8 C.F.R. § 1003.2

A motion to reconsider before the BIA must identify errors of fact or law in its prior decision and be supported by pertinent authority.

Ortiz v. Jefferson Sessions, III · filed 2017-08-10(b)(2)

“A motion to reconsider shall state the reasons for the motion by specifying the errors of fact or law in the prior [BIA] decision and shall be supported by pertinent authority.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(2). ... He fails to show the BIA abused its discretion in determining he did not show a material error of law or fact.

A motion to reconsider must identify factual or legal errors in the BIA’s prior decision.

Villa-Gastelum v. Garland · filed 2024-02-09(b)(1)

Villa-Gastelum did not identify any factual or legal errors in the BIA’s initial decision, as required for a motion to reconsider. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1).

Section 1003.2(b) requires a motion for reconsideration to specify errors of law or fact in the prior BIA decision.

Liu v. Gonzales · filed 2006-05-10(b)

Moreover, Liu’s motion to reconsider merely reiterated his prior arguments and, thus, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in finding that Liu had failed to demonstrate an error in its prior decision. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b) (providing that a motion for reconsideration must specify errors of law or fact in a prior BIA decision).

Section 1003.2(b)(1) requires a motion for reconsideration to specify errors of fact or law in the prior Board decision and be supported by pertinent authority.

Dong v. Attorney General of the United States · filed 2010-05-19(b)(1)

Such motions “shall state the reasons for the motion by specifying the errors of fact or law in the prior Board decision and shall be supported by pertinent authority.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1). ... In Dong’s case, in denying the motion for reconsideration, the BIA cited 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1) and concluded that his motion for reconsideration demonstrated no error of fact or law in its November 24, 2008 decision, and that Dong therefore failed to meet the regulatory requirements for reconsideration.

The changed-country-conditions exception to the motion-to-reopen deadline applies when the evidence was unavailable and could not have been discovered or presented at the prior Immigration Judge hearing; the BIA appeal is not the relevant “previous hearing.”

Filja v. Atty Gen USA · filed 2006-05-12(c)(3)(ii)

The BIA’s interpretation of “previous hearing” to refer to the proceeding before it rather than to the proceeding before the IJ does violence to the language of 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) when it is construed in conjunction with the language of related statutory and regulatory provisions, and it is inconsistent with the regulatory structure for fact finding and appellate review established in 8 C.F.R. § 1003.0, et seq. The BIA committed an error of law when it held that the Filjas’ motion to reopen and remand was time-barred.

Section 1003.2(c)(2)'s general time limit does not bar a motion to reopen based on changed country conditions when the applicable exception is satisfied.

Tsang v. Gonzales · filed 2007-03-07(c)(2)

To the extent that the BIA denied Tsang’s motion as untimely it did so in error as Tsang asserted changed country conditions as the basis of his motion. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2),(3)(ii).

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) permits a motion to reopen beyond the ninety-day deadline when the movant presents material evidence of changed country conditions.

Singh v. Gonzales · filed 2007-08-24(c)(3)(ii)

Moreover, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in finding that Singh failed to present material evidence of changed country conditions in order to satisfy the exception to this bar. Cf. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); Poradisova v. Gonzales, 420 F.3d 70, 78 (2d Cir.2005).

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) exempts a motion to reopen from the time and numerical limits only when it rests on material evidence of changed country conditions that was previously unavailable and could not have been presented earlier.

Qin Wen Zheng v. Gonzales · filed 2007-08-31(c)(3)(ii)

"A motion to reopen based on changed country conditions, by contrast, depends solely on a showing of previously unavailable, material documentary evidence in support of the underlying proceeding. ... We decide only that in this case the BIA did not abuse its discretion in declining to consider a document -- questionable on its face, supported only by a spouse's affidavit, and not authenticated pursuant to regulation -- that attempts to establish the sweeping proposition that subsequent to the date of the petitioner's entry into the country and application for asylum, country conditions had undergone a material adverse change sufficient to affect his petition for asylum."

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) exempts a motion to reopen from the time and numerical bars only when it is supported by credible, material documentary evidence that was previously unavailable and could not have been discovered or presented at the prior hearing.

Qin Wen Zheng v. Gonzales · filed 2007-09-21(c)(3)(ii)

See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) ("[T]ime and numerical limitations . . . shall not apply to a motion to reopen proceedings . . . based on changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality or in the country to which deportation has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the previous hearing."). ... A motion to reopen based on changed country conditions, by contrast, depends solely on a showing of previously unavailable, material documentary evidence in support of the underlying proceeding. The Board may consider only the documents submitted to establish that conditions have indeed changed critically since the applicant's departure from his home country. ... but the petitioner nevertheless must present credible, documentary evidence in order for the BIA to grant the motion.

Section 1003.2(e)(3)(ii) requires a movant relying on changed country conditions to show that conditions in the country of nationality have worsened or otherwise materially changed since the merits hearing.

Yang v. Mukasey · filed 2008-05-05(e)(3)(ii)

While both articles indicate that some persons who have violated the birth control policy have suffered at the hands of family planning authorities, Yang failed to demonstrate that circumstances in China had worsened, as required by 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(e)(3)(ii); see also Matter of S-Y-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 247, 251 (BIA 2007).

The changed-country-conditions exception permits reopening despite the ordinary time and numerical bars when materially changed conditions in the relevant country support an asylum or withholding claim.

Ni v. Mukasey · filed 2008-05-14(c)(3)(h)

The BIA further properly noted that Ni’s affidavit alleging that his mother told him that others from his home village had been forced to undergo sterilization based on the birth of two children, does not amount to evidence of changed conditions in China. Indeed, Ni fails to show how his affidavit, or any of the documents above, support his assertion that the implementation of the family planning law in China had changed. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(h). Accordingly, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Ni’s motion to reopen.

The changed-country-conditions exception to the time and numerical limits for motions to reopen requires evidence that country conditions have changed; continued violence of the same type underlying the original asylum claim does not qualify.

Singh v. Mukasey · filed 2008-08-15(e)(3)(ii)

We also find that the BIA did not abuse its discretion in finding that Singh failed to show that his motion to reopen qualified for an exception to the time and numerical limitations based on “changed country conditions” in India. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(e)(3)(ii). Singh’s motion to reopen states that “[t]he ... documentation attests that [his aunt and uncle] were killed in June 2006 because of their son and nephew’s involvement with the All India Sikh Student Foundation.” The BIA, however, stated: “[w]hile we sympathize with [Singh] regarding the loss of his family members, he has explained, in his current motion, only that the situation in India continues as it did when he filed his initial” asylum application. Indeed, none of the evidence Singh submitted with his motion demonstrates that country conditions in India have changed. Instead, his evidence reveals that the same type of violence that formed the basis of his original asylum claim continues to occur. Indeed, Singh admitted as much when he stated in his motion to reopen that his aunt and uncle “are the latest members of [his] family to fall victims of the sectarian violence that had already claimed the life of [his] cousin on February 27,1995.” Under these circumstances, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in finding that Singh failed to demonstrate changed country conditions.

Subsection (c)(3)(ii) provides an exception to the time and numerical limits on motions to reopen when conditions in the country to which removal is ordered have materially changed.

Yan Ping Lin v. Mukasey · filed 2008-08-28(c)(3)(ii)

Moreover, we find no abuse of discretion in the BIA’s conclusion that Lin failed to demonstrate that conditions in China have changed such that she met an exception to the time and numerical limitations. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii).

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) does not treat the birth of U.S. citizen children as changed conditions in China; it treats that event as a change in personal circumstances.

Lin v. Mukasey · filed 2008-10-01(c)(3)(ii)

The BIA also properly found that Lin’s motion did not qualify for the changed country conditions exception to the time limitation. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). While Lin argued in her motion to reopen that the birth of her two children was previously unavailable evidence, the birth of U.S. citizen children constitutes a change in personal circumstances and is not evidence of changed conditions in China. See Li Yong Zheng v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 416 F.3d 129, 130-31 (2d Cir.2005).

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) permits an untimely motion to reopen based on changed country conditions only when the movant submits new and material evidence of those changed conditions.

Hapidudin v. Holder · filed 2009-03-11(c)(3)(ii)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Hapidudin’s motion to reopen as untimely where Hapidudin filed the motion more than a year after the BIA’s final order of removal, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2) (motion to reopen must be filed within ninety days of final order of removal), and failed to submit new and material evidence of changed country conditions in Indonesia that would excuse the late filing, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); see also Malty, 381 F.3d at 945 (requiring circumstances to have changed sufficiently that a petitioner who previously did not have a legitimate claim for asylum now has a well-founded fear of future persecution).

The regulation permits an exception to the time limit for a motion to reopen based on changed country conditions, but not merely changed personal circumstances such as the birth of children in the United States.

Yue v. Holder · filed 2009-08-03(c)(3)(H)

However, the birth of her children in the United States constituted changed personal circumstances, rather than changed country conditions, and was thus insufficient to warrant an exception to the time limit under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(H).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) imposes no time limit on a motion to reopen alleging eligibility for asylum based on changed country conditions, but a change in personal circumstances does not excuse the filing deadline.

Zheng v. Holder · filed 2009-09-24(c)(2)

There is no time limit on the filing of a motion to reopen alleging eligibility for asylum based on changed country conditions. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). However, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in finding that Zheng’s motion was based only on a change in her personal circumstance — namely, her involvement with the Christian Democracy Party and her recent conversion to Christianity. It is well-settled that such a change in personal circumstances does not excuse the time limit for filing a motion to reopen.

