Fla. Stat. § 95.11

Section 95.11 requires an action not based on a written document to be commenced within four years.

Knighten v. PALISADES COLLECTIONS, LLC · filed 2010-07-06

Accordingly, pursuant to Fla. Stat. § 95.11, an action that is not based on a written document must commence within four years.

A five-year limitations period applies to an action on a written promissory note, running from the note’s due date.

In re Eddy · filed 2017-06-30(2)(b)

The 1986 Note became due on December 20, 2001, and was not paid within five years. As such, the limitations period under Florida law expired. The Court finds however, that the 1986 Note was revived by both the 2008 Note and the 2010 Note. ... Accordingly, despite the fact that by 2006, the debt underlying the 1986 Note was barred by Florida’s statute of limitations, the debt was revived in 2008 and again in 2010.

Section 95.11(2)(b) provides a five-year limitations period for actions on written contracts.

Service Employees International Union National Industry Pension Fund v. Hebrew Homes Health Network, Inc. · filed 2019-09-12(2)(b)

That is what happened here. Properly read, the parties’ agreement directs that Florida’s five-year statute of limitations should be applied to actions like this one seeking to collect delinquent contributions for the benefit of employees, the majority of which worked in Florida. Given that contractual language and ERISA’s lack of a limitations period for delinquent contribution claims, Florida’s five-year statute of limitations should be used to evaluate the timeliness of Plaintiffs’ action.

Section 95.11(1) gives instruments under seal a twenty-year limitations period after default.

Plant City v. Scott · filed 1945-04-17(1)

The third and last question is whether or not Sec. 95.11(1) Florida Statutes of 1941, F.S.A., barring suit after twenty years on instruments under seal, is the statute of limitations applicable to the suit here. ... We agree with the Court below that the applicable statute of limitations was the twenty-year statute relating to instruments under seal.

Section 95.11(1) imposes a twenty-year limit on an action founded on a written contract under seal.

Moynihan v. Elliott · filed 1954-03-31(1)

We forego discussion of that defense, and of other claimed defenses, because we are of the clear opinion that the statute of limitations specially pleaded barred the claim, and hence, that the judgment must be affirmed. ... The extension agreement could not be revived over twenty years later to relieve the promise of the bar of the statute of limitations.

Section 95.11(1) provides a twenty-year limitation period for a suit on a written contract under seal.

Massachusetts Bonding & Insurance Company v. Bryant · filed 1965-05-04(1)

However, the trial court's conclusion is proper because ch. 59-491, Laws of Florida, Acts of 1959 (purporting to amend Section 255.05, Florida Statutes, F.S.A., by adding the second paragraph as it appears in Florida Statutes, 1961 and 1963) has been struck down as unconstitutional (Auto Owners Ins. Co. v. Hillsborough County Aviation Authority, 153 So.2d 722 [Fla. 1963]), with the result that the twenty-year statute of limitation (Section 95.11(1), Florida Statutes, F.S.A.) is applicable to this suit upon a written contract under seal.

Section 95.11(3) supplies the applicable limitations period for an action on a written warranty not under seal.

Fenner v. Florentine Forge, Inc. · filed 1977-02-15(3)

Lastly, the action brought by Fenner on a written warranty not under seal is governed by the statute of limitations set forth in Section 95.11(3).

Section 95.11(2)(b)'s five-year period applies to an action for breach of an obligation implied by law in a written contract.

Heredia v. Safeway Trails, Inc. · filed 1979-04-03(2)(b)

Here the obligation, the alleged breach of which is the basis of this action, was one legally created by the written instrument, *421 and it is upon the latter that this action was based, with the result that the five-year statute of limitations was applicable, and the action was timely filed.

Section 95.11 permits discovery concerning a written contract for at least the five years preceding the relevant person's death, with a potentially longer period determined by the trial court.

Backus v. Howard W. Backus Towing, Inc. · filed 1980-12-23(2)(b)

We further hold that to the extent necessary to declare those rights about which Mary is in doubt with regard to the sources of funds in Howard’s drawing account, discovery should be permitted, at least to the extent of the five year period preceding Howard’s death, or to any greater extent determined by the trial court to be applicable under Section 95.11, Florida Statutes (1977).

Section 95.11 provided a twenty-year limitation period for written instruments under seal in 1959, later reduced to five years by the 1974 revision.

Jones v. Rainey · filed 1980-09-05(1) and (2)

As part of a general revision concerning the limitation of actions, the legislature in 1974 eliminated the twenty year limitation period for written instruments under seal, thereby reducing the limitation period for such a note to five years. § 95.11(1) & (2), Fla. Stat. (1979).

Section 95.11(2)(b) sets a five-year limitations period for an action on a written guaranty.

Greene v. Bursey · filed 1999-05-19(2)(b)

It is undisputed that the applicable statute of limitations is section 95.11(2)(b), Florida Statutes (1997), which sets a five-year period for suits involving an action on a contract, obligation, or liability founded on a written instrument, as here.

Section 95.11(2)(b) requires an action on a written contract to be brought within five years; a factual dispute over when the breach occurred can prevent summary judgment on when that period began.

Collections USA, Inc. v. City of Homestead · filed 2002-05-29(2)(b)

Accordingly, we conclude that a genuine issue of material fact exists as to when the five-year statute of limitations began to run on Collections' claim against the City for breach of contract.

Section 95.11(2)(b) gives a party five years to bring an action on a written contract, measured from when all elements of the breach claim exist.

JJ Gumberg Co. v. Janis Services, Inc. · filed 2003-05-28(2)(b)

Assuming that Janis breached the contract by failing to obtain liability insurance and by failing to clean up and maintain safety precautions at the time Green was injured in June of 1994, all the elements for a cause of action for breach of contract existed. Therefore, the trial court correctly dismissed these two claims as they are barred by the statute of limitations.

Section 95.11(2)(b) gives a party five years to bring an action on a contract founded on a written instrument.

Medical Jet v. Signature Flight Support · filed 2006-11-15(2)(b)

The statute of limitations for a contract founded on a written instrument is five years.

Section 95.11(3)(k)'s time bar for a claim not founded on a written instrument does not bar a breach-of-contract claim founded on a written instrument under section 95.11(2)(b).

CHHS HOSPITAL COMPANY LLC, D/B/A CHESTNUT HILL HOSPITAL v. JOHN HARMON · filed 2024-03-13(2)(b), (3)(k)

The basis for dismissing CHHS's quantum meruit claim—that is, that the claim was time-barred, see § 95.11(3)(k)—is not applicable to CHHS's breach of contract claim because the latter is "founded on a written instrument," see § 95.11(2)(b).

Section 95.11(2)(b) gives a written-contract claim five years to be filed and does not provide a discovery rule.

Mark Kinchla, Individually and Mark 48, LLC v. Ran Investments, LLC, Kilgore Properties, LLC, Nanlann, Inc., Robert Pola, Newton Corner Condominium · filed 2024-09-06(2)(b)

In this case, however, the date that knowledge was imputed to Kilgore by Nanlann’s discovery of the breach is immaterial because the claim is governed by sections 95.11(2)(b), 95.031 and 95.031(1), which do not include a discovery rule.

Section 95.11(2)(b) sets a five-year limitations period for breach of a written contract.

LAD Commercial, LLC v. Eagle Trace at Vero Beach Homeowners' Association, Inc. · filed 2024-10-02(2)(b)

Because the statute of limitations for breach of a written contract is within five years of the breach under section 95.11(2)(b), Florida Statutes (2019), it would not have expired as applied to this suit before LAD filed its complaint in 2019.

Section 95.11(2)(b) bars recovery for breach-of-contract damages that accrued more than five years before suit, including damages from recurring annual breaches.

Grand Harbor Community Association, Inc. v. GH Vero Beach Development, LLC, Bahadur · filed 2024-10-02(2)(b)

However, the statute of limitations does bar any cause of action for breach of contract damages accruing more than five years before the filing of the complaint. § 95.11(2)(b), Fla. Stat. (2020).

Section 95.11(2)(b) sets a five-year limitations period for an action regarding a debt.

Somohano v. PRA Receivables Management LLC · filed 2020-07-23(2)(b)

In our case, which is controlled by Florida state law, the statute of limitations to file an action regarding a debt is five years. Fla. Stat. § 95.11(2)(b).

Section 95.11(2)(b) sets a five-year limitations period for breach-of-contract actions.

New Lenox Industries, Inc. v. Fenton · filed 2007-05-03(2)(b)

The statute of limitations under Florida law for a breach of contract action is five years. Fla. Stat. § 95.11 (2)(b).

Section 95.11(2)(b) sets a five-year limitations period for breach of contract claims.

Gordon Jones and Laura Jones v. John H. Childers and Talent Services, Inc. · filed 1994-04-07(2)(b)

breach of contract: five years. See Fla. Stat. § 95.11(2)(b).

Section 95.11(2)(b) gives five years to bring a contract action; for installment payments, the period runs separately from when each installment becomes due.

