8 C.F.R. § 1003.2

Section 1003.2(c)(2) permits only one motion to reopen, so a third motion is numerically barred.

Chen v. Gonzales · filed 2007-03-26(c)(2)

As Chen previously filed two other motions to reopen, her third motion to reopen was barred by the numerical limitation set forth in § 1003.2(c)(2), which permits only one motion to reopen.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) limits an alien subject to a final order of removal to one motion to reopen, filed within 90 days after the final order.

Azanedo-Aguirre v. Holder · filed 2009-03-09(c)(2)

An alien who is subject to a final order of removal is limited to filing one motion to reopen removal proceedings, and that motion must be filed within 90 days of the date of entry of a final order of removal. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(e)(7)(A), (C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). Because petitioner’s motion to reopen was filed well beyond the 90-day deadline, and petitioner has failed to demonstrate that an exception to this time limit applies, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioner’s motion to reopen.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) permits an alien to file one motion to reopen within 90 days of the final administrative decision, but requires the supporting evidence to have been unavailable and undiscoverable or unpresentable at the former hearing.

Jin v. Holder · filed 2010-08-18(c)(2)

An alien seeking to reopen proceedings may file one motion to reopen no later than 90 days after the date on which the final administrative decision was rendered. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). The alien must demonstrate that the evidence offered in support of the motion was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing. Id. Here, the BIA reasonably denied Jin’s motion to reopen because she failed to demonstrate that the evidence of her former counsel’s alleged ineffective assistance was unavailable or could not have been presented at her previous hearing.

Section 1003.2(b)(2) bars a motion to reconsider that challenges only the Board’s use of the streamlining procedure.

Moreno-Suarez v. Gonzales · filed 2006-03-17(b)(2)

However, we conclude that the Board acted arbitrarily in denying petitioners’ motion to reconsider based solely on a reference to 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(2) because petitioners did not challenge the Board’s use of the streamlining procedure. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(2) (barring motions to reconsider that challenge only the Board’s use of the streamlining procedure); Bhasin v. Gonzales, 423 F.3d 977, 983-984, 987 (9th Cir.2005) (stating that this court will reverse the Board’s denial of a motion that is arbitrary, irrational or contrary to law and fails to show proper consideration of all the factors).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) generally bars a second motion to reopen before the BIA.

Jia v. United States Department of Justice · filed 2006-03-27(c)(2)

We find no such abuse, because as the BIA correctly concluded, Jia’s July 2004 motion to reopen is his second such motion and, thus, proeedurally barred. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) generally permits only one motion to reopen removal proceedings and requires it to be filed within 90 days after the final removal order.

Gonzalez-Herrera v. Gonzales · filed 2007-04-09(c)(2)

A party may file only one motion to reopen removal proceedings, and that motion must be filed not later than ninety days after the date on which the final order of removal was entered. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). The BIA therefore did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioner’s motion to reopen which was filed over seven years after the deadline for filing motions to reopen.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) permits only one motion to reopen removal proceedings and requires it to be filed within 90 days after the final order of removal.

Jaimes v. Gonzales · filed 2007-04-09(c)(2)

A party may file only one motion to reopen removal proceedings, and that motion must be filed not later than ninety days after the date on which the final order of removal was entered. ... The Board of Immigration Appeals therefore did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioner’s motion to reopen which was filed over a year after the deadline for filing motions to reopen.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) generally allows a party to file only one motion to reopen.

Estrada v. Gonzales · filed 2007-04-09(c)(2)

The regulations provide that “a party may file only one motion to reopen.... ” See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). Therefore, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioner’s fifth motion to reopen. See id., see also Iturribarria v. INS, 321 F.3d 889, 895-96 (9th Cir.2003).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) generally limits an alien to one motion to reopen before the Board of Immigration Appeals.

Acevedo v. Gonzales · filed 2007-06-12(c)(2)

The Board of Immigration Appeals did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioner’s third motion to reopen because an alien may generally file only one motion to reopen. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2); Rodriguez-Lariz v. INS, 282 F.3d 1218, 1222 (9th Cir.2002).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) permits only one motion to reopen and requires it to be filed no later than 90 days after the final administrative decision.

Romano v. Gonzales · filed 2007-06-12(c)(2)

The regulations provide that “a party may file only one motion to reopen,” and that the motion “must be filed no later than 90 days after the date on which the final administrative decision was rendered in the proceeding sought to be reopened.” See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioner’s second motion to reopen, filed more than two years after the final administrative decision was rendered.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) permits a party to file only one motion to reopen removal proceedings.

Martinez v. Gonzales · filed 2007-07-27(c)(2)

The regulations provide that a party “may file only one motion to reopen removal proceedings----” See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). Therefore, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioner’s second motion to reopen, filed one year late.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) permits only one motion to reopen removal proceedings and requires it to be filed within 90 days after the final removal order.

Ortega v. Gonzales · filed 2007-07-27(c)(2)

A party may file only one motion to reopen removal proceedings, and that motion must be filed not later than ninety days after the date on which the final order of removal was entered. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) generally permits only one motion to reopen and requires it to be filed within 90 days after the final administrative decision.

Ibarra-Vasquez v. Gonzales · filed 2007-07-27(c)(2)

The regulations provide that “a party may file only one motion to reopen,” and that the motion “must be filed no later than 90 days after the date on which the final administrative decision was rendered in the proceeding sought to be reopened.” See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) permits an alien to file only one motion to reopen, and requires that motion to be filed within 90 days of the final administrative decision.

Nissan, Danial v. Keisler, Peter D. · filed 2007-08-09(c)(2)

An alien is entitled to file only one motion to reopen, and that motion must be filed within 90 days of the final administrative decision. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2); Ajose v. Gonzales, 408 F.3d 393, 394 (7th Cir. 2005).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) permits only one motion to reopen and requires it to be filed within 90 days after the final removal order.

Soltero v. Gonzales · filed 2007-08-24(c)(2)

A party may file only one motion to reopen removal proceedings, and that motion must be filed not later than ninety days after the date on which the final order of removal was entered. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioner’s motion to reopen as untimely when it was filed over seven months after the deadline for filing motions to reopen.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) permits a party to file only one motion to reopen removal proceedings.

Buenrostro-Lomeli v. Gonzales · filed 2007-08-27(c)(2)

A party may file only one motion to reopen removal proceedings. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). Because Buenrostro-Lomeli previously had filed a motion to reopen requesting adjustment of status, we conclude that the BIA’s denial of the second motion was not an abuse of discretion.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) limits a party to one motion to reopen and requires filing it within 90 days after the final administrative decision.

Cabrera v. Keisler · filed 2007-10-10(c)(2)

The regulations provide that “a party may file only one motion to reopen,” and that the motion “must be filed no later than 90 days after the date on which the final administrative decision was rendered in the proceeding sought to be reopened.” See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) generally permits a party to file only one motion to reopen removal proceedings, subject to specified exceptions.

Duran v. Keisler · filed 2007-10-18(c)(2)

The regulations provide, with certain exceptions that do not apply to this case, that “a party may file only one motion to reopen....” See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). Therefore, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioner’s fifth motion to reopen as numerically barred. See id.

Section 1003.2(c) generally permits a petitioner to file only one motion to reopen removal proceedings.

Aguilar v. Mukasey · filed 2008-04-22(c)

The regulations state that a petitioner may file only one motion to reopen removal proceedings. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) permits only one motion to reopen, so a remand to consider additional evidence may be treated as a prohibited second motion to reopen.

Vega v. Attorney General · filed 2008-01-18(c)(2)

Under the circumstances of this case, we agree that a remand to consider additional evidence would have been equivalent to a second motion to reopen, which is prohibited by the governing law.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) permits only one motion to reopen removal proceedings and requires it to be filed within 90 days after the final order of removal.

Barraza-Garcia v. Mukasey · filed 2008-04-23(c)(2)

A party may file only one motion to reopen removal proceedings, and that motion must be filed not later than ninety days after the date on which the final order of removal was entered. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). The motion to reopen filed September 11, 2007 was petitioner’s third motion to reopen and was filed nearly three years after petitioner’s November 30, 2004 final order of removal. ... Accordingly, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioner’s motion to reopen as untimely and numerically barred.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) permits only one motion to reopen, generally requires filing within 90 days of the final administrative order, and bars motions that satisfy neither requirement unless an exception applies.

Flores-Flores v. Mukasey · filed 2008-05-16(c)(2)

The regulations provide that a party may file only one motion to reopen and the motion must be filed within 90 days of the final administrative order. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioner’s third motion to reopen filed more than ten years after the final administrative order because the motion was time- and numerically-barred and did not meet a regulatory exception to the filing requirements.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) generally permits only one motion to reopen and requires it to be filed within 90 days after the final administrative decision.

Alquicira v. Mukasey · filed 2008-06-19(c)(2)

The regulations provide that “a party-may file only one motion to reopen,” and that the motion “must be filed no later than 90 days after the date on which the final administrative decision was rendered in the proceeding sought to be reopened.” See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). Because petitioners’ motion to reopen was filed beyond the 90-day deadline, and petitioners have not contended that any exceptions to this time limit apply, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioners’ untimely motion to reopen.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) limits a party to one motion to reopen and requires filing no later than 90 days after the final administrative decision.

Rosas v. Mukasey · filed 2008-07-22(c)(2)

The regulations provide that “a party may file only one motion to reopen,” and that the motion “must be filed no later than 90 days after the date on which the final administrative decision was rendered in the proceeding sought to be reopened.” See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioners’ motion to reopen because it was filed on October 25, 2006, more than 90 days after the November 10, 2005 final administrative decision was rendered, and *413petitioners had failed to demonstrate a basis for equitable tolling of the filing requirements.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) generally permits only one motion to reopen and requires it to be filed within 90 days after the final administrative decision.