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) permits an additional motion to reopen based on material changed country conditions that were unavailable at the previous hearing, but a change in personal circumstances does not qualify.

Saho v. Holder · filed 2009-09-08(c)(3)(ii)

Although Saho’s motion is untimely and numerically barred, he may reopen his proceedings if he qualifies for one of the exceptions outlined in the regulations. ... It is well-settled that a change in personal circumstances does not qualify as an exception to the time and number limits on motions to reopen. ... Because Saho did not allege a change in country circumstances, he does not qualify for an exception to the time and number limits and therefore the BIA’s denial of his motion to reopen was proper.

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) permits excusing the 90-day motion-to-reopen deadline when the movant submits evidence demonstrating materially changed country conditions affecting eligibility for relief, but the evidence must suffice to establish those changed conditions.

Dong v. Holder · filed 2009-10-29(c)(3)(ii)

The filing deadline may also be excused when the movant submits evidence demonstrating changed country conditions materially affecting his eligibility for relief. ... In addition, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in finding that the documentation Dong submitted with his motion did not suffice to establish changed country conditions in China excusing the untimeliness of his motion to reopen.

The exception to the time and number limits for motions to reopen applies when changed-country-conditions evidence is material and was unavailable and undiscoverable at the prior hearing, which means the proceedings before the Immigration Judge.

Liu v. Attorney General of the United States · filed 2009-11-05(c)(3)(h)

The time and number requirements do not apply when the motion to reopen relies on evidence of “changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality ... if such evidence is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the previous hearing.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(h). The term “previous hearing” in § 1003.2(c)(3)(h) refers to the proceedings before the IJ.

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) creates an exception to the 90-day reopening deadline when an alien presents material evidence of changed country conditions that could not previously have been discovered or presented.

Likollari v. U.S. Atty. Gen. · filed 2009-11-05(c)(3)(ii)

An exception to the 90-day time limit is when an alien presents material evidence of changed country conditions that could not have been discovered or presented at the previous asylum hearing.

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) permits an exception for motions to reopen based on changed country conditions, but a change in personal circumstances alone, such as children born abroad, is insufficient.

Lin v. Holder · filed 2009-12-03(c)(3)(ii)

We have previously concluded that “the birth of children outside the country of origin is a change in personal circumstances that is not sufficient to establish changed circumstances in the country of origin within the regulatory exception to late-filed or successive motions to reopen under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii).”

The ninety-day filing limit for a motion to reopen does not apply to an asylum or restriction-on-removal motion based on changed country conditions when it is supported by material evidence that was previously unavailable and could not have been presented earlier.

Tju v. Holder, Jr. · filed 2010-01-26(c)(3)(ii)

But that time limitation does not apply if the motion seeks asylum or restriction on removal based on changed country conditions, and if the motion is supported by evidence that “is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the previous hearing.”

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) permits an otherwise untimely motion to reopen when materially changed circumstances in the country of removal are shown, but the petitioners' motion did not satisfy that requirement.

De Flores v. Holder · filed 2010-02-23(c)(3)(ii)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying the petitioners’ untimely motion to reopen because the motion failed to present materially changed circumstances in Peru. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); see also Malty, 381 F.3d at 945.

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) exempts a motion to reopen from the usual time and numerical limits when it is based on material, previously unavailable changed circumstances in the country of nationality or the country of removal.

Min Zhi Cong v. Holder · filed 2010-12-07(c)(3)(ii)

However, the time and numerical limitations do not apply to a motion to reopen that is “based on changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality or in the country to which deportation has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the previous hearing.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). Here, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in finding that Cong failed to establish changed country conditions based on her membership in the Chinese New Democracy Party (“CNDP”).

This subsection exempts a motion to reopen from the time limit when the asylum or withholding request is based on material changed country conditions that were previously unavailable and could not have been discovered or presented earlier.

Thomas v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2010-09-20(c)(3)(ii)

An alien is not bound by the time limitation for filing a motion to reopen if his request for asylum or withholding of removal “is based on changed country conditions arising in the country of nationality . . . if such evidence is material and was not available and would not have been discovered or presented at the previous proceeding.” 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). The evidence submitted by Thomas, however, did not show a change in conditions in Jamaica since the time of his in abstentia removal proceedings.

The changed-country-conditions exception does not excuse the time and numerical bars to reopening unless the changed conditions are material to the petitioner and his circumstances.

Yanagui v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2010-09-21(c)(3)(ii)

Petitioner failed to establish changed country conditions in Mexico that are material to petitioner and his circumstances. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); Toufighi v. Mukasey, 538 F.3d 988, 996-97 (9th Cir. 2008).

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) provides a regulatory exception to the time limit for motions to reopen when the movant establishes changed circumstances in the country of nationality.

Yan v. Holder Jr. · filed 2010-09-28(c)(3)(ii)

Yan did not show she was entitled to equitable tolling, see Iturribarria, 321 F.3d at 897 (deadline for filing motion to reopen can be equitably tolled “when a petitioner is prevented from filing because of deception, fraud, or error, as long as the petitioner acts with due diligence”), or establish changed circumstances in China to qualify for the regulatory exception to the time limit for filing motions to reopen, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); He v. Gonzales, 501 F.3d 1128, 1132 (9th Cir. 2007) (the birth of children outside the country of origin is a change in personal circumstances that is not sufficient to establish changed circumstances in the country of origin excusing the untimely filing of a motion to reopen).

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) exempts the time and numerical limits on motions to reopen when the alien establishes materially changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality.

Tikhonova v. Holder · filed 2010-10-22(c)(3)(ii)

However, the time limitations do not apply if the alien can establish materially “changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii).

Under § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii), voluntary changes in personal circumstances alone do not qualify for the changed-country-conditions exception, but personal circumstances may be considered in combination with qualifying changed country conditions.

Sarkis v. Holder · filed 2010-11-05(c)(3)(ii)

In such a case, “absent additional evidence of changed circumstances in [the country of origin],” evidence of changed personal circumstances alone does not establish changed conditions within the country of origin for purposes of the INA § 240(c)(7)(C)(ii), 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii), time bar exception. Id. at 1132; see also id. at 1133 (“We hold that the birth of a child outside the country of nationality is insufficient, on its own, to establish changed circumstances within the meaning of 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii).” (emphasis added)); accord Najmabadi, 597 F.3d at 991 (dicta). We approve of the general rule that a voluntary change in personal circumstances alone is not a sufficient ground to reopen under the changed country conditions exception to the 90-day time bar.

The changed-country-conditions exception requires an alien to show a material change in country conditions since the time of the hearing.

Huang v. Holder · filed 2011-05-12(c)(3)(ii)

To the contrary, the plain language of the regulation required Huang to demonstrate a material change in country conditions since the time of his hearing.

Section 1003.2 permits reopening a previously adjudicated asylum claim only when the petitioner shows materially changed circumstances or conditions in the country of nationality or the country of ordered deportation.

Pirmansyah v. Jefferson Sessions · filed 2018-05-31

Reopening of a previously adjudicated asylum claim is warranted only if a petitioner demonstrates materially changed circumstances or conditions “arising in the country of nationality or in the country to which deportation has been ordered.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2.

Section 1003.2(c)(3) provides an exception to the time and number limits for a motion to reopen seeking asylum when it is based on material, previously unavailable evidence of changed country conditions in the relevant country.

Djelloul v. Garland · filed 2021-05-14(c)(3)

It is undisputed that, absent an applicable exception, Hadj Djelloul’s 2018 motion to reopen was untimely and number-barred because it was his third motion to reopen and was filed more than 15 years after his removal order became final in 2002. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A), (C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). An exception to the statutory and regulatory time and number limitations is available, however, if reopening is sought to apply for asylum and the motion “is based on [evidence of] changed country conditions arising in the country of nationality or the country to which removal has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available and would not have been discovered or presented at the previous proceeding.” 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3). The BIA did not err in finding that Hadj Djelloul failed to provide evidence of such changed country conditions.

Section 1003.2(c) does not require immigration authorities to inform an alien of every possible avenue of discretionary relief.

Smaragdas v. Attorney General of the United States · filed 2007-09-12(c)

Contrary to Smaragdas’ belief, however, § 1003.2(c) does not affirmatively require that an alien be informed of all possible avenues of relief available to him.

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) excuses the time limit for a motion to reopen based on material, previously unavailable changed country conditions, while subsection (c)(1) requires the motion to include the appropriate relief application and supporting documents.

Bustillo-Martinez v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2011-06-24(c)(3)(ii), (c)(1)

That time limitation does not apply, however, where the motion is “based on changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality . . . , if such evidence is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the previous hearing”. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). Moreover, the motion to reopen “must be accompanied by the appropriate application for relief and all supporting documentation”. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) imposes time limitations on motions to reopen, and those limitations apply to Sayno's motion to reopen.

Sayno v. Gonzales · filed 2006-06-13(c)(2)

These decisions do not indicate that the time limitations set forth in 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2) are inapplicable to Sayno’s motion to reopen.

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires a movant seeking to reopen proceedings to show that the offered evidence is material, previously unavailable, and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing.

Raza v. Gonzales · filed 2006-07-21(c)(1)

A motion to reopen will not be granted unless the movant proves that the evidence sought to be offered is material, was not available, and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1).

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires a motion to reopen to state the new facts to be proven at a hearing and to be supported by affidavits or other evidentiary material.