JOHN P. WOODWARD and ROBERT C. WOODWARD v. TIMOTHY MORELL, in his capacity as PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE ESTATE OF MILDRED W. OLSON · filed 2021-05-05(2)(b)

Section 95.11 of the Florida Statutes provides for a five-year statute of limitations for “[a] legal or equitable action on a contract.” § 95.11(2)(b), Fla. Stat. (2018). ... Florida law thus holds that the statute of limitations began to run when each installment was due: upon completion of each year of college. Because the Woodwards did not file claims until 2018, their actions are barred by the applicable statute of limitations.

Section 95.11(2)(b) gives a party five years to bring a breach of contract claim.

KLAPPER v. SULLIVAN · filed 2021-03-29(2)(b)

As such, in order for New Jersey or New York’s six-year statute of limitations to bar the breach of contract claim, that claim would have to be filed no later than April 2022, whereas in order for Florida’s five-year statute of limitations to act as a bar, Metus Capital’s breach of contract claim would need to be filed after April 2021.

Section 95.11(2)(b)’s five-year limitations period for a claim to cancel a restrictive covenant begins when the claim may be brought; purchasing the property does not itself start the period absent a substantial change in circumstances.

VICTORVILLE WEST LIMITED PARTNERSHIP v. THE INVERRARY ASSOCIATION, INC. · filed 2017-08-23(2)(b)

The trial court also concluded Victorville filed its claim after the five-year statute of limitations had run because its claim came into existence when it purchased the golf course. See § 95.11(2)(b), Fla. Stat. (2013). We find this portion of the trial court’s order to be error. The statute of limitations begins to run “when the action ‘may be brought.’” ... For the statute of limitations to have begun to run when Victorville purchased the golf course, a substantial change in circumstances would have had to have taken place before Victorville purchased the property, but no evidence was presented to indicate that such a change had taken place.

Section 95.11(2)(b) requires a suit challenging an amendment to restrictive covenants to be filed within five years after the amendment is recorded, even if the amendment was allegedly improperly enacted and void.

Julie K. Hilton, The Loyd Charles etc. v. David Pearson And Elizabeth Pearson · filed 2016-02-15(2)(b)

On the merits of the statute of limitations issue, we agree with the Hiltons that reversal is compelled by Harris and Silver Shells, which stand for the proposition that a suit challenging the validity of an amendment to restrictive covenants must be filed within five years of the date that the amendment is recorded even if the suit alleges that the amendment was void because it was not properly enacted.

Section 95.11(2)(b) imposes a five-year limitations period, and a new complaint filed after a prior action was dismissed without prejudice cannot relate back to the earlier filing to avoid that bar.

Dade County v. Rohr Industries, Inc. · filed 1987-09-08(2)(b)

The district court erred in applying the relation back doctrine to the filing of a new second complaint. Although the filing of a federal action will initially toll the running of the statute of limitations, the subsequent voluntary dismissal of the federal action has the effect of placing the parties in a position as if the suit had never been filed. Attache Resort Motel, Ltd. v. Kaplan, 498 So.2d 501 (Fla. 3d D.C.A.1986), See Stein v. Reynolds Securities, Inc., 667 F.2d 33 (11th Cir.1982) (dismissal of an earlier suit without prejudice does not authorize a subsequent suit brought outside of the otherwise binding statute of limitations). At the time of its filing, June 25, 1980, Dade County’s second complaint was time-barred by Fla.Stat. § 95.11(2)(b), a five year statute of limitations.

Section 95.11(2)(b) gives claims on written contracts a five-year limitations period that runs from the date of breach.

Coyote Portable Storage, LLC v. PODS Enterprises, Inc. · filed 2015-07-08(2)(b)

Under Florida law, the limitations period for a claim on a written contract is five years. Fla. Stat. § 95.11(2)(b) (2013). The period runs from the date of the breach.

Section 95.11(2)(b) provides a five-year limitation period for legal or equitable actions on contracts founded on written instruments, including an insurer's bad-faith refusal to settle a claim.

Baranowski v. GEICO General Insurance Company · filed 2018-01-09(2)(b)

In Florida, “[a] legal or equitable action on a contract . . . founded on a written instrument” has a statute of limitation of five years. Fla. Stat. § 95.11(2)(b). The five-year limitation period applies to a complaint against an insurer for refusing in bad faith to settle a claim.

Section 95.11(2)(b) requires a claim on a written contract to be filed within five years, and a breach-of-contract claim accrues when the breach occurs.

Kirkpatrick v. Hubman · filed 2023-03-01(2)(b)

Florida law states that actions, other than for recovery of real property, shall be commenced within five years to recover for “a legal or equitable action on a contract, obligation, or liability founded on a written instrument . . . .” Fla. Stat. § 95.11 (2) (b). “A cause of action for breach of contract accrues and the limitations period commences at the time of the breach.”

Section 95.11(2)(b) gives five years to sue on a written instrument, and that period barred Solomon's challenge to the termination of her benefits.

Metropolitan Life Insurance v. Solomon · filed 1998-03-18(2)(b)

These three elements are met in this case without any genuine issues of material fact. First, Plaintiff conferred a benefit on Defendant in the form of the mistakenly-issued check. Defendant was not entitled to this cheek because of the lapse of the statute of limitations. ... Because ordering restitution would further the Plan’s contract provision prescribing time periods for suits and would not override it, Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment is hereby partially granted with regards to the mistakenly-issued cheek and interest which has accrued from the time Defendant placed the funds in an interest-bearing escrow account.

Section 95.11(3) bars an action on an unsealed contract filed more than five years after the cause of action accrued.

Wicker v. Bd. of Pub. Instruction, Dade Cty. · filed 1947-08-01(3)

We hold that if the court below had admitted the photostatic copy which was offered in evidence, that the result of the trial would have had to be the same because that evidence would have shown the verity of the defendants’ fifth plea which alleged that the contract was not under seal and that the contract was completely executed more than five years prior to the filing of the suit and the cause of action was, therefore, barred by the five-year statute of limitations.

Section 95.11(3) provides a five-year limitations period for an action founded on a written instrument.

Insurance Co. of the South v. Kennedy & Ely Insurance · filed 1962-06-05(3)

The language of this agreement is sufficient and has the essential elements to decide or determine the rights and liabilities of the parties. It does not require further parol testimony to explain its intent, but appears to be a written acknowledgment of the obligation of the appellant (insurer) to reimburse appellee (agent) and would, therefore, come within the five-year statute of limitations, as provided in Florida Statutes § 95.11(3), F.S.A.

Section 95.11(3) provides a five-year limitations period for actions on written agreements.

Hartford Accident & Indemnity Company v. Mason · filed 1968-05-21(3)

As to the statute of limitations, we hold that the five-year period would be applicable under § 95.11(3), Fla. Stat., F.S.A. Without the policy there would be no claim against the company, and it is apparent that the limitation applicable should be that pertaining to written agreements.

Section 95.11(3) gives five years to bring an action on a contract, obligation or liability founded upon an unsealed written instrument.

Wilcox v. Atkins · filed 1968-09-04(3)

In view of the foregoing, we conclude that the instrument in question is a written contract and comes within the purview of the 5-year statute of limitations, § 95.11(3), Florida Statutes, F.S.A.

Section 95.11(2)(b) requires legal or equitable actions on contracts, obligations, or liabilities founded on written instruments to be commenced within five years.

Ruhl v. Perry · filed 1980-11-13(2)(b)

We find the new statute of limitations set forth in section 95.11(2)(b) to be applicable to this cause and constitutional.

Section 95.11(2)(b) provides a five-year limitations period for a written contract, including a sufficiently definite letter confirming an agreement.

Creative Property Management, Inc. v. Gaines · filed 1982-07-21(2)(b)

There is substantial competent evidence to support the trial court’s finding that appellant either did not disclose its principal or that it specifically agreed to be personally liable for the work appellee performed and to support the finding that appellant’s letter was sufficiently definite to be enforceable and to constitute a written contract subject to the five year statute of limitations. § 95.11(2)(b), Fla.Stat. (1981).

Section 95.11(2)’s five-year period governs an intended third-party beneficiary’s claim based on a written agreement, rather than the four-year period under section 95.11(3).

Paltuco Caribbean of Florida, Inc. v. Percy Wilson Mortgage & Finance Corp. · filed 1982-07-13(2), (3)

... appellant Paltuco’s cause of action is based on the written agreement and is governed by the five year limitation period of section 95.11(2), Florida Statutes, rather than the four year limitation period of section 95.11(3), as applied by the trial *345court in granting summary judgment for co-defendants Percy Wilson and National Life Insurance Company.

Section 95.11(2)(b)'s five-year limitations period bars an accrued-royalties claim filed after the period runs without tolling.

Safe-T-Lawn, Inc. v. Lockwood · filed 1982-10-26(2)(b)

We hold that (1) the plaintiff is barred from recovering on the claim asserted for accrued royalties because (a) the record indisputably demonstrates that the debt was voluntarily forgiven and contributed to the defendant, of which Lockwood was an officer, director and stockholder, as an inducement for a third-party to lend funds to the corporation and thus to prevent its financial collapse and (b) the action was in any event time-barred by the untolled running of the five-year statute of limitations, Sec. 95.11(2)(b), Fla.Stat. (1979), prior to the filing of the complaint; and that (2) the claim for royalties on a patent later issued to the plaintiff is likewise precluded because, in two separate agreements, Lockwood specifically assigned the patent rights in question to Safe-T-Lawn.