Moreno v. Mukasey · filed 2008-07-23(c)(2)

The regulations provide that “a party may file only one motion to reopen,” and that the motion “must be filed no later than 90 days after the date on which the final administrative decision was rendered in the proceeding sought to be reopened.” See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioner’s motion to reopen because it was filed on October 22, 2007, more than 90 days after the May 2, 2006 final administrative decision was rendered.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) generally limits a petitioner to one motion to reopen, subject to exceptions.

Zhu v. Atty Gen USA · filed 2008-09-19(c)(2)

Generally, petitioners must file motions to reopen within ninety-days of the date of entry of the final administrative order of removal, see 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i), and they are generally limited to filing one such motion, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). ... The number-bar on motions to reopen is also subject to a number of exceptions. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2. ... Because none of the statutory exceptions applies, see 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C) & 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2, we agree that it is untimely and number-barred.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) generally limits a petitioner to one motion to reopen, subject to regulatory exceptions; Zhu's second motion was number-barred because no exception applied.

Zhu v. Attorney General of the United States · filed 2008-09-19(c)(2)

Generally, petitioners must file motions to reopen within ninety-days of the date of entry of the final administrative order of removal, see 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i), and they are generally limited to filing one such motion, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). ... The number-bar on motions to reopen is also subject to a number of exceptions. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2. ... Because none of the statutory exceptions applies, see 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C) & 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2, we agree that it is untimely and number-barred.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) limits an alien subject to a final order of removal to one motion to reopen, filed within 90 days after the final order.

Correa-Flores v. Mukasey · filed 2008-10-15(c)(2)

An alien who is subject to a final order of removal is limited to filing one motion to reopen removal proceedings, and that motion must be filed within 90 days of the date of entry of a final order of removal. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A), (C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) generally permits only one motion to reopen and requires it to be filed within 90 days after the final administrative decision.

Islas v. Mukasey · filed 2008-10-15(c)(2)

The regulations provide that “a party may file only one motion to reopen,” and that the motion “must be filed no later than 90 days after the date on which the final administrative decision was rendered in the proceeding sought to be reopened.” See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). A review of the administrative record demonstrates that the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioner’s motion to reopen as untimely and numerically barred because it was petitioner’s second motion to reopen and was filed on March 10, 2008, more than 90 days after the December 23, 2005 final administrative decision was entered.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) permits only one motion to reopen and requires it to be filed within 90 days after the final administrative decision.

Quintana v. Mukasey · filed 2008-10-15(c)(2)

The regulations provide that “a party may file only one motion to reopen,” and *594that the motion “must be filed no later than 90 days after the date on which the final administrative decision was rendered in the proceeding sought to be reopened.” See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A), (C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). Here, petitioner’s second motion to reopen was filed two years after the final administrative decision was rendered. The BIA therefore did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioner’s second motion to reopen.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) generally permits an alien subject to a final order of removal to file only one motion to reopen and requires that motion to be filed within 90 days, absent an applicable exception.

Lopez v. Mukasey · filed 2008-11-13(c)(2)

An alien who is subject to a final order of removal is limited to filing one motion to reopen removal proceedings, and that motion must be filed within 90 days of the date of entry of a final order of removal. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A), (C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). Because petitioners’ motion to reopen was filed beyond the 90-day deadline, and petitioners have not contended that any exceptions to this time limit apply, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioners’ untimely motion to reopen. See id.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) limits an alien subject to a final order of removal to one motion to reopen, filed within 90 days of the final order.

Urbina v. Mukasey · filed 2008-11-13(c)(2)

An alien who is subject to a final order of removal is limited to filing one motion to reopen removal proceedings, and that motion must be filed within 90-days of the date of entry of a final order of removal. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A), (C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). Because this is petitioner’s third motion to reopen, filed well beyond the 90-day deadline, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioner’s motion to reopen.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) generally limits an alien to one motion to reopen removal proceedings and requires the motion to be filed within 90 days after entry of the final removal order.

De La Cruz v. Mukasey · filed 2008-11-14(c)(2)

An alien who is subject to a final order of removal is limited to filing one motion to reopen removal proceedings, and that motion must be filed within 90 days of the date of entry of a final order of removal. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(e)(7)(A), (C)ffl; 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) generally permits a party to file only one motion to reopen.

Perez v. Gonzales · filed 2007-05-14(c)(2)

The regulations provide that “a party may file only one motion to reopen ...” See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). Therefore, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioners’ second motion to reopen. See id.; see also Iturribarria v. INS, 321 F.3d 889, 895-96 (9th Cir.2003).

Subsections (b)(2) and (c)(2) limit parties to one motion to reconsider or reopen and impose 30-day and 90-day filing deadlines, respectively.

Bello v. Mukasey · filed 2008-12-11(b)(2), (c)(2)

A party may file only one motion to reconsider a BIA decision, and that motion must be filed within 30 days after the mailing of that decision. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(2). Further, a party is limited to filing one motion to reopen removal proceedings, and that motion must be filed within 90 days after the final administrative decision. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioners’ motion to reconsider or reopen as untimely because it was filed on January 22, 2008, more than 30 or 90 days after the March 21, 2007 final administrative decision.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) generally permits an alien to file only one motion to reopen, and requires that motion to be filed within 90 days after the final removal order.

Rodriguez v. Mukasey · filed 2008-12-15(c)(2)

An alien who is subject to a final order of removal is limited to filing one motion to reopen removal proceedings, and that motion must be filed within 90 days of the date of entry of a final order of removal. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A), (C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) limits a party to one motion to reopen and requires the motion to be timely.

Burciaga v. Mukasey · filed 2008-12-16(c)(2)

Second, to the extent that petitioner’s motion could be construed as a motion to reopen removal proceedings, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in concluding that petitioner’s second motion to reopen was untimely and number-barred. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2); Lara-Torres v. Ashcroft, 383 F.3d 968, 972 (9th Cir.2004) (holding that BIA denials of motions to reopen or reconsider are reviewed for abuse of discretion), amended by 404 F.3d 1105 (9th Cir.2005).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) permits only one motion to reopen and requires it to be filed within 90 days after the final administrative decision, subject to applicable exceptions such as equitable tolling.

Lisbey v. Mukasey · filed 2009-01-27(c)(2)

The regulations provide that “a party may file only one motion to reopen,” and that the motion “must be filed no later than 90 days after the date on which the final administrative decision was rendered in the proceeding sought to be reopened.” See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioner’s motion to reopen as untimely because it was filed more than 28 months after the BIA’s final administrative decision and petitioner failed to establish grounds for equitable tolling.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) limits an alien subject to a final removal order to one motion to reopen filed within 90 days after the order's entry.

Culajay-Caracun v. Holder · filed 2009-03-09(c)(2)

An alien who is subject to a final order of removal is limited to filing one motion to reopen removal proceedings, and that motion must be filed within 90 days of the date of entry of a final order of removal. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A), (C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) limits an alien subject to a final removal order to one motion to reopen, which must be filed within 90 days after the final order's entry.

Santillan v. Holder · filed 2009-03-09(c)(2)

An alien who is subject to a final order of removal is limited to filing one' motion to reopen removal proceedings, and that motion must be filed within 90 days of the date of entry of a final order of removal. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A), (C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) generally permits only one motion to reopen and requires the motion to be filed within 90 days after the final administrative decision.

Mendoza v. Holder · filed 2009-03-09(c)(2)

The regulations provide that “a party may file only one motion to reopen,” and that the motion “must be filed no later than 90 days after the date on which the final administrative decision was rendered in the proceeding sought to be reopened.”

Section 1003.2(c)(2) permits only one motion to reopen, ordinarily filed within 90 days, but those limits may be equitably tolled for ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims.

Netsajeva v. Holder · filed 2009-04-09(c)(2)

Under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), an applicant may file only one motion to reopen her proceedings, and that motion must be filed within 90 days of the entry of the final decision in the underlying proceeding. However, both the BIA and this Court have held that the time and numerical limitations may be equitably tolled where a motion to reopen is based on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) allows an alien to file only one motion to reopen and requires filing within 90 days of the final administrative decision.

Li v. Holder · filed 2009-08-03(c)(2)

An alien may file only one motion to reopen and must do so within 90 days of the final administrative decision. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) permits one motion to reopen within 90 days, and § 1003.2(c)(3) provides exceptions to the time limit.

Samb v. Holder · filed 2009-11-05(c)(2), (c)(3)

An alien seeking to reopen proceedings may file one motion to reopen and must file that motion no later than ninety days after the date on which the final administrative decision was rendered. ... Moreover, the BIA properly found that Samb’s motion did not qualify for any exception to the time limitation.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) permits only one motion to reopen and generally requires it within 90 days after the final administrative decision, subject to the regulation’s stated filing-date cutoff.

Chen v. Holder · filed 2010-02-18(c)(2)

The regulations provide that “a party may file only one motion to reopen deportation or exclusion proceedings . . . and that motion must be filed no later than 90 days after the date on which the final administrative decision was rendered in the proceeding sought to be reopened, or on or before September 30, 1996, whichever is later.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). Chen’s March 2009 motion was indisputably untimely because she filed it more than a decade after the IJ’s March 1998 in absentia order.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) generally bars an alien from filing more than one motion to reopen or filing a motion more than 90 days after the final administrative decision.

Gao v. Holder · filed 2011-11-29(c)(2)

An alien may only file one motion to reopen and must do so within 90 days of the agency’s final administrative decision. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A), (C); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). Gao’s 2010 motion to reopen was untimely, as he was ordered removed in 2002. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A), (C); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) generally permits an alien to file only one motion to reopen.

