8 C.F.R. § 1003.2

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires a motion to reopen filed to submit an application for relief to include the appropriate application and all supporting documentation.

Chen v. Mukasey · filed 2008-10-10(c)(1)

We find no abuse of discretion in the BIA’s denial of Chen’s motion on the grounds that he had not attached Form I-589 as required by regulation. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1) (“A motion to reopen proceedings for the purpose of submitting an application for relief must be accompanied by the appropriate application for relief and all supporting documentation.”).

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires a motion to reopen seeking relief to include the appropriate relief application and all supporting documentation.

Oliveira v. Holder · filed 2009-06-04(c)(1)

We agree with the Board that Oliveira failed to demonstrate one of the threshold requirements for a motion to reopen and hold that the denial of Oliveira’s motion therefore was well within the Board’s discretion. “A motion to reopen proceedings for the purpose of submitting an application for relief must be accompanied by the appropriate application. for relief and all supporting documentation.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1).

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires a motion to reopen filed to submit an application for relief to include the appropriate application for relief.

Wang v. Holder · filed 2012-01-09(c)(1)

“A motion to reopen proceedings for the purpose of submitting an application for relief must be accompanied by the appropriate application for relief.”

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires a motion to reopen to be accompanied by an application for the relief sought.

Rode Hernandez Flores v. Eric H. Holder, Jr. · filed 2013-05-14(c)(1)

First, Hernandez did not submit an application for the relief she wished to pursue. See Waggoner v. Gonzales, 488 F.3d 632, 638-39 (5th Cir. 2007) (BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying request for remand because petitioner did not comply with 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1) by submitting application for relief with remand request).

A motion to reopen proceedings to submit an application for relief must include the appropriate relief application and all supporting documentation.

Min Wu v. Attorney General United States of America · filed 2024-04-10(c)(1)

Wu’s motion was also procedurally defective because it was not accompanied by an application for cancellation of removal. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1) (“A motion to reopen proceedings for the purpose of submitting an application for relief must be accompanied by the appropriate application for relief and all supporting documentation.”).

A motion to reopen filed to submit an application for relief must include the appropriate application and all supporting documentation.

Hernandez-Ortiz v. Garland · filed 2024-10-25(c)(1)

The plain language of the relevant regulation requires that a motion to reopen “for the purpose of submitting an application for relief must be accompanied by the appropriate application for relief and all supporting documentation.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1) (emphasis added). ... The BIA did not excuse the requirement in § 1003.2(c)(1) that the application for adjustment of status be attached to the motion to reopen. ... Mr. Hernandez-Ortiz has therefore failed to show the BIA abused its discretion in denying his motion to reopen to apply for adjustment of status when he did not submit his application with the motion as § 1003.2(c)(1) requires.

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires a motion to reopen that seeks relief to include the application for that relief.

Agyei v. U.S. Attorney General · filed 2025-03-14(c)(1)

But Agyei was required to identify qualifying relatives and the nature of the hardship they would face from removal, see 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1), (2), and to apply for cancellation, 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1).

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires an application for relief with a motion to reopen filed to submit that application, but does not require a new asylum application when the motion seeks review of a previously submitted claim.

Tanusantoso v. Barr · filed 2020-06-23(c)(1)

The text of § 1003.2(c)(1) requires that all “motions to reopen proceedings” include new facts, supported by affidavits or other evidentiary material. By contrast, it requires that “motions to reopen proceedings for the purpose of submitting an application for relief” include an application for relief and supporting documentation.

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires new evidence offered to support reopening to materially affect the outcome of the case.

Ye Hong Lian v. Gonzales · filed 2006-08-30(c)(1)

In order to warrant reopening, the new evidence must materially affect the outcome of the case. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1).

Section 1003.2(a) leaves sua sponte reopening to the BIA's unfettered discretion, while subsection (c) requires a motion to reopen based on new evidence to include affidavits or other evidentiary material.

Brienza-Schettino v. Attorney General · filed 2007-03-21(a), (c)

The BIA also construed the motion as a request to sua sponte consider reopening under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a). ... In Calle-Vujiles, we declared that § 1003.2(a), which provided for a sua sponte reopening by the BIA, “offer[ed] no standard governing the agency’s exercise of discretion.” ... “Because the BIA retains unfettered discretion to decline to sua sponte reopen or reconsider a deportation proceeding, this court is without jurisdiction to review a decision declining to exercise such discretion to reopen or reconsider the case” under the lessons of Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 830 (1985). ... Accordingly, we will dismiss the second petition for review because we lack jurisdiction. ... Because the regulations instruct that a motion to reopen based on new evidence “shall be supported by affidavits or other evidentiary material,” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c), and because there was no new evidence in this regard, there was nothing new for the BIA to consider in that regard.

Section 1003.2(b)(1) requires a motion to reconsider to specify the error of fact or law in the Board's prior decision.

Newman v. Gonzales · filed 2007-03-29(b)(1)

A motion for reconsideration asserts that the Board made an error in its earlier decision, Turri v. INS, 997 F.2d 1306, 1311 n.4 (10th Cir. 1993), and requires the movant to specify the error of fact or law in the prior Board decision. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1) (2006); Matter of Cerna, 20 I. & N. Dec. 399, 402 (BIA 1991) (noting that a motion to reconsider questions a decision for alleged errors in appraising the facts and the law).

For a motion to reopen filed more than ninety days after the last administrative decision, the applicant must show changed circumstances in the country of removal that arose since the IJ closed the record and gave rise to a claim for asylum, withholding, or CAT relief; changes in the applicant’s personal circumstances, including the birth of children in the United States, do not qualify.

Gao v. Gonzales · filed 2007-03-29(c)(3)(ii)

Because Gao’s motion was filed more than ninety days after the last administrative decision in her case, Gao was required to demonstrate changed circumstances in China, which arose since the IJ closed the record of proceedings and which gave rise to a claim for asylum, withholding, or CAT relief. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c) (3) (ii). Changes in an applicant’s personal circumstances, including the birth of children in the United States, does not constitute changed circumstances in the applicant’s country of removal. Wei Guang Wang v. BIA, 437 F.3d 270, 273 (2d Cir.2006).

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires a motion to reopen based on material evidence unavailable at the prior hearing, while § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) addresses the time-limit exception for changed circumstances in the country of nationality.

Zheng v. Gonzales · filed 2007-08-29(c)(1), (c)(3)(ii)

Zheng’s motion failed to present material evidence that could not have been presented at the prior hearing. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1). ... Lastly, Zheng’s motion was untimely filed and he does not allege any “changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii).

For an untimely motion to reopen, § 1003.2(c)(3) requires changed country conditions, and § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) requires new evidence to be material to the alien’s claim.

Zheng v. Keisler · filed 2007-10-12(c)(3), (c)(3)(ii)

It is undisputed that Castiblanco filed Zheng’s first motion to reopen out of time. This untimely filing meant that to prevail he would have had to demonstrate changed country conditions, 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3), as opposed to previously unavailable material evidence, id. § 1003.2(c)(1). ... That evidence, however, was not material to his claim. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) (requiring that new evidence be material to an alien’s claim).

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) permits a late motion to reopen based on changed country conditions, but evidence of random violence in Mexico was insufficient to establish changed circumstances supporting CAT relief.

Estrada-Dominguez v. Mukasey · filed 2008-06-18(c)(3)(ii)

The BIA properly found that the evidence submitted by petitioner, documenting random violence in Mexico, was not sufficient to establish changed circumstances to support further consideration of petitioner’s CAT claim.

The changed-country-conditions exception permits a motion to reopen after the 90-day deadline when the evidence is material, previously unavailable, and concerns changed conditions in the country of nationality; personal changes alone do not establish changed country conditions but may be relevant to that claim.

Xi Que Li v. Attorney General of the United States · filed 2009-07-06(c)(3)(h)

Motions to reopen are generally required to be filed with the BIA “no later than 90 days after the date on which the final administrative decision was rendered.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). The deadline does not apply to motions that rely on evidence of “changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality ... if such evidence is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the previous proceeding.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(h). ... The BIA’s characterization of the motion to reopen as being based solely on changed personal circumstances is inaccurate. Although changes in her personal circumstances do not constitute changed country conditions, they are relevant to her claim that she would be persecuted under changing Chinese family planning laws.

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) exempts an asylum-based motion to reopen from the 90-day deadline when it relies on material evidence of changed country conditions that was previously unavailable and could not previously have been discovered or presented.

Li v. Holder · filed 2010-01-12(c)(3)(ii)

The 90-day time limit for filing a motion to reopen does not apply when a petitioner is requesting asylum based on “changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality . . . if such evidence is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the previous hearing.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii).

Section 1003.2(c)(1) bars reopening unless the offered evidence is material and was unavailable and undiscoverable at the former hearing.

Cakmakci v. Attorney General of the United States · filed 2010-04-15(c)(1)

A motion to reopen proceedings “shall not be granted” unless it appears to the Board that the evidence offered “is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing.”

Section 1003.2(c) requires a motion to reopen based on changed circumstances to present material evidence that was previously unavailable.

Singh v. Holder · filed 2010-07-29(c)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Singh’s motion to reopen because Singh failed to present material, previously unavailable evidence of changed circumstances in India, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c), and Singh failed to establish prima facie eligibility to reopen to apply for relief under the Convention Against Torture, see Azanor v. Ashcroft, 364 F.3d 1013, 1018 (9th Cir. 2004) (“To qualify for reopening under the Torture Convention, an alien must establish a prima facie case that ‘it is more likely than not that ... she would be tortured if removed to the proposed country of removal.’ ”) (citing 8 C.F.R. § 208.16(c)(2)); see also Cano-Merida, 311 F.3d at 966.

Section 1003.2(c)(1) permits reopening only when the submitted evidence is material and previously unavailable.

Espinoza v. Holder Jr. · filed 2010-11-24(c)(1)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion by denying Espinoza’s motion to reopen on the ground that he failed to demonstrate the evidence he submitted was material and previously unavailable. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1).

