42 U.S.C. § 1983

A violation of the IDEA automatic stay provision alone does not support a § 1983 claim.

Drinker v. Colonial School District · filed 1995-02-13

The only statutory violation we have found is Colonial's violation of 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(3). Standing alone, that violation cannot rise to the level of a § 1983 claim.

Section 1983 permits Medicaid providers and recipients to enforce the Medicaid statute as amended by the 1994 Hyde Amendment.

Little Rock Family Planning Services, P.A. v. Dalton · filed 1995-07-25

Applying this hybrid test, we agree with the district court that the plaintiffs can enforce the Medicaid statute, as amended by the 1994 Hyde Amendment, through 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 provides a remedy for deprivation of rights created elsewhere but does not create substantive rights itself.

Richards v. Woods · filed 1995-08-03

Section 1983 does not create substantive rights; it provides a remedy for the deprivation of rights created elsewhere.

Section 1983 does not provide a private action to enforce HUD’s strong resident participation regulation, 24 C.F.R. § 964.135, because it supplies no objective standard for judicial enforcement.

Mungiovi v. Chicago Housing Authority · filed 1995-09-20

Moreover, even if we were to find § 964.135 applicable, we nonetheless conclude that this provision is unenforceable in a private Section 1983 action. The regulation provides no guidance as to how “strong resident participation” is to be measured, and we see no objective benchmark from which to create our own scale.

Section 1983 enforces rights created by federal law; a local ordinance cannot add to or subtract from those rights.

Cobos v. Dona Ana County Housing Authority · filed 1995-10-20

Section 1983 gives life to rights created in federal law; nothing said in local ordinances, it seems to us, can either add to or detract from the federal law.

Section 1983 creates no new federal rights; it provides a remedy for violations of existing federal constitutional or statutory rights committed under color of state law.

Grimes v. City of East Orange · filed 1995-11-08

42 U.S.C. § 1983 does not create new federal rights. Rather, it affords a remedy when there has been a violation, under color of state law, of specific, existing federal constitutional or statutory rights.

Section 1983 provides a remedy for violations of existing federal rights, so a claim must allege a violation of the Constitution or federal law.

Johnson v. University Of Wisconsin-Eau Claire · filed 1995-11-15

Because Sec. 1983 does not create substantive rights, but rather provides a remedy for violations of pre-existing rights, Sec. 1983 claims must specifically allege a violation of the Constitution or "laws" of the United States.

Section 1983 allows a medical supply provider to enforce statutory rights to Medicare Part B coinsurance for qualified Medicare beneficiaries when the payment duty benefits providers, is mandatory, and can be enforced by a court.

Paramount Health Systems, Inc. v. Wright · filed 1995-12-01

Defendants also contend that the provisions of the Social Security Act at issue do not create enforceable rights that plaintiff can assert pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. To determine whether a federal statute creates enforceable rights, the court must focus on whether the statute in question was intended to benefit the plaintiff. ... Accordingly, following Wilder, the court finds that the statutes in question create enforceable rights under which plaintiff has standing to bring the instant ease.

Section 1983 does not allow voluntary participants in a JOBS program to enforce § 602(g)’s child care provision because it does not impose a binding obligation to provide them child care without limit.

Maynard v. Robert Williams, John Awad, Dr. · filed 1996-01-12

Accordingly, we must find that no private right of action exists under § 1983 to allow a voluntary participant in a JOBS program to enforce the child care provision of § 602(g).

Section 1983 does not allow private enforcement of 20 U.S.C. § 1087uu because that provision creates no substantive federal right enforceable under § 1983.

Dorsey v. Tompkins · filed 1996-02-29

This court concludes that § 1087uu does not confer substantive rights upon the plaintiffs which would provide a basis for private enforcement under § 1983. Since § 1087uu does not create a federally enforceable right under § 1983, plaintiffs’ first claim must be dismissed.

Section 1983 permits a claim to enforce rights under FERPA even though FERPA itself provides no private cause of action.

Doe v. Knox County Board of Education · filed 1996-03-06

The plaintiffs FERPA-based § 1983 claim may thus proceed.

Section 1983 does not provide a cause of action to enforce compliance with a consent decree concerning public housing repairs and grievances.

Imes v. Philadelphia Housing Authority · filed 1996-04-30

The Court has also reviewed the Goodmond consent decree, which concerns repairs to tenant units, repair charges, and repair-related grievances, and concludes that Plaintiffs have no cause of action under § 1983 for compliance with that decree.

Section 1983 provides a cause of action for a federal statutory violation only when the statute creates a right enforceable by the complainant.

Norfolk Bus. Dist. v. HUD · filed 1996-06-12

Count V cannot support an action under title 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because § 108 of HCDA does not create any enforceable rights in the general public or individual citizens. A court's inquiry under § 1983 examines whether the provision allegedly violated was intended to benefit the complainant.

Section 1983 gives medical care providers a private right of action to enforce the Medicaid payment and access requirements of 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(30).

Methodist Hospitals, Inc. v. Sullivan · filed 1996-08-02

We therefore follow Arkansas Medical Society and hold that providers of medical care have a private right of action, derived through § 1983, to enforce § 1396a(a)(30).

Section 1983 does not provide a cause of action for violation of a preemption provision that reserves regulatory power to the federal government without creating an individual federal right.

Roger v. City of Mitchell · filed 1996-08-13

A preemption clause such as § 5403(d) that reserves power to the federal government does not create a federal right enforceable pursuant to § 1983.

Section 1983 permits health care providers to sue state officials to enforce the substantive equal-access right in 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(30).

