8 C.F.R. § 1003.2

Section 1003.2 requires a motion to reopen to present material, previously unavailable facts supported by evidence, and generally limits an alien to one motion filed within ninety days of the BIA's final order.

Zunguza v. Atty Gen USA · filed 2012-09-05(c)(1), (c)(2)

“A motion to reopen proceedings shall state the new facts that will be proven at a hearing to be held if the motion is granted and shall be supported by affidavits or other evidentiary material.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1). “A motion to reopen proceedings shall not be granted unless it appears to the [BIA] that evidence sought to be offered is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing.” Id. ... “Generally, an alien may file only one motion to reopen, and that motion must be filed within ninety days of the BIA‟s final order. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). These limitations do not apply, however, for motions based on changed country conditions arising in the country to which deportation has been ordered. Id. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii).”

Section 1003.2(c)(2) imposes a 90-day deadline and one-motion limit for reopening, while § 1003.2(b)(1) requires a reconsideration motion to identify factual or legal errors and be supported by pertinent authority.

Opre v. Lynch · filed 2016-04-28(c)(2), (b)(1)

An alien seeking to reopen proceedings is required to file a motion to reopen no later than 90 days after the date on which the final administrative decision was rendered, and is permitted to file only one such motion. ... There is no dispute that Petitioners’ August 2010, November 2010, and March 2011 motions to reopen were untimely, because the BIA issued Petitioners’ final order of removal in July 2007. ... There is also no dispute that Petitioners’ November 2010 and March 2011 motions to reopen were number-barred because Petitioners first sought reopening in August 2010. ... A motion to reconsider must specify errors of fact or law in the BIA’s decision and be supported with pertinent authority.

Section 1003.2(c)(1) permits a motion to reopen based on changed circumstances without time or numerical limits when supported by evidence that could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing.

Sedigheh and Hessmaddin Norani v. Gonzales 1 · filed 2006-06-16(c)(1)

Under the relevant regulation, there are no time or numeric limitations on a motion to reopen based on changed circumstances, provided the motion is supported by evidence that “could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1). Thus, in reviewing the BIA’s determination of whether previously unavailable evidence supported the Noranis’ motion to reopen, we must inquire whether the evidence could have been presented at the hearing before the IJ.

The exception to the time and number limits for a motion to reopen requires evidence of changed circumstances that was unavailable and could not have been discovered or presented at the prior proceeding.

Gonzalez-Cuatro v. Bondi · filed 2025-03-26(c)(3)(ii)

Unless any evidence presented now “was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the previous proceeding,” this exception does not apply. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii).

Section 1003.2(c)(1) permits the BIA to decline to consider new evidence on appeal when the applicant has not shown its materiality to the claim.

Simeonov v. Board of Immigration Appeals · filed 2007-05-07(c)(1)

Although Simeonov submitted to the BIA information regarding hate crimes that his mother allegedly suffered, he never claimed before the BIA that he feared ethnic persecution or otherwise explained how this new evidence was material to his case. Accordingly, we decline to address this basis for his claim and find that the BIA did not abuse its discretion in declining to address the new evidence on appeal. See Li Yong Cao v. United States Dep’t of Justice, 421 F.3d 149, 156 (2d Cir.2005); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1).

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires evidence offered in support of reopening to be material to the basis for the prior decision.

Yan v. Gonzales · filed 2006-06-16(c)(1)

The evidence he submitted did not address the agency’s adverse credibility finding. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1).

Section 1003.2(c)(1) bars the BIA from granting a motion to reopen unless the offered evidence appears material.

Perez-Hernandez v. Gonzales · filed 2007-04-27(c)(1)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to reopen because it considered the new medical evidence regarding Perez-Hernandez’s son and acted within its broad discretion in determining that the evidence was not material because it did not show the son’s condition was severe or that he would be unable to ob*699tain assistance or treatment in Mexico. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1) (providing that a motion to reopen “shall not be granted unless it appears to the [BIA] that evidence sought to be offered is material”).

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires evidence supporting a motion to reopen to be material and unavailable at the prior hearing, and the court applied the materiality requirement to evidence concerning changed country conditions.

Jaber v. Mukasey · filed 2008-04-23(c)(1)

Under BIA regulations, a motion to reopen “shall not be granted unless it appears to the Board that evidence sought to be offered is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing.” Allabani v. Gonzales, 402 F.3d 668, 675 (6th Cir. 2005) (citing 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1)); see also Sako v. Gonzales, 434 F.3d 857, 863 (6th Cir. 2006). ... This Court finds the BIA properly declined to reopen the proceedings because the evidence provided by Petitioner was immaterial, i.e., it would not have changed the outcome of his proceedings, and it only discussed the general country conditions within Lebanon.

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires new evidence supporting a motion to reopen to be material to the relief sought and previously unavailable.

Hernandez-Chavez v. Lynch · filed 2016-05-27(c)(1)

Petitioner satisfies the requirements of 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1) in that the expunged conviction was material to his eligibility for relief and previously unavailable.

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires new evidence supporting reopening to be material.

Cantarero v. Attorney General United States · filed 2018-05-25(c)(1)

Cantarero’s new evidence thus was not “material” as required by 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1).

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires new evidence supporting reopening or remand to be material and previously unavailable, undiscoverable, or unpresentable at the former hearing.

Miguel v. Garland · filed 2021-08-31(c)(1)

Thus, to succeed on a motion to remand, an applicant must show that the new evidence sought to be offered “is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1), (4) (2020).

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires the materiality of new evidence to be assessed in the context of the proceeding to be reopened and the claim to be proved.

Johnson v. Attorney General of the United States · filed 2007-05-17(c)(1)

Thus, materiality must not be evaluated in a vacuum. Instead, it must be assessed in the context of the proceeding that is to be reopened, and the claim that is to be proven.

Section 1003.2(c)(2)'s ninety-day and one-motion limits may be equitably tolled when ineffective assistance caused the untimely and successive motions, so a later motion raising that ineffective assistance is not procedurally barred.

Zhao v. Immigration and Naturalization Service · filed 2006-06-20(c)(2)

The question is whether, assuming Zhao’s allegations concerning his first attorney are true, the BIA correctly declined to consider those allegations on the merits because of the time and number limitations of 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). ... Accordingly, we conclude that the BIA erred in its April 6, 2004 decision denying Zhao’s second motion to reopen when it found that his motion was time-barred and declined to consider Zhao’s ineffective assistance claim on the merits. Because Zhao’s second motion to reopen alleged that Ms first such motion was denied because of ineffective assistance, we conclude in addition that the BIA erred in finding that Zhao’s second motion to reopen was number-barred. If such a petition is number-barred and not subject to equitable tolling, no petitioner could ever argue that his prior, otherwise-meritorious motion to reopen was denied because of ineffective assistance, inasmuch as the motion so arguing would inevitably be procedurally barred.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) sets a deadline for motions to reopen before the BIA, and equitable tolling requires due diligence.

Villegas v. Holder Jr. · filed 2010-10-26(c)(2)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioners’ motion to reopen as untimely because they filed the motion more than one year after the BIA’s November 9, 2006, order, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and petitioners failed to establish that they acted with the due diligence required for equitable tolling, see Iturribarria, 321 F.3d at 897; see also Singh v. Ashcroft, 367 F.3d 1182, 1184 (9th Cir. 2004).

The deadline for a motion to reopen may be equitably tolled for ineffective assistance of counsel if the movant exercises due diligence.

Bah v. Holder · filed 2010-04-21(c)(2)

Under these circumstances, it was neither arbitrary nor capricious for the BIA to find that Bah’s ninety-two day delay in filing a second motion to reopen did not exhibit the type of diligence required for equitable tolling.

Section 1003.2(b)(2) limits a party to one motion to reconsider in a case previously subject to a final BIA decision.

Duenas v. Keisler · filed 2007-10-10(b)(2)

The regulations provide that motions to reconsider shall be limited to one motion in any case previously the subject of a final decision by the BIA. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(2). Because petitioner filed his sixth motion to reconsider, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to reconsider for exceeding numerical limitations.

Subsection (a) gives the BIA discretion to deny a motion for reconsideration.

Watson v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2013-09-19(a)

The decision to deny a motion for reconsideration is within the discretion of the BIA. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a).

Section 1003.2(c)(1) permits reopening based on documents only when they could not have been discovered or obtained at the time of the hearing.

Yalymov v. Gonzales · filed 2006-07-26(c)(1)

Although Yalymov did not have many of the newly submitted documents in his possession at the time of his hearing, the regulations state that the documents must not have been discoverable at the time of the hearing in order to warrant reopening. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1). Here, Yalymov has failed to demonstrate that the documents could not have been previously obtained, and the BIA correctly noted that the documents are not material to Yalymov’s claims.

Section 1003.2(c)(1) permits reopening based on new evidence only when the evidence is material and was unavailable and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing.

Katabarwa v. Gonzales · filed 2006-08-24(c)(1)

When, as here, a petitioner moved the BIA to reopen his case based on new evidence, such motion “shall not be granted unless it appears to the Board that evidence sought to be offered is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing.” Allabani v. Gonzales, 402 F.3d 668, 675 (6th Cir. 2005) (citing 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1)). In this case, neither of the two affidavits proffered by Katabarwa satisfy the requirements of 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1). Indeed, both documents recite generalized facts which loosely correspond to Katabarwa’s hearing testimony. Even if such documents were considered previously unavailable, neither affidavit corroborates his story in any meaningful manner. Accordingly, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Katabarwa’s motion to reopen.

