Fla. Stat. § 95.11

Section 95.11(2)(c) requires a mortgage foreclosure action to be commenced within five years.

Houck Corp. v. New River, Ltd., Pasco · filed 2005-02-09(2)(c)

Section 95.11(2)(c), entitled "Limitations other than for the recovery of real property," provides that actions to foreclose a mortgage must be commenced within five years.

Section 95.11(2)(c) gives five years to foreclose municipal liens enforceable like mortgages, with the period running from the recording of the liens.

City of Riviera Beach v. Reed · filed 2008-07-16(2)(c)

Section 95.11(2)(c), Florida Statutes (1995), establishes a five-year limitations period for an action to foreclose a mortgage. ... The City had the legal ability to foreclose on the liens in the manner provided by law for the foreclosure of mortgages on real property as early as 1995, when it acquired the liens. Therefore, the trial court did not err in ruling that the recording of the liens triggered the five-year statute of limitations.

A payment default after dismissal of an earlier foreclosure action creates a new cause of action, even if the lender accelerated the debt in the earlier action; a foreclosure action based on that later default is timely if filed within the limitations period.

U.S. Bank National Ass'n v. Bartram · filed 2014-04-25(2)(c)

Based on Singleton, a default occurring after a failed foreclosure attempt creates a new cause of action for statute of limitations purposes, even where acceleration had been triggered and the first case was dismissed on its merits. Therefore, we conclude that a foreclosure action for default in payments occurring after the order of dismissal in the first foreclosure action is not barred by the statute of limitations found in section 95.11(2)(c), Florida Statutes, provided the subsequent foreclosure action on the subsequent defaults is brought within the limitations period.

Section 95.11(2)(c) requires a mortgage foreclosure action to be filed within five years after the right to foreclose accrues.

CCM Pathfinder Palm Harbor Management, LLC v. Unknown Heirs · filed 2015-01-21(2)(c)

Section 95.11(2)(c) provides that an action to foreclose a mortgage must be commenced within five years from when the right to foreclose accrues.

The five-year limit for foreclosure actions does not bar a new action based on defaults after an earlier foreclosure action was dismissed without prejudice.

Nationstar Mortgage, LLC v. Brown · filed 2015-08-24(2)(c)

As a matter of law, appellant’s 2012 foreclosure action, based on breaches that occurred after the breach that triggered the first complaint, was not barred by the statute of limitations.

Section 95.11(2)(c) allows a new mortgage foreclosure action based on a different default if the action is brought within the five-year limitations period.

Hicks v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. · filed 2015-11-13(2)(c)

Despite the previous acceleration of the balance owed in both the instant suit and prior suit, Bank is not precluded from filing a new foreclosure action based on different acts or dates of default not previously alleged, provided that the subsequent foreclosure action on the subsequent defaults is brought within the statute of limitations period found in section 95.11(2)(c), Florida Statutes.

Section 95.11(2)(c) gives a mortgage foreclosure action five years, and a voluntarily dismissed action does not bar a later action based on a different default within that period.

Nina Solonenko and Valeriy Solonenko v. Georgia Notes 18, LLC · filed 2016-01-06(2)(c)

An action to foreclose a mortgage has a five-year statute of limitations. ... We have held that a voluntarily dismissed foreclosure action “does not bar subsequent actions and acceleration based upon different events of default,” and “any acts of default still within the statute of limitations may be raised in a subsequent suit.” ... Therefore, under this court’s precedent, the action was timely brought within the five-year statute of limitations.

Section 95.11(2)(c) allows a foreclosure action based on a missed mortgage payment within its five-year limitations period, even when the initial default occurred earlier.

Bollettieri Resort Villas Condominium Association, Inc. v. The Bank of New York Mellon · filed 2016-08-26(2)(c)

Although we agree with the Fifth District that a foreclosure action must be based on a default that occurred within the five-year ■ statute of limitations period, we disagree that a complaint alleging that the homeowners are in a continuing state of default at the time of filing.fails to satisfy this requirement.

Section 95.11 sets a five-year limit for foreclosure actions, but an unsuccessful acceleration does not bar a later action based on subsequent defaults.

Anthony v. Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC · filed 2016-05-05(2)(c)

Under this line of cases, an unsuccessful acceleration does not bar later actions based on subsequent defaults - and therefore the note is enforceable.

Section 95.11(2)(c) allows five years to bring a mortgage foreclosure action; when the mortgage has an optional acceleration clause, the limitations period begins when the lender exercises that option.

Madura v. Bac Home Loans Servicing, LP · filed 2014-11-10(2)(c)

When the mortgage contains an acceleration clause, the statute of limitations begins to run when the loan is accelerated. ... Although BOA argues it did not accelerate the loan until it filed this foreclosure action, we need not decide that issue, because the loan was accelerated on May 23, 2007, at the earliest. Accordingly, BOA timely filed its counterclaim for foreclosure within the five-year deadline, on May 2, 2012.

Section 95.11(2)(b) gives five years to sue on a written instrument, with the period running from accrual; for an installment contract with optional acceleration, accrual occurs when the lender accelerates and notifies the borrower.

Mark Evon Carney · filed 2025-01-22(2)(b)

The cause of action here started to accrue when 121 FCU sent the Acceleration Letter in May 2019. Accordingly, the filing of the Florida Action within 5 years of the Acceleration Letter properly tolled the statute of limitations under § 95.11(2)(b), Florida Statutes.

Section 95.11(2)(c)'s five-year period for mortgage foreclosure does not begin at default when an optional acceleration clause remains unexercised.

Locke v. ST. FARM FIRE AND CAS. CO. · filed 1987-07-23(2)(c)

Appellants also appeal the denial of their motion to dismiss, arguing that the statute of limitations had run on the instant action. They argue that since five years had run from the time of default to the filing of the action, Section 95.11(2)(c), Florida Statutes, prohibits the current action. It has been held that the statute of limitations on a mortgage foreclosure action does not begin to run until the last payment is due unless the mortgage contains an acceleration clause. Conner v. Coggins, 349 So.2d 780 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977). In the instant case, the mortgage, which provides for installment payments with the last payment due in May, 2008, contains an optional acceleration clause. In such a case no acceleration occurs until the holder of the mortgage exercises his right to accelerate. See Cook v. Merrifield, 335 So.2d 297 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976). In the instant case, the appellee did not exercise its right to accelerate until the filing of its complaint. Therefore, the motion to dismiss was properly denied.

Section 95.11(2)(b) gives five years to sue on a written obligation; when a lender accelerates the debt, the limitations period runs from the debt’s resulting maturity.

Cadle Co. v. Rhoades · filed 2008-03-26(2)(b)

Here, Cadle does not dispute that Barnett Bank accelerated the debt and demanded full payment on or about January 22, 1998. The underlying debt at issue in this case therefore matured on that date. In order to give meaning to the phrase “which is not barred by any applicable statute of limitations,” the guarantee, therefore, required suit to be commenced against Rhoades before the limitations period ran on the underlying debt. Because the debt matured on January 22, 1998, the applicable five-year statute of limitations ran on *835January 23, 2003-close to two years before Cadle filed suit.

Section 95.11(2)(b)’s five-year period for a secured personal-property debt begins when default automatically accelerates the debt; a later collateral sale does not restart it for a deficiency claim.

Arvelo v. Park Finance of Broward, Inc. · filed 2009-06-24(2)(b)

Upon the occurrence of that event, Park Finance’s cause of action for breach of contract had fully accrued, and the five-year statute of limitations began to run. We reject the argument that her post-repossession failure or refusal to pay the deficiency “reset the clock” or allowed some new cause of action to accrue.

At the time, subsection 95.11(3)(i) imposed a four-year limitations period for fraudulent misrepresentation claims, while subsection 95.11(3)(a) imposed a four-year period for negligence claims.

Okposio v. Barry University, Inc. · filed 2025-03-05(3)(i) and (3)(a)

Here, the Court applies Florida law because it is undisputed that when the Plaintiff filed her Complaint, her fraudulent misrepresentation claims were governed by Florida’s then four-year statute of limitations. See Fla. Stat. § 95.11(3)(i). ... Thus, the Plaintiff’s fraudulent misrepresentation claims are barred by the applicable four-year statute of limitations. See Fla. Stat § 95.11(3)(i). ... It is undisputed that when the Plaintiff filed her Complaint, her negligence claims were governed by Florida’s then four-year statute of limitations. See Fla. Stat. § 95.11(3)(a). ... Consequently, the Plaintiff’s gross negligence claims are timely because they occurred within the 4-year statute of limitations. See Fla. Stat. § 95.11(3)(a).

Section 95.11(3)(a) provides a four-year limitations period for misrepresentation claims.

Steinmetz v. G.D. Parker Sod, Inc. · filed 1996-05-24(3)(a)

A cause of action for misrepresentation is governed by a four year statute of limitations. § 95.11(3)(a), Fla.Stat. (1995). ... The Johnsons’ suit, filed as it was some four years and five months after the Johnsons acquired knowledge of the misrepresentation, was barred by the statute of limitations.