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires reopening evidence to be material and previously unavailable and undiscoverable, while § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) permits asylum or withholding motions based on materially changed country conditions subject to the same availability requirement.

Lin v. Attorney General · filed 2011-04-08(c)(1), (c)(3)(ii)

But for purposes of seeking to reopen a terminated removal proceeding, Lin had to show under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1) that the evidence offered was not available and could not have been discovered and presented at the prior hearing. ... Moreover, we agree with the Attorney General that 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1) is not intended as a means to remedy the inadequacy of an alien’s case after the fact by submitting evidence that could have been gathered in time for the merits hearing. ... Under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii), the time and numerical limitations governing motions to reopen do not apply when an alien seeks asylum or withholding of removal “based on changed circumstances arising in … the country to which deportation has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the previous hearing.”

Section 1003.2(c)(1) bars reopening unless the offered evidence is material and was unavailable, and could not have been discovered or presented, at the former hearing.

Chen vs U.S. Attorney General · filed 2011-06-03(c)(1)

A motion to reopen proceedings shall not be granted unless it appears to the Board that evidence sought to be offered is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1). This regulation is “framed negatively” and “does not affirmatively require the Board to reopen the proceedings under any particular condition.” Al Najjar v. Ashcroft, 257 F.3d 1262, 1301 (11th Cir. 2001) (quotation and citation omitted).

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) permits reopening based on changed country conditions only when the supporting evidence could not have been presented at the prior proceeding.

Yang v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2011-12-22(c)(3)(ii)

But only evidence that could not be presented at a previous proceeding justifies reopening, see 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii), Bao Hua Lin v. Gonzales, 435 F.3d 708, 711 (7th Cir. 2006); Haile v. Gonzales, 421 F.3d 493, 497 (7th Cir. 2005), and the only evidence here that is new does not compel that action.

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) exempts a motion to reopen from the usual time and numerical limits when it seeks asylum or withholding based on changed country conditions and the evidence is material and previously unavailable, with the relevant comparison point being the prior IJ hearing.

Kwan Ho Wu v. Attorney General of the United States · filed 2012-02-10(c)(3)(ii)

We have explained that the BIA’s point of reference when evaluating whether country conditions have changed, or whether the evidence proffered was previously unavailable, is the time of the hearing before the IJ. ... This holds true, as is evident from the regulation’s numerical limitation, even where the applicant has already filed a motion to reopen.

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires evidence supporting a motion to reopen to be material and unable to have been previously discovered or presented at the prior hearing.

Zavala-Rios v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2012-09-28(c)(1)

Even if he had presented more evidence, the BIA will not grant a motion to reopen unless the evidence offered is material and could not have been previously discovered or presented at a prior hearing. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1).

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) bars an untimely motion to reopen unless it is based on materially changed country conditions, and section 1003.2(c)(1) requires evidence that was previously unavailable and could not have been presented at the prior hearing.

Doda v. Attorney General of the United States · filed 2012-10-01(c)(3)(ii), (c)(1)

To the extent Shqutaj contends that his evidence is relevant to the issue of his alleged persecution before leaving Albania in 1996, that evidence does not permit his untimely motion because it is not based on changed country conditions. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). Moreover, as the BIA noted, Shqutaj‟s evidence does not comply with the applicable evidentiary requirements as to that issue because he did not show that it was previously unavailable and that he could not have presented it at his previous hearing. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1).

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires a motion to reopen to be supported by evidence that is material and previously unavailable.

Ochoa-Fuentes v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2013-09-26(c)(1)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Ochoa-Fuentes’ motion to reopen to seek withholding of removal where he failed to demonstrate the evidence he submitted was material and previously unavailable. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1) (setting forth requirements for a motion to reopen); Najmabadi v. Holder, 597 F.3d 983, 990 (9th Cir. 2010) (holding that evidence presented with motion to reopen was not material because it merely recounted generalized conditions that failed to demonstrate that petitioner’s situation was appreciably different from the dangers faced by her fellow citizens).

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires evidence supporting a motion to reopen to be material and previously unavailable, undiscoverable, or unpresentable at the former hearing.

Chernykh v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2014-01-16(c)(1)

A motion to reopen requires a showing that the “evidence sought to be offered is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1). ... Because the evidence presented in Chernykh’s first motion to reopen was either previously available, or not material to her claims, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Chernykh’s first motion to reopen.

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires a motion to reopen to rely on evidence that is material and was unavailable and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing.

Alghubari v. U.S. Attorney General · filed 2014-02-07(c)(1)

Furthermore, the BIA’s regulations state that a motion to reopen proceedings shall not be granted unless it appears to the BIA that the “evidence sought to be offered is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1). ... The BIA’s determination that Alghubari’s new evidence would not likely change the result of his case was not arbitrary or capricious.

Section 1003.2(c)(1) bars a motion to reopen unless the offered evidence is material and was unavailable, undiscoverable, or unpresentable at the prior hearing.

Zheng v. Lynch · filed 2016-02-04(c)(1)

A motion to remand is subject to the same requirements as a motion to reopen. Rodriguez v. INS, 841 F.2d 865, 867 (9th Cir. 1987). “A motion to reopen proceedings shall not be granted unless it appears to the Board that evidence sought to be offered is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing . . . .” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1). The BIA didn’t abuse its discretion in determining that the documents Zheng presented were previously available.

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) allows an untimely motion to reopen when the movant establishes materially changed country conditions in the country of removal.

Xholi v. Lynch · filed 2016-06-22(c)(3)(ii)

The agency did not abuse its discretion in denying Xholi’s motion to reopen as untimely, where it was filed twelve years after the final order of removal, see 8 C.F.R. §1003.2(c)(2), and he failed to establish materially changed country conditions in Albania to overcome the regulatory time limitation for filing a motion to reopen, see 8 C.F.R. §1003.2(c)(3)(ii); Najmabadi, 597 F.3d at 987-90 (evidence must be “qualitatively different” to warrant reopening).

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires evidence supporting reopening to be material and unavailable, undiscoverable, or not presentable at the former hearing; failure to offer such evidence is a proper ground for denial.

Cedillo v. Lynch · filed 2016-06-24(c)(1)

“A motion to reopen proceedings shall not be granted unless it appears to the Board that evidence sought to be offered is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1). Failure to offer such evidence is, therefore, a proper ground on which the BIA may deny a motion to reopen, as is the movant’s failure to establish a prima facie case for the underlying substantive relief sought.

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires a motion to reopen to present material evidence that was unavailable and could not have been discovered or presented at the prior hearing.

Singh v. Attorney General United States · filed 2018-10-22(c)(1)

A motion to reopen “shall not be granted unless it appears . . . that evidence sought to be offered is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1).

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) permits an untimely motion to reopen based on materially changed country conditions, but the movant must still establish prima facie eligibility for the requested relief.

Anwar v. Barr · filed 2019-09-13(c)(3)(ii)

Nevertheless, an applicant may, at any time, move to reopen his case “based on changed country conditions arising in the country of nationality or the country to which removal has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available and would not have been discovered or presented at the previous proceeding.” 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); see also 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). To prevail on such a motion, however, the applicant also must establish his prima facie eligibility for the relief sought—in this case, asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture. See Poradisova v. Gonzales, 420 F.3d 70, 78 (2d Cir. 2005); see also Abudu v. INS, 485 U.S. 94, 104 (1988) (identifying failure to present “previously unavailable material evidence” and failure to establish prima facie eligibility as independent dispositive grounds for denying reopening). Accordingly, and contrary to Anwar’s position, the BIA’s conclusion that Anwar failed to establish prima facie eligibility for relief was dispositive, and the BIA was not required to determine whether there had been a change in conditions in Pakistan.

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) provides an exception to the filing deadline and numerical limitation for motions to reopen when the movant presents previously unavailable, material evidence.

Catalan v. Barr · filed 2020-08-19(c)(3)(ii)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in concluding that Catalan failed to establish a prima facie case for the relief she sought and that she failed to establish that she qualified for the exception to the filing deadline and numerical limitation for motions to reopen by introducing previously unavailable, material evidence. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A), (C)(ii); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); Najmabadi v. Holder, 597 F.3d 983, 986 (9th Cir. 2010); see also Catalan v. Holder, 535 F. App’x 562 (9th Cir. 2013) (denying Catalan’s previous petition for review).

Section 1003.2(c)(3) permits an untimely motion to reopen seeking asylum when it is based on material, previously unavailable changed country conditions in the country of nationality or the country of removal.

Li v. Barr · filed 2020-09-16(c)(3)

It is undisputed that Li’s 2018 motion to reopen was untimely filed more than four years after her removal order became final in 2013. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). A late filing is excused if petitioner, seeking to apply for asylum, moves to reopen “based on changed country conditions arising in the country of nationality or the country to which removal has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available and would not have been discovered or presented at the previous proceeding.” 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3). The BIA did not err in finding that Li failed to demonstrate such conditions.

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) permits a second motion to reopen based on changed country conditions only when the supporting evidence is material and was unavailable and could not have been discovered or presented at the prior hearing.

Lopez-Ramirez v. Attorney General United States · filed 2022-03-18(c)(3)(ii)

What distinguishes the motion to reopen, however, is that an applicant can bring a second one if it is “based on changed circumstances” in her country of origin and is supported by evidence that “is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the previous hearing[.]” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). ... Those materials, therefore, were not evidence that “could not have been … presented” at her hearing. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii).

Section 1003.2(e)(3)(ii) does not exempt a motion to reopen from the time bar based on the petitioner’s U.S.-born children and practice of Falun Gong as changed personal circumstances.

Wang v. Holder · filed 2009-08-06(e)(3)(ii)

As the BIA found, the birth of Wang’s children in the United States and her practice of Falun Gong are changed personal circumstances that do not fit within the exception to the time-bar for motions to reopen required by 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(e)(3)(ii).

Section (c)(3)(2) permits an exception to the time and number limits for reopening when the applicant submits evidence of changed circumstances in China, and the court upheld denial where he submitted no such evidence.