Section 1003.2(c) requires a movant seeking reopening to present previously unavailable evidence that warrants reopening.

Echeverria-Gramajo v. Mukasey · filed 2008-07-23(c)

Petitioner failed to present previously unavailable evidence warranting reopening. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c).

Section 1003.2(c) requires a movant seeking reopening before the Board to show that the evidence was unavailable and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing.

Dahal v. Holder · filed 2012-07-24(c)

He apparently made no attempt to supplement the record until after the appeal went against him, and it was at that late date that he failed to carry his burden of showing that the evidence “was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c).

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires evidence offered in a motion to reopen to be material and previously unavailable, and not discoverable or presentable at the former hearing.

Raddatz v. Garland · filed 2021-03-31(c)(1)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Balvaneda Raddatz’s motion to remand, where he did not show that additional testimony from his father was previously unavailable or that he suffered prejudice from any denial of access to legal library resources while in detention. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1) (“[a] motion to reopen proceedings shall not be granted unless it appears to the Board that evidence sought to be offered is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing”); Padilla-Martinez, 770 F.3d at 830 (“To prevail on a due-process claim, a petitioner must demonstrate both a violation of rights and prejudice.”).

Section 1003.2 requires motions to reopen to include supporting evidence, generally be filed within 90 days, and generally limits a party to one such motion; it also requires motions to reconsider to identify an error of fact or law and leaves sua sponte reopening discretionary.

Lie v. Bureau of Citizenship & Immigration Services · filed 2007-07-31(c)(1), (c)(2), (c)(3)(ii), (b)(1), (a)

Governing regulations require that a motion to reopen be supported by affidavits or other evidence. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1). Further, a motion to reopen “must be filed no later than 90 days after the date on which the final administrative decision was rendered in the proceeding sought to be reopened.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). ... Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) affords an exception to this rule for people seeking asylum based on “changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality or in the country to which deportation has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the previous hearing.” ... The BIA properly found that, construed as a motion to reconsider, Lie’s motion failed to assert an error of fact or law as required by 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1). ... The regulations provide that a party may file only one motion to reopen, and that such motion must be filed no later than 90 days after the date on which the final administrative decision was issued in the proceeding sought to be reopened. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). ... Finally, we lack jurisdiction to consider Lie’s argument that the BIA failed to address her request to reopen her ease sua sponte under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a), because such a decision is “entirely discretionary.”

Section 1003.2 requires a motion to reconsider within 30 days, and permits treating a purported motion to reopen as reconsideration when it presents no new law or facts and instead alleges error in the prior decision.

Copca v. Gonzales · filed 2007-05-14(b)(2), (b)(1), (c)(1)

Motions to reconsider shall be filed within 30 days after the BIA decision. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(2). Petitioner’s motion to reconsider was filed on October 13, 2006, over 30 days after entry of the August 15, 2006 final order of removal. Accordingly, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioner's motion to reconsider as untimely. Nor did the BIA abuse its discretion in construing petitioner’s “motion to reopen” as a motion for reconsideration where the motion failed to present new law or facts in support of petitioner’s application for cancellation of removal and instead, argued that the Immigration Judge erred in denying his application. See Mohammed v. Gonzales, 400 F.3d 785, 793 (9th Cir. 2005); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1).

Section 1003.2 permits the Board to deny reconsideration when the movant fails to identify errors of fact or law and to deny reopening when the movant fails to provide new or previously unavailable evidence.

Martinez v. Gonzales · filed 2006-07-31(b), (a) and (c)

The Board in construing Martinez’s motion as one for reconsideration did not abuse its discretion in denying relief because Martinez failed to demonstrate any errors of fact or law in the Board’s earlier decision. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b). ... The Board also acted within its discretion in denying Martinez’s motion to reopen because Martinez failed to support the motion with new or previously unavailable evidentiary material. See 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.2(a) and (c); Bhasin v. Gonzales, 423 F.3d 977, 984 (9th Cir.2005).

Section 1003.2(b) requires a motion for reconsideration to specify errors of fact or law and cite pertinent authority, while section 1003.2(c)(2) bars successive motions to reopen unless an exception such as the changed-country-conditions exception in (c)(3)(ii) applies.

Olukune v. Attorney General · filed 2008-05-06(b), (c)(2), and (c)(3)(ii)

In order to be valid, a motion for reconsideration “shall state the reasons for the motion by specifying the errors of fact or law in the prior Board decision and shall be supported by pertinent authority.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b). As the BIA found, Petitioner has not alleged any errors of fact or law, and in fact stated that she was “respectful and mindful of the Board’s well-reasoned decision.” The materials provided in this second motion, constitute, in Petitioner’s own words, “additional evidence” to “clarify” arguments that Petitioner did not adequately explain in her first motion to reopen. As Petitioner has thus not specified any error of fact or law for the BIA to consider, the BIA properly denied the motion. ... Even if we were to construe Petitioner’s motion as a second motion to reopen, it is numerically barred unless it falls into one of the exceptions listed in 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.2(c)(3)(i-iii). 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). The exception implicated by Petitioner is listed at subsection (c)(3)(ii): ... “[t]he time and numerical limitations set forth in paragraph (c)(2) of this section shall not apply to a motion to reopen proceedings . . . [t]o apply or reapply for asylum or withholding of deportation based on changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality or in the country to which deportation has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the previous hearing.” ... Petitioner’s argument that she fits this exception fails because her second motion has not presented any material information that was not previously available to her.

Section 1003.2(b)(1) requires a motion for reconsideration to specify the errors of law or fact in the Board’s prior decision.

Shierly v. Attorney General · filed 2009-01-28(b)(1)

A motion for reconsideration must specify the errors of law or fact in the BIA’s prior decision.

Section 1003.2 permits the BIA to reopen a case on a party’s motion within ninety days or sua sponte at any time, and requires a motion to reconsider to identify factual or legal errors and cite pertinent authority.

Pin Wang v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2009-07-06(a), (b)(1), (c)(2)

Petitioner’s motion to reopen was filed pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2. Under that regulation, the BIA may within its discretion reopen a case either: (1) upon motion of a party filed no later than ninety days after the final administrative decision; or (2) at any time on the BIA’s own motion. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a), (c)(2). Because petitioner’s request was filed almost five years beyond the ninety-day deadline contained in the regulation, his case could only be reopened by the BIA sua sponte and within its discretion. See id. ... A motion to reconsider must “state the reasons for the motion by specifying the errors of fact or law in the prior Board decision and shall be supported by pertinent authority.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1).

Section 1003.2(b) requires a motion for reconsideration to specify the errors of fact or law in the prior decision; merely restating earlier arguments is insufficient.

Vithlani v. Attorney General of the United States · filed 2010-01-12(b)

With respect to their motion for reconsideration, the BIA held that rather than specifying any errors of fact or law in its previous decision as required by 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b), the motion essentially restated all of the arguments previously made. (A.R.7.) We agree that, under these circumstances, the BIA properly denied the motion for reconsideration.

Section 1003.2(b)(1) requires a motion for reconsideration to identify specific errors of fact or law in the prior decision and include pertinent supporting authority.

Adolfo Jose Fernandez Gutierrez v. U.S. Attorney General · filed 2011-09-19(b)(1)

A properly presented motion for reconsideration “shall state the reasons for the motion by specifying errors of fact or law in the prior [BIA] decision and shall be supported by pertinent authority.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1).

Section 1003.2(b)(1) requires a motion to reconsider to identify an error of fact or law in the prior decision.

Rodriguez v. Gonzales · filed 2006-07-31(b)(1)

The BIA was within its discretion in denying Rodriguez’s motion to reconsider because the motion failed to identify any error of fact or law in the BIA’s prior decision affirming the IJ’s order denying cancellation of removal. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1); Socop-Gonzalez v. INS, 272 F.3d 1176, 1180 n. 2 (9th Cir.2001) (en banc).

Section 1003.2(b)(1) requires a motion to reconsider to identify an error of fact or law in the prior decision.

Escobar v. Gonzales · filed 2007-04-27(b)(1)

The BIA was within its discretion in denying petitioners’ motion to reconsider because the motion failed to identify any error of fact or law in the BIA’s prior decision affirming the IJ’s order. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1); Socop-Gonzalez v. INS, 272 F.3d 1176, 1180 n. 2 (9th Cir.2001) (en banc).

Subsection (b)(1) requires a motion to reconsider to identify an error of fact or law in the prior decision.

Cruz v. Holder · filed 2009-10-01(b)(1)

In No. 06-72969, the BIA was within its discretion in denying De Anda Cruz’s motion to reconsider because the motion failed to identify any error of fact or law in the BIA’s prior decision denying the motion to reopen.

Section 1003.2(b)(1) requires a motion to reconsider to identify an error of fact or law in the prior decision.

Romero v. Holder · filed 2010-06-10(b)(1)

The BIA acted within its discretion in denying the motion to reconsider because the motion failed to identify any error of fact or law in the BIA’s prior decision denying petitioners’ first motion to reopen. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1); Socop-Gonzalez v. INS, 272 F.3d 1176, 1180 n.2 (9th Cir. 2001) (en banc).