Lopez-Vasquez v. Holder Jr. · filed 2013-02-01(c)(2)

Nor could we remand this case to the BIA to permit Lopez-Vasquez to file a second motion to reopen. Because “aliens are entitled to file only one motion to reopen,” Lopez Vasquez “is now barred from filing a second motion to reopen.” Young Sun Shin v. Mukasey, 547 F.3d 1019, 1025 (9th Cir. 2008) (citing 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2)).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) generally permits a party to file only one motion to reopen removal proceedings, subject to a regulatory exception for materially changed circumstances.

Chen v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2013-10-23(c)(2)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion by denying Chen’s motion to reopen on the grounds that it was number barred, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2) (generally, “a party may file only one motion to reopen removal proceedings”), and that she had failed to demonstrate a material change in circumstances in China to qualify for the regulatory exception to the numerical bar, see He, 501 F.3d at 1132 (a change in personal circumstances does not establish changed country conditions).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) limits an alien to one motion to reopen removal proceedings.

Molina-Guillen v. U.S. Atorney General · filed 2019-02-19(c)(2)

An alien may file one—and only one—motion to reopen removal proceedings, whether before the immigration court or the BIA. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2); Jiang, 568 F.3d at 1256.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) generally limits an alien to one motion to reopen, so the BIA need not reach the merits of a second filing.

Mejia v. William Barr, U. S. Atty Gen · filed 2020-02-28(c)(2)

And the statute and regulations generally limit an alien to one motion to reopen. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). So it doesn’t matter whether we characterize the second filing as a motion to reconsider or as a second motion to reopen. Either way, the BIA had no obligation to reach the merits.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) generally limits an alien subject to a final removal order to one motion to reopen filed within 90 days, unless an exception applies.

Villasenor v. Garland · filed 2022-02-14(c)(2)

An alien subject to a final order of removal is generally limited to filing one motion to reopen, which must be filed within 90 days of entry of the order. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A), (C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). Petitioner’s final order of removal was issued in 2002, his third motion to reopen was filed on May 7, 2017, far beyond the 90-day deadline, and he has not established that any statutory or regulatory exception applies. Accordingly, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Petitioner’s motion to reopen as untimely and number-barred.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) generally limits an alien subject to a final removal order to one motion to reopen filed within 90 days of the order.

Leon v. Garland · filed 2022-08-31(c)(2)

An alien subject to a final order of removal is generally limited to filing one motion to reopen, which must be filed within 90 days of entry of the order. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A), (C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). Petitioner’s final order of removal was issued in 2003, but her motion to reopen was filed on May 17, 2017—long after the 90-day deadline—and she has not established that any statutory or regulatory exception applies.

Section 1003.2 sets deadlines for motions to reconsider, requires changed country conditions for certain late motions to reopen, and requires new evidence to have been previously unavailable.

Wong v. Gonzales · filed 2007-03-02(b)(2), (c)(3)(ii), (c)(1)

To the extent that Wong’s September 2005 motion requested that the BIA reconsider its prior affirmance of the Id’s decision denying Wong’s motion to rescind the order of exclusion in absentia, the motion to reconsider was properly denied as untimely. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(2). ... To the extent Wong’s September 2005 motion can be construed as a motion to reopen, because it was filed more than ninety days after the BIA’s last decision in his case, it was required to demonstrate changed conditions in China that give rise to a claim for asylum, withholding of removal, or CAT relief. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). ... Because Wong failed to show that the new evidence in his motion was previously unavailable, the BIA was not required to address it. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1).

Section 1003.2 requires a motion to reconsider to be filed within 30 days, a motion to reopen within 90 days, and recognizes an exception to the reopening deadline for qualifying changed circumstances in the country of removal.

Gao v. Board of Immigration Appeals · filed 2006-03-30(b)(2), (c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Gao’s motion to reopen. To the extent Gao’s motion was a motion to reconsider, the BIA properly found that it was untimely under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(2). Any motion challenging the BIA’s February 10, 2003 decision had to be filed within 30 days after the mailing of the decision. Id. Gao did not file his motion until September 22, 2003, well beyond the filing deadline. To the extent the motion was a motion to reopen, the BIA properly found that it was filed beyond the 90-day deadline pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). Moreover, nothing in Gao’s motion suggested changed circumstances in China that might warrant an exception to the 90-day filing deadline for motions to reopen. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii).

Section 1003.2(b)(2) requires a motion to reconsider a BIA decision to be filed within 30 days, while subsection (c)(2) requires a motion to reopen to be filed within 90 days.

Zhang v. Gonzales · filed 2006-08-10(b)(2), (c)(2)

To the extent that Zhang’s motion was a motion to reconsider the BIA’s June 2002 decision denying his 2002 motion to reopen, it was filed well beyond the 30-day filing deadline under the regulations. ... To the extent that Zhang’s motion was a motion to reopen the BIA’s November 1998 decision denying his appeal, it was filed several years beyond the 90-day filing deadline.

Section 1003.2 limits a party to one motion to reopen filed within 90 days and one motion to reconsider filed within 30 days.

Chowdhury v. Gonzales · filed 2007-08-07(c)(2), (b)(2)

With limited exceptions, a party may file only one motion to reopen deportation proceedings, and that motion must be filed no later than 90 days after the date on which the final administrative decision was rendered in the proceeding sought to be reopened, or on or before September 30, 1996, whichever is later. 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.2(c)(2), 1003.23(b)(1). Similarly, a party may file only one motion to reconsider a decision in deportation proceedings, and that motion must be filed no later than 30 days after the date of the decision being challenged. 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.2(b)(2), 1003.23(b)(1). Here, the BIA issued its decision in June 2002, but Chowdhury did not file his motion until six months later, in December 2002. Accordingly, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in determining that the motion to reconsider and the motion to reopen were untimely, as they were filed outside the respective 30 and 90 day filing deadlines. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(2), (c)(2); Kaur, 413 F.3d at 233-34.

Section 1003.2(b)(2) requires a motion to reconsider to be filed within 30 days after mailing of the Board decision, while § 1003.2(c)(2) requires a motion to reopen within 90 days after the final administrative decision.

Murillo v. Gonzales · filed 2007-08-24(b)(2) (c)(2)

We conclude that this petition for review is appropriate for summary disposition because the regulations provide that “a motion to reconsider a decision must be filed with the Board within 30 days after the mailing of the Board decision.” See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(2). The Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioners’ motion to reconsider filed on October 23, 2006, more than 30 days after the BIA’s December 30, 2004. Further, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioners’ motion to reopen because petitioners’ motion violated the time limitation on motions to reopen. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). A motion to reopen must be filed within 90 days after the date on which a final administrative decision was filed. Id. The final order of removal was entered by the Board on December 30, 2004. Petitioners’ motion to reopen was not filed until October 23, 2006. Accordingly, this petition for review is denied in part.

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires a motion to reopen to state new facts to be proven at a hearing, while § 1003.2(b)(2) requires a motion to reconsider to be filed within 30 days after the Board mails its decision.

Villagomez v. Mukasey · filed 2008-03-18(c)(1) and (b)(2)

The regulations provide that “[a] motion to reopen shall state the new facts that will be proven at a hearing....” See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1). Petitioner’s motion to reopen failed to identify new facts and instead stated that petitioner was attempting to overturn his state criminal conviction. ... The regulations provide that “[a] motion to reconsider a decision must be filed with the Board within 30 days after the mailing of the Board’s decision.” See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(2). Petitioner’s motion was filed on August 21, 2007, 60 days after the BIA’s June 22, 2007 decision. Therefore, the BIA also did not abuse its discretion in declining to entertain petitioner’s untimely motion to reconsider.

Section 1003.2 requires a motion to reopen to be based on material, previously unavailable evidence and generally filed within 90 days, while a motion to reconsider must be filed within 30 days.

Chen v. Mukasey · filed 2008-05-02(c)(1), (c)(2), (b)(2)

A motion to reopen may be filed at any time until 90 days after the date of the final administrative decision, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), while a motion to reconsider must be filed “within 30 days after the mailing of the Board decision,” see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(2). Chen filed his motion on April 11, 2007, within 90 days of the issuance of the BIA’s January 17, 2007 order dismissing his appeal, and, to the extent the motion can be considered a motion to reopen, it was therefore timely filed. However, construed as a motion to reconsider, it was untimely. ... Because Chen’s motion did not assert any newly discovered facts or new factual developments, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1), it was essentially a motion to reconsider, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b), and the BIA therefore could have dismissed it as untimely without abusing its discretion.

The regulation sets 30-day and 90-day deadlines for motions to reconsider and reopen BIA decisions, respectively.

King-Lipsitt v. Mukasey · filed 2008-10-07(b)(2), (c)(2)

To be considered timely, a motion to reconsider would have been due December 3, 2005, thirty days after the original decision. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(2). A motion to reopen would have been due February 1, 2006, ninety days after the decision. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). Petitioner filed his motion on June 21, 2007, well past these deadlines. King-Lipsitt does not address the question of timeliness in his brief or argue that any exceptions to these time bars should apply. Given the manifest fact that Petitioner’s motion was filed after the deadlines, the BIA did not commit legal or constitutional error in denying his motion as untimely.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) generally limits a party to one motion to reopen filed within 90 days, while § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) permits an exception when changed circumstances are adequately alleged.

Castro-Chacon v. Mukasey · filed 2008-10-16(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

The regulations provide that “a party may file only one motion to reopen,” and that the motion “must be filed no later than 90 days after the date on which the final administrative decision was rendered in the proceeding sought to be reopened.” See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioners’ motion to reopen, filed more than 5 years after the final administrative decision was rendered. See Iturribarria v. INS, 321 F.3d 889, 894 (9th Cir.2003). Nor did the BIA abuse its discretion in determining that petitioners failed to allege changed circumstances in Guatemala that would exempt them from the time limits for filing a motion to reopen. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) permits only one motion to reopen and generally requires filing within 90 days after the final removal order, while section 1003.2(b)(2) requires a motion to reconsider to be filed within 30 days after the BIA’s decision.