Section 95.11 sets a two-year limitations period for medical negligence claims.

Clark v. Sarasota County Public Hospital Board · filed 1998-08-31(4)(b)

The statute of limitations for medical negligence claims is two years under Florida law. § 95.11, Florida Statutes.

Section 95.11(3)(o) provides a four-year limitations period for false arrest claims brought under § 1983 in Florida.

Harris v. Goderick · filed 2015-04-22(3)(o)

In this case, the district court did not err by dismissing all of Harris’s § 1983 false arrest claims because his claims are barred by the statute of limitations. ... Therefore, Harris filed his complaint well after the four-year limitations period had run on his false arrest claims.

Section 95.11(3)(o) supplies the four-year limitations period for § 1983 claims brought in Florida.

Hamze v. Cummings · filed 2016-06-20(3)(o)

For § 1983 claims such as ... Hamze’s brought in the forum state of Florida, the statute of limitations is four years. See id.; Fla. Stat. § 95.11(3)(o).

Section 95.11(3)(p) provides a four-year limitations period for civil rights actions in Florida.

Moore v. Mrs. B. E. Chamberlain, Nurse · filed 2014-04-02(3)(p)

Florida, the applicable statute of limitations for civil rights actions is four years.

Section 95.11(3)(f) supplies a four-year limitations period for FCRA claims; each application of a discriminatory policy begins a new period for a disparate impact claim.

Smith v. Miami-Dade County · filed 2014-01-17(3)(f)

The Parties do not dispute that Plaintiffs claims are each subject to a four-year statute of limitations. ... Plainly, then, Plaintiffs disparate impact claims are not time barred, as each application of Defendant’s rehire policy constituted a “present violation” that began an independent limitations period.

Section 95.11(3)(f)’s four-year limitation period does not apply to a Florida Civil Rights Act action when an EEOC right-to-sue notice triggers the one-year period in section 760.11(5).

AISY ALEU, PHARM. D. v. NOVA SOUTHEASTERN UNIVERSITY, INC. · filed 2023-02-15(3)(f)

According to the employee, under the circumstances of this case, the four- year limitation period in section 95.11(3)(f), Florida Statutes (2015), for “[a]n action founded on a statutory liability” should have applied to her action. We disagree with the employee’s argument.

Section 95.11(3)(o)-(p) provides a four-year limitations period applicable to the claims at issue, making claims arising from the 2019 arrest and 2020 dismissal filed in 2024 untimely.

Green v. Wilkinson · filed 2025-04-23(3)(o)-(p)

As the district court found, because Green sued in May 2024 on claims related to his October 2019 arrest and to the February 2020 dismissal, the claims in his second amended complaint are time-barred under Florida’s four-year statute of limitations. ... Because the expiration of the statute of limitations warrants the dismissal of a complaint as frivolous, Green fails to demonstrate “good faith” under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) to appeal in forma pauperis.

Section 95.11(3)(o) provides a four-year limitations period for residual personal-injury claims in Florida, and section 95.11(3)(n) imposes the same period on civil battery claims.

Scott v. White · filed 2025-08-14(3)(o) and (3)(n)

Although section 1983 does not set out a limitations period, section 1983 claims are “governed by the forum state’s residual personal injury statute of limitations, which in Florida” sets a limitations period of four years. ... Florida civil battery claims are subject to the same limitations period. ... In light of the above, a reasonable factfinder could conclude that Plaintiff’s initial complaint was filed on December 21, 2016. Because this date falls well within the limitations period, Defendants are not entitled to summary judgment on their statute of limitations defense. ... The court thus applies the mailbox rule to Plaintiff’s filing of the initial complaint in this action such that her initial complaint is deemed filed on December 21, 2016—within the applicable limitations period. ... Accordingly, Defendants are not entitled to summary judgment on the basis of the statute of limitations.

Section 95.11(3)(f) provides a four-year limitations period when the Florida Commission on Human Relations fails to make a reasonable cause determination within 180 days.

Ellsworth v. Polk County Board of County Commissioners · filed 2001-02-22(3)(f)

We recently answered this question in the negative and held that the general four-year statute of limitations for statutory causes of action embodied in section 95.11(3)(f), Florida Statutes (1999), applies when the Commission fails to make a reasonable cause determination within 180 days.

Section 95.11(3)(f) provides a four-year limitations period when the Commission fails to make a reasonable cause determination on a discrimination complaint within 180 days.

Seale v. EMSA Correctional Care, Inc. · filed 2000-09-14(3)(f)

We recently answered this question in the negative and held that the general four-year statute of limitations for statutory causes of action embodied in section 95.11(3)(f), Florida Statutes (1999), applies when the Commission fails to make a rea*1190sonable cause determination within 180 days.

Section 95.11(3)(f) provides a four-year limitations period for Florida Civil Rights Act claims when the Commission on Human Relations makes no reasonable-cause determination within 180 days.

Williams v. Southeast Florida Cable, Inc. · filed 2001-04-18(3)(f)

Because appellant filed her complaint within the four-year period prescribed by section 95.11(3)(f), we reverse the trial court's entry of summary judgment and remand with directions to reinstate the claims for discrimination alleged in counts I and II of appellant's amended complaint.

Section 95.11(3)(f) gives an aggrieved person four years to sue after the Florida Commission on Human Relations fails to act within 180 days.

Santini v. Cleveland Clinic Florida · filed 2003-05-07(3)(f)

The aggrieved person then would have four years to sue under section 95.11(3)(f), Florida Statutes (1999).

Section 95.11(3)(f) provides a four-year period to file a civil action under the Florida Civil Rights Act when the commission fails to determine reasonable cause within 180 days.

White v. City of Pompano Beach · filed 2002-03-20(3)(f)

Under this section, the only restriction on White's action was that he file suit after the EEOC's 180-day determination period expired and before the four-year statute of limitations pursuant to section 95.11(3)(f) expired. As neither party disputes that White complied with this restriction, we hold reversal is required.

Section 95.11(3)(f) gives Florida Civil Rights Act claims a four-year limitations period that runs from the alleged wrongful termination and is not tolled while the claimant pursues an administrative complaint.

Ross v. Jim Adams Ford, Inc. · filed 2004-05-07(3)(f)

Accordingly, we hold that Mr. Ross's claim for a violation of the Florida Civil Rights Act accrued on the date of his alleged wrongful termination and that the running of the four-year statute of limitation in section 95.11(3) was not tolled while Mr. Ross pursued his administrative complaint with the Commission.

Section 95.11(3)(f) applies a four-year limitations period to Florida Civil Rights Act employment discrimination claims.

Maggio v. Department of Labor and Employment Security · filed 2005-08-10(3)(f)

At the outset, we note that the trial court was correct in its determination that the general four-year statute of limitations contained in section 95.11(3)(f) applied to Maggio's claim.

Section 95.11(3)(p) provides the four-year limitations period applied to § 1983 and Bivens claims brought in Florida.

Poole v. State of Florida · filed 2025-09-16(3)(p)

In Florida, this limitations period is four years.

Section 95.11(3)(f) provides a four-year limitations period for statutory causes of action when the agency fails to make a reasonable-cause determination within 180 days.

Rhenals v. Federal Express Corporation · filed 2025-05-19(3)(f)

However, when the agency fails to timely administer a reasonable cause determination as to the claimant’s FCRA claims or otherwise fails to notify the claimant that it has not made a determination, the general four-year statute of limitations, not the one-year statute of limitations, applies. See Hines, 301 So. 3d at 475 (citing Joshua City of Gainesville, 768 So. 2d 432, 433 (Fla. 2000)); see also Ellsworth v. Polk Cnty. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs, 780 So. 2d 903, 905 (Fla. 2001) (“[T]he general four-year statute of limitations for statutory causes of action embodies in section 95.11(3)(f), Florida Statutes (1999), applies when the Commission fails to make a reasonable cause determination within 180 days.”)

Section 95.11(3) supplies a four-year limitations period for this type of constitutional claim, while section 95.11(2)(b)'s five-year period applies only to claims arising from written contractual obligations between counterparties.

Swift v. Da Silva · filed 2025-06-03(3), (2)(b)

Here, Florida, the forum state, has a residual statute of limitations provision requiring commencement of Swift’s action within four years. Fla. Stat. § 95.11(3); see Swearingen, 51 F.4th at 1303. ... Swift maintains that he filed suit under Fla. Stat. § 95.11(2)(b), which provides a five-year statute of limitations, making his suit timely. That provision, however, governs actions “on a contract, obligation, or liability founded on a written instrument,” which has no bearing on Swift’s constitutional challenges to the conditions of his confinement. Id. Swift mistakenly argues that his action arises from a “written instrument” because the United States Constitution and Florida statutory law are written instruments. But § 95.11(2)(b) does not apply to any and all claims predicated on constitutional violations; it applies to claims arising from written contractual obligations between counterparties. That is not this action.

Section 95.11 provides a two-year limitations period for negligence-based actions, a two-year period subject to a four-year outside limit for medical-malpractice actions, and four-year periods for false-imprisonment, IIED, and residual personal-injury claims.

