8 C.F.R. § 1003.2

Section 1003.2(c) sets a filing deadline for motions to reopen and provides an exception for qualifying changed country circumstances.

Wang v. Holder · filed 2009-09-03(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Wang’s motion to reopen as untimely because he filed it over two years after the BIA issued its final order, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and Wang failed to demonstrate changed circumstances in China to qualify for the regulatory exception to the time limit for filing motions to reopen, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); see also Malty v. Ashcroft, 381 F.3d 942, 945 (9th Cir.2004) (“The critical question is ... whether circumstances have changed sufficiently that a petitioner who previously did not have a legitimate claim for asylum now has a well-founded fear of future persecution.”).

A change in an applicant’s personal religious practice in the United States does not establish changed country conditions that excuse an untimely motion to reopen.

Zheng v. Holder · filed 2009-10-16(c)(3)(ii)

It is well-settled that a change in personal circumstances, such as Zheng’s confirmation as a Roman Catholic in the United States and his recent increased devotion to the faith, is not evidence of changed conditions in China.

An untimely motion to reopen must show changed country conditions through material, previously unavailable evidence to qualify for the exception to the 90-day deadline.

Chen v. Attorney General of the United States · filed 2009-12-07(c)(3)(ii)

Consequently, Chen was required to show changed country conditions based on material and previously unavailable evidence to overcome the untimeliness of her motion. ... Given the lack of evidence of changed conditions in China, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in concluding that Chen’s motion to reopen was time-barred.

A change in personal circumstances, such as conversion to Christianity, does not qualify for the exception to the time limit for motions to reopen based on changed country conditions.

Lin v. Holder · filed 2009-12-21(c)(3)(ii)

However, there is no time or numerical limitation where the alien establishes materially “changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). ... As the BIA found, Lin’s alleged conversion to Christianity was a change in his personal circumstances, not a change in country conditions.

Changed personal circumstances do not satisfy the changed country conditions exception for an untimely motion to reopen.

Xue Ming Tang v. Holder · filed 2010-01-21(c)(3)(ii)

Indeed, a review of the record reveals that the BIA reasonably considered the record evidence and properly found that reopening was not warranted because Tang’s motion was based not on changed country conditions in China, but on changed personal circumstances. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii).

A late motion to reopen may qualify for an exception to the time limit if the applicant establishes changed circumstances in the country of removal.

Mohammad v. Holder · filed 2010-03-24(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Mohammad’s motion to reopen as untimely where the motion was filed over two years after the BIA’s final decision, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and Mohammad failed to establish changed circumstances in Pakistan to qualify for the regulatory exception to the time limitation, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); see also Toufighi v. Mukasey, 538 F.3d 988, 996-97 (9th Cir. 2008) (underlying adverse credibility determination rendered evidence of changed circumstances immaterial).

A motion to reopen based on changed country conditions is exempt from the filing deadline when the changes arose after the previous hearing and support a viable claim of persecution.

Kaul v. Attorney General of United States · filed 2010-05-24(c)(3)(ii)

However, as the BIA noted, there is an exception to the time requirements for motions to reopen based on changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality since the previous hearing. ... Kaul did not explain why the civil unrest that occurred around the end of 2007 and beginning of 2008 would increase the likelihood that he would be singled out for persecution in Kenya.

Section 1003.2(c) sets a time limit for motions to reopen and provides an exception for changed circumstances in the applicant’s home country.

Escobar v. Holder Jr. · filed 2010-08-30(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Escobar’s motion to reopen as untimely because Escobar filed the motion over two years after the BIA’s final administrative decision, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and Escobar failed to establish changed circumstances in Guatemala to qualify for the regulatory exception to the time limitation, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); see also Najmabadi, 597 F.3d at 991 (substantial evidence supported BIA’s conclusion that evidence submitted with motion to reopen was not qualitatively different from the evidence presented at the original hearing).

Section 1003.2(c) sets a filing deadline for motions to reopen before the BIA and provides an exception for qualifying changed country circumstances.

Sandoval v. Holder · filed 2010-09-30(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Ruvalcaba-Sandoval’s motion to reopen as untimely where it was filed over one year after the BIA’s final order, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and Ruvalcaba-Sandoval failed to establish changed circumstances in Mexico to qualify for the regulatory exception to the time limitation, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); see also Toufighi v. Mukasey, 538 F.3d 988, 996 (9th Cir. 2008) (evidence must demonstrate prima facie eligibility for relief in order to reopen proceedings based on changed circumstances).

The time limit for a motion to reopen does not apply when material, previously unavailable evidence shows changed country conditions; the birth of children in the United States changes personal circumstances, not country conditions.

Lin v. Attorney General of the United States · filed 2010-10-13(c)(3)(ii)

In sum, the BIA properly concluded that petitioners have not shown changed circumstances in China to satisfy the exception to the time limitation for filing a motion to reopen. 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.2(c)(2), (3)(ii).

The changed-country-conditions exception to the time limit for a motion to reopen does not cover a change in the applicant’s personal circumstances, such as the birth of children in the United States.

He Yun Chen v. Holder · filed 2010-10-19(c)(3)(ii)

The agency reasonably found that Chen’s motion did not qualify for any exception to the time limitations. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). It is well-settled that a change in personal circumstances, such as the birth of Chen’s two U.S. citizen children, is not evidence of changed conditions in China.

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) permits an untimely motion to reopen based on material, previously unavailable evidence of changed country conditions when the applicant makes a prima facie case for relief.

Barrie v. Atty Gen USA · filed 2010-11-29(c)(3)(ii)

We express no opinion as to whether Barrie ultimately will be successful, but we hold that the evidence he presented makes out a prima facie case sufficient to warrant reopening of the removal proceedings.

Section 1003.2(c) treats a motion to reopen filed more than one year after the final removal order as untimely unless the movant demonstrates changed country conditions.

Curin-Franco v. Holder · filed 2011-01-06(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Curin-Franco’s motion to reopen as untimely because he filed it more than one year after the BIA’s final removal order, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and Curin-Franco failed to demonstrate changed country conditions to qualify for the regulatory exception to the time limit for filing motions to reopen, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); see also He, 501 F.3d at 1132 (changed personal circumstances insufficient to support an untimely motion to reopen).

Section 1003.2(c) sets a time limit for motions to reopen and allows an exception when the movant establishes changed country circumstances.

Avetisyan v. Holder Jr. · filed 2011-03-09(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Avetisyan’s motion to reopen as untimely where the motion was filed over two years after the BIA’s final decision, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and Avetisyan failed to establish changed circumstances in Armenia or Georgia to qualify for the regulatory exception to the time limitation, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); see also Toufighi v. Mukasey, 538 F.3d 988, 996 (9th Cir. 2008) (requiring movant to produce material evidence with motion to reopen that conditions in country of nationality had changed).

The exception to the time limit for a motion to reopen requires the movant to establish changed circumstances in the country of nationality.

Dhanoya v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2011-03-09(c)(3)(ii)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Dhanoya’s motion to reopen as untimely where the motion was filed over five years after the BIA’s final decision, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and Dhanoya failed to establish changed circumstances in India to qualify for the regulatory exception to the time limitation, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); see also Toufighi v. Mukasey, 538 F.3d 988, 996 (9th Cir. 2008) (requiring movant to produce material evidence with motion to reopen that conditions in country of nationality had changed).

A motion to reopen filed after the time limit requires evidence of changed conditions in the applicant’s country of nationality to qualify for the regulatory exception.

Kaur v. Holder Jr. · filed 2011-04-14(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Kaur’s motion to reopen as untimely where the motion was filed more than a year after the BIA’s final decision, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and Kaur failed to establish changed circumstances in India to qualify for the regulatory exception to the time limitation, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); see also Toufighi v. Mukasey, 538 F.3d 988, 996 (9th Cir. 2008) (requiring movant to produce material evidence with motion to reopen that conditions in country of nationality had changed).

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) allows the BIA to consider an otherwise late motion to reopen based on changed country conditions.

Tanzil v. Atty Gen USA · filed 2011-05-04(c)(3)(ii)

Inasmuch as Tanzil limited his arguments to ―changed circumstances‖ arising in Indonesia, the BIA could and did still entertain the motions. See id. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii).

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) exempts motions to reopen based on material changed country conditions from time and number limits; a self-induced change in personal circumstances does not qualify.

Chun v. Holder · filed 2011-07-19(c)(3)(ii)

However, the time and number limitations do not apply to a motion to reopen if it is “based on changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality or in the country to which deportation has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the previous hearing.” ... As the BIA noted, Chun’s Falun Gong activities, which he commenced in the United States in 2008, reflect a self-induced change in personal circumstances, and therefore do not exempt his motion from the applicable bars.

An untimely motion to reopen seeking asylum or withholding may proceed based on material, previously unavailable evidence of changed conditions in the country of nationality or the country to which removal was ordered.

Gyamtso v. Atty Gen USA · filed 2011-08-01(c)(3)(ii)

However, the Board does not appear to have reviewed Gyamtso’s motion pursuant to the requirements of that regulation. Instead, for reasons which are unclear, the Board analyzed whether the evidence that Gyamtso’s presented with his motion demonstrated changed conditions in China, rather than in India, the country to which he was ordered removed.

Evidence of changed country conditions can support a motion to reopen despite the usual time and number limits.

Lin v. Mukasey · filed 2008-04-29(c)(3)(ii)

Although reporting sources continue to reflect the Chinese government’s policy prohibiting forcible sterilizations, the 2006 Country Report, coupled with Lin’s affidavit recounting her father’s assertions of several forced sterilizations, evidence the type of change in country conditions necessary to support reopening.

A late motion to reopen based on changed country conditions may be denied if the movant fails to show a reasonable likelihood of obtaining the underlying relief.

Giraldo-Pabon v. Lynch · filed 2016-10-21(c)(3)(ii)

Two related but distinct questions are on the table when an untimely motion to reopen has been filed: first, whether the petitioner has presented sufficient evidence of changed country conditions to permit her to file a tardy motion to reopen; and second, whether the new evidence that the petitioner has presented, together with evidence already in the record, shows that she has a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on her asylum, withholding of removal, or CAT claims. ... The agency may deny a petition if it determines that the movant has failed to meet either of those requirements.

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) allows a motion to reopen based on changed country conditions despite the usual time and number limits when the required showing is made.

Djokro v. Garland · filed 2024-05-17(c)(3)(ii)

We deny this petition seeking review of the BIA's second denial of reopening because the BIA reasonably concluded that petitioners had failed to satisfy the requirements for an exception to late filing contained in 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii) and 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii).

A motion to reopen based on changed country circumstances is exempt from the 90-day filing limit.

Sandoval v. U.S. Attorney General · filed 2007-07-03(c)(3)(ii)

The motion alleged scant evidence of changed country circumstances that would warrant an exception to the 90-day time limit.

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) exempts a motion to reopen from time and numerical limits when it establishes materially changed country conditions; changes in personal circumstances do not qualify.

Jiang v. Holder · filed 2011-02-07(c)(3)(ii)

Therefore, the changes in their lives which they alleged made them vulnerable to future persecution constituted only a change in personal circumstances which did not exempt their motion from the applicable bars.

The time limit for a motion to reopen does not apply when material, previously unavailable evidence shows changed country conditions; a change in personal circumstances alone does not qualify.

Yang v. Holder · filed 2012-04-11(c)(3)(ii)

Accordingly, because substantial evidence supports the BIA’s conclusion that Yang failed to establish a material change in conditions in China, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying her motion to reopen as untimely. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii).

Section 1003.2(c) sets a time limit for motions to reopen and provides an exception for changed circumstances in the country of removal.

Xu v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2012-04-23(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Xu’s motion to reopen as untimely where the motion was filed a year and a half after the BIA’s final decision, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and Xu failed to demonstrate changed circumstances in China to qualify for the regulatory exception to the time limit, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); Najmabadi v. Holder, 597 F.3d 983, 988-89 (9th Cir. 2010); see also Toufighi, 538 F.3d at 996-97.

The exception to the time and number limits for motions to reopen requires changed country conditions; a change in the applicant’s personal circumstances does not qualify.

Chen v. Holder · filed 2012-05-29(c)(3)(ii)

However, the time and number limitations do not apply to a motion to reopen if it is “based on changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality or in the country to which deportation has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available and could not have discovered or presented at the previous hearing.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii). As the IJ found, Chen’s practice of Falun Gong in the United States is a change in his personal circumstances, not a change in country conditions.

The time limit for a BIA motion to reopen has an exception for changed circumstances in the country of nationality; a change in personal circumstances does not qualify.

Reynald v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2012-07-09(c)(3)(ii)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Reynald’s motion to reopen as untimely where it was filed over three years after the BIA’s final order, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and Reynald failed to establish changed circumstances in Indonesia to qualify for the regulatory exception to the time limitation, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); Najmabadi, 597 F.3d at 987 (evidence submitted with motion to reopen must be qualitatively different from the evidence presented at the original hearing); He v. Gonzales, 501 F.3d 1128, 1132 (9th Cir. 2007) (change in personal circumstances does not establish changed circumstances in country of nationality).

Section 1003.2(c) sets a filing deadline for motions to reopen and allows an exception for qualifying changed circumstances in the country of removal.

Singh v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2012-09-14(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Singh’s motion to reopen as untimely where the motion was filed over three years after the BIA’s final order, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and Singh failed to present sufficient evidence of changed circumstances in India to qualify for the regulatory exception to the time limit for filing motions to reopen, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); Najmabadi v. Holder, 597 F.3d 983, 987-90 (9th Cir. 2010); Toufighi, 538 F.3d at 996-97 (underlying adverse credibility determination rendered evidence of changed circumstances immaterial).

Section 1003.2(c) sets a time limit for motions to reopen and provides an exception when the movant demonstrates changed circumstances in the country of nationality.

Uppal v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2012-09-18(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioners’ motion to reopen as untimely because the motion was filed almost five years after the BIA’s final administrative order, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and petitioners failed to demonstrate changed circumstances in India to qualify for the regulatory exception to the time limitation, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); see also Toufighi, 538 F.3d at 996 (requiring movant to produce material evidence with motion to reopen that conditions in country of nationality had changed).

A change in an applicant’s personal circumstances does not qualify for the changed country conditions exception to the time limit for a motion to reopen.

Chen v. Holder · filed 2012-09-27(c)(3)(ii)

To the extent Chen contends that the time limitation does not apply to her motion to reopen because her motion is “based on changed circumstances arising in” China, 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii), her arguments are unpersuasive. ... However, as the BIA found, her membership in the CCCR was a change in personal circumstances, not a change in country conditions.

An untimely motion to reopen may qualify for the changed country conditions exception when the movant establishes changed circumstances in the country of removal.

Samra v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2012-10-12(c)(3)(ii)

With respect to police abuses, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Samra’s untimely motion to reopen because he did not establish changed circumstances in India to qualify for the regulatory exception to the time limit.

The changed country conditions exception to the time and number limits for motions to reopen does not cover a change in the applicant’s personal circumstances.

Zheng v. Holder · filed 2012-12-04(c)(3)(ii)

However, the time and number limitations for filing a motion to reopen do not apply if the motion is “based on changed country conditions arising in the country of nationality or the country to which removal has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available and would not have been discovered or presented at the previous proceeding[s].” 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); see also 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). ... Zheng’s decision to begin practicing Christianity in the United States constitutes a self-induced change in personal circumstances that did not merit an exception to the time and number bars applicable to motions to reopen.

Slight fluctuations in persistent persecution do not establish changed country circumstances that excuse the deadline for a motion to reopen.

Zhao-Cheng v. Holder · filed 2013-08-01(c)(3)(ii)

Importantly, as the BIA observed, what this statement demonstrates is that slight temporal fluctuation in the level of ever-prevailing persecution is, itself, a continuing circumstance -- not a "changed circumstance[]" as required by the regulation.

A motion to reopen filed after the time limit may qualify for an exception if sufficient evidence shows changed circumstances in the country of removal.

Deepak v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2013-09-30(c)(3)(ii)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion by denying Deepak’s motion to reopen as untimely where the motion was filed more than seven years after the BIA’s final order, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and Deepak failed to present sufficient evidence of changed circumstances in India to qualify for the regulatory exception to the time limit for filing motions to reopen, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); see also Malty, 381 F.3d at 945 (“The critical question is . . . whether circumstances have changed sufficiently that a petitioner who previously did not have a legitimate claim for asylum now has a well-founded fear of persecution.”) Deepak’s contention that the BIA failed to consider all the evidence he presented with the motion to reopen is not supported by the record.

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) exempts a motion to reopen from time and number limits when material, previously unavailable evidence shows changed country conditions.

Lu v. Holder · filed 2014-01-09(c)(3)(ii)

There are no time and numerical limitations for filing a motion to reopen if it is “based on changed country conditions arising in the country of nationality or the country to which removal has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available and would not have been discovered or presented at the previous proceeding.” 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). ... Accordingly, the BIA did not err in finding that Lu failed to demonstrate material changed country conditions excusing the untimely and number-barred filing of his motion.

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) provides an exception to the time and number limits for motions to reopen based on changed country conditions, but the movant must show that the exception applies.

Cun-Luc v. Lynch · filed 2016-02-25(c)(3)(ii)

While there is a changed- country-conditions exception to the filing deadline and numerical limitation for motions to reopen, see 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(7)(A), (C)(ii); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(i)-(ii), 1003.23(b)(4)(i), we agree with the BIA that Cun-Luc failed to show he qualified for the exception, see Zhong Qin Zheng v. Mukasey, 523 F.3d 893, 895-96 (8th Cir. 2008) (discussing exception).

An untimely motion to reopen may be denied when the applicant fails to establish materially changed circumstances in the country of removal.

Deny Arianto v. Lynch · filed 2016-06-22(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Arianto’s motion to reopen as untimely, where he filed it more than two years after his final order of removal, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and he failed to establish materially changed circumstances in Indonesia to overcome the regulatory time limitation for filing a motion to reopen, see 8 C.F.R. §1003.2(c)(3)(ii); Najmabadi, 597 F.3d at 987-90 (evidence must be “qualitatively different” to warrant reopening).

An untimely motion to reopen requires a showing of materially changed country conditions to qualify for the filing deadline exception.

Cap v. Lynch · filed 2016-06-23(c)(3)(ii)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion by denying Cap’s motion to reopen as untimely, where the motion was filed more than a year after his final administrative order of removal, and Cap failed to demonstrate materially changed country conditions in Guatemala to qualify for the regulatory exception to the filing deadline.

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) allows an untimely motion to reopen when the movant shows material changed circumstances in the country of removal.

Kumar v. Lynch · filed 2016-11-01(c)(3)(ii)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Kumar’s motion to reopen as untimely where the motion was filed over two years after the BIA’s final order, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and Kumar failed to demonstrate material changed circumstances in India to qualify for a regulatory exception to the time limitations for filing a motion to reopen, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); Najmabadi, 597 F.3d at 991-92 (evidence must be “qualitatively different” to warrant reopening).

An untimely motion to reopen to seek asylum may proceed when material, previously unavailable evidence shows changed country conditions.

Lin v. Sessions · filed 2018-07-10(c)(3)(ii)

Accordingly, Lin did not meet her burden of showing a material change as needed to excuse her untimely filing.

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) permits an otherwise untimely motion to reopen based on changed country conditions; evidence that conditions merely continued does not qualify.

Wanjiku v. Barr · filed 2019-03-15(c)(3)(ii)

"Crucially, this evidence must demonstrate the intensification or deterioration of country conditions, not their mere continuation."

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) requires a material change in country conditions to excuse an untimely motion to reopen; continuing widespread gang violence does not establish such a change.

Raymundo v. Barr · filed 2020-08-07(c)(3)(ii)

The record does not suggest a material change in country conditions in El Salvador particular to Raymundo or his family, but rather a continuation of longstanding gang violence afflicting much of Salvadoran society.

The changed-country-conditions exception to the time and number limits for motions to reopen requires a material change relevant to the applicant’s claim.

Jado v. Wilkinson · filed 2021-02-24(c)(3)(ii)

Thus, he has not met the requirements for the time- and number-bar exception based on changed country conditions under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2).

The exception to the motion-to-reopen deadline requires a showing of changed country conditions.

Reyes-Casanova v. Garland · filed 2021-06-10(c)(3)(ii)

In addition, the BIA did not err in finding that Petitioner’s motion to reopen does not fit within the timeliness exception set out in 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii).

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) allows an untimely motion to reopen based on changed country conditions, including changes personal to the applicant that occurred in that country beyond her control.

Kaur v. Garland · filed 2021-06-21(c)(3)(ii)

Kaur must therefore show changed country circumstances for the BIA to consider her claims. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); see also 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). ... The He ... and Najmabadi principle cannot apply rigidly when changed circumstances in the country of origin, while personal to the petitioner, are entirely outside her control.

A motion to reopen filed after 90 days may proceed based on changed country conditions if supported by material evidence that was previously unavailable.

Nsai v. Garland · filed 2021-07-29(c)(3)(ii)

A petitioner may file a motion to reopen beyond the 90-day limitations period if the motion is based on changed country conditions and the petitioner submits “new facts” supported by “material” evidence that was unavailable or undiscoverable at the prior proceeding. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1)-(3); 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7).

The changed country conditions exception requires a person filing an untimely motion to reopen to establish changed conditions in the country of removal.

Stephen v. Garland · filed 2022-03-10(c)(3)(ii)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Stephen’s motion to reopen as untimely because it was filed more than one year after the order of removal be- came final and Stephen failed to establish changed country conditions in Iraq to qualify for the regulatory exception to the time limitation for filing a motion to reo- pen. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), (3)(ii); Najmabadi, 597 F.3d at 990–91.

A movant seeking reopening under the changed country conditions exception must establish prima facie eligibility for relief.

Alvarez v. Garland · filed 2022-07-20(c)(3)(ii)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Moraga Alvarez’s second motion to reopen as untimely and number-barred, where it was filed eleven years after the order of removal became final and Moraga Alvarez has not established prima facie eligibility for relief to qualify for the regulatory exception to the filing deadline.

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) allows an untimely motion to reopen based on changed country conditions when the petitioner shows a relevant change since the original hearing.

COREAS-SEGOVIA V. MERRICK GARLAND · filed 2022-12-22(c)(3)(ii)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Coreas-Segovia’s motion to reopen as untimely because it was filed more than a year after the agency’s final order, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and Coreas-Segovia failed to demonstrate changed circumstances in El Salvador to qualify for the exception to the time limitation for motions to reopen, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii).

A motion to reopen based on changed country conditions requires material evidence unavailable at the prior hearing; evidence repeating conditions already in the record does not qualify.

Portillo-Portillo v. Bondi · filed 2025-07-10(c)(3)(ii)

The evidence Portillo submitted—a single country report describing generalized violence and governmental corruption in El Salvador—does not establish materially changed conditions.

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) permits an otherwise time- and number-barred motion to reopen based on material, previously unavailable changed country conditions, but a new personal circumstance in the United States or continuing conditions in the country do not satisfy that exception.

Chen v. Holder · filed 2013-03-19(c)(3)(ii)

Here, the BIA did not err in finding that Chen failed to establish such circumstances based on his newly commenced practice of Christianity in the United States. ... Moreover, the BIA did not err in finding that Chen failed to establish a material change in conditions in China. It was reasonable for the BIA to conclude that the 2009 and 2010 reports submitted by Chen merely reflected a continuation of, and not a change in, China’s long-standing oppression of unsanctioned religious groups. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); see also 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii).

Section 1003.2(c)(1) permits the BIA to grant reopening when the petitioner presents new, material evidence that was unavailable and could not have been discovered or presented at the removal hearing.

Adeniye v. U.S. Attorney General · filed 2017-12-12(c)(1)

The BIA may grant a motion to reopen if the petitioner presents new, material evidence that was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the removal hearing. See 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.2(c)(1), 1003.23(b)(3); Verano-Velasco v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 456 F.3d 1372, 1376-77 (11th Cir. 2006).

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires a motion to reopen based on new evidence to present material evidence that was unavailable and undiscoverable at the prior hearing and to establish a prima facie case for relief.

Posada-Martinez v. Attorney General of the United States · filed 2012-04-18(c)(1)

A motion to remand based on new evidence is treated as a motion to reopen the record. ... Therefore, the alien must show that the “evidence sought to be offered is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing,” and the alien must establish a prima facie case for the relief sought. ... (quoting 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1)).

Section 1003.2(c)(1) permits the BIA to evaluate evidence submitted with a motion to reopen to determine whether the movant has established prima facie eligibility for relief.

Ni v. Garland · filed 2024-11-19(c)(1)

However, that regulation is about the BIA’s review of an immigration judge’s decision, and the BIA is permitted to evaluate evidence submitted with a motion to reopen to determine whether the movant has established prima facie eligibility for relief. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1); INS v. Abudu, 485 U.S. 94, 104 (1988).

A motion to reopen must include the application for relief and supporting documents, but a prima facie showing of eligibility is sufficient to justify reopening.

Tadevosyan v. Eric H. Holder, Jr. · filed 2014-02-26(c)(1)

Further, the BIA did not mention, and made no attempt to apply, the motion to reopen standard, which requires only establishment of “prima facie eligibility for the relief sought.” See Young Sun Shin v. Mukasey, 547 F.3d 1019, 1025 (9th Cir. 2008) (citing 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1)).

Section 1003.2(a) requires a request to reopen removal proceedings to present new evidence to be made to the BIA in a written motion to reopen.

Ferreira-Castillo v. U.S. Attorney General · filed 2011-04-04(a)

Rather, a request to reopen the removal proceedings for the presentation of new evidence must be made to the BIA in the form of a written motion to reopen. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7), 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a).

Section 1003.2(a) gives the BIA discretion to deny a motion to reopen even when the movant has established a prima facie case for relief.

Huang v. Attorney General · filed 2011-04-07(a)

Such showing notwithstanding, the BIA “has discretion to deny a motion to reopen even if the party moving has made out a prima facie case for relief.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a).

In this unpublished disposition, the court treated a motion to reopen filed four years after the Board’s decision as untimely and cited subsection (b).

Gonzalez-Varela v. Mukasey · filed 2008-01-10(b)

A review of the record reflects that the BIA entered its final decision on March 28, 2003, and accordingly any motion to reopen or to reconsider would have been due on or before April 28, 2003. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b). In this case, petitioner filed his motion to reopen on April 5, 2007.

Section 1003.2(d)'s departure bar prevents the BIA from exercising jurisdiction to sua sponte reopen removal proceedings after the alien's departure.

Lara-Amaya v. Lynch · filed 2016-10-11(d)

The IJ and the BIA did not err in concluding that the agency lacked jurisdiction to sua sponte reopen Lara-Amaya’s removal proceedings in light of the departure bar of § 1003.2(d) and § 1003.23(b)(1).

A motion to reopen based on changed country conditions requires a showing of material change.

Corona v. Bondi · filed 2026-02-18(c)(3)(ii)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in concluding that Petitioners failed to demonstrate a material change in country conditions that warranted reopening.

A late motion to reopen must show changed country conditions giving rise to a fear of future persecution or torture; evidence corroborating past persecution is immaterial.

Lena v. Department of Homeland Security · filed 2007-03-14(c)(3)

Initially, there is no dispute that Lena’s motion to reopen was filed beyond the ninety-day deadline. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3). As such, to prevail on her late-filed motion, Lena was required to demonstrate changed conditions in Albania giving rise to a fear of future persecution or torture. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(e)(3)(ii). Accordingly, the BIA properly declined to address the evidence she submitted to corroborate her past persecution claim, as it was immaterial.

Section 1003.2(c) provides a procedure for asking the BIA to reopen a case based on changed country conditions.

Tarwadi v. United States Department of Justice · filed 2009-01-08(c)

To the extent that Tarwadi is arguing that she warrants relief based on changed circumstances in Kenya, that argument is more appropriately raised in a separate motion to reopen filed directly with the BIA rather than in a petition for review in this Court. See id.; 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c).

The birth of a U.S. citizen child is a change in personal circumstances, not a change in country conditions that excuses an untimely motion to reopen.

Wang v. Holder · filed 2010-01-07(c)(3)(ii)

While the births of her U.S. citizen children may constitute a change in personal circumstances, they do not constitute a change in country conditions.

A motion to reopen based on material, previously unavailable evidence of changed country conditions is exempt from the 90-day deadline, and the BIA must adequately consider the supporting evidence.

Zheng v. Atty Gen USA · filed 2008-11-26(c)(3)(ii)

Although a motion to reopen “must be filed no later than 90 days after the date on which the final administrative decision was rendered in the proceeding sought to be reopened,” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), the 90-day limitation does not apply if the movant seeks reopening “based on changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality or in the country to which deportation has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the previous hearing.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). ... Given the BIA’s failure to discuss most of the evidentiary record in Zheng’s case, as well as the conclusions that the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reached in Li concerning at least some of the documents in this case, we will vacate the BIA’s denial of Zheng’s second motion to reopen his case and remand the matter to the BIA for further proceedings.

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) provides an exception to the filing deadline for a motion to reopen that demonstrates changed country conditions.

Zhengbin He v. Holder · filed 2010-07-19(c)(3)(ii)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying He’s motion as untimely because He filed it more than a year after the BIA’s order dismissing the underlying appeal, see 8 C.F.R. §§1003.2(b)(2) & (c)(2), and the motion failed to demonstrate changed country conditions in China to qualify for the regulatory exception to the filing deadline, see id. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii).

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) permits reopening based on changed country conditions; political activities undertaken in the United States are a change in personal circumstances.

Wang v. Holder · filed 2010-10-18(c)(3)(ii)

The BIA reasonably found that Yang’s pro-democracy activities in the United States constituted a change in personal circumstances, not a change in country conditions.

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) permits a late motion to reopen based on changed country conditions; a change in the applicant’s personal circumstances does not qualify.

Yang v. United States Department of Justice · filed 2010-10-18(c)(3)(ii)

The 90-day filing deadline may be excused if the alien can establish “changed country conditions arising in the country of nationality.” 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). ... The BIA reasonably found that Yang’s pro-democracy activities in the United States constituted a change in personal circumstances, not a change in country conditions.

A motion to reopen filed after the deadline may proceed on evidence of materially changed country conditions that was previously unavailable.

Sindicue-Herrera v. Attorney General of the United States · filed 2011-10-25(c)(3)(ii)

We also conclude that the BIA did not abuse its discretion in rejecting Sindicue- Herrera‟s allegations of changed country conditions in Colombia.

A motion to reopen based on changed country conditions requires new evidence; letters chiefly describing earlier events do not satisfy that requirement.

Ciu v. Holder · filed 2011-04-15(c)(3)(ii)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in finding that letters from petitioners’ family members were not new evidence because the letters primarily discussed events during the 1998 riots and, to the extent the letters refer to other incidents, the statements did not contain dates or any other specific details.

A motion to reopen filed after the deadline must show materially changed country conditions to qualify for the regulatory exception.

Bermudez v. Lynch · filed 2016-03-23(c)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion by denying petitioners’ motion to reopen as untimely, where the motion was filed more than seven years after the BIA’s final order, and petitioners failed to demonstrate materially changed country conditions in Mexico to qualify for the regulatory exception to the filing deadline.

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) allows a motion to reopen after 90 days based on changed country conditions supported by new, material evidence that was unavailable at the prior proceeding.

Portillo v. Whitaker · filed 2019-01-18(c)(3)(ii)

A petitioner may file a motion to reopen beyond the 90-day limitations period if the motion is based on changed country conditions and the petitioner submits “new facts” supported by “material” evidence that was unavailable or undiscoverable at the prior proceeding.

An untimely motion to reopen based on changed country conditions requires a material change relevant to the applicant’s claimed fear of persecution.

Enoh v. Barr · filed 2020-01-03(c)(2), (3)

It is undisputed that Enoh’s motion was untimely, as it was filed more than 90 days after his final order of removal. Therefore, to justify a reopening of his asylum application, he must show a change in conditions in Cameroon material to his fear of religious persecution. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i), (ii); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), (3). The BIA did not abuse its discretion because Enoh failed to show such a material change in conditions.

The Board must explain a finding that evidence of changed country conditions is inherently unbelievable before rejecting it on a motion to reopen.

Zhu v. Barr · filed 2020-10-07(c)(3)(ii)

If the BIA regards evidence of the sharp uptick in China’s repression of pro-democracy activists like Zhu as “inherently unbelievable,” it must articulate this conclusion.

A motion to reopen based on changed country conditions must present material evidence that addresses the deficiencies that led to the earlier denial of relief.

Darby v. Attorney General United States · filed 2021-06-17(c)(3)(ii)

Materiality thus requires, at a minimum, that an applicant’s evidence in a motion to reopen address the deficiencies of the initial application.

A motion to reopen filed after 90 days may proceed based on changed country conditions if supported by new, material evidence that was unavailable at the prior proceeding.

Portillo v. Garland · filed 2021-06-21(c)(1)-(3)

A petitioner may file a motion to reopen beyond the 90-day limitations period if the motion is based on changed country conditions and the petitioner submits “new facts” supported by “material” evidence that was unavailable or undiscoverable at the prior proceeding.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) bars a motion to reopen filed more than 90 days after the final administrative decision or after a second motion, while § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) provides an exception for a motion based on material, previously unavailable changed country conditions; the court upheld denial because the evidence did not establish that exception.

Martines-Castaneda v. Lynch · filed 2016-12-15(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

An alien seeking to reopen proceedings may file one motion to reopen no later than 90 days after the date on which the final administrative decision was rendered in the proceeding that the alien seeks to reopen. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A), (C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). ... The time and number limitations do not apply, however, if the motion to reopen is filed in order to apply for asylum or withholding of removal and “is based on changed country conditions arising in the country of nationality or the country to which removal has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available and would not have been discovered or presented at the previous proceeding.” 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); see also 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). ... Otherwise, substantial evidence supports the BIA’s determination that Martines-Castaneda failed to show that changed conditions in El Salvador were material to his claims for asylum or withholding of removal. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); Jian Hui Shao, 546 F.3d at 169.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) treats a motion to reopen filed more than 14 years after the IJ’s final order of removal as untimely.

Fragoso-Gonzalez v. Lynch · filed 2016-10-04(c)(2)

The agency did not abuse its discretion in denying Fragoso-Gonzalez’s motion to reopen as untimely, where the motion was filed more than 14 years after the IJ’s final order of removal, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and Fragoso-Gonzalez failed to establish the due diligence required for equitable tolling of the filing deadline, see Avagyan, 646 F.3d at 679 (equitable tolling is available to an alien who is prevented from timely filing a motion to reopen due to deception, fraud, or error, as long as petitioner exercises due diligence in discovering such circumstances).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) makes a motion to reopen untimely when it is filed over eleven months after the Board of Immigration Appeals’ final order.

Soriano v. Lynch · filed 2016-12-20(c)(2)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Mejia Soriano’s motion to reopen as untimely where the motion was filed over eleven months after the BIA’s final order, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and Mejia Soriano failed to demonstrate material changed circumstances in El Salvador to qualify for a regulatory exception to the time limitations for filing a motion to reopen, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); Najmabadi, 597 F.3d at 991-92 (evidence must be “qualitatively different” to warrant reopening).

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires a motion to reopen to state the facts to be proven and include affidavits or other evidentiary material.

Bbale v. Lynch · filed 2016-10-24(c)(1)

The alien's motion "shall state the new facts that will be proven at a hearing to be held if the motion is granted and shall be supported by affidavits or other evidentiary material." 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1). ... For the most part, the petitioner failed to support his motion with the requisite "affidavits or other evidentiary material." 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1).

A motion to remand based on new evidence is treated as a motion to reopen, which may not be granted unless the evidence is material and was unavailable and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing.

Chen v. U.S. Attorney General · filed 2016-11-29(c)(1)

We treat motions to remand based on new evidence as motions to reopen, Ali v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 643 F.3d 1324, 1329 (11th Cir. 2011), which “shall not be granted unless . . . [the] evidence sought to be offered is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing,” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1).

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires the BIA to deny reopening unless the new evidence is material and was unavailable and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing.

Rommell Fernando Rodriguez Barajas v. U.S. Attorney General · filed 2016-11-28(c)(1)

Under the applicable regulations, the BIA must not grant a motion to reopen unless the new evidence “is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing . . . .” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1).

A motion to reconsider must identify specific errors of fact or law in the prior Board decision and be supported by pertinent authority.

Verbejus v. Atty Gen USA · filed 2005-06-15(b)(1)

A motion to reconsider, governed by 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1), requires an applicant to “specify[] the errors of fact or law in the prior Board decision and shall be supported by pertinent authority.”

Section 1003.2(b)(1) requires a motion to reconsider to identify errors of law or fact in the BIA’s prior decision.

Vaziri v. Attorney General of the United States · filed 2006-10-11(b)(1)

Under the language of 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1), a motion for reconsideration is used to challenge determinations of law and fact in the BIA’s prior decision.

A motion to reconsider must specify an error of fact or law in the Board’s prior decision.

Bikim v. Mukasey · filed 2008-09-23(b)(1)

A motion for reconsideration asserts that the Board made an error in its earlier decision, Turri v. INS, 997 F.2d 1306, 1311 n.4 (10th Cir. 1993), and requires the movant to specify the error of fact or law in the prior Board decision.

A motion to reconsider must identify errors of fact or law in the BIA’s decision and be supported by pertinent authority.

Shao v. Mukasey · filed 2008-10-10(b)

A motion to reconsider must specify errors of fact or law in the challenged BIA decision and must be supported by pertinent authority.

A motion to reconsider must identify specific errors of fact or law in the challenged BIA decision.

Zeng Xi Chen v. Holder · filed 2009-06-08(b)(2)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Chen’s motion to reconsider, because Chen failed to identify specific errors of fact or law in the BIA’s order denying his underlying motion to reopen.

A motion to reconsider before the BIA must specify errors of law or fact in its prior decision.

Turnbo v. Attorney General United States · filed 2017-04-11(b)(1)

The motion did not conform to the requirements of 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2 (b)(1), as it did not specify any errors of law or fact in the April 27, 2016 BIA decision.

When jurisdiction has vested with the Board, an application for adjustment of status first requires the Board to reopen the proceedings.

Watson v. Qiu · filed 2014-02-05(a)

Such an application, however, first required the Board to reopen his proceedings, inasmuch as jurisdiction had vested with the Board (the Board having ruled on Watson’s appeal as well as on six prior motions to reopen). See 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.2(a), 1003.23(b)(1).

An alien moving to reopen bears the burden of proving eligibility for the requested relief.

Cordero-Guerra v. Attorney General of the United States · filed 2017-11-16(c)

In proving that notice was ineffective, it is the alien who bears the burden of production and proof. See Pllumi v. Att’y Gen., 642 F.3d 155, 161 (3d Cir. 2011) (citing 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)) (“The burden of proof on a motion to reopen is on the alien to establish eligibility for the requested relief.”).

Section 1003.2(c)(1) permits reopening to consider section 212(c) relief when the alien was statutorily eligible before the final deportation order.

Maxwell v. Immigration & Naturalization Service · filed 2004-08-20(c)(1)

this Court finds that the following agency regulation addressing motions to reopen, in precisely the circumstances raised by this case, supports statutory eligibility for Mr. Maxwell: ... 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1); ... Given this pertinent and persuasive regulation, the Court finds that AEDPA and IIRIRA do not retroactively revoke Mr. Maxwell’s 212(c) eligibility.

Section 1003.2(c)(1) permits the BIA to deny reopening when an alien previously had an opportunity to seek discretionary relief and the only subsequent change is adverse precedent.

Obioha v. Alberto R. Gonzales, Attorney General · filed 2005-12-08(c)(1)

Therefore, where the regulations direct that reopening should not be granted when an alien has neglected her opportunity to pursue relief, it is not unreasonable for the BIA to deny reopening where the only change in the circumstances is intervening adverse precedent.

A motion to reopen before the BIA must be filed within 90 days of the administrative decision.

Li v. Gonzales · filed 2006-06-08(c)(2)

A motion to reopen must be filed within 90 days after the date of the administrative decision being challenged. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). In this case, Li filed his motion to reopen eleven months after the BIA’s affirmance of the IJ’s decision.

A motion relying on new facts that were absent from the record when the BIA made its prior decision may be treated as a motion to reopen rather than a motion to reconsider.

Roberto Nicolas Visbal Guerra v. U.S. Atty. Gen. · filed 2006-10-18(b)(1), (c)(1)

To the extent that the petitioners relied upon new facts that were not in the record at the time the BIA denied their motion to reopen, the BIA correctly followed its own case law and regulations in construing their motion as a motion to reopen.

Section 1003.2(c) sets a 90-day deadline for motions to reopen and provides an exception for material changes in circumstances in the country of removal.

Perez v. Gonzales · filed 2006-12-29(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioner’s motion to reopen as untimely, because he did not file the motion within 90 days of the BIA’s final order of removal, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and did not demonstrate a material change in circumstances in Mexico, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii).

A motion to reopen must be filed within 90 days of the final administrative decision.

Ricalday-Lares v. Gonzales · filed 2007-05-23(c)(2)

Under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), Ricalday had ninety days, or until approximately April 30, 2005, to file a motion to reopen. He did not, however, actually file his motion to reopen until January 12, 2006, more than eight months after the 90-day deadline had expired. Thus, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in concluding that Ricalday’s motion was untimely.

A motion to reopen must be filed within 90 days of the final administrative decision; filing during the voluntary departure period does not extend that deadline.

Patel v. Attorney General of the United States · filed 2007-09-17(c)(2)

Generally, a motion to reopen must be filed no later than 90 days after the date on which the final administrative decision was rendered in the proceedings sought to be reopened. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2); Filja v. Gonzales, 447 F.3d 241, 252 (3d Cir. 2006). ... Thus, Patel’s first motion to reopen was untimely filed, and the BIA correctly affirmed the denial of that motion.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) requires a motion to reopen an ordinary cancellation claim to be filed within 90 days of the Board’s decision.

Sanchez, Ana M. v. Mukasey, Michael B. · filed 2007-10-04(c)(2)

The regulations require that a motion to reopen for this type of claim must be filed within 90 days of the Board’s decision. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). ... Because Sanchez’s motion was filed long after that 90- day period elapsed, the BIA properly concluded that her motion was untimely.

A motion to reopen is subject to a ninety-day filing deadline that may be tolled, but the motion remains untimely if filed more than ninety days after the movant knew or should have known of the alleged error.

Abidi v. Mukasey · filed 2008-07-28(c)(2)

That motion was filed more than ninety days after the entry of the removal order. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). We recognize that tolling of the ninety-day period is possible, but here, even with tolling, the motion came too late — it was more than ninety days after he knew, or should have known, of the alleged error by his former counsel.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) generally requires a motion to reopen to be filed within 90 days of the final administrative decision.

Yang v. Attorney General of United States · filed 2008-10-01(c)(2)

Therefore, Yang had to move to reopen no later than 90 days from that date.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) requires a motion to reopen within 90 days of the final decision in the proceeding sought to be reopened; denial of a motion to reconsider does not restart that period.

Vega v. Holder · filed 2010-07-19(c)(2)

The regulation requires that such a motion be filed within 90 days of when “the final administrative decision was rendered in the proceeding sought to be reopened.” (emphasis added). ... Although Soria Vega argues otherwise, his motion to reopen was necessarily directed at the merits determination issued on May 10, 2004, not the denial of his motion to reconsider.

A general motion to reopen before the BIA is subject to a 90-day filing deadline.

Kawashima v. Holder · filed 2010-08-04(c)(2)

Accordingly, we conclude that the BIA did not err in applying the 90-day filing deadlines for general motions to reopen pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2) and in denying Mr. Kawashima’s motion to reopen as untimely because it was filed almost eight months late.

A motion to reopen filed after the deadline may be denied when the movant fails to show the due diligence required for equitable tolling.

Woldesemait v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2011-03-24(c)(2)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion by denying Woldesemait’s motion to reopen because the motion was filed more than 15 years after the BIA’s February 7, 1994, order dismissing the underlying appeal, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and Woldesemait failed to demonstrate that he acted with the due diligence required to warrant equitable tolling of the filing deadline, see Iturribarria, 321 F.3d at 897.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) requires a motion to reopen to be filed within 90 days of the final administrative decision.

Mahamat v. Ashcroft · filed 2005-12-12(c)(2)

A motion to reopen “must be filed no later than 90 days after the date on which the final administrative decision was rendered.”

A motion to reopen must be filed within 90 days of the final administrative removal order, but the deadline may be equitably tolled.

Contreras-Martinez v. U.S. Attorney General · filed 2016-11-28(c)(2)

A motion to reopen must be filed within 90 days of the date of the final administrative removal order. See Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”) § 240(c)(7)(C)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). The 90-day deadline for filing motions to reopen is not jurisdictional, and thus may be subject to equitable tolling.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) sets a filing deadline for motions to reopen removal proceedings.

Sanchez v. Lynch · filed 2016-12-19(c)(2)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioners’ motion to reopen as untimely, where they filed the motion more than 10 years after their final order of removal. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2).

Section 1003.2 permits denial of a motion to reconsider when it exceeds the applicable number or time limits.

Gutierrez v. Gonzales · filed 2007-02-26(b)(3)

The agency did not abuse its discretion when it denied petitioner’s motion to reconsider as numerically and time barred. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(3).

Section 1003.2 limits a party to one motion to reconsider, including a motion styled as one to reopen that the BIA construes as seeking reconsideration.

Corona v. Mukasey · filed 2008-02-15(b)(2)

The BIA did not err when it construed petitioner’s motion to reopen as one for reconsideration and then denied it as numerically barred. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a)-(c).

Section 1003.2(b)(2) permits one motion to reconsider each BIA decision.

Mendez v. U.S. Attorney General · filed 2008-07-22(b)(2)

Mendez’s motion to reconsider the BIA’s order denying his motion to reopen was the first motion to reconsider filed for that particular BIA decision. Accordingly, the BIA abused its discretion when it denied Mendez’s motion as numerically barred under § 1003.2(b)(2).

Section 1003.2 sets requirements for motions to reconsider or remand that an administrative appeal brief must meet to raise a new claim before the Board.

Gonzalez-Alvarez v. Barr · filed 2020-12-01(b)(1), (c)(1)

Upon review, we conclude that Gonzalez-Alvarez’s administrative appeal brief did not meet the requirements of a motion to reconsider or remand, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1), (c)(1) (2020), and that the Board did not err in declining to consider his claim based on anti-gang political opinion for the first time on appeal.

Section 1003.2(a) permits the BIA to decline to decide a motion to reopen when it dismissed the underlying appeal without reaching the merits.

Sherpa v. Garland · filed 2024-01-23(a)

Whether framed as a jurisdictional rule or a claim- processing rule, the BIA followed its regulations and precedent to decline to rule on Sherpa’s motion to reopen because it had not adjudicated the merits of his underlying appeal.