Macias v. Gonzales · filed 2006-07-28(c)(1)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to reopen because Mercado Macias failed to set forth any new facts or present any new evidence to demonstrate the requisite hardship. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1) (providing that a motion to reopen “shall state the new facts that will be proven at a hearing to be held if the motion is granted and shall be supported by affidavits or other evidentiary material”).

The regulation permits reopening only when the supporting evidence was previously unavailable.

Andrade v. Gonzales · filed 2006-08-01(a) and (c)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Perez Andrade’s motion to reopen because she failed to demonstrate the evidence she submitted was previously unavailable. See 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.2(a) and (c); Bhasin v. Gonzales, 423 F.3d 977, 984 (9th Cir.2005).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) requires a motion to reopen to be filed within 90 days after the final administrative decision, subject to applicable tolling for ineffective-assistance claims.

Vartanian v. Gonzales · filed 2007-03-01(c)(2)

The BIA acted withing its discretion when it denied the Vartanians’ motion as untimely because it was filed over two years after the BIA’s final order of removal and nearly six months after the Vartanians consulted with new counsel. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2) (motion to reopen must be filed no later than 90 days after the final administrative decision was rendered); Iturribarria, 321 F.3d at 899 (explaining that in cases involving ineffective assistance of counsel, the filing deadline may be tolled until the petitioner meets with new counsel to discuss his file).

Section 1003.2(a) makes the decision to grant or deny a motion to reopen discretionary, even when the alien demonstrates entitlement to relief.

De Garcia v. U.S. Attorney General · filed 2007-03-13(a)

The decision to grant or deny a motion to reopen is a discretionary decision, even if the alien demonstrates that she is entitled to relief. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a). Therefore, De Garcia had no protected liberty interest in having her motion to reopen granted and cannot state a due process claim on this basis.

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires a motion to reopen to present new, material evidence that was previously unavailable and could not have been presented at the former hearing.

Rodriguez-Parra v. U.S. Attorney General · filed 2007-03-14(c)(1)

A motion to reopen shall state “new facts” that would be proven at a new hearing, but “shall not be granted unless it appears to the Board that evidence sought to be offered is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) requires a motion to reopen to be filed within 90 days after the final administrative decision, subject to the applicable later deadline stated in the rule.

Robles-Diaz v. Gonzales · filed 2007-03-16(c)(2)

The agency did not abuse its discretion in denying as untimely Robles-Diaz’s motion to reopen, filed more than nine years after a final order of deportation was entered in absentia. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2)-(3) (a motion to reopen must be filed no later than 90 days after the final administrative decision, or on or before September 30, 1996, whichever is later); In re M-S-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 349, 357 (BIA 1998) (en banc) (concluding that a motion to reopen to apply for a new form of relief must comply with the regular requirements for motions to reopen, including timeliness).

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires a motion to reopen to include material evidence that was unavailable at the prior proceeding.

Sterbyci v. Gonzales · filed 2007-03-22(c)(1)

Pursuant to the regulations, a motion to reopen must contain evidence that is material and was unavailable at the time of the prior proceeding. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1). In this case, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in determining that Sterbyci’s motion failed to present material evidence that could not have been presented at the prior hearing.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) generally imposes a 90-day deadline for filing a motion to reopen.

Singh v. Gonzales · filed 2007-05-17(c)(2)

Even applying equitable tolling under the assumption that Singh exercised due diligence, he did not file his motion to reopen until more than 90 days after meeting with new counsel to review his file. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying his motion to reopen as untimely.

Section 1003.2(d) does not bar the BIA from considering a motion to reopen filed after the petitioner departed the United States following completion of the immigration proceedings.

Reynoso-Cisneros v. Gonzales · filed 2007-06-06(d)

The BIA denied Reynoso-Cisneros’ motion solely on the ground that it lacked jurisdiction under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(d), which states “[a] motion to reopen or a motion to reconsider shall not be made by or on behalf of a person who is the subject of exclusion, deportation, or removal proceedings subsequent to his or her departure from the United States.” ... Reynoso-Cisneros, like Lin, filed her motion to reopen after she departed the United States under an exclusion order and, thus, after the completion of immigration proceedings. Because the BIA erred in concluding it lacked jurisdiction over Reynoso-Cisneros’ motion to reopen, we remand for the BIA to consider the motion on the merits.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) treats a motion to reopen filed more than twenty months after the BIA’s final order of removal as untimely when no qualifying evidence excuses the late filing.

Singh v. Gonzales · filed 2007-06-11(c)(2)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Singh’s motion to reopen as untimely where Singh filed the motion more than twenty months after the BIA’s final order of removal, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and failed to submit evidence of changed country conditions in India that would excuse the late filing, cf. Malty v. Ashcroft, 381 F.3d 942, 945 (9th Cir.2004) (requiring circumstances to “have changed sufficiently that a petitioner who previously did not have a legitimate claim for asylum now has a well-founded fear of future persecution”).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) requires motions to reopen before the BIA to be timely, permitting denial of an untimely motion.

Rodriguez v. Gonzales · filed 2007-06-12(c)(2)

The Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) did not abuse its discretion when it denied as untimely petitioners’ motion to reopen. See Malhi v. INS, 336 F.3d 989, 993 (9th Cir.2003); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) permits only one motion to reopen and requires it to be filed within 90 days after the final administrative decision.

Bosque-Alvarez v. Gonzales · filed 2007-06-12(c)(2)

The regulations provide that “a party may file only one motion to reopen,” and that the motion “must be filed no later than 90 days after the date on which the final administrative decision was rendered in the proceeding sought to be reopened.” See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2).

Section 1003.2 requires qualifying new evidence for reopening, generally limits a party to one motion, and permits specified exceptions, but fraud by a non-attorney is not an exception to that limit.

Maxima C. Rodriguez v. U.S. Attorney General · filed 2007-06-14(c)(1), (c)(3)(i)

The BIA may grant a motion to reopen if the movant presents new evidence that is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the removal hearing. See 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.2(c)(1) and 1003.23(b)(3). Only one motion to reopen is allowed, whether the motion is filed before the IJ or the BIA. See INA § 240(c)(7)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). The BIA may, however, grant a petitioner’s successive motion to reopen under certain specific circumstances, including when a motion to reopen is filed under 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.23(b)(4)(iii)(A)(1) or 1003.23(b)(4)(iii)(A)(2)1 and when a motion to reopen is based upon changed circumstances in the country of deportation. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(i),(ii). ... Furthermore, Rodriguez's argument that she was victim of fraud by a non-attorney who failed to relay notice of the asylum hearing to Rodriguez is not a circumstance for which the regulations allow an exception to the number limitation. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3).

Section 1003.2 requires motions to reopen to comply with its procedural requirements, and permits the BIA to insist on at least minimal compliance, including for pro se motions.

Stewart v. Attorney General · filed 2007-06-15

However, as the Appeals Examiner stated, Stewart’s letter did not comply with the procedural requirements of 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.2 and 1003.8. It is not error for the BIA to insist on compliance with the regulations governing motions to reopen. See Nocon v. INS, 789 F.2d 1028, 1033 (3d Cir. 1986) (stating that “[b]ecause the petitioners were not in compliance with the prescribed regulations, the Board was justified in denying the motion” to reconsider); see also Sinistaj v. Ashcroft, 376 F.3d 516, 519-20 (6th Cir. 2004). Although, as Stewart points out, pro se motions should be liberally construed, the BIA is entitled to insist on at least minimal compliance with the governing regulations. Accordingly, there was no legal error in the BIA’s refusal to treat Stewart’s letter as a motion to reopen.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) makes the timeliness of a motion to reopen a proper basis for the BIA to deny it.

Guzman v. Gonzales · filed 2007-07-27(c)(2)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion when it denied petitioners’ motion to reopen as untimely. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2); Lara-Torres v. Ashcroft, 383 F.3d 968, 972 (9th Cir.2004), amended by 404 F.3d 1105 (9th Cir.2005) (holding that BIA denials of motions to reopen or reconsider are reviewed for abuse of discretion).

Section 1003.2(c)(1) permits the BIA to deny a motion to reopen when the movant lacks material, previously unavailable evidence or fails to establish prima facie eligibility for the requested relief.

Feng v. United States Department of Homeland Security · filed 2007-07-30(c)(1)

The BIA may properly deny a motion to reopen when the movant fails to present material, previously unavailable evidence, or fails to establish prima facie eligibility for the relief sought. ... The BIA reasonably declined to consider the evidence Feng submitted that predated the final order of removal, as there was no indication that such evidence was previously unavailable. ... Further, the BIA reasonably found that the remaining documents did not establish Feng’s prima facie eligibility for relief because they provided no basis on which to overturn the agency’s adverse credibility finding.

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires a motion to reopen to state new facts to be proved at the reopened hearing and support them with affidavits or other evidentiary material.

Montalvo v. Gonzales · filed 2007-08-24(c)(1)

Because petitioners’ motion to reopen did not include new facts to be proven at the reopened hearing and was not supported by affidavits or other documentary evidence, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in construing the motion as one to reconsider. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1).

Section 1003.2(d)'s post-departure bar on motions to reopen is invalid because the governing statute allows an alien one motion to reopen regardless of whether the alien is in the United States.

William v. Gonzales · filed 2007-09-06(d)

Having set forth the clear meaning of § 1229a(c)(7)(A), we believe it is evident that 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(d), containing the post-departure bar on motions to reopen, conflicts with the statute by restricting the availability of motions to reopen to those aliens who remain in the United States. Therefore, we conclude that this regulation lacks authority and is invalid. Allen v. United States, 173 F.3d 533, 536 (4th Cir. 1999) (“[W]e must overturn a regulation that clearly conflicts with the plain text of the statute.”). On remand, the BIA cannot rely on 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(d) in refusing to consider William’s motion to reopen.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) bars an untimely motion to reopen when it is filed beyond the regulatory deadline and no applicable regulatory exception is met.

