Section 95.11(2)(b)'s five-year limitations period bars recovery of rent installments due more than five years before suit was filed, but does not bar later installments.

Holiday Furniture Factory Out. Corp. v. State Dept. of Corrections · filed 2003-08-21(2)(b)

Accordingly, Holiday Furniture was entitled to sue DOC for all of the unpaid installments, and the statute of limitations bars recovery only of those installments due over five years before Holiday Furniture filed suit on December 28, 2001.

Section 95.11(2)(b) gives a lessor five years from each unpaid lease installment’s due date to sue for that installment.

Hamilton v. Tanner · filed 2007-08-08(2)(b)

Mr. Tanner could have sued against this installment, assuming that it had not been paid by the Hamiltons, at the latest on September 25, 1999. See § 95.11(2)(b) (providing that an action on an obligation founded on a written instrument has a statute of limitations of five years); Holiday Furniture, 852 So.2d 926. ... As such, we must conclude that the statute of limitations precludes a claim against Mrs. Hamilton for any rents and taxes due under the October 1988—October 1994 term of the lease agreement.

Section 95.11(3)(k) gives four years to sue on an oral contract; when the contract requires separate commission payments, each missed payment starts its own limitations period.

Access Insurance Planners, Inc. v. Gee · filed 2015-09-30(3)(k)

However, for statute of limitations purposes, the proper view of the parties’ agreement was that it was a divisible contract, meaning that the failure to pay each commission was a separate breach subject to its own four-year statute of limitations.

The five-year limit for actions on written contracts does not bar a claim for a later payment merely because claims for earlier payments are time-barred.

Hannett v. Bryan · filed 1994-08-03(2)(b)

Applying Isaacs to this case, we hold that Bryan’s failure to bring suit to claim the $5,035.80 — his share of the syndication fees paid between 1978 and 1982 — did not bar his claim to that portion of the fees paid in 1987.

Subsection 95.11(3)(p) provides a four-year limitations period applicable to these § 1983 constitutional claims.

Valsaint v. City of Miami Beach, Florida · filed 2022-11-02(3)(p)

The applicable statute of limitations in Florida provides for a four-year limitations period.

Section 95.11(3) imposes a four-year limitations period on false-arrest and other intentional-tort claims, and an untimely claim is absolutely barred.

Doss v. Holder · filed 2023-09-28(3)

In Florida, there is a four-year personal injury statute of limitations. Chappell v. Rich, 340 F.3d 1279, 1283 (11th Cir. 2003); Fla. Stat. § 95.11(3). A cause of action for false arrest accrues as soon as the arrest occurs. Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 387–388 (2007). ... Florida law requires that actions for assault, battery, false arrest, malicious prosecution, malicious interference, false imprisonment, and any other intentional tort be filed within four years. Jones v. Collier County Sheriff's Dept., No. 95-232-CIV-FTM-17D, 1996 WL 172989, at *3 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 9, 1996). ... While the Court gives some leniency to a pro se party in their pleadings, the “statute of limitations established by Florida Statute §95.11(3) presents an absolute bar” to a cause of action. Id.

Section 95.11(3)(p) provides a four-year limitations period for an action accruing in Florida when no more specific limitations period applies.

Polo v. Bernstein · filed 2023-09-29(3)(p)

The applicable statute of limitations in Florida provides for a four-year limitations period from accrual of the cause of action.

Section 95.11 imposes two-year limitations periods for defamation claims under subsection (4)(h) and negligence claims under subsection (4)(a), measured from accrual, and those periods barred the claims as pleaded.

Trocano v. Vivaldi · filed 2024-03-12(4)(h); (4)(a)

An action founded on defamation must be commenced within two years from the date the cause of action accrues. Fla. Stat. § 95.11(4)(h) (effective July 1, 2018) (previously Fla. Stat. § 95.11(4)(g)). ... An action founded on negligence must be filed within two years. Fla. Stat. § 95.11(4)(a).

Section 95.11(3) provides a four-year limitations period for the breach-of-contract, fraud, and unjust-enrichment claims discussed by the court.

International Flight Resources, LLC v. Aufiero · filed 2025-03-19(3)(i), (j)

Florida law provides a four-year limitations period for all such claims.

Section 95.11(5)(e) bars a real estate broker's commission action filed more than three years after the cause of action accrued.