A motion to reconsider must specify errors of fact or law in the prior decision.

Dukureh v. Holder · filed 2010-06-21(b)(1)

To the extent that Dukureh challenges the BIA’s denial of his motion to reconsider, we find that the BIA reasonably denied that motion because he failed to specify errors of fact or law in its prior decision as required by 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1).

Section 1003.2(b)(1) requires a motion to reconsider to specify errors of law or fact and support the motion with pertinent authority; merely repeating arguments previously made to the BIA does not satisfy that requirement.

Fen Mei Chen v. U.S. Attorney General · filed 2012-04-19(b)(1)

In the motion, the alien must “specify the errors of law or fact in the previous order” and must support the motion with “pertinent authority.” 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(6)(A) & (C); see also 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1). “[A] motion that merely republishes the reasons that had failed to convince the tribunal in the first place gives the tribunal no reason to change its mind.” Calle v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 504 F.3d 1324, 1329 (11th Cir. 2007) (quotation, alteration, and citation omitted). Consequently, merely reiterating arguments previously made to the BIA does not “specify” errors of fact or law, as required for a successful motion to reconsider. Id. (citing 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1)).

Section 1003.2(b)(1) requires a motion to reconsider to identify an error of fact or law in the prior decision.

Torres v. Holder · filed 2012-07-23(b)(1)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Torres’s motion to reconsider where the motion failed to identify any error of fact or law in the BIA’s prior decision.

Section 1003.2(b)(1) requires a motion to reconsider to specify errors of fact or law in the prior Board decision, rather than merely challenge the evidence or result.

Singh v. Jefferson Sessions III · filed 2018-05-02(b)(1)

In order to prevail, a movant must “specify[] the errors of fact or law in the prior Board decision,” rather than simply challenging the Board’s consideration of the evidence and the resulting decision. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1) (2017).

Section 1003.2(b) permits the Board to deny a motion to reconsider when the movant does not show an error of fact or law in the Board’s earlier decision.

Rodriguez v. Gonzales · filed 2006-07-31(b)

Even if we liberally construe petitioner’s contentions as directed toward the Board’s denial of her motion to reconsider, the Board acted within its discretion in denying the motion because petitioner failed to demonstrate an error of fact or law in the Board’s earlier decision. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b).

The joint-filing exception permits an untimely motion to reopen only when all parties agree and jointly file it.

Lin v. Gonzales · filed 2006-08-01(c)(3)(iii)

This letter cannot reasonably be construed as consent from the Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“BICE”), which is a completely separate agency. Furthermore, there has been no “jointly filed” motion as BICE has expressly stated that it did not consent to the *86motion to reopen. The BIA thus properly denied Lin’s motion as untimely.

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(iii) sets no meaningful standards governing the agency’s discretion to consent to a jointly filed motion to reopen.

Toussaint v. Gonzales · filed 2007-05-10(c)(3)(iii)

Moreover, even if we had jurisdiction to consider whether ICE lawfully exercised its discretionary power, ICE’s decision would not be reviewable, because the relevant regulation, 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(iii), provides no meaningful standards against which to judge the agency’s exercise of its discretion.

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(iii) treats the jointly filed exception as requiring agreement by all parties and a joint filing; merely being unopposed is insufficient.

Grishchyan v. Lynch · filed 2015-09-11(c)(3)(iii)

Grishchyan argues that his motion to reopen was unopposed, but it was not “[a]greed upon by all parties and jointly filed.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(iii).

Section 1003.2(b) requires a motion to reconsider to specify an error of fact or law in the Board's original decision.

Abrahamyan v. Gonzales · filed 2006-08-01(b)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Abrahamyan’s motion to reconsider because she did not identify an error of fact or law in the BIA’s January 5, 2004 decision. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b) (requiring a motion to reconsider to specify error of fact or law in its original decision).

Section 1003.2(b)(1) requires a motion to reconsider to identify an error of fact or law in the prior order.

Vazquez v. Gonzales · filed 2006-08-25(b)(1)

The BIA was within its discretion in denying Chacon Vazquez’s motion to reconsider because the motion failed to identify any error of fact or law in the BIA’s prior order affirming the immigration judge’s decision denying cancellation of removal. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1); Socop-Gonzalez v. INS, 272 F.3d 1176, 1180 n. 2 (9th Cir.2001) (en banc); see also Jimenez-Angeles v. Ashcroft, 291 F.3d 594, 602-03 (9th Cir.2002) (holding the Nicaraguan Adjustment and Central American Relief Act special rule cancellation does not violate equal protection).

Section 1003.2(b)(1) requires a motion to reconsider to identify errors of law or fact in the prior decision.

Barron-Palomares v. Gonzales · filed 2007-02-27(b)(1)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Barron-Palomares’s motion to reconsider because Barron-Palomares failed to identify any errors of law or fact in the BIA’s previous order. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1).

Section 1003.2(b)(1) requires a motion to reconsider to identify the factual or legal errors in the prior BIA decision; repeating previously rejected arguments does not satisfy that requirement.

Freddy Jose Suarez Mauco v. U.S. Attorney General · filed 2007-03-26(b)(1)

Under the regulations, a motion for reconsideration must specify “the errors of fact or law in the prior [BIA] decision.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1). ... Because Suarez failed to specify the errors of fact or law in the prior BIA decision and simply repeated his prior arguments that the BIA had already considered and rejected, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying his motion for reconsideration. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1).

Section 1003.2(b)(1) requires a motion to reconsider to identify an error of fact or law in the prior decision.

Medina v. Gonzales · filed 2007-04-24(b)(1)

The BIA was within its discretion in denying the petitioners’ motion to reconsider because the motion failed to identify any error of fact or law in the BIA’s prior decision denying reopening. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1); Socop-Gonzalez v. INS, 272 F.3d 1176, 1180 n. 2 (9th Cir.2001) (en banc).

Section 1003.2(b)(1) requires a motion to reconsider to identify an error of fact or law in the prior decision.

Gomez v. Gonzales · filed 2007-04-27(b)(1)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion by denying the Gomezes’ motion to reconsider because the motion failed to identify any error of fact or law in the BIA’s prior decision affirming the IJ’s order. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1); Socop-Gonzalez v. INS, 272 F.3d 1176, 1180 n. 2 (9th Cir.2001) (en banc).

Section 1003.2(b)(1) requires a motion to reconsider to identify an error of fact or law in the prior decision.

Chugh v. Gonzales · filed 2007-04-27(b)(1)

The BIA was within its discretion in denying Chugh’s motion to reconsider because, despite Chugh’s due process contention, the motion failed to identify any error of fact or law in the BIA’s prior decision denying Chugh’s motion to reopen.

A motion to reconsider must identify an error of fact or law in the prior decision.

Rocha v. Gonzales · filed 2007-04-27(b)(1)

The BIA acted within its discretion in denying Aguilar Rocha’s motion to reconsider because the motion failed to identify any error of fact or law in the BIA’s prior decision affirming the IJ’s order denying cancellation of removal. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1); Socop-Gonzalez v. INS, 272 F.3d 1176, 1180 n. 2 (9th Cir.2001) (en banc).

Section 1003.2(b)(1) requires a motion to reconsider to identify an error of fact or law in the prior decision.

Corona-Barrera v. Gonzales · filed 2007-04-27(b)(1)

The BIA was within its discretion in denying Corona-Barrera’s motion to reconsider because the motion failed to identify any error of fact or law in the BIA’s prior decision affirming the IJ’s order denying cancellation of removal. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1); Socop-Gonzalez v. INS, 272 F.3d 1176, 1180 n. 2 (9th Cir.2001) (en banc).

Section 1003.2(b)(1) requires a motion to reconsider to identify an error of fact or law in the BIA's prior decision.

Gallardo v. Gonzales · filed 2007-04-30(b)(1)

The BIA was within its discretion in denying Ramirez Gallardo’s motion to reconsider because the motion failed to identify any error of fact or law in the BIA’s prior decision. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1); Socop-Gonzalez v. INS, 272 F.3d 1176, 1180 n. 2 (9th Cir.2001) (en banc).

Section 1003.2(b)(1) requires a motion to reconsider to identify an error of fact or law in the prior decision.

Singh v. Gonzales · filed 2007-08-22(b)(1)

The BIA acted within its discretion in denying Singh’s motion to reconsider because the motion failed to identify any error of fact or law in the BIA’s prior decision. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1); Socop-Gonzalez v. INS, 272 F.3d 1176, 1180 n. 2 (9th Cir.2001) (en banc).

Section 1003.2(b)(1) requires a motion to reconsider to identify an error of fact or law in the prior decision.

Hernandez v. Keisler · filed 2007-09-27(b)(1)

We conclude that the BIA acted within its discretion in denying petitioner’s motion for reconsideration because the motion failed to identify any error of fact or law in the BIA’s prior decision. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1); Socop-Gonzalez v. INS, 272 F.3d 1176, 1180 n. 2 (9th Cir.2001) (en banc).

Section 1003.2(b)(1) requires a motion for reconsideration to identify the factual or legal error in the Board’s prior decision.