Navarro v. Keisler · filed 2007-10-10(c)(2)

The Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioner’s motion to reopen as untimely because the motion was filed more than one year late, and did not meet any of the regulatory exceptions. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), (3); Lara-Torres v. Ashcroft, 383 F.3d 968, 972 (9th Cir.2004) (BIA’s denial of motion to reopen is reviewed for abuse of discretion).

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) permits an exception to the 90-day deadline for motions to reopen when changed country conditions are established, while § 1003.2(a) makes sua sponte reopening entirely discretionary.

Bhuiyan v. Mukasey · filed 2008-02-15(a), (c)(3)(ii)

Moreover, the BIA properly found that Bhuiyan did not establish that he qualified for an exception to the time limitation for motions to reopen based on changed country conditions. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); 8 C.F.R § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). ... Under these circumstances, the BIA appropriately determined that Bhuiyan failed to demonstrate meaningfully changed conditions in Bangladesh excusing the untimely filing of his motion to reopen. ... To the extent that Bhuiyan challenges the BIA’s refusal to exercise its sua sponte authority to reopen proceedings based on his labor certification or his wife’s pending asylum application, that argument is be*135yond our review because the decision of the BIA to reopen a case sua spoute under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a) is entirely discretionary. ... As such, the BIA’s conclusion that Bhuiyan’s motion did not meet an exception to the 90-day filing deadline under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) was not an abuse of discretion.

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires a BIA motion to reopen to state the new facts to be proven and permits reopening only when the offered evidence is material and was not previously available or discoverable.

Mera-Panduro v. Mukasey · filed 2008-04-11(c)(1)

A motion to reopen in the BIA must “state the new facts that will be proven at a hearing to be held if the motion is granted” and “shall not be granted unless it appears to the Board that evidence sought to be offered is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) requires a motion to reopen to be filed within 90 days of the prior decision, unless an applicable exception to the time limitation applies.

Xin Xi Guo v. United States Department of Justice · filed 2008-04-25(c)(2)

Here, we find that the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Guo’s motion to reopen as untimely. As the BIA noted, its prior decision was issued in April 1996, but Guo did not file his motion until March 2007, well beyond the 90-day deadline. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). Moreover, the BIA properly found that Guo’s motion did not qualify for an exception to the time limitation. See id.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) imposes time limits on motions to reopen and requires evidence supporting an exception to those limits.

Alvarez v. Mukasey · filed 2008-05-15(c)(2)

We conclude that the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to reopen because petitioner’s motion was untimely and the petitioner has not provided evidence to support an exception to the time limits on motions to reopen. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2).

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires a motion to reopen to present evidence that is material, previously unavailable, and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing.

Cao v. Mukasey · filed 2008-06-18(c)(1)

“A motion to reopen proceedings shall not be granted unless it appears to the Board that evidence sought to be offered is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1) (2005). Here, the BIA properly found that Cao had failed to establish that the evidence she provided in support of her motion to reopen was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) generally requires a motion to reopen to be filed within 90 days after the final administrative decision.

Perez v. Mukasey · filed 2008-07-07(c)(2)

The BIA acted within its discretion in denying as untimely Mijares Perez’s motion to reopen because it was filed more than one year after the BIA’s final administrative decision, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2) (motion to reopen must generally be filed within 90 days after the date of the final administrative decision), and because the time limitation applies to Mijares Perez’s motion, see 8 C.F.R. § 1208.18(b)(2) (stating the time limitations only do not apply to motions to reopen for purposes of protection under CAT when the final order of removal became final prior to March 22, 1999).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) imposes a filing-time limit on motions to reopen, and a motion filed 30 months after the BIA’s final decision is untimely.

Kaur v. Mukasey · filed 2008-07-31(c)(2)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Kaur’s motion to reopen as untimely where the motion was filed 30 months after the BIA’s final decision, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and Kaur failed to present sufficient evidence of changed circumstances in India to qualify for the regulatory exception to the time limit, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); He v. Gonzales, 501 F.3d 1128, 1133 (9th Cir.2007); Toufi-ghi v. Mukasey, 510 F.3d 1059, 1066-67 (9th Cir.2007) (underlying adverse credibility determination rendered evidence of changed circumstances immaterial).

Section 1003.2(a) allows the BIA to deny a motion to reopen as a matter of discretion even when the movant is prima facie eligible for relief.

Ke v. Mukasey · filed 2008-09-18(a)

The BIA may deny a motion to reopen as a matter of discretion notwithstanding the movant’s prima facie eligibility for relief. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a); see also 8 C.F.R. § 1003.23(b)(3); see INS v. Abudu, 485 U.S. 94, 105, 108 S.Ct. 904, 99 L.Ed.2d 90 (1988) (finding that “in cases in which the ultimate grant of relief is discretionary,” the agency may jump ahead and determine that the movant would not be entitled to discretionary relief).

Section 1003.2 permits the BIA to deny reopening unless new evidence is material, was unavailable at the prior hearing, and would likely change the result; changed personal circumstances do not qualify as changed country conditions.

Weng v. U.S. Attorney General · filed 2008-10-06(c)(1), (c)(3)(ii), (a)

After the BIA has affirmed an IJ’s order of removal, the alien may move to have the BIA, in its discretion, reopen the removal proceedings for the submission of new evidence. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1). A motion to reopen proceedings shall not be granted unless it appears to the BIA that the evidence sought to be offered is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1). ... An alien who attempts to show that the evidence is material bears a heavy burden and must present evidence that satisfies the BIA that, if proceedings were reopened, the new evidence would likely change the result in the case. ... Nonetheless, “[t]he Board has discretion to deny a motion to reopen even if the party moving has made out a prima facie case for relief.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a). ... First, the births are changed personal circumstances, not changed circumstances in the country of nationality. Cf. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). Second, the evidence was available and was presented by Weng in support of her asylum application and rejected by the BIA in 2005. ... Accordingly, the evidence presented by Weng does not establish a material change in country conditions in China.

Section 1003.2(c) requires a motion to reopen to include supporting affidavits or other evidentiary material and to explain why the evidence was unavailable and could not have been presented at the earlier hearing.

Chen v. Mukasey · filed 2008-11-04(c)

The BIA requires motions like Chen’s to meet the standards for a motion to reopen. See In re Coelho, 20 I. & N. Dec. 464, 471 (BIA 1992). Thus, the applicant must “support[ ] [the motion] by affidavits or evidentiary material” and demonstrate why the “evidence sought to be offered ... was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c).

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires a motion to reopen to state the new facts to be proven at a hearing and support them with affidavits or other evidentiary material.

Tellez v. Mukasey · filed 2008-11-04(c)(1)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Petitioner’s motion to reopen because the motion failed to meet the regulatory requirements. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1) (“A motion to reopen proceedings shall state the new facts that will be proven at a hearing to be held if the motion is granted and shall be supported by affidavits or other evidentiary material.”).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) generally requires a motion to reopen to be filed no later than 90 days after the final administrative decision.

Perez-Moreno v. Mukasey · filed 2008-11-04(c)(2)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion by denying Perez-Moreno’s motion to reopen as untimely because it was filed more than six years after the BIA’s September 22, 1999 order dismissing her appeal. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2) (motions to reopen generally must be filed no later than 90 days after the final administrative decision).

Section 1003.2(c)(1) bars reopening unless the offered evidence is material and was unavailable and could not have been discovered or presented at the prior hearing.

Lin v. U.S. Department of Justice · filed 2008-11-07(c)(1)

The BIA may not grant a motion to reopen “unless it appears to the Board that evidence sought to be offered is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1). Lin’s brief argues that “his wife can be a new witness to the persecution in his case who was not available at an earlier point in time.” However, Lin failed to establish: (1) that his wife’s testimony could not have been presented telephonieally or submitted in a sworn statement; and (2) that his wife’s testimony would support his claimed fear of persecution. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) requires a motion to reopen to be filed within the applicable time limit, so a motion filed more than eight months after the BIA’s final order is untimely.

Torres v. Gonzales · filed 2007-05-14(c)(2)

The Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioners’ motion to reopen filed more than eight months after the BIA’s final order because the motion to reopen was untimely. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), (3); Rodriguez-Lariz v. INS, 282 F.3d 1218, 1222 (9th Cir.2002).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) requires a motion to reopen to be timely, and equitable tolling is unavailable without due diligence.

Patel v. Gonzales · filed 2007-06-13(c)(2)

The BIA properly denied Patel’s final motion to reopen as untimely under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2) in February 2006. To establish eligibility for equitable tolling, a petitioner must establish due diligence. See Socop-Gonzalez, 272 F.3d at 1193. Patel did not do so.

Subsection (a) makes the BIA’s decision whether to grant a motion to reopen purely discretionary.

Burger v. Gonzales · filed 2007-08-17(a)

The BIA’s decision to grant a motion to reopen is purely discretionary. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a).

Section 1003.2(c) permits reopening only when the offered evidence is material and was unavailable and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing.

Assistance of Counsel in Removal Proceedings (I) · filed 2009-01-07(c)

“A motion to reopen proceedings shall not be granted unless it appears to the Board that evidence sought to be offered is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing[.]”

Section 1003.2(c)(2) makes a motion to reopen untimely when it is filed more than the prescribed period after the BIA's final order.