Schneider v. Cohan · filed 1955-07-27(5)(e)

Patently three years elapsed between the origin of the cause of action and the institution of the last suit, but the appellant argues here, as he argued before the circuit court, that he could keep his foothold in court because of Sec. 95.06, Florida Statutes 1949, and F.S.A. ... When he did that his complaint became subject to the defense of the statute of limitations and the judge was eminently correct when he decided that the litigation ended then and there.

Section 95.11(6) imposes a two-year limitation period on actions including assault and battery, but a lack-of-informed-consent claim treated as negligence is not barred by that period.

O'GRADY v. Wickman · filed 1968-06-27(6)

We therefore hold that the trial court erred in ruling that the two-year statute of limitations barred the instant action insofar as plaintiffs' claims were based on lack of consent.

Section 95.11 provides a limitations period of no more than four years for the Florida limitations rules potentially applicable to these union-related claims.

Byrd v. South Florida Carpenters District Council · filed 1991-06-14

In any event, to the extent that the limitations period for these claims would be governed by a borrowed state statute of limitations, any Florida statute of limitations that would arguably apply to the plaintiffs claims would establish a limitations period no longer than four years. See Fla.Stat. § 95.11. However, more than four years elapsed from the respective adoptions of the labor contract and new bylaws to the filing of the complaint.

Section 95.11(3)(k) gives a claim for unjust enrichment a four-year limitations period.

CLEVELAND CLINIC FLORIDA v. CHILDREN'S CANCER CARING CENTER, INC. · filed 2019-05-29(3)(k)

A four-year statute of limitations applies to claims for unjust enrichment. Yet CCCC filed its lawsuit asserting an unjust enrichment claim thirteen years after the cause of action accrued. That claim was time barred.

Section 95.11(3)(k) imposes a four-year limitation on an unjust enrichment claim pleaded without reference to a written instrument.

SOUTHERN SPECIALTIES, INC. v. FARMHOUSE TOMATOES, INC · filed 2018-11-21(3)(k)

Thus, a four-year statute of limitations applied.

Section 95.11(3)(j) imposes a four-year limitations period on unjust-enrichment claims under Florida law.

Rose v. Davis · filed 2023-08-21(3)(j)

For unjust enrichment claims, Florida applies a four-year statute of limitations, Fla. Stat. § 95.11(3)(j); Wang v. Revere Capital Management, LLC, CASE No. 22-CV-80884-RUIZ/MAYNARD, 2023 WL 2198570, at *7 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 15, 2023), while Massachusetts applies a six-year statute of limitations, Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 260, § 2; AA & D Masonry, LLC v. South St. Bus. Park, 107 N.E.3d 1229, 1233 n.10 (Mass. App. Ct. 2018).

Section 95.11’s limitations periods do not support dismissal at the pleading stage when a complaint plausibly alleges multiple conversion acts or continuing unjust enrichment.

LEX BARKER, an individual, ISS AVIATION INC. (U.S.), a Wyoming corporation, and INSTANT SECURITY SERVICE INC. (DE), a De · filed 2026-03-16(3), (7)

Consequently, a motion to dismiss based on the affirmative defense of a limitations period cannot be granted. ... No such finding can be made on the face of this complaint as Plaintiffs may indeed be able to prove a series of facts that, rather than tolling a statute, give rise to multiple acts of conversion from which damages may follow. ... Accordingly, the motion to dismiss conversion claims, which we find adequately alleged in Count I of the complaint, is DENIED. ... If so, the limitations period cannot be deemed to have run on an equitable claim for damages flowing from their unjust enrichment.

Section 95.11(3)(k) sets a four-year limitations period for unjust-enrichment claims.

Swafford v. Schweitzer · filed 2005-07-20(3)(k)

The statute of limitations on a claim for unjust enrichment is four years. § 95.11(3)(k), Fla. Stat. (1999).

Section 95.11(3)(k) gives an unjust enrichment claim a four-year limitations period that begins when the defendant receives the alleged benefit.

Flatirons Bank v. the Alan W. Steinberg Limited Partnership · filed 2017-12-06(3)(k)

The statute of limitations for an unjust enrichment claim begins to run at the time the alleged benefit is conferred and received by the defendant.

The four-year period under § 95.11(3) bars a § 1983 false imprisonment claim filed more than four years after arrest.

Navarro v. City of Riviera Beach · filed 2016-06-29(3)

As the Plaintiffs arrest occurred more than four years prior to the filing date of this action, to wit, August 24, 2015, any section 1983 claim alleged by Plaintiff for false imprisonment is barred by the applicable statute of limitations.