Habtemariam v. Mukasey · filed 2008-06-17(b)(1)

A motion for reconsideration asserts that the Board made an error in its earlier decision, Turri v. INS, 997 F.2d 1306, 1311 n.4 (10th Cir. 1993), and requires the movant to specify the error of fact or law in the prior Board decision. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1) (2007); Matter of Cerna, 20 I. & N. Dec. 399, 402 (B.I.A. 1991) (noting that a motion to reconsider questions a decision for alleged errors in appraising the facts and the law).

Section 1003.2(b)(1) requires a motion to reconsider to identify an error of fact or law in the prior decision.

Lopez-Heredia v. Mukasey · filed 2008-09-19(b)(1)

The BIA acted within its discretion in denying Lopez-Heredia’s motion to reconsider because the motion failed to identify an error of fact or law in the BIA’s prior decision. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1); see also Socop-Gonzalez v. INS, 272 F.3d 1176, 1180 n. 2 (9th Cir.2001) (en banc).

Section 1003.2(b)(1) requires a motion to reconsider to identify an error of fact or law in the prior decision.

Payan-Ortega v. Mukasey · filed 2008-11-04(b)(1)

The BIA also acted within its discretion in denying Payan-Ortega’s motion to reconsider because the motion failed to identify any error of fact or law in the BIA’s prior decision. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1); see also Socop-Gonzalez v. INS, 272 F.3d 1176, 1180 n. 2 (9th Cir. 2001) (en banc).

Section 1003.2(b)(1) requires a motion to reconsider to identify an error of fact or law in the prior BIA decision.

Medina-Meza v. Mukasey · filed 2008-11-25(b)(1)

The BIA acted within its discretion in denying petitioners’ motion to reconsider because the motion failed to identify an error of fact or law in the BIA’s prior decision.

Section 1003.2(b)(1) requires a motion to reconsider to identify an error of fact or law in the prior decision.

de Ortega v. Gonzales · filed 2007-06-13(b)(1)

The BIA acted within its discretion in denying Esquivel de Ortega’s motion to reconsider because the motion failed to identify any error of fact or law in the BIA’s prior decision. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1); Socop-Gonzalez v. INS, 272 F.3d 1176, 1180 n. 2 (9th Cir.2001) (en bane).

Section 1003.2(b)(1) requires a motion to reconsider to identify an error of fact or law in the BIA's prior decision.

Larez v. Mukasey · filed 2008-12-26(b)(1)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioners’ motion to reconsider because the motion did not identify an error of fact or law in the BIA’s prior decision. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1).

Section 1003.2(b)(1) requires a motion to reconsider to identify an error of fact or law in the BIA's prior order.

Vazquez v. Mukasey · filed 2009-01-20(b)(1)

The BIA acted within its discretion in denying Petitioner’s motion to reconsider because the motion failed to identify any error of fact or law in the BIA’s prior order dismissing Petitioner’s appeal. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1); see also Socop-Gonzalez v. INS, 272 F.3d 1176, 1180 n. 2 (9th Cir.2001) (en banc).

Section 1003.2(b)(1) requires a motion to reconsider to identify an error of fact or law in the prior decision.

Solano v. Mukasey · filed 2009-01-20(b)(1)

Therefore, the BIA was within its discretion in denying petitioners’ motion to reconsider because the motion failed to *166identify any error of fact or law in the BIA’s prior decision affirming the IJ.

Section 1003.2(b)(1) requires a motion to reconsider to identify an error of law or fact.

Medina v. Mukasey · filed 2009-01-21(b)(1)

The BIA did not abuse.its discretion in denying Medina’s motion to reconsider because the motion failed to identify any error of law or fact in the BIA’s April 3, 2006 order. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1).

Section 1003.2(b)(1) requires a motion to reconsider to identify an error of fact or law in the prior order.

Reyes-Escobar v. Mukasey · filed 2009-01-22(b)(1)

The agency acted within its discretion in denying Reyes-Escobar’s motion to reconsider, because the motion failed to identify any error of fact or law in the IJ’s order denying her motion to reopen. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1); see also Iturribarria v. INS, 321 F.3d 889, 899 (9th Cir.2003).

Section 1003.2(b)(1) requires a motion to reconsider to specify errors of fact or law in the BIA’s decision.

Dong v. Holder · filed 2009-03-11(b)(1)

The BIA reasonably denied Dong’s motion to reconsider because he failed to specify errors of fact or law in the agency’s decision as required by 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1).

Section 1003.2(b)(1) requires a motion to reconsider to identify an error of law or fact in the prior decision, and relief may be denied when it fails to do so.

Lin v. Holder · filed 2009-04-29(b)(1)

The BIA properly construed Lin’s third motion to reopen as a motion to reconsider, and did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to reconsider because the motion failed to identify any error of law or fact that would justify granting relief.

Section 1003.2(b)(1) requires a motion to reconsider to identify an error of law or fact in the prior order.

Sanchez-Paramo v. Holder · filed 2009-07-06(b)(1)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Sanchez-Paramo’s motion to reconsider because the motion failed to identify any error of law or fact in the BIA’s February 16, 2006, order.

Section 1003.2(b)(1) requires a motion to reconsider to identify an error of fact or law in the prior decision.

Minssy v. Holder · filed 2009-10-02(b)(1)

The BIA acted within its discretion in denying petitioners’ motion to reconsider because the motion failed to identify any error of fact or law in the BIA’s October 4, 2005, order.

Section 1003.2(b)(1) requires a motion to reconsider to identify errors of law or fact in the prior BIA decision.

Minin v. Holder · filed 2010-01-19(b)(1)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Minin’s motion to reconsider because the motion failed to identify any error of law or fact in the BIA’s December 26, 2006 order. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1).

Section 1003.2(b)(1) requires a motion for reconsideration to identify an error of law or fact in the prior BIA decision.

De Torres v. Holder · filed 2010-02-26(b)(1)

Construed as a motion for reconsideration, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion because it failed to identify any error of law or fact in the BIA’s May 16, 2006, decision. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1).

Section 1003.2(b)(1) requires a motion to reconsider to specify the errors of fact or law in the prior decision.

Shi v. Holder · filed 2010-03-15(b)(1)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Shi’s motion to reconsider because she failed to specify errors of fact or law in the BIA’s prior decision as required by 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1).

Section 1003.2(b)(1) requires a motion to reconsider to identify an error of law or fact in the prior BIA order.

Karapetyan v. Holder · filed 2010-07-29(b)(1)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Mambou’s motion to reconsider because the motion failed to identify any error of law or fact in the BIA’s October 13, 2007, order dismissing his appeal. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1); see also Socop-Gonzalez v. INS, 272 F.3d 1176, 1180 n.2 (9th Cir. 2001) (en banc) (purpose of a motion to reconsider is “to demonstrate that the IJ or the BIA erred as a matter of law or fact.”).

A motion to reconsider must identify an error of law or fact in the BIA's prior order.

Lua-Nunez v. Holder · filed 2010-09-29(b)(1)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Lua Nunez’s motion to reconsider because the motion failed to identify any error of law or fact in the BIA’s prior order. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1).

Section 1003.2(b)(1) requires a motion to reconsider to identify an error of fact or law in the prior BIA decision.

Aguilar v. Holder · filed 2010-09-28(b)(1)

The BIA was within its discretion in denying petitioners’ June 25, 2007, motion to reconsider because the motion failed to identify any error of fact or law in the BIA’s May 23, 2007, decision.

A motion to reconsider must identify specific errors of fact or law in the prior BIA decision and cannot merely repeat arguments previously presented.

Sebastiao De Oliveira Lingordo vs U.S. Attorney General · filed 2010-11-05(b)(1)

A motion for reconsideration, such as the one Petitioner presented the BIA in this case, “shall state the reasons for the motion by specifying the errors of fact or law in the prior [BIA] decision and shall be supported by pertinent authority.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1). A motion to reconsider that merely restates the arguments that the BIA previously rejected provides no reason for the BIA to change its prior decision. See Calle, 504 F.3d at 1329. “Therefore, merely reiterating arguments previously presented to the BIA does not constitute ‘specifying . . . errors of fact or law’ as required for a successful motion to reconsider.” Id. (citing 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1)).

Section 1003.2(b)(1) requires a motion to reconsider to identify an error of fact or law in the prior decision.

De Gallardo v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2011-06-29(b)(1)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Rojas De Gallardo’s motion to reconsider because the motion failed to identify any error of fact or law in the BIA’s prior decision dismissing her appeal. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1); Socop-Gonzalez v. INS, 272 F.3d 1176, 1180 n.2 (9th Cir. 2001) (en banc).

Subsection (b)(1) requires a motion to reconsider to identify an error of fact or law in the challenged decision.

Guncoro v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2011-07-21(b)(1)

The BIA was within its discretion in denying the November 17, 2008, motion to reconsider on the ground that the motion failed to identify any error of fact or law in the BIA’s April 29, 2008, order. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1).

Section 1003.2(b) requires a motion to reconsider to identify an error of fact or law in the prior order.

Obrego v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2012-03-02(b)

The BIA acted within its discretion in denying Obrego’s motion to reconsider because the motion failed to identify any error of fact or law in the BIA’s prior order. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b).

Section 1003.2(b)(1) requires a motion to reconsider to identify an error of fact or law in the challenged decision.