Section 95.11(2)(b) sets a five-year limitations period for actions on written instruments, including sealed promissory notes after the 1975 amendment.

Maiden v. Cogdill · filed 1983-03-23(2)(b)

Effective January 1, 1975, section 95.11 was amended so as to eliminate from section 95.11(1) the reference to sealed instruments, thus making section 95.11(2)(b) effective as to a legal or equitable action on an obligation founded on a written instrument. The limitation period is five years. ... This action not having been filed by that date, it is barred by section 95.11(2)(b), Florida Statutes (1981), which is now applicable.

Section 95.11(2)(b)'s five-year limit bars enforcement of a note and mortgage after it expires unless the party seeking tolling provides competent evidence.

EAGLE NAT. BANK OF MIAMI v. Burks · filed 1987-02-10(2)(b)

The movants, thus, sustained their initial burden by demonstrating on the face of the pleadings that the statute of limitations had expired. It was then up to Eagle Bank to rebut the evidence supporting the motion so as to create a factual issue as to whether the statute of limitations was tolled during the period it believed it owned the property. ... Thus, we affirm the summary final judgment based upon the holding that the expiration of the statute of limitations entitled Burks to judgment as a matter of law.

Section 95.11(2)(b) provides a five-year limitation period for actions on written instruments, including actions to collect a promissory note.

Swartzman v. Harlan · filed 1988-11-16(2)(b)

Section 95.11(2)(b), Florida Statutes (1981), provides for a five-year statute of limitations for actions on written instruments. Both parties agree that the cause of action on the promissory note accrued on July 18, 1981, when the Swartzmans did not pay the note when it became due. Thus, the statute of limitations would have run on July 18, 1986.

Section 95.11(3) requires the actions covered here to be commenced within four years of accrual.

Sands v. Blando · filed 1991-01-29(3)

Section 95.11(3), Florida Statutes (1989), provides that the actions appellant sued for must be commenced within four years from the date of their accrual. Appellant failed to comply with the statute of limitations requirement.

Section 95.11(2)(b) sets a five-year limitations period for an insured’s claim arising from an automobile accident.

Glantzis v. State Auto. Mut. Ins. Co. · filed 1991-02-06(2)(b)

Appellants' claim for injuries arising out of the automobile accident of April 2, 1984, was subject to the five-year statute of limitations set forth in 95.11(2)(b).

Section 95.11(2)(b)’s five-year period applies to actions arising from the specific language of a written instrument, not to a claim for breach of the implied warranty of habitability of a new residence.

ELIZABETH N. v. Riverside Group, Inc. · filed 1991-08-15(2)(b)

To the extent that the statutory description of an action as "founded on an instrument in writing" or equivalent phrase refers to contracts, obligations, or liabilities growing, not remotely or ultimately, but immediately, out of written instruments, C.J.S., supra, this section does not apply to an action for breach of the implied warranty of habitability of a new residence.

Section 95.11(2)(b) gives a health-care provider five years to sue on parents’ written agreement to pay for their children’s medical services.

Ghaleb v. Leibell · filed 1992-06-16(2)(b)

A written agreement of the parents, in an authorization for services, to be financially responsible to a health-care provider for any medical charges rendered to their children is a written contract governed by section 95.11(2)(b), Florida Statutes (1991), the five-year limitation period.

Section 95.11(2)(b) sets a five-year limitations period; an insurer dismissed from a suit cannot be reinstated after that period expires without a valid basis to overcome the bar.

Hartford Insurance Group v. Lacey-Bogue · filed 2000-09-08(2)(b)

The Group argues on appeal that the judgment should be reversed because it was never served with process and it also points out in its brief, and the record clearly shows, the suit is now *464barred against the Group by the five-year statute of limitations. § 95.11(2)(b), Fla. Stat. (1989). We agree and reverse. ... However, after the court dismissed the Group from the lawsuit on January 22, 1997, the Group could not again be sued in this cause without some valid basis to overcome the bar of the statute of limitations, and none appears here.

Section 95.11(2)(b) provides a five-year limitations period for the claims on the checks and their alleged personal guarantees.

Leavitt Communications, Inc. v. Quality Communications of America, Inc. · filed 2006-10-18(2)(b)

For both checks the limitation period began to run on June 27, 1999, and expired on June 27, 2004. See § 95.11(2)(b), Fla. Stat. (1999) (providing a limitation period of five years).

Section 95.11(2)(b) gives five years to bring an action on a written contract; for a declaratory judgment claim, that period begins when the claim accrues.

Bott v. City of Marathon · filed 2007-02-14(2)(b)

Accordingly, any action predicated on this contract had to commence within five (5) years from May 1, 2000. See § 95.11(2)(b), Fla. Stat. (2000) (providing a five year statute of limitations applicable to a legal or equitable action on a contract founded on a written instrument). Because the Botts filed the original complaint on September 30, 2005, five months after the expiration of the limitations period, their claims are time barred.

Section 95.11(2)(b) bars a written-contract claim filed more than five years after the breach, even if the contract is treated as written.

Technical Packaging, Inc. v. Hanchett · filed 2008-09-26(2)(b)

Because thirty-two of the thirty-five orders at issue were delivered before March 1998,[4] a lawsuit filed in March 2003 with respect to these deliveries was time-barred even under a five-year statute.

Section 95.11(2)(b) provides a five-year limitations period for an action on a written contract.

NATIONAL FRANCHISEE ASS'N v. Burger King Corp. · filed 2010-05-20(2)(b)

BKC also moved to dismiss on the grounds that the five-year statute of limitations period under Florida law for breach of contract had expired. See § 95.11(2)(b), Fla. Stat. (the statute of limitations for a contract founded on a written instrument is five years). ... This issue arose in 2009, clearly within the five-year statute of limitations period under Florida law for breach of contract.

Section 95.11(2)(b) gives a party five years to bring a claim under a written contract, including a written attorney fee agreement.

Clark v. Estate of Elrod · filed 2011-04-01(2)(b)

Under section 95.11(2)(b), Florida Statutes (2000), an action on a contract founded on a written instrument shall be commenced within five years. ... Accordingly, we find the trial court erred by awarding Davids any unpaid fees for Stint I because his action was barred by the statute of limitations.

Section 95.11(2)(b) sets a five-year limitations period that barred the claim filed after it expired.

Krause v. TEXTRON FINANCIAL CORP. · filed 2009-04-17(2)(b)

As such, the trial court was correct to dismiss the claim, which was filed beyond the five-year statute of limitations period found in section 95.11(2)(b).

Section 95.11(2)(b) provides a five-year limitations period for claims arising out of the premium finance agreement, which the court applied to a potential statutory notice claim.

Evanston Insurance v. Premium Assignment Corp. · filed 2013-03-26(2)(b)

Any claim that the Estate of Dr. Dave may have had against PAC pursuant to § 627.848(1)(f), Fla. Stat., or for any other claim arising out of the Premium Finance Agreement, expired on February 4, 2008, when the five-year statute of limitations ran pursuant to § 95.11(2)(b), Fla. Stat.

Section 95.11(2)(b) gives five years to bring claims for breach of a written shareholders’ agreement and the related shareholders’ derivative action.

Goodwin v. Sphatt · filed 2013-06-12(2)(b)

Goodwin’s claims for breach of the shareholders’ agreement and the shareholders’ derivative action are subject to the five-year statute of limitations for “[a] legal or equitable action on a contract, obligation, or liability founded on a written instrument.” See § 95.11(2)(b), Fla. Stat. (2005).

Section 95.11(2)(b) gives a party five years to bring an action founded on a written instrument after the claim accrues.

Grove Isle Ass'n v. Grove Isle Associates, LLLP · filed 2014-03-26(2)(b)

The limitations period for “a legal or equitable action on a contract, obligation, or liability founded on a written instrument” is five years. § 95.11(2)(b), Fla. Stat. Thus, the Condominium Association may not assert any claims for breach of contract that accrued before July 2004.

Section 95.11(2)(b) gives five years to file a contract claim after it accrues, unless the limitations period is tolled.

Olean Medical Condominium Ass'n v. Azima · filed 2014-06-20(2)(b)

Thus, unless otherwise tolled, a five-year limitations period could have expired no later than 2010, rendering Dr. Azima’s 2011 filing of the complaint time-barred.

Section 95.11(2)(b)’s five-year limitations period applies to claims alleging a violation of restrictive covenants even when the requested remedy is equitable reformation.

Silver Shells Corp. v. St. Maarten at Silver Shells Condominium Ass'n · filed 2015-06-24(2)(b)

The Association’s claims regarding the Beach Property arise from the Developer’s alleged violation of the Restrictive Covenants, which is akin to a breach of contract action. The fact that the remedy sought by the Association for the alleged breach was the “equitable reformation” of the Restrictive Covenants through the invalidation of the amendment does not change the nature of the underlying claim. ... Accordingly, we agree with the developer that the Association’s claims related to the Beach Property are subject to the five-year statute of limitations in section 95.11(2)(b).

Section 95.11 provides a four-year limitations period for a fraudulent-conveyance claim, running from when the fraudulent conduct was discovered or should have been discovered.