Wan Qin Lin v. Holder · filed 2009-08-03(c)(3)(2)

We find that the agency did not err in denying Lin’s untimely and number-barred motion to reopen because it reasonably found that he failed to submit any evidence of changed circumstances in China. ... 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(2); ... (same).

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) provides an exception to the time and numerical bars for motions to reopen when the movant establishes changed circumstances in the country of nationality.

Heredia v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2011-03-21(c)(3)(ii)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Moreno-Heredia’s third motion to reopen as untimely and numerically barred where the motion was filed nearly five years after the BIA’s final administrative order, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and Moreno Heredia failed to establish changed circumstances in Peru to qualify for the regulatory exception to the time and numerical bar for filing motions to reopen. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); see also Malty v. Ashcroft, 381 F.3d 942, 945 (9th Cir. 2004) (“The critical question is . . . whether circumstances have changed sufficiently that a petitioner who previously did not have a legitimate claim for asylum now has a well-founded fear of future persecution.”).

The regulation bars a second motion to reopen as untimely or number-barred unless the movant presents sufficient evidence of changed circumstances in the country that satisfies the regulatory exception.

Nuruzzaman v. Holder · filed 2010-06-08(c)(3)(ii)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Nuruzzaman’s second motion to reopen as untimely and number-barred, see 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.2(c)(2), because Nuruzzaman failed to present sufficient evidence of changed circumstances in Bangladesh to qualify for the regulatory exception to the time and number limits for filing motions to reopen, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); Malty v. Ashcroft, 381 F.3d 942, 945 (9th Cir. 2004) (“The critical question is . . . whether circumstances have changed sufficiently that a petitioner who previously did not have a legitimate claim for asylum now has a well-founded fear of future persecution.”).

Section 1003.2(c)(3) exempts a motion to reopen based on material changed circumstances in the country of nationality or country of deportation from the usual time and numerical limits when the evidence was previously unavailable and could not have been presented earlier.

Zhen Tong Guo v. Attorney General of the United States · filed 2012-01-04(c)(3)

However, these ―time and numerical limitations‖ do not apply to motions ―based on changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality or in the country to which deportation has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the previous hearing.‖3 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3), (c)(3)(ii); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) generally bars untimely and number-barred motions to reopen, while § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) exempts motions based on material, previously unavailable changed circumstances in the country of nationality.

Paulino v. Attorney General of the United States · filed 2012-10-01(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

As for Paulino’s motion to reopen, there appears to be no dispute with the BIA’s finding that it was both untimely and number-barred. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1229a(c)(7)(A) & (C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). However, the restrictions do not apply to motions that rely on evidence of “changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality . . . if such evidence is material and was not available and would not have been discovered or presented at the previous hearing.” 8 U.S.C. §§ 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). A motion to reopen must establish prima facie eligibility for relief, that is, a reasonable likelihood of establishing entitlement to relief, upon review of evidence accompanying the motion as well as record evidence. See Guo, 386 F.3d at 563 and n.7 (citing Sevoian v. Ashcroft, 290 F.3d 166, 173 n.5 (3d Cir. 2002)).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) bars a motion to reopen that is untimely or exceeds the one-motion limit, while § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) provides a regulatory exception when the movant establishes materially changed circumstances in the country of removal.

Singh v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2013-05-20(c)(2) (c)(3)(ii)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Singh’s fifth motion to reopen as untimely and number-barred because the motion was filed over six years after the BIA’s final decision, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and Singh failed to establish changed circumstances in India to qualify for the regulatory exception to the time and number limitations, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); Najmabadi, 597 F.3d at 988-89 (evidence of changed circumstances must be qualitatively different from what could have been presented at prior hearing).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) imposes time and number limits on motions to reopen, while § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) provides a regulatory exception when the movant demonstrates changed circumstances in the country of nationality.

Chahal v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2013-10-21(c)(2) (c)(3)(ii)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Chahal’s motion to reopen as untimely and number-barred because the successive motion was filed over six years after the BIA’s final decision, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and Chahal failed to demonstrate changed circumstances in India to qualify for the regulatory exception to the time and number limitations, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); Najmabadi, 597 F.3d at 988-89.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) makes a motion to reopen subject to time and number limits, while § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) provides a regulatory exception when changed circumstances in the country of nationality are demonstrated.

Villanueva-Moran v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2013-12-02(c)(2) and (c)(3)(ii)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Villanueva-Moran’s second motion to reopen as untimely and number-barred where the motion was filed over three years after the agency’s final order, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and Villanueva-Moran failed to demonstrate changed circumstances in Guatemala to qualify for the regulatory exception to the time limit for filing motions to reopen, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); see also Toufighi, 538 F.3d at 996.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) imposes time and number limits on motions to reopen, while § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) provides a regulatory exception when materially changed country conditions are shown.

Iraheta-Mejia v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2014-10-01(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

The agency did not abuse its discretion in denying Iraheta-Mejia’s motion to reopen as untimely because the motion was filed over three years after the final administrative order, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and Iraheta-Mejia failed to establish materially changed circumstances in El Salvador to qualify for the regulatory exception to the time limitations for motions to reopen, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); Najmabadi v. Holder, 597 F.3d 983, 987-89 (9th Cir. 2010) (evidence of changed circumstances must be qualitatively different from what could have been presented at prior hearing).

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) creates an exception to the motion-to-reopen time and number bars for withholding-of-deportation claims based on changed circumstances, but a particularly serious crime finding forecloses relief under that exception.

Bamisaiye v. U.S. Attorney General · filed 2014-10-23(c)(3)(ii)

Bamisaiye’s second motion to reopen was both time- and number-barred, but he sought relief from these bars based on an exception for applicants seeking “withholding of deportation based on changed circumstances.” See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) (emphasis added). ... That was all the BIA needed to do because ineligibility based on “particularly serious” convictions forecloses relief under the changed circumstances exception, rendering irrelevant the question of whether circumstances in Nigeria had in fact changed.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) imposes time and number limits on motions to reopen, while § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) provides a regulatory exception when materially changed circumstances in the country of removal are established.

Bhamra v. Lynch · filed 2015-11-25(c)(2) and (c)(3)(ii)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Bhamra’s third motion to reopen where it was filed over eight years after his order of removal became final, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and Bhamra failed to establish materially changed circumstances in India to qualify for the regulatory exception to the time and number limitations for motions to reopen, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); Toufighi, 538 F.3d at 996-97 (evidence was immaterial in light of prior adverse credibility determination); Najmabadi v. Holder, 597 F.3d 983, 987-90 (9th Cir. 2010) (evidence must be “qualitatively different” to warrant reopening).

A second motion to reopen filed five years after the agency’s final order is untimely and number-barred, and the changed-circumstances exception does not apply without established changed circumstances in Guatemala.

Marroquin v. Lynch · filed 2016-04-19(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Marroquin’s second motion to reopen as untimely and number-barred, where the motion was filed five years after the agency’s final order, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and Marroquin failed to establish changed circumstances in Guatemala to qualify for the regulatory exception to the filing deadline, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) applies time-and-number limits to a second motion to reopen, while § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) requires a material change in circumstances in the country of removal for the regulatory exception.

Kumar v. Lynch · filed 2016-06-20(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Kumar’s second motion to reopen as untimely and numerically-barred where the motion was filed more than four years after the BIA’s final order, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and Kumar failed to demonstrate a material change in circumstances in India to qualify for a regulatory exception to the time and number limitations for filing a motion to reopen, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); see also Najmabadi, 597 F.3d at 987-90 (petitioner failed to show evidence was “qualitatively different” to warrant reopening).

The regulation permits otherwise time- and number-barred motions to reopen for asylum or withholding based on changed home-country circumstances, but only when the evidence is material and previously unavailable.

Patel v. Attorney General United States · filed 2019-04-17(c)(3)(ii)

But these time and number limits do not bar motions to reopen to apply for asylum or withholding “based on changed circumstances” in the alien’s home country. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); Shardar v. Att’y Gen., 503 F.3d 308, 313 (3d Cir. 2007). Evidence of changed circumstances qualifies only if it “is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the” original merits hearing. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); Filja v. Gonzales, 447 F.3d 241, 253 (3d Cir. 2006).

Section 1003.2 limits motions to reopen to one motion filed within the applicable time limit, subject to an exception when changed-circumstances evidence is material and was unavailable and could not have been discovered or presented at the prior hearing.

Cordon-Gomez v. Wilkinson · filed 2021-02-22(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

The second motion is numerically barred and untimely, 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A), (C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and Petitioners failed to establish they qualify for an exception to these limits, 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) (“changed circumstances . . . evidence [must be] material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the previous hearing”); Toufighi v. Mukasey, 538 F.3d 988, 996 (9th Cir. 2008).

A motion to reconsider under § 1003.2(b) does not constitute judicial review and is not an adequate and effective substitute for habeas corpus.

Kolkevich v. Attorney General of the United States · filed 2007-09-06(b)

The Government’s arguments to the contrary are entirely unpersuasive. Fmst, it argues that Kolkevich could have filed a motion for reconsideration of his removal order with the BIA pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b) and that this would have sufficed as a form of judicial review. However, “[a]t its historical core, the writ of habeas corpus has served as a means of reviewing the legality of Executive detention, and it is in that context that its protections have been strongest.” St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 301, 121 S.Ct. 2271 (emphasis added). A motion to reconsider before the BIA is simply another point on the continuum of Executive action — it does not constitute judicial review of Executive action. Indeed, the Government’s argument is akin to saying that an appeal from the IJ to the BIA is an effective alternative to habeas because the BIA reviews the IJ. A motion to reconsider, like the BIA’s review of an IJ, is simply another phase of an administrative agency’s adjudicative process — it is not a collateral proceeding designed to review the legality of that process. Furthermore, the agency’s consideration of such a motion is clearly narrower in scope than a court’s “review” function. Therefore, a motion to reconsider pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2 is not an “adequate and effective” substitute for habeas.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) requires a motion to reopen within 90 days of the final administrative decision, and § 1003.2(b)(1) requires the movant to identify an error of fact or law in the prior order.

