Fla. Stat. § 542.335

Section 542.335 applies prospectively and does not govern the enforceability of restrictive covenants entered into before July 1, 1996.

Diaz v. John Adcock Insurance Agency · filed 1999-03-19(3)

The new statute is not applicable to this case, however, because subsection (3) provides that “[tjhis act shall apply prospectively, and it shall not apply in actions determining the enforceability of restrictive covenants entered into before July 1,1996.”

Section 542.335 applies to restrictive covenants entered into on or after July 1, 1996, but not to actions determining the enforceability of covenants entered into before that date.

Tri-County Sweeping Services, Inc. v. Lawson · filed 2000-05-31(3)

This case concerns the enforcement of a covenant not to compete entered into in 1997. The trial court found that the covenant was “void as a matter of law pursuant to § 542.33[,]Contracts in restraint of trade valid, Florida Statutes.” Effective July 1, 1996, section 542.33 was repealed. Section 542.335, Florida Statutes (1999), became effective on July 1, 1996; section 542.335(3) provides that the act applies prospectively, but not “in actions determining the enforceability of restrictive covenants entered into before July 1, 1996.”

Section 542.335(1)(f) applies only to noncompete agreements entered into after July 1, 1996.

Corporate Exp. Office Products, Inc. v. Phillips · filed 2003-04-17(1)(f)

Section 542.335(1)(f) applies only to noncompete agreements entered into after July 1, 1996.

Section 542.335 applies only to actions determining the enforceability of restrictive covenants entered into after July 1, 1996.

Cooper v. THOMAS CRAIG & COMPANY, LLP · filed 2005-07-22(3)

The parties correctly recognize that section 542.335, Florida Statutes, does not apply. That section applies only to actions determining the enforceability of restrictive covenants entered into after July 1, 1996.

Section 542.335 permits an otherwise valid restrictive covenant to bind the buyer of a business or corporate shares.

Henao v. Professional Shoe Repair, Inc. · filed 2006-05-26(1)

A restrictive covenant which otherwise satisfies the dictates of the statute is not unenforceable because it constitutes a restraint on the buyer of a business or shares of a corporation.

Section 542.335(1)(a) does not apply to real property covenants running with the land.

Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc. v. Dolgencorp, Inc. · filed 2007-09-19(1)(a)

When read in context with the other provisions of section 542.335, subsection (1)(a)'s reference to "a restrictive covenant" does not include real property covenants running with the land.

Section 542.335(1)(a) requires an anti-competitive agreement to be in a writing signed by the person against whom enforcement is sought.

Mobile Shelter Systems USA, Inc. v. Grate Pallet Solutions, LLC · filed 2012-01-14(1)(a)

That statute prohibits courts from enforcing an anti-competitive agreement “unless it is set forth in a writing signed by the person against whom enforcement is sought.” Fla. Stat. § 542.335(l)(a). Plaintiffs attempt to circumvent this requirement of Florida law is not well taken.

Section 542.335(1)(a) does not apply to real property covenants running with the land.

Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc. v. Dolgencorp, LLC · filed 2014-03-05(1)(a)

But the covenants here ran with the land and section 542.335 does not apply.

Section 542.335 does not apply to a training-cost repayment agreement that leaves the employee free to work elsewhere and does not restrict competition.

McFalls v. NCH Healthcare System, Inc. · filed 2024-01-10

It is unclear how a court could properly conduct § 542.335 analysis to an agreement like the one at issue here.

Section 542.335 permits enforcement of a written noncompete that protects a legitimate business interest and is reasonable in time, geographic scope, and line of business.

Bartelt Packaging Limited Liability Company v. Graves · filed 2024-01-29

The Agreement is in writing, reasonable in time, geography (as modified by the Court), and line of business, and formed to protect a legitimate business interest. It is enforceable.

Section 542.335 presumes a restraint lasting more than two years unreasonable; without evidence rebutting that presumption, it cannot be enforced beyond two years.

Balasco v. Gulf Auto Holding, Inc. · filed 1998-03-04(1)(d)1.

Section 542.335(1)(d)1., Florida Statutes (Supp.1996), provides that "[i]n determining the reasonableness in time... a court shall presume reasonable in time any restraint 6 months or less in duration and shall presume unreasonable in time any restraint more than 2 years in duration." The agreement under consideration here restricts employee solicitation for thirty-six months after Balasco's separation date; therefore, the three-year restriction is presumptively unreasonable. Because we find no evidence in the record to rebut this presumption, the agreement shall not be enforceable for more than two years following Balasco's separation from the Courtesy dealership.

Section 542.335(1)(a) requires a restrictive covenant to be in a signed writing; an injunction cannot extend the restriction to activity the writing does not cover.

Coastal Loading v. Tile Roof Loading · filed 2005-08-19(1)(a)

Thus, in conjunction with the closing, the parties reached a specific, written agreement as to the scope of the restriction, and the Noncompete Agreement makes no mention of roof tile hauling as being part of the restriction. See § 542.335(1)(a), Fla. Stat. (2003) ("A court shall not enforce a restrictive covenant unless it is set forth in writing signed by the person against whom enforcement is sought."). ... Because the covenant not to compete that is contained in the Noncompete Agreement only restricts the Seller and the Williamsons from engaging in the business of roof tile loading, which is distinct from the business of roof tile hauling, the trial court erred in entering a temporary injunction that prohibited roof tile hauling.

Section 542.335(1)(d)1 presumes a restraint longer than two years unreasonable; without evidence rebutting that presumption, an injunction cannot exceed two years.

Advantage Digital Sys., Inc. v. DIGITAL IMAG. SERV., INC. · filed 2003-12-03(1)(d)1

Although the agreements themselves contemplated a five-year period, section 542.335(1)(d)1 contains a presumption that a restraint in excess of two years is unreasonable. Where no evidence rebuts this presumption, it is error to enter an injunction in excess of two years.

Section 542.335(1)(e)'s five-year period is unavailable when the party seeking an injunction abandons its trade-secrets claim.

Zodiac Records Inc. v. Choice Environmental Services · filed 2013-04-17(1)(e)

After stipulating that it did not have to prove that Piccinonna stole trade secrets, Choice could not then contend that the five-year term of section 542.335(l)(e) was applicable.

Section 542.335(1)(c) permits enforcement of the full agreed non-compete period when entry of an enforceable injunction is delayed, provided the restraint is reasonably necessary to protect a legitimate business interest.

Anakarli Boutique, Inc. v. Ortiz · filed 2014-11-26(1)(c)

Where there has been a delay in the entry of a non-compete injunction enforceable under section 542.335(1)(c)2, the party seeking to...enforce the non-compete clause is entitled to receive the benefit of its bargain, which is the enforcement of the full non-compete period specified in the agreement between the parties.

Section 542.335(1) does not invalidate a lease exclusivity provision for unreasonable duration when the evidence supports its length.

Amelia Island Restaurant II, Inc. v. Omni Amelia Island, LLC · filed 2015-04-22(1)

We also conclude that section 542.335, Florida Statutes, does not require invalidation of the Lease’s exclusivity provision. ... In view of the Lease’s characteristics, even if section 542.335(1) applies to the exclusivity provision here as Omni insists, there is no evidentiary support for the conclusion that the restrictive covenant is not “reasonable in time.”

Section 542.335(1)(c) entitles a party enforcing a noncompete agreement to the full agreed period when entry of the injunction has been delayed.

2D14-4561 / Florida Digestive Health Specialists, LLP. v. Colina · filed 2016-09-07(1)(c)

We note that although the issue of the effective date of an injunction to be entered on remand from an appeal was not before this court when we issued the opinion in this case, our mandate necessarily subsumed the existing law that "[w]here there has been a delay in the entry of a non-compete injunction enforceable under section 542.335(1)(c), the party seeking to enforce the non-compete clause is entitled to . . . the enforcement of the full non-compete period specified in the agreement between the parties." Anakarli Boutique, Inc. v. Ortiz, 152 So. 3d 107, 109 (Fla. 4th DCA 2014) (footnote omitted) (citing § 542.335(1)(c), Fla. Stat. (2012)); ... The two-year injunctive period shall commence on the date the order is entered on remand.

