Fla. Stat. § 95.11

Section 95.11 gives FDUTPA and unjust-enrichment claims four-year limitations periods and claims for breach of implied contractual duties of good faith and fair dealing a five-year period.

Brown v. Nationscredit Financial Services Corp. · filed 2010-03-10

The statute of limitations for a FDUTPA claim is four years pursuant to section 95.11(3)(Q, Florida Statutes, as it is based on a statutory liability. Appellants' claim for unjust enrichment is also subject to a four-year statute of limitations pursuant to section 95.1 l(3)(k). The breach of the duties of good faith and fair dealing is a claim arising from the parties’ contractual relationship and, therefore, subject to a five-year statute of limitations under section 95.1 l(2)(b).

Section 95.11 sets a four-year limitations period for unjust enrichment claims and generally a five-year period for breach-of-contract claims.

Atria Holdings, S.A. v. Golden Florida Trade LLC · filed 2025-12-16

Under Florida law, unjust enrichment claims are subject to a four-year statute of limitations, see § 95.11(8), Fla. Stat. And breach-of-contract claims are generally subject to a five-year statute of limitations, see § 95.11(2), Fla. Stat.

Section 95.11(2) provides a five-year limitations period, but a group disability insurance policy may set a three-year period.

Guarantee Trust Life Insurance v. Fundora · filed 1977-03-01(2)

The decision in this case turns upon whether the trial court correctly held that the five year statute of limitations contained in Section 95.11(2), Florida Statutes (1975), is governing in this case. ... We conclude from the sections quoted that it was the intention of the legislature to allow to group insurance policies the right to include a limitation period less than that provided by the general five year statute but not more restrictive than the period allowed for individual disability insurance policies. Therefore, it is in keeping with the intention of the legislature that group disability policies may provide a three year statute of limitations.

Section 95.11 sets a four-year limit for intentional-tort actions and a two-year limit for wrongful-death actions.

Marek v. State · filed 2009-07-16(3)(o), (4)(d)

A civil suit must be brought within the applicable statute of limitations, which would be either two or four years, depending on the cause of action asserted. ... Wigley’s statements to Conley in the mid-1990s, his statements to Pearson, which occurred sometime in 1999 or 2000, and his statements to Blackwelder, which were overheard by Mitchell and Green no earlier than 1998, would not have exposed Wigley to civil liability because the statute of limitations had expired.

Section 95.11 provides five years for breach of contract claims and four years for breach of fiduciary duty, breach of good faith and fair dealing, and unjust enrichment claims.

Employers Insurance Company of Wassau v. Redlands Christian Migrant Association, Inc. · filed 2020-09-02(2)(b), (3)(k), (3)(p)

Here, the parties agree on the limitations period: five years for breach of contract, and four years for breach of fiduciary duty, breach of good faith and fair dealing, and for unjust enrichment. See Fla. Stat. §§ 95.11(2)(b), (3)(k), (3)(p). ... And upon review of Redlands’ counterclaims, it is not apparent that they are time-barred.

Section 95.11(4)'s two-year limitations period for wage actions does not apply to an EEOC Title VII action seeking back pay.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Crown Liquors of Broward, Inc. · filed 1980-01-29(4)

The foregoing establishes the Commission’s immunity from the application of Fla. Stat. § 95.11(4).

For an attorney-malpractice action, the two-year limitations period under § 95.11(4)(a) begins when the cause of action is discovered or should have been discovered, and a cause of action does not arise until legally cognizable damages are suffered.

Pioneer National Title Insurance Company, Etc. v. Angus G. Andrews, American Home Assurance Company, Cross Gulf Insuranc · filed 1981-08-03(4)(a)

We hold that Florida’s statute of limitations for malpractice actions against an attorney, Fla.Stat. § 95.11(4)(a), creates no bar to this action since Pioneer brought this suit within two years after it suffered the legal damages which gave it the requisite “cause of action” against appellants.

Section 95.11(4)(c) imposes a two-year limitations period on actions to recover wages, overtime, or related damages or penalties.

Lake v. Martin Marietta Corp. · filed 1982-04-26(4)(c)

On these authorities, the plaintiff’s federal claim can reasonably be characterized as an action to remedy the effects of past wage losses and to prevent future wage losses resulting from the termination of the plaintiff’s employment with the defendant Martin Marietta in March 1975. It follows that the appropriate Florida statute of limitations is the two-year statute of limitations found in Fla.Stat. § 95.11(4)(c). That statute (which was in effect in 1975) provides: Actions other than for recovery of real property shall be commenced as follows: (4) Within two years — ... (c) An action to recover wages or overtime or damages or penalties concerning payment of wages and overtime.

Section 95.11(4)(c) provides a two-year limitations period for § 1983 employment-discrimination actions in Florida when the claim seeks recovery of wages or back pay.

Arnold v. Duval County School Board · filed 1981-12-10(4)(c)

Because this action was not filed until January 7, 1980, it is barred under the two-year limitations period set forth in Fla.Stat. § 95.11(4)(c), and summary judgment must be rendered against plaintiff.

Section 95.11(4)(c) provides a two-year limitations period for claims to recover wages or overtime, or damages or penalties concerning payment of wages and overtime.

Flemings v. Miami-Dade County · filed 2021-01-14(4)(c)

Florida law provides a two-year limitations period “to recover wages or overtime or damages or penalties concerning payment of wages and overtime.” See Fla. Stat. § 95.11(4)(c). Accordingly, as to wage and overtime claims, they all must have accrued no later than April 1, 2017—three years before Plaintiff filed this lawsuit.

Section 95.11(7)(b) imposes a one-year limitation on suits for recovery of wages, including claims for personal services.

Buenger v. Kennedy · filed 1963-03-13(7)(b)

However, we cannot here ignore the plain language of Sec. 95.11(7) (b), i.e., "[s]uits *467 for recovery of wages, * * *". It was the chancellor's interpretation, and we agree, that appellant's claim is, in essence, a suit for the recovery of wages due for personal services rendered. And we cannot disagree with his finding that the one year statute applies. There seems to be some doubt as to its applicability in situations such as this, but when the legislature uses language seemingly so clear, we must follow its logical import. We have therefore concluded that the one year statute is applicable in this case instead of the three year statute.

The one-year limitation applies to actions seeking recovery for wages or similar services, but it cannot be applied without showing that more than a year elapsed after the claim accrued.

Robinson v. Malik · filed 1964-05-05(7)(b)

The one year statute of limitations for suits for recovery on wages (§ 95.11(7) (b), Fla.Stat., F.S.A.) which was held to be applicable to actions to recover for services of the kind involved here (Buenger v. Kennedy, Fla.App. 1963, 151 So.2d 463) is relied on by the appellant, but the record in this case fails to show it should be applied here. This is so because it is not disclosed that more than a year elapsed between the accrual of the cause of action for the services and the proceeding for recovery thereon.

Section 95.11(7)(b) sets a one-year limitation period for suits seeking wages, overtime, or related damages and penalties.

Metropolitan Dade County v. Maddox · filed 1970-12-22(7)(b)

Section 95.11, Fla. Stat., F.S.A., provides: "Actions other than those for recovery of real property can only be commenced as follows: "(7) Within one year. — "(b) Suits for recovery of wages, overtime, or damages and penalties accruing under laws respecting the payment of wages and overtime."

Section 95.11(4)(c) creates a two-year limitations period for actions to recover wages.

Wong v. Calvin · filed 1980-07-15(4)(c)

The Fifth Circuit’s decisions in Cutliff v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 558 F.2d 803 (5th Cir.1977), Johnson v. Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co., 491 F.2d 1364 (5th Cir. 1974), and United States v. Georgia Power Co., 474 F.2d 906 (5th Cir. 1973), constrain me to apply Florida’s statute of limitations for actions to recover wages.2 The statute, Section 95.11(4)(c), Florida Statutes (1977), creates a two-year period of limitations.

Section 95.11(5) bars claims for overtime wages accruing more than one year before the action was filed.

Perry v. City of Ft. Lauderdale · filed 1980-09-03(5)

We agree that the one-year statute of limitations applies.

Section 95.11(4)(c) sets a two-year limitations period for claims for wages, including compensation for personal services.

Roukous v. Estate of Kernan · filed 1983-12-12(4)(c)

We agree with the trial court and hold that this was a claim for wages which was barred by the two-year statute of limitations codified in Section 95.11(4)(c), Florida Statutes (1981).

A claim for back wages is subject to § 95.11(4)(c)'s limitations period even if pleaded as a request for declaratory relief.

Carpenter v. Metropolitan Dade County · filed 1985-07-02(4)(c)

Although Carpenter's complaint purported to seek a declaratory statement of his rights, his claim actually constituted an action for back wages filed beyond the applicable limitations period. § 95.11(4)(c), Fla. Stat. (1979).