Section 95.11(3)(o) requires a battery action to be brought within four years.

Dolin on Behalf of ND v. West · filed 1998-09-21(3)(o)

Florida law provides that an action for battery must be brought within four years. See § 95.11(3)(o), Fla. Stat. Because the ease was brought on June 13, 1997 and the last incidence of violence against Ms. Abraham allegedly occurred on January 22, 1993, the battery claim fails to satisfy the statute of limitations and must be dismissed.

Section 95.11(3)(o) provides a four-year limitations period for battery and other intentional tort claims, subject to exceptions.

Howard v. St. John's County Sheriff · filed 2022-03-04(3)(o)

With certain exceptions not applicable here, Florida law provides a four year statute of limitations for claims of “assault, battery, false arrest, malicious prosecution, malicious interference, false imprisonment, or any other intentional tort. . . .” Fla. Stat. § 95.11(3)(o).

Section 95.11(3)(n) requires suit for battery, false imprisonment, or another intentional tort within four years after the last element of the cause of action occurs.

Treminio v. Crowley Maritime Corporation · filed 2023-12-13(3)(n)

The statute of limitations for intentional torts and grounds for its tolling are governed by two state statutes. Florida Statute § 95.11 governs the statute of limitations for “battery . . . false imprisonment . . . or any other intentional tort,” and suit must be filed within four years of the date that the last element of the cause of action occurred, or else are time-barred. Fla. Stat. § 95.11(3)(n); see City of Riviera Beach v. Reed, 987 So. 2d 168, 170 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008) (“A cause of action accrues when the last element constituting the cause of action occurs”).

Section 95.11(3)(o) gives civil conspiracy claims a four-year limitations period as intentional tort claims.

Armbrister v. Roland International Corp. · filed 1987-08-14(3)(o)

Such claims are therefore governed by the period applicable to “intentional tort[s]”, § 95.11(3)(o), and must be brought within four years.

Section 95.11(3)(o) requires assault, battery, and other intentional tort actions to be filed within four years after the cause of action accrues.

Lindabury v. Lindabury · filed 1989-09-19(3)(o)

The applicable statute of limitations plainly provides that "[a]n action for assault, battery ... or any other intentional tort" must be commenced within four years of the time the cause of action accrues, that is "when the last element constituting the cause of action occurs." §§ 95.11(3)(o); 95.031(1), Fla. Stat. (1987).

Section 95.11(3) gives false arrest and false imprisonment claims a four-year limitations period that begins at arrest, even if the plaintiff discovers the alleged error later.

Diaz v. Metro-Dade Police Department · filed 1990-02-06(3)

The basis for the dismissal order below was that the subject complaint was, on its face, barred by the applicable four-year statute of limitations. § 95.11(3), Fla. Stat. (1983). ... We agree that the false arrest/false imprisonment claim accrued at the time of the plaintiff’s arrest, rather than several years later when the plaintiff allegedly discovered the subject computer error, and, accordingly, the claim as contained in the subject complaint and the proposed amended complaint on rehearing was facially barred by the statute of limitations.

Section 95.11(3)(o) sets a four-year limitations period for actions based on false arrest.

Scullock v. Gee · filed 2014-03-12(3)(o)

The statute of limitations for actions based on false arrest is four years. § 95.11(3)(o), Fla. Stat. (2010).

Section 95.11(3)(o) gives claims for false arrest and false imprisonment a four-year limitations period.

Ervans v. The City of Venice, Florida · filed 2015-07-10(3)(o)

Ervans' claims of false arrest and false imprisonment have a four-year limitations period. See § 95.11(3)(o), Fla. Stat. (2009).

Section 95.11(3)(o) gives assault and battery claims a four-year limitations period.

AVRAHAM v. GOLDEN · filed 2020-05-07(3)(o)

The statute of limitations in New Jersey is two years, N.J. Stat. Ann. 2A:14-2(a), and four years in Florida. Fla. Stat. § 95.11(3)(o). As alleged, Golden’s assault and battery on July 8, 2015 would be barred under New Jersey’s, but not Florida’s statute of limitations. (D.E. 49 ¶¶ 29-31.)

Section 95.11(2)(c) gives five years to bring a mortgage foreclosure action; later payment defaults can support a new action within that period.

