8 C.F.R. § 1003.2

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) creates an exception to the time limit for motions to reopen when the applicant presents sufficient evidence of changed circumstances in the country of removal.

Khov v. Holder · filed 2009-08-03(c)(3)(ii)

Khov also failed to present sufficient evidence of changed circumstances in Cambodia to qualify for the regulatory exception to the time limit for filing motions to reopen.

The changed-circumstances exception does not require a dramatic or broad social or political upheaval; it requires changed circumstances that are material and supported by evidence unavailable and undiscoverable or unpresentable at the prior hearing.

Joseph v. Holder · filed 2009-08-27(c)(3)(ii)

The plain language of the regulation does not require the asylum applicant to point to some kind of upheaval, such as the ascension of Pervez Musharraf to power in 1999 or the assassination of Benazir Bhutto in December 2007, in order to show changed circumstances. The only requirements are ... (1) that there be changed circumstances, (2) that the circumstances be material and (3) that the evidence showing changed circumstances “was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the previous hearing.”

The changed-circumstances exception does not require a broad or dramatic social or political change; a material personal or local change arising in the country of nationality can qualify if the evidence was previously unavailable.

Joseph v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2009-08-27(c)(3)(ii)

The plain language of the regulation also does not restrict the concept of “changed circumstances” to some kind of broad social or political change in the country, such as a new governing party, as opposed to a more personal or local change.

Subsection (c)(3)(ii) removes the time limit for a motion to reopen based on material changed circumstances in the country of nationality or the country of removal that were previously unavailable and could not previously have been discovered or presented.

Li v. Holder · filed 2009-11-09(c)(3)(ii)

However, there is no time limitation for filing a motion to reopen if it is “based on changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality or in the country to which deportation has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the previous hearing.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii).

Section 1003.2 requires a motion to reopen to be filed within 90 days, subject to an exception for asylum or withholding claims based on material, previously unavailable changed circumstances in the country of nationality.

Chen v. Attorney General of the United States · filed 2009-12-07(c)(2), (c)(3)(h)

An alien may file only one motion to reopen removal proceedings, “and that motion must be filed no later than 90 days after the date on which the final administrative decision was rendered in the proceeding sought to be reopened.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). The 90-day limitation does not apply to a motion to reopen which seeks asylum or withholding of deportation “based on changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality ... if such evidence is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the previous hearing.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(h).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) requires a motion to reopen within 90 days, while subsection (c)(3)(ii) provides a no-time-limit exception for material changed country conditions that were unavailable and undiscoverable or unpresentable at the prior hearing.

Sarker v. Holder · filed 2009-12-14(c)(2) and (c)(3)(ii)

An alien seeking to reopen proceedings must file his motion to reopen no later than 90 days after the date on which the final administrative decision was rendered. ... However, there is no time limit for filing a motion to reopen if it is “based on changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality or in the country to which deportation has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the previous ... hearing.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) bars a motion to reopen filed more than 90 days after the final administrative decision unless an exception applies, and § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) permits reopening based on changed country conditions when the change is material and previously unavailable.

Dung Xuong Lam v. Holder · filed 2009-12-30(c)(2) and (c)(3)(ii)

The BIA acted within its discretion in denying Lata’s motion to reopen as untimely because it was filed more than two years after the BIA’s prior order, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and Lata failed to demonstrate changed circumstances arising in Fiji, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii), or establish grounds for equitable tolling, see Iturribarria v. INS, 321 F.3d 889, 897 (9th Cir. 2003) (equitable tolling is available “when a petitioner is prevented from filing because of deception, fraud, or error,” as long as the petitioner acted with due diligence).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) requires a motion to reopen to be filed within 90 days of the final order of removal, while § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) provides a regulatory exception when material changed circumstances are demonstrated.

Flores v. Holder · filed 2010-01-20(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioners’ motion to reopen to apply for relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”) as untimely because they did not file the motion within 90 days of the BIA’s final order of removal, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), petitioners failed to demonstrate material changed circumstances in Mexico to qualify for the regulatory exception to the time limit, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii), and they did not establish prima facie eligibility for relief, see Toufighi v. Mukasey, 538 F.3d 988, 996-97 (9th Cir. 2008) (requiring movant to establish prima facie eligibility for relief).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) generally bars a motion to reopen filed more than 90 days after the final administrative order, while § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) provides a regulatory exception when the movant presents sufficient evidence of changed circumstances in the country of nationality.

Singh v. Holder · filed 2010-01-21(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Singh’s motion to reopen based on changed circumstances because the motion was filed more than ninety days after the BIA’s 2002 order, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and Singh failed to present sufficient evidence of changed circumstances in India to qualify for the regulatory exception to the time limit, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); see also Malty v. Ashcroft, 381 F.3d 942, 945 (9th Cir. 2004).

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) creates an exception to the motion-to-reopen time limit when the movant presents sufficient evidence of changed circumstances in the country of removal.

Kaur v. Holder · filed 2010-01-21(c)(3)(ii)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Kaur’s motion to reopen because the motion was filed three years after the BIA’s final removal order, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and Kaur failed to present sufficient evidence of changed circumstances in India to qualify for the regulatory exception to the time limit, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); see also Malty v. Ashcroft, 381 F.3d 942, 945 (9th Cir. 2004).

The regulation bars an untimely motion to reopen unless the movant presents sufficient evidence of changed circumstances to invoke the exception.

Atanda v. Holder Jr. · filed 2010-04-14(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Atanda’s motion to reopen as untimely where his motion was filed over a year after the BIA’s final order, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and Atanda failed to present sufficient evidence of changed circumstances in Nigeria to qualify for the regulatory exception to the time limit, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); see also Malty v. Ashcroft, 381 F.3d 942, 945 (9th Cir. 2004).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) imposes a time limit on motions to reopen, while § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) provides a regulatory exception when the applicant shows qualifying changed circumstances in the country of removal.

Jiang v. Holder · filed 2010-04-16(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

The agency did not abuse its discretion in denying Jiang’s motion to reopen as untimely because Jiang filed it over ten years after the BIA issued its final removal order, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and Jiang failed to demonstrate changed circumstances in China to qualify for the regulatory exception to the time limit for filing motions to reopen, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); He v. Gonzales, 501 F.3d 1128, 1132 (9th Cir. 2007).

Subsection (c)(2) bars a motion to reopen filed more than 90 days after the final administrative decision, subject to regulatory exceptions including subsection (c)(3)(ii), which requires sufficient evidence of changed circumstances in the country of origin.

Lie v. Holder Jr. · filed 2011-01-19(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying as untimely petitioners’ motion to reopen because the motion was filed over three years after the BIA’s order dismissing the underlying appeal. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2); see also Dela Cruz v. Mukasey, 532 F.3d 946, 949 (9th Cir. 2008) (per curiam) (“[T]he pendency of a petition for review of an order of removal does not toll the statutory time limit for the filing of a motion to reopen with the BIA.”). Additionally, petitioners failed to present sufficient evidence of changed circumstances in Indonesia to qualify for the regulatory exception to the time limit for filing motions to reopen. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); see also He v. Gonzales, 501 F.3d 1128, 1131-32 (9th Cir. 2007) (change in personal circumstances does not establish changed circumstances in the country of origin excusing untimely motion to reopen).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) generally requires a motion to reopen to be filed within 90 days of the final order, while § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) provides a regulatory exception to that time limit when material changed circumstances in the country of nationality are shown.

Balchigsuren v. Holder Jr. · filed 2011-01-19(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioners’ motion to reopen as untimely because petitioners’ did not file the motion within 90 days of the BIA’s final order of removal, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and they failed to demonstrate material changed circumstances in Mongolia to qualify for the regulatory exception to the time limit, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); see also Toufighi v. Mukasey, 538 F.3d 988, 996-97 (9th Cir. 2008) (evidence must demonstrate prima facie eligibility for relief in order to reopen proceedings based on changed circumstances).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) requires a motion to reopen to be filed within 90 days of the BIA’s final order of removal, while § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) provides a regulatory exception when the applicant shows material changed circumstances in the country of removal.

Nersisyan v. Holder Jr. · filed 2011-03-08(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Nersisyan’s motion to reopen as untimely because he did not file the motion within 90 days of the BIA’s final order of removal, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and he failed to demonstrate material changed circumstances in Armenia to qualify for the regulatory exception to the time limit, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); see also Toufighi v. Mukasey, 538 F.3d 988, 996-97 (9th Cir. 2008) (evidence must demonstrate prima facie eligibility for relief in order to reopen proceedings based on changed circumstances).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) imposes time and numerical limits on motions to reopen, while § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) provides a regulatory exception when changed circumstances in the country of nationality are established.

Gomez v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2011-03-21(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Gomez’s second motion to reopen as untimely and numerically barred where the motion was filed over a year and a half after the BIA’s final administrative order, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and Gomez failed to establish changed circumstances in Mexico to qualify for the regulatory exception to the time and numerical bar for filing motions to reopen. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); see also Malty v. Ashcroft, 381 F.3d 942, 945 (9th Cir. 2004) (“The critical question is . . . whether circumstances have changed sufficiently that a petitioner who previously did not have a legitimate claim for asylum now has a well-founded fear of future persecution.”).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) imposes a time limit on motions to reopen, while subsection (c)(3)(ii) provides a regulatory exception when changed circumstances in the country of nationality are established.

Mostofa v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2011-03-21(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion by denying Mostofa’s motion to reopen as untimely where the motion was filed over six years after the BIA’s final administrative order, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and Mostofa failed to establish changed circumstances in Bangladesh to qualify for the regulatory exception to the time limitation for filing motions to reopen. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); see also Malty v. Ashcroft, 381 F.3d 942, 945 (9th Cir. 2004) (“The critical question is . . . whether circumstances have changed sufficiently that a petitioner who previously did not have a legitimate claim for asylum now has a well-founded fear of future persecution.”).

Section 1003.2(c) requires a motion to reopen to be filed within 90 days of the underlying Board order unless the regulatory exception for materially changed circumstances applies.

Mendoza-Lopez v. Holder · filed 2010-06-08(c)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Mendoza-Lopez’s motion to reopen as untimely because it was not filed within 90 days of the BIA’s underlying order, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c), and Mendoza-Lopez failed to demonstrate changed circumstances in Guatemala to qualify for the regulatory exception to the time limitation on motions to reopen, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); see also Malty, 381 F.3d at 945 (critical question is whether circumstances have changed sufficiently that a petitioner who previously did not have a legitimate claim now does).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) requires a motion to reopen to be filed within 90 days, while § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) permits an exception based on changed circumstances only when the motion relies on material evidence that was previously unavailable and could not have been discovered or presented earlier.