Section 95.11(4)(c)’s two-year limit applies to a section 440.205 retaliatory-discharge action seeking lost wages and benefits.

Otis Elevator Co. v. Scott · filed 1987-02-25(4)(c)

In our opinion, the present case is governed by Broward Builders Exchange, Inc. v. Goehring, 231 So.2d 513, (Fla. 1970), decided prior to the enactment of Section 440.205, in which the Florida Supreme Court stated that Section *943 95.11(7)(b),[1] the predecessor of 95.11(4)(c) was the applicable statute of limitations for recovery of wages under a contract: ... While there was no contract here, we believe that we are compelled to follow the above case because of its broad language.

Section 95.11(4)(c) imposes a two-year limitations period on employment discrimination claims even when the plaintiff seeks more than back pay.

Hullinger v. Ryder Truck Rental, Inc. · filed 1987-12-24(4)(c)

Under that section, an action to recover wages or overtime or penalties or damages concerning paying of wages or overtime must be brought within two years. ... In McGee v. Ogburn, 707 F.2d 1312, 1314 (11th Cir.1983), the court reviewed the decision in Broward Builders and stated that in employment discrimination actions, no matter the theory or legal basis for the cause of action, the two-year statute applies. ... We agree and accordingly the order dismissing Hullinger's complaint is AFFIRMED.

Deferred monthly draws against commissions are not wages subject to section 95.11(4)(c)'s two-year limit; the four-year contract limit in subsection (3)(k) applies.

Iamaio v. Kite · filed 1988-09-21(4)(c)

The compensation in this case is not wages in that context. Accordingly, we conclude that the two-year statute of limitations in section 95.11(4)(c) does not apply and that the four-year limitation in section 95.11(3)(k) for actions on a contract does apply.

Section 95.11(3)(f) gives four years to bring a statutory age-discrimination wrongful-discharge claim, even if the damages include lost wages; the two-year period in section 95.11(4)(c) does not apply.

Hullinger v. Ryder Truck Rental, Inc. · filed 1989-08-31(3)(f), (4)(c)

The fact that his damages may include or even be limited to recovery for such quantifiable injuries as the wages he lost had he not been discharged does not mean that his claim is one "to recover wages." Because the basis for Hullinger's cause of action is section 760.10, the applicable statute of limitations is section 95.11(3)(f) pertaining to "an action founded on a statutory liability."

Section 95.11(4)(c)'s two-year limitations period for wages does not apply to sales commissions.

Barnes Surgical Specialties, Inc. v. Bradshaw · filed 1989-10-13(4)(c)

This court addressed this issue in Iamaio v. Kite, 531 So.2d 400 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988), where based on distinctions the supreme court has made between wages and commissions, we held that compensation in the form of commissions does not fall within the category of wages in the context of section 95.11(4)(c).

Section 95.11(4)(c)'s two-year period does not apply to wrongful discharge claims merely because the damages include lost wages.

McRae v. Douglas · filed 1994-09-30(4)(c)

Counts III and IV are claims essentially alleging wrongful discharge and are not simply actions to recover lost wages. Under the language in Hullinger, neither count would fall within the two year limitations period found in section 95.11(4)(c).

Section 95.11(4)(c) governs claims for unpaid guaranteed wages under a written employment contract, and its limitations period begins when the employer refuses to honor the guarantee.

Joseph v. Okeelanta Corp. · filed 1995-05-10(4)(c)

We hold that appellants' actions to recover the unpaid balance of a guaranteed aggregate amount of wages are actions for unpaid wages governed by section 95.11(4)(c). ... We also hold that the statute of limitations did not begin to run until such date as appellees refused to honor the guarantee agreement.

Section 95.11(4)(c)’s two-year limit for wage claims does not apply to an executive’s claim for an unpaid bonus treated as salary.

Nealon v. RIGHT HUMAN RESOURCE CONSUL. · filed 1996-03-20(4)(c)

In light of the nature of his employment, his claim for an unpaid bonus can only be deemed a claim for an unpaid salary. Thus, we conclude that this action is not time barred by section 95.11(4)(c).

Section 95.11(3)(k)'s four-year limitations period governs a salaried employee's claim for an unpaid bonus.

Cabanas v. WOMACK & BASS, PA · filed 1998-02-11(3)(k)

In Nealon v. Right Human Resource Consultants, Inc., 669 So.2d 1120 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996), this court clearly held that an action by an executive, a salaried employee, for an unpaid bonus was not a suit for wages for purposes of section 95.11(4)(c). Rather, the correct statute of limitations governing these actions is the four-year provision of section 95.11(3)(k). Following the holding in Nealon, Cabanas' action was timely brought under section 95.11(3)(k) and is not barred.

Section 95.11(4)(c)'s two-year limit for wage claims does not apply to all compensation for services; an invoice labeled “wages” does not establish whether the provider was an employee or an independent contractor.

Medical Cost Control & Management, Inc. v. Dougherty · filed 2001-06-27(4)(c)

Not all compensation from employment, however, constitutes “wages” for the purpose of section 95.11(4)(c). ... Likewise, the legend on the invoice is not determinative of the issue in this case, i.e., whether the appellants provided their services as employees or as independent contractors.

Section 95.11(4)(c) gives two years to sue for unpaid wages; section 95.11(3)(k) gives a salaried employee four years to sue for unpaid commissions.

Richey v. Modular Designs, Inc. · filed 2004-08-10(4)(c), (3)(k)

Appellant's action for his last week of unpaid wages was instituted within two years of the date the wages allegedly became payable in late December 2000 and, thus, was not barred by section 95.11(4)(c). Turning to Richey's claim for unpaid commissions, we agree with him that, as a salaried employee suing for unpaid commissions, the four-year statute of limitations in section 95.11(3)(k), Florida Statutes (2000) is applicable to his claim for commissions.

Section 95.11(4)(c) requires wage claims, including claims for services valued as unpaid wages, to be brought within two years.

Blackburn v. BARTSOCAS · filed 2008-01-30(4)(c)

The Estate argues, inter alia, that the claim for sweat equity is in reality a claim for past wages and is limited by section 95.11(4)(c), Florida Statutes (2001), which provides that an action to recover wages or overtime or damages or penalties concerning the payment of wages and overtime shall be commenced within two years. Therefore the Estate asserts that the wage claim calculation is limited to the years 1999 and 2000. We agree. ... We therefore reverse and remand for entry of a judgment on behalf of the Bartsocases which reflects the wage claim for the two years prior to the filing of their complaint.

Section 95.11(4)(c) limits a claim for unpaid wages, including compensation calculated as sweat equity, to the two years before the complaint was filed.

Blackburn v. Bartsocas · filed 2008-03-05(4)(c)

The Estate argues, inter alia, that the claim for sweat equity is in reality a claim for past wages and is limited by section 95.11(4)(c), Florida Statutes (2001), which provides that an action to recover wages or overtime or damages or penalties concerning the payment of wages and overtime shall be commenced within two years. Therefore the Estate asserts that the wage claim calculation is limited to the years 1999 and 2000. We agree. ... We therefore reverse and remand for entry of a judgment on behalf of the Bartsocases which reflects the wage claim for the two years prior to the filing of their complaint plus prejudgment interest.

Section 95.11(4)(e)'s two-year limit for wage-related actions applies to a wrongful-discharge claim seeking back pay and damages.

Barbara L. WILLIAMS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. WESTERN ELECTRIC COMPANY, Defendant-Appellee · filed 1980-06-09(4)(e)

The statute provided that “An action to recover wages or overtime or damages or penalties concerning payment of wages and overtime” shall be brought within two years. Fla.Stat. § 95.11(4)(e). ... There it was held that the Florida Statute of Limitations relating to wages is applicable in actions such as this. ... It follows therefore that the judgment of the district court should be and it is ... AFFIRMED.

Section 95.11(4)(e) requires an action founded on a violation of Part I of chapter 517 to be filed within two years after the facts giving rise to the cause of action were discovered or should have been discovered with due diligence, and no later than five years after the violation occurred.

Bryne v. GULFSTREAM FIRST BANK & TRUST CO., ETC. · filed 1981-12-21(4)(e)

Fla.Stat. § 95.11(4)(e) requires a two prong test to be met. First, the law suit must be commenced within two years “from the time the facts giving rise to the cause of action were discovered or should have been discovered with the exercise of due diligence.” ... Giving plaintiffs the benefit of every doubt by applying the December, 1979 date would still not serve to satisfy the second prong of the test which requires that actions of this type be instituted “not more than five years from the date such violation occurred.”

Section 95.11(4)(e) gives Chapter 517 claims a two-year limitations period that runs from when the plaintiff discovered or reasonably should have discovered the alleged violation.