Asanga v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2012-03-27(b)(1)

Asanga must identify some error of fact or law in the denial of her first motion to reopen. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1).

Section 1003.2(b)(1) requires a motion to reconsider before the BIA to identify an error of law or fact in the prior order.

Monterroso v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2012-10-15(b)(1)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioners’ motion to reconsider because the motion failed to identify any error of law or fact in the BIA’s October 7, 2010, order. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1).

Section 1003.2(b)(1) requires a motion to reconsider to identify an error of fact or law in the prior decision.

Singh v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2012-12-28(b)(1)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Singh’s motion to reconsider because Singh did not identify any error or fact or law in the BIA’s prior decision. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1).

Section 1003.2(b)(1) requires a motion to reconsider to identify an error of fact or law in the prior decision.

Jahja v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2013-05-22(b)(1)

Moreover, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioners’ motion to reconsider where the motion failed to identify any error of fact or law in the BIA’s prior decision dismissing petitioners’ appeal. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1); Socop-Gonzalez v. INS, 272 F.3d 1176, 1180 n.2 (9th Cir. 2001) (en banc).

Section 1003.2(b)(1) requires a motion to reconsider to identify an error of fact or law in the BIA’s prior order.

Martinez-Benitez v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2013-07-31(b)(1)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Martinez-Benitez’s motion to reconsider because the motion failed to identify any error of fact or law in the BIA’s prior order. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1); Socop-Gonzalez v. INS, 272 F.3d 1176, 1180 n. 2 (9th Cir. 2001) (en banc).

Section 1003.2(b)(1) requires a motion to reconsider to identify an error of fact or law in the BIA’s prior decision.

Gonzalez-Gonzalez v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2013-09-26(b)(1)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Gonzalez-Gonzalez’s motion to reconsider because she failed to identify any error of fact or law in the BIA’s prior decision. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1).

Section 1003.2(b)(1) requires a motion to reconsider to identify an error of fact or law in the prior decision.

Diva Arevalo v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2014-11-25(b)(1)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Arevalo’s motion to reconsider because Arevalo failed to identify any error of fact or law in the BIA’s prior order. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1).

Section 1003.2(b)(1) permits a motion to reconsider to raise errors of fact or law in the Board’s prior decision.

Mena-Flores v. Holder · filed 2015-01-23(b)(1)

“A motion to reconsider . . . is available to raise errors of fact or law committed by the [Board] in its prior decision.” Mahamat v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 1281, 1283 n.3 (10th Cir. 2005); see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1).

Section 1003.2(b)(1) requires a motion to reconsider to specify the errors of law or fact in the prior decision.

Zhu v. Lynch · filed 2015-07-06(b)(1)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in concluding that Zhu failed to specify any error of law or fact in its prior decision denying his motion to reopen. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(6)(C); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1); see also Jian Hui Shao v. Mukasey, 546 F.3d 138, 173 (2d Cir. 2008).

Section 1003.2(b)(1) requires a motion to reconsider to identify an error of fact or law in the prior BIA order.

Vasquez v. Lynch · filed 2015-12-15(b)(1)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Vasquez’s motion to reconsider because the motion failed to identify any error of fact or law in the BIA’s prior order. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1).

Section 1003.2(b)(1) requires a motion to reconsider to identify an error of fact or law in the prior decision.

Ramirez-Guzman v. Jefferson Sessions, III · filed 2018-09-18(b)(1)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Ramirez-Guzman’s motion to reconsider for failure to identify any error of fact or law in the BIA’s prior order. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1).

Section 1003.2(b)(1) requires a motion to reconsider to identify an error of law or fact in the prior BIA decision.

Rivas v. Garland · filed 2021-09-21(b)(1)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioners’ motion to reconsider where they failed to identify any error of law or fact in the BIA’s prior decision. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1); Ma v. Ashcroft, 361 F.3d 553, 558 (9th Cir. 2004) (“A petitioner’s motion to reconsider must identify a legal or factual error in the BIA’s prior decision.”).

Section 1003.2(b)(1) requires a motion to reconsider to identify an error of fact or law in the prior decision.

Khalasawi v. Garland · filed 2022-07-12(b)(1)

Khalasawi also styled his motion as one to reconsider, but he did not identify a prior error of fact or law by the Board; that aspect of his motion was therefore meritless. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1).

Section 1003.2(b)(1) requires a motion to reconsider to identify an error of fact or law in the prior Board of Immigration Appeals order.

Lezama-Sanchez v. Garland · filed 2022-08-03(b)(1)

The BIA did not err in denying Lezama-Sanchez’s motion to reconsider because the motion failed to identify any error of fact or law in the BIA’s prior order. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1).

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) exempts a motion to reopen from the usual time and numerical limits when it seeks asylum or withholding based on changed country conditions supported by material evidence that was previously unavailable and could not previously have been discovered or presented.

Cao v. Atty Gen USA · filed 2007-04-24(c)(3)(ii)

In most cases, a petitioner may file only one motion to reopen removal proceedings, and that motion must be filed no later than 90 days after the date on which the final administrative decision was rendered in the proceedings sought to be reopened. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2); Filja v. Gonzales, 447 F.3d 241, 252 (3d Cir. 2006). However, this time and number requirement does not apply to aliens seeking to reapply for asylum or withholding of deportation based upon changed circumstances arising in the country to which deportation has been ordered, so long as evidence supporting the motion is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the previous hearing. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); Johnson v. Ashcroft, 286 F.3d 696, 704 (3d Cir. 2002).

Section 1003.2 generally requires a motion to reopen to be filed within 90 days of the final administrative decision, but allows an exception when the motion is based on changed country conditions.

Xia v. United States · filed 2006-08-02(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

A motion to reopen must be filed with the BIA within ninety days of the final administrative decision, unless it is based on a change in country conditions under 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.2(c)(2), 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). Here Xia has alleged no change in country conditions. Instead, he simply reiterates the facts in his affidavit filed with the underlying motion. Therefore, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in finding that Xia did not qualify for the regulatory exception to the filing deadline and in denying Xia’s motion to reopen as untimely.

The exception to the 90-day deadline for reopening asylum proceedings applies to changed circumstances arising in the applicant’s country of nationality, not merely to changed personal circumstances.

Li v. Attorney General · filed 2007-08-28(c)(3)(ii)

Given the clarity of the language found in § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii), however, we hold that changed personal circumstances are distinct from changed circumstances arising in Li’s country of nationality, China.

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) permits an exception to the 90-day reopening bar only when material evidence shows changed country conditions, not merely changed personal circumstances.

Dong v. Attorney General · filed 2008-05-12(c)(3)(ii)

A petitioner must file a motion to reopen within 90-days of the BIA’s final administrative order. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c). An exception to the 90-day bar for filing a motion to reopen may be granted only if there are changed country conditions as demonstrated by evidence that “is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the previous hearing.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); Filja v. Gonzales, 447 F.3d 241, 253 (3d Cir. 2006). ... We agree that Dong’s changed personal circumstances are distinct from changed circumstances arising in China.

Section 1003.2 requires a motion to reopen to be filed within ninety days unless the movant qualifies for the exception for asylum or withholding claims based on materially changed country conditions.

Chen v. Mukasey · filed 2008-09-12(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

Therefore, Chen was required to comply with the ninety-day filing deadline for motions to reopen or establish an exception to that deadline as delineated in the Act and regulations. Id. at 152-53. The relevant provisions of the Act and regulations, in ton, require a showing of changed country conditions. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a (c)(7)(C)(ii); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(h). Thus, the BIA properly found that the birth of Chen’s children in the United States is a changed personal circumstance insufficient to justify reopening.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) requires a motion to reopen to be filed within ninety days of the final administrative decision, while section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) permits an exception to that deadline only when material evidence shows changed country conditions.

Geni v. Mukasey · filed 2008-10-28(c)(2) and (c)(3)(ii)

The BIA properly denied Geni’s motion to reopen as untimely where it was filed more than four years after his '2003 final order of removal. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2) (providing that an applicant must file a motion to reopen within ninety days of the final administrative decision). Moreover, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in finding that Geni failed to present material evidence of changed country conditions sufficient to satisfy the exception to the time limitation. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); INS v. Abudu, 485 U.S. 94, 104-105, 108 S.Ct. 904, 99 L.Ed.2d 90 (1988). The documents that Geni submitted provide, at most, anecdotal evidence that there was continued unrest in Montenegro in 2006. Such evidence does not demonstrate changed country conditions sufficient to warrant reopening his proceedings.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) imposes a 90-day deadline for motions to reopen, while § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) provides an exception for material, previously unavailable evidence of changed country conditions; generalized evidence may not satisfy that exception.

Siregar v. Holder · filed 2009-06-19(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

It is uncontested that Siregar filed his motion to reopen past the applicable 90-day deadline. That fact is fatal to Sire-gar’s attempt to reopen for further consideration of his claim for cancellation of removal. ... Mindful of the extremely deferential standard of review, we conclude that this ruling was not an abuse of discretion. ... Siregar’s eviden-tiary offerings were generalized and attenuated, consisting mainly of century-old articles regarding the eruption of Krakatoa that presented very little concrete evidence of modern anti-Western backlash or its likelihood of being applied to Siregar. The BIA reasonably could have concluded that this showing was inadequate to satisfy the changed conditions exception to the 90-day time limit.