Gutierrez v. Mukasey · filed 2008-03-26(c)(2), (b)(1)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Gutierrez’s motion to reopen as untimely because it was filed almost a year and half after the BIA’s final order of removal. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2) (motion to reopen must be filed within 90 days of final administrative decision). ... The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Gutierrez’s motion to reconsider because he failed to identify an error of fact or law in the BIA’s prior order. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1); Socop-Gonzalez v. INS, 272 F.3d 1176, 1180 n. 2 (9th Cir. 2001) (en banc).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) requires motions to reopen to be filed within ninety days and generally limits an alien to one motion to reopen, while § 1003.2(b)(1) requires a motion to reconsider to specify the errors of fact or law in the prior decision.

Amoroso v. Atty Gen USA · filed 2008-03-26(c)(2), (b)(1)

A motion to reopen must be filed within ninety days of the BIA’s decision. ... Further, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Amoroso’s second motion to reopen based on the numerical bar under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2) limiting the appellant to a single motion to reopen. See id. (stating that an alien may file only one motion to reopen deportation proceedings). Exceptions to this numerical limitation under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2 do not apply in Amoroso’s situation. ... See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1) (requiring that a motion to reconsider “state the reasons for the motion by specifying the errors of fact or law in the prior [BIA] decision”).

Section 1003.2(b)(1) requires a motion to reconsider to identify the factual or legal errors in the prior Board decision and support the motion with pertinent authority.

Huang v. Mukasey · filed 2008-05-05(b)(1)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Huang’s motion to reconsider because the motion failed to identify any legal or factual errors in the underlying decision. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1) (“A motion to reconsider shall state the reasons for the motion by specifying the errors of fact or law in the prior Board decision and shall be supported by pertinent authority.”).

Section 1003.2(b)(1) requires a motion to reconsider to identify errors of fact or law in the prior order and support them with pertinent authority; merely repeating previously rejected arguments does not satisfy that requirement.

Juan Carlos Medina Ramirez v. U.S. Attoney General · filed 2011-06-23(b)(1)

A motion to reconsider shall specify “the errors of fact or law” in the previous order and “shall be supported by pertinent authority.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1). A motion to reconsider that merely restates the arguments that the BIA previously rejected provides no reason for the BIA to change its prior decision. See Calle, 504 F.3d at 1329. Thus, an applicant does not specify errors of fact or law, as required by the regulation, where he merely reiterates previously rejected arguments. Id.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) requires a motion to reopen to be filed within 90 days, subject to regulatory exceptions, and § 1003.2(b)(1) requires a motion to reconsider to identify errors of fact or law in the prior decision.

Soto v. Garland · filed 2021-09-17(c)(2), (b)(1)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Montanez Soto’s motion to reopen as untimely where the motion was filed more than 90 days after the final order of removal, and where Montanez Soto failed to demonstrate a material change in country conditions in Mexico to qualify for the regulatory exception to the time limitation for filing a motion to reopen. See 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.2(c)(2), (3)(ii); Najmabadi v. Holder, 597 F.3d 983, 990-91 (9th Cir. 2010) (BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying motion to reopen where petitioner failed to submit material evidence of qualitatively different country conditions). ... The BIA also did not abuse its discretion in denying Montanez Soto’s motion to reconsider where he failed to identify any error of law or fact in the BIA’s prior decision. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1) (a motion to reconsider must identify errors of fact or law in a prior decision); Movsisian v. Ashcroft, 395 F.3d 1095, 1098 (9th Cir. 2005) (the BIA abuses its discretion if it acts arbitrarily, irrationally, or contrary to law); see also Granado-Oseguera v. Mukasey, 546 F.3d 1011, 1015-16 (9th Cir. 2008) (recognizing that failure to comply with a voluntary departure order renders an applicant statutorily ineligibility for cancellation of removal for 10 years).

Section 1003.2(b)(1) requires a motion to reconsider to specify the factual or legal errors in the challenged Board decision that warrant reversal.

Gachuma v. Garland · filed 2023-11-30(b)(1)

In a motion to reconsider, the petitioner must specify “the errors of fact or law” in the challenged Board decision – here, the denial of reopening – that warrant reversal. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1). We conclude that the Board was well within its discretion in finding that Gachuma’s motion to reconsider failed to identify any error in the Board’s ruling on reopening that could have affected its dispositive prejudice analysis.

Section 1003.2(e)(3)(ii) exempts a motion to reopen from the 90-day deadline when changed-country conditions are material and were previously unavailable or undiscoverable, and evidence is not material when an underlying adverse credibility finding defeats its significance.

Hamzaj v. Mukasey · filed 2008-06-13(e)(3)(ii)

A motion to reopen is exempt from the 90-day deadline if it is “based on changed circumstances arising in the country of rationality or in the country to which deportation has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the previous hearing.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(e)(3)(ii). ... The BIA properly determine that the evidence Hamzaj submitted in his motion to reopen was not material in light of the underlying adverse credibility finding. See Kaur, 413 F.3d at 234.

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) exempts a motion to reopen based on asylum or withholding of removal from the ninety-day filing limit when materially changed country-conditions evidence was previously unavailable.

Obomighie v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2012-01-04(c)(3)(ii)

An alien may file one motion to reopen within ninety days of the entry of a final order of removal. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A), (C) (2006); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2) (2011). The time limit does not apply if the basis for the motion is to seek asylum or withholding of removal based on changed country conditions, “if such evidence is material and was not available and would not have been discovered or presented at the previous proceeding.” 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); see also 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). ... We conclude that the Board did not abuse its discretion by finding that Obomighie failed to show a change in country conditions that would excuse the late filing of the motion to reopen.

The changed-country-conditions exception applies only when the evidence shows materially changed conditions in the country of removal, not merely changed personal circumstances or continuing repression.

Di Wang v. Holder · filed 2012-08-10(c)(3)(ii)

To the extent Wang contends that the time and number limitations do not apply to his motion to reopen because his motion is “based on changed circumstances arising in” China, 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii), his arguments are unpersuasive. ... However, as the BIA found, his membership in the PFDC was a change in personal circumstances, not a change in country conditions. ... Moreover, the record supports the BIA’s determination that Wang has not established changed conditions arising in China, as a comparison of the State Department reports Wang submitted in his original proceeding and with his motion to reopen showed only a continuation of repression of political dissidents.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) imposes a time limit on motions to reopen, while § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) provides an exception when changed country conditions are demonstrated.

Dhillon v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2013-02-13(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Dhillon’s motion to reopen as untimely because the motion was filed over four years after the BIA’s final administrative order, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and Dhillon failed to demonstrate changed circumstances in India to qualify for the regulatory exception to the time limitation, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); see also Toufighi, 538 F.3d at 996 (requiring movant to produce material evidence with motion to reopen that conditions in country of nationality had changed).

Section 1003.2 requires a motion to reopen to be filed within 90 days, subject to an exception for material, previously unavailable evidence of changed country conditions.

Da Le Liu v. Attorney General of the United States · filed 2013-03-08(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

There is no dispute that Liu’s motion to reopen was untimely, as it was not filed with the BIA within ninety days of the BIA’s 2002 decision. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). However, the ninety-day requirement does not apply to motions that rely on evidence of “changed country conditions arising in the country of nationality . . . if such evidence is material and was not available and would not have been discovered or presented at the previous proceeding.” 8 U.S.C. §§ 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); see also 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). Here, Liu would have to show that he is eligible to file a second asylum application in reopened proceedings based on his new Christian faith and on changed country conditions since the time of his scheduled hearing before the IJ.

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) creates an exception to the motion-to-reopen time limit for changed circumstances arising in the applicant’s country of nationality, but not for self-induced changes in personal circumstances.

Gechev v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2013-07-31(c)(3)(ii)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Gechev’s untimely motion to reopen because he did not establish changed circumstances in Bulgaria to qualify for the regulatory exception to the time limit. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); Najmabadi, 597 F.3d at 988-89, 991 (evidence of conditions similar to those in evidence at prior proceedings was not “qualitatively different”; exception under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) is only for changed circumstances arising in country of nationality, not self-induced change in personal circumstances).

The exception to the motion-to-reopen time and number limits applies to changed conditions arising in the country at issue, not merely changed personal circumstances in the United States.

Jallow v. Holder · filed 2013-09-30(c)(3)(ii)

In addition, birth of Jallow’s children in the United States was a change in personal circumstances, not a change of conditions “arising in” The Gambia.

The changed-country-conditions exception to the time and numerical limits requires material new evidence, and a mixed petition may be rejected when the country-condition change alone cannot justify reopening.

Zhang v. Attorney General of the United States of America · filed 2013-11-14(c)(3)(ii)

Although we do not conclude that a mixed petition always must be rejected, we conclude that the BIA would not have abused its discretion in rejecting the motion in this case as being based on a mixed petition because the claimed change in country conditions, standing alone, could not justify granting the motion. ... Further, while Zhang has established that this new evidence could not have been presented at her original hearing, in order to trigger the exception to § 1003.2(c)(2)’s time and numerical limitations, she also must show that it would have been material. ... To show materiality, Zhang must carry the “heavy burden” of alleging facts that “would be sufficient, if proved, to change the result of [her] application.”

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) provides an exception to the time and numerical limits for a motion to reopen when the applicant establishes materially worsened changed country circumstances since the prior denial.

Singh v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2014-01-27(c)(3)(ii)

Although Singh was placed in deportation proceedings prior to the effective date of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, his motion is nevertheless subject to the time and numeric limitations set forth at 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). Singh filed his motion to reopen on June 29, 2009, more than two years past the 90-day regulatory time limitation. The motion was therefore untimely, unless Singh could establish the applicability of the exception for changed country circumstances set forth at 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). The BIA did not abuse its discretion in determining that Singh failed to do so. ... In addition, the BIA did not abuse its discretion when it concluded that Singh’s evidence failed to establish that the treatment of suspected Sikh militants has worsened since his application was originally denied in 2003.