Juan v. Mukasey · filed 2008-10-16(c)(2), (b)(2)

The statute and regulations provide, with certain exceptions that do not apply to this case, that only one motion to reopen removal proceedings may be filed and that the motion to reopen must be filed within 90 days after the date of entry of a final order of removal. ... Because petitioners’ third motion to reopen was filed beyond the 90-day deadline, and petitioners have not contended that any recognized exceptions to the number and time limits apply, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioners’ motion to reopen as untimely and numerically barred. ... The statute and regulations provide that a motion to reconsider must be filed within 30 days after the mailing of the BIA’s decision. ... We conclude that the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to reconsider because petitioners’ motion to reconsider was untimely by approximately four months.

Section 1003.2 generally permits only one motion to reopen filed within 90 days, while subsection (c)(3)(ii) provides an exception for changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality.

Lui v. Mukasey · filed 2008-10-20(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

We conclude that the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Lui’s motion to reopen as time and number barred. With limited exceptions, a party may file only one motion to reopen removal proceedings and must do so no later than 90 days after the date on which the final administrative decision was rendered in the proceeding sought to be reopened. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). Lui concedes that he filed his second motion to reopen more than 90 days after the BIA’s final administrative decision dated January 1997, but argues that he qualifies for an exception because the motion to reopen is “based on changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality....” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). Lui offered as evidence of such “changed circumstances” an unauthenticated notice that he allegedly received in the United States from family planning authorities in China that orders him to report for “sterilization operations to void giving birth to the third child.” The BIA noted “serious concerns regarding the authenticity of the village notice,” observing that “the governmental authority referenced in the letterhead portion of the document is different from the authority signing the document” and that Liu failed to establish “how the Chinese government learned of his address in the United States or of his present situation, given his absence from China since 1991.” The BIA considered these factors in light of the immigration judge’s unchallenged adverse credibility finding and reasonably declined to accord probative weight to Liu’s submission.

Section 1003.2(b)(2) limits an alien to one motion to reconsider filed within 30 days after the Board decision is mailed, while § 1003.2(c)(2) limits an alien to one motion to reopen filed within 90 days after entry of a final removal order.

Estrada v. Mukasey · filed 2009-01-28(b)(2), (c)(2)

An alien who is subject to a final order of removal is limited to filing one motion to reconsider with the Board within 30 days after the mailing of the Board decision. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(6)(A), (B); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(2). An alien is also limited to filing one motion to reopen removal proceedings, and that motion must be filed within 90 days of the date of entry of a final order of removal. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A), (C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). Because petitioners’ motion was filed beyond the deadlines for both types of motions, and petitioners have not contended that any exceptions to this time limit apply, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioners’ untimely motion to reconsider or reopen. See id.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) requires a motion to reopen to be filed within 90 days after the final order of removal, while § 1003.2(b)(2) requires a motion to reconsider to be filed within 30 days after the BIA's decision is mailed.

Xia v. Mukasey · filed 2009-01-28(c)(2) (b)(2)

The statute and regulations provide, with certain exceptions that do not apply to this case, that the motion to reopen must be filed within 90 days after the date of entry of a final order of removal. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A), (C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). Because petitioner’s motion to reopen was filed beyond the 90-day deadline, and petitioner has not established that any recognized exceptions to the time limit applies, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioner’s motion to reopen as untimely. See id. ... The statute and regulations provide that a motion to reconsider must be filed within 30 days after the mailing of the BIA’s decision. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(6)(B); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(2). We conclude that the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to reconsider because petitioner’s motion to reconsider was untimely. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(6)(B); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(2).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) requires a motion to reopen within 90 days after the final administrative decision, while § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) provides an exception when material evidence shows changed country conditions and was previously unavailable or undiscoverable.

Fen Chun Ou v. Holder · filed 2009-03-02(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

The BIA’s regulations require an alien seeking to reopen proceedings to file a motion to reopen no later than 90 days after the date on which the final administrative decision was rendered. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). There is no dispute that Ou’s February 2008 motion was untimely inasmuch as the BIA issued a final order in January 2003. However, there is no time limit for filing a motion to reopen if it is “based on changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality or in the country to which deportation has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the previous hearing.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). Here, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Ou’s motion to reopen as untimely.

Subsection (b)(2) sets a 30-day deadline for a motion to reconsider, while subsection (c)(2) generally permits only one motion to reopen filed within 90 days, subject to limited exceptions.

Dong v. Holder · filed 2009-03-16(b)(2), (c)(2)

The regulations provide that a motion to reconsider “must be filed with the Board within 30 days after the mailing of the Board decision or on or before July 31, 1996, whichever is later.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(2). ... The regulations provide that, with limited exceptions, a party may file only one motion to reopen removal proceedings, and that motion must be filed no later than 90 days after the date on which the final administrative order of removal was issued. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2).

Section 1003.2(b)(2) requires a motion to reconsider to be filed within 30 days, while § 1003.2(c)(2) generally requires a motion to reopen to be filed within 90 days and limits the number of such motions.

Chen v. Holder · filed 2010-02-02(b)(2), (c)(2)

To the extent that Chen challenges the BIA’s denial of his motion to reconsider, the BIA reasonably denied the motion as untimely, because it was undisputed that it was filed beyond the 30 day deadline. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(2). With regard to the BIA’s denial of Chen’s motion to reopen, we conclude that the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Chen’s motion to reopen as untimely and number-barred. Chen’s order of deportation became final in April 1998, but he did not file his motion until August 2008, well beyond the 90-day deadline. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). The motion to reopen was his sixth filed before the BIA. See id.

Section 1003.2 sets 90-day and 30-day filing deadlines for motions to reopen and reconsider, and requires a reconsideration motion to identify errors of fact or law and cite pertinent authority.

Zheng v. Attorney General · filed 2010-12-15(c)(2), (b)(2), (b)(1)

A motion to reopen “must be filed no later than 90 days after the date on which the final administrative decision was rendered in the proceeding sought to be reopened.” See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). A motion for reconsideration must be filed within 30 days of that decision. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(2). Zheng’s motion to reopen was filed on November 10, 2008, well more than 90 days after the BIA issued its final removal order on July 16, 2008. ... Such motions “shall state the reasons for the motion by specifying the errors of fact or law in the prior Board decision and shall be supported by pertinent authority.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1).

Section 1003.2 generally requires motions to reopen within 90 days and motions to reconsider within 30 days of final removal orders, subject to specified exceptions.

Perez-Hernandez v. Garland · filed 2022-10-07(c)(2), (b)(2), (a), (c)(3)

“Generally, a motion to reopen must be filed within 90 days of a final order of removal. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). Similarly, a motion to reconsider generally must be filed within 30 days of a final order of removal. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(6)(B); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(2). ... Perez-Hernandez filed his last motion to reopen five years later on July 29, 2020 — well over four years late. ... Consequently, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in finding his motion to reopen or reconsider was untimely.”

Section 1003.2(b)(2) allows one motion to reconsider within 30 days after entry of a final removal order, and section 1003.2(c)(2) allows one motion to reopen within 90 days after entry of a final removal order.

Martirosyan v. Garland · filed 2023-08-30(b)(2), (c)(2)

A movant may file one motion to reconsider within 30 days of the date of entry of a final order of removal. ... A movant may file one motion to reopen within 90 days of the date of entry of a final order of removal.

Section 1003.2(b)(2) bars an alien from filing more than one motion for reconsideration or seeking reconsideration of the denial of a prior motion for reconsideration.

Da Silva-Moreira v. Eric Holder, J · filed 2013-03-04(b)(2)

As held by the BIA, an alien may not file more than one motion for reconsideration and may not seek reconsideration of the denial of a prior motion for reconsideration. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(2).

Section 1003.2(b)(2) bars a second motion to reconsider before the Board of Immigration Appeals.

Marquez-Mata v. Gonzales · filed 2007-07-27(b)(2)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to reconsider as barred by regulation.

Section 1003.2(b)(2) limits a party to one motion to reconsider in a case that has previously been the subject of a final Board decision.

Avalos v. Gonzales · filed 2007-07-27(b)(2)

The regulations provide that “motions to reconsider shall be limited to one motion to reconsider in any case previously the subject of a final decision by the Board.” See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(2). The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioner’s third motion to reconsider.

Section 1003.2(b)(2) permits only one motion to reconsider a given decision and bars reconsideration of a decision denying a previous motion to reconsider.

Argueta v. Gonzales · filed 2007-04-30(b)(2)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Petitioners’ fifth motion to reconsider. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(2)(“A party may file only one motion to reconsider any given decision and may not seek reconsideration of a decision denying a previous motion to reconsider.”)

Section 1003.2(b)(2) allows a party to file only one motion to reconsider a given decision.

Biviano v. Gonzales · filed 2007-05-14(b)(2)

The regulations provide that “a party may file only one motion to reconsider any given decision____” See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(2). Therefore, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioners’ fourth motion to reconsider as numerically barred.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) generally permits a party to file only one motion to reopen, subject to specified exceptions.

Tafoya v. Gonzales · filed 2007-04-09(c)(2)

The regulations provide, with certain exceptions that do not apply to this case, that “a party may file only one motion to reopen....” See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). Therefore, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioners’ second motion to reopen as numerically barred. See id.; see also Iturribarria v. INS, 321 F.3d 889, 895-96 (9th Cir.2003).

Section 1003.2(b)(2) bars a party from filing more than one motion to reconsider.

Millan v. Gonzales · filed 2007-04-09(b)(2)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioner’s third motion to reconsider because the motion was numerically barred. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(2); Lara-Torres v. Ashcroft, 383 F.3d 968, 972 (9th Cir.2004) (BIA’s denial of a motion to reconsider is reviewed for abuse of discretion).