Section 542.335(1)(d) presumes a restraint against a former franchisee reasonable if it lasts one year or less and unreasonable if it lasts more than three years.

Bernardin · filed 2026-03-27(1)(d)

In Florida, a noncompete provision against a former franchisee warrants a presumption that “any restraint 1 year or less” is reasonable and that “any restraint more than 3 years in duration” is unreasonable. ... Florida courts tend to uphold two-year restrictions, which fall between the two presumptions.

Specialized training and confidential business information can create a fact question about whether a restriction longer than two years overcomes the presumption of unreasonableness.

Crom, LLC v. Preload, LLC · filed 2019-03-31(1)(d)

Also, even if the programs are not trade secrets but are confidential business information, restricting Bacon's use of her highly specialized PCT design training, which was not available through her education but only through Crom, and her knowledge of Crom's confidential information, to benefit a direct PCT competitor could be sufficient to justify rebut the two-year presumption. Thus, there is a question of fact as to the reasonableness of the length of the restriction.

Section 542.335(1)(e) presumes a five-year post-term confidentiality clause reasonable to the extent it protects trade secrets.

K3 Enterprises, Inc. v. Sasowski · filed 2022-08-07(1)(e)

Thus, to the extent that the five-year confidentiality clause is predicated upon protecting trade secrets, the Court presumes it is reasonable pursuant to Section 542.335(1)(e).

Section 542.335(1)(d)(3) presumes a postterm noncompete of three years or less reasonable when it is tied to the sale of business assets.

Head Kandy LLC v. McNeill · filed 2023-11-07(1)(d)(3)

Consequently, the Court finds the non-compete provision presumptively reasonable in duration under section 542.335(1)(d)(3).

Section 542.335(1)(j)'s presumption of irreparable injury from violating an enforceable restrictive covenant is rebuttable.

Don King Productions, Inc. v. Chavez · filed 1998-09-15(1)(j)

This case involves the interpretation of section 542.335(1)(j), Florida Statutes (1997), and whether the statutory presumption of irreparable injury where a valid contract restricting competition is breached is a conclusive one or a rebuttable one. We hold that it is a rebuttable presumption and affirm the trial court's denial of a temporary injunction.

Section 542.335(j) creates a rebuttable presumption of irreparable injury when a party proves a violation of an enforceable restrictive covenant.

AMERICA II ELECTRONICS INC. v. Smith · filed 2002-11-20(j)

Under section 542.335(j), Florida Statutes (2001), a party seeking to enforce a restrictive covenant by injunction need not directly prove that the defendant's specific activities will cause irreparable injury if not enjoined. Rather, the statute provides that "[t]he violation of an enforceable restrictive covenant creates a presumption of irreparable injury to the person seeking enforcement of a restrictive covenant." Here, the record reflects that America II's evidence was sufficient to prove a violation of an enforceable restrictive covenant under section 542.335. Therefore, its evidence was sufficient to create a rebuttable presumption of irreparable injury for purposes of obtaining an injunction under section 542.335(j).

Section 542.335(1)(j) creates a rebuttable presumption of irreparable injury when an enforceable restrictive covenant is violated.

JonJuan Salon, Inc. v. Acosta · filed 2006-03-22(1)(j)

"The violation of an enforceable restrictive covenant creates a presumption of irreparable injury to the person seeking enforcement of a restrictive covenant." § 542.335(1)(j), Fla. Stat. ... Of course, the presumption of irreparable injury is rebuttable.

Section 542.335(1)(j)'s presumption of irreparable injury includes potential harm to customer relationships and confidential client information, even when some monetary losses are ascertainable.

Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co. v. Hausinger · filed 2006-05-05(1)(j)

In our view, the trial court misunderstood the statutory presumption. It is true that money damages were ascertainable as to some clients that Mr. Hausinger admittedly solicited. But the harm presumed under the statute includes the potential damage to VALIC's longstanding relationships with its customers and the protection of confidential client information.

Section 542.335(1)(j) creates a rebuttable presumption of irreparable injury when an enforceable restrictive covenant is violated.

Litwinczuk v. Palm Beach Cardiovascular Clinic, LC · filed 2006-10-18(1)(j)

Section 542.335(1)(j) states, in part: "The violation of an enforceable restrictive covenant creates a presumption of irreparable injury to the person seeking enforcement of a restrictive covenant." This presumption is rebuttable, not conclusive.

Section 542.335(1)(j) gives a party seeking to enforce a covenant not to compete a presumption of irreparable injury if it shows that the covenant protects a legitimate business interest and was violated.

Walsh v. Paw Trucking, Inc. · filed 2006-11-22(1)(j)

Section 542.335(1)(j) provides that "[t]he violation of an enforceable restrictive covenant creates a presumption of irreparable injury to the person seeking enforcement of a restrictive covenant." ... Therefore, to benefit from the presumption of irreparable injury, the party seeking to enforce a covenant not to compete must show that the covenant protects a legitimate business interest as defined by section 542.335(1)(b) and that the covenant was violated.

Section 542.335(1)(j) creates a presumption of irreparable injury when an enforceable restrictive covenant is violated.

IC Systems, Inc. v. Oliff · filed 2002-08-21(1)(j)

The violation of an enforceable restrictive covenant not only creates a presumption of irreparable injury,[4] if it involves misappropriation of trade secrets the legislature has expressly authorized the complainant to seek both injunctive relief and damages.[5]See also Information Tech. and Eng'g Corp. v. Reno, 813 So.2d 1053 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002)(alleged breach of employment contract, providing for both injunctive relief and arbitration, allowed court to retain jurisdiction over count requesting injunction while compelling arbitration on other counts involving tort claims).

Section 542.335(1)(j)'s presumption of irreparable harm is rebuttable.

H & M HEARING ASSOCIATES, LLC v. Nobile · filed 2007-03-02(1)(j)

However, the presumption of irreparable harm is rebuttable.

Section 542.335 presumes irreparable harm from a violation of a compliant noncompete or nonsolicitation covenant once a legitimate business interest is shown, but the defendant may rebut that presumption.

Continental Group, Inc. v. KW Property Management, LLC · filed 2009-04-22(1)(j)

For violations of a covenant not to compete or solicit in compliance with Florida Statutes Section 542.335, upon a showing of legitimate business interest as in this case, irreparable harm is presumed, though Defendants can rebut this presumption.

Section 542.335(1)(j) presumes irreparable injury from the violation of an enforceable restrictive covenant; the presumption does not apply without a showing that the covenant is likely enforceable and was violated.

GPS INDUSTRIES, LLC v. Lewis · filed 2010-03-01(1)(j)

Florida law provides that “[t]he violation of an enforceable restrictive covenant creates a presumption of irreparable injury to the person seeking enforcement of a restrictive covenant.” Fla. Stat. § 542.335(1)(j) (emphasis added). As detailed above, GPSI has not shown a substantial likelihood of success as to whether its restrictive covenants are enforceable or as to Lewis’s violations of those restrictive covenants. Therefore, no presumption of irreparable injury exists on this record.

A violation of an enforceable restrictive covenant creates a rebuttable presumption of irreparable injury.

Atomic Tattoos, LLC v. Morgan · filed 2010-09-10(1)(j)

“The violation of an enforceable restrictive covenant creates a presumption of irreparable injury to the person seeking enforcement of a restrictive covenant.” § 542.335(l)(j). Morgan does not challenge the reasonableness of the limitations provided in the covenant; it is undisputed that Morgan opened up Saints & Scholars within seven miles from Atomic Tattoos and less than a year after his termination from Atomic Tattoos. The presumption that Atomic Tattoos suffered irreparable harm as a result of Morgan’s violation of the restrictive covenant has not been rebutted. See § 542.335(l)(j).