Tambay Trustee, Inc. v. Southard (In Re Southard) · filed 1988-09-14

In this connection it should be noted that the applicable nonbankruptcy law, Fla.Stat. § 95.11, provides that the relevant statute of limitations is four years. ... However, it is well established that the date of the transfer is not determinative of when the state law cause of action for a fraudulent conveyance accrues, but rather it is the date on which the fraudulent conduct was discovered or should have been discovered.

Subsection (4)(e) sets a two-year limitations period for Chapter 517 actions running from when the facts were discovered or should have been discovered with due diligence, subject to a five-year outer limit from the violation.

Schoch v. Dade City Retirement Housing, Inc. · filed 1988-11-08(4)(e)

The appropriate statute of limitations to be applied to these claims, therefore, is Fla.Stat. § 95.11(4)(e). That section provides for a limitations period of two years for actions brought pursuant to Chapter 517 “with the period running from the time the facts giving rise to the cause of action were discovered or should have been discovered with the exercise of due diligence, but not more than 5 years from the date such violation occurred.”

Section 95.11(4)(e) requires chapter 517 actions to be filed within two years after discovery (or when the facts should have been discovered with reasonable diligence), and never more than five years after the violation.

King v. Gandolfo · filed 1989-06-06(4)(e)

When Florida is the forum state, the proper limitations period to apply to these claims is the limitations period prescribed in the Florida Securities and Investor Protection Act, Fla. Stat. §§ 517.011, et seq. ... This limitations period is set forth at Fla. Stat. § 95.11(4)(e), which provides in pertinent part: ... Based on the two year statute of limitations, the events in question would have had to have occurred on or after March 28, 1987, to be actionable in this cause. ... Plaintiffs complaint is unequivocal that she discovered the facts giving rise to this action in May 1986. Therefore, as to count 1, the motion to dismiss will be granted.

Section 95.11(3)(k)'s four-year limitations period begins when the alleged breach occurs, even if the contractual relationship continues.

Dovenmuehle, Inc. v. LAWYERS TITLE INS. · filed 1985-11-06(3)(k)

It is also conceded that section 95.11(3)(k), Florida Statutes (1983), which provides for a four-year statute of limitations, applies. ... In the case at bar, a definite breach is alleged to have occurred during the life of the contract; that is, at the time the property was acquired in 1973. We hold that the statute of limitations began to run on that date in 1973.

Section 95.11’s five-year limitations period for mortgage foreclosure does not run from a default when the controlling mortgage makes acceleration optional and the mortgagee has not accelerated the debt.

KRC Enterprises, Inc. v. Soderquist · filed 1989-12-15

Thus, the mortgage, providing for acceleration at the mortgagee's option, prevails over the language in the note. ... Therefore, the five year statute of limitations had not run.

For a property-taking claim arising from a land transfer, section 95.11(3)(p)’s four-year period begins on the deed date.

Heckman v. City of Oakland Park · filed 1994-09-14(3)(p)

The parties agree that the four-year statute of limitations provided by section 95.11(3)(p), Florida Statutes (1991) applies. ... Because this count focuses on the actual transfer of the seven-foot parcel to the City, and what, if anything, the Heckmans received in compensation from the City (not the DOT), the date of the deed from the Heckmans would trigger the running of the statute.

Section 95.11(2)(b)’s five-year limit for a pension-plan participation claim runs from notice that the employee is excluded from the plan.

City of Hollywood v. Petrosino · filed 2004-01-07(2)(b)

Because these five elements existed at the time Petrosino was hired and was informed he could not participate in the City's pension plan, Petrosino's cause of action accrued in 1987. See id.; Margolis, 732 So.2d at 509. This places Petrosino's claim well outside of the five-year statute of limitation. See § 95.11(2)(b), Fla. Stat. (2001).

Section 95.11(3)(p) gives a landowner four years to bring an as-applied regulatory taking claim after an administrative denial makes the claim ripe.

Sutton v. Monroe County · filed 2009-12-23(3)(p)

We now affirm the trial court’s dismissal because we, too, agree with Monroe County that Suttons’ action was barred by the four (4) year statute of limitations found in section 95.11(3)(p), Florida Statutes (2007). ... As Monroe County correctly points out, Sutton’s claim would have become ripe in 1997 after her administrative appeal of Monroe County’s denial of her application for a building permit, not in 2006 when the BUD was rendered.

Section 95.11(3)’s four-year limit bars challenges to the DDA’s establishment and boundaries brought more than four years after their enactment, but does not bar a challenge to an annual tax ordinance enacted within that period.

Milan Investment Group, Inc. v. City of Miami · filed 2010-11-24(3)

The City and DDA are correct in their assertion that the four-year statute of limitations, § 95.11(3), applies to (and bars) Milan Investment’s challenges to the establishment of the DDA and its boundaries. ... In the case of the separate and later City ordinance imposing the half-mill DDA levy for the fiscal year beginning October 1, 2008, however, the challenged ordinance was enacted by the City within the limitation period and thus the challenge is not time-barred.

The five-year limitations period for breach of a written contract begins when performance is due if the promisee elects to await performance after an anticipatory breach.

Dutra v. Kaplan · filed 2014-04-16(2)(b)

The limitations period for Dutra’s breach of contract claim began to run in 2009, and not in 2004, as argued by Kaplan. Therefore, Dutra timely brought her claim.

Section 95.11(2)(b)'s state limitations period does not bar enforcement of an assigned NDSL loan when federal law provides a later filing deadline.

United States v. Hunter · filed 1988-11-15(2)(b)

Florida Stat. § 95.11(2)(b), which would have required that suit be brought well before the date of assignment, is clearly such a state law, and therefore, by virtue of Section 484A of the HEA, its limitations now have no effect on the United State’s ability to enforce an assigned loan obligation previously affected by that law.

Section 95.11(4)(e) supplied the two-year Florida limitations period for federal § 10(b) claims when selected under New York’s borrowing statute.

Dymm v. Cahill · filed 1990-02-13(4)(e)

The Florida statute of limitations governing § 10(b) claims is the two-year period applicable to Florida’s blue sky laws, Fl.Stat. § 95.11(4)(e).

Section 95.11(4)(e) requires securities-fraud claims to be filed within two years after discovery of the facts giving rise to the claim and no more than five years after the violation.

In Re Rospatch Securities Litigation · filed 1991-04-10(4)(e)

When Florida is the forum state in federal securities cases, federal courts have applied the two year/five year statute of limitations of Florida's Blue Sky laws, Fla.Stat. §§ 517.011 et seq., to federal securities law claims. King v. Gandolfo, 714 F.Supp. 1180, 1181 (M.D.Fla.1989) (citing Byrne v. Gulfstream First Bank & Trust Co., 528 F.Supp. 692, 693-94 (S.D.Fla.1981), aff'd without opinion, 720 F.2d 686 (11th Cir. 1983)). Under Florida's Blue Sky laws, claims must be brought within two years of discovery of the facts giving rise to the cause of action, but in any event not more than five years from the date such violation occurred. Fla.Stat. § 95.11(4)(e). As this court sits as if Florida were the forum state, the two year/five year limitations period applies to plaintiffs' securities fraud claims.

Section 95.11 imposes a two-year discovery-based and five-year absolute limitations period for the securities claims, a four-year period for fraud, and a two-year period for professional-malpractice claims, subject to continuing representation.

Wilder v. Meyer · filed 1991-10-08(4)(e), (3)(j), (4)(a)

The applicable statute of limitations for the Plaintiff’s Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Florida’s Blue Sky Law claims is § 95.11(4)(e). Fla.Stat. § 95.-11(4)(e). ... Fla.Stat. § 95.11(4)(e) requires a two prong test to be met. ... First, the lawsuit must be commenced within two years “from the time the facts giving rise to the cause of action were discovered or should have been discovered with the exercise of due diligence.” Second, actions of this type must be instituted “not more than 5 years from the date such violation occurred.” Fla.Stat. § 95.11(4)(e). ... Therefore, equitable tolling will not serve to extend the five-year bar provided by the statute of limitations. ... Plaintiff's common law fraud claim in Count V of the Amended Complaint is governed by a four-year statute of limitations. Fla.Stat. § 95.11(3)(j). ... The Plaintiffs negligence and breach of fiduciary duty claims are governed by a two-year statute of limitations applicable to professional malpractice claims. Fla.Stat. § 95.11(4)(a). ... However, this two-year statute of limitations is subject to the continuing representation doctrine. ... The continuing representation tolls the statute of limitations as long as the attorney continues to represent the client.

Section 95.11(3)(j) imposes a four-year limitations period on legal or equitable actions founded on fraud, while a truly forged deed is outside that rule because it is void ab initio.

Padron Warehouse v. Realty Associates Fund III · filed 2005-07-14(3)(j)

Regardless of what labels PWC places on its claims, those claims are based on fraud, a fraud which Realty is alleged to have conspired and participated in. ... In Moore, the Fifth District held that, in the case of a truly forged deed — that is, a deed in which one person signed as if she were another — § 95.11(3)(j) does not apply because a forged deed is void ab initio and cannot transfer title. ... But, unlike the situation in Moore, there is no forgery. Mr. Padron signed his own name, and not anyone else's, on the purchase agreement and the deed. The fact that Mr. Padron allegedly did not have the authority to bind PWC in this transaction does not make his genuine signature a forgery. ... Accordingly, PWC's claims, which are in reality claims "founded upon fraud," are dismissed as time-barred under § 95.11(3)(j).