Bruno v. Mona Lisa at Celebration, LLC (In Re Mona Lisa at Celebration, LLC) · filed 2009-08-12(4)(e)

Finally, Count III alleges violations of the Florida Securities and Investor Protection Act (Fla.Stat.Chap.517). Fla. Stat. § 95.11(4)(e) states that claims based on any provision of Chapter 517 of the Florida Statutes are subject to a two-year statute of limitations. ... To the extent specific plaintiffs failed to file their claims within two years after they discovered or reasonably should have discovered the alleged violation, their claims under Count III also may be disregarded in the mediation and estimation process.

Section 95.11(4)(e) requires an action for a chapter 517 violation to be brought within two years of discovery and no more than five years after the violation.

Puchner v. Bache Halsey Stuart, Inc. · filed 1989-11-07(4)(e)

Similarly, section 95.11(4)(e), Florida Statutes (1987), bars Puchner's cause of action for violations of Florida's Investor Protection Act. Under the statute, an action for violations of chapter 517 must be brought within two years from discovery, but not more than five years from the date the violation occurred. Puchner closed his account at Prudential-Bache in March of 1978 and did not file suit until August of 1983. Because there is no showing that Prudential-Bache committed fraud after Puchner closed his account, his action under chapter 517, brought more than five years after the last violation occurred, is barred as a matter of law.

Section 95.11(4)(e) provides a two-year limitations period for securities fraud claims, tolled until the fraud is or reasonably should be discovered through reasonable diligence.

In Re Integrated Resources Real Estate Ltd. Partnerships Securities Litigation · filed 1994-01-04(4)(e)

The running of this statute of limitations is tolled until the alleged fraud is discovered or reasonably should have been discovered in the exercise of reasonable diligence. ... Therefore, the § 10(b) claims of Plaintiffs Dennis M. Boyle, Harold Ginsberg, and James M. McLaughlin (the “Florida Plaintiffs”) are not time-barred under Florida law.

Section 95.11(4)(e) gives plaintiffs two years to bring a Chapter 517 claim, starting when they discovered or should have discovered the underlying facts through due diligence; ignorance of the law does not delay the period.

GLK, L.P. v. Four Seasons Hotel Ltd. · filed 2009-10-14(4)(e)

Under section 95.11(4)(e), Florida Statutes, the limitations period for Chapter 517 violations is two years “running from the time the facts giving rise to the cause of action were discovered or should have been discovered with the exercise of due diligence.... ” The operation of the statute of limitations is not postponed where plaintiffs are in possession of all the facts necessary to determine whether they have a cause of action but are ignorant of the law on which their claim is based.

Section 95.11(4)(e) allows the two-year period for Chapter 517 claims to run from when the fraud was discovered or should have been discovered.

Garland v. Advanced Medical Fund, LP II · filed 2000-01-18(4)(e)

A review of the two limitations provisions reveals that, where Georgia’s statute prescribes a two-year period starting from the time of either the contract or the sale, Florida’s statute allows the two-year period to run from the time the fraud was discovered or should have been discovered.

Section 95.11(6) bars an action under laches only if it was not commenced within the limitations period for the same subject matter.

Norman v. Kal · filed 1982-03-02(6)

First, Kal cites Fla. Stat. § 95.11(6), a codification of the doctrine of laches, which provides that “Piaches shall bar any action unless it is commenced within the time provided for legal actions concerning the same subject matter.... ” Since it has already been determined that this action was properly commenced under the limitations laws of both Illinois and Florida, this statute is not applicable.

Section 95.11(7)(b) (1973) sets a one-year period for wage and overtime suits, which may guide whether laches bars an equitable claim.

City of St. Petersburg v. Norris · filed 1976-06-30(7)(b)

Additionally, the law is well established that the statute of limitations may be used as a guide in considering whether laches bars a cause of action in equity. ... The applicable statute here, Fla. Stat. § 95.11(7)(b), (1973), states that: ... (7) Within one year. ... (b) Suits for the recovery of wages, overtime, or damages and penalties accruing under laws respecting the payment of wages and overtime.

Section 95.11(6) applies only to the time provided for legal actions concerning the same subject matter and does not eliminate the unreasonable delay element of laches.

City of Miami v. Gates · filed 1981-01-20(6)

§ 95.11(6) refers only to the "time provided for legal actions concerning the same subject matter" [e.s.] of the cause in question. ... Moreover, even if otherwise applicable, § 95.11(6) does not purport to affect that element of the laches doctrine which requires an unreasonable delay, without satisfactory explanation, in commencing the action after the plaintiff has been put on notice of his rights.

Section 95.11(1), as it stood in 1973 and earlier, provides the applicable limitations defense when a suit on promissory notes is challenged solely for delay in filing.

Kay v. Fernandez · filed 1979-08-07(1)

Laches being an equitable defense, the appropriate defense for a simple running of time in this instance is the applicable statute of limitations. See the wording of Section 95.11(1), Florida Statutes, as it appears in 1973 and prior thereto.[1] Nothing other than delay in bringing suit appears on this record.

Section 95.11(6) makes the laches period and the applicable statute of limitations period identical in this case.

Ves Carpenter Contractors, Inc. v. City of Dania · filed 1982-11-10(6)

Ves has been unable to demonstrate any prejudice as a result of the court's ruling because the city consistently alleged laches as an affirmative defense and, under Section 95.11(6), Florida Statutes (1981), the laches period and the statute of limitations period applicable to this case are identical.

Section 95.11(6) bars an equitable action after the limitations period for a legal action on the same subject matter runs, without considering whether unclean hands would prevent a traditional laches defense.

Engle v. Acopian · filed 1983-04-27(6)

This statute applies to equitable actions and modifies an application of the unclean hands doctrine to the extent that when the applicable time period runs, the action is barred without a consideration of whether unclean hands would prevent equitable defenses from being raised, e.g., whether unclean hands would prevent the application of the traditional doctrine of laches.

Section 95.11’s statutory laches provision does not apply to actions to recover real property.

Turner v. Wheeler · filed 1986-12-16(6)

However, Section 95.11 by its terms concerns only "limitations other than for the recovery of real property" (emphasis supplied).

Section 95.11(6) applies to an equitable action only when a limitations period governs an equivalent legal cause of action.

Corinthian Investments, Inc. v. Reeder · filed 1989-11-03(6)

Accordingly, we agree with the trial court that section 95.11(6) does not bar this suit. We conclude that section 95.11(6) is not applicable. Our basis is the above-explained lack of a statute of limitations period for a legal action which is equivalent to the equitable action involved here.

Section 95.11(6) makes laches a bar to an action that the statute of limitations would bar.

Harmony Homes, Inc. v. United States Ex Rel. Small Business Administration · filed 1996-08-05(6)

Florida Statute § 95.11(6) provides that laches automatically bar any action that would be barred by the statute of limitations. ... THEREFORE, this Court finds that this cause of action is additionally barred by lach-es and pursuant to Florida Statute § 95.11(6), Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED, thus mooting Plaintiffs cross motion.

Sections 95.11(6) and (3)(k) impose a four-year limit on a resulting-trust claim arising from an oral agreement.

Trustman v. Gelfman · filed 1999-02-03(6), (3)(k)

Pursuant to sections 95.11(6) and 95.11(3)(k) (a legal or equitable action on a contract, obligation, or liability not founded on a written instrument), Trustman had to assert a resulting trust within four years of the origin of the claim.

Section 95.11(6) bars an equitable accounting claim under laches when it is filed after the limitations period for a legal action concerning the same subject matter.

Patten v. Winderman · filed 2007-09-26(6)

Although Patten's claim for an accounting is an equitable action, it concerns the same subject matter as his claim for breach of fiduciary duty. Therefore, his claim that laches applies to his accounting claim fails because section 95.11(6), Florida Statutes (2006), provides in pertinent part: Laches shall bar any action unless it is commenced within the time period provided for legal actions concerning the same subject matter regardless of lack of knowledge by the person sought to be held liable that the person alleging liability would assert his or her rights and whether the person sought to be held liable is injured or prejudiced by the delay. . . .

Section 95.11(6) applies statutory laches to easement actions; the period does not begin until the servient owner's use becomes hostile or adverse to the easement holders.

Conrad v. Young · filed 2009-05-27(6)

Because there was no evidence in this case that the servient owners’ use of the property was hostile or adverse to the easement owners until 1999, when the servient owners refused their request to remove certain encroachments, the trial court did not err in denying Conrad’s motion for directed verdict on her statutory laches defense.

Section 95.11(6) bars an action seeking a trustee’s accounting for periods more than four years before suit when the action seeks to enforce a breach of trust or fiduciary duty through monetary relief.

Doris Rich Corya, etc. and Paul J. Rich Sanders, etc. v. Sanders · filed 2014-11-05(6)

Because an action for accounting seeking to enforce a breach of trust or fiduciary duty entitles a beneficiary to damages, the application of section 95.11(6) bars an action seeking an accounting from a trustee more than four years before the action is filed.