Gutierrez v. Mukasey · filed 2009-01-20(c)(2)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Petitioner’s motion to reopen as untimely because the motion was filed more than 37 months after the BIA’s December 8, 2003 order dismissing Petitioner’s appeal. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2).

Section 1003.2(c)(1) bars reopening to present evidence that was available at the prior hearing and bars reopening for discretionary relief when the opportunity to apply was explained and afforded, absent later-arising circumstances.

Doe v. Attorney General of United States · filed 2009-01-22(c)(1)

According to the relevant immigration regulations, a motion to reopen shall not be granted unless it appears to the Board that evidence sought to be offered is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing; nor shall any motion to reopen for the purpose of affording the alien an opportunity to apply for any form of discretionary relief be granted if it appears that the alien’s right to apply for such relief was fully explained to him or her and an opportunity to apply therefore was afforded at the former hearing, unless the relief is sought on the basis of circumstances that have arisen subsequent to the hearing. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1) (emphasis added). The BIA correctly noted that Doe had failed to present any evidence with his initial Motion to Reopen—such as evidence of changed circumstances—that was not available during the pendency of his hearing before the IJ. To the contrary, all of the evidence presented by Doe with his Motion to Reopen predated his initial hearing—in some instances by more than a decade. Accordingly, the BIA’s denial of Doe’s appeal of his first Motion to Reopen was not an abuse of discretion.

Section 1003.2(a) requires a motion to reopen a case already decided by the BIA to be filed with the BIA, rather than the Immigration Court.

Chen v. Holder · filed 2009-03-24(a)

Because Chen was required to file her motion to reopen before the BIA under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a), the IJ did not abuse her discretion in finding that the Immigration Court did not have jurisdiction to consider the motion.

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires a motion to reopen to state new facts and permits reopening only when the offered evidence is material and was unavailable and could not have been previously discovered or presented.

Heslert Jose Castillo Castillo v. U.S. Atty. Gen. · filed 2009-04-21(c)(1)

A motion to reopen “shall state the new facts that will be proven at a [new] hearing,” but “shall not be granted unless it appears to the [BIA] that evidence sought to be offered is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1). ... Therefore, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in concluding that the 2007 report provided no new, material information as to a change in country conditions since the time the IJ entered the order of removal.

Section 1003.2(c) generally treats a motion to remand that seeks to introduce previously unavailable new evidence as a motion to reopen, which may be granted when the evidence is material and could not have been presented at the removal hearing.

Henry Leonel Fontes Martinez v. U.S. Atty. Gen. · filed 2009-04-27(c)

On the other hand, when a motion to remand seeks, as here, to introduce evidence not previously presented, the motion is generally treated as a motion to reopen under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c). ... A motion to reopen may be granted if the alien presents new evidence that is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the removal hearing. See 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.2(c)(1), 1003.23(b)(3).

Section 1003.2(c)(1) permits denial of a motion to reopen when the movant fails to provide a new application or personal statement articulating the new persecution claim.

Chipilo v. Holder · filed 2009-04-27(c)(1)

We find that the BIA properly relied on Chipilo’s failure to provide “a new application or his own personal statement articulating this new risk of persecution” as one of the grounds on which to base its denial of his motion to reopen. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1).

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires the Board to deny a motion to reopen unless the offered evidence is material, previously unavailable, and undiscoverable or unpresentable at the former hearing.

Fatima v. Attorney General of the United States · filed 2009-06-04(c)(1)

A motion to remand filed while an appeal is pending before the BIA is functionally equivalent to a motion to reopen. Korytnyuk v. Ashcroft, 396 F.3d 272, 282 (3d Cir. 2005). A motion to reopen “shall not be granted unless it appears to the Board that evidence sought to be offered is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing.” See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1). Because Fatima failed to prove that the documents she submitted to the BIA could not have been previously discovered, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion.

Section 1003.2(c)(1) permits reopening only when the motion presents new facts to be proven at a hearing and materially relevant evidence that was previously unavailable or could not have been presented earlier.

Warui v. Holder · filed 2009-08-18(c)(1)

A motion to reopen may only be granted if it states "new facts that will be proven at a hearing to be held if the motion is granted." 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1). Such a motion "shall not be granted unless it appears to the Board that evidence sought to be offered is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing." Id. ... As the BIA noted, Warui's motion did not state any new facts material to her claims and it was not supported by any previously unavailable evidence. ... On this basis, the BIA's decision not to reopen was not an abuse of discretion.

A motion to reopen must state the new facts to be proved and be supported by evidence, and reopening requires material evidence that was previously unavailable and could not have been presented earlier.

Flores v. U.S. Attorney General · filed 2009-09-29(c)(1)

A motion to reopen “shall state the new facts that will be proven at a hearing to be held if the motion is granted and shall be supported by affidavits or other evidentiary material. . . . A motion to reopen proceedings shall not be granted unless it appears to the Board that evidence sought to be offered is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1).

Section 1003.2 requires an alien moving to reopen proceedings to submit the appropriate application for relief and all supporting documentation.

Ojo v. Attorney General of the United States · filed 2009-10-05

The applicable regulations specify that an alien seeking to reopen proceedings in order to submit an application for relief must submit a copy of “the appropriate application for relief and all supporting documentation.”

Section 1003.2(c) generally limits motions to reopen to one motion filed within 90 days, while § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) provides an exception for materially changed country conditions that could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing.

Kiptabut v. Holder · filed 2009-12-23(c) and (c)(3)(ii)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Kiptabut’s motion to reopen because her motion was untimely, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c), and Kiptabut failed to establish changed country conditions or other special circumstances that would warrant reopening, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); see also Malty v. Ashcroft, 381 F.3d 942, 945 (9th Cir. 2004) (“The critical question is ... whether circumstances have changed sufficiently that a petitioner who previously did not have a legitimate claim for asylum now has a well-founded fear of future persecution.”).

Section 1003.2(a) leaves jurisdiction over a second motion to reopen with the BIA after the BIA has dismissed the prior appeal.

Miramontes-Arteaga v. Holder · filed 2010-06-02(a)

The agency correctly determined that the IJ lacked jurisdiction to entertain Miramontes-Arteaga’s second motion to reopen because jurisdiction remained with the BIA following the BIA’s order dismissing Miramontes-Arteaga’s prior appeal. See 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.2(a), 1003.23(b)(1).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) requires a petitioner filing a second motion to reopen more than 90 days after the original BIA appeal to show changed circumstances in the country of nationality for exemption from the time and number limits; subsection (a) makes sua sponte reopening discretionary, so courts lack jurisdiction to review the BIA's refusal to exercise that authority.

Mehovic v. Holder · filed 2011-01-06(c)(2), (a)

Because petitioners filed this, their second, motion to reopen, more than ninety days after the denial of their original appeal to the BIA, they were required to show changed circumstances in their country of nationality in order for their motion to be exempt from the applicable time and number limitations. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii). ... Finally, to the extent that petitioners request review of the BIA’s decision not to reopen their proceedings sua sponte, we lack jurisdiction to review the BIA’s decision not to exercise its authority to reopen a case sua sponte under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a), because such a decision is “entirely discretionary.”

Section 1003.2(c)(1) provides the procedure for seeking BIA reopening when an alien discovers new information after deportation proceedings are final.

Peci v. Eric H. Holder, Jr. · filed 2010-06-03(c)(1)

Now, when an alien discovers new information after the BIA has finalized deportation proceedings, the proper procedure is for the alien to move the BIA to reopen the proceedings. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1).

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires a motion to reopen to present material new evidence.

Rendon v. Holder Jr. · filed 2010-06-03(c)(1)

Also, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioners’ underlying motion to reopen because they failed to present material new evidence of hardship. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1) (2009).

Section 1003.2 requires a timely motion to reopen immigration proceedings to present new and material facts sufficient to warrant reopening.

Zheng v. Holder · filed 2010-08-25

Additionally, contrary to Zheng’s argument that the BIA applied the wrong standard in assessing her timely motion to reopen, the BIA did not err in finding that she failed to demonstrate “new and material facts” sufficient to warrant reopening. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2; see also INS v. Abudu, 485 U.S. 94, 104-05 (1988).

Subsection (c) generally prohibits a party from filing a second motion to reopen with the BIA.

Aly v. Holder Jr. · filed 2011-06-23(c)

The BIA properly construed Aly’s second motion as a motion to reopen and denied it as an impermissible second motion to reopen. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c); see also Iturribarria v. INS, 321 F.3d 889, 895-96 (9th Cir. 2003).

Section 1003.2(a) permits the BIA to deny a motion to reopen on discretionary grounds even when the movant could satisfy all threshold requirements.

Alfaouri v. Holder · filed 2012-01-06(a)

The BIA may deny a motion to reopen on the ground that, even if the movant were able to satisfy all threshold inquiries, the movant would nonetheless not be entitled to a discretionary grant of relief, 8 C.F.R. y 1003.2(a); INS v. Abudu, 485 U.S. 94, 105 (1988), and the BIA may determine in the first instance the bona fides of a marriage to inform its exercise of discretion.

Section 1003.2(c)(1) bars reopening unless the proffered evidence is material and was unavailable and could not have been discovered or presented at the prior hearing.