Section 1003.2(b)(2) numerically bars a second motion to reconsider before the Board of Immigration Appeals.

Cortes v. Gonzales · filed 2007-04-09(b)(2)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioners’ second motion to reconsider because the motion was numerically barred. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(2); Lara-Torres v. Ashcroft, 383 F.3d 968, 972 (9th Cir.2004) (BIA’s denial of a motion to reconsider is reviewed for abuse of discretion).

Section 1003.2(b)(2) limits a party to one motion to reconsider a given BIA decision, so the BIA may deny a fifth motion as numerically barred.

Salazar v. Gonzales · filed 2007-03-16(b)(2)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioner’s fifth motion to reconsider as numerically barred. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(2) (stating numerical limits on motions to reconsider); Iturribarria v. INS, 321 F.3d 889, 895-96 (9th Cir.2003).

Section 1003.2(b)(2) permits only one motion to reconsider a given decision and bars reconsideration of a decision denying an earlier motion to reconsider.

De Zhu Ou Yang v. United States Department of Justice · filed 2006-03-30(b)(2)

Under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(2), a “party may file only one motion to reconsider any given decision and may not seek reconsideration of a decision denying a previous motion to reconsider.” Section 1003.2(b)(2) by its terms barred Yang’s third motion for reconsideration and the BIA therefore did not abuse its discretion in denying that motion.

Section 1003.2(b)(2) permits only one motion to reconsider a given decision and requires it to be filed with the Board within 30 days after the decision is mailed.

Valtierra v. Gonzales · filed 2007-08-24(b)(2)

The regulations provide that a party may file only one motion to reconsider any given decision, and such motion “must be filed with the Board within 30 days after the mailing of the Board decision.” See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(2). The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioner’s fourth motion to reconsider, filed more than 18 months after the BIA’s October 12, 2004 decision affirming the denial of his application for cancellation of removal.

Section 1003.2(b)(2) bars a party from filing more than one motion to reconsider with the BIA.

Balderrama v. Keisler · filed 2007-10-10(b)(2)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in construing petitioner’s motion for remand as a motion to reconsider and denying the motion, which was petitioner’s third motion to reconsider, as numerically barred. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(2); Lara-Torres v. Ashcroft, 383 F.3d 968, 972 (9th Cir.2004).

Section 1003.2(b)(2) bars a motion to reconsider that is number-barred and seeks reconsideration of a decision denying a previous motion to reconsider.

Orduna v. Keisler · filed 2007-10-18(b)(2)

Specifically, the BIA did not abuse its discretion when it denied petitioner’s motion to reconsider when the motion was number-barred and sought reconsideration of “a decision denying a previous motion to reconsider.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(2); see Lara-Torres v. Ashcroft, 383 F.3d 968, 972 (9th Cir.2004), amended by 404 F.3d 1105 (9th Cir.2005) (holding that BIA denials of motions to reopen or reconsider are reviewed for abuse of discretion).

Section 1003.2(b)(2) allows only one motion to reconsider a given decision and requires it to be filed with the Board within 30 days after the decision is mailed.

Burciaga v. Mukasey · filed 2008-03-14(b)(2)

The regulations provide that a party may file only one motion to reconsider any given decision, and such motion “must be filed with the Board within 30 days after the mailing of the Board decision.” See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(2). The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioner’s motion, filed more than seven months after the BIA’s June 25, 2005 decision denying petitioner’s motion to reopen.

Section 1003.2(b)(2) limits an alien subject to a final order of removal to one motion to reconsider, which must be filed within 30 days after the BIA decision is mailed.

Carlos v. Mukasey · filed 2008-06-18(b)(2)

Specifically, an alien who is subject to a final order of removal is limited to filing one motion to reconsider a prior agency decision, and that motion must be filed within 30 days after the mailing of the BIA’s decision. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(2). Here, petitioners filed their fourth motion to reconsider on September 21, 2007, more than 2 years after the BIA’s October 7, 2004 decision dismissing their appeal. Accordingly, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in determining that petitioners’ motion was numerically barred.

Section 1003.2(b)(2) permits only one motion to reconsider a given decision and bars reconsideration of a decision denying a previous motion to reconsider, with no exceptions to these numerical limits.

Camara v. Department of Homeland Security · filed 2008-10-03(b)(2)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Camara’s motion to reconsider. Pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(2), an individual “may file only one motion to reconsider any given decision and may not seek reconsideration of a decision denying a previous motion to reconsider.” ... However, there are no exceptions to the numerical limitations for motions to reconsider.

Section 1003.2(b)(2) numerically bars successive motions to reconsider.

Soto v. Mukasey · filed 2008-09-25(b)(2)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying the petitioners’ successive motion to reconsider because the motion was numerically barred. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(2).

Section 1003.2(b)(2) numerically bars a successive motion to reconsider.

Barrera v. Mukasey · filed 2008-09-25(b)(2)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying the petitioners’ successive motion to reconsider because the motion was numerically barred. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(2).

Section 1003.2(b)(2) limits a party to one motion to reconsider and requires it to be filed within 30 days of the BIA’s decision.

Cendejas v. Mukasey · filed 2008-11-04(b)(2)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Petitioners’ motion to reconsider. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(2) (a party may only file one motion to reconsider, which must be filed within 30 days of BIA’s decision).

Section 1003.2(b)(2) limits an alien subject to a final order of removal to one motion to reconsider, which must be filed within 30 days after the final order is entered.

Hernandez v. Mukasey · filed 2008-11-13(b)(2)

An alien who is subject to a final order of removal is limited to filing one motion to reconsider that decision, and the motion must be filed within 30 days of the date of entry of a final order of removal. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(6)(A), (B); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(2).

Section 1003.2(b)(1) limits an alien with a final removal order to one motion to reconsider, filed within 30 days after entry of the order.

Mendoza-Valencia v. Mukasey · filed 2008-11-14(b)(1)

An alien who is subject to a final order of removal is limited to filing one motion to reconsider, and that motion must be filed within 30 days of the date of entry of a final order of removal. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(6); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1). Because petitioners’ second motion to reconsider was filed beyond the 30-day deadline, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioners’ motion to reconsider as untimely and number-barred.

Section 1003.2 permits one motion to reconsider each BIA decision and requires the motion to identify errors of fact or law in the prior decision; merely repeating previously rejected arguments does not satisfy that requirement.

Sierra-Valencia v. U.S. Atty. Gen · filed 2008-12-12(b)(2), (b)(1)

Under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(2), “[a] party may file only one motion to reconsider any given decision and may not seek reconsideration of a decision denying a previous motion to reconsider.” This court has held that under the language of this regulation an alien may file one motion to reconsider for each decision by the BIA that the alien is removable, and is not limited to one motion to reconsider throughout the entire proceedings. Calle v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 504 F.3d 1324, 1328 (11th Cir. 2007). The BIA, therefore, erred in dismissing Petitioners’ motion seeking reconsideration of the denial of their motion to reopen as numerically barred, because it was the first motion to reconsider that BIA decision. ... Specifically, the government asserts that the second motion for reconsideration fails to “state the reasons for the motion by specifying the errors of fact or law in the prior [BIA] decision” and is not “supported by pertinent authority” as required by regulation. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1); see also INA § 240(c)(6)(C), 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(6)(C). ... “Therefore, merely reiterating arguments previously presented to the BIA does not constitute ‘specifying . . . errors of fact or law’ as required for a successful motion to reconsider.” Id. (quoting 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1)). ... Accordingly, Petitioners’ motion to reconsider fails as a matter of law for not specifying errors of fact or law in the BIA’s denial of the motion to reopen. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) limits an alien to one motion to reconsider and requires filing it within 30 days after entry of the final order of removal.

Jimenez-Cabrera v. Holder · filed 2009-03-09(c)(2)

An alien who is subject to a final order of removal is limited to filing one motion to reconsider removal proceedings. A motion reconsider must be filed within 30 days of the entry of the final order of removal. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2).

Section 1003.2(b)(2) permits a party to file only one motion to reconsider a given decision and bars reconsideration of a decision denying a previous motion to reconsider.

Cervantes v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2013-01-16(b)(2)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Corza’s successive motion to reconsider as number-barred. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(2) (“A party may file only one motion to reconsider any given decision and may not seek reconsideration of a decision denying a previous motion to reconsider.”).

Section 1003.2(b)(2) requires a motion to reconsider to be filed within 30 days and bars a party from seeking reconsideration of a decision denying a previous motion to reconsider.

Molina-Rojas v. Garland · filed 2022-12-06(b)(2)

The Board denied the motion as untimely and number-barred because (1) it was not filed within 30 days of the January 30 decision, as 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(2) requires for motions to reconsider; and (2) a party “‘may not seek reconsideration of a decision denying a previous motion to reconsider,’” R. at 3 (quoting § 1003.2(b)(2)). ... Fourth, the Board was not required to consider equitable tolling of the appeal deadline when it denied the second motion for reconsideration because it determined that the motion itself was both untimely and number-barred. ... We see no abuse of discretion in that determination.

Subsection (c)(4) treats new evidence or claims submitted to the BIA while an appeal is pending as a motion to remand, analyzed under the substantive standards for motions to reopen.

Villar v. Board of Immigration Appeals · filed 2007-03-14(c)(4)

Where a petitioner submits new evidence or claims to the BIA while his appeal is pending before the BIA, such claims are generally construed as a motion to remand and are analyzed under the substantive standards applicable to motions to reopen. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(4); Li Yong Cao v. United States Dep’t of Justice, 421 F.3d 149, 156 (2d Cir.2005).

Section 1003.2(d)(3)(iv) bars the BIA from engaging in factfinding on appeal and requires a party relying on new evidence to seek remand by motion.