Section 542.335(1)(j) presumes irreparable injury when a restrictive covenant is violated.

Avalon Legal Information Services, Inc. v. Keating · filed 2013-03-08(1)(j)

According to section 542.335(l)(j), Florida Statutes, Schneider’s violation of the restrictive covenant created a presumption of irreparable injury to Keating.

Section 542.335(1)(j) creates a rebuttable presumption of irreparable injury when an enforceable restrictive covenant is violated.

Medco Data, LLC v. Bailey · filed 2014-11-26(1)(j)

Subsection (l)(j) specifically addresses temporary injunctions and provides in relevant part that “[t]he violation of an enforceable restrictive covenant creates a presumption of irreparable injury to the person seeking enforcement of a restrictive covenant.” The burden is rebut-table but must be applied to enforceable restrictive covenants that have been violated.

Section 542.335(1)(j) creates a rebuttable presumption of irreparable injury when a party seeks to enforce a restrictive covenant by temporary injunction.

Allied Universal Corp. v. Given · filed 2017-03-15(1)(j)

As such, Allied’s evidence was sufficient to create a rebuttable presumption of irreparable injury for purposes of obtaining a temporary injunction under section 542.335(j).

Section 542.335(1)(j) presumes irreparable injury from the violation of an enforceable restrictive covenant when a party seeks an injunction.

Data Payment Systems v. Caso · filed 2018-08-01(1)(j)

Thus, it appears that the trial court erred by not employing the statutory presumption of irreparable harm dictated by section 542.335(1)(j), which requires consideration of whether the subject agreements are lawful and enforceable.

Section 542.335(1)(j) presumes irreparable injury when an enforceable restrictive covenant is violated.

U.S. Security Associates, Inc. v. Campos · filed 2020-05-13(1)(j)

Pursuant to Fla. Stat. § 542.335(1)(j), “the violation of an enforceable restrictive covenant creates a presumption of irreparable injury to the person seeking enforcement of a restrictive covenant.” ... The Defendants’ use of Plaintiff’s confidential business information, including client information, operational details, and pricing information, as well as the Defendants’ interference with Plaintiff’s relationships with its clients, constitutes irreparable harm to Plaintiff’s legitimate business interests.

A violation of an enforceable restrictive covenant creates a rebuttable presumption of irreparable injury when the covenant protects a legitimate business interest.

URGELLES v. COMBINED INSURANCE COMPANY OF AMERICA · filed 2021-03-24(1)(j)

Subsection 542.335(1)(j) provides, in relevant part, that “[t]he violation of an enforceable restrictive covenant creates a presumption of irreparable injury to the person seeking enforcement of a restrictive covenant.” ... Combined established, and the trial court found, that its restrictive covenants sought to protect trade secrets, confidential information, specialized training, and goodwill with policyholders. Appellants failed to rebut that presumption.

Section 542.335(1)(j) presumes irreparable injury from the violation of a valid restrictive covenant; that presumption does not extend to a trade secret misappropriation claim on its own.

Castellano Cosmetic Surgery Center, P.A. v. Doyle · filed 2021-07-28(1)(j)

Under Florida law, there is a statutory presumption of irreparable injury stemming from the violation of a valid restrictive covenant. ... But neither FUTSA nor DTSA contains the same statutory presumption that the restrictive covenant statute does, and the Court may not read one into the statute where the text does not provide one.

Section 542.335(1)(j) creates a rebuttable presumption of irreparable injury when an enforceable restrictive covenant is violated.

GFA INTERNATIONAL, INC. v. TRILLAS · filed 2021-09-01(1)(j)

At the evidentiary hearing, GFA established the violations of the restrictive covenants by competent, substantial evidence, raising a statutory presumption of irreparable injury. That presumption was not rebutted by any evidence in the record.

Section 542.335(1)(j) creates a rebuttable presumption of irreparable injury when a restrictive covenant is violated.

E-Telequote Insurance, Inc. v. Mayberry · filed 2023-05-18(1)(j)

Under Florida law, the violation of a restrictive covenant creates a rebuttable presumption of irreparable injury. Fla. Stat. § 542.335(1)(j). Given that Plaintiff has demonstrated a substantial likelihood of success on the merits, there exists a rebuttable presumption of irreparable injury.

Section 542.335(1)(j) provides a rebuttable presumption of irreparable injury when a party shows a likelihood of success in enforcing a restrictive covenant.

Mainsail Parent, LLC v. Jewell · filed 2024-08-26(1)(j)

Under Florida law, because Plaintiffs have shown a likelihood of success on their breach-of-contract claims, they are also entitled to a rebuttable presumption of irreparable injury. See Proudfoot Consulting Co. v. Gordon, 576 F.3d 1223, 1231 (11th Cir. 2009) (citing Fla. Stat. § 542.335(1)(j)).

Section 542.335(1)(j) presumes irreparable harm from the violation of an enforceable restrictive covenant.

PIRTEK USA, LLC v. Lager · filed 2022-08-11(1)(j)

The statute creates a presumption of irreparable harm resulting from the violation of an enforceable restrictive covenant.

Section 542.335(1)(j) creates a rebuttable presumption of irreparable injury when an enforceable restrictive covenant is violated; the defendant bears the burden of rebutting it.

North American Products Corp. v. Moore · filed 2002-04-02(1)(j)

Thus, once the party requesting enforcement of the restrictive covenant establishes one or more “legitimate business interests” justifying the restriction, irreparable injury must be presumed by the Court and the burden shifts to the defendant to establish the absence of such injury.

Section 542.335(1)(j) presumes irreparable injury when an enforceable restrictive covenant is violated, shifting the burden to the respondent to show an absence of injury.

Transunion Risk and Alternative Data Solutions, Inc. v. Reilly · filed 2015-12-02(1)(j)

Once the party seeking to enforce the covenant establishes that it is entitled to the presumption of irreparable injury, “the statute shifts the burden to the respondent to establish the absence of injury.” DePuy Orthopaedics, Inc. v. Waxman, 95 So. 3d 928, 939 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012). As the trial court’s ruling was issued before Reilly presented any evidence, Reilly could not have met his burden of presenting evidence overcoming the presumption.

Section 542.335(1)(j) presumes irreparable injury when an enforceable restrictive covenant is violated; a defendant must show an absence of injury to rebut that presumption.

Smart Pharmacy, Inc. v. Viccari · filed 2016-05-31(1)(j)

Here, Smart Pharmacy was entitled to a presumption of irreparable harm based on Viccari’s violation of his noncompete agreement, and the presumption was not rebutted because it was undisputed that Smart Pharmacy lost at least some business to Pensacola Apothecary as a direct result of Viccari’s breach and Pensacola Apothecary’s complicity therein.

Section 542.335(j)’s presumption of irreparable injury can be rebutted by delay in seeking an injunction.

Partners Insight, LLC v. Gill · filed 2023-04-14(j)

Any presumption of irreparable harm under Fla. Stat. § 542.335(j) is rebutted by the length of delay.

Section 542.335(1)(j) presumes irreparable injury in restrictive-covenant cases, but a lengthy delay in seeking an injunction can rebut that presumption.

Miner, Ltd. v. Sanacore · filed 2025-07-16(1)(j)

While Florida law presumes irreparable injury in restrictive- covenant cases, § 542.335(1)(j), Fla. Stat., that presumption may be rebutted, including by a lengthy delay.

Section 542.335(1)(j) requires a proper bond for a temporary injunction enforcing a restrictive covenant, leaves the bond amount to the court’s sound discretion, and applies the ordinary standard of review for temporary injunctions.

Montville v. Mobile Medical Industries, Inc. · filed 2003-09-24(1)(j)

The language of the rule is substantively indistinguishable from the language of the statute. Both simply require a proper bond, set by the court in the exercise of its sound judicial discretion. We hold that the standard of review of an order granting a temporary injunction under the statute is precisely the same as the standard of review of the grant or denial of any temporary injunction.