Section 95.11(3) provides a four-year limitations period for § 1983 claims arising in Florida.

Johnny E. Ellison, Jr. v. Lester · filed 2008-04-30(3)

However, we have held that the four-year statute of limitations under Fla. Stat. § 95.11(3) applies to § 1983 claims arising in Florida. See e.g., Chappell v. Rich, 340 F.3d 1279, 1283 (11th Cir. 2003) (per curiam).

Section 95.11(5)(a) provides one year to bring an action for specific performance of a contract.

United Paperworkers International v. ITT Rayonier, Inc. · filed 1990-06-07(5)(a)

The Union, however, proposes that this action is governed by the most analogous state statute of limitation, Fla.Stat. § 95.11(5)(a), which provides one year in which to bring an action for specific performance of a contract. The Court agrees with the Union’s interpretation of the governing law and accordingly the action was timely filed and served.

Subsection 95.11(5)(a) provides a one-year limitations period for an action seeking specific performance of a contract.

United Paperworks International, Local 395, United Paperworkers International, Local 766 v. Itt Rayonier, Inc. · filed 1991-05-20(5)(a)

Therefore, we hold that under the general rule that state statutes of limitation should be borrowed where Congress fails to provide a federal statute of limitations, the appropriate limitation period in this case is that found in Fla.Stat. § 95.11(5)(a) — one year.

Section 95.11(4)(e) requires claims to be brought within two years after discovery of the facts giving rise to the claim and no more than five years after the violation.

Atlantis Group, Inc. v. Rospatch Corp. · filed 1991-04-10(4)(e)

Under Florida’s Blue Sky laws, claims must be brought within two years of discovery of the facts giving rise to the cause of action, but in any event not more than five years from the date such violation occurred. Fla.Stat. § 95.11(4)(e). As this court sits as if Florida were the forum state, the two year/five year limitations period applies to plaintiffs’ securities fraud claims.

Section 95.11(4)(a) imposes a two-year statute of limitations on a former client's breach-of-fiduciary-duty claim against counsel when the claim is treated as professional malpractice.

Tambourine Comercio Internacional SA v. Solowsky · filed 2009-02-17(4)(a)

Based on the plain text of sections 95.11(3)(o) and 95.11(4)(a) and also the guidance provided by Florida courts, we hold the district court was correct in treating Tambourine’s breach of fiduciary duty claim against its former counsel as a professional malpractice claim subject to the two-year statute of limitations.

Section 95.11(5)(a) requires an action for specific performance of a contract to be brought within one year after the contract is breached.

CENTRAK NAT. BANK OF MIAMI v. Central Bancorp., Inc. · filed 1982-03-30(5)(a)

Section 95.11(5)(a), Florida Statutes (1979) requires that an action for specific performance of a contract be brought within one year. Consistent with Florida law, this means that the statute of limitations begins to run on the date the contract is breached.

Section 95.11(5)(a) gives a party one year from breach to sue for specific performance; a pending declaratory action does not toll that period unless it prevents the party from pursuing the remedy.

City of Orlando v. Williams · filed 1986-07-24(5)(a)

Section 95.11(5)(a), Florida Statutes (1985) requires that an action for specific performance of a contract shall be commenced within one year. Consistent with Florida law, this means that the statute of limitations begins to run on the date the contract is breached. ... Since the Williams group was not prevented from pursuing its legal remedy, the declaratory action did not toll the running of the statute and this action was barred by the statute of limitations.

Section 95.11(5)(a)'s one-year limit bars a time-barred counterclaim for specific performance of a real-property sale contract.

Rybovich Boat Works, Inc. v. Atkins · filed 1991-08-22(5)(a)

We believe that, as a matter of law, unfairness and unjustness always exist whenever a court allows a time-barred claim for specific performance to be raised as a counterclaim in a lawsuit arising from a contract for purchase and sale of real property.

Section 95.11(5)(a) imposes a one-year limitations period on a claim for specific performance of a contract, including a claim for injunctive relief treated as specific performance.

Ferola v. Blue Reef Holding Corp., Inc. · filed 1998-10-28(5)(a)

The trial court dismissed count I of the Ferolas' complaint with prejudice, concluding that the Ferolas' claim for injunctive relief was a claim for specific performance of a contract, and that the allegations of the complaint demonstrated that the one year statute of limitations period for specific performance barred the action. See § 95.11(5)(a), Fla. Stat. (1995). We agree and affirm the dismissal of count I.

Section 95.11(5) allows one year from accrual to bring an action for specific performance.

Schachter v. Krzynowek · filed 2007-06-13(5)

Section 95.11(5), Florida Statutes (2003), allowed the buyer one year from the time the cause of action accrued within which to bring an action for specific performance.

Section 95.11(5)(a) applies a one-year limitations period to an action seeking to compel performance of an affirmative contractual obligation.

MELBOURNE OCEAN CLUB CONDOMINIUM v. Elledge · filed 2011-08-26(5)(a)

Thus, Appellees’ claim against Tinimar constituted an action for specific performance, subject to a one year statute of limitations.

Section 95.11(5)(a) requires an action for specific performance of a contract to be brought within one year, with the limitations period beginning when the contract is breached.

McMillan v. Shively · filed 2009-12-08(5)(a)

Section 95.11(5)(a), Florida Statutes (2008), requires an action for specific performance of a contract be brought within one year, and the statute of limitations begins to run on the date the contract is breached.

Section 95.11(5)(a) gives a party one year from the breach to bring a specific performance claim to enforce a repurchase option.

Palm Beach Polo Holdings, Inc. v. Wellington Acquisition, LLC and Ethrensa Family Trust Company · filed 2023-11-29(5)(a)

This was an option of limited duration, because when the time period for commencement of construction passed, the seller would have only one year to declare a default and bring a specific performance claim to exercise its right/option. ... We agree with the trial court that the statute of limitations period to enforce the right/option based upon the purchaser’s breach of the contract’s provision regarding construction of the residence began after the two-year period for construction expired without the purchaser commencing construction of the residence.

Section 95.11(3)(c) provides a four-year limitations period for a subrogation claim founded on engineering work used to plan an improvement to real property, even when the claim also concerns professional malpractice.

AMERICAN AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY v. FDH INFRASTRUCTURE SERVICES, LLC · filed 2023-05-31(3)(c)

Section 95.11(3) applies narrowly to only construction-based claims. This provision stands in contrast to section 95.11(4), which encompasses any “professional malpractice” action. ... Consequently, we find this action falls within the ambit of the four-year limitation.

Section 95.11(3)(c)'s four-year period for claims involving a latent design defect may require a jury to decide when the claimant had notice of a cause of action.

INLET MARINA OF PALM BEACH, LTD. v. ANDERSON MOORE CONSTRUCTION · filed 2018-01-31(3)(c)

As in Performing Arts, whether the facts and circumstances were sufficient to put the marina on notice that a cause of action existed before the four-year limitations period expired should be a question for the jury.

Section 95.11(3)(a) applies to negligence claims arising from simple roof repairs; section 95.11(3)(c) does not.

Companion Property & Casualty Group v. Built Tops Building Services, Inc. · filed 2017-05-10(3)(a)

However, Companion sued Built Tops for negligence due to a simple repair of the subrogor’s roof. The correct portion of section 95.11 that is applicable here is (3)(a), not (3)(c), because Companion alleged an action founded on negligence.

For § 95.11(3)(c)'s construction defect repose period, a contract is complete only after both parties have performed.

Busch v. Lennar Homes, LLC · filed 2017-04-13(3)(c)

A contract is not complete until "both sides of the contract" have been performed.

For an action involving a latent defect in an improvement to real property, the four-year limitations period begins when the defect is discovered or should have been discovered with due diligence, and notice of a defective condition in underground pipes may present a factual question.

City of Fort Lauderdale v. Ross, Saarinen, Bolton & Wilder, Inc. · filed 1992-10-26(3)(c)

ROSS argues, and the CITY agrees, that the contract and negligence counts are governed by a single statute providing for the commencement within four years of any action “founded on the design, planning, or construction of an improvement to real property.” Fla.Stat. § 95.11(3)(c). If the action involves a latent defect, the four-year period begins when .'“the defect is discovered or should have been discovered with the exercise of due diligence.” Id. ... Stated differently, both cases measure the limitations period from the notice of a defective condition. Caudill simply recognizes that, with underground pipes, notice of a defect is more difficult to imply. The CITY herein alleges that it was “unaware” of the defect in pipe design until 1987. Assuming the truth of this allegation, the court declines to imply notice as a matter of law, and thereby bar the contract and negligence claims, because the CITY admits prior knowledge of a single leak in a one-mile stretch of pipe eleven years after its first use. ... It appears that summary judgment on the issue may be inappropriate as well: “[w]hether one by exercise of reasonable diligence should have known he had a cause of action against the defendant is, ordinarily, a question of fact which should be left to the jury.” Caudill, 461 So.2d at 243 (citing cases).