Section 95.11(6) limits an action seeking trust accountings, where none have been prepared, to accountings for no more than four years before the action was filed.

Doris Rich Corya, etc. v. Sanders · filed 2015-02-11(6)

We thus conclude, on the facts of this case, that statutory laches under section 95.11(6) limits the right to an accounting, where no accounting has been done, to no more than four years before filing an action for an accounting against the trustee of an irrevocable trust.

Section 95.11(6) ties the laches bar to the limitations period for legal actions concerning the same subject matter.

Woodward v. Orator E. Woodward, individually, and as Trustee of the Mary T. Woodward Trust, etc., Lorence Woodward, Marcus Woodward, Serena Woodward and Maureen Woodward · filed 2016-05-04(6)

The trial court also erred in finding that laches barred the action. Section 95.11(6), Florida Statutes (2012), provides that “[l]aches shall bar any action unless it is commenced within the time provided for legal actions concerning the same subject matter . . . .” ... In sum, we find that neither res judicata nor laches barred the 2012 action.

Section 95.11(6) supports a laches bar to a challenge brought after the challengers knew of a transaction, delayed unreasonably, and others acquired rights.

Hemispheres Condominium Ass'n v. Levin · filed 1989-01-23(6)

The defenses raised regarding the alleged invalidity of the 1980 recreation lease purchase are barred by the application of the doctrine of laches. The Defendants, with knowledge of the alleged transaction, have stood by for an unreasonable length of time without taking any steps to set the acts aside or otherwise interfere. During the intervening time, rights have been acquired by others. Head v Lane, supra; § 95.11(6), Florida Statutes.

Section 95.11(4)(e) requires an action based on a Part I, Chapter 517 violation to be brought within two years after the facts were or should have been discovered through due diligence, subject to a five-year outer limit.

Boyd v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith · filed 1985-06-18(4)(e)

The court has carefully considered the allegations of count 2 and finds that plaintiff also has alleged sufficient facts to toll the limitations period of Fla.Stat. § 95.11(4)(e). The court finds that plaintiff’s lack of both sophistication and opportunity to discover the facts is sufficient to objectively conclude that plaintiff’s action is timely.

Section 95.11(3)(e) imposes a four-year limitations period on FDUTPA claims, and fraudulent concealment may toll that period when willful concealment uses fraudulent means, including nondisclosure where a duty to disclose exists.

Harman v. Taurus International Manufacturing Inc. · filed 2024-08-19(3)(e)

FDUTPA claims are subject to a four-year statute of limitations under Fla. Stat. § 95.11(3)(e). ... Fraudulent concealment is a tolling doctrine that “requires the defendants to engage in the willful concealment of the cause of action using fraudulent means to achieve that concealment.” ... Generally, “the fraud must be of such a nature as to constitute active concealment to prevent inquiry or elude investigation or to mislead a person who could claim a cause of action.” ... As to “fraudulent means,” Florida law “recognizes that fraud can occur by omission.” ... In particular, “[a] defendant’s knowing concealment or nondisclosure of a material fact may . . . support an action for fraud where there is a duty to disclose.” ... But absent a duty to disclose, “mere nondisclosure of all material facts in an arm’s length transaction is ordinarily not actionable . . . unless some artifice or trick has been employed to prevent the representee from making further independent inquiry.”

Section 95.11 bars an action brought more than three years after the liability accrued.

Burkman v. Taran · filed 1953-11-02

Concededly it was not brought within three years after the accrual of the liability, as was required by the applicable and governing provisions of our statute of limitations (section 95.11, Florida Statutes 1951).

Section 95.11 bars a cause of action when the complaint is not filed within the statutory time.

Dibble v. Jensen · filed 1961-04-20

The fact that the appellee defendant was absent from the state did not deter the appellant from the institution of an action which would have tolled the statute of limitations if filed within the time provided by § 95.11, supra.

Section 95.11(3) supplies a five-year limitations period by analogy for a demand for arbitration, absent special circumstances.

Gissendanner v. Manchester Ins. Co. · filed 1975-02-11(3)

Manchester's contention that the demand for arbitration which was some two years after the accident and, therefore, prejudicial, is without merit as a reasonable time for such demand is fixed by analogy with the Statute of Limitations[1] which is five years, unless there be some special circumstances shown.

Subsection 95.11(4) sets a four-year limitations period for the action, subject to tolling when the defendant is absent from Florida and not amenable to service.

Milton v. Landers · filed 1977-10-04(4)

Appellees contend that the filing of a complaint tolls the running of statutes of limitation, and since appellant could have filed suit at any time during the four year period in accordance with Section 95.11(4), Florida Statutes (1969), appellant’s failure to file a complaint within four years of the accident bars appellant from maintaining her action. We disagree. While Dibble v. Jansen, 129 So.2d 162 (Fla. 3d DCA 1961), *674seems to support appellees’ position, we cannot, for the reasons set forth in Friday v. Newman, 183 So.2d 25 (Fla. 2d DCA 1966), accept that position. As the Friday court pointed out, a defendant’s absence from the state of Florida tolls the applicable statute of limitations only if the defendant is not amenable to the service of process.

The two-year limitations period for legal malpractice begins when the client knew or should have known that the attorney's handling constituted malpractice.

Smith v. Hussey · filed 1978-11-01(4)(a)

Accordingly, there was a factual question as to when Smith knew or should have known that Hussey's handling of the case constituted malpractice, and thus there was a factual issue as to when the statute of limitations commenced running.

Section 95.11(3)(p) imposes a four-year limitations period on the claims at issue, and repairs do not toll that period.

K/F Dev. & Inv. Corp. v. Williamson Crane & Dozer Corp. · filed 1979-02-13(3)(p)

We hold that the four-year Statute of Limitations was applicable on the other claims and that the statute was not tolled by the repairs.

Section 95.11(3)(a)’s four-year negligence deadline is a nonjurisdictional limitations period.

Thorney v. Clough · filed 1983-10-11(3)(a)

First, we hold that the statute of limitations is not jurisdictional, but is instead a period of limitation.

Section 95.11(3)(a)’s limitations period is not tolled during minority when the minor has access to the courts through natural parents.

Velazquez v. Metropolitan Dade County · filed 1983-12-13(3)(a)

We reject the plaintiff’s challenge to section 95.11(3)(a), Florida Statutes (1981), as an unconstitutional denial of access to the courts. Our supreme court has responded to the issues raised herein when it decided Slaughter v. Tyler, 126 Fla. 515, 171 So. 320 (1936), overruled on other grounds, Manning v. Serrano, 97 So.2d 688 (Fla.1957); accord Gasparro v. Horner, 245 So.2d 901 (Fla. 4th DCA 1971). Since the emancipated minor in the present case had access to the courts through his natural parents, the statute of limitations was not tolled during his minority.

Section 95.11(4)(a)’s limitations period for professional malpractice is not tolled by collateral litigation that cannot negate the alleged malpractice.

Graham v. Holler · filed 1986-12-24(4)(a)

Moreover, since the collateral litigation, irrespective of its outcome, could not have negated Graham's delinquent act (assuming, arguendo, that damages had resulted from it), that litigation did not toll the running of the malpractice statute of limitations.

Section 95.11(4)(e)’s two-year limit bars a state securities counterclaim filed after the limit expires when an earlier federal action was voluntarily dismissed.

Attache Resort Motel, Ltd. v. Kaplan · filed 1986-11-12(4)(e)

Although the filing of the federal action did initially toll the running of the statute of limitations, the subsequent voluntary dismissal of the federal action had the effect of placing the parties in a position as if the suit had never been filed. ... We therefore agree with Attache that because Kaplan's counterclaim in the state court was filed more than two years after the cause of action accrued, it was barred by section 95.11(4)(e) and should have been dismissed.

Section 95.11(5)(b)’s one-year period is tolled when an action to enforce an equitable lien is filed against the property.

Westburne Supply v. Comm. Villas Partners · filed 1987-05-19(5)(b)

An action to foreclose an equitable lien is essentially an action against the property and not necessarily an in personam claim against the person or entity having title to or possession of the property; therefore, the statute of limitations is tolled when the action to enforce the lien is filed against the property.

A disputed material fact about when the limitations period began prevents summary judgment based on section 95.11.

Miles Plastering & Associates, Inc. v. McDevitt & Street Co. · filed 1991-01-09

Because there is a genuine issue of material fact regarding exactly when the statute time began to run, it was error for the trial court to grant final summary judgment based on the fact that any statute of limitations had run.

Section 95.11(3)(f)’s four-year period for statutory liability actions is not tolled by pursuing CETA administrative remedies when exhaustion is not required.

Black v. Broward Employment & Training Administration · filed 1988-06-10(3)(f)

They also agree that Florida’s four-year statute of limitations for statutory liability actions applies. Fla.Stat. § 95.11(3)(f). ... Because the congressional intent not to require exhaustion in this case was at all times clear, there was no tolling of the statute of limitations.