Wisageni v. Attorney General of the United States · filed 2010-06-28(c)(2) (c)(3)(ii)

A motion to reopen must be filed no later than ninety days after the date on which the final administrative decision was rendered. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). Wisageni’s motion plainly was beyond this time limit. Nevertheless, he sought to invoke an exception by reapplying for asylum based on “changed circumstances” in Indonesia. A motion to reopen filed under this exception must rely on evidence that “is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the previous hearing.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); see Zheng v. Att’y Gen., 549 F.3d 260, 265 (3d Cir. 2008). As mentioned, the BIA held that Wisageni failed to show changed country conditions in Indonesia, and thus concluded that he failed to offer a sufficient basis to warrant reopening the proceedings. We discern no abuse of discretion.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) makes a motion to reopen untimely when filed almost two years after the BIA’s final order, and § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) requires sufficient evidence of changed circumstances in Mexico to qualify for the regulatory exception to that time limit.

Hernandez-Mejia v. Holder Jr. · filed 2010-07-12(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Hernanedez-Mejia’s motion to reopen as untimely where his motion was filed almost two years after the BIA’s final order, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and he failed to present sufficient evidence of changed circumstances in Mexico to qualify for the regulatory exception to the time limit, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii).

The regulation imposes a time limit on motions to reopen and provides an exception when the movant establishes changed circumstances in the country of removal.

Satchithananthan v. Holder · filed 2010-07-15(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Satchithananthan’s motion to reopen as untimely where the motion was filed over three years after the BIA’s final decision, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and Satchithananthan failed to establish changed circumstances in Sri Lanka to qualify for the regulatory exception to the time limitation, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); see also Toufighi, 538 F.3d at 996-97 (underlying adverse credibility determination rendered evidence of changed circumstances immaterial).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) imposes a time limit on motions to reopen, while subsection (c)(3)(ii) exempts motions supported by qualifying changed circumstances in the country of origin.

Hong v. Holder · filed 2010-07-19(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Ye’s motion to reopen as untimely because she filed it 11 years after the BIA issued its final order, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and Ye failed to demonstrate changed circumstances in China to qualify for the regulatory exception to the time limit for filing motions to reopen, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); see also He v. Gonzales, 501 F.3d 1128, 1132 (9th Cir. 2007) (the birth of children outside the country of origin is a change in personal circumstances that is not sufficient to establish changed circumstances in the country of origin excusing the untimely filing of a motion to reopen).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) imposes a time limit on motions to reopen, while § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) creates a regulatory exception when changed circumstances in the country of nationality are shown.

Singh v. Holder · filed 2010-09-30(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Singh’s motion to reopen as untimely where the motion was filed more than two years after the BIA’s final order, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and Singh failed to demonstrate changed circumstances in India to qualify for the regulatory exception to the time limitation, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); see also Toufighi v. Mukasey, 538 F.3d 988, 996 (9th Cir. 2008) (evidence must demonstrate prima facie eligibility for relief in order to reopen proceedings based on changed circumstances).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) makes a motion to reopen filed more than 90 days after the final administrative order untimely, while § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) provides a changed-circumstances exception that requires the movant to establish eligibility.

Baula v. Holder Jr. · filed 2010-10-26(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Baula’s motion to reopen as untimely where the motion was filed more than a year after the BIA’s February 28, 2007, order, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and she failed to demonstrate that she was eligible for an exception to the regulatory limitations based on changed circumstances, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); Najmabadi, 597 F.3d at 992 (petitioner seeking to reopen based on changes in country conditions must “provide evidence linked to her particular circumstances”).

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) provides a regulatory exception to the 90-day motion-to-reopen deadline when the applicant demonstrates material changed circumstances in the country of nationality.

Velasquez v. Holder · filed 2010-11-01(c)(3)(ii)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Velasquez’ motion to reopen to apply for humanitarian asylum under 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(1)(iii)(B) because he did not file the motion within 90 days of the BIA’s final order of removal, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and he failed to demonstrate material changed circumstances in Guatemala to qualify for the regulatory exception to the time limit, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); see also Toufighi v. Mukasey, 538 F.3d 988, 996-97 (9th Cir. 2008) (evidence must demonstrate prima facie eligibility for relief in order to reopen proceedings based on changed circumstances).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) makes a motion to reopen subject to a time limit, while subsection (c)(3)(ii) provides a regulatory exception when the movant establishes changed circumstances in the country of removal.

Mena-Estrada v. Holder Jr. · filed 2010-11-02(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Mena-Estrada’s motion to reopen as untimely because Mena-Estrada filed the motion more than nine months after the BIA’s final administrative decision, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and Mena-Estrada failed to establish changed circumstances in El Salvador to qualify for the regulatory exception to the time limitation, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); see also Najmabadi, 597 F.3d at 991.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) treats a motion to reopen filed almost four years after the final removal order as untimely, and § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) requires material evidence of changed circumstances to excuse the late filing.

Tambunan v. Holder Jr. · filed 2010-11-30(c)(2) (c)(3)(ii)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Tambunan’s motion to reopen as untimely where Tambunan filed the motion almost four years after the BIA’s final order of removal, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and failed to submit material evidence of changed circumstances in Indonesia that would excuse the late filing, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); see also Malty, 381 F.3d at 945 (requiring circumstances to have changed sufficiently that a petitioner who previously did not have a legitimate claim for asylum now has a well-founded fear of future persecution).

Subsection (c)(2) imposes a time limit on motions to reopen, while subsection (c)(3)(ii) provides a regulatory exception when changed circumstances in the country of nationality are shown.

Jaswal v. Holder Jr. · filed 2011-06-09(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Jaswal’s motion to reopen as untimely, because he filed it nearly four and a half years after the BIA issued its final administrative order, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and Jaswal failed to demonstrate changed circumstances in India to qualify for the regulatory exception to the time limit for filing motions to reopen, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); see also Toufighi v. Mukasey, 538 F.3d 988, 996 (9th Cir. 2008) (requiring movant to produce material evidence with motion to reopen that conditions in country of nationality had changed).

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) provides an exception to the time limit for a motion to reopen when the movant demonstrates changed circumstances in the country of nationality.

Madhar v. Holder Jr. · filed 2011-06-29(c)(3)(ii)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying the Madhars’ motion to reopen where the motion was filed almost three years after the BIA’s final administrative order, see 8 C.F .R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and the Madhars failed to demonstrate changed circumstances in India to qualify for the regulatory exception to the time limitation, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); Najmabadi, 597 F.3d at 987 (new evidence “must be ‘qualitatively different’ from the evidence presented at the previous hearing”); see also Toufighi v. Mukasey, 538 F.3d 988, 996-97 (9th Cir. 2008) (underlying adverse credibility determination rendered evidence of changed circumstances immaterial).

Section 1003.2 makes a motion to reopen untimely if filed outside the applicable time limit, unless the movant presents sufficient evidence of changed circumstances to qualify for the regulatory exception.

Shi v. Holder Jr. · filed 2011-07-19(c)(2) and (c)(3)(ii)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Shi’s motion to reopen, because it was untimely, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and Shi failed to present sufficient evidence of changed circumstances in order to qualify for the regulatory exception to the time limit for filing motions to reopen, 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); see also Toufighi, 538 F.3d at 996-97 (requiring movant to produce material evidence with motion to reopen that conditions in country of nationality had changed).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) requires a motion to reopen to be filed within 90 days after the final order of removal, while § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) provides an exception when the movant presents evidence of changed circumstances in the country of removal.

Singh v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2011-07-20(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Singh’s motion to reopen as untimely because the motion was not filed within 90 days after the BIA’s final order of removal, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and Singh failed to present evidence of changed circumstances in India to qualify for an exception to the time limit, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). We reject Singh’s contention that there are no time limits for filing a motion to reopen to apply for CAT relief. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) bars a motion to reopen filed over four years after the BIA’s final decision when the movant cannot establish the changed-circumstances exception in (c)(3)(ii) with sufficient evidence.

Grewal v. Holder Jr. · filed 2011-08-16(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Grewal’s motion to reopen as time-barred where the motion was filed over four years after the BIA’s final decision, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and Grewal failed to present sufficient evidence of changed circumstances in India to qualify for an exception to the time limit, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3) (ii); see also Toufighi, 538 F.3d at 996-97.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) makes a motion to reopen untimely when filed beyond the applicable time limit, while § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) allows an exception based on changed circumstances in the country of removal when supported by sufficient evidence.

Lata v. Holder Jr. · filed 2011-08-16(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioners’ motion to reopen as untimely where the motion was filed over three years after the BIA’s final decision, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and petitioners failed to present sufficient evidence of changed circumstances in Fiji to qualify for an exception to the time limit, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); see also Toufighi, 538 F.3d at 996-97.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) imposes a time limit on motions to reopen, while § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) permits an exception based on sufficient evidence of changed circumstances in India.

Ali v. Holder Jr. · filed 2011-08-16(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Ali’s motion to reopen as untimely because he filed the motion nearly four years after the BIA issued its final order of removal, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and he failed to present sufficient evidence of changed circumstances in India to qualify for an exception to the time limit for filing motions to reopen, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii).

Section 1003.2 generally requires a motion to reopen to be filed within 90 days, but exempts motions based on material, previously unavailable changed country conditions.

Liu v. Holder · filed 2011-11-23(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

A motion to reopen generally must be filed no later than 90 days after the date on which the final administrative decision was rendered in the proceedings sought to be reopened. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). ... The time limitation does not apply to a motion to reopen if it is “based on changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality or in the country to which deportation has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the previous hearing.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) makes a motion to reopen untimely when filed beyond the applicable time limit, while § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) permits an exception only when the movant presents material evidence of changed circumstances.

Singh v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2011-11-23(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion by denying Singh’s motion to reopen as untimely because the motion was filed over five years after the BIA’s final order, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and Singh failed to present material evidence of changed circumstances in India to qualify for the regulatory exception to the time limitation for filing motions to reopen, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); see also Toufighi v. Mukasey, 538 F.3d 988, 996-97 (9th Cir. 2008) (underlying adverse credibility determination rendered evidence of changed circumstances immaterial).