Arshad v. United States Department of Justice · filed 2006-04-06(d)(3)(iv)

Finally, the BIA properly construed Ar-shad’s submission of new evidence as a motion to remand, and did not err in denying that motion. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(d)(3)(iv) (providing that the BIA is not to engage in factfinding in the course of an appeal, and that a party asserting new evidence must make a motion to remand).

Section 1003.2(c)(1) places the burden on the movant to present evidence supporting a motion to reopen.

Show Ching Lin v. Holder · filed 2009-07-09(c)(1)

Indeed, it was Lin’s burden to present evidence to support her motion. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(B); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1).

Section 1003.2(c) requires a motion to reopen to be supported by affidavits or other evidentiary material and permits the Board to discount unauthenticated foreign documents.

Wei v. U.S. Attorney General · filed 2011-10-28(c)

The motion must be supported by affidavits or other evidentiary material, and the board is entitled to discount unauthenticated foreign documents. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c); Kazemzadeh v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 577 F.3d 1341, 1353 (11th Cir. 2009).

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) permits a late or successive motion to reopen based on material, previously unavailable evidence of changed circumstances in the country of nationality, but a child’s birth outside that country alone is insufficient.

He v. Gonzales · filed 2007-09-04(c)(3)(ii)

We join our sister circuits and hold that the birth of children outside the country of origin is a change in personal circumstances that is not sufficient to establish changed circumstances in the country of origin within the regulatory exception to late-filed or successive motions to reopen under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii).

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) permits consideration of an otherwise time- and numerically-barred motion to reopen when the new evidence demonstrates a material change in country circumstances.

Subekti v. Mukasey · filed 2008-12-19(c)(3)(ii)

The new evidence thus failed to show a material change1 in country circumstances, 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii), and further failed to undercut the agency’s pri- or determination that similar evidence was inadequate to establish petitioners’ entitlement to the relief sought.

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) permits an otherwise untimely and numerically-barred motion to reopen when the movant shows changed country circumstances.

Jian Long Chen v. Holder · filed 2009-02-25(c)(3)(ii)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in concluding that Chen failed to show “changed [country] circumstances,” a prerequisite to permitting his otherwise untimely and numerically-barred motion to reopen.

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) permits consideration of an otherwise time-barred motion to reopen when the movant demonstrates changed country circumstances.

Chen v. Holder · filed 2009-03-13(c)(3)(ii)

We conclude that Chen failed to demonstrate “changed [country] circumstances” such as to permit consideration of his otherwise time-barred motion to reopen. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii).

Section 1003.2(a) authorizes the Board to reopen or reconsider, on its own motion and at any time, a case in which it has rendered a decision.

Weng v. Attorney General of the United States · filed 2015-10-15(a)

Generally speaking, “[t]he [Board]'s authority to sua sponte reopen removal proceedings comes from 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a), which states that ‘[t]he Board may at any time reopen or reconsider on its own motion any case in which it has rendered a decision.’” Meanwhile, “[t]he Board may review questions of law, discretion, and judgment and all other issues in appeals from decisions of immigration judges de novo.” Because an ineffective assistance of counsel question is such an issue, Weng’s jurisdictional argument is unavailing.

Section 1003.2(a) gives the BIA limited authority to reconsider on its own motion a case in which it has rendered a decision.

Shi v. Bureau of Citizenship & Immigration Services · filed 2006-04-27(a)

However, the BIA has limited authority to reconsider, on its own motion, any case in which it has rendered a decision. ... Assuming, hypothetically that this Court has jurisdiction to review the BIA’s refusal to exercise its sua sponte authority of 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a), the BIA did not abuse its discretion .in refusing to reconsider its order.

Section 1003.2(a) gives the BIA broad discretion to reopen proceedings sua sponte at any time, and its decision not to do so is reviewed for abuse of discretion.

Finlayson-Green v. U.S. Atty. Gen. · filed 2007-04-25(a)

Decisions not to reopen under § 1003.2(a) are reviewed for an abuse of discretion. See Anin, 188 F.3d at 1279. While the BIA may sua sponte grant a motion to reopen at any time pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a), the BIA has wide discretion to deny such a motion, even if the moving party has met its prima facie burden to reopen. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a). Under § 1003.2(a), the BIA has the discretion to reopen the proceedings “as it sees fit.”

Section 1003.2(a) provides the BIA’s sua sponte reconsideration authority, but its discretionary decision is not reviewable because no meaningful standards guide that discretion.

Ali v. Mukasey · filed 2008-04-08(a)

There are no guidelines directing the BIA’s decision whether to reconsider on its own motion. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a). Therefore, this court has no jurisdiction to review the BIA’s decision to deny Hadj-Ali’s untimely motion to reopen.

Section 1003.2(a) leaves the BIA's sua sponte reconsideration decision unguided by judicially reviewable standards, so a court cannot review the denial of an untimely motion to reopen.

Kierewicz v. Mukasey · filed 2008-07-22(a)

There are no guidelines directing the BIA’s decision whether to reconsider on its own motion. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a). Therefore, this court has no jurisdiction to review the BIA’s decision to deny Kierewicz’s untimely motion to reopen.

Section 1003.2(a) gives the BIA sua sponte authority to reopen removal proceedings, and a court lacks jurisdiction to review the BIA’s decision declining to invoke that authority.

Pineda v. Holder · filed 2009-03-02(a)

We lack jurisdiction to review the BIA’s decision not to invoke its sua sponte authority to reopen removal proceedings under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a). See Ekimian v. INS, 303 F.3d 1153, 1159 (9th Cir.2002).

Section 1003.2(a) permits the BIA to reopen immigration proceedings sua sponte, and its discretionary decision is generally not reviewable, except to identify reliance on an incorrect legal premise.

Castel v. Atty Gen USA · filed 2011-05-12(a)

Although Castel’s motion to reopen was untimely, and although the BIA determined that Castel failed to produce new and material evidence to circumvent the timeliness requirements, the BIA retained the discretion to reopen Castel’s proceedings “sua sponte.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a). “[W]e lack jurisdiction to review a decision on whether and how [the BIA] exercise[d] that discretion.” Pllumi v. Att’y Gen., No. 09-4454, --- F.3d ---, 2011 WL 1278741, *2 (3d Cir. April 6, 2011). However, “we may exercise jurisdiction to the limited extent of recognizing when the BIA has relied on an incorrect legal premise.” Id. at *3.

Subsection (a) gives the Board permissive sua sponte authority to reopen or reconsider a case at any time, without imposing a standard or requiring the Board to act.

Anaya-Aguilar v. Holder · filed 2012-06-14(a)

And the regulation promulgated by the Attorney General that vests the Board with sua sponte authority does not establish any standard for determining when exercising such authority is appropriate. See id. (citing 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a)); see also 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c). Moreover, the regulation does not require that the Board exercise its sua sponte authority at all; rather, the regulation uses permissive language that allows the Board to reopen a case at its own behest. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a) (“The Board may at any time reopen or reconsider on its own motion any case in which it has rendered a decision.”). This strongly suggests that the exercise of sua sponte authority is best left to the discretion of the Board and, therefore, is unreviewable. See Tamenut, 521 F.3d at 1004.

Section 1003.2(a) authorizes the BIA to reopen a case sua sponte at any time, but the BIA’s exercise of that discretionary authority is generally unreviewable because the regulation provides no governing standards.

Wimalaratne v. U.S. Attorney General · filed 2012-06-12(a)

The BIA may reopen a case “at any time” sua sponte. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a). ... Because there are no standards to govern the BIA’s exercise of its sua sponte discretion, we lack jurisdiction to review such a decision. Id. at 1293-94.

Subsection (a) permits the BIA to reopen or reconsider any case sua sponte at any time, but provides no meaningful standards for reviewing that discretion.

Beatriz Elena Anchico Obando v. U.S. Attorney General · filed 2012-08-15(a)

Under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a), the BIA may sua sponte reopen or reconsider any case in which it has rendered a decision at any time, including upon a party’s written request. ... We lack jurisdiction to review the BIA’s decision concerning whether to grant a motion to reopen based on its sua sponte authority because 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a) provides no meaningful standards against which to judge the BIA’s exercise of discretion.

Section 1003.2(a) permits the BIA to reopen or reconsider a case on its own motion at any time, leaving that sua sponte decision to the BIA’s discretion without a meaningful judicial standard.

Shoyombo v. Lynch · filed 2015-08-28(a)

Because the decision to reopen sua sponte under § 1003.2(a) is explicitly left to the BIA’s discretion, with “no meaningful standard” against which ... to judge the exercise of that discretion, we -- like ten of our sister circuits -- have held that we lack jurisdiction to review the denial of a motion asking the BIA to exercise its § 1003.2(a) discretion and reopen a removal proceeding sua sponte.

Section 1003.2(a) permits the BIA to reopen or reconsider a case on its own motion at any time, and that authority is discretionary.

Sebastian-Soler v. U.S. Attorney General · filed 2018-09-04(a)

The source of the BIA’s sua sponte authority comes from 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a), which provides that “[t]he Board may at any time reopen or reconsider on its own motion any case in which it has rendered a decision.” Thus, that authority is discretionary.

Section 1003.2(a) permits an alien to seek the BIA’s sua sponte reconsideration through a regulatory motion that may be filed at any time.

Salazar v. William Barr, U. S. Atty Ge · filed 2019-04-02(a)

When seeking reconsideration, an alien may either invoke the BIA’s regulatory power to sua sponte reconsider proceedings under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a) or invoke the statutory right to reconsider proceedings under 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(6). See Lugo-Resendez v. Lynch, 831 F.3d 337, 340-41 (5th Cir. 2016). While the filing of a statutory motion to reconsider is subject to time constraints, a regulatory motion to reconsider may be filed at any time. See § 1229a(c)(6)(B); § 1003.2(a).