Jihad Geagea v. Holder · filed 2012-03-13(c)(1)

Because Petitioners’ submission of general news articles does not constitute “material” evidence, the BIA properly rejected Petitioners’ motion on this ground. See 8 CFR § 1003.2(c)(1) (“A motion to reopen proceedings shall not be granted unless it appears to the Board that evidence sought to be offered is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing . . . .”). Second, Petitioners submitted a note from a Lebanese doctor who treated Geagea from 1994 to 2000 to “certify that . . . Geagea is seen [sic] . . . from May 1994 till his leaving Lebanon due to severe anxiety-depression . . . causing . . . memory troubles . . . .” A.R. 33. As the BIA found, “this evidence contains previously available information and could have been presented earlier . . . .” A.R. 4. As such, the Board also properly denied Petitioners’ motion pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1). Consequently, we AFFIRM the BIA’s denial of Petitioners’ motion to remand.

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires that evidence supporting a motion to reopen be material, previously unavailable, and undiscoverable or unpresentable at the former hearing.

Perez v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2013-02-14(c)(1)

“A motion to reopen proceedings shall not be granted unless it appears to the Board that evidence sought to be offered is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing . . . .” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1). Although Ibanez Perez cites to the location in the administrative record of the new evidence, he does not offer any description of the evidence to corroborate his assertion regarding its materiality, and he does not address at all the BIA’s conclusion that some of the evidence was available prior to the merits hearing. Therefore, Ibanez Perez has failed to demonstrate that the BIA abused its discretion by denying his motion to reopen.

Section 1003.2(c) directs that a request to reopen a case be presented to the BIA in the form of a motion to reopen.

Dangol v. Holder · filed 2013-06-18(c)

Such a request must be made before the BIA in the form of a motion to reopen. See Xiao Xing Ni v. Gonzales, 494 F.3d 260, 269 (2d Cir. 2007); see also 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)©.

Section 1003.2(c)(1) bars the BIA from granting a motion to reopen unless the offered evidence is material and was unavailable and undiscoverable or unpresentable at the former hearing.

Ayor v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2013-11-12(c)(1)

The BIA is foreclosed from granting motions to reopen “unless it appears to the [BIA] that evidence sought to be offered is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing”. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1).

Section 1003.2(a) gives an Immigration Judge or the BIA complete discretion to deny a motion to reopen.

Onyido v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2014-03-20(a)

Section 1003.2(a) affords an Immigration Judge (IJ) or the BIA “complete discretion” to deny a motion to reopen, and we therefore have “no legal standard by which to judge” such a decision.

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires the BIA to deny a motion to reopen unless the offered evidence is material and was unavailable and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing.

Maldonado v. Holder · filed 2014-08-14(c)(1)

“A motion to reopen proceedings shall not be granted unless it appears to the [BIA] that evidence sought to be offered is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing....” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1). ... The BIA did not abuse discretion in denying the motions to reopen.

A motion to reopen must be supported by new or previously unavailable evidence.

Bakayoko v. Holder · filed 2015-04-20(c)(1)

We also conclude that the Board did not abuse its discretion in denying Bakayoko’s motion to reopen because the motion was not supported by new or previously unavailable evidence. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(B); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1); Maldonado v. Holder, --- F.3d ---, 2014 WL 3953651, at *7 (2d Cir. Aug. 14, 2014).

Section 1003.2(c) requires a motion to reopen to be denied unless the new evidence is material and was unavailable and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing.

Salgado-Salinas v. Lynch · filed 2015-09-28(c)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Salgado-Salinas’ motion to remand, where Salgado-Salinas failed to establish that the evidence he submitted was unavailable at the time of his removal hearing. ... 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c) (“A motion to reopen proceedings shall not be granted unless it appears to the Board that evidence sought to be offered is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing[.]”).

Section 1003.2(c) generally treats a motion to remand seeking to introduce previously unpresented evidence as a motion to reopen.

Ramphal v. U.S. Attorney General · filed 2015-11-17(c)

“[I]f a motion to remand seeks to introduce evidence that has not previously been presented, it is generally treated as a motion to reopen under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c).”

Section 1003.2 provides that a motion to reopen an immigration case should be filed with the Board of Immigration Appeals rather than the court of appeals.

Egbengwu v. Lynch · filed 2016-01-26

To the extent that Egbengwu requests that this court reopen his case, we deny the request, as any motion to reopen should be filed with the BIA, not with this court. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2.

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires a party seeking to reopen proceedings to show that the evidence is material and was unavailable and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing, and the same strict standard applies when DHS seeks reopening.

Sakhawati v. Lynch · filed 2016-03-14(c)(1)

But this procedural peculiarity provides no basis to depart from the strict standard set forth in Allabani, Hyzoti, and Trujillo-Roque, where we held that evidence existing at the time of the prior hearing is not sufficient to reopen proceedings under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1).

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires reopening evidence to be material, previously unavailable, and undiscoverable or unpresentable at the former hearing.

Arguelles v. U.S. Attorney General · filed 2016-11-23(c)(1)

“A motion to reopen proceedings shall not be granted unless it appears to the Board that evidence sought to be offered is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing.”

Section 1003.2(c) bars the BIA from granting a motion to reopen unless the offered evidence is material and was previously unavailable.

Sanbur Shire v. Attorney General United States · filed 2018-05-31(c)

Under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c), the BIA may not grant a motion to reopen unless the evidence offered is material and was previously unavailable.

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires reopening evidence to have been previously unavailable, and § 1003.2(a) leaves the Board’s discretionary sua sponte reopening decision unreviewable in these circumstances.

Sanchez v. Whitaker · filed 2018-11-21(c)(1), (a)

We conclude that the Board did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion because Sanchez failed to show that the new evidence he provided was previously unavailable. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1) (2018); Onyeme v. INS, 146 F.3d 227, 234 (4th Cir. 1998). Further, under these circumstances, we lack jurisdiction to review the Board’s discretionary decision not to reopen sua sponte. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a) (2018); Mosere v. Mukasey, 552 F.3d 397, 400–01 (4th Cir. 2009).

Section 1003.2, together with § 1003.23, does not allow a petitioner to file a second motion to reopen in absentia proceedings based on the same claims.

Patatanyan v. Whitaker · filed 2018-12-28

The regulations, 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.2, 1003.23, do not allow a petitioner to file a second motion to reopen in absentia proceedings based on the same claims.

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires a motion to reopen to identify material evidence that was unavailable and could not have been discovered or presented at the earlier hearing.

Perez-Cazun v. Barr · filed 2019-04-17(c)(1)

A motion to reopen is a little different. Instead of specifying errors in the Board’s decision, it must identify “material” evidence that “was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the [earlier] hearing.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1).

Subsection (a) gives the BIA discretion to deny a motion to reopen despite a prima facie case for relief, but that discretionary-denial authority applies to reopening for asylum, not withholding of removal.

Mwaura v. Sessions · filed 2019-05-06(a)

See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a) (“The [BIA] has discretion to deny a motion to reopen even if the party moving has made out a prima facie case for relief.”). This provision applies only to reopening to consider asylum, not to reopening to consider withholding of removal.

Section 1003.2 permits a motion to reopen within 90 days of a final removal order, requires an appropriate accompanying application when relief is sought, and authorizes the BIA to reopen a case sua sponte.

DeJesus v. Attorney General United States · filed 2020-08-13(c)(2), (c)(1), (a)

An undocumented person may file a motion to reopen within ninety days of a final order of removal. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). The period for filing a motion to reopen may be subject to equitable tolling so long as the non-citizen exercised due diligence in filing his motion. Alaazir v. Att’y Gen., 639 F.3d 86, 90 (3d Cir. 2011). A motion to reopen “for the purpose of submitting an application for relief must be accompanied by the appropriate application.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1). ... The BIA may elect to sua sponte reopen any case in which it has rendered a decision. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a).

A motion to reopen must rely on material facts that could not have been discovered or presented at the prior hearing.

Tibakweitira v. Wilkinson · filed 2021-02-01(c)(1)

The motion must be based on facts that are “material” and “could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1).

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires reopening evidence to be material, previously unavailable, and likely to change the outcome, while subsection (a) preserves the BIA's discretion to deny reopening even after a prima facie showing.

Guzman v. Wilkinson · filed 2021-02-08(c)(1), (a)

New evidence presented in a motion to reopen must be material, must have been unavailable at the former hearing, and must be “likely [to] change the result in the case.” Young Sun Shin v. Mukasey, 547 F.3d 1019, 1025 (9th Cir. 2008); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1). However, the BIA has “discretion to deny a motion to reopen even if the party moving has made out a prima facie case for relief.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a).

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires a motion to reopen to state the new facts to be proven and include affidavits or other evidence, and permits reopening only when the offered evidence is material and was unavailable or undiscoverable at the former hearing.

Gonzalez-Lemus v. Garland · filed 2023-01-05(c)(1)

A motion to reopen must “state the new facts that will be proven at a hearing to be held if the motion is granted and shall be supported by affidavits or other evidentiary material.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1). To that end, the motion “shall not be granted unless it appears . . . that evidence sought to be offered is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing.” Id.

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires a motion to reopen seeking relief to include a current application when changed circumstances make a prior application insufficient.

Bracamontes-Cortez v. Garland · filed 2023-02-16(c)(1)

The BIA concluded that Bracamontes-Cortez’s prior application for cancellation of removal was insufficient to satisfy 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1) given his changed circumstances, in particular his divorce and new allegations of abuse by his now ex-spouse. The BIA did not abuse its discretion in so concluding.

Section 1003.2(a) permits a new application to be pursued through a motion to reopen with the agency.

Bernal-Gonzalez v. Garland · filed 2023-04-20(a)

We deny petitioner’s request to remand so that he may pursue an application for cancellation of removal. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a) (a new application can be pursued through a motion to reopen with the agency).