Merritt v. Knowles · filed 2025-07-16(5)(c), (3)(n), (3)(o), and (5)(a)

An action for medical malpractice shall be commenced within [two] years from the time the incident giving rise to the action occurred or within [two] years from the time the incident is discovered, or should have been discovered with the exercise of due diligence; however, in no event shall the action be commenced later than [four] years from the date of the incident or occurrence out of which the cause of action accrued, except that this [four]-year period shall not bar an action brought on behalf of a minor on or before the child’s eighth birthday. ... As Plaintiff has not brought this case on behalf of a minor, by the statute’s plain language, she had four years maximum from the complained-of events to assert the state tort claims in her complaint, and she did not meet this deadline. ... The limitations period for false imprisonment is four years in Florida. ... Section 1983 claims, such as Plaintiff’s due process claims, “are governed by the forum state’s residual personal injury statute of limitations, which in Florida” sets of a limitations period of “four years.” ... IIED claims also have a four-year limitations period in Florida. ... As “[a]n action founded on negligence,” Fla. Stat. § 95.11(5)(a), an NIED claim under Florida law is subject to a two-year limitations period, id.; see Trocano v. Vivaldi, 720 F. Supp. 3d 1231, 1241 (M.D. Fla. 2024) (observing in the NIED context that “an action founded on negligence must be filed within two years”).

Subsection 95.11(3) supplies a four-year limitations period for section 1983 claims filed in Florida by serving as the forum state’s residual personal-injury limitations period.

Curtis v. Mislevy · filed 2025-10-01(3)

Section 1983 claims are governed by the forum state’s residual personal injury statute of limitations, which in Florida is four years. Doe as Next Friend of Doe #6 v. Swearingen, 51 F.4th 1295, 1302-03 (11th Cir. 2022); see also Fla. Stat. § 95.11(3).

Section 95.11(2)(b) gives five years from accrual to sue on a written contract; when notice of a compensation cap is disputed, that factual issue must be resolved to determine whether the claim is timely.

Newmeyer v. Southeast Mortgage Co. · filed 1991-06-18(2)(b)

Based upon facts that are established in the record before us, we agree with Newmeyer's argument that the statute of limitations applicable to this case is Section 95.11(2)(b), which provides for a five-year period, starting from the date the cause of action arises, in which to bring an action founded upon obligations that stem from a written contract. Regarding the five-year limitation period that governs Newmeyer’s action, the first issue to be resolved is to ascertain when he received notice of SEMCO’s cap on its compensation agreement. Only after such a determination is made can it then be determined whether or not Newmeyer's action was barred by Section 95.11(2)(b).

Section 95.11 provides one year to seek specific performance of a contract and five years to bring a breach of contract claim.

Langley Ltd. Partnership v. School Board of Lake County · filed 2013-04-12(5)(a), (2)(b)

Both parties agree that a one-year limitations period applies to the School Board’s specific performance claim, section 95.11(5)(a), Florida Statutes, with a longer five-year limitations period applicable to the breach of contract claim generally. ... Because the School Board did not file suit within the applicable limitations periods, its action against Langley is barred.

Section 95.11 provides a five-year limitations period for written contract claims and a four-year period for oral contract claims.

Mitchell v. Osceola Farms Co. · filed 2005-12-29

The statute of limitations in Florida for a breach of contract claim is five years for a written contract, Fla. Stat. § 95.11(2)(b), and four years for an oral contract, Id. § 95.1 l(3)(k).

Section 95.11 provides a two-year limitations period for unpaid wages and a five-year period for breach of a written contract.

Kennedy v. Home Performance Alliance, Inc. · filed 2023-02-06(2)(b), (4)(c)

This claim has a statute of limitations much longer than six months and is undoubtedly subject to the terms of Section 95.03. See Fla. Stat. §§ 95.11(2)(b) & (4)(c) (setting a statute of limitations of two years for a claim of unpaid wages and five years for a claim for breach of a written contract).

Section 95.11(4)(f) gives Florida securities-violation claims a two-year discovery-based limitations period, capped at five years, and whether the violation should have been discovered is generally a fact question.

Zalazar v. Capital Force LLC · filed 2023-10-20(4)(f)

At bottom, “[t]he date on which [Plaintiff] should have reasonably discovered that [the Notes] were unregistered [for the purposes of an unregistered securities claim under Florida law] is a question of fact. This is a question best left for summary judgment or trial.”

Section 95.11 imposes a five-year limitations period on written-contract claims and four-year limitations periods on tortious-interference and fraud claims, running from accrual rather than delayed discovery for these claims.

Aldabe · filed 2026-02-13(2)(b), (3)(o), (3)(i)

A claim for breach of a written contract is subject to Florida’s five-year statute of limitations. Fla. Stat. § 95.11(2)(b). The limitations period begins at the time the breach occurs, not when the plaintiff discovers the breach. ... Plaintiff’s breach of contract claim under the 2012 Contract is barred by Florida’s five-year statute of limitations. ... Therefore, because the alleged breach occurred in 2016 and the limitations period is five years, the claim is dismissed as untimely. ... A claim for tortious interference with a contractual relationship is subject to a four-year statute of limitations. Fla. Stat. § 95.11(3)(o). ... Plaintiff’s claim for tortious interference against Intact is barred by the Florida statute of limitations. ... Plaintiff filed this action in 2025, outside the four-year limitations period. Fla. Stat. § 95.11(3)(o). ... Plaintiff’s claim for fraudulent inducement is barred by the statute of limitations. Under Florida law, fraud claims are subject to a four-year statute of limitations. Fla. Stat. § 95.11(3)(i). ... Each alleged inducement occurred more than four years before Plaintiff filed the SAC. Therefore, the fraudulent inducement claim is time-barred.

The four-year limitations period begins when the claimant discovers or should have discovered the invasion of a legal right.

Lund v. Cook · filed 1978-02-02(3)(a) and (3)(p)

Chapter 74-382, Laws of Florida, did not change this rule though it did provide an overall limitation on its application as to certain specific types of cases. Rather than abrogate the rule, the amendment reinforces it.

For medical malpractice, the limitations period does not begin until the claimant discovers or should with reasonable diligence have discovered the negligent act or resulting injury.

Nolen v. Sarasohn · filed 1980-01-22(6), (4)(a), and (4)(b)

Nevertheless, regardless of which statute may be applicable, the general principle of law is that the running of the statute is tolled until the claimant, through the exercise of reasonable *163 diligence, is put on notice as to either the negligent act or the injury caused thereby.

Under Section 95.11(3), defendants seeking summary judgment on a limitations defense must conclusively show that no genuine factual issue remains about when the plaintiff knew or reasonably should have known of the cause of action.

Szabo v. Ashland Oil Co. · filed 1984-03-27(3)

The record shows that, on the statute of limitations question, the defendants simply failed in their burden to demonstrate conclusively the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.

Section 95.11(3)'s four-year limitations period does not warrant summary judgment when disputed facts could establish delayed discovery under the adverse-interest exception.

Florida Department of Insurance v. Blackburn (In Re Blackburn) · filed 1997-05-20(3)

For these reasons, the court concludes that the defendant is not entitled to summary judgment on its statute of limitations affirmative defenses to the plaintiffs claims. The summary judgment record contains disputed facts that, if determined at trial in favor of the plaintiff, would support the conclusion that, pursuant to the adverse interest exception to Florida’s discovery rule and the separate and distinct legal capacities of regulator and receiver, the defendant’s knowledge was not imputed to GSL, the regulator’s knowledge was not imputed to the receiver, and neither GSL nor the receiver could have discovered the claims until the receiver’s appointment on August 12, 1991.

Section 95.11(3) does not apply the delayed discovery doctrine to tortious interference or unfair and deceptive trade practice claims.

YUSUF MOHAMAD EXCAV. INC. v. Ringhaver Equip. Co. · filed 2001-09-07(3)(f), (3)(o)

Applying this same reasoning, we hold that the trial court correctly concluded that the delayed discovery doctrine is not applicable to causes of action for tortious interference and unfair and deceptive trade practices because section 95.11(3) is silent on the issue.

Section 95.11 does not extend delayed discovery to claims for breach of fiduciary duty, civil theft, conspiracy, conversion, or unjust enrichment arising from misappropriation of assets.

Davis v. Monahan · filed 2002-11-07

Aside from the provisions above for the delayed accrual of a cause of action in cases of fraud, products liability, professional and medical malpractice, and intentional torts based on abuse, there is no other statutory basis for the delayed discovery rule.

Section 95.11(3)(a)'s four-year limitations period is not delayed when a plaintiff could readily discover the accident and possible injury, even if the plaintiff learns the extent of the injury later.

Carter v. Lowe's Home Centers, Inc. · filed 2007-04-26(3)(a)

James Carter appeals a final order dismissing his complaint with prejudice based upon the statute of limitations, section 95.11(3)(a), Florida Statutes (2002). ... We agree with the trial court that the delayed discovery doctrine is not applicable here. ... In this case, nothing prevented Carter from discovering that he slipped and fell and that he might have been injured as a result thereof.