Section 542.335(1)(h) directs courts to construe restrictive covenants in favor of reasonable protection of legitimate business interests, but a temporary injunction still requires strict compliance with Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.610.

Salazar v. Hometeam Pest Defense, Inc. · filed 2017-11-17(1)(h)

Nevertheless, the legislature has instructed us to "construe a restrictive covenant in favor of providing reasonable protection to all legitimate business interests established by the person seeking enforcement." § 542.335(1)(h), Fla. Stat. (2009). Despite the legislature's directive, "[a] temporary injunction requires strict compliance with Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.610." Coscia v. Old Fla. Plantation, Ltd., 828 So. 2d 488, 490 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002).

Section 542.335(1)(j) requires a bond for a temporary injunction and bars enforcement of a contractual bond waiver, but requires no bond for a permanent injunction.

PREMIER COMPOUNDING PHARMACY, INC. v. LARSON · filed 2018-06-13(1)(j)

While section 542.335(1)(j) provides a temporary injunction requires a ... bond, and a contractual provision waiving a bond will not be enforced, no bond is required for a permanent injunction.

Section 542.335 requires a party seeking a temporary injunction to show irreparable harm, no adequate remedy at law, a substantial likelihood of success on the merits, and that the injunction serves the public interest.

PICTURE IT SOLD PHOTOGRAPHY, LLC v. BUNKELMAN · filed 2020-01-08

Under section 542.335, a party seeking a temporary injunction must establish four elements: “(1) the likelihood of irreparable harm[;] (2) the unavailability of an adequate remedy at law[;] (3) a substantial likelihood of success on the merits[;] and (4) that a temporary injunction will serve the public interest.”

Section 542.335(1)(j)'s presumption of irreparable injury can be applied with Rule 65, while subsection (1)(g)1's restriction on considering hardship governs enforceability and does not apply when deciding whether to issue a preliminary injunction.

TransUnion Risk and Alternative Data Solutions, Inc. v. McLachlan · filed 2015-08-27(1)(g)1; (1)(j)

We find that section 542.335(1)(j) of the Florida Statutes does not conflict with federal procedure codified in Rule 65; however, because we find that section 542.335(1)(g)1 is not applicable to the enforcement of the Agreement by preliminary injunction, we vacate and remand to the district court for the limited purpose of determining whether the threatened injury to TRADS outweighs the damage the injunction may cause MacLachlan, giving full consideration to the hardship MacLachlan would suffer should the injunction issue.

Section 542.335(1)(j) applies alongside federal preliminary injunction procedure, while (1)(g)1’s bar on considering individual hardship applies when deciding enforceability, not whether to grant an injunction.

TransUnion Risk & Alternative Data Solutions, Inc. v. MacLachlan · filed 2015-08-27(1)(g)1; (1)(j)

We find that section 542.335(l)(j) of the Florida Statutes does not conflict with federal procedure codified in Rule 65; however, because we - find that section 542.335(l)(g)l is not applicable to the enforcement of the Agreément by preliminary injunction, we vacate and remand to the district court for the limited purpose of determining whether the threatened injury to TRADS outweighs the damage the injunction may cause MacLachlan, giving full consideration to the hardship MacLachlan would suffer should the injunction issue.

Section 542.335(1)(j) presumes irreparable injury from violating an enforceable restrictive covenant, but that presumption does not govern a preliminary injunction in federal court.

Miller v. Global Electronic Testing Services · filed 2026-01-06(1)(j)

Florida’s presumption of irreparable harm for breach of covenants not to compete, codified by § 542.335(1)(j), “conflicts with traditional federal equity practice” because it “lifts the burden of establishing irreparable harm from the movant’s shoulders and shifts it to the nonmovant.” Blue-Grace Logistics LLC v. Fahey, 340 F.R.D. 460, 466 (M.D. Fla. 2022). Accordingly, that presumption “does not govern in a federal diversity action for a preliminary injunction.”

Section 542.335(1)(j) presumes irreparable harm from violation of an enforceable restrictive covenant, but that presumption does not govern preliminary injunctions in federal diversity actions.

Blue-Grace Logistics LLC v. Fahey · filed 2022-02-07(1)(j)

The Court concludes that § 542.335(1)(j)’s presumption of irreparable harm conflicts with traditional federal equity practice and does not govern in a federal diversity action for a preliminary injunction.

Section 542.335(1)(c) requires a restrictive covenant to be reasonably necessary to protect a legitimate business interest; an injunction may be limited to customer and pricing restrictions when a broader ban on competing work is unnecessary.

Austin v. Mid State Fire Equip. · filed 1999-03-05(1)(c)

Paragraph 542.335(1)(c) provides in part that "[a] person seeking enforcement of a restrictive covenant also shall plead and prove that the contractually specified restraint is reasonably necessary to protect the legitimate business interest or interests justifying the restriction." ... The injunction should have been limited to the customer and pricing portions of the covenant because beyond that it serves only to prohibit competition and becomes unreasonable protection for Mid State.

Section 542.335(1)(c) requires courts to narrow an overbroad restrictive covenant to the relief reasonably necessary to protect a legitimate business interest.

Shields v. Paving Stone Co., Inc. · filed 2001-10-17(1)(c)

As stated in section 542.335(1)(c), Florida *1269 Statutes, "[i]f a contractually specified restraint is overbroad, overlong, or otherwise not reasonably necessary to protect the legitimate business interest or interests, a court shall modify the restraint and grant only the relief reasonably necessary to protect such interest or interests." Because Paving Stone did not have exclusive relationships with any of its customers and information on customers was readily obtainable through the yellow pages and trade subscriptions, the nonsolicitation/nondisclosure agreement was not reasonable to protect Paving Stone's customer base.

Section 542.335(1)(c) requires a court to narrow an overbroad restrictive covenant to the scope reasonably necessary to protect a legitimate business interest.

OMI INC. v. Nieves-Garcia · filed 2002-08-07(1)(c)

While we find no abuse of discretion with the trial court's preliminary assessment that the non-compete provision appears to be unduly restrictive on an employee such as Nieves-Garcia who has worked only in Dade County, we do conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in denying injunctive relief rather than modifying the restraint to reasonably protect OMI's business interests pursuant to Section 542.335(1)(c).

Section 542.335(1)(c) requires a restrictive covenant to be reasonably necessary to protect legitimate business interests and not be overbroad or overlong.

Fulford v. DRAWDY BROS. CONST., II, INC. · filed 2005-06-01(1)(c)

The restrictive covenant was "reasonably necessary to protect" such legitimate business interests and was not "overbroad" or "overlong." § 542.335(1)(c), Fla. Stat. (2004).

Section 542.335(1)(c) requires an injunction enforcing a restrictive covenant to grant only the relief reasonably necessary to protect an established legitimate business interest.

Hasley v. Harrell · filed 2007-12-07(1)(c)

Section 542.335(1)(c) requires that the injunction be tailored to grant only the relief reasonably necessary to protect the established legitimate business interest.

Under § 542.335(1)(g)2, a business buyer does not leave its line of business merely by referring some customers to other agencies while retaining the right to serve them.

USI INS. SERVICES OF FLORIDA, INC. v. Pettineo · filed 2008-07-16(1)(g)2

The buyer's restructuring of the type of policies it would sell and those it would refer to other agencies did not remove it from the line of business that the seller agreed to avoid. While the buyer may not currently serve that population, it purchased the right to do so.

A restrictive covenant limited to customers with whom an employee had business contact is not invalid under § 542.335(1) merely because it lacks a geographic limitation.

ENVIRONMENTAL SERVICES, INC. v. Carter · filed 2009-04-24(1)

Decisional law demonstrates that a relatively narrow restriction, such as the one here, is not invalid because it fails to contain a geographic limitation.

Section 542.335(1)(c) requires a court to modify an unreasonable restrictive covenant and grant only the relief needed to protect a legitimate business interest.