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) does not exempt a late motion to reopen from the time limit when the claimed change is only the applicant’s post-removal personal circumstances rather than changed country conditions in the country of origin.

Chan v. Holder · filed 2011-12-01(c)(3)(ii)

As a preliminary matter, the BIA did not err in concluding that Chan’s Falun Gong activities in the United States constituted a change in personal circumstances, not a change in conditions “arising in the country of origin,” 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii), and therefore were not sufficient to overcome the time limitation for filing a late motion to reopen, see, e.g., Wei Guang Wang v. BIA, 437 F.3d 270, 272-74 (2d Cir. 2006) (making clear that the time and numerical limitations on motions to reopen may not be suspended because of a “self-induced change in personal circumstances” that is “entirely of [the applicant’s] own making after being ordered to leave the United States”); Li Yong Zheng v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 416 F.3d 129, 130-31 (2d Cir. 2005) (holding that a change in personal circumstances does not qualify as “changed circumstances” so as to invoke the exception provided by 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii)).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) imposes a time limit on motions to reopen, while § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) provides a changed-country-conditions exception requiring sufficient evidence of changed circumstances.

Singh v. Holder Jr. · filed 2012-01-24(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion by denying Singh’s motion to reopen as untimely where the motion was filed over four years after the BIA’s final order, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and Singh failed to present sufficient evidence of changed circumstances in India to qualify for the regulatory exception to the time limit for filing motions to reopen, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); Malty v. Ashcroft, 381 F.3d 942, 945 (9th Cir. 2004) (“The critical question is . . . whether circumstances have changed sufficiently that a petitioner who previously did not have a legitimate claim for asylum now has a well-founded fear of future persecution.”).

The provision makes a motion to reopen untimely when filed outside the applicable time limit unless the movant demonstrates changed country conditions qualifying for the regulatory exception.

Lopez-Romero v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2012-02-22(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Lopez-Romrero’s motion to reopen because it was untimely, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). Lopez-Romero failed to demonstrate changed country conditions to qualify for the regulatory exception to the time limit, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) generally bars a motion to reopen filed more than 90 days after the final administrative decision, while § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) provides an exception when material evidence shows changed country conditions.

Kaur v. Holder Jr. · filed 2012-03-02(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Kaur’s motion to reopen as untimely because the motion was filed over two years after the BIA’s final order, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and Kaur failed to present material evidence of changed circumstances in India to qualify for the regulatory exception to the time limitation for filing motions to reopen, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); see also Toufighi v. Mukasey, 538 F.3d 988, 996-97 (9th Cir. 2008) (underlying adverse credibility determination rendered evidence of changed circumstances immaterial).

Section 1003.2 generally requires a motion to reopen to be filed within the applicable time limit, but permits the time limit to be excused when the movant presents sufficient evidence of materially changed circumstances in the country of removal.

Singh v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2012-03-02(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion by denying Singh’s motion to reopen as untimely where the motion was filed over five years after the BIA’s final order, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and Singh failed to present sufficient evidence of changed circumstances in India to qualify for the regulatory exception to the time limit for filing motions to reopen, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); Malty v. Ashcroft, 381 F.3d 942, 945 (9th Cir. 2004) (“The critical question is . . . whether circumstances have changed sufficiently that a petitioner who previously did not have a legitimate claim for asylum now has a well-founded fear of future persecution.”).

Section 1003.2 generally requires a motion to reopen to be filed within 90 days of the final administrative order, but allows an exception when materially changed circumstances in the country of removal are shown.

Maltez v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2012-03-06(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Rodriguez Maltez’s motion to reopen as untimely where the motion was filed over two-and-a-half years after the BIA’s final administrative order, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and Rodriguez Maltez failed to demonstrate materially changed circumstances in Nicaragua to qualify for the regulatory exception to the time limit for filing motions to reopen, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); Najmabadi, 597 F.3d at 989-90.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) makes a motion to reopen subject to a time limit, while § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) provides a regulatory exception when changed circumstances in the country of nationality or removal justify reopening.

Kang v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2012-04-23(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Kang’s motion to reopen as untimely where the motion was filed over four and half years after the BIA’s final order, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and Kang failed to present sufficient evidence that he exercised diligence in discovering his claim for ineffective assistance of counsel, see Singh v. Gonzales, 491 F.3d 1090, 1096-97 (9th Cir. 2007) (petitioner was not entitled to equitable tolling where there was no evidence of what he did between the time he became suspicious of the fraud and when he sought advice from his present counsel). Kang also failed to present sufficient evidence of changed circumstances in India to qualify for the regulatory exception to the time limit for filing motions to reopen. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); Malty v. Ashcroft, 381 F.3d 942, 945 (9th Cir. 2004) (“The critical question is . . . whether circumstances have changed sufficiently that a petitioner who previously did not have a legitimate claim for asylum now has a well-founded fear of future persecution.”).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) imposes a time limit on motions to reopen, and § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) permits an exception when sufficient evidence shows changed circumstances in the country.

Singh v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2012-04-23(c)(2) (c)(3)(ii)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Singh’s motion to reopen as untimely where the motion was filed over six years after the BIA’s final order, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and Singh failed to present sufficient evidence of changed circumstances in India to qualify for the regulatory exception to the time limit for filing motions to reopen, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); Najmabadi v. Holder, 597 F.3d 983, 987 (9th Cir. 2010) (newly submitted evidence must be “qualitatively different” from the evidence presented at the prior hearing); Toufighi, 538 F.3d at 994-97 (evidence was irrelevant in light of prior adverse credibility determination).

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) permits the time-limit exception for a motion to reopen when the applicant presents material evidence of changed circumstances in the country of nationality or removal.

Torres v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2012-04-24(c)(3)(ii)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioners’ motion to reopen to apply for asylum and withholding of removal as untimely because the motion was filed over five years after the BIA’s final order, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and petitioners failed to present material evidence of changed circumstances in Colombia to qualify for the regulatory exception to the time limitation for filing motions to reopen, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); see also Najmabadi v. Holder, 597 F.3d 983, 991 (9th Cir. 2010).

Section 1003.2 requires a motion to reopen to be filed within 90 days, but the time limit does not apply when the motion relies on material, previously unavailable evidence of changed circumstances in the country of nationality.

Chen v. Attorney General of the United States · filed 2012-05-09(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

There is no dispute that Chen’s motion to reopen was untimely, as it was not filed with the BIA within ninety days of the BIA’s 2003 decision. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1229a(c)(7)(A) & (C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). However, the ninety-day requirement does not apply to motions that rely on evidence of “changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality . . . if such evidence is material and was not available and would not have been discovered or presented at the previous hearing.” 8 U.S.C. §§ 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) generally limits an alien to one motion to reopen filed within 90 days, while § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) exempts motions based on material, previously unavailable changed country conditions; a change in personal circumstances does not qualify.

Wen Hui Chen v. Holder · filed 2012-05-29(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

The agency’s regulations permit an alien seeking to reopen proceedings to file one motion to reopen no later than 90 days after the date on which the final administrative decision was rendered. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A), (C); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). It is undisputed that Chen’s August 2008 motion to reopen was untimely because the Immigration Judge (“IJ”) issued a final order of removal in July 1996. However, there are no limitations for filing a motion to reopen if it is “based on changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality or in the country to which deportation has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the previous hearing.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii). ... Here, the BIA reasonably found that Chen failed to demonstrate a change in country conditions, and merely established a change in her personal circumstances, with regard to her membership in the Chinese Democracy Party (“CDP”).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) bars an untimely motion to reopen unless the applicant qualifies for an exception, including the changed-country-conditions exception in subsection (c)(3)(ii).

Singh v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2012-07-06(c)(2) and (c)(3)(ii)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Singh’s untimely motion to reopen where the motion was filed over five and a half years after the agency’s final order, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and Singh failed to establish changed circumstances in India to qualify for the regulatory exception to the time limitation. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); Najmabadi, 597 F.3d at 987-90.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) imposes a time limit on motions to reopen, while § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) provides a regulatory exception when changed circumstances are established.

Hartono v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2012-07-09(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Hartono’s motion to reopen as untimely because the motion was filed more than four years after the BIA’s final decision, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and Hartono failed to establish changed circumstances to qualify for the regulatory exception to the time limitation, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); see also Najmabadi, 597 F.3d at 987, 989-90 (the new evidence must be “qualitatively different” from the evidence at the previous hearing).

Subsections (c)(2) and (c)(3)(ii) make a motion to reopen untimely when filed years after the final order unless the movant provides sufficient evidence of changed circumstances in the country to fit the regulatory exception.

Hutauruk v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2012-07-11(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Hutauruk’s motion to reopen as untimely where the motion was filed over four years after the BIA’s final order, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and Hutauruk failed to present sufficient evidence of changed circumstances in Indonesia to qualify for the regulatory exception to the time limit for filing motions to reopen, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); Najmabadi v. Holder, 597 F.3d 983, 987 (9th Cir. 2010) (evidence supporting a motion to reopen must be “qualitatively different” from what was presented at the initial hearing).

The changed-circumstances exception permits an otherwise untimely motion to reopen when the movant presents sufficient evidence of changed circumstances in the relevant country.

Simbolon v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2012-07-11(c)(3)(ii)

With respect to Simbolon’s claims based on Christianity, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Simbolon’s motion to reopen as untimely where the motion was filed over three years after the BIA’s final order, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and Simbolon failed to present sufficient evidence of changed circumstances in Indonesia to qualify for the regulatory exception to the time limit for filing motions to reopen, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); see Najmabadi v. Holder, 597 F.3d 983, 987 (9th Cir. 2010) (evidence of changed circumstances must be qualitatively different from what was presented at the prior hearing).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) imposes a time limit on motions to reopen, while § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) provides a regulatory exception when the relevant country’s circumstances have changed sufficiently.

Singh v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2012-08-14(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Singh’s motion to reopen as untimely where the motion was filed over three years after the BIA’s final decision, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and Singh failed to demonstrate changed circumstances in India to qualify for the regulatory exception to the time limitation, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); Malty v. Ashcroft, 381 F.3d 942, 945 (9th Cir. 2004) (“The critical question is . . . whether circumstances have changed sufficiently that a petitioner who previously did not have a legitimate claim for asylum now has a well-founded fear of future persecution.”).