Stern v. Bank of America Corp. · filed 2015-06-30(2)(c)

Accordingly, the Court declines to follow Beauvais and instead concludes that the statute of limitations does not bar BOA from foreclosing upon the Property on the basis of future nonpayment defaults or non-payment defaults which have occurred within the past five years.

Section 95.11(2)(c) requires a mortgagee to sue to foreclose within five years of the last payment required under the mortgage.

MICHAEL R. MAISONNEUVE and CYNTHIA A. MAISONNEUVE v. SITUS INVESTMENTS, LLC · filed 2021-08-18(2)(c)

The mortgagee was required to sue to foreclose within five years of the date of the last payment required under the mortgage.

Section 95.11(2)(c) does not exclude older missed mortgage payments from the full accelerated debt recoverable in a timely foreclosure action based on a later default.

GRDIC v. H S B C BANK U S A, N. A. · filed 2019-03-13(2)(c)

We write to explain why HSBC was not precluded from obtaining a judgment for the entire unpaid debt due under Mr. Grdic's mortgage loan, including payment amounts that had accrued more than five years before HSBC filed its complaint.

Section 95.11(2)(c) gives a mortgagee five years from default to bring a foreclosure action; a later default starts a new limitations period.

Connie L. Mielke and Blair C. Mielke v. Deutsche Bank National Trust Company, etc. · filed 2019-01-10(2)(c)

A plaintiff has five years to bring a mortgage foreclosure action once a borrower has defaulted. § 95.11(2)(c), Fla. Stat. Florida courts have consistently held that a foreclosure action is not time-barred where the plaintiff alleges and proves the existence of a continual default. ... The right to enforce a promissory note accrues when the default occurs, regardless of whether the plaintiff possesses the note.

Section 95.11(2)(c) permits a foreclosure judgment for the full accelerated mortgage debt, including amounts due more than five years before filing, when a default within the limitations period triggers acceleration.

Gonzalez v. Federal National Mortgage Assoc. · filed 2018-08-01(2)(c)

As discussed below, we conclude that Fannie Mae is not barred from seeking a final judgment that includes amounts due outside the five-year statute of limitations, as Fannie Mae alleged that Appellant had defaulted within the limitations period and that Fannie Mae had exercised its right to accelerate all sums due under the Note and Mortgage.

For a reverse mortgage with optional acceleration and a fixed maturity date, § 95.11(2)(c)'s five-year foreclosure period does not begin merely because the borrower dies; it begins when the note matures.

Hayes v. Reverse Mortgage Solutions · filed 2018-11-21(2)(c)

This case presents an issue of first impression as to when the statute of limitations in section 95.11(2)(c), Florida Statutes, begins to run for purposes of a reverse mortgage where the borrower died before the note matured. We hold the statute of limitations does not begin until the note matures and, accordingly, we affirm.

Section 95.11(2)(c)’s five-year limit does not bar a foreclosure action alleging missed payments continuing after an earlier default.

Bank of New York Mellon v. Arnoux · filed 2018-10-31(2)(c)

The complaint in the instant foreclosure action alleged that Arnoux had “defaulted under the Note and Mortgage by failing to pay the full payment due February 1, 2008, and all subsequent payments” (emphasis added). It is now well-settled in this district2 that the action was not barred by the statute of limitations, and the trial court erred in entering final summary judgment in favor of Arnoux and involuntarily dismissing the Bank’s action.

Section 95.11(2)(c) permits foreclosure within five years of a qualifying payment default or the note’s maturity; a timely action may recover all sums due if the note and mortgage allow it.

BANK OF AMERICA, N.A. v. KENNETH H. GRAYBUSH and ROBIN B. GRAYBUSH · filed 2018-08-15(2)(c)

When a note contains an optional acceleration clause, a lender only runs out of opportunities to foreclose, under the applicable statute of limitations, after five years of the latest default, or after five years of the date of maturity of the note. But, should a lender bring a timely action under either scenario, it is entitled to all sums due under the note and mortgage—should the note and mortgage contractually provide.

Section 95.11(2)(c) allows a foreclosure action based on a payment default within five years of filing, even when the borrower’s debts were discharged in bankruptcy earlier.

CAN FINANCIAL, LLC v. KRAZMIEN · filed 2018-08-01(2)(c)

Thus, the foreclosure complaint, filed within five years of a continuing default, was not barred by the statute of limitations and Borrower’s bankruptcy discharge did not affect Bank’s ability to initiate an in rem foreclosure action.