A John Doe complaint that substantially misidentifies the defendant does not toll the four-year limitations period under section 95.11(3).

Gilliam v. Smart · filed 2002-03-15(3)

In other words, the "John Doe" pleadings amounted to "a substantially incorrect identification of the defendant" that did not commence an action against the real party Gilliam and did not toll the running of the statute of limitations.

Section 95.11(3)(a) gives plaintiffs four years to file a negligence action; equitable tolling does not excuse a late filing when counsel chooses to attend to another attorney’s personal matter instead of filing.

Williams v. ALBERTSON'S INC. · filed 2004-08-06(3)(a)

Section 95.11(3)(a), Florida Statutes, requires an action for negligence to be filed within four years. ... Williams' attorney made no attempt to file within the limitations period and the courthouse was open. Instead, the attorney chose to help another attorney with a personal matter on the last day to file.

Section 95.11(8)'s filing period for a mandamus petition must be correctly calculated before the petition can be dismissed as time-barred.

Tweed v. McDonough · filed 2007-05-31(8)

Appellant seeks review of an order which denied his - mandamus as time-barred under section 95.11(8), Florida Statutes. He argues, among other things, that the circuit court erroneously computed the time for filing of a mandamus petition and that therefore dismissal of the mandamus petition was incorrect. The ap-pellee has notified this court that it agrees and concedes error. We find this concession to be well-taken and accordingly the order is reversed and the cause is remanded for further proceedings.

Section 95.11(3) provides a four-year limitations period for the causes of action at issue.

M.J.O. Holding Corp. v. Heller · filed 2012-08-15(3)

Four years is the applicable limitations period for the causes of action at issue. See § 95.11(3), Fla. Stat. (2003).

Section 95.11(3) sets a four-year limitations period for products liability, fraud, and negligence actions and bars untimely suits.

Castleman v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. · filed 2012-08-17(3)

The limitations period for products liability, fraud, and negligence actions is four years. § 95.11(3), Fla. Stat. ... If not, the suit was time-barred by section 95.11(3), Florida Statutes. ... Because the Castlemans did not meet the deadline to qualify for Engle class membership, their lawsuit was barred by the statute of limitations.

Section 95.11(7) does not toll the limitations period for the Title IX claims under these facts.

Janie Doe 1 ex rel. Miranda v. Sinrod · filed 2013-05-08(7)

We reject the plaintiffs’ argument that section 95.11(7) tolls the statute of limitations under these facts.

Section 95.11(2)(b) sets a five-year limit for uninsured motorist claims, running from the collision, but policy provisions requiring exhaustion of the tortfeasor’s liability coverage toll that limit until those benefits are paid.

ROSEMARY ARWAY v. PROGRESSIVE AMERICAN INSURANCE COMPANY · filed 2024-03-01(2)(b)

The trial court correctly determined that Arway’s UM claim is governed by the five-year statute of limitations for actions on written contracts under section 95.11(2)(b), Florida Statutes, running from the date of Arway’s collision with the underinsured motorist. See Woodall v. Travelers Indem. Co., 699 So. 2d 1361, 1362–63, 1362 n.2 (Fla. 1997). But the trial court erred in holding Arway’s UM claim time barred because, under Woodall, the exhaustion and no-action provisions of the Progressive policy tolled the statute of limitations until the underinsured motorist’s BI liability insurance benefits were fully paid to Arway.

Section 95.11(2)(d)’s five-year limitations period for willful minimum wage claims is not tolled for purposes of providing presuit notice while a class action is pending.

Zequeira v. MMPB Group, LLC, Etc. · filed 2024-09-25(2)(d)

We therefore hold that the pendency of a class action proceeding does not apply to toll the statute of limitations for the requirement to provide presuit notice.

Section 95.11(2)’s deadline is not equitably tolled when an insured waits until the last moment to pursue its claim and faces a choice between filing suit and following a presuit notice procedure.

Oceania III Condominium Association, Inc. v. Westchester Surplus Lines Insurance Company · filed 2023-02-23(2)

Critically, the statute of limitations on Oceania’s claim, as set forth in Fla. Stat. § 95.11(2), expired on September 12, 2022, one day before the Defendants’ responses to the notices were due. ... Accordingly, the Court concludes that the circumstances surrounding Oceania’s late filing of its claim do not merit equitable tolling of the September 12, 2022, statute of limitations deadline.

Section 95.11 gives five years to bring a contract action founded on a written instrument and four years to bring one not founded on a written instrument.

Peters III v. Cheval Golf Club, LLC · filed 2022-01-19(2)(b), (3)(k)

The Peters allege that the ITED and breach of contract took place in November of 2019, leaving plenty of time to refile their claims before the statute of limitations runs on those claims. ... section 95.11(2)(b), Fla. Stat. (requiring legal or equitable actions on a contract “founded on a written instrument” be brought within five years); 95.11(3)(k), Fla. Stat. (requiring legal or equitable actions on a contract “not founded on a written instrument” be brought within four years).

Section 95.11 provides five years for breach-of-contract claims and four years for unjust-enrichment claims; dismissal on those grounds requires the complaint to show that the claims are time-barred.

Employers Insurance Company of Wassau v. Redlands Christian Migrant Association, Inc. · filed 2020-06-18(2)(b), (3)(j)

Here, the parties agree on the limitations periods—five years for breach of contract and four years for unjust enrichment. See Fla. Stat. §§ 95.11(2)(b), (3)(j). ... At bottom, it is not apparent from the Amended Complaint that Plaintiff’s claims are time-barred.

Section 95.11 sets three-year limits for oral contract actions and four-year limits for tort actions.

Meyer v. Roth · filed 1966-07-26

Section 95.11 Fla.Stat., F.S.A. permits actions on oral contracts within three years and tort actions within four jrears.

Section 95.11 allows four years for a contract obligation not founded on a written instrument and five years for one founded on a written instrument.

HOSP. CONSTRUCTORS LTD. EX REL. LIFEMARK HOSPITALS OF FLORIDA, INC. v. Lefor · filed 2000-01-07(3)(k), (2)(b)

The statute of limitations on a legal or equitable contract or obligation not founded on a written instrument is four years. See § 95.11(3)(k), Fla. Stat. (1990). When an action is based upon an obligation founded on a written instrument, the statute of limitations is five years. See § 95.11(2)(b), Fla. Stat. (1990).

Section 95.11 allows five years to seek damages for breach of a written contract and one year to seek specific performance; an allegation that damages arose later can defeat dismissal on limitations grounds.

Elmore v. Florida Power & Light Co. · filed 2000-04-19(2)(b), (5)(a)

Under section 95.11(2)(b), an action for damages for breach of a written contract must be brought within five years. ... Under section 95.11(5)(a), a claim of specific performance of a contract must be brought within one year. ... However, Elmore alleged that he did not suffer any damages flowing from the breach until March, 1998. As damages are the last element for a cause of action for breach of contract, we hold that this allegation should have survived a motion to dismiss based on this ground.

Section 95.11(3) provides a four-year limitations period for negligence and conversion claims.

Penagos v. Capital Bank · filed 2000-07-26(3)

Given our conclusion that compensable injury arose only upon the Bank’s refusal to pay after written demand, it follows that the same accrual date should be applied for the negligence and conversion claims. As the lawsuit was filed within the four-year statutory limitation period on those claims, see § 95.11(3), Fla. Stat. (1987), the lawsuit was timely on those claims as well.

Section 95.11(3)(a) requires a general negligence action to be commenced within four years.

Nale v. Montgomery · filed 2000-09-13(3)(a)

A cause of action for general negligence must be commenced within four years. See § 95.11(3)(a), Fla. Stat. (1999).

Section 95.11 gives ordinary negligence claims a four-year limitations period.

Sussman v. First Financial Title Co. · filed 2001-08-01

The statute of limitations on ordinary negligence is four years. See § 95.11, Fla. Stat. (1997). ... This suit was therefore filed within the time period prescribed by the statute of limitations.

Section 95.11(2)(b)’s five-year limit for contract actions does not apply to an assessment proceeding unless members breach their indemnity agreement by failing to pay the assessment.

Super Transport, Inc. v. Florida Department of Insurance · filed 2001-10-02(2)(b)

The five-year statute of limitations for an action on a contract, section 95.11(2)(b), Florida Statutes, would not be applicable in this assessment proceeding unless appellants were to breach the FESA indemnity agreement by failing to pay the assessment.

Section 95.11(3)(o) gives common law tort claims a four-year limitations period.

Efron v. Milton · filed 2004-06-23(3)(o)

The trial court was correct in determining that the common law tort claims are subject to a four-year statute of limitations pursuant to section 95.11(3)(0), Florida Statutes.

Section 95.11(3)(a) sets a four-year limitations period for negligence actions.