Partylite Gifts, Inc. v. MacMillan · filed 2012-09-11(1)(c)

Where, as here, the provisions of a restrictive covenant are unreasonable, the correct procedure is for the Court to modify, or “blue pencil,” the agreement and award an appropriate remedy.

Section 542.335 requires a restrictive covenant’s geographic scope to be reasonable and tied to a legitimate business interest.

Davenport v. AWP, Inc. · filed 2021-04-23(1)

This broad geographic scope is not tied to any legitimate business interest of AWP. And such wide-sweeping restriction cannot be considered reasonable.

Section 542.335(1)(c) permits enforcement of nondisclosure and nonsolicitation clauses reasonably necessary to protect a legitimate business interest.

Builder Services Group, Inc. v. Harkins · filed 2023-07-21(1)(c)

Turning to the terms of the BSG Agreement, its non-disclosure and non-solicitation clauses are valid and enforceable. Under Florida law, such clauses are enforceable if they are “reasonably necessary to protect [a] legitimate business interest.” Walsh v. Paw Trucking, Inc., 942 So. 2d 446, 448 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006) (alteration in original) (quoting § 542.335(1)(c), Fla. Stat. (2003)).

Section 542.335(1)(c) requires courts to narrow an overbroad restrictive covenant to the relief reasonably necessary to protect a legitimate business interest.

KOVA Commercial of Naples, LLC v. Sabin · filed 2023-10-04(1)(c)

The Court will therefore blue pencil the non-solicitation clause to limit it to only Collier and Lee Counties, Florida.

Section 542.335(1)(c) permits a court to modify a restrictive covenant that is broader or longer than reasonably necessary to protect a legitimate business interest.

Tactical Rehabilitation Inc. v. Youssef · filed 2024-11-07(1)(c)

By contrast, Florida law expressly permits courts to “blue pencil” or modify a restrictive covenant when it is “overbroad, overlong, or otherwise not reasonably necessary to protect the legitimate business interest or interests.” Fla. Stat. § 542.335(1)(c) (West 1996).

Section 542.335(1)(b) requires proof of a legitimate business interest to enforce a noncompete agreement; customer relationships driven mainly by price and prompt delivery were not substantial relationships under the statute.

Anich Industries, Inc. v. Raney · filed 2000-03-03(1)(b)

Under either interpretation, however, "substantial relationships" have not been shown. The customers who testified on Anich's behalf all acknowledged that they made their industrial tool and equipment purchases based primarily on cost and the supplier's ability to provide the goods quickly. There was little evidence of any exclusive or other kind of relationship that could be construed as "substantial" within the meaning of the statute.

Section 542.335(1)(b)3 protects a substantial relationship with a prospective patient only when that patient is a particular, identifiable individual.

Univ. of Florida, Bd. of Trustees v. Sanal · filed 2003-01-29(1)(b)3

Accordingly, we hold that, to qualify as a "legitimate business interest" pursuant to section 542.335(1)(b)3, a "relationship" with a "prospective patient" must be, in addition to "substantial," one with a particular, identifiable, individual.

Section 542.335(1)(b)3 recognizes substantial relationships with prospective patients as a legitimate business interest that can support a restrictive covenant.

Supinski v. OMNI HEALTHCARE, PA · filed 2003-08-29(1)(b)3

Omni established to the satisfaction of the trial judge that Dr. Supinski interfered with "substantial relationships with prospective ... patients" within the meaning of the statute, and we do not perceive any abuse of discretion by the trial court in this regard.

Section 542.335 allows an employer to establish a legitimate business interest through its substantial relationships with customers or prospective customers without proving that the former employee personally had such a relationship.

Milner Voice and Data, Inc. v. Tassy · filed 2005-06-21(1)(b)

Relevant case law indicates that the proper inquiry focuses on the relationship between an employer and its prospective and existing customers; an employer need not prove that its former employee himself had a substantial relationship with any particular customer.

Section 542.335 recognizes substantial relationships with existing customers as a legitimate business interest even when the employee brought those customers to the employer.

Hilb Rogal & Hobbs of Florida, Inc. v. Grimmel · filed 2010-12-01(1)(b)3.

Based upon the statute’s provision that “substantial relationships with specific prospective or existing customers” is a legitimate business interest, it appears that even though Grimmel brought these customers into HRH, Grimmel was HRH’s employee and that was what his job entailed.

Section 542.335(1)(b) recognizes valuable confidential sales information and substantial relationships with specific customers as legitimate business interests that can support an enforceable restrictive covenant.

Reliance Wholesale, Inc. v. Godfrey · filed 2010-12-22(1)(b)

First, Reliance’s database qualifies as “[v]aluable confidential business or professional information that otherwise does not qualify as trade secrets.” ... Second, the trial court’s findings of fact also demonstrate that Reliance established the existence of a second “legitimate business interest” — “[sjubstantial relationships with specific prospective or existing customers.” ... Therefore, pursuant to section 542.335(1)(b), Reliance established that the restrictive covenant contained in the 2005 Agreement is enforceable.

Section 542.335 recognizes referral sources as a protectable legitimate business interest supporting a restrictive covenant.

Infinity Home Care, L.L.C. and Sylvie Forjet v. Amedisys Holding, LLC · filed 2015-11-18(1)(b)

In sum, we hold that referral sources are a protectable legitimate business interest under section 542.335, Florida Statutes.

Section 542.335(1)(b) allows home health service referral sources to qualify as legitimate business interests, depending on the context and proof.

& SC16-400 Elizabeth White v. Mederi Caretenders Visiting Services of Southeast Florida, LLC., and Americare Home Therapy, Inc., etc. v. Carla Hiles · filed 2017-09-14(1)(b)

In light of the foregoing, we conclude that home health service referral sources may be a protected legitimate business interest within the meaning of section 542.335, depending upon the context and proof adduced.

Section 542.335 recognizes patient referral sources as legitimate business interests that can support non-compete and non-solicitation covenants.

Mederi Caretenders Visiting Services of Southeast Florida, LLC and Almost Family, Inc. v. White · filed 2015-12-02

Recently, in Infinity Home Care, LLC v. Amedisys Holding, LLC, 40 Fla. L. Weekly D1929 (Fla. 4th DCA Aug. 19, 2015), we concluded that referral sources are protectable legitimate interests and that an employment contract containing non-compete and non-solicitation provisions was enforceable. On the authority of Infinity Home Care, we reverse the final summary judgment and remand for further proceedings.

Customer goodwill associated with an ongoing business through a trademark, service mark, or geographic market is a legitimate business interest that can support a restrictive covenant.

7-Eleven, Inc. v. Kapoor Bros. · filed 2013-09-13(1)(b)(4)

While 7-Eleven has advanced an assortment of legitimate business interests advanced by its restrictive covenant, discussion of only one of them is necessary and dispositive: “legitimate business interests” include the protection of customer, patient or client goodwill associated with an ongoing business by way of a trademark, service mark or within a specific geographic location or marketing or trade area.

Section 542.335 recognizes relationships with referral sources as protectable legitimate business interests.

Infinity Home Care, L.L.C. and Sylvie Forjet v. Amedisys Holding, LLC · filed 2015-08-19(1)(b)

In sum, we hold that referral sources are a protectable legitimate business interest under section 542.335, Florida Statutes.

Substantial relationships with existing patients qualify as a legitimate business interest supporting a restrictive covenant.

Ansaarie v. First Coast Cardiovascular Inst., P.A. · filed 2018-06-28(1)(b)3.

The lower court properly found FCCI demonstrated a legitimate business interest in its substantial relationships with its existing patients.

Section 542.335(1)(b)(3) recognizes substantial relationships with existing customers as a legitimate business interest without requiring proof of a particular, identifiable customer.