Section 95.11(5)(b) requires an action for trespass upon real property to be brought within three years, with the limitations period for permanent damage beginning when the damage becomes apparent as permanent.

Petroleum Products Corp. v. Clark · filed 1971-05-20(5)(b)

The authorities all agree that the period of limitations does not commence to run against the cause of action for permanent damage to realty until the damage is apparent and it becomes obvious such damage is of a permanent character. ... Thus, the action was not barred by § 95.11(5) (b), Florida Statutes, and the trial court was eminently correct in its determination.

Section 95.11(3)(c)'s twelve-year absolute bar on lawsuits involving construction defects violates Florida's constitutional right of access to courts when it eliminates a cause of action without an alternative remedy.

Overland Const. Co., Inc. v. Sirmons · filed 1979-03-01(3)(c)

We hold that, insofar as section 95.11(3)(c), Florida Statutes (1975), provides an absolute bar to lawsuits brought more than twelve years after events connected with the construction of improvements to real property, it violates article I, section 21 of the Florida Constitution.

Section 95.11(3) bars a construction-defect damages claim filed more than four years after the claimant was on notice of the defects.

Elison v. Goodman · filed 1981-03-10(3)

The Elisons' cross-claim for damages allegedly caused by construction defects in their new home was terminated by summary judgment on statute of limitation grounds, because unequivocal statements in their depositions established that they were on notice of the defects more than four years before the action was filed. Section *1202 95.11(3), Florida Statutes (1979); Steiner v. Ciba-Geigy Corp., 364 So.2d 47 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978), cert. denied, 373 So.2d 461 (Fla. 1979). The judgment is affirmed, notwithstanding the filing of an affidavit in opposition to the summary judgment in which Mr. Elison directly contradicted his deposition testimony concerning the date of discovery, so as to bring it within the limitations period.

Section 95.11(3)(c)'s twelve-year limit cannot constitutionally bar a claim that arose after the limit expired.

Perez v. Universal Engineering Corp. · filed 1982-03-30(3)(c)

There is no dispute that under this statute the twelve-year period expired in 1970. Neither is there a dispute that if appellants have a cause of action, it accrued after 1970. ... In answer to the first of the two issues we hold that the twelve-year ban portion of the statute, cited with emphasis above, cannot constitutionally be applied to bar appellants' action for recovery.

Section 95.11(3)(c)'s four-year period applies to claims against an architect for defective building design rather than the two-year professional malpractice period.

School Bd. of Seminole County v. GAF Corp. · filed 1982-04-14(3)(c)

We agree that section 95.11(3)(c) applies to these cases rather than the two-year statute.[2] The language of the four-year statute is much more specifically applicable to these suits against Kelley than the two-year statute, which generally references "professional malpractice" suits.[3] However, we disagree that the record established conclusively, in these cases, that the four-year statute had run against the School Board by July of 1977.

Section 95.11(3)(c)'s four-year period is not postponed when an owner knows of an obvious construction problem but does not know its specific cause.

Havatampa Corp. v. McELVY, JENNEWEIN, INC. · filed 1982-06-30(3)(c)

We affirm the trial court's holding that section 95.11(3)(c) bars appellant's action. ... Appellant cannot rely on a lack of knowledge of the specific cause of the problem to protect it against expiration of the four year statute of limitations.

Section 95.11(3)(c)'s limitations period for construction defect claims did not begin when earlier leaks appeared if the defect was discovered later.

Biscayne Roofing Co. v. PALMETTO FAIRWAY, ETC. · filed 1982-08-10(3)(c)

Upon discovering the defect, and within the applicable period of limitations,[1] section 95.11(3)(c), Florida Statutes (1975), the condominium association filed an action based upon negligence and breach of warranties. ... We reject Biscayne's assertion that the leaks gave rise to a cause of action at an earlier date.

Knowledge of an obvious construction problem satisfies subsection (3)(c)'s discovery requirement despite repair attempts and lack of knowledge of the specific defect.

Kelley v. School Bd. of Seminole County · filed 1983-07-14(3)(c)

The evidence shows that, regardless of Kelley's attempts to repair the roofs and regardless of the school board's lack of knowledge of a specific defect, the school board knew more than four years prior to August 1977 that something was wrong with the roofs of these three schools.

Section 95.11(3)(c) gives four years to sue over the design or construction of an improvement to real property; for a latent defect, the period begins when the defect is or should have been discovered through due diligence.

Bd. of Trustees v. Scott · filed 1984-12-21(3)(c)

The limitation period for an action founded on the design or construction of an improvement to real property is four years from the date of actual possession or completion of the contract, whichever is later, except that, when the action involves a latent defect, the time runs from when the defect is discovered or should have been discovered with the exercise of due diligence.

Section 95.11(3)(c)'s four-year limit applies to warranty claims arising from improvements to real property.

Dubin v. Dow Corning Corp. · filed 1985-10-02(3)(c)

We read this language to mean "any" action arising out of improvements to real property, whether founded on contract or on negligence.

Section 95.11(3)(c)'s four-year period for construction-defect claims begins when the claimant has notice of a defective condition, even without a later engineer's report.

CONQUISTADOR CONDOMINIUM. v. Conquistador Corp. · filed 1987-01-07(3)(c)

We find no merit in appellant's argument that they did not know that the roof was defective until they received the engineer's report in 1982. The roof had leaked since 1976 and the repairs beginning in 1979 cannot be considered insubstantial. The record contains sufficient uncontradicted evidence to support the trial judge's conclusion that as a matter of law appellant had notice in 1979 that a defective condition existed.

Under § 95.11(3)(c), notice to a condominium association of defects in common elements is imputed to unit owners when applying the four-year limitations period to their claims against developers.

Naranja Lakes Condominium No. Two, Inc. v. Rizzo · filed 1985-01-22(3)(c)

Because a condominium association is the contractually and statutorily designated agent of the unit owners with respect to the maintenance and repair of the common elements, sec. 718.111(6), Fla.Stat. (1981), notice to the association of defects in those areas is deemed to be notice to the owners. 2 Fla.Jur.2d Agency and Employment § 94 (1977). In this case, it appears as a matter of law that the appellant associations became aware — through their own managing agent — of the defects which were the subject matter of the instant class actions against the developers more than four years before they filed suit on the unit owners’ behalf under Fla.R.Civ.P. 1.221 and sec. 718.111(2), Fla.Stat. (1981). Hence, the trial court properly granted summary judgment that the cases were barred by the statute of limitations. Sec. 95.11(3)(c), Fla.Stat. (1981); see Kelley v. School Board of Seminole County, 435 So.2d 804 (Fla.1983).

Section 95.11(3)(c)’s fifteen-year limit on actions involving the design, planning, or construction of improvements to real property is constitutional because the legislature established a sufficient public necessity for it.

American Liberty Ins. Co. v. West and Conyers · filed 1986-04-11(3)(c)

In enacting the preamble to the new section 95.11(3)(c), we believe the legislature has met the requirements of Overland Construction Co., thereby sustaining the validity of the statute.

A plaintiff invoking section 95.11(3)(c)'s latent-defect exception must plead avoidance and prove the facts supporting the exception.

Richardson v. Wilson · filed 1986-06-27(3)(c)

Thus, in accordance with the Glass analysis, a plaintiff seeking to avoid a statute of limitation through the tolling provisions of section 95.051 or a specific statutory exception would have the burden of pleading avoidance, and of proving facts relevant to the tolling of or the exception to the statute during the trial. The jury instruction requiring appellants to prove latency of the construction defects was proper.

Section 95.11(3)(c)’s four-year period does not bar a claim if the plaintiff proves the damage was caused by a latent defect that the plaintiff neither knew nor should have known about before the limitations period.

Evans v. Almand Construction Co. · filed 1988-09-01(3)(c)

Because the appellants alleged that the settling and resultant damage to the house was the result of a latent defect (the defective, unstable and unsuitable fill) of which they had no actual or constructive knowledge prior to 1982, the entry of summary judgment on statute of limitations grounds was erroneous. If the appellants are able to prove their allegations, i.e., if they can prove to the satisfaction of a trier of fact that the damage to their house was caused by a latent defect of which they neither knew nor should have known prior to 1982, the four year statute of limitations will not constitute a bar to their action.

Section 95.11(3)(c) starts the limitations period for a latent construction defect when the defect is discovered or should have been discovered through due diligence; a factual dispute over latency prevents summary judgment on that defense.

Kala Investments, Inc. v. Sklar · filed 1989-01-31(3)(c)

While it is true that the section provides for a four-year limitations period on actions "founded on the design planning, or construction of an improvement to real property, with the time running from ... the date of the issuance of a certificate of occupancy," significant here is its further provision that "when the action involves a latent defect, the time runs from the time the defect is discovered or should have been discovered with the exercise of due diligence." ... First, if, as we have already determined, reasonable persons could differ as to whether the defect was patent or latent, then summary judgment based on the statute of limitations — which also turns on the patency-latency determination — is as inappropriate as summary judgment based on the rule of Slavin v. Kay.