Section 95.11(5)(h) sets a two-year limitations period for libel and slander actions.

Trocano v. Vivaldi · filed 2026-02-17(5)(h)

It is true that Trocano’s defamation claims were barred by the two-year statute of limitations, as the district court determined. See Fla. Stat. § 95.11(5)(h) (providing that the statute of limitations for “[a]n action for libel or slander” is two years). Trocano’s defamation claims in her operative complaint were based on publications that Vivaldi allegedly made in January and February 2021. Therefore, Trocano filed her July 2023 lawsuit five months too late.

Section 95.11(4)(g) sets a two-year limit for libel and slander actions.

WAGNER, NUGENT, JOHNSON v. Flanagan · filed 1993-11-10(4)(g)

The legislature has established unequivocal guidelines governing the statute of limitations for defamation suits and has decided on a two-year period: 95.11 Limitations other than for the recovery of real property. — Actions other than for recovery of real property shall be commenced as follows: ... . (4) WITHIN TWO YEARS. — ... . (g) An action for libel or slander.

Section 95.11(4) sets a two-year limitations period for the suit at issue.

Kelly v. Penson · filed 1995-10-10(4)

We affirm the dismissal of appellant’s second amended complaint, finding no error by the trial court in its determination that appellant failed to file his suit within the two-year statute of limitations period. § 95.11(4), Fla.Stat.

Section 95.11(4)(g) sets a two-year limitations period for defamation claims; an alleged statement made within that period is timely.

Mishiyev v. Davis, Beasley Media Group, LLC · filed 2025-01-31(4)(g)

At least two allegedly defamatory statements appear timely. One, Mr. Mishiyev described statements made to the nightclub owner in November 2020. See § 95.11(4)(g); Ashraf v. Adventist Health Sys./Sunbelt, Inc., 200 So. 3d 173, 174 (Fla. 5th DCA 2016).

Section 95.11(4)(g) sets a two-year limitations period for libel and slander claims.

Norkin v. Fla. Bar · filed 2018-04-26(4)(g)

Florida has a two-year statute of limitations for libel or slander. See Fla. Stat. § 95.11(4)(g). ... Plaintiff filed his initial Complaint on January 23, 2018-more than two years after each article was published. Therefore, Plaintiff's claim for defamation is dismissed as time-barred.

The 2023 amendment shortening the limitations period for negligence claims to two years applies only to causes of action accruing after March 24, 2023; earlier-accruing claims remain governed by the prior four-year period.

Sullenberger · filed 2026-04-17(4)(a)

“Effective March 24, 2023, Florida’s statute of limitations, Fla. Stat. § 95.11, was amended to reduce the statute of limitations for negligence claims from four to two years.” ... “The amendments,” however, only “apply to causes of action accruing after the effective date of this act.” ... Because our Plaintiff’s § 1983 action accrued on December 2, 2017, his claim is subject to the statute of limitations that was in effect then, which was four years.

Section 95.11(6) does not make an existing medical malpractice claim expire when the shortened limitations period takes effect.

Maltempo v. Cuthbert · filed 1974-01-18(6)

If we were to answer the certified question affirmatively, we would be holding that the plaintiff's cause of action expired at the very time the act first became effective. We hold that this result should not obtain and, therefore, answer the certified question in the negative.

Before a limitations period has completely run and barred an action, the legislature may extend the time to sue without creating retroactive legislation or impairing a vested right.

Mazda Motors of Am., Inc. v. SC Henderson & Sons, Inc. · filed 1978-11-17

A person has no vested right in the running of a statute of limitations unless it has completely run and barred his action. Before the action is barred by the statute of limitations, the legislature may amend the statute enlarging the period of time within which an action may be brought. This is not retroactive legislation and does not impair a vested right.

Section 95.11(3)(j) provides a four-year limitations period that does not apply to causes of action arising before its effective date, while section 95.11(5)(d) requires fraud suits to be commenced within three years.

McGlynn v. Rosen · filed 1980-08-19(3)(j), (5)(d)

In any event, the general statute of limitations relied upon by appellants would not alter the disposition of this cause. Section 95.11(3)(j), Florida Statutes (Supp. 1974), did not become effective until January 1, 1975. As the supreme court recently held in Dade County v. Ferro, 384 So.2d 1283 (Fla. 1980), when a cause of action arises from an occurrence which predates the effective date of a statute of limitations, that statute does not apply. Thus, the four-year statute relied upon by appellants is inapplicable. If this action were not barred by the expiration of the "winding up" period, then the general statute of limitations as codified by Section 95.11(5)(d), Florida Statutes (1973), would govern. The latter statute requires a suit based on fraud to be commenced within three years. The McGlynns' complaint is therefore untimely under both the general statute of limitations for fraud as well as under the "winding up" statute.

Section 95.11(3) provides a four-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions.

Sairras v. Schleffer · filed 2009-06-22(3)

Sairras did not file his § 1983 claim within Florida’s four-year statute of limitations for filing personal injury actions. Fla. Stat. § 95.11(3); Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 270-75, 280, 105 S. Ct. 1938, 1943-47, 1949 (1985) (concluding that § 1983 actions are best characterized as personal injury actions and that the forum state’s statute of limitations for personal injury actions applies).

Section 95.11(3)(a) sets a four-year limitations period for negligence claims.

Eichenbaum v. Rossland Real Estate, Ltd. · filed 1987-02-25(3)(a)

The statute of limitations applicable to a negligence claim is four years. § 95.11(3)(a), Fla.Stat. (1985).

Section 95.11(3)(a) sets a four-year limitation period for negligence actions.

Bay Park Towers Condo. v. Hj Ross & Assoc. · filed 1987-03-10(3)(a)

Appellee inspected the plumbing system in 1975. The limitation period for an action founded on negligence is four years. § 95.11(3)(a), Fla. Stat. (1985). Thus, a new action by individual unit owners would be barred by the statute of limitations.

Section 95.11(3)(a) gives negligence claims a four-year limitations period that begins when the injured person knows of the acts invading her legal rights, even if she does not yet know she can sue a particular defendant.

Johnson v. Deluxe Tire Service, Inc. · filed 1989-06-15(3)(a)

The statute of limitations for negligence is four years. § 95.11(3)(a), Fla.Stat. (1987). ... However, as appel-lees assert, the cause of action accrues when the plaintiff became aware of the acts which constituted the invasion of her legal rights, not when she became aware of a right to sue a particular defendant. ... If, as she alleges, her husband, as an agent of One Stop, was negligent in not inspecting and securing the other wheels of the vehicle, the facts supporting this claim were known to her at the time of the accident, and the statute of limitations commenced to run at that time.

Section 95.11(3)(a) sets a four-year limitations period for negligence actions.

Keller v. Reed · filed 1992-08-26(3)(a)

The statute of limitations applicable to a negligence action is four years. § 95.11(3)(a), Fla. Stat. (1989).

Section 95.11(3)(a) provides a four-year limitations period for personal injury claims.

Jones v. Law Firm of Hill and Ponton · filed 2002-08-13(3)(a)

Jones’s personal injury claim against Ramada Inn had a four year statute of limitation period. Fla. Stat. § 95.11(3)(a).

Section 95.11(3)(f) gives claims founded on a statutory liability a four-year limitations period.

BLACK DIAMOND PROPERTIES, INC. v. Haines · filed 2011-09-23(3)(f)

As to all Plaintiffs except the Haineses, it is uncontroverted that the suit was not filed within the four-year limitations period under the statute. ... We conclude that the section 817.41 claims of Angelo and Brenda Masut, Tom Howell, and Richard Conboy are barred by the statute of limitations.

Section 95.11(3)(o)-(p) provides a four-year limitations period for personal-injury torts.

Earnest E. Tillman v. Henriquez · filed 2013-05-17(3)(o)-(p)

Florida has a four-year statute of limitations for personal-injury torts.

Section 95.11(3) supplies a four-year limitations period for personal injury actions, which applies to § 1983 claims brought in Florida.

Dillard v. Treasure Coast Forensic Treatment Center/GEO Care and All Staff · filed 2026-01-07(3)

In Florida, the applicable statute of limitations governing personal injury ... actions is four years. ... Accordingly, under Florida’s statute of limitations, his claims expired four years later in 2018.

Section 95.11 does not apply to this kind of tax refund claim.

Walgreen Drug Stores Company v. Lee · filed 1946-09-27(5E)

We do not think a renewal of the application for refund was necessary, provided it met the requirements of Section 215.26, as quoted; neither do we think Section 95.11, Florida Statutes 1941, is applicable to a claim of this kind.

Section 95.11(3)(p) limits recovery of maintenance taxes to those paid within four years before suit.

Spring Lake Imp. Dist. v. Tyrrell · filed 2002-01-25(3)(p)

Thus, because the affected landowners waited so long to seek relief, we conclude that the statute of limitations and the doctrine of laches bar them from recovering those taxes assessed for maintenance beyond the four-year period contained in section 95.11(3)(p), Florida Statutes (1997). Specifically, no maintenance tax paid prior to January 23, 1994, may be refunded.