Section 95.11(2)(c)’s five-year limitations period runs from each new mortgage default, so a continuing default can support foreclosure based on defaults within that period.

U. S. BANK, N. A., SUCCESSOR TRUSTEE v. GONZALEZ · filed 2018-05-02(2)(c)

Although the initial alleged default date of August 1, 2010, occurred more than five years prior to the filing of the foreclosure complaint on February 25, 2016, because the statute of limitations runs from the date of each new default and the complaint alleged a continuing state of default since August 1, 2010, U.S. Bank's ... complaint was sufficient to establish that foreclosure could be based on any default that was within the statutory period.

Section 95.11(2)(c) permits foreclosure based on defaulted mortgage payments within the five-year limitations period, even when earlier payments are time-barred.

Deutsche Bank v. Torres · filed 2018-05-02(2)(c)

While Deutsche Bank may be barred from seeking certain defaulted payments under the note (those falling outside the five-year statute of limitations), it may still seek to foreclose and to collect on all defaulted payments not otherwise barred by the statute of limitations.

Section 95.11(2)(c) does not bar a foreclosure action when the complaint alleges a payment default within five years of filing.

U.S. Bank v. Morelli · filed 2018-06-06(2)(c)

It is now settled law that a when a foreclosure complaint alleges a borrower is in default for any payment due within five years of the filing of the complaint, the action is not barred by section 95.11(2)(c) of the Florida Statutes.

A foreclosure complaint alleging a continuous default that includes payments due within the preceding five years is not barred by the five-year limitations period.

Deutsche Bank v. Miller · filed 2018-03-05(2)(c)

The Bank’s complaint was not time-barred because the Bank alleged a continuous state of default that encompassed payments within the five years preceding the filing of the complaint.

Section 95.11(2)(c) allows a foreclosure action based on continuing payment defaults occurring within five years before the suit was filed.

DESAI v. BANK OF NEW YORK MELLON, ETC. · filed 2018-03-07(2)(c)

BNY pleaded and proved that Desai was in an ongoing state of default from August 2010 to the filing the second complaint. Thus, having limited its recovery only to those defaults occurring within five years of the second lawsuit, BNY’s action was not barred by the statute of limitations.

Dismissal of a mortgage foreclosure action revokes acceleration, so the five-year limitations period does not continue to run on the accelerated debt, regardless of why the action failed.

AVELO MORTGAGE, LLC. v. VERO VENTURES, LLC. etc. · filed 2018-06-27(2)(c)

The issue of whether acceleration of the amounts due under a note and mortgage in a later dismissed foreclosure action triggers application of the five-year statute of limitations under section 95.11(2)(c), Florida Statutes (2014) has been clearly decided by our supreme court in Bartram v. U.S. Bank National Ass’n, 211 So. 3d 1009 (Fla. 2016). In that case, the court held that because the effect of an involuntary dismissal of a foreclosure action is revocation of the acceleration, “the statute of limitations does not continue to run on the amount due under the note and mortgage” regardless of the reason why the dismissed foreclosure action was unsuccessful. Id. at 1012, 1020. Pursuant to Bartram, the trial court’s ruling on the application of the statute of limitations and repose was incorrect.

Section 95.11(2)(c) does not bar a successive foreclosure action that alleges missed payments within the five-year limitations period, even when an earlier dismissed action alleged the same initial default.

Bank of New York Mellon Corp. v. Anton · filed 2017-08-30(2)(c)

We therefore hold that BONYM’s second foreclosure action was not barred by the five-year statute of limitations.

Section 95.11(2)(c) does not bar a subsequent foreclosure action based on a later default if that action is filed within five years of the later default.

Wells Fargo Bank, NA v. BH-NV Investments 1, LLC · filed 2017-08-16(2)(c)

Accordingly, both Bartram and Beauvais II hold that a subsequent foreclosure action is not barred so long as the second action is brought on a subsequent default within the five-year statute of limitations period found in section 95.11(2)(c), Florida Statutes. A review of the record evidence in this case shows that the default in the Second Foreclosure Action is different than the default in the First Foreclosure Action. Moreover, the record evidence further establishes that the later default occurred within five years of the filing of that subsequent action.

Section 95.11(5)(h)’s one-year limitations period does not apply to a claim on a promissory note after a short sale when no foreclosure certificate was issued and no deed in lieu of foreclosure was accepted.