Section 95.11(3)(c)'s discovery period begins when known damage puts the owner on notice of a possible cause of action, even without knowledge of the defect's specific cause.

ALMAND CONST. CO., INC. v. Evans · filed 1989-07-06(3)(c)

The Evans' knowledge of the settling of the house and resultant structural damage, which they concede they had as early as 1978, was sufficient to put them on notice that they had, or might have had, a cause of action. This knowledge meets the discovery component of section 95.11(3)(c).

Section 95.11(3)(c) gives a plaintiff four years from discovery of a building defect to sue for negligent design or construction; a separate negligent repair claim may still be timely.

Miller v. Capriles · filed 1988-10-13(3)(c)

In effect at all material times was Section 95.11(3)(c), Florida Statutes, which provided for a 4 year statute of limitation for a cause of action based on the design or construction of the subject building, with the time of the running of the statute of limitations to commence when the defect is discovered or should have been discovered in the exercise of due diligence. ... Since the statute of limitation had run prior to the filing of this action on the negligent design/construction of the building, the Plaintiff can have no recovery as to same. ... When Plaintiff brought her action for the negligent repair, the same was within the 4 year statute of limitation.

If no certificate of occupancy was issued, the 15-year period runs from the latest listed event that did occur.

Wambles v. Amrep Southeast, Inc. · filed 1990-10-18(3)(c)

Indeed the most that could be inferred from Mr. Hutchinson’s affidavit, if we assume such records were kept and maintained, is that the certificate of occupancy never issued. In such case, instead of extending indefinitely the statute of limitations, we hold that the latest date of the statutory listed incidents which did occur would control.

Section 95.11(3)(c) ordinarily gives four years to file a condominium construction defect claim for breach of implied warranty.

Charley Toppino & Sons v. SEAWATCH · filed 1994-11-10(3)(c)

Accordingly, a suit for breach of implied warranty under section 718.203 ordinarily must be filed within this four-year period.

Section 95.11(3)(c)’s limitations period governs claims for breach of a general contractor’s duties on structural improvements to real property.

Suntrust Banks of Florida, Inc. v. Don Wood, Inc. · filed 1997-05-09(3)(c)

Since the Bank sued the Contractor for allegedly breaching its duties as the general contractor on a project involving structural improvements to the Bank’s real property, the trial court properly ruled that the limitations period set forth in section 95.11(3)(c) controlled.

Section 95.11(3)(c)’s construction statute of repose is not extended by the condominium association tolling provision in section 718.124.

Homeowners v. Disney World · filed 1999-01-13(3)(c)

We decline the appellants' invitation to abrogate legislative power and therefore conclude that section 718.124 is necessarily limited to its terms and does not otherwise alter section 95.11(3)(c).

Section 95.11(3)(c)'s statute of repose applies to indemnity and contribution claims founded on the design, planning, or construction of an improvement to real property.

State, Dept. of Transp. v. Echeverri · filed 1999-07-14(3)(c)

Even assuming the very arguable question that the point was properly preserved below, we reject the contention as contrary to the plain language of the statute which clearly applies to all actions "founded on the design, planning, or construction of an improvement to real property."

Under § 95.11(3)(c), an obvious manifestation of a construction defect gives notice when it appears, but notice cannot be inferred as a matter of law when the manifestation could have other causes.

Performing Arts Center Authority v. CLARK CONST. GROUP, INC. · filed 2001-05-09(3)(c)

In sum, we conclude that where there is an obvious manifestation of a defect, notice will be inferred at the time of manifestation regardless of whether the plaintiff has knowledge of the exact nature of the defect. See Kelley, 435 So.2d at 806. However, as in this case, where the manifestation is not obvious but could be due to causes other than an actionable defect, notice as a matter of law may not be inferred. See Caudill, 461 So.2d at 244.

For construction claims without a latent defect, the four-year limitations period begins at the latest of the events listed in § 95.11(3)(c), including abandonment of unfinished construction.

Alexander v. Suncoast Builders, Inc. · filed 2002-12-26(3)(c)

Rather, pursuant to section 95.11(3)(c), when a latent defect is not involved, the limitation period begins to run from the latest of the following events: the date of actual possession by the owner; the date of the issuance of a certificate of occupancy; the date of abandonment of construction if not completed; the date of completion or termination of the contract between the professional engineer, registered architect, or licensed contractor and his or her employer.

Section 95.11(3)(c) gives four years to bring a construction-defect claim; discovering one defect does not necessarily start the period for unrelated latent defects.

Wishnatzki v. Coffman Const., Inc. · filed 2004-08-13(3)(c)

In pertinent part, section 95.11(3)(c) provides a four-year statute of limitations applicable to an action founded on the construction of an improvement to real property. ... Considering the complaint on its face, we cannot say as a matter of law that the limitations period commenced to run in 1988 when the Homeowner first experienced "problems with the roof." Further facts may or may not establish that other problems around the windows or in the walls constituted unrelated defects of which the Homeowner did not have notice until well after 1988.

Under the 1989 version of section 95.11(3)(c), the 15-year construction statute of repose is measured from the latest statutory date, including the date any professional engineer, architect, or contractor completed or terminated its contract, rather than the date a particular defendant finished its work.

Allan and Conrad v. University of Cent. Fl. · filed 2007-07-27(3)(c)

The trial court concluded that the correct measuring point for the commencement of the repose period under the statute's fourth prong was the latest date that any of the following entities completed or terminated their contract—the professional engineer, registered architect, or licensed contractor. ... We find it unnecessary to address the second and third elements because we find no error in the trial court's interpretation of section 95.11(3)(c).

For a latent construction defect, the limitation period runs from when the defect is discovered or should have been discovered with due diligence.

SALTPONDS CONDOMINIUM ASS'N, INC. v. McCoy · filed 2007-12-19(3)(c)

The engineering report attached to the amended complaint in this case does not conclusively establish, at this stage, that the defects are patent. Where the defect is latent, the limitation period "runs from the time the defect is discovered or should have been discovered with the exercise of due diligence." § 95.11(3)(c), Fla. Stat. (2006).

Section 95.11(3)(c) does not support dismissal of a construction defect complaint when factual questions about latent defects and tolling may affect the limitations period.

SALTPONDS CONDO. v. Walbridge Aldinger Co. · filed 2008-04-30(3)(c)

Because of the various factual issues regarding the latency of the defects and the various tolling provisions which may be applicable, we conclude that the amended complaint should not have been dismissed.

Section 95.11(3)(c) makes the limitations period for a latent construction defect claim depend on when the claimant knew or should have known of the defect.

Mariner Club, Ltd. v. Summit Contractors, Inc. · filed 2009-11-05(3)(c)

When the statute of limitations ran depends on when the former owner knew or should have known of the alleged latent defect(s) of which the former owner complains.

Section 95.11(3)(c)’s four-year period for construction defect claims begins when an obvious defect manifests, even if the owner does not yet know its precise nature or cause.

Hochberg v. THOMAS CARTER PAINTING, INC. · filed 2011-06-08(3)(c)

The statute provides a tolling provision: “[W]hen the action involves a latent defect, the time runs from the time the defect is discovered or should have been discovered with the exercise of due diligence.” ... However, Florida law is clear that “where there is an obvious manifestation of a defect, notice will be inferred at the time of manifestation regardless of whether the plaintiff has knowledge of the exact nature of the defect.”

Section 95.11(3)(e)'s fifteen-year repose period does not bar an action when the relevant contract was not completed or terminated fifteen years before suit.

Downs v. United States · filed 2011-06-13(3)(e)

After considering the testimony and evidence submitted at that partial trial, the Court found that, assuming the statute of repose applies, it does not bar Downs’ action since the LCA was not completed or terminated fifteen years before Downs filed suit.

The event that starts the construction-defect statute of repose need not itself be an improvement to real property; completion of the relevant contract can start the period.

Clearwater Housing Authority v. Future Capital Holding Corp. · filed 2013-11-08(3)(c)

We agree that, based on the plain language of the statute, the issue in this case is not whether the 2003 final plat was an improvement to real property but whether it was completed under Clear-water Housing’s contract with Florida Design.

Section 95.11(3)(c)’s ten-year construction statute of repose begins when both parties have completed their performance under the contract, including required final payment.

Cypress Fairway Condominium v. Bergeron Construction Co. · filed 2015-05-08(3)(c)

Completion of the contract means completion of performance by both sides of the contract, not merely performance by the contractor.

Section 95.11(3)(c)'s four-year period applies to actions concerning construction of an improvement to real property based on the nature of the contract, regardless of whether the contractor is licensed.

Brock v. Garner Window & Door Sales, Inc. · filed 2016-02-29(3)(c)

First, the reference to “licensed contractor” is contained within the portion of the statute that addresses when the statute commences to run, not the types of actions to which it applies. The applicability of the statute turns on the nature of the contract, not the particular triggering event that starts the computation period.

Section 95.11(3)(c)’s 12-year limitation cannot bar a cause of action that accrues only after the limitation period has elapsed.