Section 1003.2 permits the BIA to deny a motion to reopen filed to seek relief when the associated application does not establish a prima facie entitlement to that relief.

Naula-Leon v. Attorney General United States of America · filed 2023-08-01

But when a motion to reopen removal proceedings is filed for the purposes of applying for relief, the BIA may deny said motion if it concludes that the associated application fails to show a prima facie entitlement to the relief sought.

Section 1003.2(a) permits a party to move in writing to reopen a Board decision, but reopening remains discretionary; supporting new evidence must be material and previously unavailable under § 1003.2(c)(1).

Miguel Angel Martinez Moz v. U.S. Attorney General · filed 2025-04-03(a), (c)(1)

A party may, in writing, move the Board to reopen a case in which it has rendered a decision. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a). In support of its motion, the party is required to “state the new facts that will be proven” in support of relief, and the motion shall be granted only if it appears to the Board that the evidence sought to be offered is material and “was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing.” Id. § 1003.2(c)(1). The decision to grant or deny such a motion is within the Board’s discretion, and the Board may deny the motion even if the moving party has made out a prima facie case for relief. Id. § 1003.2(a).

Section 1003.2(c) bars using polygraph evidence as the basis for reopening immigration proceedings.

Miah v. Bondi · filed 2026-03-09(c)

Nor did the BIA abuse its discretion in denying his motion to reopen for consideration of polygraph evidence because “polygraph evidence cannot serve as the basis for reopening under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c).”

Subsection (a) gives the BIA discretion when ruling on a motion to reopen, so its decision is reviewed for abuse of discretion.

Cornejo v. Blanche · filed 2026-05-11(a)

The BIA has discretion in ruling on a motion to reopen. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a). Accordingly, we apply a “deferential, abuse-of-discretion standard of review.”

Section 1003.2(l) sends motions to reopen through a screening panel and provides for decision by one Board member unless the motion requires a three-member panel.

Patel v. Mukasey · filed 2008-11-12(l)

Motions to reopen are first considered by a screening panel and will be disposed of by a single BIA member unless the screening panel member determines that the motion must be handled by a three-member panel.

The Board must consider material country conditions evidence before exercising its discretion to deny a motion to reopen under § 1003.2(a).

Lin Lee v. Attorney General of the United States · filed 2011-10-06(a)

The government also argues that the Board may, in the exercise of its discretion, deny a motion to reopen under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a); Shardar v. Att’y Gen. of U.S., 503 F.3d 308, 313 (3d Cir. 2007), even if the party moving has made out a prima facie case for relief, see Respondent’s Brief, at 26. We reject this principle as a basis for denying Lee’s petition for review, because, in her case, it conflicts with our holding in Zheng, requiring the agency to explicitly consider any country conditions evidence that materially bears on an applicant’s claim prior to exercising that discretion.

Section 1003.2(c) governs motions to reopen based on new facts or changed circumstances; denying such a motion cannot cure the Board’s legal error on direct appeal.

Doissaint v. Mukasey · filed 2008-08-18(c)

We hold that, when the BIA commits legal error in a petitioner’s direct appeal, the BIA cannot cure that error in a denial of the petitioner’s motion to reopen.

The BIA may deny a motion to reopen in its discretion even when the movant establishes prima facie eligibility for relief.

Antunez v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2014-07-10(a)

Moreover, even if a movant establishes prima facie eligibility for relief, the agency may, in its discretion, deny a motion to reopen. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.23(b)(3); Doherty, 502 U.S. at 323. Here, the BIA did not abuse its discretion by adopting the IJ’s conclusion that Chamu did not warrant a favorable exercise of discretion after weighing Chamu’s residence in the United States and hardship on his family against his lack of “due diligence or willingness to comply with the immigration laws.”

Section 1003.2(a) gives the BIA jurisdiction over a motion to reopen a case in which it has made a decision.

Chavez-Ochoa v. Lynch · filed 2016-08-03(a)

The BIA has jurisdiction over motions to reopen a case in which it has made a decision, 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a), and once that jurisdiction is exercised, it is exclusive, see id. § 1003.23(b).

A motion to reopen to seek adjustment of status is subject to the usual ninety-day filing deadline.

Toufighi v. Mukasey · filed 2007-12-12(c)(2)

If § 1229c(d)(1)(B) does not apply, Tou- fighi was still bound by the usual ninety-day deadline for motions to reopen, which ran long before he applied for a change of status.7 See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2); 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(I).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) imposes a ninety-day filing limit for motions to reopen, subject to specified exceptions.

Blancas v. Holder · filed 2010-01-20(c)(2)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioners’ motion to reopen as untimely because the motion was filed more than two years after the BIA’s May 24, 2005, order, and did not fall within one of the exceptions to the ninety-day filing limit. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) generally limits a party to one motion to reopen filed no later than 90 days after the final administrative decision, subject to exceptions.

Perez v. Mukasey · filed 2008-05-15(c)(2)

The regulations provide, with certain exceptions that do not apply to this case, that “a party may file only one motion to reopen ... and that motion must be filed no later than 90 days after the date on which the final administrative decision was rendered....” See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) generally permits only one motion to reopen and requires it to be filed within 90 days of the final administrative decision, subject to limited exceptions and the applicable later date.

You Gan Lin v. Bureau of Citizenship & Immigration Services · filed 2008-10-28(c)(2)

With limited exceptions, a party may file only one motion to reopen removal proceedings, and that motion must be filed no later than 90 days after the date on which the final administrative decision was rendered in the proceeding sought to be reopened, or on or before September 30, 1996, whichever is later. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). Here, the IJ issued his final order of removal in April 1999 and Lin did not file the instant motion to reopen until October 2006. Accordingly, the BIA properly found that Lin’s motion was untimely. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2).

(c)(1) requires a motion to reopen filed to submit an application for relief to include the appropriate application and all supporting documentation.

Huang v. Holder · filed 2009-03-30(c)(1)

The regulations explicitly require that a motion to reopen filed in order to submit an application for relief “must be accompanied by the appropriate application for relief and all supporting documentation.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) bars a motion to reopen filed more than three years after the BIA's order when the regulatory exception to the filing deadline is not shown.

Suman v. Holder · filed 2010-04-14(c)(2)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioners’ motion to reopen because the motion was filed more than three years after the BIA’s order dismissing the underlying appeal, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and petitioners failed to demonstrate materially changed circumstances in India to qualify for the regulatory exception to the filing deadline, see id. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); see also Malty, 381 F.3d at 945 (“The critical question is . . . whether circumstances have changed sufficiently that a petitioner who previously did not have a legitimate claim for asylum now has a well-founded fear of future persecution.”).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) permits only one motion to reopen and requires it to be filed within 90 days after the removal order.

Djie v. Attorney General United States · filed 2012-09-06(c)(2)

A party may file only one motion to reopen and such motion must be filed no later than 90 days after the date of the removal order. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2); 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i). Djie’s motion to reopen, filed more than six years after the Board’s July 25, 2005 decision, was untimely and thus was properly denied on that basis.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) imposes a filing deadline for motions to reopen, and a motion filed approximately 13 years after the final administrative order is untimely absent equitable tolling.

Lara-Garcia v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2012-09-24(c)(2)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion by denying Lara-Garcia’s motion to reopen as untimely because the motion was filed approximately 13 years after issuance of the final administrative order, see 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.2(c)(2), 1241.31, and Lara-Garcia failed to demonstrate the due diligence necessary to warrant equitable tolling of the filing deadline, where his motion did not state when he had definitively learned of the alleged ineffective assistance of his former attorney, see Avagyan, 646 F.3d at 679 (measuring the end of the tolling period from “when petitioner definitively learns of the harm resulting from counsel’s deficiency”).

Section 1003.2(c)(1) does not impose a time limit for filing a motion to reopen to present evidence that could not have been presented at the IJ hearing.

Chen v. Holder · filed 2013-04-29(c)(1)

Second, the BIA faulted Chen for "not having filed a motion to remand while the appeal was pending." The relevant regulation, however, does not impose a time limit for filing a motion to reopen proceedings to present evidence that could not have been presented at the IJ hearing. Norani, 451 F.3d at 294 & n.3 (citing 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1)).

Subsection (c)(2) requires a motion to reopen deportation proceedings within 90 days after the final administrative decision, subject to equitable tolling in certain ineffective-assistance cases when the petitioner acts diligently.

Benavidez v. Lynch · filed 2015-07-28(c)(2)

A party must file a motion to reopen deportation proceedings no later than 90 days after the date on which the final administration decision was rendered. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). Benavidez filed her motion to reopen on July 5, 2011, nearly four years after the date on which the BIA rendered its decision. We have held, however, that in certain circumstances, the BIA should toll the 90-day filing period for a petitioner seeking to reopen on the basis of ineffective assistance of counsel. Singh v. Ashcroft, 367 F.3d 1182, 1185-86 (9th Cir. 2004). For equitable tolling due to ineffective assistance of counsel to apply, a petitioner must, inter alia, act with due diligence in pursuing her claim. Id. at 1186.

Section 1003.2(c)(3) supplies regulatory exceptions to the filing deadline for motions to reopen, and eligibility for an exception must be established by the movant.