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) permits the 90-day reopening deadline to be excused for changed circumstances arising in the country of removal, but not merely changed personal circumstances.

Hazem v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2014-07-03(c)(3)(ii)

The BIA found that being listed as a derivative beneficiary on another alien’s asylum application may qualify as a change in personal circumstances but cannot constitute changed circumstances arising in Germany. This finding is not irrational, arbitrary, or contrary to law. Hazem filed her motion to re-open almost three years after the final administrative decision, and has not shown any changed circumstances in Germany within the meaning of 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii).

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) exempts a motion to reopen from the time limit when it is based on materially changed country conditions and the supporting evidence was previously unavailable.

Hambardzumyan v. Holder · filed 2014-10-06(c)(3)(ii)

There is no time limit, however, for moving to reopen “based on changed country conditions arising in the country of nationality or the country to which removal has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available and would not have been discovered or presented at the previous proceeding.” 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); see also 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). We find no error in the agency’s determination that Hambardzumyan failed to demonstrate a material change in conditions in Armenia.

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) provides an exception to the timeliness bar for reopening when changed circumstances are shown, and the BIA must properly evaluate the evidence offered to establish them.

Chen v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2014-10-20(c)(3)(ii)

The BIA denied Chen’s motion as untimely, finding that she failed to show changed circumstances to qualify for the regulatory exception provided in 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). ... The BIA also abused its discretion in finding Chen failed to show changed circumstances where it discounted the government announcement she submitted solely because it had not been authenticated.

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) permits an untimely motion to reopen based on changed country conditions only when the supporting evidence is new and material to the claimed fear of persecution.

Ismail v. Lynch · filed 2015-05-05(c)(3)(ii)

Because the evidence that Ismail presented was neither new nor “material” to his claimed fear of persecution, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii), the BIA properly denied his third motion to reopen.

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) provides an exception to the time-and-number bar when changed country conditions support prima facie eligibility for asylum, withholding of removal, or CAT relief.

Galdino v. Lynch · filed 2015-05-15(c)(3)(ii)

Therefore, Galdino had to establish an exception to the bar by demonstrating that there were changed country conditions in Brazil giving rise to his prima facie eligibility for aylum, withholding of removal and relief under CAT. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). Galdino failed to make this showing.

The changed-country-conditions exception to the motion-to-reopen time and number limits applies only when the evidence shows a material change; an incremental or marginal increase in existing violence is insufficient.

Ilyas v. Lynch · filed 2015-07-28(c)(3)(ii)

Although the news articles and reports submitted by Ilyas suggested that violence may have increased over the years, it was not error to conclude that the recent evidence—even if it showed a marginal increase—was insufficient to constitute a material change in country conditions excusing the applicable procedural limitations.

Subsection (c)(3)(ii) requires the Board to determine whether evidence supporting a motion to reopen is qualitatively different from evidence available at the original merits hearing.

Williams v. Lynch · filed 2015-11-10(c)(3)(ii)

The BIA’s disposition therefore contravenes the applicable regulation, which requires a determination of whether Williams’s evidence is qualitatively different from evidence available at the time of her 1993 merits hearing.

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) exempts an asylum-based motion to reopen from the 90-day deadline when it is based on material evidence of changed conditions in the country of nationality or removal that was previously unavailable and could not have been presented earlier.

Yang v. Lynch · filed 2015-12-02(c)(3)(ii)

This time limitation, however, does not apply to a motion to reopen in order to apply for asylum if it is “based on changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality or in the country to which deportation has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the previous hearing.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii).

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) permits an exception to the time limit for a motion to reopen when the movant establishes materially changed country conditions.

Pratasik v. Jefferson Sessions · filed 2017-02-22(c)(3)(ii)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Pratasik’s motion to reopen because he failed to establish materially changed country conditions in Indonesia to qualify for an exception to the time limitation for filing a motion to reopen. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii), Najmabadi, 597 F.3d at 978-79 (evidence must be “qualitatively different” to warrant reopening).

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) creates an exception to the time limit for motions to reopen when the movant shows materially changed circumstances in the country of removal.

Singh v. Jefferson Sessions · filed 2017-02-23(c)(3)(ii)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioners’ untimely motion to reopen because Singh failed to establish materially changed circumstances in India to qualify for the regulatory exception to the time limitation imposed on motions to reopen.

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) provides a regulatory exception allowing a motion to reopen filed outside the normal time limit when the applicant shows materially changed circumstances in the country of removal.

Wu v. Jefferson Sessions · filed 2017-03-15(c)(3)(ii)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Wu’s motion to reopen as untimely, where it was filed more than four years after the BIA’s final order, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and Wu failed to establish materially changed circumstances in China as to either of his claims to qualify for the regulatory exception to the time limit for filing a motion to reopen, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); see Najmabadi, 597 F.3d at 987-89 (evidence must be “qualitatively different” to warrant reopening).

The exception to the time and number limits applies to materially changed country conditions, not merely changed personal circumstances.

Momin v. Attorney General United States · filed 2017-06-16(c)(3)(ii)

As the BIA recognized, evidence of any change in Momin’s BNP participation in the United States, or the Awami League’s subsequent awareness of his new political activities, relates to changed personal circumstances, not changed country conditions in Bangladesh, and changed personal circumstances do not excuse an alien from the time and number limitations on a motion to reopen.

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) permits the BIA to reopen deportation proceedings after the 90-day deadline when the request relies on material changed country conditions that were previously unavailable and could not previously have been presented.

Hang-Liang Pan v. Jefferson Sessions, III · filed 2017-07-21(c)(3)(ii)

The BIA has the authority to reopen deportation proceedings beyond the 90-day limitation period if the request for relief “is based on changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality or the country to which deportation has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the previous hearing.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii).

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) provides an exception to the time limit for motions to reopen when the movant presents materially changed country conditions in the country of removal.

Sugiharto v. Jefferson Sessions · filed 2017-08-14(c)(3)(ii)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Sugiharto’s motion to reopen because he filed it more than five years after the BIA’s final order, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and the motion failed to establish materially changed country conditions in Indonesia to qualify for the regulatory exception to the limitations imposed on filing a motion to reopen, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii), see Toufighi v. Mukasey, 538 F.3d 988, 996-97 (9th Cir. 2008) (evidence was immaterial in light of prior adverse credibility determination).

The ninety-day deadline for a motion to reopen does not apply when the motion relies on materially changed country conditions supported by evidence that was previously unavailable and could not have been discovered or presented earlier.

Ghebresillasie v. Jefferson Sessions · filed 2018-03-28(c)(3)(ii)

The ninety-day deadline, however, does not apply if the motion to reopen is “based on changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality or in the country to which deportation has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the previous hearing.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); see also Go v. Holder, 744 F.3d 604, 609 (9th Cir. 2014) (holding “that the procedural requirements specified in 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c) apply to CAT claims”). “[I]n order for evidence to be ‘material,’ ‘not available,’ and not able to have ‘been discovered or presented at the previous hearing,’ it must be ‘qualitatively different’ from the evidence presented at the previous hearing.” Najmabadi v. Holder, 597 F.3d 983, 987 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting Malty v. Ashcroft, 381 F.3d 942, 945–46 (9th Cir. 2004)).

The changed-country-conditions exception allows a motion to reopen despite the usual time and number limits when the applicant demonstrates changed country conditions.

Xiuman Wan v. Jefferson Sessions · filed 2018-05-21(c)(3)(ii)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Wan’s motion to reopen as untimely where the motion was filed seven years after the BIA’s final order, see 8 C.F.R § 1003.2(c)(2), and where Wan failed to demonstrate changed country conditions in China to qualify for the regulatory exception to the time and number limitations for filing a motion to reopen, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); see also Najmabadi, 597 F.3d at 987-90 (petitioner failed to show evidence was “qualitatively different” to warrant reopening).

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) requires a motion to reopen based on changed country conditions to present material evidence that was unavailable and could not have been discovered or presented at the prior hearing.

Singh v. Whitaker · filed 2018-12-04(c)(3)(ii)

Singh filed his motion to reopen under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii), which requires the movant to demonstrate changed country conditions by presenting evidence that is “material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the previous hearing.”

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) exempts an asylum-related motion to reopen from the time limit when it is based on material changed country conditions and the evidence was previously unavailable.

Tang v. Whitaker · filed 2018-12-14(c)(3)(ii)

The time limitation does not apply if the motion is to reopen proceedings in order to apply for asylum “based on changed country conditions arising in the country of nationality or the country to which removal has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available and would not have been discovered or presented at the previous proceeding.” 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); see also 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). For largely the same reasons set forth in Jian Hui Shao, we find no error in the agency’s determination that Tang failed to demonstrate a material change in country conditions as needed to excuse the untimely filing of his motion.

The ninety-day and one-motion limits do not apply when reopening is based on materially changed country conditions supported by evidence that was previously unavailable and could not have been presented earlier; longstanding persecution can still have materially worsened.

Ming Fang Chen v. Whitaker · filed 2018-12-21(c)(3)(ii)

Those temporal and numerical limits do not apply, however, if the motion to reopen is based on “changed country conditions,” and if evidence of the alleged changes “is material and was not available and would not have been discovered or presented at the previous proceeding.” See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). ... The BIA’s assertion that the Chinese government’s persecution of Christians is “longstanding” and “continu[ing]” does not preclude a claim that those conditions have materially worsened. See A.R. 4-5. Accordingly, we are unable to affirm the BIA’s rejection of the Second Motion on the basis of its flawed assessment of the country conditions for Christians in China.

The changed-country-conditions exception to the time limit for motions to reopen requires the movant to show materially changed conditions in the home country and bears the burden of proof.

Salguero-Galdamez v. Attorney General United States · filed 2019-02-13(c)(3)(ii)

But this time limit has a few exceptions. Salguero-Galdamez gestures at only one: that the conditions in Guatemala have materially changed since his prior proceeding. Id. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). He bears the burden of proof on this exception. Pllumi v. Att’y Gen., 642 F.3d 155, 161 (3d Cir. 2011). He has not met that burden.