Valdes v. Western Knapp Engineering Co. · filed 1980-05-06(3)(c)

The plaintiffs appeal from a summary judgment holding that their claims, as against one of the defendants below, Western Knapp Engineering Company, were absolutely precluded by the running of the 12-year statute of limitation contained in Section 95.11(3)(c), Florida Statutes (1977). Subsequent to the entry of the order below, the supreme court held in Overland Construction Co. v. Sirmons, 369 So.2d 572 (Fla. 1979) that the statute could not constitutionally be applied to bar a cause of action which, like the one in this case, did not *1372accrue until after the statutory period had already elapsed. ... Pursuant thereto, the judgment under review is Reversed.

Section 95.11(3)(j) gives fraud claims four years to be filed, with the period beginning when the fraud was discovered or should have been discovered with due diligence.

Colonial Penn Insurance v. Value Rent-A-Car Inc. · filed 1992-12-08(3)(j)

Under Florida law, actions for fraud are subject to a four year statute of limitations. Fla.Stat. § 95.11(3)(j). The statute of limitations based on fraud is strictly construed against the party bringing suit and begins to run when the alleged basis of the action was either discovered or should have been discovered by the exercise of due diligence. ... On the basis of Colonial’s allegations, Colonial had notice of the fraudulent activity by its own admission when it “suspected under-reporting of gross receipts by Value” in July of 1987. ... Assuming that the latest possible date of discovery of the fraud occurred on July 6,1987, an action filed later than July 6, 1991 would be barred by the statute of limitations. ... In the present case, the Florida fraud count was first maintained against Cohen in the First Amended Complaint filed on August 9, 1991, one month after the expiration of the statute of limitations. ... Without having met the requirements of Rule 15(c) ... , Colonial’s fraud count asserted against Cohen does not relate back to the original complaint and is therefore barred by the statute of limitations.

Section 95.11(3)(j) imposes a four-year limitations period on fraud and derivative claims; the court applied it to bar claims where the plaintiff had sufficient notice more than four years before suit.

Korman v. Iglesias · filed 1993-06-23(3)(j)

Pursuant to Florida law, claims for fraud and its derivative claims .must be brought within four years. Fla.Stat. § 95.11(3)(j) (1991). ... Based on the totality of the undisputed facts, the Court concludes that Korman had sufficient knowledge of her legal rights to trigger the statue of limitations more than four years prior to bringing suit in this cause.

Section 95.11(3)(j) imposes a four-year limitations period on legal or equitable actions founded on fraud, and claims labeled otherwise are still subject to it when their substance is fraud.

Padron Warehouse Corp. v. Realty Associates Fund III, L.P. · filed 2005-07-14(3)(j)

I agree with Realty. Regardless of what labels PWC places on its claims, those claims are based on fraud, a fraud which Realty is alleged to have conspired and participated in. ... Accordingly, PWC’s claims, which are in reality claims “founded upon fraud,” are dismissed as time-barred under § 95.11(3)0).

Section 95.11(4)(e) starts the two-year limitations period for a Florida Securities Act claim when the plaintiff discovers or should have discovered the violation, meaning when the plaintiff has constructive notice of facts supporting the claim.

Altenel v. Millennium Partners, L.L.C. · filed 2013-03-12(4)(e)

The two-year clock on a claim under the Florida Securities Act begins to run from the time when a plaintiff discovered or should have discovered the violation—i.e., when it had constructive notice of the facts giving rise to the claim.

Section 95.11(3)(j) requires fraud actions to be brought within four years.

AllState Insurance Company v. Vizcay · filed 2016-06-23(3)(j)

Under Florida law, an action for fraud must be brought within four years. Fla. Stat. § 95.11(3)(j).

Section 95.11(3)(j) requires fraud actions to be commenced within four years.

Beach Community Bank v. CBG Real Estate LLC · filed 2017-01-09(3)(j)

Under Florida law, an action for fraud must be commenced within four years. Fla. Stat. § 95.11(3)(j).

Section 95.11(3)(j) gives fraud claims a four-year limitations period, but the claim should not be dismissed at the pleading stage when the complaint does not conclusively establish that the period bars recovery.

Tannenbaum v. Jefferies, LLC · filed 2019-10-25(3)(j)

Jefferies first contends that Tannenbaum’s claims are barred by Florida’s four- year statute of limitations on claims sounding in fraud. Fla. Stat. § 95.11(3)q). But an assertion that the applicable statute of limitations has lapsed is an affirmative defense, which a complaint needn’t anticipate or negate. ... Only when allegations contained within the complaint itself conclusively demonstrate, on their face, that an affirmative defense operates to bar recovery on the plaintiff's claim is it subject to dismissal pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). ... Here, the allegations aren’t so conclusive. ... The Court will deny the motion on this ground.

Section 95.11(3)(j) requires a fraud action to be brought within four years, with accrual measured under Florida's discovery rule.

Otero v. NewRez LLC · filed 2023-01-27(3)(j)

As the Eleventh Circuit observed, “[a]n action for fraud must be brought within four years under Florida law. Fla. Stat. § 95.11(3)(j).” (Doc. 79, p. 3). “The clock on the statute of limitations for a fraud claim begins to run when ‘the facts giving rise to the cause of action were discovered or should have been discovered with the exercise of due diligence.’” (Id. (quoting Fla. Stat. § 95.031(2)(a))). ... The Circuit Court found, and this Court agrees, the amended complaint establishes the Plaintiffs knew of the alleged fraud as early as February 20, 2014. (Id.; see also Doc. 46, ¶ 20). That is, the Plaintiffs allege BONYM made a fraudulent representation at the September 10, 2014 hearing. (Doc. 46, ¶ 21). And the Plaintiffs claim Attorney Tromberg, and her firm, colluded with BONYM from the beginning. (Id. ¶ 22). Accordingly, the Plaintiffs’ fraud claim (Count I) is barred by the statute of limitations and is dismissed with prejudice.

Section 95.11(3)(i) provides a four-year limitations period for fraud actions, running from when the facts giving rise to the claim were discovered or should have been discovered with due diligence.

The Prudential Insurance Company of America v. Gardina · filed 2025-08-08(3)(i)

“An action founded upon fraud under [Fla. Stat. § 95.11(3)(i)] . . . must be begun within [a four-year period] . . . with the period running from the time the facts giving rise to the cause of action were discovered or should have been discovered with the exercise of due diligence. . . .” Fla. Stat. § 95.031(2)(a). ... Even so, their argument fails because whether Plaintiff should have discovered Defendants’ fraud in 2016 was a heavily disputed issue of fact at trial.

Section 95.11(3)(j) gives legal and equitable claims founded on fraud four years from discovery of the facts constituting the fraud, including claims for deed cancellation or a trust.

Steigman v. Danese · filed 1987-01-13(3)(j)

Although Counts I, II, and III are equitable actions for cancellation of deeds, and resulting and constructive trusts upon real property, the claims are founded upon misrepresentation and fraud. Thus, these counts, with Count IV, are controlled by the section 95.11(3)(j) 4-year limitations period. The period would not run, however, until discovery of the facts constituting fraud, which in this case allegedly occurred when Bernard Danese died.

Section 95.11(3)(j) provides a four-year limitations period for fraud actions; the period begins when the underlying facts were or should have been discovered.

Yacht Investors, Inc. v. Lazar (In re Lazar) · filed 1988-01-08(3)(j)

The debtor also argues that, under Florida law, the statute of limitations for acts of fraud is four years, which period has expired. See § 95.11(3)(j), Florida Statutes (1986). However, the four year limitation period begins to run only from the time when the facts underlying the cause of action were discovered or should have been discovered. See § 95.031(2), Florida Statutes. The debtor’s conduct, from the time of the subject transfers through and including the trial of this case, has been aimed at concealing the true nature of the subject transfers. The Court finds that the debtor and the defendants failed to establish that, in the exercise of due diligence, the creditors knew or should have known of the subject transfers more than four years prior to the filing of this action.

Section 95.11(3) supplies the four-year period for an undue influence claim; under section 95.031(2), the period runs from discovery of the facts giving rise to the claim, which cannot occur through reasonable diligence until the influence ends.

Merkle v. Hogan · filed 1989-06-21(3)

Undue influence is a species of fraud. ... Section 95.031(2), Florida Statutes (1987), provides that an action based upon fraud must be begun within the time periods prescribed in section 95.11(3), with the period running from the time the facts giving rise to the cause of action were discovered or should have been discovered with the exercise of due diligence but, in any event, within twelve years after the date of the commission of the alleged fraud. ... Courts in other jurisdictions have held that as a matter of law, facts giving rise to a cause of action based on undue influence do not become discoverable by the exercise of reasonable diligence until the termination of the influence. ... We agree and, therefore, reverse and remand this cause for further proceedings consistent herewith.

Section 95.11(3)(j) gives a fraud claim four years from accrual; the period begins once actual damage exists, even if its amount remains uncertain.

Hynd v. Ireland · filed 1991-07-17(3)(j)

An action for fraud must be filed within four years of the accrual of the cause of action. § 95.11(3)(j), Fla. Stat. (1989). ... Because a cause of action does not accrue for statute of limitations purposes until all elements are present, a determination as to when legally cognizable damages were incurred by appellant will be dispositive of this case. ... Clearly, damage actually occurred, although the amount remained uncertain, and appellant had more than the mere possibility of future damage.