Delgado v. J. Byrons, Inc. · filed 2004-07-07(3)(a)

However, Delgado would have been unable to do so because the four-year statute of limitations for negligence had run. See § 95.11(3)(a), Fla. Stat.

Section 95.11(2)(b) provides a five-year limitation for written contract actions, while § 95.11(3)(k) provides a four-year limitation for oral contract actions.

United States v. Olavarrieta · filed 1986-04-09(2)(b), (3)(k)

Despite the inapplicability of the Eleventh Amendment as to this Third Party Defendant, the Board is correct that the action is barred by any of the statutes of limitations conceivably pertinent. The Board cites 28 U.S.C. § 2415 (six year limitation on actions brought by the United States); Fla.Stat. § 95.11(2)(b) (five year limitation on a written contract action); and Fla.Stat. § 95.11(3)(k) (four year limitation an action brought on an oral contract). As stated in the companion order, Olavarrieta states that statements were made to him by the Third Party Defendants prior to his enrollment. Thus, the action accrued in 1975 at the latest, and is therefore barred by any of the statutes of limitations listed above.

Section 95.11(4)(c) requires actions to recover wages to be brought within two years.

Spencer v. Puerto Rico Marine Management, Inc. · filed 1986-09-09(4)(c)

After extensive review of the authorities cited in the litigants’ memoranda, the Court has concluded that the two-year statute of limitations contained in Fla.Stat. § 95.11(4)(c) (1985) is applicable in the case sub judice.

Section 95.11(3)(i) and (3)(p) impose four-year limitations periods, running from the time the last element of the cause of action occurs, for actions to recover specific personal property and actions not otherwise specifically provided for.

C.L. Whiteside & Associates Construction Co. v. Servico Capital Corp. (In Re C.L. Whiteside & Associates Construction Co.) · filed 1990-08-31(3)(i) and (3)(p)

Fla.Stat. § 95.11(3) provides a general four year statute of limitations with regard to actions to recover specific personal property (subparagraph (i)) and any actions not otherwise specifically provided for in the statutes (subparagraph (p)). The statute of limitations is therefore 4 years from the time when the last element constituting Plaintiff’s cause of action occurred.

The four-year limitations period for intentional-tort claims is not tolled by filing an EEOC charge, so conduct occurring more than four years before suit is barred.

Caprio v. American Airlines, Inc. · filed 1994-03-25(3)

Plaintiff, however, argues that the statute of limitation on her tort claims should be tolled during the pendency of her charge before the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). However, the fact that a plaintiff filed a claim with the EEOC does not mean that Florida’s statute of limitations period should be tolled. Cf. Farancz v. St. Mary’s Hosp., Inc., 585 So.2d 1151 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991) (filing of charge with the Florida Commission on Human Relations did not toll four-year statute of limitation under Florida Statute § 95.11(3)). In the present case, Plaintiffs tort claims must have occurred within the four year statute of limitations period to be actionable. Thus, any conduct occurring prior to April 28, 1988 is barred by Florida’s four-year statute of limitations.

Section 95.11(3) gives conversion claims a four-year limitations period running from the conversion, unless the conversion was fraudulently concealed.

Small Business Administration v. Echevarria · filed 1994-09-09(3)

The statute of limitations applicable to conversion is four years and begins to run at the time of the conversion, except when the conversion is fraudulently concealed. ... The Court finds that based upon the testimony of the SBA’s investigator Chapel, the earliest time the Plaintiff could have brought this action was 1989, when Chapel discovered that the Defendants had engaged in self-dealing. The SBA filed this Complaint in 1991, thus this action was brought within the four-year applicable statute of limitations.

Under Fla. Stat. § 95.11, the twenty-year limitation in subsection (1) applies to enforcing a judgment entered by a federal district court in Florida, while subsection (2)(a)'s five-year period applies to judgments foreign to Florida.

Balfour Beatty Bahamas, Ltd. v. Boca Raton Millwork, Inc. · filed 1998-01-22(1), (2)(a)

This Court agrees with the district court’s finding in Leasco that subsection (1) (the twenty-year limitation period) applies in this action. Subsection (2)(a), the five-year limitation period, pertains to judgments foreign to the state of Florida, not domestic judgments.

Section 95.11's limitations periods bar untimely reformation claims seeking affirmative relief, including when brought as compulsory counterclaims, absent an applicable exceptional circumstance.

American Annuity Group, Inc. v. Guaranty Reassurance, Corp. · filed 2001-04-18

Fourth, Defendant does not contest that the equitable action of reformation based upon mutual mistake, unilateral mistake or fraud are all still subject to the Florida statutes of limitations cited by Plaintiffs. Reformation is a request for affirmative relief which is clearly subject to the statute of limitations defenses. Reformation actions are barred when they are not timely raised, either as an original action, or as a compulsory counterclaim. ... Fifth, Defendant does not dispute that its newly asserted reformation counterclaims are time-barred by the applicable Florida statutes of limitations, absent exceptional circumstances also not present here.

Section 95.11 imposes a four-year statute of limitations on intentional tort claims.

Cheves v. Department of Veterans Affairs · filed 2002-08-16

The statute of limitations for intentional torts is four years. Fla. Stat. § 95.11.

Section 95.11(3)(a) requires an action founded on fraud to be brought within four years after accrual.

Allocco v. City of Coral Gables · filed 2002-08-23(3)(a)

An action founded on fraud must be brought within four years of its accrual. ... Such an action accrues at the time the facts giving rise to the cause of action were discovered or should have been discovered with the exercise of due diligence.

Section 95.11(3) provides a four-year limitations period for actions founded on fraud, negligent misrepresentation, or breach of fiduciary duty, and the limitations period for a continuing tort runs from when the tortious conduct ceases.

Laney v. American Equity Investment Life Ins. · filed 2003-01-31(3)

Desimone is correct that Florida Statutes section 95.11(3) provides a statute limitation period of four years for actions founded on fraud, negligent misrepresentation, or breach of fiduciary duty. ... Florida law, however, recognizes an exception to the general statute of limitation rules for torts that are continuing in nature. ... Under the continuing torts doctrine, the statute of limitations runs from the date that the tortious conduct ceases. ... This comment leads this Court to conclude that the continuing torts doctrine could apply in a churning case. The factual question of whether De-simone’s actions constituted a continuing tort precludes summary judgment. To what extent, if any, the concept applies to this case is an issue for the trier of fact to decide.

Section 95.11(3) provides a four-year limitations period for the applicable personal-injury and intentional-tort claims, while section 95.11(2) provides five years for a written-contract claim.

Shivers v. International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers Local Union 349 · filed 2008-01-09

The statute of limitations for causes of action arising under the “bill of rights” is determined by reference to the state general or residual personal injury statute of limitations, see Hester v. Int’l Union of Operating Engrs., 878 F.2d 1309, 1310 (11th Cir. 1989), which under Florida law is four years, see Fla. Stat. § 95.11(3). ... Under Florida law, the statute of limitations for breach of a written contract is five years. Fla. Stat. § 95.11(2). ... Under Florida law, the statute of limitations for intentional torts is four years. See Fla. Stat. § 95.11(3).

Section 95.11 provides a five-year statute of limitations for tort actions.

Klayman v. Barmak · filed 2009-03-13

Florida state law provides a five-year statute of limitations for tort actions. Fla. Stat. § 95.11 (2008). The conduct that allegedly constituted a breach of contract and fiduciary duty occurred in 2003, which is less than five years from 2007, when plaintiff brought this suit. Hence, this action is not time barred under Florida law.

Section 95.11(3)(o) provides a four-year limitations period for actions not otherwise assigned a limitations period, including slander of title and intentional infliction of emotional distress.

Madura v. Lakebridge Condominium Assn. · filed 2010-06-14(3)(o)

Under Florida law, Plaintiffs had four years to commence suit for slander of title and intentional infliction of emotional distress, see Fla. Stat. § 95.11(3)(o); Plaintiffs had two years from the alleged violation to file suit under the Florida Consumer Collection Practices Act (“FCCPA”). See Fla. Stat. §559.77(4). At the time of dismissal, Plaintiffs had approximately four months to file FCCPA claims and over two years to file the other state law claims.

Section 95.11(3)(f) gives FDUTPA claims a four-year limitations period, which may be tolled when a defendant fraudulently conceals the alleged defect.

BALLOU v. BMW OF NORTH AMERICA LLC · filed 2023-06-28(3)(f)

The statute of limitations for claims under FDUTPA is four years. Fla. Stat. § 95.11(3)(f); Matthews v. Am. Honda Motor Co., No. 12–60630, 2012 WL 2520675, at *3 (S.D. Fla. June 6, 2012). Here, Plaintiff purchased her vehicle in March 2012. Compl. ¶ 8. However, Plaintiff did not file suit until July 2018, more than two years after the four-year statute of limitations period had concluded in March 2016. Therefore, the Court considers whether equitable principles allow the claim to proceed.