Section 95.11(3)(p)'s four-year limit bars refunds for maintenance taxes assessed for periods before the cutoff, even when paid later.

Spring Lake Imp. Dist. v. Tyrrell · filed 2004-03-19(3)(p)

Instead of awarding refunds for maintenance taxes assessed and paid after January 23, 1994, the trial court awarded refunds for maintenance taxes paid after that date, even though they were assessed earlier. While such a holding could be parsed from single sentences in Spring Lake I, the context of the entire opinion makes it clear that the court intended to bar the Landowners from receiving refunds for taxes assessed and paid for the time period prior to January 23, 1994. Thus, we reverse and remand with directions for the trial court to reduce the award by the amounts paid for 1990, 1991, 1992, and 1993, plus the corresponding postjudgment interest.

Section 95.11(1)’s twenty-year period for enforcing a judgment does not override an applicable deadline for presenting a claim against the judgment debtor’s estate.

Holden v. Patterson · filed 1953-04-21(1)

But we see no reason to search further for an answer to the question the appellant propounds because, even if her contention should prevail, she could not escape the effect of the law which was on the statute books at the time the judgment was entered, that is, the law which governed, prior to the enactment in 1933 of Florida Probate Law, supra, the presentation of claims against an estate irrespective of the twenty-year statute of limitations.

Section 95.11(6)'s two-year limit for wrongful death actions does not extend the time allowed by Florida probate law to bring a claim against a decedent's estate.

Toney v. Adair · filed 1960-05-19(6)

They operate in different areas. The statute of limitations (§ 95.11(6) makes no reference to actions against the estate of a deceased or his appointed representative. Clearly, the validity and enforcement of claims against estates are controlled by provisions with reference thereto as contained in the Florida Probate Law. The statute of nonclaim as contained in the Probate Law specifies the conditions and controls the period in which such actions for damages may be filed.

Section 95.11 limits actions other than those for recovery of real property, and judgments of justices of the peace must fit one of its subsections.

Viggio v. Wood · filed 1958-03-27

Thus this section provides a limitation for all actions other than those for the recovery of real 'property, and the judgment of justices of the peace must fall within one of the subsections. ... It is not necessary for a decision in this case to determine which subsection governs judgments of justices oí the peace. It is sufficient that we find they do not fall under the twenty year provision.

Section 95.11(3)(k) gives four years to bring quantum meruit and unjust enrichment claims based on obligations not founded on a written instrument.

Merle Wood & Associates, Inc. v. Trinity Yachts, LLC · filed 2012-03-09(3)(k)

The statute of limitations applicable to MWA’s quantum meruit and unjust en...richment claims provides a four year window to file a complaint for “[a] legal or equitable action on a contract, obligation, or liability not founded on a written instrument.”

Section 95.11(3)(k) provides four years to bring a claim for breach of an oral promise.

Kopel v. Kopel · filed 2017-01-26(3)(k)

The statute of limitations provides only a four-year period in which to raise such a claim. § 95.11(S)(k), Fla. Stat (1993). ... Even using 1993, the statute .of limitations expired on Petitioner’s claim in 1997 at the latest.

Section 95.11(5)(e) limits actions on unwritten agreements to three years, requiring a demand within a reasonable time tied to that limitation period.

Stoudenmire v. Florida Loan Co. · filed 1960-01-26(5)(e)

“ * * * where a demand or some other act is required of a plaintiff as a condition precedent to his right to sue, ‘the demand must be made in a reasonable time, and this time, unless there be some special circumstances shown, will be fixed in analogy to the statute of limitations.’ ” ... We adopt the hereinabove stated rule in Smith v. Middle States Utility Co., supra.

Section 95.11(5)(e) gives three years to bring an action based on an unwritten contract, beginning when the forgery is discovered or should have been discovered with ordinary business care.

Edgerly v. Schuyler · filed 1959-06-26(5)(e)

We hold that the period of the statute of limitations begins to run from the discovery of the forgery by the depositor unless it can be demonstrated to the satisfaction of the trier of fact that at an earlier time the depositor would have discovered the forgery if he had exercised ordinary business care. The determination of the time for the beginning of the period of the statute of limitations becomes a question of fact. ... Although appellee contends that either § 95.11(3) or (4) is the pertinent general statute of limitations governing this action,[13] we conclude that the proper provision of the statute of limitations to be applied is § 95.11(5) (e), Fla. Stat., F.S.A. ... Since the contract is not in writing the action is governed by the three year statute of limitations.

Section 95.11(5)(a) allows three years to bring an action founded on a statutory liability, except an action for a penalty or forfeiture.

Indemnity Ins. Co. v. Brooks-Fisher Insulating Co. · filed 1962-04-18(5)(a)

The period of limitations within which a suit such as that of plaintiff had to be commenced prior to the 1959 amendment, however, fell within the operation of section 95.11(5) (a), Florida Statutes, F.S.A. This section provides, in essence, that an action other than one for the recovery of real property may be commenced within three years if founded upon a liability created by statute, aside from one for penalty or forfeiture. Since a statute of limitations was in operation, this exception is likewise inapplicable.

Section 95.11(5)(e) requires an action on a contract not founded on a written instrument to be brought within three years.

DuPont v. Parker and Company of Florida · filed 1966-09-27(5)(e)

The general rule is that the statute is tolled for a person only when he is prevented from exercising his legal remedy by the pendency of other legal proceedings. See 54 C.J.S. Limitations of Actions § 247. In the instant case, Counts One and Three were founded upon a breach of an oral contract to procure certain insurance while the prior litigation was founded on a policy of insurance. DuPont was not precluded from an action against Parker due to the action he filed against the insurance company in Federal Court, on the policy itself. Counts One and Three were not filed within the three year statute of limitations and were properly dismissed.

Section 95.11(5)(e) requires an action on this obligation to be commenced within three years from the date of the obligation.

Rowland v. Wolf · filed 1966-11-22(5)(e)

It appears that the plaintiff’s claim to these monies is barred by the statute of limitations, Section 95.11(5) (e), Florida Statutes, F.S.A., which requires that such action must be commenced within three years from the date of the obligation.

Section 95.11(5)(e) imposes a three-year limitation period on an action based on a contract, obligation, or liability not founded on a written instrument.

Imperial Apartment Hotel, Inc. v. Aronson · filed 1968-08-20(5)(e)

We hold only that the trial court committed prejudicial error when he ruled that the appellant’s claim was barred by the three-year statute of limitations.

Section 95.11(5)(e) sets a three-year limit for actions on unwritten contracts, obligations, or liabilities.

Tower v. Moskowitz · filed 1972-05-09(5)(e)

We do not find merit in the appellants' argument that the lower court erred in failing to apply a statute of limitations of § 95.11(5) (e), Fla. Stat., F.S.A. to a claim for back rent asserted in an action formerly cognizable in equity.

Section 95.11(5)(e) requires actions on obligations not founded on a written instrument to be filed within three years.

Westinghouse Credit Corp. v. GRANDOFF INVEST., INC. · filed 1974-06-12(5)(e)

Finally, it is urged by Westinghouse that in the event we should be inclined to affirm the final judgment of the trial court that the applicable statute of limitations, Section 95.11(5)(e), Florida Statutes, F.S.A.,[1] has run as to part of the claim. We agree.[2] In the light of the statute, supra, Grandoff is entitled to payment of the reasonable rental value of the 439 square feet commencing June 17, 1968, and not as the trial court calculated from August 22, 1967, the date Grandoff purchased the Ross Building, this action having been filed on June 17, 1971.

Section 95.11(3)(k) provides a four-year limitations period for an equitable action on an implied contract to recover child support expenses.

Williams v. Johnson · filed 1991-07-25(3)(k)

The applicable statute of limitations for an equitable action on an implied contract is four years. See § 95.11(3)(k), Fla. Stat. (1989).

Section 95.11(3)(k) sets a four-year limitations period for oral contract claims, and a genuine factual dispute about whether a claim is barred precludes summary judgment.

Multi-Line Claims Service, Inc. v. Cumis Insurance Society · filed 1999-07-21(3)(k)

With that in mind, the lower court erred in granting summary judgment to Cumis where Multi-Line sufficiently set forth a cause of action for breach of an oral contract, and there remains a genuine issue of fact regarding whether the claim is barred by section 95.11(3)(k), Florida Statutes (1997), the four-year statute of limitations applicable to oral contracts.

Section 95.11(3)(k) gives four years to bring an action on an oral loan payable on demand; the period begins when repayment is demanded and refused.

Mosher v. Anderson · filed 2002-04-25(3)(k)

For the reasons that follow, we approve the Second District's decision in Mason, and hold that a cause of action on an oral loan payable upon demand accrues, and the statute of limitations begins to run, at the time when demand for payment is made. ... Section 95.11(3)(k), Florida Statutes (2001), mandates that "[a] legal or equitable action on a contract, obligation, or liability not founded on a written instrument" shall be brought within four years. Thus, all agree that an action on the oral loan in this case is subject to a four-year statute of limitation.