Verastegui-Araujo v. Garland · filed 2021-10-15(c)(3)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Verastegui-Araujo’s motion to reopen or reconsider as untimely, where it was filed more than five years after the order of removal became final, and where she did not establish that she would qualify for a regulatory exception to the filing deadline for motions to reopen or that equitable tolling of the filing deadline for motions for reconsideration is warranted. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(6)(b), (7)(C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2 (c)(3); Avagyan v. Holder, 646 F.3d 672, 679 (9th Cir. 2011) (equitable tolling of the filing deadline may be available “when a petitioner is prevented from filing because of a deception, fraud, or error, as long as the petitioner acts with due diligence” in discovering such circumstances); see also Aguilar Fermin v. Barr, 958 F.3d 887, 895 (9th Cir. 2020) (“the lack of time, date, and place in the NTA sent to [petitioner] did not deprive the immigration court of jurisdiction over her case”).

Section 1003.2(c)(3) does not excuse a motion-to-reopen filing deadline when the new evidence would not likely change the outcome.

Poudel v. Garland · filed 2022-05-20(c)(3)

As the BIA determined, Poudel did not introduce new evidence that would likely have changed the outcome of his case, and no exception to the filing deadline for his motion to reopen otherwise applies. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3); Shin v. Mukasey, 547 F.3d 1019, 1025 (9th Cir. 2008) (observing that petitioners who “seek to remand or reopen proceedings to pursue relief bear a ‘heavy burden’ of proving that, if proceedings were reopened, the new evidence would likely change the result in the case” (quoting Matter of Coelho, 20 I. & N. Dec. 464, 473 (BIA 1992))).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) requires a motion to reopen to meet the general 90-day filing deadline unless an exception under § 1003.2(c)(3) applies.

Melgar-Lopez v. Garland · filed 2022-06-10(c)(2), (c)(3)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying as untimely Melgar-Lopez’s motion to reopen because he filed the motion more than eight years after his final order of removal. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2) (requiring motions to reopen to comply with the general 90-day filing deadline). Melgar-Lopez neither alleged nor demonstrated that any statutory or regulatory exception to the filing deadline applies. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3); Najmabadi v. Holder, 597 F.3d 983, 986 (9th Cir. 2010) (describing the circumstances under which the 90-day filing deadline does not apply).

Section 1003.2(c)(3)'s exceptions to the 90-day deadline for motions to reopen do not cover motions seeking adjustment of status based on marriage or cancellation of removal based on hardship to qualifying relatives.

Dorville v. Garland · filed 2023-08-30(c)(3)

Dorville moved to reopen to apply to adjust status based on his marriage and to apply for cancellation of removal based on hardship to qualifying relatives, but neither form of relief implicates any statutory or regulatory exceptions to the filing deadline.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) starts the 90-day deadline for a motion to reopen on the date the final administrative decision was rendered.

Reyes-Rodriguez v. Garland · filed 2024-04-11(c)(2)

Reyes-Rodriguez was not eligible to apply for cancellation of removal at any point before the 90-day window closed. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2) (establishing the starting point for accruing the motion-to-reopen deadline as the date the final administrative decision was rendered).

Section 1003.2(c) requires a properly supported motion to reopen BIA proceedings when new information becomes available.

Matskiv v. Ashcroft · filed 2004-07-14(c)

Upon approval of his labor certification and approval by the Department of Homeland Security, Mr. Matskiv must file a properly supported motion to reopen.

A motion to reopen before the BIA must be filed within 90 days of the final administrative decision in the removal proceeding; a grant of voluntary departure does not postpone that deadline.

Ocampo v. Holder · filed 2010-12-14(c)(2)

The “administrative decision” at issue, then, is the BIA’s November 12, 2002, order summarily affirming the IJ’s determination that Ccayhuari was removable and ordering his removal if he failed to voluntarily depart within 30 days of the date of the order.

Changed personal circumstances do not satisfy the regulatory exceptions to the filing deadline for a motion to reopen.

Miranda v. Barr · filed 2019-09-23(c)(3)

Lopez Miranda’s contentions regarding changed personal circumstances do not meet any statutory or regulatory exception to the filing deadline.

A motion to reopen filed after the deadline requires a showing of changed country circumstances to qualify for the regulatory exception.

Zaman v. Holder · filed 2009-12-28(c)(2), (e)(3)(ii)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Zaman’s motion to reopen because the motion was filed more than two years after the BIA’s order dismissing the underlying appeal, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2); see also Matter of Velarde-Pacheco, 23 I. & N. Dec. 253, 256 (BIA 2002) (motion to reopen based on pending 1-130 petition may be granted if, inter alia, the motion is timely filed), and Za-man failed to demonstrate changed circumstances in Bangladesh to qualify for the regulatory exception to the filing deadline, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(e)(3)(ii); see also Malty, 381 F.3d at 945 (“The critical question is ... whether circumstances have changed sufficiently that a petitioner who previously did not have a legitimate claim for asylum now has a well-founded fear of future persecution.”).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) sets a filing deadline for motions to reopen; equitable tolling requires due diligence in discovering deception, fraud, or error.

Singh v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2012-12-21(c)(2)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Singh’s motion to reopen as untimely because the motion was filed more than six years after the BIA’s final order of removal, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and Singh failed to establish the due diligence required for equitable tolling of the filing deadline, see Avagyan, 646 F.3d at 678-80 (equitable tolling is available to a petitioner who establishes that he suffered from deception, fraud or error, and exercised due diligence in discovering such circumstances).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) bars untimely or numerically excessive motions to reopen unless an exception under (c)(3) applies, while subsection (b)(2) permits only one motion to reconsider a given decision and bars reconsideration of a decision denying a prior motion to reconsider.

Rui An Lin v. Board of Immigration Appeals · filed 2006-06-09(c)(2), (c)(3), (b)(2)

In considering Lin’s October 2003 motion as a motion to reopen, the BIA reasonably denied the motion as untimely and as exceeding the numerical limitations under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). Lin’s motion was his third motion to reopen, and he presented no documentation to demonstrate that the time and numerical exceptions to 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2) under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3) would apply to his motion. In considering Lin’s October 2003 motion as a motion reconsider, the BIA reasonably denied the motion pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(2), inasmuch as the motion sought the reconsideration of the BIA’s denial of Lin’s previous motion to reconsider.

Section 1003.2(b)(2) bars a party from seeking reconsideration of a decision denying a previous motion to reconsider.

Cabrera v. Keisler · filed 2007-10-02(b)(2)

Further, the BIA properly determined that it was prohibited from reconsidering its March 2005 order under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(2), which provides that “[a] party ... may not seek reconsideration of a decision denying a previous motion to reconsider.”

Section 1003.2(c)(2) imposes a 90-day deadline for most motions to reopen, and § 1003.2(b)(2) denies the BIA jurisdiction over a motion seeking reconsideration of a decision denying a prior motion to reconsider.

Ramirez v. Keisler · filed 2007-10-18(c)(2), (b)(2)

Specifically, the BIA did not abuse its discretion when it denied petitioners’ motion to reopen as untimely. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2); Lara-Torres v. Ashcroft, 383 F.3d 968, 972 (9th Cir.2004), amended by 404 F.3d 1105 (9th Cir.2005) (holding that BIA denials of motions to reopen or reconsider are reviewed for abuse of discretion). Furthermore, even if petitioners’ motion was construed as a motion to reconsider, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion because the BIA lacks jurisdiction to consider a motion “seeking] reconsideration of a decision denying a previous motion to reconsider.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(2).

Section 1003.2(b)(2) bars an alien from filing a motion to reconsider the denial of a previous motion to reconsider.

Lara-Mijares v. Mukasey · filed 2008-05-20(b)(2)

We also consider exhausted the third issue, which asserts that the BIA should have reopened the case to consider additional evidence of hardship and that the BIA failed to rule on the motion to reconsider its moral-character determination, because there is no further administrative remedy available: An alien may not file a motion to reconsider the denial of a previous motion to reconsider, 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(2), and is limited to one motion to reopen removal proceedings, subject to certain exceptions not applicable here, id. § 1003.2(c)(2).

Section 1003.2 limits an alien to one motion to reopen filed within 90 days and one motion to reconsider filed within 30 days, and requires a reconsideration motion to identify an error of law or fact.

Martinez v. Mukasey · filed 2008-08-18(c)(2), (b)(2), (b)(1)

An alien who is subject to a final order of removal is limited to filing one motion to reopen removal proceedings, and that motion must be filed within 90 days of the date of entry of a final order of removal. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A), (C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). Further, such alien is limited to filing one motion to reconsider a removal decision, and that motion must be filed within 30 days of the date of entry of a final order of removal. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(6)(A), (B); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(2). Because petitioners’ motion was their second motion to reopen, it was filed beyond the 90-day deadline, and no exceptions applied, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioners’ motion as numerically barred. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(e)(7)(A), (C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). Further, to the extent the BIA construed petitioners’ motion as a motion to reconsider, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion as both untimely and because it failed to specify any error in law or fact in the prior removal order. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(6)(A), (B); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1), (2).

Section 1003.2(b)(2) bars a successive motion asking the Board to reconsider the denial of an earlier motion to reconsider.

Diaz v. U.S. Attorney General · filed 2009-06-23(b)(2)

Diaz was not permitted to file a successive motion that requested the Board reconsider the denial of a previous motion to reconsider. INA § 240(c)(6); 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(6)(A); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(2).

Section 1003.2(b)(2) bars a party from seeking reconsideration of a decision denying a previous motion to reconsider.

Martinez-Sandoval v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2011-07-22(b)(2)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Martinez-Sandoval’s July 20, 2009, motion to reconsider under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(2) (“A party . . . may not seek reconsideration of a decision denying a previous motion to reconsider.”).