Subsections (c)(2) and (c)(3)(ii) impose a time limit on motions to reopen and permit an exception only when the movant presents sufficient, individualized evidence of changed circumstances in the relevant country.

Habib v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2012-08-14(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Habib’s motion to reopen as untimely where the motion was filed over 12 years after the September 30, 1996 deadline, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and Habib failed to present sufficient evidence of changed circumstances in Egypt of individualized relevancy to him to qualify for the regulatory exception to the time limit for filing motions to reopen, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); Najmabadi v. Holder, 597 F.3d 983, 987-90 (9th Cir. 2010).

Section 1003.2(c)(2)'s time limit barred Celmeta's motion filed over four years after the BIA's final order, and she did not meet the changed-circumstances exception in § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii).

Celmeta v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2012-08-16(c)(2) and (c)(3)(ii)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Celmeta’s motion to reopen as untimely where the motion was filed over four years after the BIA’s final order, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and Celmeta failed to present sufficient evidence of changed circumstances in Albania to qualify for the regulatory exception to the time limit for filing motions to reopen, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); see Najmabadi v. Holder, 597 F.3d 983, 987 (9th Cir. 2010) (material new evidence must be qualitatively different from the evidence presented at the prior proceeding); Bolshakov v. INS, 133 F.3d 1279, 1281 (9th Cir. 1998) (the BIA correctly concluded that petitioners evidence of renewed threats did not show new circumstances).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) imposes a time limit on motions to reopen, while § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) provides a regulatory exception when the movant presents sufficient evidence of changed circumstances in the country of removal.

Kaur v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2012-09-14(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Kaur’s motion to reopen as untimely where the motion was filed over four years after the BIA’s final order, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and Kaur failed to present sufficient evidence of changed circumstances in India to qualify for the regulatory exception to the time limit for filing motions to reopen, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii).

Paragraph (c)(2) generally permits one motion to reopen filed no later than 90 days after the final administrative decision, while paragraph (c)(3)(ii) exempts a motion based on material changed country conditions that were previously unavailable and could not have been discovered or presented earlier.

Huang v. Holder · filed 2012-09-27(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

An alien may file one motion to reopen, generally no later than 90 days after the date on which the final administrative decision was rendered. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A), (C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). ... The time limitation does not apply to a motion to reopen if it is “based on changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality or in the country to which deportation has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the previous hearing.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii). However, Huang failed to establish a material change in country conditions.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) bars a motion to reopen filed more than 90 days after the final administrative decision unless an exception applies, and § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) requires material evidence of changed circumstances to invoke the relevant exception.

Singh v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2012-10-15(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Singh’s motion to reopen as untimely because the motion was filed over four years after the BIA’s final order, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and Singh failed to present material evidence of changed circumstances in India to qualify for the regulatory exception to the time limitation for filing a motion to reopen, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); see also Toufighi, 538 F.3d at 996-97 (underlying adverse credibility determination rendered evidence of changed circumstances immaterial).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) imposes a time limit on motions to reopen, while § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) provides an exception when sufficient evidence shows changed circumstances in the country of nationality or last residence.

Shameem v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2012-10-29(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioners’ motion to reopen as untimely where the motion was filed over seven years after the BIA’s final order, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and petitioners failed to present sufficient evidence of changed circumstances in Fiji to qualify for the regulatory exception to the time limit for filing motions to reopen, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); see Najmabadi v. Holder, 597 F.3d 983, 987 (9th Cir. 2010) (evidence of changed circumstances must be qualitatively different from what could have been presented at the prior hearing).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) imposes a time limit on motions to reopen, while § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) provides an exception when the movant demonstrates changed circumstances in the country of removal.

Nix v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2012-11-16(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Nix’s motion to reopen as untimely where the motion was filed over twelve years after the agency’s final order, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and Nix failed to demonstrate changed circumstances in Guatemala to qualify for the regulatory exception to the time limit for filing motions to reopen, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); see also Toufighi, 538 F.3d at 996 (requiring movant to produce material evidence of change in the country of origin that would establish prima facie eligibility for relief).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) makes a motion to reopen subject to a time limit, while § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) provides a regulatory exception when the applicant demonstrates changed circumstances in the country of removal.

Kustanto v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2012-11-16(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Kustanto’s motion to reopen as untimely where it was filed almost five years after the BIA’s final order, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and Kustanto did not demonstrate changed circumstances in Indonesia to qualify for the regulatory exception to the time limit for filing motions to reopen, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); Najmabadi, 597 F.3d at 987 (new evidence must be qualitatively different from the evidence presented at the prior proceeding to be material).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) imposes a time limit on motions to reopen, and § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) provides a regulatory exception when the movant establishes changed circumstances in the country of removal.

Onyeagoro v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2012-11-19(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Onyeagoro’s motion to reopen as untimely where the motion was filed over four years after the BIA’s final order, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and Onyeagoro failed to establish changed circumstances in Nigeria to qualify for the regulatory exception to the time limit for filing motions to reopen, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); Najmabadi, 597 F.3d at 988-89 (evidence of changed circumstances must be qualitatively different from what could have been presented at prior hearing); He v. Gonzales, 501 F.3d 1128, 1132 (9th Cir. 2007) (a change in personal circumstances does not establish changed country conditions).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) bars an untimely motion to reopen, while § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) provides an exception when materially changed country conditions are demonstrated.

Takhar v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2012-12-21(c)(2) and (c)(3)(ii)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Takhar’s motion to reopen as untimely where it was filed two years after the BIA’s final order, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and Takhar failed to demonstrate materially changed circumstances in India to qualify for the regulatory exception to the time limit, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); Najmabadi, 597 F.3d at 987-89 (new evidence must be qualitatively different from the evidence presented at the prior proceeding to be material).

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) creates a regulatory exception to the time limit for a motion to reopen when the movant presents material evidence of changed circumstances in the country of nationality.

Perez-Fajardo v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2013-02-14(c)(3)(ii)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Perez-Fajardo’s motion to reopen as untimely because Perez-Fajardo failed to present material evidence of changed circumstances in Guatemala to qualify for the regulatory exception to the time limit for filing a motion to reopen. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); Najmabadi, 597 F.3d at 990 (previously unavailable evidence must be material to the petitioner’s claim).

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) excuses the time limit for a motion to reopen based on changed country conditions only when the movant provides objective evidence of materially changed conditions sufficient to establish the exception.

Dia v. Holder · filed 2013-03-28(c)(3)(ii)

We find no abuse of discretion in the BIA’s determination that Dia failed to provide objective evidence of materially changed conditions in Guinea sufficient to excuse his motion’s untimeliness. ... As Dia’s motion did not provide objective evidence of changed conditions in Guinea, the BIA did not err in denying his motion to reopen as untimely because he did not establish an exception to the time limitation. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii).

Section 1003.2 generally limits an alien to one motion to reopen filed within 90 days, but that time limit does not apply when the motion relies on material, previously unavailable evidence of changed conditions in the country of nationality or removal.

Oluwale v. Holder · filed 2013-05-23(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

An alien may file one motion to reopen, generally no later than 90 days after the date on which the final administrative decision was rendered in the proceedings sought to be reopened. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A), (C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). ... The time limitation does not apply to a motion to reopen if it is “based on changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality or in the country to which deportation has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the previous hearing.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii). However, we find no basis to reverse in the BIA’s conclusion that Oluwale failed to establish a material change in conditions arising in Nigeria since the time of his 2003 merits hearing.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) imposes a time limit on motions to reopen, and § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) permits a regulatory exception when changed circumstances in the country are material to the claim.

Kaur v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2013-05-24(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Kaur’s untimely motion to reopen where the motion was filed over four years after the BIA’s final decision, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and Kaur failed to establish changed circumstances in India material to her claim to qualify for the regulatory exception to the time limitation, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); Toufighi, 538 F.3d at 996-97 (underlying adverse credibility determination rendered evidence of changed circumstances immaterial).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) makes a motion to reopen untimely when it is filed beyond the applicable time limit, while § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) provides a regulatory exception when materially changed circumstances in the country of removal are established.

Hilwani v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2013-06-13(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Hilwani’s motion to reopen as untimely because the motion was filed over three years after the BIA’s final decision, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and Hilwani failed to establish materially changed circumstances in Indonesia to qualify for the regulatory exception to the time limitations for motions to reopen, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); Najmabadi, 597 F.3d at 988-89 (evidence of changed circumstances must be qualitatively different from what could have been presented at prior hearing).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) sets a time limit for motions to reopen, while § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) provides a regulatory exception when the movant presents sufficient evidence of changed circumstances in the country of removal.

Singh v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2013-06-14(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Singh’s motion to reopen as untimely where the motion was filed over four years after the BIA’s final order, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and Singh failed to present sufficient evidence of changed circumstances in India to qualify for the regulatory exception to the time limit for filing motions to reopen, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); Toufighi, 538 F.3d at 994-97 (underlying adverse credibility determination rendered evidence of changed circumstances immaterial); Malty v. Ashcroft, 381 F.3d 942, 945 (9th Cir. 2004) (holding “[t]he critical question is . . . whether circumstances have changed sufficiently that a petitioner who previously did not have a legitimate claim for asylum now has a well-founded fear of future persecution.”).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) imposes a time limit on motions to reopen, while § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) provides a changed-country-conditions exception that requires sufficient evidence.

Yang v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2013-06-14(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Yang’s motion to reopen as untimely where the motion was filed over five years after the BIA’s final order, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and Yang failed to present sufficient evidence of changed circumstances in China to qualify for the regulatory exception to the time limit for filing motions to reopen, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) bars an untimely motion to reopen absent an applicable exception, and § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) requires changed circumstances in the country of removal to invoke the regulatory exception.

Khosla v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2013-07-31(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Khosla’s motion to reopen as untimely where the motion was filed over three years after the BIA’s final order, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and Khosla failed to establish changed circumstances in India to qualify for the regulatory exception to the time limit for filing motions to reopen, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); Toufighi, 538 F.3d at 996-97 (underlying adverse credibility determination rendered evidence of changed circumstances immaterial).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) imposes a 90-day deadline for motions to reopen, while § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) provides an exception when material changed-country-conditions evidence was previously unavailable.

Singh v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2013-08-16(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Singh’s motion to reopen as untimely because the motion was filed seven months after the BIA’s final decision, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and Singh failed to establish materially changed circumstances in India to qualify for the regulatory exception to the time limitations for motions to reopen, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); Najmabadi, 597 F.3d at 988-89 (evidence of changed circumstances must be qualitatively different from what could have been presented at prior hearing).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) imposes a time limit on motions to reopen, while § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) provides a changed-circumstances exception when the applicant demonstrates qualifying changed circumstances in the country of removal.