Section 95.11(3)(k)’s four-year period for an oral contract claim begins when payment is due and refused; an earlier anticipatory repudiation does not necessarily start the period.

Banks v. Lardin · filed 2006-09-20(3)(k)

In this case, performance of the contract, i.e., payment to Banks, P.A., by Lardin, P.A., was not due until an attorney's fee was collected. When Lardin, P.A., refused to pay, the breach occurred and the cause of action accrued.

Section 95.11(3)(k) requires an action for breach of an oral contract to be filed within four years after the claim accrues.

Brooks Tropicals, Inc. v. Acosta · filed 2007-04-18(3)(k)

Actions sounding in breach of oral contract must be commenced within four years of accruing: ... In this case, the last element of Acosta's breach of contract action occurred in mid-June 1994 when the proceeds of the Benlate suit were distributed to Acosta, allegedly not in accordance with the claimed oral contract. Since the instant action was not brought until October 2000, it is barred.

Section 95.11’s five-year limitation period governs an action on a payment bond that does not meet § 713.23’s statutory requirements.

General Elec. Co. v. COMMERICIAL STAND. INSUR CO. · filed 1976-07-30

The sole issue in this appeal is whether appellant-plaintiff's cause of action is governed by the five-year statute of limitation as prescribed in Section 95.11, Florida Statutes, or by the one year statute as set out in Section 713.23, Florida Statutes. The trial judge, in dismissing plaintiff's complaint, held that the one year statute was applicable. We reverse.

Section 95.11(2)(b) gives suits on common law performance bonds a five-year limitations period without deferring accrual for latent defects.

SCHOOL BD. OF VOLUSIA v. Fidelity Co. of Md. · filed 1985-05-02(2)(b)

Although the lawsuit may have been timely as to the roofing contractor, roofing supplier, the architect and other defendants, § 95.11(3)(c), Fla. Stat. (1983),[1] it is well established that a suit on a common law performance bond[2] is an action on a "contract, obligation, or liability founded on a written instrument." § 95.11(2)(b). That period of limitations is five years. ... There is no comparable deferral of accrual of a cause of action for latent undiscovered defects in section 95.11(2)(b), unlike the four year statute of limitations found in section 95.11(3)(c).

Section 95.11(6) imposes a two year statute of limitations, and a timely motion for leave to amend with an attached amended complaint can preserve the claim against newly added defendants through relation back.

Smith v. Metropolitan Dade County · filed 1976-10-26(6)

Appellant basically contends that the filing of her motion for leave to amend along with the amended complaint tolled the two year statute of limitations and, therefore, this defense was not available to the defendant. We find this point has merit. The better rule is that a motion for leave to amend with the amended complaint attached joining additional defendants filed within the statutory period stands in the place of the actual amendment which is filed with leave of court subsequent to the running of the statute of limitations. See Rademaker v. E.D. Flynn Export Co., 17 F.2d 15 (5th Circuit 1927). Plaintiff having filed her motion for leave to join additional parties before the running of the statute of limitations, it follows that the amended complaint related back to the time of the filing of her motion to amend so as to defeat a defense based on the statute of limitations relating to the time in which an action must be filed. Cf. Galuppi v. Viele, 232 So.2d 408 (Fla.4th DCA 1970).

Section 95.11 bars an action against a new defendant added after the limitations period has run.

Golconda Corp. v. Newton · filed 1976-08-19

The statute clearly barred the action against Golconda, a new party.

Section 95.11’s two-year malpractice limitations period bars a claim against a newly added defendant when the original complaint did not name or describe that defendant and the amendment does not relate back.

Lindsey v. HH RAULERSON JR. MEM. HOSP. · filed 1987-04-08(4)(b)

After the running of the two year Statute the plaintiff sought leave to add a party. ... However, in this case there was no misnomer, rather a totally separate party was added. Here, the defendant was not named in the initial complaint by any description. ... The relation back rule, therefore, should not be applied in this case.

Section 95.11’s limitations period bars a malpractice claim against a newly added defendant when the amendment does not relate back because it adds a separate party rather than correcting a misnomer.

Lindsey v. H.H. Raulerson Junior Memorial Hospital · filed 1987-04-08

This is an appeal from a final order dismissing a malpractice claim with prejudice upon application of the Statute of Limitations. § 95.11, Fla.Stat. (1985). ... We agree with the trial court’s conclusion that this was not a mere misdescription of a party or a “misnomer.” The facts here are insufficient to support application of the relation back principle. ... The relation back rule, therefore, should not be applied in this case.

Section 95.11 does not bar a negligence action when an amended complaint correcting the defendant’s name relates back to a timely original complaint.

Schwartz v. Tampa Electric Company · filed 1991-05-23

The issue raised by the motion for judgment on the pleadings is whether Plaintiff’s action is barred by section 95.11, Florida Statutes, the applicable statute of limitations for this negligence action. ... F. Under the circumstances, it would be unjust to allow the amendment to have the effect of barring Plaintiff’s action.

Section 95.11(3) sets a four-year limitations period for negligence actions; an amendment that relates back to a complaint filed within that period is not barred.

Colandrea v. King · filed 1995-10-25(3)

The complaint was filed within the four-year limitations period set forth for negligence actions in section 95.11(3), Florida Statutes (1989). ... The proposed amended complaint in this case was clearly based upon the same occurrence between the same parties as was alleged in the original complaint. Pursuant to rule 1.190(c), the amendment related back to the date of the original pleading. Because the original complaint was filed within the statute of limitations period, the trial court erred in ruling the amendment was barred.

Section 95.11(4)(b)'s medical malpractice limitations period does not bar an amended vicarious liability claim that relates back to a timely complaint arising from the same occurrence.

Maraj v. North Broward Hosp. Dist. · filed 2008-07-30(4)(b)

We agree with plaintiffs that their vicarious liability claim as to Dr. James, added to their second amended complaint, relates back to their initial and amended complaint and thus is not defeated by the statute of limitations.

Section 95.11(3)(e) sets a four-year limit for tort actions. A new defendant added after that period cannot benefit from relation back without knowledge of the lawsuit before the period expired.

Rayner v. AIRCRAFT SPRUCE-ADVANTAGE INC. · filed 2010-06-18(3)(e)

The deadline for pursuing a cause of action sounding in tort under Florida’s four-year statute of limitations was August 18, 2005. § 95.11(3)(e), Fla. Stat. (2009). ... Our review of these cases convinces us that lack of prejudice, in this context, requires a showing that the new party had knowledge of the lawsuit prior to expiration of the statute of limitations. ... In this case, the record shows that Specialty (the distributor) was not aware of the suit against Advantage (the avionics installer), until after the statute of limitations had run.

Section 95.11(3)(n) gives forfeiture proceedings a four-year statute of limitations.

Mosley v. State Ex Rel. Broward Cty. · filed 1978-10-11(3)(n)

However, we believe the vehicle was subject to forfeiture for the heroin transaction which took place on July 21st and the mere fact that the car was not seized on that date, but eight days later, is of no consequence because the statute of limitations for forfeiture proceedings is four years. Section 95.11(3)(n) Florida Statutes (1975).

Section 95.11(3)(b)'s four-year limit extinguishes a claim to establish paternity for intestate succession four years after the claimant reaches adulthood.

Dixon v. Bellamy · filed 2018-07-25(3)(b)

Accordingly, as there is no explicit statutory language in the 2009 amendment to section 732.108(2)(b) to indicate that the Florida Legislature intended to create a new and separate cause of action that would not be subject to the statute of limitations, Bellamy’s right to establish paternity was extinguished in 1981—four years after she reached the age of maturity.

Section 95.11(3)(b) sets a four-year deadline for actions relating to determining paternity.

STATE DEPT. OF HEALTH, ETC. v. West · filed 1979-12-20(3)(b)

Accordingly, having determined that section 95.11(3)(b) is not substantially or logically related to its asserted goals, we hold section 95.11(3)(b) to be unconstitutional under our state and federal constitutions and reverse.

Section 95.11(3)(b) required paternity actions to be brought within four years, but the court held that the limitations period was not a meritorious defense because the statute was unconstitutional.

Richardson v. State, Department of Health & Rehabilitative Services ex rel. Goodrich · filed 1980-11-07(3)(b)

The only defense raised and briefed before this court was the applicability of Section 95.-ll(3)(b), Florida Statutes (1979) which required that an action relating to the determination of paternity be brought within four years. However, we note that the Supreme Court of Florida has recently struck down this statute as unconstitutional. ... In view of this holding, we conclude that the statute of limitations is not a meritorious defense to this action.

Section 95.11(3)(b)’s limitation period for a paternity action does not run during the claimant’s infancy, but can expire after the claimant reaches majority.