JAVIER ALONSO-LLAMAZARES, M.D. v. INTERNATIONAL DERMATOLOGY RESEARCH, INC., etc. · filed 2022-01-19(1)(b)(3)

There is also no requirement that IDR present evidence of a particular, identifiable existing customer, client, or patient with which it has a substantial relationship.

Section 542.335 recognizes nonpublic referral-source information developed through a business’s work and expense as a legitimate business interest supporting a restrictive covenant.

Veterinary Orthopedic Implants, Inc. v. Haas · filed 2020-09-08(1)(b)(2)

As VOI’s referral sources constitute non-public information, specific to VOI, and acquired through its hard work and expense, the Court is satisfied that VOI has a legitimate business interest in maintaining its referral sources as confidential business information.

Section 542.335(1)(b) permits enforcement of a restrictive covenant to protect valuable confidential business information.

Autonation, Inc. v. O'BRIEN · filed 2004-12-02(1)(b)

After carefully considering the arguments and the evidence submitted in this case, the Court finds that AutoNation has established legitimate business interests justifying the enforcement of O’Brien’s Non-Compete Agreement. The testimony and evidence submitted by the parties demonstrated that as a high-level professional at AutoNation, O’Brien was exposed to confidential and proprietary information associated with running the used car division of a large automotive retailer.

Section 542.335 recognizes valuable confidential business or professional information as a legitimate business interest that can support a restrictive covenant.

Brown & Brown, Inc. v. Ali · filed 2007-06-25(1)(b)(2)

As the Florida statute affirmatively lists protection of valuable confidential business or professional information as a legitimate business interest, this Court finds that Brown has established such interest in the confidential information Ali was exposed to during his employ.

A franchisor’s interest in re-entering a former franchise market and protecting its goodwill can establish a legitimate business interest supporting a non-compete covenant.

Peterbrooke Franchising of Am., LLC v. Miami Chocolates, LLC · filed 2018-02-28(1)(b)

That being the case, PFA's interest in re-entering the market and its efforts to bolster the goodwill associated with Peterbrooke in the Miami area (ECF Nos. 70-1, 70-2) are sufficient to establish its legitimate business interest in enforcing the Non-Compete Provision.

Valuable confidential business information may be a legitimate business interest supporting a restrictive covenant; a genuine factual dispute about that status precludes summary judgment.

Vital Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Alfieri · filed 2022-05-09(1)(b)

Accordingly, at the very least, there are genuine issues of material fact whether VPX’s confidential business information constitutes a legitimate business interest justifying the restrictive covenant.

Trade secrets qualify as legitimate business interests that justify enforcement of a restrictive covenant.

Cnsl Hold v. Jowers · filed 2024-04-01(1)(b)

Under Florida law, enforcement of a restrictive covenant is justified by the “existence of one or more legitimate business interests.”2 Fla. Stat. § 542.335(1)(b). The district court found that MWK’s client information constituted trade secrets and trade secrets are considered legitimate business interests. Id. We find no clear error.

Section 542.335 recognizes extraordinary or specialized training as a legitimate business interest that can justify a restrictive covenant.

Aero Kool Corp. v. Oosthuizen · filed 1999-05-12(1)(b)5

In this case, the record clearly demonstrates that Aero Kool has a legitimate business interest in the extensive, specialized training in aircraft component repair that it provided to Oosthuizen.

Section 542.335 protects an employer’s interest in training only when the training is specialized or extraordinary and exceeds what is typical in the industry.

IDMWORKS, LLC v. Pophaly · filed 2016-06-23(1)(b)(5)

Training constitutes a legitimate business interest protectable by an injunction only when the training rises to the level of being specialized or extraordinary. Fla. Stat. § 542.335(l)(b)(5). This means that training must go beyond that typically offered in any given industry.

Specialized training can establish a legitimate business interest under § 542.335(1)(b).

Washburn v. One Hour Air Conditioning Franchising, L.L.C. · filed 2022-09-27(1)(b)

A legitimate business interest under Florida law is also shown by “specialized training,” Fla. Stat. § 542.335(1)(b), and the agreement required the franchisee managers and key employees to attend training both in person and through materials provided by One Hour.

Section 542.335(1)(b)(5) recognizes specialized training as a legitimate business interest that can support a reasonably necessary non-compete restriction.

Savis, Inc. v. Cardenas · filed 2023-09-13(1)(b)(5)

The Court concludes that Savis has established a legitimate business interest in the specialized training it provided to Cardenas, which is reasonably necessary to protect its established interests under § 542.335(1)(b)(5).

Section 542.335(1)(b)5 does not treat usual on-the-job training as extraordinary or specialized training that supports a restrictive covenant.

RUSSEL VESSELS, JR AND COAST TO COAST TERRAZZO, LLC vs DR. TERRAZZO OF FLORIDA, LLC D/B/A DR. TERRAZZO · filed 2022-12-22(1)(b)5

Therefore, because the evidence did not support that Appellee provided Vessels with specialized or extraordinary training, it was error for the trial court to conclude that Appellee had a legitimate business interest and that the Agreement was enforceable.

Section 542.335(1)(b) requires a party seeking to enforce a restrictive covenant to prove a legitimate business interest; commonly used sales methods do not establish one.

Passalacqua v. Naviant, Inc. · filed 2003-05-14(1)(b)

Naviant failed to prove, through Hirsch or otherwise, anything which even approximates a "legitimate business interest" as defined in the statute, section 542.335(1)(b), Florida Statutes.

Section 542.335(1)(b) requires proof of a legitimate business interest to enforce a noncompete covenant; generalized concerns do not suffice.

Gould & Lamb, LLC v. D'ALUSIO · filed 2007-03-09(1)(b)

After hearing and evaluating conflicting trial testimony, the trial court concluded that Gould & Lamb did not prove the existence of trade secrets or that restraint was reasonably necessary to protect the legitimate business interests of Gould & Lamb. We agree with the trial court's evidentiary findings. Generalized statements of concern cannot substitute for proof.

Section 542.335 requires evidence of a legitimate business interest to justify a restrictive covenant.

Garcia v. U.S. Floral Corp. · filed 1999-11-03

Because the plaintiff, U.S. Floral Corporation, presented sufficient evidence of a legitimate business interest justifying the restrictive covenant, § 542.335, Fla. Stat. (1999), and irreparable harm, Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.610, we affirm the trial court’s entry of a temporary injunction.

Section 542.335 requires a legitimate business interest and a restraint reasonably necessary to protect it before a contract in restraint of trade can be enforced.

Lubkey v. Compuvac Systems, Inc. · filed 2001-04-25(1)(b)(2)

Section 542.335 requires that, to enforce a contract that is in restraint of trade, the trial court must find that the plaintiff (CompuVac) has a "legitimate business interest"[3] and that it is reasonably necessary to protect this business interest.

Section 542.335(1)(b) requires a party seeking to enforce a restrictive covenant to plead and prove at least one legitimate business interest justifying it.

4uortho, LLC v. Practice Partners, Inc. · filed 2009-09-09(1)(b)

To establish that an agreement itself is lawful and enforceable, a party must “ ‘plead and prove the existence of one or more legitimate business interests justifying the restrictive covenant.’ ”

Section 542.335(1)(c) requires a party seeking to enforce a restrictive covenant to prove that enforcement is necessary to protect its legitimate business interests; proof of a contract violation alone is insufficient.

Evans v. Generic Solution Engineering, LLC · filed 2015-10-30(1)(c)

In other words, evidence that a party violated a broadly worded restrictive covenant is not enough to warrant relief, because Florida statutory law (as a matter of public policy) does not allow a party to enforce a restrictive covenant unless it proves that enforcement is necessary to protect its legitimate business interests.

Section 542.335 does not treat ordinary financial assistance and business support to a contractor as legitimate business interests that justify a restrictive covenant.

Lucky Cousins Trucking, Inc. v. QC Energy Resources Texas, LLC · filed 2016-07-28(1)(b)

And while QCER maintain that they provided Lucky Cousins with “financial concessions,” “revenue splits,” “equipment rental discounts,” “expense reimbursement,” and “cash assistance,” these are simply not the types of interest that can be protected through use of a restrictive covenant. These appear to be common practices in the hauling industry that cannot constitute a protectable business interest or extraordinary training.