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) exempts a motion to reopen from the 90-day deadline only when material changed-country-conditions evidence was unavailable and could not have been previously discovered or presented.

Bedalli v. Eric H. Holder, Jr. · filed 2009-07-09(c)(3)(ii)

As an initial matter, the first exhibit, a 1995 report regarding the risks ethnic Albanians face if they, like petitioner, avoid conscription in the army, was clearly available at the time of petitioner’s underlying application for asylum and withholding of removal and is therefore not considered as evidence of changed circumstances. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) (ninety-day time limitation does not apply if evidence of changed circumstances is both material and “was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the previous hearing”).

The exception in § 1003.2(c)(3)(h) does not excuse the 90-day reopening deadline when the applicant lacks material evidence of changed country conditions.

Simonchyk v. Holder · filed 2009-09-21(c)(3)(h)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in finding that Simonchyk failed to present material evidence of changed country conditions sufficient to be exempt from the time limitation.

The changed-country-conditions exception allows a motion to reopen outside the filing deadline only when the applicant presents evidence of changed country conditions that would warrant the exception.

Shi Yong Fang v. Holder · filed 2009-10-02(e)(3)(ii)

In addition, the BIA did not err in finding that Fang failed to present evidence of changed country conditions in China that would warrant an exception to the filing deadline for his motion to reopen.

The exception removes the time limit for a motion to reopen based on changed circumstances in the country of nationality or removal, when the evidence is material and was unavailable and undiscoverable at the prior hearing.

Meichang Sun v. Holder · filed 2010-02-16(c)(3)(ii)

However, there is no time limit for filing a motion to reopen if it is “based on changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality or in the country to which deportation has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the previous hearing.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). In this case, the BIA reasonably found that Sun’s motion to reopen did not qualify for such an exception.

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) permits an untimely motion to reopen when the alien shows changed country conditions in the country of nationality, but changed personal circumstances do not qualify.

Chen v. Holder · filed 2010-05-24(c)(3)(ii)

The 90-day filing deadline may be excused if the alien can establish “changed country conditions arising in the country of nationality . . . .” 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). Here, however, the BIA reasonably concluded that reopening was not warranted because Chen’s motion was based not on changed country conditions in China, but on changed personal circumstances – his conversion to Catholicism.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) generally requires a motion to reopen to be filed within 90 days, while subsection (c)(3)(ii) excuses that deadline when supported by new and material evidence of changed country conditions.

Abor v. Holder Jr. · filed 2011-03-02(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Ser-Abors’ March 5, 2009, motion to reopen as untimely where Ser-Abor filed the motion more than ninety days after the BIA’s final order of removal, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and failed to submit new and material evidence of changed country conditions in Mexico that would excuse the late filing, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii).

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) exempts a motion to reopen based on changed country conditions from the ninety-day filing deadline, but the movant must provide material, previously unavailable evidence showing changed conditions.

Wang v. U.S. Attorney General · filed 2010-05-13(c)(3)(ii)

To meet the exception to the ninety-day filing deadline, the movant must show that there is new evidence that is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the removal hearing. See 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.2(c)(1), 1003.23(b)(3); ... Because Wang failed to provide material, previously unavailable evidence of changed country conditions since August 31, 2006, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying his motion to reopen.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) requires a motion to reopen to be filed within 90 days, while § 1003.2(c)(3) provides an exception for material, previously unavailable evidence of changed country conditions.

Zhuang Ping Lin v. U.S. Attorney General · filed 2010-11-30(c)(2), (c)(3)

Ordinarily, an alien who is subject to a final order of removal and wishes to file a motion to reopen must do so within 90 days of the final administrative removal order. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). That time limit is inapplicable, however, if the alien can demonstrate “changed country conditions arising in the country of nationality or the country to which removal has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available and would not have been discovered or presented at the previous proceeding.” 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); see also 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) imposes a 90-day deadline for motions to reopen based on changed personal circumstances, while § 1003.2(c)(3) removes that deadline when the change is changed country conditions.

Lin v. Holder · filed 2010-12-02(c)(2), (c)(3)

Furthermore, Lin enjoyed the opportunity to submit, within 90 days of his final order of removal, a motion to reopen the proceedings based on changed personal circumstances. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). If Lin’s changed circumstances had been based on changed conditions within his country of nationality or in the country to which he was ordered removed, the 90-day time limit would not have applied and Lin could have submitted a motion to reopen at any time. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3). These procedures are reasonable and constitutionally sufficient.

The 90-day reopening deadline does not apply to an asylum motion based on material, previously unavailable changed country conditions, and the alien bears the burden of proving eligibility for relief.

Doda v. Attorney General of the United States · filed 2011-11-22(c)(3)(ii), (c)(1)

The 90-day time limit for filing a motion to reopen does not apply if the motion relates to an application for asylum based on “changed country conditions arising in the country of nationality or the country to which removal has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available and would not have been discovered or presented at the previous proceeding.” 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(e)(7)(C)(ii); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). The alien bears the burden of proving eligibility for the requested relief. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) requires a motion to reopen to be filed within 90 days, but § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) exempts a motion based on material, previously unavailable evidence of changed country conditions.

Ni v. Atty Gen USA · filed 2012-05-10(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

Although a motion to reopen “must be filed no later than 90 days after the date on which the final administrative decision was rendered in the proceeding sought to be reopened,” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), this time limitation does not apply if the alien seeks reopening “based on changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality or in the country to which deportation has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the previous hearing.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) generally requires a motion to reopen within 90 days, but § 1003.2(c)(3)(H) exempts motions based on material, previously unavailable changed country conditions.

Ni v. Attorney General of the United States · filed 2012-05-10(c)(2), (c)(3)(H)

Although a motion to reopen “must be filed no later than 90 days after the date on which the final administrative decision was rendered in the proceeding sought to be reopened,” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), this time limitation does not apply if the alien seeks reopening “based on changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality or in the country to which deportation has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the previous hearing.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(H).

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) exempts a motion to reopen from the ninety-day deadline when it relies on material evidence of changed country conditions that was previously unavailable and could not have been discovered or presented earlier.

Chen v. Attorney General · filed 2012-05-17(c)(3)(ii)

There is no dispute that Chen’s motion to reopen was untimely, as it was not filed with the BIA within ninety days of the BIA’s 2006 decision. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1229a(c)(7) (C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). However, the ninety-day requirement does not apply to motions that rely on evidence of “changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality . . . if such evidence is material and was not available and would not have been discovered or presented at the previous hearing.” 8 U.S.C. §§ 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). ... Because Chen did not present material evidence of changed country conditions, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying her motion to reopen.

Section 1003.2 generally requires a motion to reopen to be filed within 90 days, but the deadline does not apply when the motion relies on material, previously unavailable changed circumstances in the country of nationality.

Zhou v. Holder · filed 2012-07-11(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

A motion to reopen generally must be filed no later than 90 days after the date on which the final administrative decision was rendered in the proceedings sought to be reopened. ... The time limitation does not apply to a motion to reopen if it is “based on changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality or in the country to which deportation has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the previous hearing.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) imposes a 90-day limit on motions to reopen, while § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) excepts motions based on material, previously unavailable changed country conditions.

Guo v. Holder · filed 2012-08-20(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

Aliens seeking to reopen proceedings may file one motion to reopen no later than 90 days after the date on which the final administrative decision was rendered. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A), (C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). It is undisputed that Guo’s July 2009 motion to reopen was untimely, because the BIA issued its final order of removal in April 2002. However, the time limitation for filing a motion to reopen does not apply if the motion is “based on changed country conditions arising in the country of nationality or the country to which removal has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available and would not have been discovered or presented at the previous proceeding.” 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); see also 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). In this case, the agency did not abuse its discretion in denying Guo’s motion to reopen as untimely. Guo’s decision to join the China Democracy Party (“CDP”) in the United States constitutes a self-induced change in personal circumstances that did not merit an exception to the time limitation. ... Further, although Guo argues that he provided articles and a statement describing the arrest and detention of CDP members and political activists in China, those materials do not describe a change in country conditions since Guo’s September 2000 hearing.

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) provides an exception to the 90-day deadline for a motion to reopen when the request is based on changed country conditions in the country of nationality, but the exception does not apply absent sufficient proof of changed conditions.

Haghirian v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2013-09-18(c)(3)(ii)

Although Haghirian concedes that his motion to reopen was filed more than 90 days after the date on which the final administrative decision was rendered, he seeks application of the exception when an alien’s request for relief is based on changed country conditions arising in the country of nationality. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). He has not shown that the BIA abused its discretion by according limited weight to his supporting documents. He has also failed to show that the BIA erred by concluding that he had not shown changed conditions in Iran sufficient to exempt him from the 90-day deadline.

Section 1003.2 imposes a 90-day deadline for motions to reopen, subject to an exception for materially changed country conditions; Diallo’s evidence did not justify reopening under that exception.

Diallo v. Holder · filed 2013-10-16(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

An alien seeking to reopen proceedings is required to file a motion to reopen no later than 90 days after the date on which the final administrative decision was rendered. ... Diallo contends, however, that he has established materially changed country conditions excusing his untimely motion to reopen, namely, that the government of Guinea is aware of his political activities in the United States, and will persecute him on the basis of those activities and his ethnicity if he is removed to Guinea. ... The BIA did not abuse its discretion in finding that Diallo did not warrant reopening on this basis.