Garris v. Cruce · filed 1981-10-01(3)(b)

However, infants not being sui juris, the statute of limitations for initiating this paternity action, Section 95.11(3)(b), Florida Statutes, could not run against appellant during her infancy. See Commercial Building Company v. Parslow, 93 Fla. 143, 112 So. 378 (1927). Nevertheless, since appellant reached her majority on September 15, 1972, the limitation period prescribed by Section 95.11(3)(b) had run by the time she filed her suit on April 17, 1980.

Section 95.11(3)(b) gives a paternity action four years from the date the child reaches majority.

State, Department of Health & Rehabilitative Services ex rel. Sippert v. Tindall · filed 1993-07-28(3)(b)

Paternity actions are governed by a four-year statute of limitations, with the time running from the date the child reaches the age of majority.

Section 95.11(3)(b) does not bar an action to establish paternity solely for inheritance purposes.

Scruggs v. Wilson · filed 1994-06-29(3)(b)

Therefore on both statutory construction grounds and constitutional grounds we hold that section 95.11(3)(b) may not be utilized to bar appellant’s action for inheritance.

Section 95.11(3)(k) does not limit a minor child’s support claim against an unwed father; support sought in a paternity action falls under the limitations period in section 95.11(3)(b).

State, Department of Health & Rehabilitative Services v. Skinner · filed 1995-01-18(3)(b), (3)(k)

We agree with the First District’s conclusion in Fowhand v. Piper, 611 So.2d 1308,1311 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992), and hold that section 95.11(3)(k) does not limit a minor child’s claim for support from an unwed father. Ms. Braun’s action for child support was part of her action to determine the child’s paternity. Section 95.11(3)(b), Florida Statutes (1991), provides a four-year limitations period for “an action relating to the determination of paternity, with the time running from the date the child reaches the age of majority.” The issue of child support is intertwined with the issue of paternity and is therefore encom*283passed in section 95.11(3)(b).

Section 95.11(3)(b) applies to paternity adjudications brought in probate to establish inheritance rights.

Wilson v. Scruggs · filed 1996-07-18(3)(b)

However, the fact that paternity may be adjudicated in the course of probate proceedings does not mean that section 95.11(3)(b) is inapplicable to such proceedings. To the contrary, the reasoning of the court below ignores the plain language of section 95.11(3)(b), which states that it applies to an “action relating to the determination of paternity.” Clearly, an adjudication under section 732.108(2)(b) is an action relating to the determination of paternity.

Section 95.11(3)(b)’s four-year limitation applies to a probate proceeding under section 732.108(2)(a) to establish paternal lineage.

Thurston v. Thurston · filed 2000-12-15(3)(b)

We agree with the trial court that a proceeding under section 732.108(2)(a) is an action relating to paternity to which section 95.11(3)(b) applies.

Once the time to commence an action under § 95.11(3)(a) has expired, the action cannot be abated for later revival.

Dukanauskas v. Metropolitan Dade County · filed 1979-12-18(3)(a)

This is in accord with the general rule that abatement of an action is proper only where the cause of action is not extinguished and thus capable of revival. 1 Am.Jur.2d Abatement, Survival and Revival, § 125. In this case, the time within which an action may be commenced has expired. See § 95.11(3)(a), Fla. Stat. (1977).

Section 95.11(6) permits laches to bar an action before the applicable limitations period expires only where strong equities support it.

Goodwin v. Blu Murray Ins. Agency, Inc. · filed 2006-09-15(6)

The court also erred in applying laches to bar Goodwin's recovery of renewal commission shortages. Section 95.11(6), Florida Statutes (2002), provides: Laches shall bar any action unless it is commenced within the time provided for legal actions concerning the same subject matter regardless of lack of knowledge by the person sought to be held liable that the person alleging liability would assert his or her rights and whether the person sought to be held liable is injured or prejudiced by the delay. This subsection shall not affect application of laches at an earlier time in accordance with law. ... Laches may be applied before the statute of limitations expires only where strong equities, not present here, appear.

Section 95.11(3)(c) provides the limitations period for products liability actions.

Loughan v. The Firestone Tire & Rubber Company · filed 1980-08-22(3)(c)

With this gloss on Bauld before it, of which the court below did not have the benefit, and dealing with admittedly common law causes of action, the transferror court, applying Ohio’s choice of law rule, would have looked to its two-year statute of limitations rather than to the Florida truncated statute. The Florida court was obligated to do likewise.

Section 95.11(2)(b) sets a five-year limit for actions on written contracts, including a Florida action on notes executed and defaulted in Georgia.

Strauss v. Sillin · filed 1981-02-18(2)(b)

The Florida statute of limitations for bringing an action on a contract founded on a written instrument provides that the action must be brought within five years. § 95.11(2)(b), Fla. Stat. (1978). ... We agree with Strauss that Brown v. Case controls and requires reversal. ... In conflict of laws situations, matters of procedure are generally resolved by the law of the state in which the action has been instituted.

Section 95.11(3) provides a four-year limitations period and is treated as procedural under Maryland choice-of-law rules.

Rockstroh v. AH Robins Co., Inc. · filed 1985-02-20(3)

Since § 95.11(3) is similar in concept to the Maryland statute, it is clear that the Florida statute would be characterized under Maryland law as procedural as is the Maryland statute itself.

Section 95.11 does not bar a claim arising in another state when that state has the more significant relationship to the claim and the claim is timely there.

ROBINSON BY HARGIS v. Merkle · filed 1997-09-19

Although Bates involved the application of Florida's borrowing statute, section 95.10, we read the language in Bates to be applicable to any conflict of law question concerning a statute of limitation, including section 95.11, Florida Statutes (1993). Thus, we believe Florida's statute of limitations should not be used to bar a cause of action which arose in another state or territory when that state or territory has the more significant relationship to the cause of action, and the action is not barred in the foreign state.

Section 95.11(4)(b)'s medical malpractice time limit does not bar a claim when the state with the most significant relationship to the parties and occurrence has a limitations law that permits it.

Merkle v. Robinson · filed 1999-07-08(4)(b)

We see no reason to refrain from employing the "significant relationship" test to conflict of law issues concerning limitation periods generally, thereby treating conflicts of law pertaining to section 95.11 consistently with conflicts concerning substantive law and with conflicting limitations periods affected by the borrowing statute.

The significant relationship test determines whether section 95.11 or another jurisdiction's limitations period applies.

Fulton County Adm'r v. Sullivan · filed 1999-11-24

In Robinson, we answered a certified question and held that the "significant relationship" test for use in applying section 95.10, Florida Statutes (1997) (borrowing statute), also applies to the determination of whether to apply Florida's statute of limitations, section 95.11, Florida Statutes (1997), or the limitations period of another jurisdiction. ... Under Robinson, we now find that the Georgia statute of limitations applies because, as the trial court found in this case, the circumstances underlying this case have the most significant relationship to the State of Georgia.

Section 95.11(3)(a) provides a four-year limitations period for negligence claims, which applies when Florida has the more significant relationship to the injury and the parties.

Tune v. Philip Morris Incorporated · filed 2000-07-14(3)(a)

Compare N.J. Stat. Ann. 2A:14-2 (1997) (two-year statute of limitations for negligence claims) with § 95.11(3)(a), Fla. Stat. (1997) (four-year statute of limitations for negligence claims). ... Overall, Florida clearly has the more significant relationships with this lawsuit as to the issue of statute of limitations and is fully justified in following the statute of limitations established by its own legislature.

Section 95.11(2)(b) gives an insured five years to bring a claim for uninsured motorist benefits against the insurer because the claim arises from the insurance contract.

Burnett v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. · filed 1982-01-20(2)(b)

That the uninsured motorist stands in a tort relationship to appellant does not change the fact the action below arose out of an insurance contract between the parties. Thus, only the five-year limitation period specified by section 95.11(2)(b) applies.

Section 95.11 allows four years for negligence claims and five years for uninsured motorist claims; expiration of the negligence period does not bar recovery of uninsured motorist benefits.

Lewis v. Allstate Ins. Co. · filed 1995-08-31(3)(a), (2)(b)

Since appellants had the legal right to recover damages from the tortfeasors at the time of the accident, it appears the expiration of the limitations period as to the tortfeasors does not bar their right to recover UM benefits.

Section 95.11(3)(a) sets a four-year limit for bodily injury actions; expiration of that period against a tortfeasor does not bar an insured's claim for uninsured motorist benefits.

Robinson v. Auto Owners Ins. Co. · filed 1998-10-16(3)(a)

Section 95.11(3)(a), Florida Statutes (1995), imposes a four-year limitation on the commencement of bodily injury actions. ... Moreover, the expiration of the limitations period as to the tortfeasor, a procedural defense, does not bar an insured's right to recover UM benefits.

Section 95.11(2)(b)’s five-year limitations period applies to uninsured motorist claims arising from an insurance contract; waiver and estoppel do not prevent its assertion on these facts.

Schultz v. Amica Mutual Insurance · filed 2001-01-24(2)(b)

Appellants Paula and Alexander Schultz appeal a summary final judgment entered in favor of Arnica Mutual Insurance Company on the ground that their uninsured motorist claim was barred by the statute of limitations. We affirm. ... Finally, the doctrines of waiver and estoppel do not prevent Arnica from raising a statute of limitations defense.