A party seeking to enforce a restrictive covenant must prove why the restraint is reasonably necessary to protect its legitimate business interests.

Nuvasive, Inc. v. LeDuff · filed 2019-11-13(1)(c)

Here, NuVasive does not provide evidence on why the non-compete and non- solicitation restraints are reasonably necessary to protect its legitimate business interests.

Section 542.335 requires a restrictive covenant to be reasonably necessary to protect a legitimate business interest.

Office Depot, Inc. v. BABB · filed 2020-03-19(1)(c)

Section 542.335, Florida Statutes, establishes certain requirements for a covenant not to compete to be “enforceable.” The statute requires that the restrictive covenant be in writing and signed by the person against whom enforcement is sought; be reasonable in time, area, and line of business (i.e., scope); and be reasonably necessary to protect one or more legitimate business interests. ... Office Depot also satisfies the requirement that the covenant be reasonably necessary to protect a legitimate business interest.

Section 542.335 requires an employer to plead facts showing how a competitor’s hiring of former employees would harm a claimed legitimate business interest; generic allegations do not suffice.

Sunbelt Rentals, Inc. v. Cox · filed 2025-01-09(1)(b)

However, to meet federal pleading standards, generic and conclusory allegations will not suffice; an employer must allege “how” those interests are being or would be harmed by a competitor hiring a former employee.

Section 542.335’s legitimate-business-interest requirement can be adequately pleaded through allegations that a restrictive covenant protects business goodwill and reputation.

The Genterra Group, LLC v. Sanitas USA Inc. · filed 2021-01-15(1)(b)

Additionally, Genterra has adequately pled that it has a legitimate business interest to support the restrictive covenants.

Section 542.335(f) does not permit denial of an injunction on public health, safety, and welfare grounds based solely on patient preference.

Uro-Care, P.A. v. Montford · filed 1999-10-13(f)

In denying appellants’ motion for preliminary injunction, the trial court only cited one of the grounds argued by the appellee, to-wit: enforcement of the covenant was contrary to “the public health, safety and welfare.” § 542.335(f), Fla. Stat. (1997). However, the record reflects that the sole ground cited by the trial court for denying the preliminary injunction relates to “patient preference” rather than “the public health, safety, and welfare.”

Section 542.335(1)(g)(3) requires courts considering enforcement of a non-compete clause to consider applicable legal and equitable defenses, including an employer's material breach.

Lee v. Pinsky · filed 2005-02-23(1)(g)(3)

Section 542.335(1)(g)(3), Florida Statutes, provides that when a court is considering the enforceability of a non-compete clause it is required to consider all applicable legal and equitable defenses. ... There is substantial evidence that Pinsky materially breached the agreement where he did not compensate Lee for over $275,000 worth of services provided by Lee, despite the fact that both agreements provided that Lee should receive a percentage of such revenues.

Section 542.335 requires courts deciding whether to enforce a non-compete clause to consider all applicable legal and equitable defenses.

Leighton v. First Universal Lending, LLC · filed 2006-04-12(1)(g)3

In determining the enforceability of non-compete clauses, the trial court must consider all applicable legal and equitable defenses.

Section 542.335(1)(g)(1) prohibits courts from considering the restrained person's individual hardship when deciding whether to enforce a restrictive covenant by temporary injunction.

Florida Digestive Health Specialists, LLP v. Ramon E. Colina, M.D. · filed 2015-07-31(1)(g)(1)

Whether Dr. Colina—as the party against whom the injunction was sought—will suffer greater injury by imposition of the injunction than FDHS would suffer without an injunction is not a part of the court's consideration.

Section 542.335(1)(g)(1) bars a court enforcing a restrictive covenant from considering the individual hardship enforcement would cause the person subject to it.

Florida Digestive Health Specialists, LLP v. Ramon E. Colina, M.D. · filed 2015-11-04(1)(g)(1)

Whether Dr. Colina—as the party against whom the injunction was sought—will suffer greater injury by imposition of the injunction than FDHS would suffer without an injunction is not a part of the court's consideration.

Section 542.335(1)(f)(2)’s requirement for successor enforcement does not prevent a party to a new agreement from enforcing a noncompete clause incorporated from an earlier agreement.

Infinity Radio Inc. v. Whitby · filed 2001-02-21(1)(f)(2)

The 1999 "amendment" was not an assignment, but rather, a brand new agreement between Whitby and Infinity that incorporated all provisions of the 1995 agreement by reference. Therefore, and notwithstanding the provisions of section 542.335(1)(f)(2), Infinity, as party to the new agreement, was entitled to enforce the noncompete clause against Whitby.

Section 542.335 permits an assignee to enforce a non-competition agreement only if the agreement expressly authorizes enforcement by an assignee.

Marx v. Clear Channel Broadcasting, Inc. · filed 2004-10-13(f)2

Under the new provision, non-competition agreements can be enforced by assignees, but only if the agreement expressly so provides. Here, the contract does not so provide. Thus under either statute the non-competition clause in this case is not enforceable by the assignee.

Section 542.335(1)(f)1. requires a restrictive covenant to expressly identify a third-party beneficiary and state that it is intended for that person's benefit before the beneficiary can enforce it.

Tusa v. RALPH ROFFE & KKA, INC. · filed 2001-07-18(1)(f)1.

Further, the Roffe/KKA lease does not identify Tusa as a third-party beneficiary or state that the restrictive covenant was intended for Tusa's benefit. Accordingly, we hold that, under section 542.335(f)(1), Tusa has no viable claim against KKA.

Section 542.335(1)(f) permits a nonparty to enforce a restrictive covenant only if the agreement expressly names and authorizes that beneficiary, assignee, or successor to enforce it.

Cellco Partnership v. Kimbler · filed 2011-06-24(1)(f)

We acknowledge that section 542.335(l)(f) provides for limited circumstances in which a nonparty to a restrictive covenant may seek to enforce it. Specifically, the statute provides that a court may not refuse to enforce a restrictive covenant on the basis that the person seeking enforcement is a third-party beneficiary of the contract or an assignee or successor to a party in such a contract. § 542.335(l)(f)(l) & (2). But those exceptions only apply where the third-party beneficiary, assignee, or successor is expressly named and authorized to enforce the covenant.

Section 542.335(1)(f)(2) permits an assignee to enforce a restrictive covenant when the agreement’s assignment language expressly authorizes that enforcement.

Patel v. Boers · filed 2011-08-26(1)(f)(2)

The assignment language contained in the instant Provider Agreement is sufficient to constitute an express authorization of enforcement by an assignee or successor as required by the statute.

Section 542.335 permits an assignee to enforce a restrictive covenant when a general assignment clause expressly extends the agreement’s rights and obligations to the assignee.

DePuy Orthopaedics, Inc. v. Waxman · filed 2012-08-03(1)(f)2

Therefore, like the Provider Agreement in Patel, the provisions at issue here are sufficient to constitute an express authorization of enforcement by an assign-ee or successor, as required by the statute and, on the record before us, there is no basis for affirming the trial court’s order based on the tipsy coachman rule.

Section 542.335(1)(f) bars a court from refusing enforcement of a restrictive covenant by a third-party beneficiary expressly identified in the contract as entitled to enforce it.

Richland Towers, Inc. v. Denton · filed 2014-03-12(1)(f)

But the court may not refuse enforcement sought by a third-party beneficiary who is expressly identified in the contract as one entitled to enforce the restrictive covenants.

A merger that changes a contracting employer's ultimate parent, but leaves the employer itself intact, does not make the employer a successor under subsection (1)(f).