Section 95.11(3) supplies Florida’s four-year personal-injury limitations period applicable to constitutional claims under § 1983.

Evans v. Schuyler · filed 2024-10-02(3)

To the extent Plaintiff raises claims based on constitutional violations that occurred more than four years ago, such claims must be dismissed as time barred.4 See Majette v. O’Connor, 811 F.2d 1416, 1419 (11th Cir. 1987) (per curiam) (stating that “the most appropriate statute of limitations for all section 1983 actions is the personal injury statute of limitations of the state whose law is to be applied”); Fla. Stat. § 95.11(3) (providing that the statute of limitations for personal injury cases in Florida is four years).

Section 95.11(3) provides a four-year statute of limitations for personal injury claims in Florida.

THOMAS v. MCNEIL · filed 2025-03-07(3)

Florida observes a four year personal injury statute of limitations. See Chappell v. Rich, 340 F.3d 1279, 1283 (11th Cir. 2003); Fla. Stat. § 95.11(3). Given that Plaintiff’s claims are based on events from October of 2019, they are barred by the statute of limitations.

Section 95.11 provides a four-year limitations period for an action based on a conspiracy that causes damage.

Faulk v. Allen · filed 1943-02-19

If so it would be subject to the four year statute, Section 95.11, Florida Statutes, 1941.

Section 95.11 requires an action for fraud to be brought within three years after the fraud is discovered.

EJ Evans Company v. Ohio State Life Insurance Company · filed 1962-08-17

Assuming that the action was one for fraud, the fraud, if any, was discovered in March of 1955. The action was therefore barred by Section 95.11, Fla. Stat., F.S.A., which provides that an action for fraud shall be brought within three years after its discovery.

Section 95.11(5)(a) imposes a three-year limitation period on actions based on liabilities created by statute.

Wall v. Johnson · filed 1955-01-25(5)(a)

We have no difficulty in holding, however, that a bastardy proceeding under the Old Act was subject to the three-year limitation period prescribed by Subsection 5(a) of Section 95.11, supra.

For a negligence claim, the four year limitations period begins on the date of the alleged breach of duty.

Sarajian v. Pilafian · filed 1963-12-13

The amended complaint, bottomed solely on the tortious charge, was governed by the four year Statute of Limitations, which commenced to run on the date of the alleged breach of duty on the part of the ap-pellee.

Section 95.11(5)(e) supplies a statute of limitations that can bar an action.

National Union Fire Insurance v. Dorsey · filed 1966-04-05(5)(e)

Upon motion for summary judgment it was made to affirmatively appear that the action is barred by the appropriate statute of limitations, § 95.11(5) (e), Fla.Stat., F.S.A.

Section 95.11 sets limitation periods for actions other than recovery of real property, including two years for listed claims and four years for offenses not specifically named.

Walter Frank Knowles Alias John Frank Smith v. Carson · filed 1969-11-07

Title 8, § 95.11, Florida Statutes, F.S.A., establishes the limitations upon actions other than for recovery of real property. Under subsection (6) of that section, actions for libel, assault, battery, or a false imprisonment must be brought within two years. Subsection (4) provides that an offense not specifically named must be brought within four years. Actions which may be commenced in periods exceeding four years are inapplicable to the instant case. Therefore, irrespective of the determination as to exactly which Florida statute is involved, the action is barred by these limitations.

Section 95.11(3) provides a four-year statute of limitations.

Dade County v. Lambert · filed 1976-01-20(3)

Therefore, the four-year statute of limitations, provided for in § 95.11(3), Fla. Stat., applies herein.

Section 95.11(7)(b) imposes a one-year limitations period on the claim.

Keel v. Brown · filed 1964-03-13(7)(b)

Plaintiff-appellant first contends that the lower court erred in determining that the one-year period of limitation imposed by § 95.11(7) (b), Florida Statutes, F.S.A., was applicable to plaintiff's claim. That particular question was resolved by this court adversely to this plaintiff's position in Buenger v. Kennedy, Fla. App. 1963, 151 So.2d 463, a case decided subsequent to the filing of the instant appeal. ... Rule 1.15(c) had the effect of relating back the amended complaint at law to the date of the original complaint in chancery. The court erred in sustaining the defendant's defense of the Statute of Limitations.

Section 95.11 sets limitations periods for claims, including four-year and two-year periods for malpractice actions during the relevant transition.

Nelson v. Winter Park Memorial Hospital Ass'n · filed 1977-08-12(4) and (6)

Upon due consideration of the briefs and record on appeal we are of the opinion that the cause of action giving rise to the entry of a summary judgment in favor of the defendants-appellees accrued prior to July 1, 1972, the effective date of the two-year statute of limitations (Section 95.11(6), Florida Statutes (1973)) governing malpractice actions. See Foley v. Morris, 339 So.2d 215 (FIa.1976); Reinhardt v. Schwab, 343 So.2d 837 (Fla.1977). The plaintiffs-appellants’ cause of action was governed by the four-year statute of limitations,1 (Section 95.11(4), Florida Statutes (1973)) which was effective until July 1, 1972. Foley v. Morris, supra.

Section 95.11 sets limitation periods for actions, and a defendant may be barred from relying on an applicable period when its earlier position caused the filing delay.

Salcedo v. Asociacion Cubana, Inc. · filed 1979-03-13(4)

However it may be characterized, the estoppel doctrine means in this case that, having successfully claimed that mediation was a required condition precedent to the filing of this action, the defendant may not now be heard to say that the delay specifically caused by the pendency of that very proceeding has resulted in the running of the statute of limitations.

Section 95.11(6) imposes a two-year limitations period applicable to a loss of consortium claim.

Daniels v. Weiss · filed 1980-07-21(6)

An amendment to the pleadings does not relate back to the date the original complaint was filed if the amendment states a new cause of action or adds a new party. ... The applicable two-year statute of limitations [Section 95.11(6), Florida Statutes (1973)] having already run at the time Odie Daniels filed the complaint seeking damages for loss of consortium, the trial court erred in denying Oper's motion for summary judgment as to said claim.

Section 95.11(4) sets a four-year limitations period for the survival action.

SCHOOL BD. OF BROWARD CTY. v. Surette · filed 1981-01-28(4)

When the survival cause of action arose in 1971, the applicable statute of limitations was four years. § 95.11(4), Fla. Stat. (1971). Thus, the statute of limitations became a bar to the survival action on September 16, 1975, four years after the accident.

Section 95.11(4) bars a survival action four years after the accident.

School Board of Broward County v. Surette · filed 1981-01-28(4)

When the survival cause of action arose in 1971, the applicable statute of limitations was four years. § 95.11(4), Fla.Stat. (1971). Thus, the statute of limitations became a bar to the survival action on September 16, 1975, four years after the accident.

A section 95.11 statute of limitations defense is waived if it is not pleaded at trial and cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.

Kissimmee Util. Auth. v. Better Plastics, Inc. · filed 1988-05-26

We decline to address this issue because the statute of limitations is an affirmative defense that must be pleaded at trial. ... The Authority waived the statute of limitations defense by electing not to plead it even though the Authority claims to have been aware the defense was available. The Authority's failure to plead the statute of limitations below bars it from raising the issue for the first time on appeal.

Section 95.11 provides four-year limitations periods for promissory estoppel and personal injury actions.

Woodburn v. Florida Department of Children & Family Services · filed 2011-12-01(3)(k), (3)(p)

The Eleventh Circuit has held that the statute of limitations for an action for estoppel is four years: ... Promissory estoppel is an “equitable action on a contract, obligation, or liability not founded on a written instrument,” which must be commenced within four years from when the last element constituting the cause of actions occurs. ... The applicable statute of limitations in Florida provides for a four-year limitations period. Fla. Stat. § 95.11(3)(p) (2011); see also Sneed, 370 Fed.Appx. at 47 (stating same).

Section 95.11(3) provides a four-year limitations period for this type of Florida action.

Ambrit, Inc. v. Kraft, Inc. · filed 1986-12-10(3)

The pertinent limitations period for this type of action in Florida is four years, over twice the length of time in issue here.

Section 95.11(3)(p) imposes a four-year limitations period on § 1983 claims arising in Florida from an unconstitutional or otherwise illegal act.

Driessen v. Florida Department of Children & Families · filed 2009-10-29(3)(p)

“[A] plaintiff must commence a § 1983 claim arising in Florida within four years of the allegedly unconstitutional or otherwise illegal act.” ... Because approximately four years and four months passed between when Driessen knew of the injury (and who caused it) and when she filed her complaint, Driessen’s suit is clearly time-barred by Florida Statute § 95.11(3)(p).

Section 95.11(3)(j) imposes a four-year limitations period on the state-law claims at issue.

Frantz v. Walled · filed 2013-03-18(3)(j)

Frantz’s state law claims were also subject to a four-year statute of limitations. Fla. Stat. § 95.11(3)(j). Therefore, they too were untimely filed.