Kambey v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2013-09-27(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Kambey’s motion to reopen as untimely because the motion was filed over three years after the BIA’s final administrative order, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and Kambey failed to demonstrate changed circumstances in Indonesia to qualify for the regulatory exception to the time limitation, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); Najmabadi, 597 F.3d at 988-89 (evidence of changed circumstances must be qualitatively different from evidence that could have been presented at prior hearing).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) imposes a time limit on motions to reopen, while § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) provides a regulatory exception when the movant presents sufficient evidence of changed circumstances in the country of removal.

Devi v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2013-09-30(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion by denying Devi’s motion to reopen as untimely where the motion was filed more than five years after the BIA’s final order, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and Devi failed to present sufficient evidence of changed circumstances in India to qualify for the regulatory exception to the time limit for filing motions to reopen, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); see also Malty, 381 F.3d at 945 (“The critical question is . . . whether circumstances have changed sufficiently that a petitioner who previously did not have a legitimate claim for asylum now has a well-founded fear of persecution.”).

Section 1003.2 bars a motion to reopen filed more than 90 days after a final order unless the movant provides sufficient evidence of materially changed country conditions qualifying for the regulatory exception.

Huang v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2013-09-30(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Huang’s motion to reopen as untimely because the motion was filed over six years after the BIA’s final order, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and Huang failed to present sufficient evidence of changed circumstances in China to qualify for the regulatory exception to the time limit for filing motions to reopen, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); Malty v. Ashcroft, 381 F.3d 942, 945 (9th Cir. 2004) (“The critical question is . . . whether circumstances have changed sufficiently that a petitioner who previously did not have a legitimate claim for asylum now has a well-founded fear of future persecution.”).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) imposes a time limit on motions to reopen, and § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) requires material changed circumstances in the country of nationality for the relevant exception.

Johanes v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2013-09-30(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Johanes’s untimely motion to reopen where the motion was filed almost six years after the BIA’s final decision, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and Johanes failed to establish changed circumstances in Indonesia material to his claim, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); see also Malty v. Ashcroft, 381 F.3d 942, 945 (9th Cir. 2004) (requiring circumstances to have changed sufficiently that a petitioner who previously did not have a legitimate claim for asylum now has a well-founded fear of persecution).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) generally requires a motion to reopen to be filed within 90 days, while § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) exempts a motion based on qualifying changed country conditions.

Chen v. Holder · filed 2013-11-14(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

An alien may file one motion to reopen, generally no later than 90 days after the date on which the final administrative decision was rendered in the proceedings sought to be reopened. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A), (C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). ... The time limitation does not apply to a motion to reopen “based on changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality or in the country to which deportation has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the previous hearing.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) makes a motion to reopen subject to a time limit, while § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) provides a regulatory exception when changed circumstances in the country of removal are demonstrated.

Verduzco-Wence v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2013-12-10(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Verduzco-Wence’s motion to reopen as untimely because it was filed nearly nine years after the BIA’s final decision, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and Verduzco-Wence failed to demonstrate changed circumstances in Mexico to qualify for the regulatory exception to the time limitation, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); Najmabadi, 597 F.3d at 988-89 (evidence submitted with motion to reopen must show conditions are qualitatively different than at time of hearing); see also Almaraz v. Holder, 608 F.3d 638, 640 (9th Cir. 2010) (change in personal circumstances is insufficient to excuse an untimely motion to reopen).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) limits motions to reopen to a timely filing, while § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) provides an exception when the movant demonstrates materially changed country conditions.

Felipa De Los Angeles-Moreno v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2013-12-19(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying De Los Angeles-Moreno’s motion to reopen as untimely because it was filed nearly two years after the BIA’s final decision, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and De Los Angeles-Moreno failed to demonstrate changed circumstances in El Salvador to qualify for the regulatory exception to the time limitation, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); Najmabadi, 597 F.3d at 988-89 (evidence submitted with motion to reopen must show conditions are qualitatively different than at time of hearing); see also Almaraz v. Holder, 608 F.3d 638, 640 (9th Cir. 2010) (change in petitioner’s health was a change in personal circumstances, not a change in country conditions sufficient to excuse an untimely motion to reopen).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) bars a motion to reopen filed more than 90 days after the final administrative decision, unless an applicable exception such as materially changed circumstances under subsection (c)(3)(ii) is established.

Ren v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2014-01-24(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Ren’s motion to reopen as untimely because the motion was filed over four years after the BIA’s final decision, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and Ren failed to establish materially changed circumstances in China to qualify for the regulatory exception to the time limitation for motions to reopen, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); Najmabadi, 597 F.3d at 987 (new evidence “must be ‘qualitatively different’ from the evidence presented at the previous hearing”).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) imposes a time limit on motions to reopen, and § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) provides an exception when the applicant demonstrates changed country conditions.

Singh v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2014-01-24(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Singh’s motion to reopen as untimely because the motion was filed over five years after the BIA’s final decision, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and Singh failed to demonstrate changed circumstances in India to qualify for the regulatory exception to the time limit for filing motions to reopen, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); Najmabadi, 597 F.3d at 988-89.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) generally bars a motion to reopen filed more than 90 days after the agency's final order of removal, while § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) provides an exception when changed circumstances in the country of nationality are established.

Martinez v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2014-02-24(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in dismissing Martinez’s appeal of the IJ’s denial of his motion to reopen as untimely where it was filed over 90 days after the agency’s final order of removal, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and Martinez failed to establish changed circumstances in Guatemala to qualify for the regulatory exception to the time limitation, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); Najmabadi v. Holder, 597 F.3d 983, 987 (9th Cir. 2010) (evidence submitted with motion to reopen must be qualitatively different from the evidence presented at the original hearing).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) imposes a time limit on motions to reopen, while § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) provides a regulatory exception when materially changed conditions are shown.

Ngantung v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2014-03-03(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion by denying Ngantung’s motion to reopen as untimely because the motion was filed more than four years after the BIA’s final order, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and Ngantung did not demonstrate materially changed conditions in Indonesia to qualify for the regulatory exception to the time limit for filing motions to reopen, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); Najmabadi, 597 F.3d at 987 (evidence must be “qualitatively different” from the evidence presented at the previous hearing).

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) provides an exception to the ninety-day deadline for a motion to reopen when materially changed country conditions support the motion.

Ali v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2014-04-14(c)(3)(ii)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion by denying Ali’s motion to reopen in its entirety because it was filed five years after the BIA’s final decision, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and it did not fall within the changed-circumstances exception to the ninety-day time limit on motions to reopen, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). Ali’s evidence did not show that conditions in Eritrea changed materially after her 2003 hearing, so the exception did not apply with respect to any of Ali’s claims.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) imposes a 90-day deadline for motions to reopen, while § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) exempts motions based on material, previously unavailable evidence of changed circumstances in the country of nationality.

Ujkaj v. Holder · filed 2014-04-24(c)(2) (c)(3)(ii)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Ujkaj’s 2011 motion to reopen as untimely, because he filed it more than 90 days after the BIA’s 2005 final order of removal. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). Although the time limitation does not apply if a motion is based on material, previously unavailable evidence of “changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality,” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii), substantial evidence supports the BIA’s finding that Ujkaj did not demonstrate a change in conditions in Albania.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) imposes a ninety-day deadline for motions to reopen, while § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) provides an exception for country-conditions motions supported by material, previously unavailable evidence showing changed circumstances.

Singh v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2014-04-24(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion when it denied Singh’s motion as untimely. Singh filed his motion more than ninety days after the BIA’s final administrative order. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). Unable to demonstrate changed circumstances in India, he also failed to qualify for the regulatory exception to the time limit. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) (providing an exception to the ninety-day deadline for applications based on changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality if petitioner’s new evidence is material and was unavailable at the previous hearing); see also Najmabadi, 597 F.3d at 987–90 (explaining that new evidence must be “qualitatively different” from evidence presented at the petitioner’s original hearing).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) imposes a time limit on motions to reopen, and § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) provides a regulatory exception when materially changed circumstances in the country of removal are established.

Boedijono v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2014-10-20(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioners’ motion to reopen as untimely because the motion was filed over three years after the BIA’s final decision, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and they failed to establish materially changed circumstances in Indonesia to qualify for the regulatory exception to the time limitation for motions to reopen, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); Najmabadi, 597 F.3d at 987 (new evidence “must be ‘qualitatively different’ from the evidence presented at the previous hearing”).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) generally bars a motion to reopen filed more than 90 days after the final administrative decision, while § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) provides an exception when the motion is based on material evidence of changed country conditions.

Singh v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2015-03-19(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion when it denied Singh’s motion to reopen as untimely because the motion was filed over four years after the BIA’s final decision, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and Singh failed to demonstrate changed country conditions in India to qualify for an exception to the time limitations for a motion to reopen, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii), Najmabadi, 597 F.3d at 991-92 (BIA did not abuse discretion where petitioner failed to introduce material evidence); see also Cano-Merida v. INS, 311 F.3d 960, 965-66 (9th Cir. 2002) (no abuse of discretion where motion to reopen did not establish prima facie eligibility for CAT relief).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) imposes a 90-day deadline for motions to reopen, while § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) exempts motions based on material, previously unavailable changed country conditions from that deadline.

Gjolaj v. Lynch · filed 2015-07-02(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

Although the time limitations do not apply if the motion “is based on changed country conditions arising in the country of nationality or the country to which removal has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available and would not have been discovered or presented at the previous proceeding,” 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); see also 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii), we find no error in the BIA’s conclusion that Gjolaj failed to establish any material change in conditions.

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) provides an exception to the time limit for a motion to reopen when the movant establishes material changed circumstances in the country of nationality.

Singh v. Lynch · filed 2015-07-07(c)(3)(ii)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioners’ untimely motion to reopen because they did not establish material changed circumstances in India to qualify for the regulatory exception to the time limit.

The changed-circumstances exception to the time limit for a motion to reopen requires material evidence of changed circumstances in the country of removal.