Collier HMA Physician Management, LLC v. Brian Menichello, M.D. · filed 2017-05-31(1)(f)

Viewing what occurred based on traditional principles of corporate law, no other entity emerged from the transaction as a successor to Collier HMA. Tellingly, Dr. Menichello continued to be employed by and to receive his compensation from Collier HMA. And, of course, Collier HMA could not be a successor to itself. As the only other signatory to the Agreement, Collier HMA had the right to seek enforcement of the restrictive covenant in its own contract.

A corporation surviving a merger may enforce restrictive covenants held by the merging corporation.

LUPIN ATLANTIS HOLDINGS SA, a foreign corporation v. ZENG · filed 2024-10-15(1)(f)(1)

This Court agrees with the reasoning in Johnson Controls and finds that the restrictive covenants at issue are enforceable by LAHSA, as the surviving corporation, by way of merger.

Section 542.335(1)(h) requires courts to construe restrictive covenants to reasonably protect established legitimate business interests and does not support a further geographic reduction without a stated basis.

SOUTHERNMOST v. Torregrosa · filed 2004-12-22(1)(h)

Further, because section 542.335(1)(h), Florida Statutes (2003), directs that "[a] court shall construe a restrictive covenant in favor of providing reasonable protection to all legitimate business interests established by a the person seeking enforcement," we direct the trial court to reinstate its oral pronouncements with regard to geographic area.

Section 542.335(1)(c) requires an opportunity to present evidence on a restrictive covenant’s reasonableness and scope before it is held enforceable on summary judgment.

Whitby v. Infinity Radio Inc. · filed 2007-01-24(1)(c)

We agree with Appellants that the trial court erred in holding the non-compete covenant enforceable on summary judgment without allowing Appellants to present evidence as to the covenant's reasonableness and scope.

Section 542.335(1)(h)’s interpretive mandate can leave the meaning of a restrictive covenant for trial rather than resolution as a matter of law.

Alvarez v. Rendon · filed 2007-04-05(1)(h)

Section 542.335(1)(h), Florida Statutes (2005), instructs that: A court shall construe a restrictive covenant in favor of providing reasonable protection to all legitimate business interests established by the person seeking enforcement. A court shall not employ any rule of contract construction that requires the court to construe a restrictive covenant narrowly, against the restraint, or against the drafter of the contract. . . . Given the interpretative mandate of the statute, we agree with the trial court that the meaning of this provision cannot be determined as a matter of law.

Section 542.335 places the burden on the party opposing a noncompete covenant to show that it is overbroad or not reasonably necessary to protect a legitimate business interest.

Edwards v. Harris · filed 2007-08-23(1)(c)

Section 542.335 also provides that the appellant had the burden of establishing that the covenant was overbroad or not otherwise reasonably necessary to protect the established legitimate business interest.

Section 542.335(1)(h) prohibits construing a restrictive covenant narrowly and against the restraint of trade or commerce.

TRI-COUNTY CONCRETE PRODUCTS, INC. v. Lower · filed 2008-10-08(1)(h)

We affirm the final judgment, but remand for the trial court to strike that portion of the judgment stating that covenants not to compete are narrowly read and construed against restraint of trade or commerce.

Section 542.335(1)(h) directs courts to construe restrictive covenants to reasonably protect established legitimate business interests and forbids construing them narrowly or against the drafter.

Heiderich v. Florida Equine Veterinary Services, Inc. · filed 2012-03-30(1)(h)

In assessing such a covenant, Florida law specifically provides that “[a] court shall construe a restrictive covenant in favor of providing reasonable protection to all legitimate business interests established by the person seeking enforcement. A court shall not employ any rule of contract construction that requires the court to construe a restrictive covenant narrowly, against the restraint, or against the drafter of the contract.” § 542.335(1)(h), Fla. Stat. (2010).

Section 542.335(1)(h) requires courts to construe restrictive covenants to provide reasonable protection for established legitimate business interests and forbids rules that construe them narrowly or against the drafter.

Anarkali Boutique, Inc. v. Ortiz · filed 2012-12-12(1)(h)

Further, “[a] court shall construe a restrictive covenant in favor of providing reasonable protection to all legitimate business interests established by the person seeking enforcement.” § 542.335(1)(h), Fla. Stat. (2008). “A court shall not employ any rule of contract construction that requires the court to construe a restrictive covenant narrowly, against the restraint, or against the drafter of the contract.” Id. Construing the agreement here, its obvious purpose was to preclude the worker from competing with the company after the company trained the worker and allowed her to build her own clientele.

A patent-license covenant limited to competition that infringes the licensed patents can be enforceable despite a nineteen-year term because its narrow scope bears on reasonableness.

MDS (Canada) Inc. v. Rad Source Technologies, Inc. · filed 2013-07-01(a)

We also disagree with the conclusion of the district court that the third sentence is an unenforceable restrictive covenant under Florida law. Under Florida law, the “enforcement of contracts that restrict or prohibit competition during or after the term of restrictive covenants, so long as such contracts are reasonable in time, area, and line of business, is not prohibited.” Fla. Stat. § 542.335(a). Although a nineteen year restrictive covenant would likely be presumptively unreasonable under Florida law, the restrictive covenant is narrow in scope because it applies only to competition that infringes the licensed patents.

Section 542.335 requires a party seeking to enforce a restrictive covenant to plead and prove a legitimate business interest and that the restraint is reasonably necessary to protect it; these threshold requirements are elements of the claim.

RAUCH, WEAVER, NORFLEET, KURTZ & CO, INC. v. GARNAN ENTERPRISES, LLC and NANCY LEGAULT · filed 2021-03-17(1)(b)-(c)

Section 542.335 sets forth elements that the plaintiff, as the party seeking enforcement of the restrictive covenant, has the initial burden to “plead and prove.” Under the section 542.335 framework, a restrictive covenant is void unless it is reasonably necessary to protect a legitimate business interest. The threshold requirements of section 542.335 are essential elements in any cause of action concerning enforcement of a restrictive covenant.

Section 542.335(1)(k) allows attorney's fees for a party that successfully challenges the enforceability of a restrictive covenant.

Sun Group Enterprises, Inc. v. DeWitte · filed 2004-12-23(1)(k)

Section 542.335(1)(k), Florida Statutes (2003), allows an award of attorney's fees to the prevailing party "in any action seeking enforcement of, or challenging the enforceability of, a restrictive covenant." Appellees, having successfully challenged the enforceability of a restrictive covenant, are entitled to attorney's fees.

Section 542.335(1)(k) does not authorize attorney’s fees against a third party who did not sign the restrictive covenant.

Bauer v. Dilib, Inc. · filed 2009-09-16(1)(k)

To the extent the plaintiff sought to recover its attorney’s fees under section 542.335(l)(k), no such statutory authority exists against a third party like Bauer.

Section 542.335(1)(k) permits a court to award reasonable attorney’s fees to the prevailing party in an action concerning the enforceability of a restrictive covenant when no contract provides for fees.

Puleo v. Morris · filed 2012-10-03(1)(k)

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the circuit court’s order to the extent that it determines that Mr. Puleo and FPF are entitled to their reasonable attorney’s fees under section 542.335(l)(k).

Section 542.335(1)(k) permits a trial court to award reasonable attorney’s fees to a party that prevails because a restrictive covenant is unenforceable.

Tesla Electric, Armature & Machine, Inc. v. JLM Advanced Technical Services, Inc. · filed 2013-12-10(1)(k)

JLM prevailed on Tesla’s breach-of-contract claim due to the unenforceability of the restrictive covenant in the parties’ contract. Therefore, section 542.335(l)(k) grants the trial court discretion to award JLM its reasonable attorney’s fees.

Section 542.335 permits courts to enforce a restrictive covenant through remedies other than injunctive relief.

Protherapy Associates, LLC v. Afs of Bastian, Inc. · filed 2011-05-03(1)(j)

Moreover, Florida Statutes § 542.335, which applies in this case, expressly contemplates that a court may enforce a restrictive covenant by means other than injunctive relief. See Fla. Stat. § 542.335(1)(j).