The changed-country-conditions exception permits an untimely motion to reopen when a change in the petitioner's personal circumstances makes otherwise qualifying changed country conditions material.

Chandra v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2014-05-12(c)(3)(ii)

The plain language of 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) does not preclude an untimely motion where a change in the petitioner’s personal circumstances is a necessary predicate to the success of the motion.

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) permits a petitioner to file a motion to reopen at any time to seek asylum based on materially changed country conditions, supported by previously unavailable or undiscoverable evidence, if the petitioner shows prima facie eligibility for the relief sought.

Sutarsim v. Barr · filed 2020-05-01(c)(3)(ii)

Motions to reopen removal proceedings must generally be filed within ninety days of the final administrative order. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). But "a petitioner may file a motion to reopen at any time if he brings the motion seeking to apply for asylum based on changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality." Xin Qiang Liu v. Lynch, 802 F.3d 69, 75 (1st Cir. 2015) (citing 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii)). To be eligible for this exception, a petitioner must demonstrate "that the change in country conditions is material and must support that showing by evidence that was either unavailable or undiscoverable at the time of her merits hearing." Nantume v. Barr, 931 F.3d 35, 38 (1st Cir. 2019) (citing Garcia-Aguilar v. Whitaker, 913 F.3d 215, 218 (1st Cir. 2019)). She must also "show prima facie eligibility for the substantive relief that she seeks." Id. (citing Chen v. Lynch, 825 F.3d 83, 87 (1st Cir. 2016)). These requirements apply equally to a petitioner's claims for asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT protection. Id.

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) permits an untimely motion to reopen seeking asylum or withholding based on materially changed country conditions only when the evidence was previously unavailable and could not have been presented earlier.

F-S-N · filed 2020-06-12(c)(3)(ii)

Generally, an alien requesting reopening of removal proceedings must file a motion to reopen within 90 days of the date of a final administrative order of removal. Section 240(c)(7)(C)(i) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i) (2018); C.F.R. §§ 1003.2(c)(2), 1003.23(b)(1) (2020). This time limitation does not apply to a motion to reopen seeking to pursue asylum or withholding of removal based on changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality, if such evidence is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the previous hearing. Section 240(c)(7)(C)(ii) of the Act; 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.2(c)(3)(ii), 1003.23(b)(4)(i); see also Wanrong Lin v. Holder, 771 F.3d 177, 182 (4th Cir. 2014). ... In any case, the respondent has not established changed circumstances that warrant an exception to the filing deadline. ... These general allegations, without more, do not establish a material change in country conditions sufficient to excuse her untimely motion. See Matter of S-Y-G-, 24 I&N Dec. at 252. The absence of materially changed country conditions is a separate and independent basis to deny the motion to reopen. See section 240(c)(7)(C)(ii) of the Act; Matter of C-W-L-, 24 I&N Dec. 346, 354 (BIA 2007) (denying an untimely motion seeking asylum in the absence of changed country conditions).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) imposes a filing deadline for motions to reopen, while § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) provides an exception when materially changed country conditions are established.

Perez v. Garland · filed 2021-11-15(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Perez Perez’s motion to reopen as untimely, where it was filed over two years after the order of removal became final, see 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and she has not established changed country conditions in Guatemala to qualify for the regulatory exception to the filing deadline, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); Toufighi v. Mukasey, 538 F.3d 988, 996 (9th Cir. 2008) (requiring movant to produce material evidence with motion to reopen that conditions in country of nationality had changed); see also Najmabadi, 597 F.3d at 987-90 (evidence must be “qualitatively different” to warrant reopening).

The changed-country-conditions exception permits reopening after the 90-day deadline when the new evidence is material and was unavailable and could not previously have been discovered or presented.

Singh v. Garland · filed 2023-04-24(c)(3)(ii)

To reopen a CAT deferral proceeding on these grounds outside the 90-day deadline, Singh must show that the new evidence “is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the previous hearing.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); see Agonafer v. Sessions, 859 F.3d 1198, 1203–04 (9th Cir. 2017). ... The BIA found that the newly submitted evidence was not material because the evidence was general in nature and did not demonstrate a “specific likelihood that [Singh] would personally face torture.”2 The agency’s decision was supported by the record because general evidence of increased human rights abuse and economic deterioration in Fiji unrelated to his underlying claim involving his parents’ persecution in 1988 or his intellectual disabilities does not demonstrate a material change in conditions. Id.

(c)(3)(ii) exempts a motion to reopen from the 90-day filing deadline when it is based on changed country conditions that were unavailable at the prior removal proceedings.

Wellington Goncalves de Oliveira v. Attorney General United States of America · filed 2023-07-14(c)(3)(ii)

Goncalves de Oliveira is exempt from the 90-day filing deadline for motions to reopen because he requested humanitarian asylum based on changed country conditions that were unavailable at his previous removal proceedings. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i), (ii); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii).

An untimely motion to reopen requires evidence of a material change in country conditions; unchanged enforcement of an existing policy does not qualify.

Zhu v. Attorney General United States · filed 2016-02-01(c)(3)(ii)

Because Zhu and Jiang “failed to demonstrate that the policy is enforced differently now than when [they were] ordered removed,” they have failed to show a material change in country conditions that would justify their untimely motion to reopen.

Changed country conditions can excuse an untimely motion to reopen.

Oppier v. Sessions · filed 2017-07-17(c)(3)(ii)

Accordingly, Oppier has established changed country conditions in Indonesia sufficient to excuse the untimeliness of her motion.

Section 1003.2 exempts motions to reopen based on changed country conditions from its time limits.

Matte v. Gonzales · filed 2005-12-20(c)(3)(ii)

The time limitations set forth in the section do not apply to petitions to reopen due to changed country conditions.

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) excuses the deadline for a motion to reopen based on changed country conditions when the supporting evidence is material and previously unavailable.

Vilija v. Atty Gen USA · filed 2011-04-08(c)(3)(ii)

Vilija‟s motion to reopen was not filed within 90 days of the Board‟s September, 2002 decision and thus was untimely filed. Moreover, we conclude that the Board‟s determination that she failed to demonstrate changed country conditions sufficient to excuse her untimely motion to reopen was not arbitrary, irrational, or contrary to law.

Section 1003.2(b)(2) imposes a filing deadline on motions to reconsider, permitting the Board to deny a motion filed out of time.

Negoro v. Gonzales · filed 2007-04-09(b)(2)

The Board of Immigration Appeals did not abuse its discretion when it denied petitioners’ motions to reconsider and reopen as untimely. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(2) & (c)(2).

Section 1003.2(b)(1) requires a motion to reconsider to be timely and to identify an error of fact or law in the prior decision.

Martinez v. Keisler · filed 2007-09-27(b)(1)

To the extent the BIA construed Martinez’s motion as a motion to reconsider, it did not abuse its discretion because the motion was untimely and failed to identify any error of fact or law in the BIA’s prior decision. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1); So-cop-Gonzalez v. INS, 272 F.3d 1176, 1180 n. 2 (9th Cir.2001) (en banc).

Section 1003.2(b)(2) requires a motion to reconsider a Board of Immigration Appeals decision to be filed within 30 days after that decision.

Castellanos-Santiago v. Mukasey · filed 2008-03-24(b)(2)

To the extent that CastellanosSantiago challenges the BIA’s denial of his motion to reconsider cancellation, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying the *546motion as untimely because it was filed more than 30 days after the BIA’s prior decision. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(2).

A motion to reconsider filed almost 10 months after the BIA’s underlying order is untimely under § 1003.2(b)(2), absent equitable tolling.

Agripa v. Holder · filed 2009-12-23(b)(2)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Agripa’s motion as untimely because the motion was filed almost 10 months after the BIA’s December 21, 2004, order dismissing the underlying appeal, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(2), (c)(2), and Agripa failed to establish grounds for equitable tolling, see Iturribarria v. INS, 321 F.3d 889, 897 (9th Cir. 2003) (equitable tolling available where “petitioner is prevented from filing because of deception, fraud, or error, as long as the petitioner acts with due diligence”).

Section 1003.2(b)(2) permits denial of a motion to reconsider as untimely when the motion is filed outside the applicable deadline.

Erazo-rivas v. Holder Jr. · filed 2010-04-16(b)(2)

So construed, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Erazo-Rivas’s motion to reconsider as untimely. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(2).

Section 1003.2(b)(2) requires a motion to reconsider to be filed within the prescribed time, so a motion filed more than two years after the BIA’s final administrative decision is untimely.

Dhillon v. Holder · filed 2010-07-29(b)(2)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Dhillon’s motion to reconsider as untimely, where it was filed over two years after the BIA’s final administrative decision. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(2).

Section 1003.2(b)(2) requires a motion to reconsider a final BIA order to be filed within the applicable deadline, so a motion filed more than five months after the order is untimely.

Martinez-Villanueva v. Holder Jr. · filed 2010-09-07(b)(2)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Martinez-Villanueva’s motion to reconsider as untimely because he filed the motion more than 5 months after the BIA issued its final order, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(2), and Martinez-Villanueva did not show he acted with the diligence required for equitable tolling, see Singh v. Gonzales, 491 F.3d 1090, 1096-97 (9th Cir. 2007).