Section 95.11(3) provides a four-year limitations period for the FDUTPA and unjust-enrichment claims.

Bowe v. Public Storage · filed 2015-04-29(3)

The statute of limitations for these claims is four years. Fla. Stat. § 95.11(3).

Section 95.11(3)(o) provides a four-year limitations period for a false-arrest action, which the court applied to the plaintiff's federal civil-rights claims arising in Florida.

Simione v. LIBMAN · filed 2019-11-25(3)(o)

Thus, in a § 1983 or § 1985 case brought in the forum state of Florida, the statute of limitations is four years.

Section 95.11(3)(o) provides a four-year statute of limitations for false-arrest claims in Florida.

Maeguerita Quire v. Detective Christopher Smith · filed 2021-07-30(3)(o)

In Florida, where this cause of action arose, the statute of limitations for false arrest claims is four years. Fla. Stat. § 95.11(3)(o). And the cause of action for false arrest accrues on the date of arrest.

Section 95.11(3) provides a four-year limitations period for personal-injury actions and serves as the limitations period for ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims in Florida.

Karantsalis v. City of Miami Springs, Florida · filed 2021-11-12(3)

In Florida, the most analogous state limitations period comes from personal injury actions, which provide a period of four years. Fla. Stat. § 95.11(3); Silva v. Baptist Health S. Fla., Inc., 856 F.3d 824, 841 (11th Cir. 2017) (applying a four-year limitations period to claims under the ADA and Rehabilitation Act in Florida). We therefore must apply the statute of limitations for personal injury claims arising in Florida—four years.

Subsection 95.11(3) imposes a four-year limitations period on personal-injury claims, including federal civil-rights claims brought under § 1983.

Innova Investment Group, LLC v. Village of Key Biscayne · filed 2024-05-29(3)

The concurrent legal remedy for count four’s federal excessive fine claim—a section 1983 damages action—is subject to Florida’s four-year statute of limitations for personal injury claims. See Chappell v. Rich, 340 F.3d 1279, 1283 (11th Cir. 2003); Fla. Stat. § 95.11(3). That four-year period begins to run when the facts necessary to support the cause of action are “apparent or should be apparent to a person with a reasonably prudent regard for his rights.” Lovett v. Ray, 327 F.3d 1181, 1182 (11th Cir. 2003) (quoting Rozar v. Mullis, 85 F.3d 556, 561–62 (11th Cir. 1996)). It is apparent from the face of Innova’s complaint that count four’s federal excessive fine claim is untimely under section 95.11(3). The facts necessary to support that claim were apparent, or at least reasonably should’ve been, by November 5, 2012, at the latest.

Section 95.11(3) supplies Florida’s four-year personal-injury limitations period applicable to ADA, Rehabilitation Act, and Title VI claims.

Cuff v. Florida A&M University & Board of Trustees · filed 2024-10-23(3)

Florida’s four-year statute of limitations applied to Cuff’s claims under the ADA, the Rehabilitation Act, and Title VI. See Rozar v. Mullis, 85 F.3d 556, 561 (11th Cir. 1996) (holding that Georgia’s personal injury limitations period applied to a Title VI claim brought in Georgia); Karantsalis v. City of Miami Springs, Fla., 17 F.4th 1316, 1320 (11th Cir. 2021) (holding that Florida’s personal injury limitations period applied to ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims brought in Florida); Fla. Stat. § 95.11(3).

Section 95.11(3) provides a four-year statute of limitations for § 1983 claims arising in Florida.

Hamlett, Shawn v. Officer Desire · filed 2025-06-16(3)

Therefore, under Florida’s four-year statute of limitations for § 1983 claims, Plaintiff has until March 29, 2029 to bring his claims. See Ellison v. Lester, 275 F. App’x 900, 901-02 (11th Cir. 2008) (holding that the four-year statute of limitations under Fla. Stat. § 95.11(3) governs § 1983 claims arising in Florida).

Section 95.11(3)'s four-year limitations period governs § 1983 claims arising in Florida.

FOMBY · filed 2025-10-16(3)

The statute of limitations governing § 1983 claims arising in Florida is four years. Ellison v. Lester, 275 Fed. App’x 900, 901-02 (11th Cir. 2008); Chappell v. Rich, 340 F.3d 1279, 1283 (11th Cir. 2003); see also Fla. Stat. § 95.11(3).

Section 95.11(3) provides a four-year statute of limitations for § 1983 claims arising in Florida.

PRESSLEY · filed 2026-01-15(3)

Third, even if Heck did not bar Pressley’s claims, the claims would be subject to dismissal based on the four-year statute of limitations. See Ellison v. Lester, 275 F. App’x 900, 901-02 (11th Cir. 2008) (“[T]he four-year statute of limitations under Fla. Stat. § 95.11(3) applies to § 1983 claims arising in Florida.”); ... Thus, Pressley should have been aware of any misconduct related to her prosecution in 2016, before she pled no contest to the charge, and any related claims are time-barred.

Section 95.11(3) provides a four-year limitations period for personal-injury claims.

Daniels v. Town of Palm Beach, Florida · filed 2025-08-18(3)

For any claims that accrued before March 24, 2023, Florida’s personal injury limitations period is four years. See Baker v. Gulf & W. Indus., Inc., 850 F.2d 1480, 1482 (11th Cir. 1988) (citing Fla. Stat. § 95.11(3)).

Section 95.11(3) supplies a four-year limitations period for § 1983 claims arising in Florida.

WILSON · filed 2026-03-10(3)

In Florida, claims brought under § 1983 are subject to a four-year statute of limitations. See Ellison v. Lester, 275 F. App’x 900, 901-02 (11th Cir. 2008) (“[T]he four-year statute of limitations under Fla. Stat. § 95.11(3) applies to § 1983 claims arising in Florida.”).

Section 95.11(3)(p) imposes a four-year limitations period on tort claims, including intentional infliction of emotional distress.

Ross v. Twenty-Four Collection, Inc. · filed 1993-04-27(3)(p)

First, the various tort claims pled in the complaint, including intentional infliction of emotional distress, are, as a matter of law, barred by the four-year statute of limitations for tort claims. Section 95.11(3)(p), Fla. Stat. (1989). These causes of action accrued no later than April 11, 1984, when the plaintiff Karen Ross was allegedly forced to resign her employment with the defendant Twenty-Four Collection, Inc. after enduring several years of sexual harassment on the job. The complaint herein was filed on April 10, 1989, approximately five years later, and was therefore clearly barred by the applicable four-year statute of limitations.

Section 95.11(3) supplies a four-year limitations period for § 1981 claims.

Paldano v. Althin Medical, Inc. · filed 1996-12-12(3)

It is undisputed that Florida’s four-year statute of limitations for personal injuries, found in § 95.11(3), Florida Statutes, applies to the Plaintiff’s § 1981 claims.

Section 95.11(3)(e)’s four-year limitations period applies to FCRA claims when the FCHR does not issue a reasonable cause determination within 180 days.

Efstathion v. CBRE Capital Markets, Inc. · filed 2025-03-19(3)(e)

This Court finds that, pursuant to the Florida Supreme Court’s holding in Joshua, because the 180-day period lapsed without issuance of a reasonable cause determination by the FCHR, the general four-year limitations period for statutory violations set forth in section 95.11(3)(e), Florida Statutes, applies.

Section 95.11(3) supplies a four-year limitations period for § 1983 claims in Florida.

Johnson v. Culpepper · filed 2021-08-26(3)

For § 1983 claims in Florida, the ... appropriate statute of limitations is four years.

Section 95.11(2)(b) provides a five-year limitation period for actions on written contracts, while related claims may receive four-year periods under section 95.11(3).

Vaughter v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc. · filed 1987-05-20(2)(b)

Moreover, under Florida law as incorporated into the Railway Labor Act, see United Transportation Union v. Florida East Coast Ry., 586 F.2d 520, 525 (5th Cir.1978), plaintiffs had five years to assert their claims under the most generous statute of limitation possibly applicable. See Fla.Stat. § 95.11(2)(b) (1982) (action on written contract); cf. id. §§ 95.11(3)(a), (f), (p) (four-year limitation for claims based on negligence, “statutory liability,” and actions without a limitation period elsewhere specified).

Section 95.11(2)(b) provides a five-year limitations period for a legal or equitable action on a contract, obligation, or liability founded on a written instrument.

Capital Factors, Inc. v. Homeline Corp. (In Re General Plastics Corp.) · filed 1993-08-19(2)(b)

However, General Plastics’ accounting claim is governed by Fla.Stat. § 95.11(2)(b), which provides a five year limitations period for “a legal or equitable action on a contract, obligation, or liability founded on a written instrument” because this accounting action was based on Capital Factors’ alleged breach of its obligations under the written factoring agreement.