The exception permits an asylum- or withholding-based motion to reopen based on materially changed country conditions, and the relevant comparison point is the previous hearing in the proceedings being reopened.

Singh v. U.S. Aqtorney General · filed 2019-07-01(c)(3)(ii)

But those limits do not apply to applications “for asylum or withholding of deportation based on changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality or in the country to which deportation has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the previous hearing.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); INA § 240(c)(7)(C)(ii), 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii). ... The 2011 hearing is the relevant time period for assessing changed country conditions because it is the “previous hearing” in the proceedings Singh seeks to reopen. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); INA § 240(c)(7)(C)(ii), 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii).

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) permits an otherwise time-barred motion to reopen when an asylum applicant presents material evidence of changed country conditions that was previously unavailable.

Chen v. Barr · filed 2019-08-14(c)(3)(ii)

However, the time limitation for filing a motion to reopen does not apply if the motion is filed in order to apply for asylum “based on changed country conditions arising in the country of nationality or the country to which removal has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available and would not have been discovered or presented at the previous proceedings.” 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); see also 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). The agency did not abuse its discretion in finding that Chen’s evidence was insufficient to establish a material change in conditions in China.

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) permits an untimely motion to reopen when country conditions materially changed and the supporting evidence was previously unavailable or could not have been discovered at the prior proceeding.

Lorenzo v. Barr · filed 2019-08-28(c)(3)(ii)

To satisfy the changed-country-conditions exception to the 90-day window for filing a motion to reopen, a petitioner “must show that conditions in the country to which [he] will be removed have materially changed, with evidence of such change being unavailable or unable to have been discovered at the previous proceeding.” Yu Yun Zhang v. Holder, 702 F.3d 878, 880 (6th Cir. 2012) (citations omitted); see 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3).

Section 1003.2 generally requires motions to reopen to be filed within the applicable deadline, but permits a changed-country-conditions exception when the movant demonstrates materially changed conditions.

Martinez-Gonzalez v. Barr · filed 2020-04-13(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Martinez-Gonzalez’s motion as untimely, where it was filed approximately three years after his final administrative order. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). Martinez-Gonzalez did not demonstrate materially changed conditions in Mexico to qualify for the changed county conditions exception to the filing deadline. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii).

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) permits reopening based on materially changed conditions in the country of nationality when those changes support a previously unavailable claim and the petitioner shows an individualized risk of persecution.

Matar v. Barr · filed 2020-06-12(c)(3)(ii)

Matar also sought to reopen under the exception for changed circumstances in the country of nationality. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). Matar has a heavy burden and must demonstrate that “circumstances have changed sufficiently that a petitioner who previously did not have a legitimate claim” now does, Malty v. Ashcroft, 381 F.3d 942, 945 (9th Cir. 2004), and that his predicament is “appreciably different from the dangers faced by [his] fellow citizens.” Singh v. INS, 134 F.3d 962, 967 (9th Cir. 1998) (internal quotation marks omitted). The BIA did not abuse its discretion in holding that the current conditions evidence submitted with Matar’s motion to reopen is not qualitatively different from the previous evidence and does not show an individualized risk of persecution, especially after being out of the country for over two decades. See Najmabadi v. Holder, 597 F.3d 983, 990 (9th Cir. 2010).

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) requires the changed circumstance supporting reopening to arise in the country of nationality, and the Board must also assess prima facie eligibility for the requested relief.

Ahmed v. Wilkinson · filed 2021-02-09(c)(3)(ii)

That change must “aris[e] in the country of nationality.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). ... Changed circumstances, however, is just one of the factors that the Board considers when adjudicating a request for reopening. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). The Board also must assess whether the evidence establishes a prima facie claim for the relief sought.

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) requires a motion to reopen based on changed country conditions to show changed circumstances in the country of nationality or deportation; changed personal circumstances alone are insufficient.

Rodriguez v. Garland · filed 2021-03-15(c)(3)(ii)

As explained in Chandra, while changes in personal circumstances may be relevant to a motion to reopen based on changed country conditions, a petitioner cannot succeed on such a motion that “relies solely on a change in personal circumstances,” without also providing sufficient evidence of related changed country conditions. Chandra, 751 F.3d at 1037. This is because the regulatory language governing such claims requires that a motion to reopen be based on “changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality or deportation.” Id. at 1036 (emphasis added) (citing 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii)).

(c)(3)(ii) exempts a motion to reopen from the time and numerical limits when material evidence of changed country conditions was unavailable and could not have been discovered or presented at the previous hearing.

Alao v. Attorney General United States · filed 2021-05-20(c)(3)(ii)

The BIA not only failed to address any of these documents, but also rejected Alao’s argument because the evidence of his own mental illnesses was “not new and previously unavailable,” App. 5, even though 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) provides a different standard under which the BIA must consider whether the evidence of changed country conditions “is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the previous hearing.”

The regulatory exception to the time and number limits for a motion to reopen requires the movant to demonstrate changed country conditions in the relevant country.

De Ortiz v. Garland · filed 2021-10-15(c)(3)(ii)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Cortez De Ortiz’s second motion to reopen as untimely and number-barred where it was filed over a decade after the order of removal became final, see 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A), (C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and where Cortez De Ortiz failed to demonstrate changed country conditions in El Salvador to qualify for a regulatory exception to the time and number limitations, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); Najmabadi v. Holder, 597 F.3d 983, 991-92 (9th Cir. 2010) (BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying motion to reopen where petitioner failed to introduce material evidence of changed country conditions).

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) permits reopening based on changed country conditions affecting persons of the movant's newly asserted status, even when that status was not part of the original proceedings.

Zacharia v. Garland · filed 2022-02-10(c)(3)(ii)

We agree that a change of status as to sexual orientation could serve as the basis to reopen a case even though that status played no part in his original proceedings. But the movant would nevertheless have to show that conditions in the country had changed for persons of that status since the original proceedings. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); Salim, 831 F.3d at 1137.

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) provides an exception to the time and number bars for a motion to reopen based on materially changed country conditions.

Abbas v. Garland · filed 2023-01-23(c)(3)(ii)

First, he seeks application of an exception to the bars based on changed country conditions relevant to his claims for asylum, withholding, and CAT relief, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii), and claims the BIA abused its discretion by failing to review his evidence. The BIA decision included only a cursory acknowledgement of the country conditions evidence rather than a substantive analysis. This error was harmless, however, because the record does not establish that there has been a material change in country conditions since Abbas’s initial proceedings.

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) permits reopening based on changed country conditions only when the supporting evidence was previously unavailable and the change is material.

Rivera-Gonzalez v. Garland · filed 2023-03-08(c)(3)(ii)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Rivera-Gonzalez’s motion because she failed to demonstrate material changed country conditions based on evidence that was unavailable at the time of her prior hearing in 2016. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). Much of the documentary evidence that Rivera-Gonzalez submitted to show changed conditions for LGBTQ persons in Mexico was available at the time of her prior hearing. And the record does not establish that the BIA abused its discretion in concluding that her remaining evidence demonstrates only “incremental” change, not a “material” change.

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) permits a petitioner to file a motion to reopen at any time to apply for relief based on changed country conditions.

Anos v. Garland · filed 2023-03-24(c)(3)(ii)

A petitioner may file a motion to reopen at any time for the purpose of submitting an application for relief based on changed country conditions.

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) allows an otherwise untimely motion to reopen when the movant provides material evidence of changed country conditions in the country of removal.

Monterroso v. Garland · filed 2023-09-14(c)(3)(ii)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion when concluding that Monterroso failed to demonstrate changed country conditions that would excuse the untimeliness of his motion to reopen.1 See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). Monterroso bore the burden of “produc[ing] evidence that conditions have changed in [Guatemala]” since his removal hearing in 2012. Silva, 993 F.3d at 718.

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) permits a motion to reopen without a time limit when it is based on changed country conditions, but not merely changed personal circumstances.

Guo v. Garland · filed 2023-11-20(c)(3)(ii)

To the extent Guo challenges the BIA’s refusal to apply that exception, which he never cites in his brief, the BIA correctly concluded that he failed to provide evidence of changed country conditions, as opposed to changed personal circumstances. See Zheng v. DOJ, 416 F.3d 129, 130-31 (2d Cir. 2005) (holding that 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) does not apply to changed personal circumstances, only changed country conditions).

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) permits reopening based on materially changed country conditions, but evidence of generalized crime and violence that does not show an appreciably different level of gang violence is insufficient.

Rodriguez v. Garland · filed 2023-12-08(c)(3)(ii)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Osorio’s motion to reopen based upon failure to establish materially changed country conditions. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). The evidence that Osorio submitted in support of his motion to reopen—his 2019 declaration and the 2018 Human Rights Report for El Salvador—does not show an appreciably different level of gang violence in El Salvador when compared to the evidence Osorio submitted at his 2016 hearing. Moreover, the new evidence describes only “generalized conditions” of crime and violence and is thus immaterial to the success of Osorio’s petitions.

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) exempts a motion to reopen seeking asylum or withholding based on changed country conditions from filing limits when the evidence is material and was previously unavailable.

Castellanos-Mendoza v. Garland · filed 2024-04-04(c)(3)(ii)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Castellanos-Mendoza’s second motion to reopen as numerically barred and untimely, see 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A) (only one motion to reopen allowed), (c)(7)(C)(i) (motion to reopen must be filed within ninety days of the final removal order), and he has not established changed country conditions in Guatemala to qualify for an exception, see 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) (filing limitations do not apply to a motion to reopen “[t]o apply or reapply for asylum or withholding of deportation based on changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality . . . if such evidence is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the previous hearing”); Toufighi v. Mukasey, 538 F.3d 988, 996-97 (9th Cir. 2008) (movant must produce material evidence that conditions in country of nationality had changed).

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) permits a motion to reopen outside the 90-day deadline only when supported by new evidence showing changed country conditions; evidence that was previously available or shows only continuation of existing conditions does not qualify.