Section 95.11’s five-year limit for actions on written contracts and two-year limit for wage claims do not govern an action to set aside an arbitration award.

Harper v. Continental Can Co. · filed 1982-03-31(2)(b), (4)(c)

The trial judge was correct in ruling that this action was time-barred, since it was not filed within the 90 day limitations period provided by section 682.13, Florida Statutes (1981), a provision of the Florida Arbitration Code relating to petitions to vacate arbitration awards, which statute more specifically applies to this action than the 5 year statute of limitation provided by section 95.11(2)(b), Florida Statutes (1981), relating to “a legal or equitable action on a contract, obligation, or liability founded on a written instrument.” Section 95.11(4)(c), Florida Statutes (1981), which imposes a 2 year limitation on “an action to recover wages or overtime or damages or penalties concerning payment of wages and overtime” does not apply, regardless of whether appellants were hourly employees paid with wages or salaried employees.

Section 95.11(3)’s four-year period for tort actions does not govern an employee’s suit challenging the disposition of a labor grievance.

Sanders v. Grand Union Co. · filed 1982-06-21(3)

Plaintiff maintains, however, that this action is controlled by the four-year statute applicable to suits founded upon tort, which statute is found in Fla.Stat. § 95.11(3) (1981). ... This Court concurs with the reasoning expressed in Fields and will, therefore, render summary judgment against plaintiff herein on the grounds that his suit is time-barred under Florida’s ninety-day statutory period for actions to vacate arbitration awards.

Section 95.11(2)(a) gives a party five years to bring an action on another state's judgment or decree; a later arrearages judgment is not barred merely because the earlier support order is barred.

Winland v. Winland · filed 1982-07-09(2)(a)

That statute requires that an action on a judgment or decree of another state must be commenced within five years. ... We agree with the husband, however, that the 1972 Ohio order is barred by Florida's statute of limitation or laches. Accordingly, we reverse the final judgment to the extent that it established the 1972 order as a Florida judgment. ... That order clearly is not barred by section 95.11(2)(a). We reject the husband's argument that the 1981 order should be barred because the 1972 order is barred.

Section 95.11(2)(a) applies to domestication actions for both foreign state and foreign federal judgments.

Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Panelfab Intern. Corp. · filed 1987-01-27(2)(a)

Moreover, both state and federal foreign judgments are equally enforceable in Florida through a domestication action under Section 95.11(2)(a), Florida Statutes (1985).

Section 95.11(2)(a) allows five years to bring an action on another state's judgment, including an action against an alleged alter ego of the judgment debtor.

Turner Murphy v. SPEC. CONSTRUCT. · filed 1995-08-28(2)(a)

Like the proceedings on Count I, proceedings on Count II comprise an "action on a judgment or decree of any court ... of ... any other state or territory in the United States." § 95.11(2)(a), Fla. Stat. (1991). Because Turner Murphy filed within five years of November 16, 1987, these proceedings commenced within the time allowed by the statute of limitations.

Section 95.11(1) allows a judgment creditor to start a new limitations period by bringing an action on the judgment and obtaining a new judgment before the existing period expires.

Adams v. Adams · filed 1997-03-12(1)

In Crane v. Nuta, 157 Fla. 613, 26 So.2d 670 (1946), the court held that a judgment, whether domestic or foreign, constitutes a cause of action upon which a new and independent action may be based, citing to section 95.11(1), Florida Statutes, on limitations of actions on judgments. ... "[I]f the statute of limitation period has almost run on the judgment ... the judgment creditor can start the limitation period anew by bringing an action upon the judgment and obtaining a new judgment." Koerber v. Middlesex College, 136 Vt. 4, 383 A.2d 1054, 1057 (1978). We agree with the pronouncement of the Vermont court.

Section 95.11’s five-year limit for actions on foreign judgments does not bar registration under the UFMJRA; the twenty-year limit applicable to Florida judgments governs.

Le Credit Lyonnais, SA v. Nadd · filed 1999-09-10(1), (2)(a)

For the reasons stated in this opinion, we conclude that the twenty-year statute is the applicable bar to recording and enforcing a foreign country's judgment under the UFMJRA. ... Accordingly, we hold that Florida's five-year statute of limitations directed at actions brought on judgments of foreign countries, does not apply to the registration, filing or recording of a foreign judgment pursuant to the UFMJRA, and that the applicable statute of limitations are the ones pertinent to Florida's domestic judgments.

Section 95.11(2)(a) does not treat postjudgment garnishment or registration of a federal judgment under 28 U.S.C.A. § 1963 as an action on a judgment subject to its five-year limit.

Burshan v. NATIONAL UNION FIRE INS. COMPANY OF PITTSBURGH, PA. · filed 2001-08-08(2)(a)

We, therefore, hold that neither the 1999 garnishment proceeding nor the 1993 registration of the judgment under 28 U.S.C.A. § 1963 was an "action on a judgment" within the meaning of section 95.11(2)(a).

Section 95.11(2) applies its five-year limit to a counterclaim seeking recognition and enforcement of an out-of-state judgment.

Caiazza v. Tuff Realty Corp. · filed 2001-11-16(2)

We have no difficulty in concluding that Appellants’ counterclaim is an “action on a judgment” as that term is used in section 95.11(2). As such, we conclude, as did the trial judge, that Appellants’ counterclaim was untimely under section 95.11(2).

Section 95.11 does not limit recognition of a foreign money judgment, but subsection (1) gives a creditor twenty years to bring an action to enforce it after registration and recognition.

Nadd v. Le Credit Lyonnais, SA · filed 2001-11-21(1)

Therefore, in answer to the first certified question, we hold the only limitation applicable to the recognition of a foreign money judgment is that the judgment be enforceable where rendered; Florida's statute of limitations does not affect the recognition portion of a UFMJRA action. In answer to the second certified question, we hold that the twenty-year period contained in section 95.11(1) should be applied to actions brought to enforce a foreign judgment once it has become domesticated through the registration and recognition phase of the UFMJRA.

Section 95.11(2)(a) sets a five-year period for an action to enforce a judgment from another state that has not been domesticated in Florida.

New York State Dept. of Taxation v. Patafio · filed 2002-10-25(2)(a)

The twenty year limitation period set forth in section 95.11(1) applies to actions seeking to enforce a foreign judgment only after such judgment had been domesticated in Florida pursuant to the applicable statutes. Because that is not the case here, we conclude, as did the trial court, that the five-year limitation period set forth in section 95.11(2)(a) applies.

Section 95.11(2)(a) applies to independent actions on a judgment, but not to recording a foreign judgment or enforcing it under the Florida Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act.

Michael v. Valley Trucking Co., Inc. · filed 2002-12-04(2)(a)

The re-recording in 2000 was not prohibited by the statute of limitations in section 95.11(2)(a), because that section applies only to independent actions on a judgment and not to the recording of a foreign judgment and proceedings to enforce that judgment under the FEFJA.

Section 95.11(2) bars an action to enforce an undomesticated foreign divorce decree in Florida when the limitations period has expired.

In Re Estate of Tensfeldt · filed 2003-01-15(2)

Because the Wisconsin decree is a foreign decree, never domesticated in Florida, the statute of limitations barred any action to enforce the decree in this state.

Section 95.11(2)(a) provides a five-year limitations period for an action to enforce undomesticated judgments from another state, including the tax warrants at issue here.

NY STATE DEPT. OF TAX. AND FIN. v. Klein · filed 2003-07-09(2)(a)

By the very terms of the statute, the twenty-year limitation period applies to actions seeking to enforce a foreign judgment after it has been domesticated under the applicable statutes. In Patafio and in the instant case, the New York judgments were not domesticated in Florida. ... The trial court's conclusion that the five-year statute of limitation applies was correct; however, as in Patafio the pleadings in the instant case do not conclusively demonstrate when the New York State Department of Taxation and Finance's action accrued or if it was tolled at any time after the commencement of the five-year period.

Section 95.11(2)(a) imposes a five-year limit on actions upon foreign judgments, but does not apply to recording or enforcing a foreign judgment under the FEFJA.

Haigh v. Planning Bd. of Town of Medfield · filed 2006-11-03(2)(a)

Actions on foreign judgments are subject to the five year statute of limitation in section 95.11(2)(a). Caiazza v. Tuff Realty Corp., 805 So.2d 29, 31 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001). However, simply recording a foreign judgment or proceeding to enforce a foreign judgment under the FEFJA is not subject to section 95.11(2)(a). Michael v. Valley Trucking Co., 832 So.2d 213, 216 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002).

Section 95.11’s five-year limit on actions involving foreign judgments does not apply to recording a foreign judgment under the Florida Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act.

NEW YORK STATE COM'R OF TAXATION v. Friona · filed 2005-05-11(2)(a)

Section 95.11 simply does not apply when a judgment creditor opts to domesticate its foreign judgment under FEFJA rather than immediately enforce it under another subsection.