Section 1003.2(a) permits the BIA to reopen or reconsider, on its own motion, any case in which it has rendered a decision.

Carla Elia Munguia Mejia v. U.S. Attorney General · filed 2019-07-12(a)

The BIA may at any time reopen or reconsider on its own motion any case in which it has rendered a decision. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a).

Section 1003.2(a) places the BIA’s sua sponte authority to reopen removal proceedings within its discretion, so a court lacks jurisdiction to review the BIA’s refusal to exercise that authority.

Plaza-Hernandez v. U.S. Attorney General · filed 2020-03-09(a)

We lack jurisdiction to review the BIA’s refusal to exercise its authority to sua sponte reopen proceedings because it is committed to the BIA’s discretion by law. Lenis v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 525 F.3d 1291, 1293–94 (11th Cir. 2008) (discussing § 701(a)(2)); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a).

Section 1003.2(a) gives the BIA discretion to reopen or reconsider its decisions sua sponte, and generally leaves that exercise unreviewable absent legal or constitutional error.

Lona v. Barr · filed 2020-05-15(a)

When equitable tolling is unavailable, the BIA may, in its discretion, exercise its sua sponte authority to “reopen or reconsider on its own motion any case in which it has rendered a decision.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a). ... Short of the BIA adopting an explicit rule that it will apply in every case, our review of the BIA’s unfettered discretion to reconsider or reopen on its own motion is limited to instances where the agency misconstrues the parameters of its sua sponte authority based on legal or constitutional error and, as a consequence, does not truly exercise its discretion. ... In sum, our review for legal or constitutional error under Bonilla does not encompass alleged inconsistencies between the BIA’s grants or denials of discretionary relief.

Section 1003.2(a) gives the BIA discretion to reopen or reconsider immigration cases sua sponte, but a denial may be reviewed for constitutional or legal error.

Thompson v. Barr · filed 2020-05-21(a)

The BIA possesses discretionary authority to grant or deny a motion to reopen pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a). ... We see no reason to construe the provision allowing such motions in a manner that would permit legal errors regarding the existence of discretion to grant these motions to be insulated from review when Congress has made clear that other such legal errors concerning other exercises of discretion are reviewable.

Section 1003.2(a) gives the Board discretionary authority to reopen or reconsider a case on its own motion, but that authority is limited to exceptional circumstances.

H-Y-Z · filed 2020-11-13(a)

The Board may at any time reopen or reconsider on its own motion any case in which it has rendered a decision. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a) (2020). ... The Board’s “sua sponte” authority to reopen or reconsider cases is limited to exceptional circumstances and is not meant to cure filing defects or circumvent the regulations. ... The respondent’s motion does not demonstrate an exceptional situation that would warrant the exercise of our discretionary authority to reopen her proceedings. See Sang Goo Park v. Att’y Gen. of U.S., 846 F.3d 645, 650 (3d Cir. 2017) (citing 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a)). ... Nor do we consider the respondent’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel to be a valid basis to reopen her removal proceedings and vacate the frivolousness finding. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a).

Section 1003.2(a) gives the BIA sua sponte authority to reconsider a matter, but the BIA’s decision whether to invoke that authority is committed to its unfettered discretion and is not subject to judicial review.

Dominguez v. Garland · filed 2021-04-05(a)

We also lack jurisdiction regarding Molina Dominguez’s claims that the BIA abused its discretion by not exercising its sua sponte authority under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a) to reconsider the matter. See Belay-Gebru v. INS, 327 F.3d 998, 1000–01 (10th Cir. 2003) (“[T]he decision of the BIA whether to invoke its sua sponte authority is committed to its unfettered discretion. Therefore, the very nature of the claim renders it not subject to judicial review.” (alteration in original) (citation omitted)).

Subsection (a) makes sua sponte reconsideration discretionary and supplies no standard for review, so a court may review a refusal only for legal or constitutional error.

Sheiko v. Garland · filed 2021-04-16(a)

No statute directs the BIA when to reconsider sua sponte or prescribes a standard for the BIA to use in making such a determination. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a). As a result, we have jurisdiction to review such decisions only where the BIA committed some legal or constitutional error.

Subsection (a) authorizes the BIA to reopen or reconsider a case at any time on its own motion, and a refusal to exercise that authority sua sponte is not reviewable.

Lopez-Portillo v. U.S. Attorney General · filed 2021-05-06(a)

While the BIA “may at any time reopen or reconsider a case in which it has rendered a decision on its own motion,” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a), the decision to refuse to reopen removal proceedings sua sponte is “committed to agency discretion by law.”

Section 1003.2(a) gives the BIA authority to reopen cases sua sponte, but a decision declining such reopening is not subject to judicial review.

Martinez-Galeas v. Garland · filed 2022-03-08(a)

The Code of Federal Regulations has a similar provision for the BIA’s ability to reopen a case before it. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a). However, “we lack jurisdiction to review the BIA’s decision to decline sua sponte reopening.” Hernandez-Castillo, 875 F.3d at 206 (discussing both immigration judges’ and the BIA’s regulatory authority).

Section 1003.2(a) places the Board’s sua sponte authority to require reissuance of an order within its discretion.

Xue v. Bondi · filed 2025-10-30(a)

We also deny Xue’s petition to the extent he argues that the Board deprived him of his due process right to an appeal when it declined to invoke its sua sponte authority to require reissuance of the Order. Such a decision falls within the Board’s discretion.

Subsection (a) gives the BIA broad discretion to reopen removal proceedings sua sponte in exceptional situations, subject to review for legal or constitutional error.

Garcia v. Bondi · filed 2025-12-05(a)

Here, the BIA articulated the “exceptional situations” standard for its exercise of discretion under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a). ... Because the BIA’s decision “evinces no misunderstanding of the agency’s broad discretion to grant or deny sua sponte relief—that is, the BIA ‘exercise[d] its authority against the correct legal background’—there is nothing left for [this court] to review.”

A motion to reopen filed while an appeal is pending before the BIA is generally treated as a motion to remand to the immigration judge for further proceedings.

Zhang v. United States Department of Justice · filed 2006-05-01(c)(4)

A motion to reopen filed while an appeal is pending before the BIA is generally construed as a motion to remand to the IJ for further proceedings. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(4); Li Yong Cao v. United States Dep’t of Justice, 421 F.3d 149, 156 (2d Cir.2005).

Section 1003.2(c)(4) permits a motion to reopen filed while a Board appeal is pending to be treated as a motion to remand and considered with the appeal, and the Board must address whether to do so.

Yang v. U.S. Attorney General · filed 2009-09-02(c)(4)

If the alien moves to reopen while an appeal is pending before the Board, the motion “may be deemed a motion to remand for further proceedings before the Immigation Judge” and “may be consolidated with, and considered by the Board in connection with, the appeal to the Board.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(4). The decision whether to consider the motion to reopen in conjunction with an appeal rests with the Board. Yang moved the Board to remand so Yang could introduce evidence not previously presented, but the Board failed to mention Yang’s motion when it dismissed Yang’s appeal. Because the Board failed to decide whether it would be appropriate to reopen the case, we “remand to the [Board] for additional investigation or explanation.”

Section 1003.2(c)(4) allows the BIA to treat a motion to reopen filed while an appeal is pending as a motion to remand, consolidate it with the appeal, and consider it with the appeal.

Hase v. Holder · filed 2010-02-03(c)(4)

Because Petitioner filed her motion to reopen during the pendency of her appeal to the BIA, the BIA properly construed the motion as seeking remand to the IJ. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(4) (providing that a motion to reopen filed when an appeal is pending before the BIA may be deemed a motion to remand and consolidated by the BIA and considered along with the appeal).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) limits a party to one motion to reopen and generally requires filing within 90 days, while § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) provides a changed-circumstances exception and requires material evidence that was previously unavailable.

Ni v. Department of Homeland Security · filed 2007-05-07(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

The regulations state that individuals may file only one motion to reopen, 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and there is no dispute that Ni has filed two motions to reopen with the BIA. The regulations also state that motions to reopen must be filed within 90 days of issuance of the “final administrative decision.” Id. The BIA dismissed Ni’s appeal in December 1996 and denied his first motion to reopen in December 1999, yet he did not file his second motion to reopen until April 2006, well beyond the 90-day filing deadline. Accordingly, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in finding that Ni’s second motion was untimely and numerically barred. The regulations provide for several exceptions to the 90-day filing deadline and numerical limitation, but only the changed circumstances exception of 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) is at issue here. The regulations further require that the movant offer evidence that was material and “was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), (3)(ii).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) generally requires a motion to reopen to be filed within 90 days after the final administrative decision, while § 1003.2(e)(3)(ii) creates a no-time-limit exception for motions based on changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality.

Yang v. Mukasey · filed 2008-03-21(c)(2), (e)(3)(ii)

The BIA’s regulations require an alien seeking to reopen proceedings to file a motion to reopen no later than 90 days after the date on which the final administrative decision was rendered. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). Here, there is no dispute that Yang’s October 2006 motion was untimely where the BIA issued its decision in March 2004. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). However, there is no time limit for filing a motion to reopen if it is “based on changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(e)(3)(ii).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) imposes a 90-day deadline for motions to reopen, while § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) provides a changed-circumstances exception; Jiang’s motion was untimely and did not qualify for the exception.

Jiang v. Mukasey · filed 2008-04-11(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

As the BIA noted, this motion was untimely because the agency issued a final order in July 1992, and Jiang did not file his motion to reopen until July 2006, well beyond the 90-day deadline. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). The BIA properly found that Jiang’s motion did not qualify for the changed circumstances exception to the time limitation applicable to motions to reopen and Jiang fails to raise a material challenge to this finding in his brief to this Court. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) limits a party to one motion to reopen filed within 90 days of the final administrative decision, while subsection (c)(3)(ii) provides an exception to those limits when changed circumstances are shown.