WHITNEY BANK, a Mississippi state v. Von Daniel Grant Jr., and Lisa D. Grant · filed 2017-08-07(5)(h)

Applying this rationale to the current case, under the plain language of the statute the one-year limitations period in section 95.11(5)(h) does not apply to bar Whitney Bank’s claims.

Section 95.11(2)(c) permits a foreclosure action based on missed mortgage payments that became due within five years of filing, even when earlier payments are older.

Sandra A. Forero and William L. Forero v. Green Tree Servicing, LLC · filed 2017-07-14(2)(c)

Likewise, this third foreclosure action was not barred by the 5-year statute of limitations. Under the facts of this case, where it was alleged and established at trial that no payments had been made on the mortgage since November 2008, each missed payment constituted a new default.

Section 95.11(2)(c)’s five-year limit runs separately for each missed mortgage installment, beginning the day after that installment is due, rather than when the debt is accelerated.

Ventures Trust 2013-I-NH Ex Rel. MCM Capital Partners, LLC v. Johnson · filed 2017-05-19(2)(c)

It is well-settled that the accrual of the cause of action for each missed monthly installment payment accrues the day after each is due to be paid, not on the date of the acceleration of the entire balance.

Section 95.11(2)(c)’s five-year limit bars a later foreclosure suit based on the same payment default and acceleration when that default occurred more than five years before the later suit.

Collazo v. HSBC Bank USA, N.A. · filed 2016-10-13(2)(c)

The record in the present case discloses that HSBC asserted the same payment default date and basis for acceleration in both the 2008 and 2014 complaints, a date over five years preceding the commencement of the 2014 case in the circuit court. As a result, we reverse the final judgment of foreclosure and remand the case for dismissal without prejudice in accordance with this Court’s recent opinion on rehearing en banc in Beauvais.

Section 95.11(2)(c) allows a foreclosure action based on a separate payment default after dismissal of an earlier foreclosure action if the new action is filed within five years of that default.

& SC14-1266 & SC14-1305 Lewis Brooke Bartram v. U.S. Bank National Association, etc. & The Plantation at Ponte Vedra v. U.S. Bank National Association, etc. & Gideon M.G. Gratsiani v. U.S. Bank National Association, etc. · filed 2016-11-03(2)(c)

For the reasons set forth in this opinion, we answer the rephrased certified question in the negative and hold, consistent with our reasoning in Singleton, that the mortgagee, also referred to as the lender, was not precluded by the statute of limitations from filing a subsequent foreclosure action based on payment defaults occurring subsequent to the dismissal of the first foreclosure action, as long as the alleged subsequent default occurred within five years of the subsequent foreclosure action.

Section 95.11(2)(c) excludes mortgage installments due more than five years before a foreclosure suit from the amount recoverable.

Collazo v. HSBC Bank USA, N.A. · filed 2016-04-13(2)(c)

On remand, the trial court is to determine the correct sum of principal and interest due under the mortgage note calculated by excluding monthly instalment payments due over five years before the commencement of the second foreclosure suit by HSBC (January 24, 2014).

Section 95.11(2)(c) does not bar a later mortgage foreclosure action based on a separate default merely because an earlier foreclosure action accelerated the loan.

Deutsche Bank Trust Company Americas, Etc. v. Beauvais · filed 2016-04-13(2)(c)

Here we follow that choice. And, as have numerous post-Singleton courts before us, we apply this determination, while made in the context of a res judicata defense, to a statute of limitations defense.

Section 95.11(2)(c) imposes a five-year limitations period for mortgage-foreclosure recovery, running from acceleration, maturity, or the due dates of only the installments sued upon, depending on the lender's chosen recovery.

Tiffiany Tamara Rolle · filed 2024-02-16(2)(c)

Bellissimo holds a traditional mortgage loan, providing for monthly installments, the right but not the obligation to accelerate the debt following a default by Ms. Rolle, and an ultimate maturity date at which time all unpaid sums become due. The application of the Florida statute of limitations depends on what recovery the lender seeks. The lender may accelerate the loan following a default, in which case the statute of limitations runs from the time of acceleration. The lender may wait for the date of maturity. If the lender has not previously accelerated, then the statute of limitations will run five years after the maturity date. Finally, although extremely uncommon, it is technically possible for a lender on an installment obligation to seek judgment only for those installments that have come due and were not paid without accelerating. If the lender elects to proceed in this manner, then the suit may only seek collection of those sums that were actually in default within the past five years.