De Cruz v. Garland · filed 2024-05-08(c)(3)(ii)

Because a motion to reopen requires new evidence and the changed country conditions exception to the 90-day deadline requires evidence of changed conditions, see 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii), the BIA did not abuse its discretion in concluding that the articles that were previously available did not support reopening.

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) exempts a motion to reopen based on material, previously unavailable changed country conditions from the usual time and number limits.

Singh v. McHenry · filed 2025-01-22(c)(3)(ii)

These time and number limitations, however, do not apply to a motion filed to apply for asylum “based on changed country conditions arising in the country of nationality or the country to which removal has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available and would not have been discovered or presented at the previous proceeding.” 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); see also 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). For reasons set forth below, we conclude that the BIA did not err in finding that this exception did not apply.

The changed-country-conditions exception does not excuse the time and number limits when the submitted evidence is not material because it fails to overcome an underlying adverse-credibility determination.

Dhali v. Bondi · filed 2025-04-29(c)(3)(ii)

“Moreover, even crediting Dhali’s argument to this Court that his country conditions evidence shows that Awami League members have become more violent against opposing political party member since the time of his hearing—an assertion he did not make in his motion to reopen—any such change would not be material in light of his failure to rebut the finding that he was not credible as to his political involvement. ... Because Dhali failed to submit evidence overcoming the agency’s underlying adverse credibility determination, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying his untimely and number-barred motion to reopen.”

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) creates an exception to the deadline for motions to reopen when asylum is based on material, previously unavailable changed country conditions in the relevant country.

Lin v. Bondi · filed 2025-11-19(c)(3)(ii)

This deadline does not apply, however, if the movant seeks to apply for asylum “based on changed country conditions arising in the country of nationality or the country to which removal has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available and would not have been discovered or presented at the previous proceeding.” 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); see also 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). In addition to establishing such a change, the movant must demonstrate prima facie eligibility for the relief sought.

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) requires a noncitizen seeking to reopen proceedings more than 90 days after a final removal order to submit evidence of materially changed conditions in the country of nationality or removal.

Herrera v. Blanche · filed 2026-05-21(c)(3)(ii)

When a noncitizen seeks to reopen proceedings more than ninety days after a final order of removal, they must provide evidence of material changed conditions in the country of nationality or removal. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); see also Kaur v. Garland, 2 F.4th 823, 830 (9th Cir. 2021).

The exception to the reopening deadline for changed country circumstances requires a showing of developments after the merits hearing.

Chen v. Board of Immigration Appeals · filed 2007-08-01(c)(3)(ii)

Therefore, in order to qualify for an exception to this time bar, he was required to demonstrate changed circumstances arising in China. ... Because Chen submitted insufficient evidence to support the allegations in his motion, and provided insufficient information to establish that there had been developments in China post-dating his hearing, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying his motion to reopen based on changed circumstances in China.

The birth of children in the United States is a change in personal circumstances, not changed country conditions that excuse the deadline for a motion to reopen.

Guo v. Mukasey · filed 2008-12-19(c)(3)(ii)

The BIA held, however, that the birth of Guo’s two children in the United States in the time since her removal proceedings constituted a change in personal circumstances rather than evidence of changed country conditions. Binding precedent in this circuit requires us to agree.

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) excuses the time and number limits on motions to reopen when previously unavailable, material evidence shows changed country conditions.

Rodriguez v. U.S. Attorney General · filed 2013-12-30(c)(3)(ii)

Because Rodriguez failed to establish changed country conditions in Colombia sufficient to excuse the filing of his untimely and number-barred motion to reopen, he is not entitled to relief.

Section 1003.2(c) permits an otherwise untimely motion to reopen when the movant establishes materially changed circumstances in the country of removal.

Romo v. Lynch · filed 2015-12-15(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Holguin Romo’s motion to reopen where the motion was filed more than a year after the BIA’s final administrative order, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and Holguin Romo failed to establish materially changed circumstances arising in Mexico to qualify for the regulatory exception to the time limitation for a motion to reopen, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); He v. Gonzales, 501 F.3d 1128, 1132-33 (9th Cir.2007) (documentation insufficient to establish changed circumstances); see also Najmabadi, 597 F.3d at 987 (requiring that evidence of changed country conditions “be ‘qualitatively different’ from the evidence presented at the previous hearing”) (citation omitted).

A motion to reopen qualifies for the exception to the time and number limits only if it presents new and material evidence demonstrating a material change in country conditions.

Montesinos-Bonilla v. Lynch · filed 2015-12-17(c)(3)(ii)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Montesinos-Bonilla’s motion to reopen as time and number barred, where he filed his second motion over seven years after his final order of removal, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and he failed to submit new and material evidence demonstrating a material change in El Salvador to qualify for the regulatory exception to the time and number limitations for filing motions to reopen, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); see also Najmabadi, 597 F.3d at 988-90 (new evidence lacked materiality).

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) requires material evidence of changed country circumstances to qualify for an exception to the time limit for a motion to reopen.

Singh v. Lynch · filed 2016-03-02(c)(3)(ii)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Singh’s motion to reopen because it was filed more than four years after his order of removal became final, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and Singh failed to present material evidence of changed circumstances in India to qualify for a regulatory exception to the time limitation for filing a motion to reopen, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); Najmabadi, 597 F.3d at 987-90 (evidence must be “qualitatively different” to warrant reopening); see also Toufighi v. Mukasey, 538 F.3d 988, 996-97 (9th Cir.2008) (evidence was immaterial in light of prior adverse credibility determination).

The changed-country-conditions exception requires material evidence; presenting a new asylum theory does not itself make the evidence material.

Tovar v. Lynch · filed 2017-01-09(c)(3)(ii)

But the central question in this case is whether the submitted evidence was material, not whether it was previously available or qualitatively different. We do not see how the fact that Rivera is asserting a new theory of asylum bears on the evidence’s materiality.

Materially changed country conditions can excuse the time and numerical limits on a motion to reopen when the supporting evidence was previously unavailable.

Chen v. Sessions · filed 2017-08-09(c)(3)(ii)

For largely the same reasons set forth in Jian Hui Shao, we find no error in the agency’s determination that Chen failed to demonstrate materially changed country conditions excusing the untimely and number barred filing of her motion.

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) permits an untimely motion to reopen based on changed conditions in the country of nationality; the birth of children in the United States does not qualify.

Fang Rong Zheng v. Attorney General of the United States · filed 2010-03-25(c)(3)(ii)

The BIA found that her evidence — namely the birth of her two children in the United States — did not constitute “changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality” as required by 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii) and 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) to waive the ninety-day deadline for motions to reopen. This conclusion comports with our precedent, ... and we find that the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Zheng’s untimely motion to reopen.

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) exempts asylum and withholding motions based on changed country conditions from the time and numerical limits on motions to reopen.

C-W-L · filed 2007-07-01(c)(3)(ii)

The regulations expressly provide that the time and numerical limitations on motions to reopen will not bar asylum or withholding of removal applications where the application is based on changed country conditions. 8 C.F.R. §§1003.2(c)(3)(ii), 1003.23(b)(4)(i).

A change in the political party in power does not necessarily establish changed country conditions that excuse the time and number limits on a motion to reopen.

Ndoci v. Barr · filed 2020-10-30(c)(3)(ii)

Contrary to Ndoci’s assertions, a change of the political party in power does not necessarily establish a material change in country conditions.

An untimely motion to reopen may qualify for the changed country conditions exception, but a vague report of a bombing does not establish changed circumstances.

Panjwani v. Gonzales · filed 2005-03-03(c)(3)(ii)

While Panjwani testified before the IJ in 2000 that violence between Muslims (his religious association) and Hindus was not uncommon in India, and that he feared for his safety because of it, it seems reasonable for the BIA to have concluded that a non-specific bus bombing, without any further details, does not rise to the level of “changed circumstances.”

A motion to reopen based on changed country conditions is exempt from the ordinary filing deadline.

Marke v. Attorney General of the United States · filed 2005-06-13(c)(3)(ii)

That claim is not barred by the time limitations set forth on 8 C.F.R. 1003.2(c) pursuant to 8 C.F.R. 1003.2(c)(3).

A late motion to reopen may qualify for the changed country conditions exception when it presents new, material evidence that was unavailable at the previous hearing.

Ni v. Board of Immigration Appeals · filed 2006-01-19(c)(3)(ii)

A motion that does not comply with these time limitations can only be brought where the alien can establish “changed country conditions arising in the country of nationality....” 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c) (7) (C) (ii); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). Such a motion to reopen shall not be granted unless it appears that the evidence offered “is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented” at the previous hearing. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1). ... However, the BIA failed to consider Ni’s evidence of changed country conditions, and did not make a determination as to whether the submitted evidence was new and material to Ni’s claim and thereby exempted her from the time limitations on a motion to reopen. As such, the BIA abused its discretion.

The Board must assess a claimed changed-country-conditions exception to the numerical limit on motions to reopen; a later merits assessment can make remand for an earlier error futile.

Alam v. Alberto R. Gonzales, United States Attorney General, 1 · filed 2006-02-17(c)(3)(ii)

Thus, on the motion for reconsideration, the BIA reviewed the entire record submitted by Alam, recognized its prior error in mechanically applying the numerical limits on motions to reopen, addressed on the merits his claim that the changed-country-conditions exception applied, and rejected it on the merits. The BIA’s finding makes clear that it has assessed the evidence behind Alam’s CAT claim and found that to be an insufficient ground for asylum as well. Because the BIA has articulated legally proper and sufficient reasoning for denying Alam’s motion to reopen, albeit in the context of deciding his motion to reconsider, remand would be pointless “because it is clear that the agency would adhere to its prior decision in the absence of error.”

The changed country circumstances exception to the time and numerical limits on motions to reopen does not apply when newly issued evidence supports a claim already considered.

Zheng v. Gonzales · filed 2006-02-28(c)(3)(ii)

One such exception, the only one applicable here, is where the alien can establish “changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality.” 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii) (2005); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) (2005). ... The BIA rationally concluded that although Zheng’s evidence, a fine receipt, was newly issued, the IJ had already considered his claim that he would be persecuted for his failure to pay the family planning fine. As such, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in determining that Zheng’s third motion to reopen did not fall within any recognized exception to the time and numerical limitations.