Verduzco v. Mukasey · filed 2008-05-16(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

The regulations provide that “a party may file only one motion to reopen,” and that the motion “must be filed no later than 90 days after the date on which the final administrative decision was rendered in the proceeding sought to be reopened.” See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioners’ motion to reopen, filed more than two years after the final administrative decision was rendered. See Iturribarria v. INS, 321 F.3d 889, 894 (9th Cir.2003). Nor did the BIA abuse its discretion in determining that petitioners failed to alleged changed circumstances in Mexico that would exempt them from the time limits for filing a motion to reopen. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). Accordingly, this petition for review is denied.

Section 1003.2 sets a time limit for motions to reopen, subject to an exception when the motion is based on changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality.

Liu v. Mukasey · filed 2008-06-11(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

The BIA’s decision that Liu’s motion to reopen was untimely, given that it was filed five years after the BIA dismissed her appeal, is beyond objection. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). Moreover, although there is no time limit for filing a motion to reopen if it is “based on changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality,” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii), the BIA properly found that Liu’s motion did not qualify for such an exception to the time limitation.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) requires a motion to reopen within 90 days of the final administrative decision, unless § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii)'s changed-country-conditions exception applies, and prima facie eligibility alone does not cure untimeliness.

Pangkey v. Attorney General of the United States · filed 2008-06-27(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

An alien who seeks to reopen his removal proceedings must file a motion no later than ninety days after the date of the final administrative decision. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). To overcome this time bar, an applicant must supply evidence of “changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality” that was “not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the previous hearing.” See id. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). ... As the Board correctly concluded, the documentation provided by Pangkey does not demonstrate changed country conditions as required by the regulations governing motions to reopen. Instead, the report and accompanying articles are cumulative to his original application, as they discuss ongoing corruption and general violence perpetrated against Christians in Indonesia—conditions that existed at the time of Pangkey’s original merits hearing before the IJ. Pangkey has not provided evidence of a new and imminent threat to him in particular, or to Christians in general in the region where Pangkey’s family lives. Although prima facie eligibility for the requested relief is necessary for the grant of a motion to reopen, see Guo v. Ashcroft, 386 F.3d 556, 563 (3d Cir. 2004), it is not sufficient when a motion is untimely.

The changed-circumstances exception removes the time limit for a motion to reopen to reapply for asylum or withholding only when the evidence is material and was unavailable and could not have been discovered or presented at the prior hearing.

Singh v. Mukasey · filed 2008-07-23(c)(3)(h)

The time limitation does not apply to motions to reopen to reapply for asylum or withholding of deportation based on changed circumstances if such evidence is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the previous hearing. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(h). A review of the administrative record demonstrates that there is substantial evidence to support the BIA’s decision that petitioner failed to demonstrate that the exception to the time limitation applied.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) bars a motion to reopen when it is untimely and the movant has not shown materially changed circumstances.

Hermanto v. Mukasey · filed 2008-08-06(c)(2)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Hermanto’s motion to reopen because it was untimely and Hermanto failed to present evidence of material changed circumstances. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2); see also Malty v. Ashcroft, 381 F.3d 942, 945 (9th Cir.2004) (“The critical question is ... whether circumstances have changed sufficiently that a petitioner who previously did not have a legitimate claim for asylum now has a well-founded fear of persecution.”).

The changed-circumstances exception permits a motion to reopen filed outside the time limit only when the applicant establishes changed circumstances sufficient to demonstrate prima facie eligibility for relief.

Tampake v. Mukasey · filed 2008-09-08(c)(3)(h)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in finding that Tampake filed his motion out of time and did not fall within the time limit exception of 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(h) because he did not establish changed circumstances in Indonesia sufficient to demonstrate prima facie eligibility for relief.

Section 1003.2 generally requires a motion to reopen to be filed within 90 days, but the time limit does not apply when the motion rests on material changed country circumstances; a change in personal circumstances alone ordinarily is insufficient.

Dwaidari v. Mukasey · filed 2008-10-02(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion as untimely because it was filed on December 18, 2003, more than 90 days after the last BIA decision on July 25, 2002. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). ... The time limit for filing the motion to reopen would not apply to Dwaidari if he could demonstrate “changed circumstances” in Syria that merit reopening his case to allow him to seek asylum. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). Dwaidari contends that he falls under this exception because he has become a vocal critic of the Syrian government since living in the United States, but offers no evidence in support of his claim. Moreover, a change in personal circumstances alone does not ordinarily permit reopening under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). See Chang Hua He v. Gonzales, 501 F.3d 1128, 1132 (9th Cir.2007). The only evidence that Dwaidari submitted of change in Syria was a collection of articles reporting that Syrian officials tortured and mistreated Maher Arar, a Syrian-Canadian individual who was removed from the United States to Syria on terrorism-related suspicion. That evidence alone is insufficient to establish changed circumstances warranting the reopening of Dwaidari’s case.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) limits an alien to one motion to reopen filed within 90 days of the agency’s final decision, while subsection (c)(3)(ii) provides an exception for subsequent changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality.

Yong Fa Hong v. Mukasey · filed 2008-10-07(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

The law limits an alien to one motion to reopen to be filed within ninety days of the agency’s final administrative decision, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), unless the alien demonstrates subsequent “changed circumstances arising in the *440country of nationality,” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). Because the change in Chinese law here at issue took effect on September 1, 2002, Hong’s failure to cite the change in his October 16, 2006 motion to reopen precludes him from doing so now.

The provisions make a motion to reopen untimely when filed beyond the applicable time limit, unless the applicant demonstrates changed circumstances qualifying for the regulatory exception.

Prayogo v. Mukasey · filed 2008-10-24(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Prayogo’s motion to reopen as untimely because it was filed over two years after the BIA issued its final order, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and Prayogo failed to demonstrate changed circumstances in Indonesia to qualify for the regulatory exception to the time limit for filing motions to reopen, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); see also Malty v. Ashcroft, 381 F.3d 942, 945 (9th Cir.2004) (requiring circumstances to have changed sufficiently that a petitioner who previously did not have a legitimate claim for asylum now has a well-founded fear of future persecution).

Section 1003.2 limits an alien to one motion to reopen filed within 90 days of the final removal order, subject to an exception when changed circumstances are shown.

Lopez-Hernandez v. Mukasey · filed 2008-11-14(c)(2), (c)(3)(h)

An alien who is subject to a final order of removal is limited to filing one motion to reopen removal proceedings, and that motion must be filed within 90 days of the date of entry of a final order of removal. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A), (C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). Because petitioners’ January 18, 2008 motion to reopen was filed more than 90 days after the BIA’s August 25, 2006 final administrative order, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioners’ untimely motion to reopen. See id. Nor did the BIA abuse its discretion in determining that petitioners failed to allege changed circumstances in Mexico that would exempt them from the time limits for filing a motion to reopen. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(h).

Section 1003.2(c)(1) imposes a 90-day deadline for motions to reopen, while § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) exempts motions based on qualifying changed circumstances in the country of nationality or removal.

Qosaj v. Mukasey · filed 2008-12-10(c)(1), (c)(3)(ii)

A party may file a motion to reopen removal proceedings no later than 90 days after the date on which the final administrative decision was rendered in the proceeding sought to be reopened. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1), (c)(2). However, this time limitation does not apply to a motion to reopen proceedings to apply or reapply for asylum “based on changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality or in the country to which deportation has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the previous hearing.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii).

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) requires an applicant filing an untimely motion to reopen to show changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality.

Zhang v. Mukasey · filed 2009-01-16(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

Zhang does not dispute that her December 2007 motion to reopen was filed over two years after the BIA’s October 2005 decision. The BIA thus properly observed that her motion was untimely, unless she established that she was newly eligible for asylum based on changed circumstances arising in China. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii).

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(iv) makes a motion to reopen timely despite the ordinary time limit when it is based on fraud in the original proceeding.

Dhillon v. Mukasey · filed 2009-01-22(c)(3)(iv)

The government’s motion, though filed six years after the IJ granted Petitioners’ asylum, was not untimely because it was based on fraud in the original proceedings. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(iv). ... Because the government offered uncontested evidence of fraud in the original proceeding, its motion to reopen was timely under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(iv).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) limits motions to reopen by time and number, while § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) provides a regulatory exception when changed country conditions support an asylum claim.

Kumar v. Holder · filed 2009-04-28(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Kumar’s second motion to reopen as untimely and numerically barred where the motion was filed nearly four years after the BIA’s decision, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and Kumar failed to demonstrate changed circumstances in India to qualify for the regulatory exception to the time and numerical limits for filing motions to reopen, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); see also Malty v. Ashcroft, 381 F.3d 942, 945 (9th Cir.2004) (“The critical question is ... whether circumstances have changed sufficiently that a petitioner who previously did not have a legitimate claim for asylum now has a well-founded fear of future persecution.”).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) sets a time limit for motions to reopen, while § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) provides a regulatory exception when changed circumstances in the country of nationality are demonstrated.

Singh v. Holder · filed 2009-06-25(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Singh’s motion to reopen as untimely where the motion was filed seven months after the BIA’s decision, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and Singh failed to demonstrate changed circumstances in India to qualify for the regulatory exception to the time limit for filing motions to reopen, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); see also Toufighi v. Mukasey, 538 F.3d 988, 996-97 (9th Cir.2008) (underlying adverse credibility determination rendered evidence of changed circumstances immaterial).

Section (c)(3)(ii) provides an exception to the time bar for motions to reopen, but changed personal circumstances such as the birth of children in the United States do not qualify.

Weng v. Attorney General · filed 2009-08-03(c)(3)(ii)

We find no error in the BIA’s determination that the birth of Weng’s children in the United States are changed personal circumstances that do not fit within the exception to the time-bar for motions to reopen required by 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii).