8 C.F.R. § 1003.2

Section 1003.2 requires motions to reopen to be filed within 90 days, but permits a late motion seeking asylum or withholding when it is based on material, previously unavailable changed country conditions.

Canales-Canales v. Bondi · filed 2025-09-11(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

Movants seeking to reopen removal proceedings may file a motion to reopen no later than 90 days after the date on which the final administrative decision was rendered. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). It is undisputed that Canales-Canales’s 2023 motion to reopen was untimely because she filed it over three years after the final administrative decision. The time limit does not apply, however, if the motion is filed to apply for asylum or withholding of removal “based on changed country conditions arising in the country of nationality or the country to which removal has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available and would not have been discovered or presented at the previous proceeding.” 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); see also 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). “When reviewing whether . . . evidence established changed country conditions, the BIA must ‘compare the evidence of country conditions submitted with the motion to those that existed at the time of the merits hearing below.’” Tanusantoso v. Barr, 962 F.3d 694, 698 (2d Cir. 2020) (quoting In re S-Y-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 247, 253 (B.I.A. 2007)). “Change that is incremental or incidental does not meet the regulatory requirements for late motions of this type.” In re S-Y-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 257.

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) exempts a motion to reopen from the usual time and numerical limits when the movant seeks to reapply for previously denied asylum or withholding of removal based on changed country conditions.

Mouns v. Garland · filed 2024-08-28(c)(3)(ii)

And perhaps most importantly, it would be nonsensical for the Coelho standard to apply every time a reopening movant — like Mouns — seeks to reapply for asylum and withholding of removal based on changed country conditions. A flat rule that such cases always present special, adverse considerations would be wholly at odds with the special, favorable treatment that Congress has bestowed upon them. Again, by statute, a motion to reopen is not subject to the usual time and number limits where the movant is pursuing asylum or withholding of removal based on changed country conditions. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii). And the Attorney General’s own regulations specify that the exception extends to reopening movants who raise changed country conditions to “reapply for” previously denied relief. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) (emphasis added).

Section 1003.2 requires a motion to reopen to be filed within 90 days, permits an exception for changed country conditions, and requires supporting evidence to be material and previously unavailable.

Diawara v. Holder · filed 2009-04-01(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii), (c)(1)

A motion to reopen must be filed no later than 90 days after the final administrative decision is rendered in the proceedings that the applicant seeks to reopen. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). However, an applicant may be excused from compliance with the 90-day time limit if he submits evidence establishing “changed country conditions arising in the country of nationality .... ” 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). Such a motion to reopen shall not be granted unless it appears that the evidence offered in support of the motion “is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented” at the previous hearing. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) requires a motion to reopen to be filed within 90 days, subject to the changed-country-conditions exception in § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) for asylum or withholding claims supported by material evidence that was previously unavailable and undiscoverable.

Habib v. Holder · filed 2009-04-07(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

The Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”) and its implementing regulations provide that an individual must file a motion to reopen within ninety days of the issuance of a final administrative order of removal. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(e)(7)(C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). This limitation, however, does not apply when the motion to reopen is filed in order to apply for asylum or withholding of removal based on changed circumstances arising in the individual’s country of nationality, if the evidence submitted is material and was unavailable and undiscoverable at the time of the individual’s hearing before the IJ. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c) (7)(C) (ii); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(h).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) imposes a 90-day time limit on motions to reopen, while § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) provides an exception requiring material evidence of changed country conditions that was previously unavailable and could not have been presented earlier.

Cabrera v. Holder · filed 2009-04-08(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

Valenzuela Cabrera filed the motion to reopen outside the 90-day time limit set forth in 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). In addition, he failed to present material evidence of changed country conditions that was not available and could not have been presented at the previous proceeding.

Paragraph (c)(3)(ii) creates an exception to the one-motion limit in paragraph (c)(2) for changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality; changed personal circumstances do not excuse the time and numerical limits on motions to reopen.

Li v. Atty Gen USA · filed 2009-04-10(c)(3)(ii), (c)(2)

The other statute to which we referred in our remand order, INA § 240(c)(7)(C)(ii), excuses the 90-day deadline for filing a motion to reopen where the alien seeks to apply for asylum based on “changed country conditions arising in the country of nationality or the country to which removal has been ordered.” INA § 240(c)(7)(C)(ii); see also 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) (providing that the limit on filing “only one motion to reopen,” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), does not apply where the alien demonstrates “changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality”). Thus, under this statutory and regulatory scheme, changed personal circumstances may permit the filing of a successive or untimely asylum application under INA § 208(a)(2), but cannot excuse the time and numerical limitations applicable to motions to reopen.

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) permits an alien with a final removal order to pursue a successive asylum application through a motion to reopen beyond the ordinary deadline only when the motion is based on changed country conditions.

Chen v. U.S. Attorney General · filed 2009-04-13(c)(3)(ii)

The language at section [1158(a)(2)(D)] and 8 C.F.R. § 1208.4 that permits an updated or successive asylum application based on changed personal circumstances applies in conjunction with section [1229a(c)(7)(C)] and 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.2(c) and 1003.23(b) to permit such an application at any time during proceedings before the entry of a final order of removal or within the 90-day deadline for a motion to reopen. Outside of those circumstances, changed country conditions must be shown. ... Thus, we hold that an alien who has been ordered removed cannot file a successive asylum application, “except as part of a timely and properly filed motion to reopen or one that claims that the late motion is excused because of changed country conditions.”

The provision permits reopening based on changed circumstances in the country of nationality when the evidence is material and was previously unavailable and could not have been discovered or presented at the previous hearing.

Liang v. Atty Gen USA · filed 2009-05-26(c)(3)(ii)

Liang did not contest the tardiness of his motion; he did, however, assert that it fell within the exception of 8 C.F.R. 1003.2(c)(3)(ii), which permits reopening “based on changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality . . . if such evidence is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the previous hearing.”

Section 1003.2(c)(2) generally limits an alien to one motion to reopen filed within 90 days, while § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) waives those limits for material, previously unavailable evidence of changed country conditions; changed personal circumstances alone do not qualify.

Chen v. Atty Gen USA · filed 2009-06-11(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

An alien generally may file only one motion to reopen, and must file the motion with the BIA “no later than 90 days after the date on which the final administrative decision was rendered.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). The time and number requirements are waived for motions that rely on evidence of “changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality . . . if such evidence is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the previous proceeding.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). Changes in personal circumstances do not constitute changed country conditions, and thus do not excuse a motion’s untimeliness, but such changes may be relevant to a claim that an alien would be persecuted under changing Chinese family planning laws. Zheng v. Attorney General, 549 F.3d 260, 267 (3d Cir. 2008).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) imposes a ninety-day deadline on motions to reopen, including CAT-related motions, while subsection (c)(3)(ii) provides an exception only for material evidence of changed country conditions that was previously unavailable and could not previously have been presented.

De Oca v. Holder · filed 2009-07-02(c)(2) and (c)(3)(ii)

The motion was untimely because Montes De Oca filed it outside the ninety-day time limit set forth in 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), which does not specifically exclude CAT claims from the time limit. Moreover, the exception to the time limit based on changed country conditions does not apply because Montes De Oca did not present material evidence of changed country conditions that was not available and could not have been presented at the previous proceeding.

The changed-country-conditions exception removes the time and numerical limits on motions to reopen when material evidence of changed conditions was unavailable and undiscoverable at the prior hearing.

Dhillon v. Attorney General of the United States · filed 2009-07-07(c)(3)(h)

One such exception pertinent to Dhil-lon’s case provides that an alien may reapply for asylum or statutory withholding of removal based on changed circumstances in the alien’s home country. Pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(h), the time and number limitations on motions to reopen do not apply where the applicant seeks to apply for asylum “based on changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality or in the country to which deportation has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the previous hearing.”

The regulation sets a 90-day deadline for motions to reopen, with an exception for reopening based on changed country conditions when the evidence is material and was unavailable and could not previously have been presented.

Huang v. Attorney General of the United States · filed 2009-08-27(c)(2), (c)(3)(h)

Although a motion to reopen “must be filed no later than 90 days after the date on which the final administrative decision was rendered in the proceeding sought to be reopened,” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), this time limitation does not apply if the alien seeks reopening “based on changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality or in the country to which deportation has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the previous hearing.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(h).

Subsection (c)(2) generally limits a motion to reopen to one motion filed within 90 days, while subsection (c)(3)(ii) removes those limits for a motion based on material, previously unavailable evidence of changed country conditions.

Yi Fin Wan v. Holder · filed 2009-09-01(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

However, there is no time limit for filing a motion to reopen if it is “based on changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality or in the country to which deportation has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the previous hearing.” ... Here, the BIA reasonably concluded that Wan had not demonstrated that the time and numerical limitations for filing his motion to reopen were excused by changed country conditions where he submitted no evidence of such conditions in support of his motion.

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) excuses the 90-day deadline for a motion to reopen based on materially changed country conditions that were previously unavailable and could not previously have been discovered or presented.

Arias v. U.S. Attorney General · filed 2009-09-30(c)(3)(ii)

That time limit does not apply, however, to motions “based on changed country conditions arising in the . . . country to which removal has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available and would not have been discovered or presented at the previous proceeding.” Id. § 1229(c)(7)(C)(ii); accord 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). ... As the BIA concluded, this new evidence was insufficient to establish that conditions in Venezuela had materially changed since the time of her hearing. The BIA therefore did not abuse its discretion in denying Arias’s motion to reopen as untimely.

Section 1003.2(c)(2)'s one-motion, 90-day time limit applies unless the changed-country-conditions exception in § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) is met with material evidence that was previously unavailable; inadequate evidence does not excuse the time limit.

Li v. Holder · filed 2009-09-30(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

There is no dispute that Li’s April 2007 and March 2008 motions to reopen were untimely where the BIA entered a final administrative order dismissing his appeal in May 1996. ... The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Li’s third motion to reopen because it reasonably found that he failed to proffer material evidence in support of that motion. ... The BIA did not err in finding that Li failed to demonstrate changed country conditions excusing the time limitation for filing his fourth motion to reopen where he failed to submit any evidence in support of that motion.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) generally requires a motion to reopen within 90 days, while § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) creates an exception for material, previously unavailable evidence of changed conditions in the country of nationality.

Yu v. Attorney General of the United States · filed 2009-09-28(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

Motions to reopen are generally required to be filed with the BIA “no later than 90 days after the date on which the final administrative decision was rendered.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). The deadline does not apply to motions that rely on evidence of “changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality ... if such evidence is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the previous proceeding.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). Here, the motion to reopen was not filed within the 90-day window; therefore, petitioners must show changed country conditions in order to excuse the untimeliness.

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) permits reopening after the ninety-day limit only when the motion is based on material changed country conditions that were previously unavailable and could not have been discovered or presented.

Huang v. Holder · filed 2009-10-08(c)(3)(ii)

Because this motion to reopen was filed more than ninety days after the BIA’s affirmance of the Immigration Judge’s (“IJ”) order of deportation, we can grant relief only if the motion is “based on changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality or in the country to which deportation has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the previous hearing.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii).

The changed-country-conditions exception removes the 90-day deadline for a motion to reopen only when the movant presents material evidence that was unavailable and could not have been discovered or presented at the prior hearing.

Chen v. U.S. Attorney General · filed 2009-10-16(c)(3)(ii)

However, the 90-day deadline does not apply if the motion is based on evidence of changed country conditions in the home country that could not have been produced at the previous hearing. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); INA § 240(c)(7)(C)(ii), 8 U.S.C. §1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii). To meet this exception, a movant must show material evidence that was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the previous hearing. Id.

The provision removes the time limit for a motion to reopen when it is based on material changed circumstances in the country of nationality or designated country that were previously unavailable and could not have been discovered or presented earlier.

Chen v. Holder · filed 2009-10-16(c)(3)(h)

However, there is no time limitation for filing a motion to reopen if it is “based on changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality or in the country to which deportation has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the previous hearing.”

The changed-country-conditions exception to the motion-to-reopen time and number limits does not apply when the alien fails to present material evidence demonstrating changed country conditions.

Jian Wen Wang v. Holder · filed 2009-10-19(c)(3)(ii)

However, there are no time and number limitations for filing a motion to reopen if it is “based on changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality or in the country to which deportation has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the previous hearing.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3) (ii). ... The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Wang’s third motion to reopen because it reasonably found that he failed to proffer material evidence in support of that motion.

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) excuses the 90-day deadline for a motion to reopen only when it relies on material, previously unavailable evidence of changed country conditions; changed personal circumstances do not suffice.

Anandarajah v. Attorney General of the United States · filed 2009-11-20(c)(3)(ii)

Although a motion to reopen “must be filed no later than 90 days after the date on which the final administrative decision was rendered in the proceeding sought to be reopened,” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), this time limitation does not apply if the alien seeks reopening “based on changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality or in the country to which deportation has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the previous hearing.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(h). ... Changed personal circumstances are insufficient to excuse an alien from the time limit on a motion to reopen.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) imposes a 90-day deadline on motions to reopen, while § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) creates a no-time-limit exception for material, previously unavailable evidence of changed country conditions.

Pranata v. Holder · filed 2009-12-01(c)(2) and (c)(3)(ii)

We find that the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Pranata’s motion to reopen as untimely. As the BIA noted, it had issued a final order of removal in May 2005, but Pranata did not file his motion until September 2008, well beyond the 90-day deadline. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). There is no time limit for filing a motion to reopen “based on changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality or in the country to which deportation has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the previous hearing.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). Here, however, the BIA properly found that Pranata’s motion did not qualify for such an exception, and that he did not otherwise demonstrate his prima facie eligibility for relief. See INS v. Abudu, 485 U.S. 94, 104-05 (1988).

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(a) removes the time and number limits for a motion to reopen based on changed circumstances in the country of nationality when the evidence is material and was previously unavailable.

Zheng v. Holder · filed 2009-11-24(c)(3)(a)

However, there are no time and number limitations for filing a motion to reopen if it is “based on changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality or in the country to which deportation has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the previous hearing.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(a).

The regulation requires a motion to reopen within 90 days, but creates a no-time-limit exception for materially changed country conditions supported by evidence that was unavailable and undiscoverable at the prior hearing.

Li v. Holder · filed 2009-12-14(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

An alien seeking to reopen proceedings must file his motion to reopen no later than 90 days after the date on which the final administrative decision was rendered. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). ... However, there is no time limit for filing a motion to reopen if it is “based on changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality or in the country to which deportation has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the previous hearing.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). The BIA reasonably found that Sarker’s motion to reopen did not qualify for such an exception.

Section 1003.2 requires a motion to reopen to be filed within 90 days, subject to an exception for material, previously unavailable changed country conditions.

Apetyonok v. Holder · filed 2009-12-11(c)(2) (c)(3)(ii)

An alien seeking to reopen proceedings must file her motion to reopen no later than 90 days after the date on which the final administrative decision was rendered. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). In this case, it is undisputed that Apetyonok’s June 2008 motion was untimely inasmuch as the BIA issued a final order of removal in July 2005. See id. However, there is no time limit for filing a motion to reopen if it is “based on changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality or in the country to which deportation has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the previous hearing.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). The BIA reasonably found that Apetyonok’s motion to reopen did not qualify for such an exception.

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(h) removes the time and numerical limits on a motion to reopen when material, previously unavailable evidence shows changed circumstances in the country of nationality or the country designated for deportation.

Chen v. Holder · filed 2009-12-15(c)(3)(h)

However, there are no time and numerical limitations for filing a motion to reopen if it is “based on changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality or in the country to which deportation has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the previous hearing.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(h). The BIA reasonably found that Chen did not qualify for such an exception.

Section 1003.2 generally imposes a 90-day deadline for motions to reopen, with an exception for material, previously unavailable evidence of changed conditions in the country of nationality.

Dhoot v. Attorney General of the United States · filed 2009-12-28(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

Petitioners are generally required to file a motion to reopen with the BIA “no later than 90 days after the date on which the final administrative decision was rendered.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). The deadline does not apply to motions that ... rely on evidence of “changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality ... if such evidence is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the previous hearing.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). Here, Dhoot did not file the motion to reopen within the 90-day window; therefore, he must show changed country conditions in India in order to excuse the untimeliness.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) generally allows one motion to reopen filed within 90 days, while § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) exempts motions based on material, previously unavailable changed country conditions; changed personal circumstances do not qualify.

Ping Gui Chen v. Holder · filed 2009-12-30(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

The regulations permit an alien to file one motion to reopen and require that it be filed within 90 days after the date on which a final administrative decision was rendered in the proceeding sought to be reopened. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). ... However, the time limits do not apply to a motion to reopen that is “based on changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality or in the country to which deportation has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the previous hearing.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). ... The BIA reasonably found that Chen’s decision to practice Falun Gong in the U.S. was a changed personal circumstance, not a changed country condition. ... We conclude that, the BIA did not err in denying Chen’s untimely motion to reopen. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) imposes a 90-day deadline for motions to reopen, subject to the changed-country-conditions exception in § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii).

Bin Chen v. U.S. Attorney General · filed 2010-01-07(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

A motion to reopen must be filed no later than 90 days after the final administrative decision. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). But this time limit does not apply if the motion to reopen is based on changed circumstances in the country of the movant’s nationality. Id. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). To meet this exception, a movant must offer material evidence that “was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the previous hearing.” Id. ... Because Chen’s motion to reopen was not timely, and he did not present evidence establishing changed conditions in China, the BIA’s denial of his motion was not arbitrary or capricious, or otherwise an abuse of discretion.

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) permits an untimely motion to reopen when it is based on material, previously unavailable evidence of changed country conditions.

Liu v. U.S. Attorney General · filed 2010-01-12(c)(3)(ii)

However, the time limit does not apply if the motion to reopen is based on changed country conditions, “if such evidence is material and was not available and would not have been discovered or presented at the previous proceeding.” ... A change in personal circumstances does not authorize the untimely filing of a motion to reopen. ... Based on our review of the record and consideration of the parties’ briefs in this case, we grant the petition for review. Although Liu’s personal circumstances changed since the time of her first immigration court hearing with her adoption of the practice of Falun Gong, her motion to reopen was based on the change in China’s stepped-up enforcement of its prohibition against Falun Gong practitioners. ... Thus, to the extent the BIA concluded that Liu did not satisfy the requirement for a motion to re-open because she presented evidence of a change in her personal circumstances, it abused its discretion.

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) permits an alien to avoid the usual time and numerical limits on motions to reopen by establishing materially changed circumstances in the country of nationality.

Zheliazouski v. Holder · filed 2010-02-03(c)(3)(ii)

Ordinarily, an alien may only file one motion to reopen and must do so within 90 days of the final administrative decision. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). There is no dispute that the Petitioner’s second motion to reopen was both untimely and numerically barred. However, there is no time or numerical limitation where the alien establishes materially “changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) requires a motion to reopen to be filed within ninety days of the final removal order, while § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) provides an exception based on new and material evidence of changed country conditions.

Karfendi v. Holder · filed 2010-02-22(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioners’ motion to reopen as untimely where petitioners filed the motion more than three years after the BIA’s final order of removal, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2) (motion to reopen must be filed within ninety days of final order of removal), and failed to submit new and material evidence of changed country conditions in Indonesia that would excuse the late filing, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); see also Malty, 381 F.3d at 945 (requiring circumstances to have changed sufficiently that a petitioner who previously did not have a legitimate claim for asylum now has a well-founded fear of future persecution).

Section 1003.2(e)(3)(ii) permits an otherwise untimely motion to reopen when country conditions have changed since the prior proceedings.

Zheng v. Attorney General of the United States · filed 2010-03-08(e)(3)(ii)

To succeed in his untimely motion to reopen Zheng must show that country eon-ditions in China have changed since his case was closed in 1996. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(e)(3)(ii).

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) permits a further motion to reopen an asylum proceeding only when there has been a change in country conditions since the denial of the prior motion.

Zheng v. Holder · filed 2010-03-15(c)(3)(ii)

The only basis on which they could file a further petition to reopen their asylum proceeding is a change in country conditions since the denial of the second petition. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); Lin v. Gonzales, 435 F.3d 708, 710 (7th Cir. 2006); Krougliak v. INS, 289 F.3d 457, 460 (7th Cir.2002).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) imposes a 90-day deadline for motions to reopen, while § 1003.2(c)(3)(h) excepts motions based on qualifying changed-country-conditions evidence.

Dialingana v. Attorney General of United States · filed 2010-03-16(c)(2) and (c)(3)(h)

Motions to reopen are generally required to be filed with the BIA “no later than 90 days after the date on which the final administrative decision was rendered.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). The deadline does not apply to motions that rely on evidence of “changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality ... if such evidence is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the previous hearing.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(h).

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) allows the 90-day deadline for a motion to reopen to be equitably tolled when the alien establishes changed country conditions in the country of nationality.

Wang v. Holder · filed 2010-04-08(c)(3)(ii)

The 90-day filing deadline may be equitably tolled if the alien can establish “changed country conditions arising in the country of nationality . . . .” 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). Here, however, the BIA reasonably concluded that recent activities relating to China’s suppression of political dissent on the internet did not constitute changed country conditions. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) requires a motion to reopen to be filed within 90 days after the final administrative order unless an exception applies; the changed-country-conditions exception in subsection (c)(3)(ii) requires material evidence that was unavailable and could not previously have been discovered or presented, and subsection (c)(1) requires the BIA to assess those evidentiary conditions.

Kumarasinghe v. Holder · filed 2010-04-27(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii), and (c)(1)

First, it is undisputed that the motion to reopen was filed more than six years after the BIA’s June 2002 final order. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2) (providing that motion to reopen “must be filed no later than 90 days after” final administrative order). Although there is no time limit for filing a motion to reopen “based on changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality or in the country to which deportation has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the previous hearing,” id. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii), the BIA properly found that petitioners failed to demonstrate that their motion satisfied the requirements of this exception. ... In assessing whether petitioners’ evidence of changed country conditions was “material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing,” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1), the BIA did nothing more than perform the function legally required of it.

The changed-country-conditions exception removes the time and numerical limits on a motion to reopen when the alien establishes materially changed conditions in the country of nationality.

Mohammad v. Holder · filed 2010-12-14(c)(3)(ii)

However, there are no time or numerical limitations if the alien establishes materially “changed country conditions arising in the country of nationality.” 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); see also 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii).

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) permits an otherwise untimely or numerically barred motion to reopen when the alien presents materially changed conditions in the country of nationality, requiring proof of a change from conditions at the original proceedings.

Mowla v. Holder · filed 2010-12-15(c)(3)(ii)

However, there is no time or numerical limitation if the alien establishes materially “changed country conditions arising in the country of nationality.” 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); see also 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). ... Therefore, because petitioners submitted evidence demonstrating only recent conditions in Bangladesh, as opposed to evidence establishing a change in conditions between the initial proceedings and the motion to reopen, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii), the BIA reasonably found that petitioners failed to show changed conditions in Bangladesh sufficient to warrant reopening.

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) permits an untimely motion to reopen seeking asylum based on changed country conditions only when the supporting evidence is material and was previously unavailable and could not have been discovered or presented.

Zou v. Attorney General of the United States · filed 2011-01-05(c)(3)(ii)

The “motion must be filed no later than 90 days after the date on which the final administrative decision was rendered in the proceeding sought to be reopened,” id. at 1003.2(c)(2), except that the time limitation does not apply where the alien seeks to “apply or reapply for asylum or withholding of deportation based on changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality or in the country to which deportation has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the previous hearing,” id. at 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). ... Accordingly, the Board did not abuse its discretion in concluding that Zou’s evidence was insufficient to establish changed country conditions in China so as to create an exception to the time limitation for filing a motion to reopen, 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii).

The exception to § 1003.2's time limit for reopening asylum proceedings requires changed country conditions, not merely changed personal circumstances.

Lin v. Holder · filed 2011-02-16(c)(3)(ii)

It is well-settled that changed personal circumstances are distinguishable from changed country conditions. See Wei Guang Wang v. BIA, 437 F.3d 270, 273-274 (2d Cir. 2006) (“The law is clear that a petitioner must show changed country conditions in order to exceed the 90-day filing requirement for seeking to reopen removal proceedings. . . . A self-induced change in personal circumstances cannot suffice.” (internal citation omitted)); Li Yong Zheng v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 416 F.3d 129, 130 (2d Cir. 2005) (per curiam) (holding that a change in personal circumstances does not qualify as “changed circumstances” so as to invoke the exception provided by 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii)). As Lin asserted that he did not begin practicing Falun Gong until after conditions worsened for Falun Gong practitioners around the time of the 2008 Beijing Olympics, the BIA did not err in finding that Lin had failed to demonstrate changed country conditions as required to overcome the time limitation on motions to reopen. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii)).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) makes a motion to reopen untimely when filed outside the regulatory time limit, while § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) requires a showing of changed country conditions for the exception to that limit.

Foronda v. Holder · filed 2011-02-28(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Foronda’s motion to reopen because it was untimely, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), Foronda failed to demonstrate changed country conditions to qualify for the regulatory exception to the time limit, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii), and Foronda failed to establish that the alleged ineffective assistance may have affected the outcome of his proceedings, see Rojas-Garcia v. Ashcroft, 339 F.3d 814, 826 (9th Cir. 2003) (to prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim a petitioner must demonstrate prejudice).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) generally bars a motion to reopen filed more than 90 days after the BIA's final order, while subsection (c)(3)(ii) provides a regulatory exception when the movant shows changed country conditions.

Liu v. Holder Jr. · filed 2011-03-07(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Liu’s motion to reopen as untimely because Liu filed it more than 90 days after the BIA issued its final order, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and Liu failed to demonstrate changed country conditions to qualify for the regulatory exception to the time limit for filing motions to reopen, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); see also Toufighi v. Mukasey, 538 F.3d 988, 996-97 (9th Cir. 2008) (underlying adverse credibility determination rendered evidence of changed country conditions immaterial).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) generally bars a motion to reopen filed more than 90 days after the final administrative order, while § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) provides an exception when the motion is based on materially changed country conditions that could not have been presented at the prior hearing.

Yun v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2011-03-09(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Yun’s second motion to reopen as untimely, because she filed it over four years after the BIA issued its final administrative order, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and Yun failed to demonstrate changed circumstances in China to qualify for the regulatory exception to the time limit for filing motions to reopen, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); see also Lin v. Holder, 588 F.3d 981, 988-89 (9th Cir. 2009) (concluding record did not establish change in family planning laws or enforcement of such laws that would establish changed country conditions excusing untimely motion to reopen).

Section 1003.2 requires motions to reopen to be filed within 90 days, subject to an exception when the movant shows material changed country conditions.

Gil v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2011-03-29(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Gil’s motion to reopen as untimely because the motion was filed over 90 days after the BIA’s final administrative decision, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and because Gil failed to demonstrate changed country conditions material to her claim in order to qualify for the regulatory exception to the time limit for filing motions to reopen, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); Almaraz v. Holder, 608 F.3d 638, 640-41 (9th Cir. 2010) (denying petition for review where evidence of changed country conditions was not material to petitioner).

The regulation makes a motion to reopen untimely when filed beyond the applicable time limit, unless the movant demonstrates changed country conditions qualifying for the exception.

Liu v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2011-03-29(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Liu’s motion to reopen as untimely because the motion was filed over two years after the BIA’s final administrative decision, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and Liu failed to demonstrate changed country conditions to qualify for an exception to the time limit for filing such motions, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); Najmabadi, 597 F.3d at 986-990.

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) permits an untimely motion to reopen when the applicant presents material evidence of changed country conditions that was previously unavailable.

Mazariegos vs U.S. Attorney General · filed 2011-02-02(c)(3)(ii)

Normally, a motion to reopen may be brought only within 90 days of the underlying order of removal, 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), however, an applicant may be excused from the ordinary time limits for filing motions to reopen by presenting evidence demonstrating “changed country conditions arising in the country of nationality or the country to which removal has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available and would not have been discovered or presented at the previous proceeding.” 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); see also 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) imposes a 90-day deadline for motions to reopen, subject to the changed-country-conditions exception in § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii), which requires material evidence that was previously unavailable and could not have been discovered or presented earlier.

Lita v. Atty Gen USA · filed 2011-04-01(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

The “motion must be filed no later than 90 days after the date on which the final administrative decision was rendered in the proceeding sought to be reopened,” id. at 1003.2(c)(2), except that the time limitation does not apply where the alien seeks to “apply or reapply for asylum or withholding of deportation based on changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality or in the country to which deportation has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the previous hearing,” id. at 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). See also 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii).

Section 1003.2 generally requires a motion to reopen to be filed within 90 days of the final administrative decision, subject to an exception when the motion is based on materially changed country conditions supported by sufficient evidence.

Singh v. Holder · filed 2010-06-03(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Singh’s motion to reopen as untimely where the motion was filed over two years after the BIA’s final decision, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and Singh failed to present sufficient evidence of changed circumstances in India to qualify for the regulatory exception to the time limit, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); see also Toufighi v. Mukasey, 538 F.3d 988, 996-97 (9th Cir. 2008) (underlying adverse credibility determination rendered evidence of changed circumstances immaterial).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) generally requires motions to reopen to be filed within 90 days, while § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) creates an exception for material changed country conditions that were unavailable and could not previously have been presented.

Wan Tao Lu v. Attorney General · filed 2010-04-12(c)(2) (c)(3)(ii)

In general, motions to reopen must be filed within ninety days from the date “the final administrative decision was rendered.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). ... We agree that Lu failed to demonstrate changed circumstances in China that materially affect his eligibility for asylum. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) generally requires motions to reopen within 90 days, while § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) provides an exception for changed-country-conditions motions supported by material, previously unavailable evidence.

Mazen Said v. Atty Gen USA · filed 2010-06-09(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

The BIA denied Said’s motion to reopen as untimely. Motions to reopen generally must be filed within 90 days of the final administrative order of removal. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). There is an exception for motions to reopen on the grounds of changed country conditions that are based on evidence that is “material and was not available and would not have been discovered or presented at the previous proceeding.” 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); see also 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). ... The BIA, however, concluded that Said’s new evidence is not “material,” which we have recognized is an adequate ground on which to deny a motion to reopen. See Filja, 447 F.3d at 255.

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) creates a regulatory exception to the time limit for a motion to reopen when the movant establishes changed country conditions relevant to the claim.

Khan v. Holder · filed 2010-06-14(c)(3)(ii)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion by denying petitioners’ motion to reopen where the motion was filed over two years after the BIA’s final order, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and petitioners failed to establish changed country conditions in Fiji to qualify for the regulatory exception to the time limitation, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); see also Malty v. Ashcroft, 381 F.3d 942, 945 (9th Cir. 2004) (“The critical question is . . . whether circumstances have changed sufficiently that a petitioner who previously did not have a legitimate claim for asylum now has a well-founded fear of future persecution.”).

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) requires an untimely motion to reopen to establish changed country conditions.

Zheng v. Holder · filed 2010-06-22(c)(3)(ii)

The substantive standards for each motion are distinct. Whereas a motion to reconsider must specify errors of fact or law in the BIA’s prior decision, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1), an untimely motion to reopen must establish changed country conditions, 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); see Jian Hui Shao v. Mukasey, 546 F.3d 138, 169 (2d Cir. 2008).

Section 1003.2 permits an untimely motion to reopen without a time or numerical limit only when the alien establishes materially changed country conditions, and requires the motion to be supported by affidavits or other evidentiary material.

Zhisong v. Holder · filed 2010-06-23(c)(3)(ii), (c)(1)

Although Zhisong’s motion was indisputably untimely, there is no time or numerical limitation if the alien establishes materially “changed country conditions arising in the country of nationality.” 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); see also 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). ... Moreover, although Zhisong argues that “the landscape of the law applicable to [his motion to reopen] has sufficiently shifted,” and that “China’s application of its birth policies has shifted,” he submitted no evidence of changed country conditions with his motion. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1) (stating that “[a] motion to reopen proceedings . . . shall be supported by affidavits or other evidentiary material).

Paragraph (c)(2) generally bars a motion to reopen filed more than 90 days after the BIA’s final order, while paragraph (c)(3)(ii) provides an exception when the movant establishes changed country conditions.

Kumar v. Holder · filed 2010-07-13(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion by denying petitioners’ motion to reopen as untimely where the motion was filed more than 90 days after the BIA’s final order, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and petitioners failed to establish changed country conditions in Fiji to qualify for the regulatory exception to the time limitation, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); see also Malty v. Ashcroft, 381 F.3d 942, 945 (9th Cir. 2004) (“The critical question is . . . whether circumstances have changed sufficiently that a petitioner who previously did not have a legitimate claim for asylum now has a well-founded fear of future persecution.”).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) bars a motion to reopen filed more than 90 days after the BIA’s final order, subject to the exception in § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) when changed country conditions are established.

Hovhannisyan v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2010-07-13(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion by denying Hovhannisyan’s motion to reopen as untimely where the motion was filed more than 90 days after the BIA’s final order, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and Hovhannisyan failed to establish changed country conditions in Armenia to qualify for the regulatory exception to the time limitation, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); see also Toufighi v. Mukasey, 538 F.3d 988, 996-97 (9th Cir. 2008) (underlying adverse credibility determination rendered evidence of changed circumstances immaterial).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) makes a motion to reopen untimely when filed more than 90 days after the final removal order, unless an exception applies, and § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) provides an exception when changed country conditions are demonstrated.

Cheng v. Holder · filed 2010-07-14(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

The agency did not abuse its discretion in denying Cheng’s motion to reopen as untimely because Cheng filed it over twelve years after the BIA issued its final removal order, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and Cheng failed to demonstrate changed country conditions, including a change in laws or the enforcement of family planning laws, to qualify for the regulatory exception to the time limit for filing motions to reopen, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); Lin v. Holder, 588 F.3d 981, 988-989 (9th Cir. 2009); He, 501 F.3d at 1132.

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) permits a motion to reopen based on changed country conditions when the supporting evidence shows that conditions materially changed, but evidence predating the prior decision or showing no worsening from the asserted change does not satisfy that standard.

Suganthan, Pathmakan v. Mukasey, Mi · filed 2010-07-16(c)(3)(ii)

On October 23, 2008, the BIA denied the motion on the grounds that it was untimely filed and the evidence submitted in support was not sufficiently strong to show changed country conditions for the purpose of 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). ... Specifically, the BIA correctly observed that the information contained in the 2007 Country Report predated the IJ’s January 2008 decision. The Board also noted that the materials submitted by Pathmakanthan revealed that fighting had been ongoing since 2006, notwithstanding the cease-fire, so the official end of the truce in 2008 was not sufficient to show changed country conditions. Nor did the materials reveal that conditions for Tamils in the country had worsened due to the end of the cease-fire. Therefore, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Petitioner’s motion to reopen.

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) permits an untimely motion to reopen when the evidence establishes materially changed country conditions that could not previously have been presented.

Pathmakanthan v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2010-07-16(c)(3)(ii)

Specifically, the BIA correctly observed that the information contained in the 2007 Country Report predated the IJ’s January 2008 decision. The Board also noted that the materials submitted by Pathmakanthan revealed that fighting had been ongoing since 2006, notwithstanding the cease-fire, so the official end of the truce in 2008 was not sufficient to show changed country conditions. Nor did the materials reveal that conditions for Tamils in the country had worsened due to the end of the cease-fire. Therefore, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Petitioner’s motion to reopen.

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) creates an exception to the 90-day deadline for a motion to reopen when it relies on material, previously unavailable evidence of changed circumstances in the country of nationality.

Liu v. Attorney General of the United States · filed 2010-07-19(c)(3)(ii)

Motions to reopen generally must be filed with the BIA “no later than 90 days after the date on which the final administrative decision was rendered.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). ... it is saved by the exception to the 90-day limit for motions that rely on evidence of “changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality . . . if such evidence is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the previous hearing.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). ... After its thorough discussion of the extensive evidence submitted by petitioner, the BIA concluded that it “fails to establish a change in circumstances or country conditions ‘arising in the country of nationality’ so as to create an exception to the time limitation for filing a motion to reopen to apply for asylum.” (A.R. 4.) We cannot say that the BIA abused its discretion in so holding.

The provisions treat a motion to reopen filed eight years after the final administrative decision as untimely unless the movant establishes changed circumstances in the country of removal.

Shu Hua Tan v. Holder · filed 2010-07-19(c)(2) (c)(3)(ii)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Hong’s motion to reopen as untimely where it was filed eight years after the BIA’s final administrative decision, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and Hong failed to establish changed circumstances in China to qualify for the regulatory exception to the time limitation, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); see Toufighi v. Mukasey, 538 F.3d 988, 996 (9th Cir. 2008) (evidence must demonstrate prima facie eligibility for relief in order to reopen proceedings based on changed country conditions).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) generally requires a motion to reopen within 90 days, while § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) exempts motions based on qualifying changed country conditions in the country of removal from that deadline.

Wang v. U.S. Attorney General · filed 2010-07-20(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

Pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), an alien subject to deportation must file her motion to reopen within 90 days of the final removal order. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2); 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A), (C)(i). However, there is no time limit on the filing of a motion to reopen if it is based on changed country conditions arising in the country to which removal has been ordered, and if the evidence in support of that motion is material, and was not available or discoverable at the prior proceeding. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) generally permits only one motion to reopen filed within 90 days, while § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) removes those limits when the alien establishes materially changed country conditions in the country of nationality.

Huang v. Holder · filed 2010-07-27(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

An alien may file only one motion to reopen and must do so within 90 days of the final administrative decision. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). However, there is no time or numerical limitation where the alien establishes materially “changed country conditions arising in the country of nationality.” 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7) (C)(ii); see also 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). Here, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Huang’s motion to reopen, which was indisputably untimely.

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) permits a motion to reopen without the usual time limit only when it is based on material changed country conditions that were previously unavailable and could not have been discovered or presented at the earlier hearing.

Tian v. Board of Immigration Appeals · filed 2010-07-27(c)(3)(ii)

While there is no time limitation for motions to reopen “based on changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality or in the country to which deportation has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the previous hearing,” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii), the BIA reasonably found that Tian did not qualify for such an exception. As the BIA noted, Tian’s recent practice of Christianity and the birth of his U.S. citizen children constitute changed personal circumstances, not changed country conditions.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) requires a motion to reopen based on changed personal circumstances to be filed within 90 days of a final order of removal, while § 1003.2(c)(3) exempts a motion based on changed country conditions from that time limit.

Lin v. Holder · filed 2010-09-02(c)(2), (c)(3)

Furthermore, Lin enjoyed the opportunity to submit, within 90 days of his final order of removal, a motion to reopen the proceedings based on changed personal circumstances. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). If Lin’s changed circumstances had been based on changed conditions within his country of nationality or in the country to which he was ordered removed, the 90-day time limit would not have applied and Lin could have submitted a motion to reopen at any time. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3). These procedures are reasonable and constitutionally sufficient.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) generally requires a motion to reopen within 90 days, while § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) excepts motions based on material, previously unavailable changed country conditions.

Chen v. Holder · filed 2010-09-03(c)(2) and (c)(3)(ii)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Chen’s motion to reopen as untimely. A motion to reopen generally must be filed no later than 90 days after the date on which the final administrative decision was rendered in the proceedings sought to be reopened. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). There is no dispute that Chen’s motion to reopen, filed in December 2008, did not fall within that timeframe. The 90-day time limitation does not apply, however, to a motion to reopen “based on changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality or in the country to which deportation has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the previous hearing.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) makes a motion to reopen untimely when filed nearly two years after the final order, while § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) requires changed country conditions for the regulatory exception to the filing deadline.

Thind v. Holder · filed 2010-09-07(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Thind’s motion to reopen as untimely because Thind filed it nearly two years after the BIA issued its final order, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and Thind failed to demonstrate changed country conditions to qualify for the regulatory exception to the time limit for filing motions to reopen, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); see also Toufighi v. Mukasey, 538 F.3d 988, 996-97 (9th Cir. 2008) (underlying adverse credibility determination rendered evidence of changed country conditions immaterial).

The exception to the ninety-day limit permits reopening based on changed country conditions when the evidence is material to the underlying relief and was previously unavailable; the applicant’s absence from the country during the changes is not, by itself, a bar to materiality.

Smith v. Holder · filed 2010-09-09(c)(3)(ii)

The applicable provision, 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii), states that the time and numerical limitations "shall not apply" to a motion to reopen proceedings "[t]o apply or reapply for asylum or withholding of deportation based on changed circumstances . . . if such evidence is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the previous hearing." ... That a petitioner was not in the country during claimed changes cannot, however, be a per se bar to the materiality of those changes to the petitioner.

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) permits reopening for renewed asylum, withholding, or CAT claims based on changed country conditions only when the supporting evidence was previously unavailable and is material to the petitioners and their circumstances.

Soto v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2010-09-21(c)(3)(ii)

Petitioners’ renewed claim for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under CAT, based on changed country conditions, failed to present evidence of changed country conditions in Mexico that are material to petitioners and their circumstances. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); Toufighi v. Mukasey, 538 F.3d 988, 996-97 (9th Cir. 2008) (requiring movant to produce previously unavailable evidence of changed country conditions that are material to petitioners and their circumstances).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) makes a motion to reopen subject to a time limit, while § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) provides an exception when changed country conditions are shown.

Shen v. Holder · filed 2010-09-22(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

The agency did not abuse its discretion in denying Shen’s motion to reopen as untimely because Shen filed it over three years after the BIA issued its final removal order, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and Shen failed to demonstrate changed country conditions to qualify for the regulatory exception to the time limit for filing motions to reopen, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); Lin v. Holder, 588 F.3d 981, 988-989 (9th Cir. 2009) (record did not establish change in family planning laws or enforcement of such laws that would establish changed country conditions excusing untimely motion to reopen); He, 501 F.3d at 1132 (the birth of children outside the country of origin is a change in personal circumstances that is not sufficient to establish changed circumstances in the country of origin excusing the untimely filing of a motion to reopen).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) makes a motion to reopen untimely when filed more than 90 days after the final administrative decision, while subsection (c)(3)(ii) provides a changed-country-conditions exception that requires proof of changed circumstances.

Karapetyan v. Holder Jr. · filed 2010-09-30(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioners’ motion to reopen as untimely where it was filed over four years after the BIA’s final order, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and petitioners failed to establish changed circumstances in Armenia to qualify for the regulatory exception to the time limitation, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); see Toufighi v. Mukasey, 538 F.3d 988, 996 (9th Cir. 2008) (evidence must demonstrate prima facie eligibility for relief in order to reopen proceedings based on changed country conditions).

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) permits reopening to seek Convention Against Torture relief only when the movant presents material evidence of changed country conditions that was previously unavailable and could not have been presented at the prior proceeding.

Cruz v. Holder · filed 2010-10-22(c)(3)(ii)

The Board did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to reopen to allow petitioners to seek relief under the Convention Against Torture, because petitioners failed to present material evidence of changed country conditions that was not available and could not have been presented at the previous proceeding.

After the 90-day deadline, an applicant may move to reopen based on changed conditions in the country of removal only with material evidence that was previously unavailable and could not have been presented at the earlier hearing.

Kolaj v. Atty Gen USA · filed 2011-04-07(c)(3)(ii)

Where, as here, an applicant moves to reopen after expiration of the ninety-day deadline for filing such a motion, the applicant must rely upon evidence of “‘changed circumstances … in the country to which deportation has been ordered,’” and must show that “‘such evidence is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the previous hearing.’” Zheng v. Att’y Gen., 549 F.3d 260, 265 (3d Cir. 2008) (quoting 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii)); see Shardar, 503 F.3d at 313 (“[I]f the asylum applicant presents material evidence of changed country conditions that could not have been presented during the hearing before the IJ, his motion can be considered, even if … the motion is beyond the 90-day time limit for filing.”).

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) allows reopening based on changed country conditions only when the movant presents material evidence that was unavailable and could not have been presented at the former hearing, concerning changed circumstances in the country of nationality.

Shin Thing Sudin v. Attorney General of the United States · filed 2011-04-11(c)(3)(ii)

When the motion to reopen is based on changed country conditions, the movant must present evidence that is “material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing,” which is based on “changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) makes a motion to reopen untimely when filed more than five years after the BIA's final administrative order, while § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) provides a regulatory exception when changed circumstances in the country are demonstrated.

Masood v. Holder · filed 2011-04-12(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioners’ motion to reopen as untimely where the motion was filed more than five years after the BIA’s final administrative order, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and petitioners failed to demonstrate changed circumstances in Bangladesh to qualify for the regulatory exception to the time limitation, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); see also Toufighi v. Mukasey, 538 F.3d 988, 996-97 (9th Cir. 2008) (evidence must demonstrate prima facie eligibility for relief warranting reopening based on changed country conditions), and petitioners do not challenge the BIA’s determination that they are not entitled to equitable tolling.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) imposes a 90-day deadline for motions to reopen, while subsection (c)(3)(ii) permits an untimely asylum-related motion only when the applicant establishes qualifying changed country conditions with material evidence that was previously unavailable.

Lin v. Attorney General of the United States · filed 2011-04-27(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

A motion to reopen must normally be filed no later than ninety days following the final administrative proceeding the movant is attempting to reopen. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). Notwithstanding the ninety-day time limit, a petitioner may move to reopen, but the petitioner must demonstrate changed country conditions in the country of nationality, 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii), and the motion “shall not be granted unless it appears to the Board that evidence sought to be offered is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing,” 5 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1); see also Shardar v. Attorney Gen., 503 F.3d 308, 313 (3d Cir. 2007). ... In view of the record as a whole, see Liu, 555 F.3d at 148, including numerous State Department reports, and the deferential standard of review, Guo, 386 F.3d at 562, we cannot say that BIA’s review of Lin’s evidence of changed country conditions was deficient. Accordingly, Lin has not met his burden of demonstrating changed country conditions sufficient to support his motion to reopen or successive application for asylum.

The time and number limits for motions to reopen do not apply when the motion relies on material changed country conditions that were previously unavailable, and “previous hearing” means the proceedings before the Immigration Judge.

Liu v. Attorney General · filed 2011-05-13(c)(3)(ii)

The time and number requirements do not apply to motions that rely on evidence of “changed country conditions,” INA § 240(c)(7)(C)(ii) [8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii)], or “changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality . . . if such evidence is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the previous hearing.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). The term “previous hearing” in § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) refers to the proceedings before the IJ.

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) makes the time limits for a motion to reopen inapplicable when the alien presents material evidence of changed country conditions that was previously unavailable and could not previously have been discovered or presented.

Guo Ju Huang, Guang Zhen Huang vs U.S. Attorney General · filed 2011-05-31(c)(3)(ii)

Nevertheless, the time limits are inapplicable if the alien can demonstrate “changed country conditions arising in the country of nationality or the country to which deportation has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the previous hearing.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) imposes a time limit on motions to reopen, and § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) provides a regulatory exception based on qualifying changed circumstances in the country of nationality.

Khudaverdyan v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2011-06-22(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Khudaverdyan’s motion to reopen as untimely because the motion was filed more than three years after the BIA’s final decision, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and Khudaverdyan failed to establish changed circumstances in Armenia to qualify for the regulatory exception to the time limitation, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); see also Toufighi v. Mukasey, 538 F.3d 988, 996 (9th Cir. 2008) (evidence must demonstrate prima facie eligibility for relief in order to reopen proceedings based on changed country conditions); Nagoulko v. INS, 333 F.3d 1012, 1018 (9th Cir. 2003) (possibility of future harm too speculative).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) makes a motion to reopen untimely when filed more than three years after the BIA's final removal order, unless the regulatory exception applies, and section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) requires changed country conditions for that exception.

Lin v. Holder Jr. · filed 2011-06-23(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Lin’s motion to reopen as untimely because Lin filed it over three years after the BIA issued its final removal order, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and Lin failed to demonstrate changed country conditions, including a change in laws or the enforcement of family planning laws, to qualify for the regulatory exception to the time limit for filing motions to reopen, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); Lin v. Holder, 588 F.3d 981, 988-989 (9th Cir. 2009); He, 501 F.3d at 1132-33.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) imposes a 90-day deadline for a motion to reopen, while subsection (c)(3)(ii) exempts a motion based on changed circumstances in the country of nationality only when the supporting evidence is material and previously unavailable or undiscoverable.

Bektesevic v. Holder · filed 2011-06-15(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

The 90-day filing deadline for motions to reopen does not apply, however, if a motion is “based on changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality . . . [and] if such evidence is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the previous hearing.”

Section 1003.2(c)(2) generally bars motions to reopen filed more than 90 days after the final removal order, while § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) provides an exception when the movant establishes materially changed conditions in the country of nationality.

Espinel v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2011-06-29(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Espinel’s motion to reopen as untimely where it was filed more than 90 days after the BIA’s final removal order, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and Espinel failed to establish changed circumstances in Venezuela to qualify for the regulatory exception to the time limitation, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); see also Toufighi v. Mukasey, 538 F.3d 988, 996 (9th Cir. 2008) (requiring movant to produce material evidence with motion to reopen that conditions in country of nationality had changed).

The exception to the time and numerical limits covers motions to reopen for asylum or withholding based on material, previously unavailable changed circumstances in the country of nationality or the country to which removal has been ordered.

Gyamtso v. Attorney General of the United States · filed 2011-08-01(c)(3)(ii)

However, the time and numerical limitations do not apply to motions to reopen to apply or reapply for asylum or withholding of removal based on changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality or the country to which removal has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available and would not have been discovered or presented at the previous proceeding. ... As mentioned, Gyamtso admitted that his motion was untimely, but filed it pursuant to § 1003.2(c)(3)(h). However, the Board does not appear to have reviewed Gyamtso’s motion pursuant to the requirements of that regulation. ... Instead, for reasons which are unclear, the Board analyzed whether the evidence that Gyamtso’s presented with his motion demonstrated changed conditions in China, rather than in India, the country to which he was ordered removed.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) imposes a 90-day deadline for motions to reopen, while § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) permits reopening based on material evidence of changed country conditions.

Olumuyiwa v. Attorney General of the United States · filed 2011-05-20(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

Olumuyiwa’s motion to reopen was untimely because she did not file it within ninety days of the BIA’s previous decision. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). Thus, to obtain reopening, she had to present material evidence of “changed country conditions arising in” Nigeria. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii).

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) permits reopening when material evidence establishes changed country conditions, and its materiality requirement requires the BIA to qualitatively assess the submitted evidence.

Zheng v. Attorney General of the United States · filed 2010-10-04(c)(3)(ii)

Indeed, we note that 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) provides that reopening may be granted if “material” evidence establishes changed country conditions. This materiality requirement contemplates a qualitative assessment by the BIA of the evidence submitted.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) generally permits only one motion to reopen filed within 90 days, while § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) excepts qualifying asylum motions based on material, previously unavailable changed country conditions.

Chao v. Board of Immigration Appeals · filed 2010-10-05(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

An alien may only file one motion to reopen and must do so within 90 days of the agency’s final administrative decision. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). Petitioners’ motion was indisputably untimely because it was filed more than three years after the BIA entered its final order of removal. However, the time limitation does not apply to a motion to reopen seeking to apply for asylum “based on changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality or in the country to which deportation has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the previous hearing.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). ... We have previously reviewed the agency’s consideration of evidence similar to that which petitioners submitted and have found no error in its conclusion that such evidence is insufficient to establish either changed country conditions excusing the time limit for filing a motion to reopen or a realistic chance of forced sterilization.

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires material, genuinely new evidence for reopening, while § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) excuses the normal time and one-motion limits only when the motion is based on changed country conditions.

Boules v. U.S. Attorney General · filed 2010-10-12(c)(1), (c)(3)(ii)

Generally, the motion to reopen must be filed within ninety days of the final administrative removal order. INA § 240(c)(7)(C)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). However, the ninety-day deadline and one-motion limit do not apply if the motion to reopen is based on changed country conditions. INA § 240(c)(7)(C)(ii), 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). Because motions to reopen removal proceedings are disfavored, the movant bears a “heavy burden.” Zhang v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 572 F.3d 1316, 1319 (11th Cir. 2009). To succeed on a motion to reopen, the movant must show that there is new evidence that is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the removal hearing. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1); see also Verano-Velasco v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 456 F.3d 1372, 1376 (11th Cir. 2006); Abdi, 430 F.3d at 1149. Evidence is not “new” if it was available and could have been presented at the alien’s former hearing. Verano-Velasco, 456 F.3d at 1377. To be “material,” the evidence must be the kind that, if the proceedings were reopened, would likely change the result in the case. See Ali v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 443 F.3d 804, 813 (11th Cir. 2006). ... We agree with the BIA that most of the petitioners’ evidence does not show a material change has occurred in Egypt since their removal proceedings in February 2008. Most of their evidence shows that Coptic Christians continue to be subjected to sporadic incidents of harassment and violence by Islamic extremists, not that such mistreatment has recently escalated. Additionally, some of the petitioners’ evidence pre-dates their February 2008 removal hearing, and they do not explain how that evidence was previously unavailable.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) generally limits an alien to one motion to reopen filed within 90 days, while § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) removes that time limit when materially changed country conditions in the country of nationality are established with previously unavailable evidence.

Zhou Sun Ni v. Holder · filed 2010-10-13(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

An alien may only file one motion to reopen and must do so within 90 days of the final administrative decision. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). Ni’s motion to reopen – filed over six years after the BIA issued a final order in his case – was untimely. However, there is no time limitation if the alien establishes materially “changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality if such evidence . . . was not available . . . at the previous hearing.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). Although Ni argues that his former wife’s testimony will corroborate his own prior testimony that he was forcibly sterilized and was not previously available, the BIA properly noted that such evidence does not establish a change in country conditions, as required under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). Thus, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Ni’s motion to reopen.

Section 1003.2(b)(1) requires a motion to reconsider to identify specific factual or legal errors in the prior BIA decision and support them with pertinent authority; § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) excuses the motion-to-reopen time and number limits when the alien establishes material changed country conditions.

Lilliam De Jesus Larios-Garcia v. U.S. Attorney General · filed 2012-09-25(b)(1); (c)(3)(ii)

A motion to reconsider shall state the reasons for the motion by specifying the errors of fact or law in the prior [BIA] decision and shall be supported by pertinent authority. ... Here, the BIA did not abuse its discretion by denying Larios-Garcia’s motion, construed as a motion to reconsider its prior decision denying her motion to reopen, because she failed to identify any specific error of fact or law in that prior decision. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(6)(C). ... In addition, the BIA did not abuse its discretion by denying her motion, construed as a motion to reopen, because she failed to establish material, changed circumstances in country conditions that excuse the time and number-bar. INA § 240(c)(7)(C)(ii), 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii).

Section 1003.2 distinguishes motions to reopen, which rely on new facts supported by evidence, from motions to reconsider, which identify errors of fact or law and must be filed within 30 days.

Lin v. U.S. Dept. of Justice · filed 2007-04-10(c)(1), (b)(1), (b)(2)

A motion to reopen must include “new facts that will be proven at a hearing to be held if the motion is granted and shall be supported by affidavits or other evidentiary material.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1). A motion to reconsider, on *46the other hand, specifies “errors of fact or law in the prior Board decision.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1). Because Lin did not allege new facts, but argued only that the BIA had erred in its previous decision, the motion was properly construed as a motion to reconsider. ... A motion to reconsider “must be filed with the Board within 30 days after the mailing of the Board decision.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(2). The BIA’s decision denying Lin’s claim on the merits was rendered in March 2005. Lin did not file his motion until June 2005, well past the 30-day deadline. As such, the BIA properly denied the motion as untimely.

A motion styled as a motion to reconsider is substantively a motion to reopen when it asserts new facts and evidence.

Singh v. Gonzales · filed 2006-03-28(b)(1)

The BIA correctly held that Singh’s motion to reconsider substantively constituted a second motion to reopen, as it asserted new facts and evidence that Singh was unable to submit in sufficient time to accompany his initial motion to reopen. See Socop-Gonzalez v. INS, 272 F.3d 1176, 1180 & n. 2 (9th Cir.2001) (distinguishing motions to reopen and reconsider); see also 8 U.S.C. 1229a(c)(6)(C); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) supports denying a motion to reopen as untimely when it was filed more than two years after the final decision, while § 1003.2(b)(1) supports denying reconsideration when the movant identified no error of fact or law.

Mendez-Alvarez v. Gonzales · filed 2006-07-28(c)(2), (b)(1)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Mendez-Alvarez’s motion to reopen as untimely where the motion was filed more than two years after its final decision. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). ... The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Mendez-Alvarez’s motion to reconsider because she failed to identify any error of fact or law in the BIA’s order denying her motion to reopen. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1).

Section 1003.2 distinguishes motions to reopen from motions to reconsider, requires material evidence that was previously unavailable for reopening, and imposes a 90-day filing deadline for motions to reopen subject to equitable tolling.

Chen v. Gonzales · filed 2007-03-21(c)(1), (b)(1), and (c)(2)

The language of Chen’s argument mirrors that found in the regulations defining motions to reopen. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1) (“A motion to reopen proceedings shall not be granted unless it appears to the Board that evidence sought to be offered is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing.” (emphasis added)). Moreover, the BIA correctly found that Chen’s motion did not meet the standard of a motion to reconsider because it “failed to present any additional legal arguments, a change of law, or an argument or aspect of the case which was not previously considered by the Board.” See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1). ... Furthermore, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in finding that Chen’s motion was untimely and did not qualify for equitable tolling, of the 90-day statute of limitations applied to motions to reopen. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2).

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires reopening evidence to be material and previously unavailable, while § 1003.2(b)(1) requires reconsideration motions to identify factual or legal errors and cite pertinent authority.

Singh v. Gonzales · filed 2007-04-18(c)(1), (b)(1)

Such a motion “shall not be granted unless it appears to the Board that evidence sought to be offered is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing.” ... Failure to offer such evidence is, therefore, a proper ground on which the BIA may deny a motion to reopen, as is the movant’s failure to establish a prima facie case for the underlying substantive relief sought. ... A motion to reconsider must specify errors of fact or law in the BIA’s decision and be supported with pertinent authority. ... “The BIA does not abuse its discretion by denying a motion to reconsider where the motion repeats arguments that the BIA has previously rejected.”

Section 1003.2(b)(2) requires a motion to reconsider to be filed within 30 days after the BIA decision is mailed, and section 1003.2(c)(1) requires a motion to reopen to state the new facts to be proven and include new and material evidence.

Salazar v. Gonzales · filed 2007-06-12(b)(2), (c)(1)

The regulations state that a motion to reconsider must be filed with the BIA within 30 days after the mailing of the BIA decision. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(2). ... The regulations also provide that a motion to reopen proceedings shall state the new facts that will be proven at a hearing to be held if the motion is granted and shall be supported by new and material evidence. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1).

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires a motion to reopen to state new facts and include supporting evidence, while § 1003.2(b)(1) requires a motion to reconsider to identify factual or legal errors in the prior Board decision and cite pertinent authority.

Lin v. Immigration & Naturalization Service · filed 2007-08-01(c)(1) and (b)(1)

Although Lin titled his motion a “motion to reopen,” the BIA properly construed it as a motion to reconsider because the motion did not assert any new facts or submit any new evidence; rather, it merely reasserted Lin’s claims for asylum and withholding of removal and stated that he wanted the proceedings “reopened for reconsideration.” See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1) (“A motion to reopen proceedings shall state the new facts that will b.e proven at a hearing to be held if the motion is granted and shall be supported by affidavits or other evidentiary material.”); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1) (“A motion to reconsider shall state the reasons for the motion by specifying the errors of fact or law in the prior Board decision and shall be supported by pertinent authority.”); Ke Zhen Zhao v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 265 F.3d 83, 90-91 (2d Cir.2001).

Subsections (b)(1) and (c)(2) require a motion to reconsider to identify an error of fact or law and numerically bar a second motion to reopen.

Navarro-Pulido v. Gonzales · filed 2007-08-22(b)(1), (c)(2)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion when it denied Navarro-Pulido’s motion to reconsider because it faded to identify any error of fact or law in the BIA’s prior decision. ... The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Navarro-Pulido’s second motion to reopen as numerically barred.

Section 1003.2 treats legal challenges to a prior BIA decision as motions to reconsider and requires those motions to be filed within 30 days, while motions to reopen address new facts.

Rochel-Romero v. Mukasey · filed 2008-03-18(b)(1), (b)(2)

Such a legal argument should be presented to the BIA in the form of a motion to reconsider, not in a motion to reopen. A motion to reopen should be based upon alleged new facts that bear upon the agency’s earlier decision. ... Also, we cannot construe Rochel-Romero’s motion to reopen as a motion to reconsider because it would not be timely. His motion was filed well beyond the thirty day period set in 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(2) for filing a motion to reconsider.

Section 1003.2(b)(2) prohibits a second motion to reconsider absent applicable exceptions, and section 1003.2(c)(2) prohibits a second motion to reopen absent applicable exceptions.

Carandia v. Gonzales · filed 2007-05-14(b)(2), (c)(2)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion by construing petitioner’s motion to reopen as a motion to reconsider, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a)-(c), or by denying petitioner’s second motion to reconsider; a second motion to reconsider, absent certain exceptions that do not apply to this case, is prohibited under the regulations. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(2); Lara-Torres v. Ashcroft, 383 F.3d 968, 972 (9th Cir.2004), amended on other grounds by 404 F.3d 1105 (9th Cir.2005). Moreover, the motion would have been petitioner’s second motion to reopen, which, absent certain exceptions that do not apply to this case, is also prohibited under the regulations. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) bars a second motion to reopen filed nearly five years after the BIA’s final decision, while § 1003.2(b)(1) requires a motion to reconsider to specify errors of fact or law rather than introduce new evidence.

Mangar v. Mukasey · filed 2008-12-10(c)(2), (b)(1)

The BIA properly denied Man-gar’s May 2007 motion to reopen as time and number barred, where it was his second such motion and it was filed almost 5 years after the BIA’s final decision in his case. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). ... While a motion to reconsider must specify errors of fact or law in the BIA’s decision, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1), Mangar sought to introduce new evidence in his motion to reconsider.

Section 1003.2 limits motions to reopen to one filed within 90 days and requires new facts supported by affidavits or other evidence; it permits only one motion to reconsider within 30 days, requires specification of factual or legal error, and does not authorize reconsideration of a decision denying a prior motion to reconsider.

Khalil v. Attorney General · filed 2009-02-05(b)(1), (c)(1), (c)(2), (b)(2)

We conclude that the Board did not abuse its discretion in denying Khalil’s second motion to reopen and second motion for reconsideration. The Board correctly determined in denying the motion to reopen that it was time and number barred, 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). See also 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7). Only one motion to reopen is permitted, id., and this was Khalil’s second, and since the Board’s original decision was dated October 10, 2007, the current motion, filed on March 13, 2008, was untimely in that it was not filed within 90 days of that decision, id. Furthermore, a “motion to reopen proceedings shall state the new facts that will be proven at a hearing to be held if the motion is granted and shall be supported by affidavits or other evidentiary material.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1). The Board correctly determined that the second motion to reopen presented no new evidence. ... For similar reasons, the Board did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion for reconsideration. An alien may file one motion to reconsider within thirty days of the date of the decision. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(6); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(2). The regulations do not authorize an alien to seek reconsideration of a decision denying a previous motion to reconsider. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(2). We further agree with the Board that there also was no basis for reconsidering the prior decision in that Khalil failed to specify any error of fact or law in the Board’s previous decision. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1).

Section 1003.2(b)(1) requires a motion to reconsider to specify errors of fact or law, and § 1003.2(c)(2) bars a numerically barred motion to reopen based on additional evidence.

Bista v. Holder · filed 2009-05-04(b)(1), (c)(2)

Here, the BIA properly denied Bista’s motion to reconsider where he failed to specify errors of fact or law in the BIA’s decision as required by 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1). ... The BIA, moreover, properly considered Bista’s effort to submit additional evidence as a numerically barred motion to reopen and did not abuse its discretion in denying it as such.

Section 1003.2 requires material, previously unavailable evidence for reopening based on changed circumstances, preserves the Board’s discretion to deny reopening even after a prima facie showing, and requires a reconsideration motion to specify errors of fact or law and cite pertinent authority.

Alomba v. U.S. Atty. Gen. · filed 2009-06-03(c)(3), (a), (b)(1)

In a motion to reopen on the basis of changed circumstances, the alien must show material evidence that was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the previous hearing. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3). ... Nonetheless, “[t]he Board has discretion to deny a motion to reopen even if the party moving has made out a prima facie case for relief.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a). ... “A motion to reconsider shall state the reasons for the motion by specifying the errors of fact or law in the prior [BIA] decision and shall be supported by pertinent authority.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(6)(C), INA § 240(c)(6)(C).

Section 1003.2 distinguishes motions to reconsider, which challenge legal or factual determinations already made by the Board, from motions to reopen, which present new facts supporting relief from removal.

Long Quan Piao v. Attorney General for the United States · filed 2009-12-22(b)(1), (c)(1)

A motion to reconsider properly challenges determinations of law and fact already made by the Board. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1). In contrast, a motion to reopen seeks to present new facts that would entitle the alien to relief from removal. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1). Since Piao sought to introduce new facts concerning his prior counsel’s negligence in filing the notice of appeal to the Board two days late, his motion was properly construed as a motion to reopen.

Section 1003.2(b)(1) requires a motion to reconsider to specify an error of fact or law; subsection (c)(2) makes a motion to reopen filed three years after the BIA's order untimely; and subsection (a)'s sua sponte reopening authority is not subject to judicial review.

Zapeta v. Holder · filed 2010-01-13(b)(1), (c)(2), (a)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Barrera Zapeta’s motion as a motion to reconsider. The motion failed to specify an error of fact or law with respect to the BIA’s prior determination that her February 1, 2006, motion to reopen was untimely. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1). ... The BIA also did not abuse its discretion in denying as untimely the motion as a motion to reopen where it was filed 3 years after the BIA’s order dismissing the underlying appeal. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). ... We lack jurisdiction to review the BIA’s decision not to invoke its sua sponte authority to reopen proceedings under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a). See Ekimian v. INS, 303 F.3d 1153, 1159 (9th Cir. 2002).

Section 1003.2(b)(1) requires a motion to reconsider to identify an error of fact or law in the prior decision, while § 1003.2(c)(1) requires evidence supporting a motion to reopen to have been unavailable or undiscoverable at the time of the removal hearing.

Johal v. Holder · filed 2010-04-16(b)(1) (c)(1)

The BIA acted within its discretion in denying Johal’s motion to reopen and reconsider because the motion failed to identify any error of fact or law in the BIA’s prior decision, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1), and Johal did not demonstrate that the polygraph evidence submitted was unavailable or incapable of being discovered at the time of his removal hearing, see Goel v. Gonzales, 490 F.3d 735, 738 (9th Cir.2007); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1).

Section 1003.2(a) makes the BIA’s decision to grant or deny a motion to reopen or reconsider discretionary.

Thind v. Holder · filed 2010-04-21(a)

The BIA’s decision to grant or deny a motion to reopen or reconsider is discretionary.

A motion to reconsider must specify errors of fact or law in the prior Board decision and include pertinent authority, while a second motion to reopen is numerically barred unless a listed exception applies.

Gutierrez v. Holder · filed 2010-05-19(b)(1), (c)(2), (c)(3)

“A motion to reconsider shall state the reasons for the motion by specifying the errors of fact or law in the prior Board decision and shall be supported by pertinent authority.” ... “The BIA also did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioners’ September 1, 2006, motion to reopen as numerically barred. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A) (an alien may only file one motion to reopen removal proceedings unless an exception applies); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). This was petitioners’ second motion to reopen the proceedings, and petitioners did not establish that any of the exceptions in 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3) to the numerical bar applied.”

Section 1003.2(b)(1) requires a motion to reconsider to specify errors of fact or law and cite pertinent authority, while § 1003.2(c)(1) permits reopening only for material evidence that was previously unavailable and could not have been discovered or presented earlier.

Victor v. Holder · filed 2010-08-06(b)(1), (c)(1)

A motion to reconsider “shall state the reasons for the motion by specifying the errors of fact or law in the prior Board decision and shall be supported by pertinent authority.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1). ... But neither of these alleged errors in the IJ’s decision are the sort of error of fact or law warranting relief in a motion to reconsider. ... Thus, the BIA did not abuse its discretion when it denied Victor’s motion to reconsider. ... The BIA has discretion to reopen a removal proceeding when the alien presents material evidence that “was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1). ... Here too, the BIA was within its considerable discretion when it denied Victor’s motion to reopen. ... Thus, the BIA did not abuse its discretion by denying Victor’s motion to reopen.

Section 1003.2(a) governs motions to reconsider before the Board, whose denials are reviewed for abuse of discretion.

Zeherye v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2011-11-17(a)

The denial of a motion to reconsider is reviewed for abuse of discretion. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a) (2011); Narine v. Holder, 559 F.3d 246, 249 (4th Cir. 2009); Jean v. Gonzales, 435 F.3d 475, 481 (4th Cir. 2006).

Section 1003.2(b)(1) requires a motion to reconsider to identify errors of fact or law and be filed within 30 days after the BIA decision is mailed; section 1003.2(c)(1) requires a motion to reopen to rely on material evidence that was previously unavailable and could not have been presented earlier.

Palomino-Alzamora v. Holder · filed 2012-02-22(b)(1), (c)(1)

“A motion to reconsider shall state the reasons for the motion by specifying the errors of fact or law in the prior [BIA] decision . . . [and] must be filed with the [BIA] within 30 days after the mailing of the [BIA] decision.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(6)(B), (C). Palomino-Alzamora’s motion to reconsider was untimely, as it was filed 81 days after the BIA’s decision was mailed. ... However, a “motion to reopen proceedings shall not be granted unless it appears to the [BIA] that evidence sought to be offered is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing.” See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(B). As the BIA noted, Palomino-Alzamora did not submit or identify any additional evidence regarding her underlying request for relief from removal. Consequently, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying her motion to reopen.

Section 1003.2(b)(1) requires a motion to reconsider to identify errors of fact or law in the challenged BIA decision and be supported by pertinent authority.

Medic v. Holder · filed 2012-07-05(b)(1)

A motion to reconsider must “specify errors of fact or law in the [challenged BIA decision] and [] be supported by pertinent authority.” See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(6); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1); Ke Zhen Zhao v. Mukasey, 265 F.3d 83, 90 (2d Cir. 2001).

Section 1003.2(b)(1) requires a motion to reconsider to identify an error of law or fact, while § 1003.2(c)(1) requires supporting evidence for reopening or remand to have been unavailable at the prior hearing.

Melgar v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2012-10-15(b)(1), (c)(1)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Melgar’s motion to reconsider where she did not identify any error of law or fact in the BIA’s previous determinations that she did not qualify for cancellation of removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a), and that her motion to remand failed to show that the evidence she had submitted was not available at the time of her hearing before the immigration judge. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1), (c)(1); Romero-Ruiz v. Mukasey, 538 F.3d 1057, 1063 (9th Cir. 2008) (“The formal requirements of a motion to remand and a motion to reopen are the same.”)

A motion to reconsider must identify an error of fact or law in the prior decision.

Alvarado-Castillo v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2012-11-16(b)(1)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Alvarado-Castillo’s motion to reconsider because the motion failed to identify any error of fact or law in the BIA’s prior decision upholding the denial of petitioner’s applications for relief. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1).

A motion to reconsider must identify an error of fact or law in the prior BIA order.

Alberto-Canaca v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2012-11-19(b)(1)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Alberto-Canaca’s motion to reconsider because the motion failed to identify any error of fact or law in the BIA’s prior order. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1).

Section 1003.2 requires a motion to reconsider to identify errors of law or fact and be supported by pertinent authority, and permits reopening only when the new evidence is material and previously unavailable.

Azuaje-Rengel v. U.S. Attorney General · filed 2013-01-17(b)(1) (c)(1)

A motion to reconsider must specify the errors of law or fact in the prior BIA decision and must be supported by pertinent authority. ... The BIA has the discretion to deny a motion to reopen for failing to introduce evidence that was material and previously unavailable. ... 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1) (stating that the BIA shall not grant a motion to reopen unless it appears that the evidence that the petitioner seeks to offer is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing).

Section 1003.2(b)(1) requires a motion to reconsider to identify an error of law or fact in the underlying decision.

Turangan v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2013-04-22(b)(1)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Turangan’s motion to reconsider where Turangan did not point to any error of law or fact in the BIA’s underlying decision. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1).

Section 1003.2(a) provides that denial of a motion to reconsider is reviewed for abuse of discretion, and § 1003.2(b)(1) requires the motion to specify the factual or legal error in the Board’s prior decision.

Martinez v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2013-05-30(a), (b)(1)

The denial of a motion to reconsider is reviewed for abuse of discretion. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a) (2012); Narine v. Holder, 559 F.3d 246, 249 (4th Cir. 2009); Jean v. Gonzales, 435 F.3d 475, 481 (4th Cir. 2006). A motion to reconsider asserts that the Board made an error in its earlier decision. The movant must specify the error of fact or law in the Board’s prior decision. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1).

Section 1003.2(c) requires a motion to reopen to state new facts to be proved at a hearing and include affidavits or other evidence, while § 1003.2(b)(1) permits reconsideration based on a change in law only when the motion also identifies a factual or legal error in the prior decision.

Rangel-Perez v. U.S. Attorney General · filed 2013-07-18(c), (b), (b)(1)

Given that the purpose of a motion to reopen is to present new facts, it is doubtful a motion to reopen is the proper vehicle to argue a change in the law. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c) (requiring motion to reopen to “state the new facts that will be proven at a hearing to be held if the motion is granted” and to be “supported by affidavits or other evidentiary material”); ... Unlike a motion to reopen, a motion to reconsider filed pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b) may be based on a change in the law. ... A motion to reconsider, however, must also show a factual or legal error in the BIA’s prior decision—in this case, the BIA’s decision affirming the IJ’s denial of Rangel-Perez’s first motion to reopen. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1); ...

Subsection (b)(1) governs motions to reconsider before the BIA, while subsection (c)(2) limits motions to reopen by requiring denial of untimely and number-barred motions.

Duan v. Holder Jr. · filed 2013-12-18(b)(1), (c)(2)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Duan’s motion to reconsider. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(6); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1). The motion did not allege errors of fact or law, but instead was based on new evidence. The BIA properly construed the motion to reconsider as a motion to reopen, and thus did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion as untimely and number-barred. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2).

Section 1003.2(b) requires a motion to reconsider to identify factual or legal errors and cite pertinent authority, while § 1003.2(c)(1) requires a motion to reopen to present material new evidence that was previously unavailable.

Mshihiri v. Eric H. Holder, Jr. · filed 2014-05-29(b), (c)(1)

A motion to reconsider must identify “errors of fact or law in the prior Board decision and shall be supported by pertinent authority.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b). ... Consequently, Mshihiri did not point to any legal or factual errors in the BIA’s February 14 order, and the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion. ... A motion to reopen must present new evidence that “is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1). ... It was thus available six years before the final hearing before the IJ. ... Consequently, the BIA did not abuse its discretion by denying Mshihiri’s motion to reopen.

Section 1003.2(a) places decisions on motions to reopen or reconsider within the Board of Immigration Appeals’ discretion, subject to abuse-of-discretion review.

Abdelghani v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2014-06-03(a)

The decision to grant or deny a motion to reopen or reconsider is within the discretion of the Board." 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2. Accordingly, the BIA enjoys “broad discretion” in deciding whether or not to reopen proceedings. I.N.S. v. Rios-Pineda, 471 U.S. 444, 449 (1985). The BIA’s decision to grant or deny a motion to reopen will survive review for abuse of discretion unless the BIA’s decision is, “arbitrary, irrational, or contrary to law.” Babai v. I.N.S., 985 F.2d 252, 255 (6th Cir. 1993). Thus a court must affirm the BIA’s denial of a motion to re-open as long as the BIA provided, “a rational basis for its decision, including an explanation of any departure from established policies, and the decision [does] not rest on an impermissible basis, such as invidious discrimination.” Gor v. Holder, 607 F.3d 180, 197 (6th Cir. 2010).

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires a motion to reopen to be supported by new evidence, while § 1003.2(b)(1) requires a motion to reconsider to specify errors of fact or law and support them with pertinent authority.

Nabe v. Attorney General United States · filed 2015-12-14(c)(1), (b)(1)

First, the BIA did not commit legal or constitutional error by declining to reopen the proceedings where Nabe did not submit any—much less new—evidence supporting his motion. See 8 C.F.R. §1003.2(c)(1). Second, a motion for reconsideration is a “request that [the BIA] reexamine its decision in light of additional legal arguments, a change of law, or perhaps an argument or aspect of the case which was overlooked.” In re Ramos, 23 I. & N. Dec. 336, 338 (BIA 2002) (en banc) (quotation marks omitted). Accordingly, Nabe was required to “state the reasons for the motion by specifying the errors of fact or law in the prior . . . decision” and support those assertions with “pertinent authority.” 8 C.F.R. §1003.2(b)(1); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(6)(C).

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires a motion to reopen to identify material evidence that was unavailable and could not have been discovered or presented at the prior hearing, while § 1003.2(b)(1) requires a motion to reconsider to identify specific legal or factual errors in the prior BIA decision and cite relevant authority.

Toure v. Attorney General United States · filed 2017-03-10(c)(1), (b)(1)

As the BIA duly noted, a motion to reopen will only be granted if “it appears to the Board that evidence sought to be offered is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing,” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1), and a motion to reconsider must cite specific errors of law or fact in the prior BIA decision with citations to relevant authority, 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1). Toure did not make those showings.

A motion to reconsider must specify legal or factual errors in the prior decision and cannot serve as a vehicle for introducing new facts.

Kuffour v. Sessions · filed 2018-10-26(b)(1) (c)

Such a motion must therefore specify the asserted errors, 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1), and not merely "regurgitate[] contentions that were previously made and rejected." ... A motion to reconsider is also not the proper vehicle for introducing new facts; reconsideration "contests the correctness of the original decision based on the previous factual record, as opposed to a motion to reopen, which seeks a new hearing based on new or previously unavailable evidence." In re O-S-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 57-58; see also 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c).

Section 1003.2(c)(1) governs motions to reopen based on changed circumstances and requires supporting evidence that was unavailable at the former hearing.

Gonzalez v. Garland · filed 2021-10-20(b)(1), (c)(1)

Remand is available in two contexts before the BIA: when an alien seeks reconsideration of a decision or when an alien seeks to have the proceedings reopened. Although these motions are often treated interchangeably, a request for reconsideration is based upon “errors of fact or law in the prior Board decision,” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1), whereas a request to reopen proceedings results from changed circumstances and specifically contemplates that an alien will do so “for the purpose of submitting an application for relief,” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1). ... One of these requirements is that the motion be “supported by affidavits or other evidentiary material,” which is “material that was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1).

Section 1003.2(b)(1) requires a motion to reconsider to specify errors of law or fact; § 1003.2(b)(2) bars reconsideration of a decision denying a prior motion to reconsider; and § 1003.2(c)(1) requires reopening evidence to be material and previously unavailable or undiscoverable or unpresentable at the former hearing.

Omoju v. Garland · filed 2022-11-01(b)(1), (b)(2), (c)(1)

A motion to reconsider “shall specify the errors of law or fact in the previous order and shall be supported by pertinent authority.” 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(6)(C); see also 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1). ... and “may not seek reconsideration of a decision denying a previous motion to reconsider,” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(2). ... The motion was number barred and improperly sought reconsideration of an order denying reconsideration. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(6)(A); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(2). ... “A motion to reopen . . . shall not be granted . . . unless the evidence sought to be offered is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1).

Section 1003.2 requires a motion to reopen within 90 days of the final administrative decision and a motion to reconsider within 30 days of the Board’s decision; reconsideration must identify errors of fact or law.

Ruballos v. Ashcroft · filed 2004-12-13

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Ruballos’s motion to reopen. Ruballos filed her motion to reopen on June 27, 2003, more than six months after the BIA issued its final order of removal on October 17, 2002. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2) (a motion to reopen “must be filed no later than 90 days after the date on which the final administrative decision was rendered in the proceeding sought to be reopened”). No exceptions to the 90 day limitation apply in this case. ... We also conclude that the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Ruballos’s motion for reconsideration as untimely. Ruballos’s former attorney filed this motion on June 11, 2003, more than sixth months after the BIA’s final order of removal. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(2) (“A motion to reconsider a decision must be filed with the Board within 30 days after the mailing of the Board decision ... ”). Moreover, Ruballos’ motion for reconsideration did not specify any “errors of fact or law in the prior Board decision” that would warrant granting the motion.

A motion to reconsider must identify an error of fact or law in the prior decision; a filing that instead presents new evidence is treated as a motion to reopen.

Mohammed v. Mukasey · filed 2008-05-30(b)(1)

Mohammed’s second motion, entitled a “Motion to Reconsider,” was likewise properly construed by the agency as a motion to reopen because it presented new evidence and did not assert any errors of law or fact in the earlier decision.

Section 1003.2(c) requires a motion to reopen to be supported by new material evidence that could not have been discovered and presented at the former hearing.

Singh v. Gonzales · filed 2006-08-24(c)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to reopen because petitioner failed to support the motion with the requisite new material evidence which could not have been discovered and presented at the former hearing. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c); see also Konstantinova v. INS, 195 F.3d 528, 530 (9th Cir.1999).

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires a motion to reopen to state the new facts to be proven at the hearing and to include affidavits or other evidentiary material supporting those facts.

Cestari-Cuenca v. Mukasey · filed 2008-12-03(c)(1)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Cestari-Cuenca’s motion to reopen because Cestari-Cuenca failed to set forth new facts or present new evidence. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1) (a motion to reopen “shall state the new facts that will be proven at a hearing to be held if the motion is granted and shall be supported by affidavits or other evidentiary material”).

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires a motion to reopen to state the new facts to be proven at a hearing and be supported by affidavits or other evidentiary material.

Dong v. Filip · filed 2009-02-02(c)(1)

Under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1), a “motion to reopen proceedings shall state the new facts that will be proven at a hearing to be held if the motion is granted and shall be supported by affidavits or other evidentiary material.”

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires a motion to reopen to state the new facts to be proved and show that the supporting evidence is material and was previously unavailable.

Ratnasingam v. Holder · filed 2009-02-12(c)(1)

A motion to reopen deportation proceedings must state "the new facts that will be proven . . . if the motion is granted" and must demonstrate that "evidence sought to be offered is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing." 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1).

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires a motion to reopen to be supported by material evidence, and the BIA may deny the motion when the offered evidence does not meaningfully show the claimed likelihood of torture.

Solorzano-Rodri v. Holder Jr. · filed 2011-10-06(c)(1)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Solorzano-Rodriguez’s motion to reopen on the grounds that he failed to comply with the procedural requirements set forth in Matter of Lozada, 19 I. & N. Dec. 637 (BIA 1988), see Reyes, 358 F.3d at 597, and failed to provide meaningful evidence of a likelihood of torture, see 8 C.F.R. §1003.2(c)(1) (providing that a motion to reopen “shall not be granted unless it appears to the [BIA] that evidence sought to be offered is material”).

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires new evidence supporting a motion to reopen to be material and previously unavailable or undiscoverable at the former hearing.

Barry v. Holder · filed 2012-10-16(c)(1)

Barry fails to establish that the evidence in support of his claim of future persecution was “material” and “was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1). The letter supporting Barry’s claim that he participates in pro-democracy activities in the United States reflects that he has been a member of the Union for the Development of the Fouta Djallon since 2007 – nearly two years prior to his April 2009 merits hearing. Barry does not explain how evidence of his political activities in the United States was unavailable at the time of that hearing. The various news articles about mistreatment of Peuhl people fail to establish a “pattern or practice” of persecution. 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(2)(iii). Accordingly, the record establishes that Barry failed to satisfy the requirements for reopening, and we “can predict with confidence that the agency would reach the same result” even if it considered Barry’s evidence regarding his ethnicity and his political activities in the United States.

Section 1003.2(c)(1) permits reopening when the alien presents material new evidence that could not have been discovered or presented at the removal hearing.

Ion Zaporojan v. U.S. Attorney General · filed 2012-10-09(c)(1)

The BIA may grant the motion if the alien presents new evidence that is material and could not have been discovered or presented at the removal hearing. Id. § 240(c)(7)(C)(ii), 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); see also 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1). An alien moving to reopen bears “a heavy burden” with respect to materiality in that he must show “that, if the proceedings were opened, the new evidence would likely change the result in the case.” Jiang v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 568 F.3d 1252, 1256-67 (11th Cir. 2009); Ali v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 443 F.3d 804, 813 (11th Cir. 2006). Thus, the BIA may deny a motion to reopen if the new evidence does not establish prima facie eligibility for relief. Al Najjar v. Ashcroft, 257 F.3d 1262, 1302 (11th Cir. 2001).

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires a motion to reopen to state the new facts to be proven at a hearing and to be supported by affidavits or other evidentiary material.

Chen v. Jefferson Sessions · filed 2017-10-03(c)(1)

We are not persuaded by Chen’s contention that the BIA, in noting that Chen had not addressed certain findings or provided corroborating evidence, was impermissibly requiring specific corroboration. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1) (“A motion to reopen proceedings shall state the new facts that will be proven at a hearing to be held if the motion is granted and shall be supported by affidavits or other evidentiary material.”).

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires evidence supporting a motion to reopen to be material and previously unavailable, meaning it could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing.

Singh v. Barr · filed 2019-11-15(c)(1)

The BIA did not err in denying Singh’s motion to reopen because the evidence he offered in support thereof was either not new, or not material in that it merely reinforced country conditions evidence already in the record. Two of the twelve documents that Singh submitted with his motion to reopen pre-date his August 2016 hearing before the IJ, and the relevant evidence that post-dates his hearing details events that occurred before August 2016. Such evidence, therefore, was not previously unavailable or new because it describes conditions and events in India before Singh’s hearing. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1).

Section 1003.2(c)(1) allows reopening only when the offered evidence is material, requiring a showing that it would likely change the result in the case.

Dos Santos v. U. S. Attorney General · filed 2020-12-11(c)(1)

The Board may grant a motion to reopen only if, among other things, the “evidence sought to be offered is material.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1). A petitioner attempting to show materiality bears a “heavy burden” and must present evidence that “would likely change the result in the case.” ... The new evidence Dos Santos wanted to introduce on remand—a photocopy of both her passport and Form I-94—is not material. ... Her new evidence is therefore not material.

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires a party seeking to reopen proceedings to present new evidence that would likely change the outcome of the case.

Jimenez-Araujo v. Garland · filed 2022-05-27(c)(1)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion by denying Jimenez-Araujo’s motion to reopen, because he did not introduce new evidence that would likely have changed the outcome of his case. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1); Shin v. Mukasey, 547 F.3d 1019, 1025 (9th Cir. 2008) (applicants who seek to “reopen proceedings to pursue relief bear a ‘heavy burden’ of proving that, if proceedings were reopened, the new evidence would likely change the result in the case” (quoting Matter of Coelho, 20 I. & N. Dec. 464, 473 (BIA 1992))).

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires a motion to reopen to present new, previously unavailable or undiscoverable evidence that would be material to the proceeding.

Myers v. Bondi · filed 2025-09-08(c)(1)

To justify reopening, Myers was required to adduce new evidence that was neither available nor discoverable before the previous hearing and would be material to the outcome of the proceeding. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1) (2021); see also Xiu Ling Chen v. Holder, 751 F.3d 876, 878 (8th Cir. 2014). ... Accordingly, the Board did not abuse its discretion by denying his motion to reopen on this point.

Section 1003.2(c)(1) defines new evidence as evidence that could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing.

Lemus-Escobar v. Bondi · filed 2025-11-10(c)(1)

The regulation continues to define that term as evidence that “could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1) (emphasis added).

A motion to reopen must state the new facts to be proved and support them with affidavits or other evidence; an unsupported assertion does not warrant remand.

Santana v. Attorney General United States · filed 2015-12-17(c)(1)

Counsel’s bald ... representation that Vasconcelos told counsel that he had sustained “treatment at the hands of ICE” agents similar to that experienced by the alien in Oliva-Ramos is plainly insufficient to warrant remand. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1) (“A motion to reopen proceedings shall state the new facts that will be proven at a hearing to be held if the motion is granted and shall be supported by affidavits or other evidentiary material.”).

Section 1003.2(c)(1)'s procedural requirements for motions to reopen are not discretionary, so a BIA decision applying them is reviewable.

Fernandez v. Gonzales · filed 2006-03-01(c)(1)

Decisions by the BIA that apply the procedural requirements of 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1) are not discretionary under this definition.

Section 1003.2(a) makes motions to reconsider matters within the BIA's discretion, so they generally are not judicially reviewable except when they present constitutional claims or questions of law.

Fedorca v. Mukasey · filed 2008-12-09(a)

Motions to reconsider are within the discretion of the BIA, 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a), and so are generally unreviewable, save those that present constitutional or legal questions.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) sets a deadline for motions to reopen, and the court may review the BIA’s untimeliness decision for abuse of discretion, while § 1003.2(a)’s discretionary refusal to reopen is not reviewable.

Bissoo v. Attorney General of the United States · filed 2010-01-14(c)(2), (a)

We have jurisdiction to review the BIA’s decision to deny the motion to reopen as untimely under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). ... Here, in the absence of any indication in the record to the contrary, we conclude that the BIA’s denial of Bissoo’s motion to reopen as untimely because it was filed almost ten years too late was not arbitrary, irrational, or contrary to law. ... To the extent that Bissoo challenges the BIA’s decision not to invoke its discretionary authority to reopen under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a), we agree with the Government that we lack jurisdiction to review it. ... Accordingly, the Government’s motion to dismiss is granted in part, and we will dismiss for lack of jurisdiction Bissoo’s petition for review of the Board’s decision to deny reopening as a matter of discretion pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a). We will deny the petition for review as to the BIA’s decision that the motion to reopen was untimely pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2).

Section 1003.2(a) gives the Board broad discretion to grant or deny a motion to reopen, but that regulatory discretion does not eliminate federal-court review of the Board’s decision.

Kucana v. Holder · filed 2010-01-20(a)

From the Legislature’s silence on the discretion of the Attorney General (or his delegate, the Board) over reopening motions, see supra, at 243, n. 10, we take it that Congress left the matter where it was pre-IIRIRA: The BIA has broad discretion, conferred by the Attorney General, “to grant or deny a motion to reopen,” 8 CFR § 1003.2(a), but courts retain jurisdiction to review, with due respect, the Board’s decision.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) bars an untimely motion to reopen unless an exception to the time limitation applies, while discretionary sua sponte reopening under § 1003.2(a) is not subject to judicial review.

Li v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2014-08-15(c)(2), (a)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Li’s motion to reopen as untimely where the motion was filed more than three years after the BIA’s final order of removal, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and she has not demonstrated that an exception to the time limitations on motions applies, see id; Socop-Gonzalez, 272 F.3d at 1193. ... We lack jurisdiction to consider the BIA’s discretionary decision not to reopen sua sponte pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a). See Mejia-Hernandez v. Holder, 633 F.3d 818, 823-24 (9th Cir. 2011); see also Matter of G-D-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 1132, 1135 (BIA 1999) (BIA’s consideration of whether a fundamental change in the law warrants reopening involves an exercise of its sua sponte authority).

The Board has discretion to grant or deny a motion to reopen, and courts review denials for abuse of discretion.

Debeatham v. Holder · filed 2010-04-28(a)

Federal regulations, promulgated by the Attorney General, provide that motions to reopen are committed to the discretion of the BIA. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a) (“The decision to grant or deny a motion to reopen . . . is within the discretion of the Board . . . .”). ... Accordingly, we continue to review denials of motions to reopen for “abuse of discretion,” as we did before Kucana.

Section 1003.2 does not warrant dismissing a petition for procedural noncompliance when the BIA considered and rejected the claim on the merits.

NOLOS v. Holder · filed 2010-07-09

The BIA’s decision, however, did not deny Nolos’s ... motion on the ground of noncompliance with 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2. Although the BIA noted that Nolos “could and should have raised this claim during proceedings before the [IJ]” and “failed to support his claim with any evidence or to attach an application for the relief requested,” it went on to consider and reject Nolos’s claim that he was a United States citizen. Against this background, we decline the Government’s invitation to dismiss in part Nolos’s petition on the basis of noncompliance with 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2.