Section 1003.2(b)(1) requires a motion to reconsider to be timely and to identify an error of fact or law in the prior decision.

Uneputty v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2011-07-22(b)(1)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion by denying petitioners’ motion to reconsider where the motion was untimely and petitioners failed to identify any error of fact or law in the BIA’s previous decision affirming an immigration judge’s removal order. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1), (2).

Section 1003.2(b)(2) requires a motion to reconsider to be filed within 30 days after the BIA's order.

Iniguez v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2013-06-13(b)(2)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioners’ motion to reconsider as untimely because it was filed more than 30 days after the BIA’s October 24, 2008, order. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(2).

Section 1003.2(b)(2) requires a motion to reconsider to be filed within thirty days after the final agency decision.

Marihot v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2013-09-30(b)(2)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Marihot’s motion to reconsider as untimely because it was filed more than thirty days after the final agency decision. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(2).

The court upheld denial of a motion to reopen because the movant failed to submit material evidence supporting the assertions in his motion.

Singh v. Board of Immigration Appeals · filed 2006-08-01(c)(3)(ii)

The BIA also correctly observed that Singh failed to submit material evidence in support of the assertions made in his motion to reopen, and it reasonably denied Singh’s motion on this basis. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); cf. INS v. Jong Ha Wang, 450 U.S. 139,143, 101 S.Ct. 1027, 67 L.Ed.2d 123 (1981) (holding that court of appeals erred in overturning BIA’s denial of motion to reopen deportation proceeding in order to apply for suspension of deportation, where alien’s allegations were not supported by affidavit or evidentiary material).

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) allows reopening based on material evidence of changed country conditions, but evidence that does not rebut a prior adverse credibility finding may be immaterial.

Shqutaj v. Atty Gen USA · filed 2013-04-04(c)(3)(ii)

Furthermore, it is not unreasonable for the BIA to conclude that evidence submitted with a motion to reopen is not “material” where it does not rebut an adverse credibility finding.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) sets a ninety-day filing period for motions to reopen, but untimeliness is not jurisdictional because subsection (a) gives the BIA discretion to reopen or reconsider a case at any time; subsection (c)(1) requires qualifying previously unavailable evidence.

Recio-Prado v. Gonzales · filed 2006-08-02(c)(2), (a), and (c)(1)

He acknowledges that it was not timely filed. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2) (stating that a petitioner has ninety days following the final administrative decision in which to file a motion to reopen). We agree with Recio-Prado, however, that this is not a jurisdictional bar to relief. The regulations themselves grant the BIA discretion to reopen or reconsider "at any time" a case in which it has issued a decision. ... We doubt the plea transcript qualifies as evidence that "was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing," a condition necessary before the BIA may grant the motion to reopen.

The BIA may deny a motion to reopen in its discretion even when the movant has made a prima facie case, and the motion must be supported by affidavits or other evidentiary material.

Quintero v. U.S. Attorney General · filed 2008-07-29(a), (c)(1)

Moreover, the BIA “has discretion to deny a motion to reopen even if the moving party has made out a prima facie case for relief.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a) ... Although the Petitioners argue that Elsa was not required to produce “conclusive” proof of her prima facie eligibility for adjustment of status under the CAA, Elsa was, nonetheless, required to support her motion to reopen “by affidavits or other evidentiary material.” See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1).

Section 1003.2(a), together with subsection (c), permits the BIA to deny a motion to reopen when the movant failed to contest deportability on appeal and submitted no new evidence challenging the deportability determination.

Acosta-Ponce v. Mukasey · filed 2008-12-29(a)

The BIA acted within its discretion in denying Acosta-Ponce’s motion to reopen where he failed to contest his deport-ability on appeal to the BIA and submitted no new evidence calling the agency’s deportability determination into question. See 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.2(a), (c).

Section 1003.2(c)(1) permits reopening based on material new evidence that was unavailable at the removal hearing, while § 1003.2(c)(2) generally requires the motion to be filed within 90 days after the final administrative decision.

Cheng Xi Li v. U.S. Attorney General · filed 2009-01-15(c)(1), (c)(2)

Motions to reopen may be granted if there is new evidence that is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the removal hearing. See 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.2(c)(1), 1003.23(b)(3). The movant has the “heavy burden” of presenting evidence which would likely change the result in the case. Ali v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 443 F.3d 804, 813 (11th Cir. 2006). Ordinarily, a motion to reopen “must be filed no later than 90 days after the date on which the final administrative decision was rendered in the proceeding sought to be reopened.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2); INA § 240(c)(7)(C)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) requires a motion to reopen to be filed within 90 days after the final administrative decision, while subsection (a) gives the Board discretion to deny reopening even when the movant makes a prima facie case for relief.

Xue Fang Ou Yang v. U.S. Attorney General · filed 2009-03-13(c)(2), (a)

A motion to reopen must be filed no later than 90 days after the final administrative decision. ... Nonetheless, “[t]he Board has discretion to deny a motion to reopen even if the party moving has made out a prima facie case for relief.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a). ... Because the record here demonstrates that Ou Yang’s motion to reopen based on ineffective assistance of counsel was filed almost three and a half years after the statutory 90-day filing deadline expired, and equitable tolling does not apply to late filed ineffective assistance of counsel claims, we conclude that the BIA did not abuse its discretion by denying Ou Yang’s second motion to reopen.

Section 1003.2(a) leaves motions to reopen to the Board’s discretion, while subsection (c)(1) requires the movant to state new facts and offer material evidence that was previously unavailable; the court applied those requirements in upholding the denial.

Stenaj v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2011-07-08(a), (c)(1)

“The decision to grant or deny a motion to reopen . . . is within the discretion of the Board.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a). Accordingly, we review for abuse of discretion the BIA’s denial of a motion to reopen. ... A motion to reopen, accompanied by the appropriate application for relief, “shall state the new facts that will be proven” and “shall not be granted unless . . . th[e] evidence sought to be offered is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1). ... Stenaj has not provided any additional evidence to overcome the BIA’s findings. Indeed, she acknowledged that “[h]er claim is based on the same set of facts” as her mother’s. ... Accordingly, the BIA did not abuse its discretion when it concluded that Stenaj presented no new evidence supporting her theory of relief.

Section 1003.2(c)(1) permits reopening only when the party presents new material evidence unavailable at the original hearing, while section 1003.2(a) preserves the BIA's discretion to deny reopening even after a prima facie case for relief is shown.

Patel v. Holder · filed 2013-10-21(c)(1), (a)

A motion to reopen may be granted only if a party presents new material evidence unavailable at the time of the original hearing, 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1), and the BIA retains discretion to deny such a motion “even if the party moving has made out a prima facie case for relief,” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a).

Subsection (c)(1) requires new evidence supporting a motion to reopen to be material, previously unavailable, and likely to change the result; subsection (a) preserves the BIA’s discretion to deny reopening even when the movant makes a prima facie showing for relief.

Aguirre v. Garland · filed 2021-07-07(c)(1), (a)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying the petitioners’ motion to remand their case to the IJ to consider new evidence. New evidence presented in a motion to reopen must be material, must have been unavailable at the former hearing, and must be “likely [to] change the result in the case.” Shin v. Mukasey, 547 F.3d 1019, 1025 (9th Cir. 2008); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1). The BIA has “discretion to deny a motion to reopen even if the party moving has made out a prima facie case for relief.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a). The BIA reasonably concluded that the declaration from Gutierrez Aguirre’s mother concerning new threats from Los Sicarios was unlikely to change the outcome of the case because it did not strengthen the petitioners’ claims that their feared harm was on account of a protected ground.

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires a movant seeking reopening to submit the appropriate application for relief and all supporting documentation to establish eligibility.

Liu v. Gonzales · filed 2007-06-07(c)(1)

When a movant seeks to reopen for the purpose of submitting an application for relief, the movant must submit “the appropriate application for relief and all supporting documentation” in order to establish such eligibility. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1).

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires a motion to reopen filed to seek relief to include the appropriate relief application and all supporting documentation.

Conteh v. Gonzales · filed 2006-08-22(c)(1)

The regulations provide that "[a] motion to reopen proceedings for the purpose of submitting an application for relief must be accompanied by the appropriate application for relief and all supporting documentation." 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1). The petitioner's perfunctory submission to the BIA falls far short of satisfying this requirement.

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires a motion to reopen filed to submit an application for relief to include the appropriate application and all supporting documentation.

Kamal v. Gonzales · filed 2007-02-27(c)(1)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion by denying Ramal’s motion to reopen, because Ramal failed to submit an asylum application with her motion and the record did not contain a pending application. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1) (“A motion to reopen proceedings for the purpose of submitting an application for relief must be accompanied by the appropriate application for relief and all supporting documentation.”); see also Singh v. INS, 295 F.3d 1037, 1039 (9th Cir.2002) (The BIA’s denial of a motion to reopen shall be reversed only if it is “arbitrary, irrational or contrary to law.”).

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires a motion to reopen seeking adjustment of status to include the adjustment-of-status application.

Moreno v. Gonzales · filed 2007-03-16(c)(1)

Moreover, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in concluding that the petitioners failed to submit an adjustment of status application with their motion as required by 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1).