Ching v. Lynch · filed 2015-12-14(c)(3)(ii)

Though the BIA was mistaken when it found that Ching did not file an asylum application with his motion to reopen, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Ching’s motion where it separately found the motion untimely, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and found Ching failed to present material evidence of changed circumstances in the Philippines to qualify for a regulatory exception to the time limitation for filing a motion to reopen, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); see also Toufighi, 538 F.3d at 996 (stating the hurdles a petitioner must clear in order to prevail on a motion to reopen based on changed country conditions).

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) exempts a motion to reopen from the time bar when the movant sufficiently shows changed country conditions with material evidence that was unavailable and could not have been discovered or presented at the prior hearing.

Wu v. Lynch · filed 2016-02-01(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

Wu concedes that his motion to reopen is untimely on its face. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i) (“[T]he motion to reopen shall be filed within 90 days of the date of entry of a final administrative order of removal.”); see also 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2) (same). The time-bar is not applied, however, where a petitioner can make a sufficient showing of changed country conditions through evidence that “is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the previous hearing.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); see 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) bars a motion to reopen filed outside the applicable time limit, while § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) provides a regulatory exception when the movant presents material evidence of changed circumstances in the country of nationality.

Irias v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2016-03-02(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Singh’s motion to reopen because it was filed more than four years after his order of removal became final, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and Singh failed to present material evidence of changed circumstances in India to qualify for a regulatory exception to the time limitation for filing a motion to reopen, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); Najmabadi, 597 F.3d at 987-90 (evidence must be “qualitatively different” to warrant reopening); see also Toufighi v. Mukasey, 538 F.3d 988, 996-97 (9th Cir. 2008) (evidence was immaterial in light of prior adverse credibility determination).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) imposes time limitations on motions to reopen, while section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) provides a regulatory exception when materially changed circumstances in the relevant country are established.

Megawati v. Lynch · filed 2016-03-21(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Megawati’s motion to reopen, where she filed it more than two years after the final order of removal, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and she failed to establish materially changed circumstances in Indonesia to qualify for the regulatory exception to the time limitations for motions to reopen, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); see also Najmabadi, 597 F.3d at 988-89 (evidence of changed circumstances must be qualitatively different from what could have been presented at prior hearing).

Section 1003.2 imposes a time limit on motions to reopen, but that limit does not apply when the motion is based on material, previously unavailable evidence of changed country conditions.

Weng v. Lynch · filed 2016-04-28(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

However, the time limitation for filing a motion to reopen does not apply if the motion “is based on changed country conditions arising in the country of nationality or the country to which removal has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available and would not have been discovered or presented at the previous proceeding.” 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); see also 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) generally requires a motion to reopen within 90 days of a final administrative decision, but § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) creates an exception for an asylum-based motion supported by changed country conditions and material evidence unavailable at the prior hearing.

Farrales v. Lynch · filed 2016-12-23(c)(2) (c)(3)(ii)

Ordinarily, a petitioner must file a motion to reopen within ninety days of a final administrative decision. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). This time limit does not apply, however, if the motion is filed for the purpose of seeking asylum “based on changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality or in the country to which deportation has been ordered. ” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). In order to meet the changed country conditions exception to the deadline, a petitioner must present material evidence that could not have been discovered or submitted at the time of the previous hearing.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) makes a motion to reopen untimely when filed more than 90 days after the final order of removal, subject to the exceptions in section 1003.2(c)(3), including the changed-country-conditions exception in (c)(3)(ii).

Diaz-Amezcua v. Jefferson Sessions · filed 2017-02-23(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Diaz-Amezcua’s motion to reopen to apply for new relief as untimely, where it was filed more than two years after his final order of removal, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and Diaz-Amezcua failed to establish changed country condition in Mexico to qualify for the regulatory exception to the filing deadline, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) generally requires a motion to reopen within 90 days, while § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) permits a later motion based on materially changed country conditions supported by previously unavailable evidence.

Zhu v. Attorney General of the United States · filed 2017-03-01(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

Generally, a motion to reopen must be filed within 90 days of the final administrative decision. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). However, a motion to reopen based on “changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality” based on “evidence [that] is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the previous hearing” may be filed after the 90-day period has elapsed. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) bars an untimely motion to reopen, while § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) permits an exception when the movant demonstrates materially changed circumstances in the country of removal.

Figueroa-Lemus v. Jefferson Sessions · filed 2017-08-14(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Figueroa Lemus’s motion to reopen because the motion was filed more than two years after the BIA’s final decision, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and Figueroa Lemus failed to demonstrate materially changed circumstances in El Salvador to qualify for an exception to the time limitations for filing a motion to reopen, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); Najmabadi, 597 F.3d at 991-92 (BIA did not abuse its discretion where petitioner failed to introduce material evidence); see also Cano-Merida v. INS, 311 F.3d 960, 965-66 (9th Cir. 2002) (no abuse of discretion in denying motion to reopen where petitioner did not establish prima facie eligibility for CAT relief).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) imposes a 90-day deadline for motions to reopen, while subsection (c)(3) provides a regulatory exception when the movant establishes materially changed circumstances in the country of removal.

Bhullar v. Jefferson Sessions · filed 2017-10-02(c)(2), (c)(3)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Bhullar’s motion to reopen where he filed it more than 90 days after the BIA’s final administrative decision, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and where he failed to establish materially changed circumstances in India to qualify for the regulatory exception to the time limitations for motions to reopen, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3); Najmabadi, 597 F.3d at 991-92 (BIA did not abuse its discretion where petitioner failed to introduce material evidence).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) imposes a time limit on motions to reopen, while § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) provides a regulatory exception when materially changed circumstances are established.

Phang v. Jefferson Sessions · filed 2017-10-03(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioners’ motion to reopen as untimely where it was filed over two years after the BIA’s final order of removal, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and petitioners failed to establish materially changed circumstances in Indonesia to qualify for the regulatory exception to the time limit for filing a motion to reopen, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); Najmabadi, 597 F.3d at 987-90 (evidence must be “qualitatively different” to warrant reopening).

The time limit for a motion to reopen does not apply when the motion seeks asylum based on material, previously unavailable changed country conditions, and incremental or continuing conditions do not satisfy that exception.

Lin v. Sessions · filed 2018-02-22(c)(3)

However, the time limitation for filing a motion to reopen does not apply if reopening is sought to apply for asylum and the motion “is based on changed country conditions arising in the country of nationality or the country to which removal has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available and would not have been discovered or presented at the previous proceeding.” ... The BIA did not err in finding that Lin failed to demonstrate such conditions. ... Accordingly, given that the country conditions evidence of suppression and interference with unregistered Christian groups at the time of Lin’s hearing in 2007, and the continuation of such conditions at the time she filed her motion, the BIA reasonably concluded that this evidence did not demonstrate a material change in country conditions excusing the untimely filing of her motion.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) generally requires a motion to reopen to be filed within 90 days, but § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) provides an exception for a CAT motion based on qualifying changed country conditions.

Iqbal v. Attorney General United States · filed 2018-05-22(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

Ordinarily, “a party may file only one motion to reopen . . . and that motion must be filed no later than 90 days after the date on which the final administrative decision was rendered in the proceeding sought to be reopened.” Id. at § 1003.2(c)(2). The time and number limitations in § 1003.2(c) apply to motions to reopen to seek protection under the CAT, including those based on changed country conditions. Bamaca-Cifuentes v. Att’y Gen. of U.S., 870 F.3d 108, 111 (3d Cir. 2017). ... The 90-day deadline does not apply where the alien applies for CAT protection “based on changed circumstances arising . . . in the country to which deportation has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the previous hearing.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003(c)(3)(ii). The Board correctly concluded that Iqbal’s allegation that he was attacked in 2005 during a trip to Pakistan could have been presented at his 2014 removal hearing. Iqbal’s brief focuses on the alleged 2015 threat, Petitioner’s Informal Brief, at 2-3, but the alleged 2015 threat is insufficient to show worsening country condition that would excuse Iqbal’s untimely motion to reopen. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii).

The changed-country-conditions exception for an asylum motion to reopen does not apply when the supporting evidence was already available at the prior hearing.

Nieto-Cruz v. Jefferson Sessions · filed 2018-05-24(c)(3)(ii)

To the extent that she now claims a fear of persecution, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in concluding that the evidence submitted was available at the prior hearing, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii), and that she had not established a prima facie claim for relief, see Delgado-Ortiz v. Holder, 600 F.3d 1148, 1151-52 (9th Cir. 2010) (noting “returning Mexicans from the United States” is “too broad” to qualify as a particular social group).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) makes a motion to reopen untimely when filed beyond the applicable time limit, while § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) permits a late motion based on material, previously unavailable changed country conditions.

Viknesrajah v. Barr · filed 2019-04-09(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

It is undisputed that Viknesrajah’s 2016 motion to reopen was untimely as it was filed almost three years after the BIA’s last decision in his case. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). The time limitation does not apply if reopening is sought to apply for asylum (or withholding of removal and protection under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”)) and the motion “is based on changed country conditions arising in the country of nationality or the country to which removal has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available and would not have been discovered or presented at the previous proceeding.” 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); see also 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). ... Because Viknesrajah failed to demonstrate a material change, the agency did not abuse its discretion in denying his motion to reopen as untimely. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) imposes a ninety-day deadline for motions to reopen, subject to the changed-country-conditions exception in § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) for material evidence that was previously unavailable.

Senthinathan v. Attorney General United States · filed 2019-04-18(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

There is no dispute that Senthinathan’s motion to reopen was untimely, as it was not filed with the BIA within ninety days of the BIA’s 2012 decision. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A) & (c)(7)(C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). However, the ninety-day requirement does not apply to motions that rely on evidence of “changed country conditions arising in the country of nationality or the country to which removal has been ordered if such evidence is material and was not available and would not have been discovered or presented at the previous proceeding.” 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii).

The exception to the time limit for motions to reopen applies when an alien demonstrates material, previously unavailable changed circumstances in the country of nationality.

Dominguez v. Attorney General United States · filed 2019-07-22(c)(3)(ii)

The time limit for motions to reopen does not apply if the alien demonstrates “changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); Shardar v. Att’y Gen., 503 F.3d 308, 313 (3d Cir. 2007). The evidence of changed circumstances must be “material” and unavailable at the original removal proceeding. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii).

Section 1003.2 requires a motion to reopen to be filed within 90 days of the final removal order, subject to an exception when the movant submits new and material evidence of changed country conditions.

Xie v. Barr · filed 2019-12-19(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioners’ motion to reopen as untimely where petitioners filed the motion more than a year after the BIA’s final order of removal, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2) (providing that the motion to reopen must be filed within 90 days of the final order of removal), and failed to submit new and material evidence of changed country conditions in China that would excuse the late filing, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); He v. Gonzales, 501 F.3d 1128, 1132 (9th Cir. 2007) (holding that birth of children in the United States is a change in personal circumstances that “alone is insufficient” to “establish changed circumstances in the country of origin”).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) imposes a 90-day deadline for motions to reopen, while § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) exempts an asylum motion based on material, previously unavailable changed country conditions.

Singh v. Barr · filed 2020-04-10(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

An alien ordinarily must move to reopen no later than 90 days after entry of the final administrative decision. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). But this time limitation does not apply if the motion is filed to apply for asylum “based on changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality or in the country to which deportation has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the previous hearing.” Id. § 1003.2(c)(3). “In determining whether evidence accompanying a motion to reopen demonstrates a material change in country conditions that would justify reopening, [the agency] compare[s] the evidence of country conditions submitted with the motion to those that existed at the time of the merits hearing below.”

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) permits an untimely motion to reopen to seek asylum based on changed country conditions only when the supporting evidence is material and was unavailable, and could not have been discovered or presented, at the prior hearing.

Diallo v. Barr · filed 2020-07-07(c)(3)(ii)

However, the time limitation does not apply if the motion is filed in order to apply for asylum “based on changed country conditions arising in the country of nationality or the country to which removal has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available and would not have been discovered or presented at the previous hearing.” 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); see also 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) imposes a 90-day deadline for motions to reopen, while § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) excepts motions based on material, previously unavailable changed country conditions.

Rafiq v. Barr · filed 2020-09-16(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

The movant also must file a motion to reopen no later than 90 days after the date on which the final administrative decision was rendered. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). ... However, this time limitation does not apply if the motion is filed to apply for asylum “based on changed country conditions arising in the country of nationality or the country to which removal has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available and would not have been discovered or presented at the previous proceedings.” 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); see also 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) imposes a 90-day limit for motions to reopen, while § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) exempts certain asylum motions based on material, previously unavailable changed country conditions.

Fang v. Wilkinson · filed 2021-02-19(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

It is undisputed that Fang’s 2014 motion to reopen was untimely because she filed it more than 18 years after she accepted a final order of voluntary departure in 1996. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i) (setting 90-day deadline for motions to reopen); 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.2(c)(2), 1003.23(b)(1) (same). ... The time limitation for filing a motion to reopen does not apply if reopening is sought to apply for asylum and the motion “is based on changed country conditions arising in the country of nationality or the country to which removal has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available and would not have been discovered or presented at the previous proceeding.” 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); see also 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.2(c)(3)(ii), 1003.23(b)(4).

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) permits an exception to the 90-day motion-to-reopen deadline when the motion is based on material, previously unavailable changed circumstances in the country of nationality or country of removal; a changed personal circumstance does not qualify as a changed country condition.

Mendez-Benhumea v. Garland · filed 2021-12-01(c)(3)(ii)

To meet that exception, a petitioner must show that his or her application is “based on changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality or the country to which deportation has been ordered” by offering “evidence [that] is material and was not available or could not have been discovered or presented at the previous hearing.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) (2020). According to Mr. Mendez-Benhumea, that his biological daughter recently identified as transgender, constitutes new, material evidence of changed circumstances. Aplt. Br. 25–28. The BIA determined that this constitutes a changed personal circumstance, not a changed country condition, and denied the second motion as untimely. AR 255. This is a straightforward and reasonable conclusion that does not constitute an abuse of discretion.

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) permits an untimely motion to reopen based on changed country conditions only when the supporting evidence shows changed conditions, was previously unavailable, and is sufficiently material to justify reopening.

Sarksian v. Garland · filed 2022-02-24(c)(3)(ii)

Thus, that evidence cannot demonstrate changed country conditions or satisfy the requirement that it was previously unavailable. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). ... As a result, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in finding that Sarksian’s evidence was not sufficiently material to justify reopening under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii).

Section 1003.2 generally requires a motion to reopen within 90 days, but exempts a motion based on materially changed country conditions supported by previously unavailable evidence.

Garcia v. Garland · filed 2022-03-14(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

Ordinarily, a motion to reopen must be filed within ninety days of the BIA’s decision. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). However, this time-limit does not apply to a motion to reopen based on changed country conditions, “if such evidence is material and was not available and would not have been discovered or presented at the previous proceeding.” 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii).

The changed-country-conditions exception permits a late motion to reopen seeking asylum when material evidence of changed conditions was unavailable and could not have been presented in the prior proceeding.

Zhang v. Garland · filed 2022-12-15(c)(3)(ii)

There is an exception to the time limitation if the motion is filed to seek asylum “based on changed country conditions arising in the country of nationality or the country to which removal has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available and would not have been discovered or presented at the previous proceeding.” 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); see also 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). ... The BIA did not err in finding that Zhang failed to demonstrate a material change in conditions in China as needed to excuse the time limitation.

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) excuses the 90-day time limit for a CAT-related motion to reopen only when materially changed country-condition evidence was previously unavailable and could not have been discovered or presented at the prior hearing.

Harmez v. Garland · filed 2023-03-30(c)(3)(ii)

But the 90-day deadline does not apply to motions to reopen proceedings to apply for CAT protection based on changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality or the country to which deportation has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the previous hearing. ... Because we find no abuse of discretion in the Board’s conclusion that the exception to the time limit did not apply, we need not decide whether the regulatory exception could have applied to the numeric limitation.

Section 1003.2 requires a motion to reopen to be filed within 90 days of a final removal order, unless the motion invokes materially changed country conditions that were previously unavailable.

Li v. Garland · filed 2023-09-01(c)(2) (c)(3)(ii)

A motion to reopen ordinarily must be filed within ninety days of a final order of removal. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). The time limit does not apply, however, if the movant seeks to reopen to apply for asylum “based on changed country conditions arising in the country of nationality or the country to which removal has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available and would not have been discovered or presented at the previous proceeding.” 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). ... Here, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Li’s motion to reopen. As the agency correctly determined, Li’s motion was untimely because he filed it in 2015 – approximately thirteen years after the BIA affirmed his removal order in 2002 – and Li did not qualify for the changed-conditions exception.

A motion to reopen generally must be filed within 90 days, but that limit does not apply when the motion seeks asylum based on qualifying changed country conditions.

Lin v. Garland · filed 2024-04-02(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

The 90-day time limit does not apply, however, if the movant seeks to reopen to apply for asylum “based on changed country conditions arising in the country of nationality or the country to which removal has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available and would not have been discovered or presented at the previous proceeding.” 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); see also 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). ... The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Lin’s motion because substantial evidence supports its conclusion that Lin failed to demonstrate a material change in conditions for Christians in China since her 2011 hearing.

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) exempts a motion to reopen from the time limit when it seeks reopening based on changed country conditions in the country of nationality and is supported by material evidence that was unavailable during the prior removal proceeding.

Ester Villalta-Portillo v. Attorney General United States of America · filed 2025-06-20(c)(3)(ii)

The time limitation for filing motions to reopen does not apply to motions seeking reopening “based on changed country conditions arising in the country of nationality” and supported by material evidence that was not available during the previous removal proceeding. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); see also 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). But Petitioners have not presented any such evidence warranting reopening.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) generally requires a motion to reopen to be filed within 90 days, while § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) excuses that limit for an asylum motion based on material changed country conditions in the country of nationality.

Qu v. Bondi · filed 2025-12-16(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

Movants seeking to reopen proceedings generally may file a motion no later than 90 days after the date on which the final administrative decision was rendered, 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), but the time limit does not apply if the motion is filed to apply for asylum “and is based on changed country conditions arising in the country of nationality or the country to which removal has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available and would not have been discovered or presented at the previous proceeding,” 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); see also 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) (excusing time limit for “changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality”).

A late motion to reopen requires sufficient evidence of changed country circumstances to qualify for the exception to the filing deadline.

Hossan v. Gonzales · filed 2007-02-23(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Hossan’s motion to reopen as untimely where the motion was filed more than two years after the BIA’s decision, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and Hossan failed to submit sufficient evidence of changed circumstances in Bangladesh to qualify for the regulatory exception to the time limit, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii).

Section 1003.2(b)(1) requires a motion to reconsider to identify errors of fact or law in the prior order and to be supported by pertinent authority.

Velazquez-Macedo v. U.S. Attorney General · filed 2013-08-26(b)(1)

A motion to reconsider shall specify “the errors of fact or law” in the previous order and “shall be supported by pertinent authority.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1). ... As such, Velazquez-Macedo failed to specify any errors of law or fact committed by the BIA in its original decision. See Calle, 504 F.3d at 1328-29.

A motion to reconsider must identify specific errors of fact or law in the BIA’s prior decision.

Martinez v. U.S. Attorney General · filed 2013-12-30(b)(1)

A motion to reconsider must identify specific errors of fact or law in the BIA’s prior decision. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1).

Section 1003.2(b)(1) requires a motion to reconsider to identify errors of fact or law in the prior decision.

Moreno v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2014-08-15(b)(1)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Moreno’s motion to reconsider because Moreno failed to identify any error of fact or law in the BIA’s March 10, 2011 order. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1) (a motion to reconsider must identify errors of fact or law in a prior decision); see also Mohammed, 400 F.3d at 791 (the court reverses the denial of a motion to reconsider only if the BIA acted “arbitrarily, irrationally, or contrary to law”).

Section 1003.2(a) gives the Board discretion over motions to reconsider, so a denial is reviewed for abuse of discretion.

Yurova v. Lynch · filed 2015-06-18(a)

The denial of a motion to reconsider is reviewed for abuse of discretion. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a) (2015); Narine v. Holder, 559 F.3d 246, 249 (4th Cir. 2009).

Section 1003.2(b)(2) bars a party from seeking reconsideration of a decision denying a previous motion to reconsider.

Costa v. U.S. Attorney General · filed 2015-11-23(b)(2)

The BIA also did not abuse its discretion in denying Costa's second motion to reconsider as barred by regulation because a party may not seek reconsideration of a decision denying a previous motion to reconsider. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(2).

Section 1003.2(b)(1) limits a motion to reconsider to additional legal arguments, a change of law, or an argument overlooked in the earlier decision.

Yusev v. Lynch · filed 2016-04-04(b)(1)

Motions to reconsider “are not replays of the main event” and must point the Board to additional legal arguments, a change of law, or an argument that was overlooked in its earlier decision.

Section 1003.2(b)(2) bars a party from seeking reconsideration of a decision denying a previous motion to reconsider.

Moyses De Andrade Machado v. U.S. Attorney General · filed 2015-10-30(b)(2)

Only one motion to reconsider may be filed, id. § 1229a(c)(6)(A), and a party may not seek reconsideration of a decision denying a previous motion to reconsider, 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(2).

A motion to reconsider must specify errors of fact or law in the prior decision.

Depaz v. Lynch · filed 2016-08-24(b)(1)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Rafael Depaz’s motion to reconsider where Rafael Depaz failed to identify any error of fact or law in the BIA’s prior order. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1) (a motion to reconsider must specify errors of fact or law in a prior decision).

Section 1003.2(b)(1) requires a motion to reconsider to identify errors of fact or law; mere disagreement with the outcome is insufficient.

Qureshi v. Attorney General United State · filed 2017-02-02(b)(1)

A motion to reconsider must be based on errors of fact or law; mere disagreement with the outcome is not sufficient. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(6)(C); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1).

A motion to reconsider must specify errors of fact or law in the prior decision.

Delatorre v. Jefferson Sessions · filed 2017-02-22(b)(1)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Delatorre’s motion to reconsider, where she failed to establish any error of fact or law in the BIA’s prior order. ... See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1) (a motion to reconsider must specify errors of fact or law in a prior decision); 8 U.S.C. § 1101(f) (defining good moral character “[f]or the purposes of this Act”); cf. Romero-Ochoa v. Holder, 712 F.3d 1328, 1330-32 (9th Cir. 2013) (concluding that 8 U.S.C. § 1101(f)(7) was constitutional in the context of cancellation of removal and voluntary departure under 8 U.S.C. §§ 1229b(b)(1), 1229c(b)(1)).

Section 1003.2(b)(1) requires a motion to reconsider to identify an error of fact or law in the prior order.

Tumax-Tuy v. Sessions · filed 2017-04-19(b)(1)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Tumax-Tuy’s motion to reconsider because the motion failed to identify any error of fact or law in the BIA’s May 4, 2012, order.

Section 1003.2(b)(1) requires a motion to reconsider to specify the errors of fact or law in the prior Board decision.

Woozencroft v. Sessions · filed 2017-12-06(b)(1)

Motions to reconsider must “specify[] the errors of fact or law in the prior Board decision.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1). ... Although Woozencroft reiterated in his motion that he was awaiting surgery and could not file a brief because of his poor vision, he did not “specify[] [any] errors of fact or law in the prior Board decision” denying his briefing extension request as required. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1). Therefore, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying reconsideration.

Section 1003.2(b)(1) requires a motion to reconsider to specify the errors of fact or law in the prior BIA decision and to be supported by pertinent authority.

Guerrero-Soto v. Jefferson Sessions, III · filed 2018-02-08(b)(1)

“A motion to reconsider shall state the reasons for the motion by specifying the errors of fact or law in the prior [BIA] decision and shall be supported by pertinent authority.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1).

A motion to reconsider before the BIA must identify an error of law or fact in the Board's earlier decision.

Devora-Rojas v. Jefferson Sessions · filed 2018-06-29(b)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Devora-Rojas' motion to reconsider its November 2010 decision to dismiss his appeal on the ground that he failed to identify any error of law or fact in the BIA's earlier decision. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(6)(A), (C); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b); Matter of O-S-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 56, 57 (BIA 2006) ("A motion to reconsider challenges the Board's original decision and alleges that it is defective in some regard.").

Section 1003.2(b)(1) requires a motion to reconsider to specify errors of fact or law in the prior decision.

Bernabe v. Jefferson Sessions · filed 2018-07-13(b)(1)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Marmol Bernabe’s motion to reconsider where Marmol Bernabe failed to identify any error of fact or law in the BIA’s prior order. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1) (a motion to reconsider must specify errors of fact or law in a prior decision); Ma v. Ashcroft, 361 F.3d 553, 558 (9th Cir. 2004) (discussing standard for a motion to reconsider).

Section 1003.2(b)(1) requires a motion to reconsider to identify errors of law or fact in the prior BIA decision and cite pertinent authority.

Campos v. Attorney General United States · filed 2018-11-15(b)(1)

An alien whose motion to reopen is denied may seek reconsideration, but she must “specify[] the errors of law or fact in the prior [BIA] decision,” and cite to “pertinent authority.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1). ... We will not disturb the BIA’s denial of Campos’s motion for reconsideration because her motion pressed the same arguments she had made to the BIA on appeal. ... Because Campos’s reconsideration motion “repeat[ed] arguments that the BIA has previously rejected,” the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion.

Section 1003.2(b)(1) supports denying reconsideration when the movant fails to identify an error of fact or law in the BIA’s prior order.

De Mota v. Barr · filed 2019-09-23(b)(1)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Tobias de Mota’s motion to reconsider for failure to identify any error of fact or law in the BIA’s prior order, where she failed to establish that the BIA’s denial of sua sponte reopening departed from a settled course of adjudication or involved any “incorrect legal premise.” See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1); Bonilla v. Lynch, 840 F.3d 575, 588 (9th Cir. 2016) (the court’s jurisdiction to review BIA decisions denying sua sponte reopening is limited to reviewing the reasoning behind the decisions for legal or constitutional error).

Section 1003.2(b)(1) requires a motion to reconsider to identify the errors of law or fact in the prior order and support the motion with pertinent authority.

Singh v. Garland · filed 2023-05-02(b)(1)

A motion to reconsider “shall specify the errors of law or fact in the previous order and shall be supported by pertinent authority.” 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(6)(C); see also 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1).

Section 1003.2(b)(2) bars a party from seeking reconsideration of a decision denying a previous motion to reconsider.

Argueta v. Bondi · filed 2025-05-09(b)(2)

The BIA also based its denial on the additional ground that the motion violated the prohibition on seeking to reconsider a ruling on a motion to reconsider. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(2) (providing that “a party may not seek reconsideration of a decision denying a previous motion to reconsider”). ... Likewise, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Sandoval Argueta’s motion for reconsideration as number-barred and violative of the prohibition on moving to reconsider a decision on a prior motion to reconsider.

Section 1003.2(b)(1) allows the Board to treat a motion to reconsider as a motion to remand and consolidate it with the underlying appeal when the Immigration Judge no longer has jurisdiction.

J-H-M-H · filed 2025-10-07(b)(1)

Because the parties’ joint motion to reconsider was still pending at the time the respondent filed the initial appeal on April 24, 2024, the Immigration Judge no longer had jurisdiction over this motion at the time he issued his May 1, 2024, decision. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.23(b)(1) (2020) (stating that an Immigration Judge may “reconsider any case in which he or she has made a decision, unless jurisdiction is vested with the Board of Immigration Appeals”). Under such circumstances, we may deem the motion to reconsider a motion to remand and consolidate it with the underlying appeal. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1) (2025).

Section 1003.2(b)(1) limits reconsideration to errors in the Board’s prior decision; an argument that could have been raised earlier cannot first be presented in a motion to reconsider.

Perez v. Holder · filed 2014-04-09(b)(1)

A motion to reconsider is available to raise “errors of fact or law in the prior Board decision.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1) (emphasis added). ... Her argument therefore was not properly presented to the BIA for the first time in her motion to reconsider.

Section 1003.2(b)(1) requires a motion to reconsider to identify a particular error of fact or law in the Board’s prior decision.

Shao v. Gonzales · filed 2006-03-10(b)(1)

A motion to reconsider “shall state the reasons for the motion by specifying the errors of fact or law in the prior Board decision and shall be supported by pertinent authority.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1). Petitioner did not specify any particular error of fact or law in the March 17, 2003 decision.

A motion to reconsider a final BIA decision is a collateral attack, and res judicata bars a belated challenge to the Board’s jurisdiction to issue that decision.

Guevara v. Gonzales · filed 2006-05-19(a)

Accordingly, because res judicata barred the jurisdictional attack, the BIA abused its discretion in granting the motion to reconsider on that basis, the only basis raised in DHS’s motion to reconsider.

A motion to reconsider before the BIA must present sufficient legal arguments, changes in law, or overlooked issues to merit reconsideration.

Uddin v. U.S. Attorney General · filed 2007-02-14(b)

After review of the record, with particular attention to the motion for reconsideration, we discern no abuse of discretion in the BIA’s conclusion that Uddin’s motion did not meet the controlling standard under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b).

A motion to reconsider must identify a factual or legal error in the BIA’s prior decision; it cannot introduce new evidence.

Mungongo v. Gonzales · filed 2007-03-15(b)(1)

By contrast, a motion to reconsider must direct the BIA’s attention to the defect in the earlier decision “by specifying the errors of fact or law in the prior Board decision ... supported by pertinent authority.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1).

A motion to reconsider must identify an error of fact or law in the Board’s prior decision; repeating rejected contentions is insufficient.

Saa v. Keisler · filed 2007-11-20(b)(1)

A motion for reconsideration asserts that the Board made an error in its earlier decision, Turri v. INS, 997 F.2d 1306, 1311 n.4 (10th Cir. 1993), and requires the movant to specify the error of fact or law in the prior Board decision.

A motion to reconsider must identify errors of fact or law in the BIA’s prior decision; repeating rejected arguments does not meet that requirement.

Jorge A. Cardona Montoya v. U.S. Attorney General · filed 2009-08-19(b)(1)

Here, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Cardona’s motion to reconsider because Cardona did not identify any errors of fact or law in the prior BIA decision denying his motion to reopen.

A motion to reconsider must be timely and identify an error of fact or law in the BIA’s prior decision.

Rahardja v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2013-12-06(b)(1)

Construed as a motion to reconsider, the BIA was within its discretion in denying Rahardja’s motion where the motion was untimely, and it failed to identify any error of fact or law in the BIA’s October 15, 2009 decision denying reopening.

A motion to reconsider must identify a specific error in the Board’s prior decision; repeating an argument the Board already rejected is insufficient.

El Jabali v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2014-07-31(b)(1)

Moreover, El Jabali’s motion did not point to a specific fact overlooked by the BIA. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1); Ali v. Ashcroft, 395 F.3d 722, 731 (7th Cir. 2005).