Section 95.11(2)(c) requires a mortgage foreclosure action to be commenced within five years.

Conner v. Coggins · filed 1977-09-02(2)(c)

§ 95.11, Florida Statutes (1975), provides that an action to foreclose a mortgage shall be commenced within five years.

Section 95.11(2)(c) requires mortgage foreclosure actions to be commenced within five years, and subsection (6) makes laches automatic when the action is barred by the statute of limitations.

Smith v. Branch · filed 1980-12-31(2)(c), (6)

Section 95.11(2)(c), Florida Statutes (1979) provides that an action to foreclose a mortgage shall be commenced within five years. ... However, this finding may have been based solely upon the finding that the statute of limitations had expired, since section 95.11(6) provides that laches automatically bars any action that would be barred by the statute of limitations.

Section 95.11 provides a five-year limitations period for seeking a mortgage deficiency judgment.

Barnes v. ESCAMBIA CTY EMPLOYEES CU · filed 1986-05-14

As noted by appellee, the applicable statute of limitations is section 95.11, providing a period of five years. Since appellee filed its petition within that period, this cause could be dismissed only under the present rule 1.420(e) if good cause is not shown for inactivity in the case for a period of one year.

Section 95.11(2)(c) controls the time limit for an action to foreclose a mortgage.

USX Corp. v. Schilbe · filed 1989-01-06(2)(c)

That is to say, foreclosure of the mortgage is time barred by section 95.11(2)(c) and the enforceable life of the mortgage lien ended by operation of section 95.281 prior to the commencement of their action.

Section 95.11(2)(c) provides no limitations defense when loans extended by a mortgage have no specific maturity date and demands for payment were not in writing.

Pitts v. Pastore · filed 1990-01-05(2)(c)

Mr. Pitts did not raise or argue a statute of limitations defense based on section 95.11(2)(c), Florida Statutes (1985). Since the loans, as extended by the mortgage, had no specific maturity date and the Pastores' demands to pay were not in writing, this statute provides no aid to Mr. Pitts.

Section 95.11 provides a five-year limitations period for an action to reestablish and foreclose a mortgage when rescission of its satisfaction is incidental to that action.

Farmers & Merchants Bank v. Riede · filed 1990-08-16(2)(b), (2)(c)

Rather, the Riedes sought reestablishment and foreclosure of their mortgage, and rescission of the satisfaction was merely incident to the primary remedy they requested. Accordingly, the five-year limitations period applicable to equitable actions on contracts, obligations, or liabilities founded on a written instrument, Section 95.11(2)(b), Florida Statutes, and actions for foreclosure of mortgages, Section 95,ll(2)(c), Florida Statutes, controlled, and the Riedes’ suit was timely.

Section 95.11(2)(c)'s five-year period does not govern mortgage foreclosure actions; section 95.281 supplies the applicable limitation.

Monte v. Tipton · filed 1993-01-27(2)(c)

We agree with the trial court that the statute of limitations had not run. Mrs. Monte argues that section 95.11(2)(c), Florida Statutes (1991), bars the commencement of this action more than five years after the right to foreclose accrued which occurred on August 1, 1975, at the earliest. The trial court correctly concluded, citing Locke v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 509 So.2d 1375 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987), that the claim was not barred by the statute of limitations. Section 95.281, Florida Statutes (1991), is the limitation statute applicable to mortgages.

Section 95.11(2)(c) provides a limitations bar to enforcement of mortgages.

Admiral Security & Investment Co. v. Curtis · filed 2001-08-29(2)(c)

We affirm the trial court’s holding on summary judgment in this quiet title action that the applicable statutes of limitations and repose bar enforcement of the subject mortgages. See §§ 95.11(2)(c) and 95.241, Fla. Stat. (2000).

Section 95.11(2)(c)'s five-year limitations period does not bar foreclosure by an assignee of the federal government when the government was exempt from that period.

LLP Mortg. Ltd. v. Cravero · filed 2003-08-13(2)(c)

When LLP brought this suit to foreclose, the trial court held that it was barred by Florida's five year period of limitations, section 95.11(2)(c), Florida Statutes, the cause of action having accrued when the mortgage was accelerated in 1995. ... We therefore conclude that LLP's foreclosure is not barred by Florida's statute of limitations and reverse.