The time limit for a motion to reopen does not apply when material evidence of changed country conditions was previously unavailable or undiscoverable.

Jiang v. Gonzales · filed 2006-04-24(c)(3)(ii)

The time limitation does not apply, however, to a motion to reopen that is based on changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality or in the country to which deportation has been ordered, if evidence of those circumstances is material and neither previously available or discoverable at the prior hearing. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). ... None of this evidence appears to have been unavailable or undiscoverable at Jiang’s prior hearing, nor do his arguments indicate a change in circumstances in China.

A child’s birth in the United States is a change in the parents’ personal circumstances, so it does not qualify for the exception to the numerical limit on motions to reopen based on changed country circumstances.

Xue Mei Pan v. Board of Immigration Appeals · filed 2006-06-21(c)(3)(ii)

A birth of a child in the United States constitutes changed personal circumstances of the parents and not changed circumstances in China and therefore does not fall within the scope of the exception to the numerical bar.

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) excuses the 90-day deadline for a motion to reopen based on changed country conditions when the supporting evidence is material and was previously unavailable.

Qeraxhiu v. Gonzales · filed 2006-11-15(c)(3)(ii)

In addition, the information provided in the affidavits is not material to the question of changed country circumstances occurring after the Board's March 24, 2003 order. The Board's conclusion that the affidavits were neither previously unavailable nor material is both reasonable and a sufficient ground for denying a motion to reopen.

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) permits an exception to the limits on motions to reopen when previously unavailable evidence shows material changed conditions in the alien's homeland.

Raza v. Gonzales · filed 2007-04-19(c)(3)(ii)

Under this rubric, the agency may waive numerical and temporal bars to reopening if an alien makes a convincing demonstration of changed conditions in his homeland. Those changes, however, must be material to the underlying substantive relief that the alien is seeking (here, asylum or withholding of removal) and the evidence tendered in support thereof must have been unavailable during the prior proceedings.

The birth of a child outside the country of nationality, on its own, does not establish changed country circumstances that excuse an untimely or successive motion to reopen.

He v. Gonzales · filed 2007-09-04(c)(3)(ii)

We hold that the birth of a child outside the country of nationality is insufficient, on its own, to establish changed cir- cumstances within the meaning of 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii).

A motion to reopen filed after the ninety-day deadline requires evidence of changed country conditions to qualify for the exception; an article that does not show such a change is insufficient.

Alemu v. Mukasey · filed 2007-12-11(c)(3)(ii)

Motions to reopen removal proceedings are governed by 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7) and 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2. ... The BIA’s conclusion that this article did not show changed country conditions was a reasonable interpretation of the record and did not ignore or distort the evidence.

The exception to the ninety-day deadline for motions to reopen requires evidence that shows changed country conditions.

Alemu v. Keisler · filed 2007-12-11(c)(3)(ii)

Motions to reopen removal proceedings are governed by 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7) and 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2. ... The BIA's conclusion that this article did not show changed country conditions was a reasonable interpretation of the record and did not ignore or distort the evidence.

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) exempts a motion to reopen from the ninety-day deadline when material, previously unavailable evidence shows changed country conditions.

Gashi v. Mukasey · filed 2007-12-12(c)(3)(ii)

We conclude that the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Gashi’s motion to reopen because he failed to demonstrate changed country conditions in Kosovo sufficient to reopen his ease. ... This time limitation does not apply to motions to reopen based on changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality, if the motion is supported by evidence that is “material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the previous hearing.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii).

A motion to reopen filed more than three years after a BIA order is untimely when the applicant fails to provide sufficient evidence of changed country circumstances.

Hasan v. Mukasey · filed 2008-01-24(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Hasan’s motion to reopen as untimely because it was filed more than three years after the BIA’s October 25, 2002 order. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). Moreover, Hasan failed to provide sufficient evidence of changed circumstances in Yemen to establish that he now has a well-founded fear of future persecution. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); see also Malty, 381 F.3d at 945.

The changed country conditions exception to the time limit for a motion to reopen requires evidence of changed conditions in the country; a change in the applicant’s personal circumstances does not suffice.

Chen v. Mukasey · filed 2008-04-04(c)(3)(ii)

As such, the BIA properly found that Chen failed to demonstrate a change in country conditions in China sufficient to except her from the time limitation for the filing of motions to reopen. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii).

An untimely motion to reopen for asylum or withholding may proceed if material evidence that was previously unavailable and could not have been discovered or presented at the prior hearing shows changed conditions in the country of removal.

Suwu v. Attorney General of the United States · filed 2008-05-28(c)(3)(ii)

Suwu does not dispute that his motion to reopen was filed beyond the ninety-day filing period, but he does not address how his motion satisfied the criteria of 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii), the procedural hurdle he must overcome before having his untimely motion to reopen considered.

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) removes the time and number limits on motions to reopen when the applicant establishes materially changed conditions in the country of nationality.

Zheng v. Mukasey · filed 2008-06-04(c)(3)(ii)

There is no time or numerical limitation, however, where the alien establishes materially “changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). ... The BIA properly found that Zheng failed to establish changed country conditions in China, which would have excused her untimely and number barred motion, because: (1) she did not provide any objective evidence indicating that she is the mother of two children born in the United States; (2) she did not provide any objective country conditions evidence demonstrating that returnees with U.S.-born children are subjected to persecution; (3) the two Department of State reports that Zheng cited did not establish changed country conditions in China; (4) the unsupported statements in her brief concerning conditions in China are not evidence and, as such, are not due any weight; and (5) much of the evidence Zheng submitted predated the IJ’s 2002 decision and was thus not new or previously unavailable.

A change in personal circumstances does not excuse the time limit for filing a motion to reopen.

Liu v. Mukasey · filed 2008-08-22(c)(3)(ii)

Indeed, it is well-settled that a change in personal circumstances, such as Liu’s baptism, does not excuse the time limit for filing a motion to reopen.

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) permits an untimely motion to reopen based on material, previously unavailable evidence of changed conditions in the country of nationality or removal.

Zheng v. Mukasey · filed 2008-10-16(c)(3)(ii)

However, there is no time limit for filing a motion to reopen “based on changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality or in the country to which deportation has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the previous hearing.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). Here, the BIA properly found that Zheng’s motion did not qualify for such an exception.

Undated evidence alone is insufficient to establish changed country circumstances that excuse an untimely motion to reopen.

Feng v. Mukasey · filed 2008-10-16(c)(3)(ii)

As the BIA concluded, however, this was the only evidence Feng submitted relevant to his changed circumstances argument, and it is insufficient to show “changed circumstances” as required by 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) where it is undated.

A late motion to reopen may qualify for the changed country conditions exception when the evidence shows changed conditions rather than speculation about future problems.

Zequiraj v. Mukasey · filed 2008-10-21(c)(3)(ii)

Moreover, the BIA properly found that Zequiraj failed to show that his motion to reopen met an exception to the time limitation based on “changed country conditions” in Kosovo. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii).

A motion to reopen may be filed after the deadline when previously unavailable, material evidence shows changed conditions in the country of removal.

Guo v. Mukasey · filed 2008-11-05(c)(3)(ii)

There is no time limit for filing a motion to reopen “based on changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality or in the country to which deportation has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the previous hearing.” Id, § 1003.2(c)(3)(H). Here, however, the BIA concluded that Guo’s motion did not qualify for such an exception. We agree.

The changed country circumstances exception requires the BIA to assess the asserted change itself; an applicant's role in creating the original reason for fearing harm does not alone disqualify a later change.

Larngar v. Holder · filed 2009-04-06(c)(3)(ii)

Because of the BIA's apparent conflation of separate inquiries, we are concerned that the Board may not have applied "a properly framed burden of proof," see Conteh, 461 F.3d at 44 (emphasis added), when it impliedly concluded that, regardless of whether the petitioner induced the changed circumstances or not, so long as the petitioner originally induced the reason for his fear of harm he cannot establish changed country circumstances.

After a final removal order, an applicant seeking to file a successive asylum application outside the ordinary reopening deadline must file a motion to reopen showing changed country conditions.

Zheng v. Holder · filed 2009-04-16(c)(3)(ii)

Because Zheng failed to file a motion to reopen showing changed country conditions with her successive asylum application, the BIA did not err in dismissing her motion to file a successive asylum application.

Changes in an alien’s personal circumstances, even when known to potential persecutors, do not establish changed country conditions that excuse an untimely motion to reopen.

Jiang v. United States Department of Justice · filed 2009-07-16(c)(3)(ii)

Indeed, it would defeat the purpose of the existing statutory and regulatory scheme to find that an alien who changes her personal circumstances, and makes her potential persecutors aware of that change, may establish changed country conditions.

The changed country conditions exception to the time limit for a motion to reopen does not cover a change in the applicant’s personal circumstances.

Keyrupan v. Attorney General of the United States · filed 2009-07-20(c)(3)(ii)

First, we agree with the BIA that Keyrupan’s changed personal circumstance, i.e. the birth of her son, is distinct from changed circumstances arising in Indonesia.

An untimely motion to reopen requires a showing of changed country conditions; changed personal circumstances do not satisfy that requirement.

Castaneda v. U.S. Attorney General · filed 2009-07-23(c)(3)(ii)

We conclude that the BIA did not abuse its discretion because Petitioner did not demonstrate changed country conditions, as needed to excuse the untimeliness of her motion to reopen. First, Petitioner’s burden to demonstrate changed country conditions cannot be met by a showing of changed personal circumstances.

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) permits an untimely or successive motion to reopen based on material changed country conditions; translation errors that do not materially change the evidence do not qualify.

Huang v. Holder · filed 2009-08-19(c)(3)(ii)

Therefore, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in concluding that the purported translation errors did not demonstrate material changed country conditions excusing the time and numerical limitations applicable to Huang’s motion.