Visiting Nurse Association of North Shore, Inc. v. Bullen · filed 1996-08-22

Section 1983 enables a private action against a State official to vindicate federal statutory rights enforceable by the plaintiff. ... For the foregoing reasons, therefore, we conclude that plaintiffs possess standing to enforce the substantive section 1396a(a)(30) requirement that the State adopt "methods and procedures" which will afford "equal access" to medical care as defined in section 1396a(a)(30).

Section 1983 provides redress for violations of rights secured by RFRA and the Fourth Amendment.

Mockaitis v. Harcleroad · filed 1997-01-27

The plaintiffs also seek relief under the more general Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which provides redress for the deprivation of any right "secured by the Constitution and laws." As our analysis under RFRA and the Fourth Amendment indicates, Harcleroad has violated the civil rights of the plaintiffs secured by RFRA and by the Fourth Amendment. Proving their case under these heads, the plaintiffs have also proved their case under the Civil Rights Act, with the exception already noted as to their case for destruction of the tape.

Section 1983 does not provide an action when the only alleged deprivation is of rights under the ADA.

Houck v. City of Prairie Village · filed 1997-09-03

In addition, we agree with the conclusion of the court in Holbrook v. City of Alpharetta, 112 F.3d 1522, 1531 (11th Cir.1997), that plaintiffs may not maintain a § 1983 action if the only alleged deprivation is of their rights under the ADA.

Section 1983 provides a remedy for violations of rights secured elsewhere; it does not itself create substantive rights.

Norris v. Housing Authority of City of Galveston · filed 1997-11-03

Section 1983 itself creates no rights, but instead, merely provides a remedy for the violation of rights guaranteed elsewhere.

Section 1983 does not enforce a right found only in a regulation when the underlying statute creates no specific federal right or the regulation imposes distinct duties beyond that right.

Harris v. James · filed 1997-11-06

On the other hand, if the regulation defines the content of a statutory provision that creates no federal right under the three-prong test, or if the regulation goes beyond explicating the specific content of the statutory provision and imposes distinct obligations in order to further the broad objectives underlying the statutory provision, we think the regulation is too far removed from Congressional intent to constitute a "federal right" enforceable under § 1983.

Section 1983 permits a claim predicated on Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act.

Borough of Palmyra, Board of Education v. F.C. · filed 1998-04-22

The Cs may properly assert a claim directly under Section 504, as well as a § 1983 claim predicated on Section 504.

Section 1983 claims can be based on alleged deprivations of rights protected by federal law or the Constitution.

Freeman, et al. v. NH Dept, of Correc · filed 1998-05-29

Again, viewing plaintiffs' allegations in a charitable light, they arguably state § 1983 claims for alleged deprivations of rights protected by federal law and/or the United States Constitution.

Section 1983 requires deprivation of a federal right; regulations that apply only to federal prisons give state prisoners no such right.

Foster v. Nelson · filed 1998-07-23

However, we can readily dispose of Foster’s claim that the defendants’ alleged violation of these federal regulations gives rise to an injury under § 1983, because the regulations relied upon by Foster explicitly apply only to federal penal institutions and the inmates held there, and thus do not flesh out any federal rights, privileges, or immunities vis-à-vis state prisoners.

An implementing regulation cannot, by mandatory language alone, create a federal right enforceable under § 1983.

Smith v. Palmer · filed 1998-10-13

Upon consideration of the conflicting views on this issue, the court concurs with the approach adopted by the Fourth and Eleventh Circuit Courts of Appeal and rejects the argument advanced by plaintiff Smith that mandatory language contained in an implementing regulation alone is sufficient to create a federally protected right for purposes of § 1983.

Section 1983 provides a cause of action for violations of 7 U.S.C. § 1926(b).

RURAL WATER, ELLSWORTH COUNTY v. City of Wilson · filed 1998-10-26

A claim of a violation of § 1926(b) is properly brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim for violating the Interstate Corrections Compact because the Compact is not federal law and creates no constitutionally protected liberty interest.

Ghana v. Pearce · filed 1998-11-05

As the Compact is not federal law and does not create a constitutionally protected liberty interest, we hold that a violation the Compact cannot be the basis for a section 1983 action.

Section 1983 provides no right of action to challenge the adequacy of state Medicaid reimbursement rates for services rendered after the Boren Amendment’s repeal on October 1, 1997.

HCMF Corp. v. Gilmore · filed 1998-11-09

There can be but one reasonable conclusion from Congress’s action: Congress precluded a right of action under § 1983 for reimbursement claims for services rendered on or after October 1st.

Section 1983 provides a remedy for violations of federal rights, not merely violations of federal law.

Cablevision of Boston, Inc. v. Public Improvement Commission · filed 1999-01-27

Section 1983 provides a remedy for violations of federal rights. The plaintiff must assert a violation of a federal right, not merely a violation of federal law.

Section 1983 does not permit recovery based solely on violation of a remedial court order because the order does not itself create a federally protected right.

Storemski v. Harris County Texas · filed 1999-03-04

A remedial order cannot serve as a substantive basis for a § 1983 claim because such orders to not create “‘rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws.’”

Section 1983 permits enforcement of rights under §§ 209 and 177 of the Clean Air Act against state vehicle emission regulation.

American Automobile Manufacturers Ass'n v. Cahill · filed 1999-05-18

In sum, Plaintiff validly brought its causes of action seeking to enforce §§ 209 and 177 of the CAA as claims under § 1983 and is properly considered a prevailing party in a § 1983 action.

Section 1983 provides a remedy for rights under federal vessel licensing statutes that protect federally licensed vessels from improper state interference.

Waste Management Holdings, Inc. v. Gilmore · filed 1999-08-30

The Court therefore denies the Commonwealth’s motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ § 1983 claim insofar as it asserts rights under the federal licensing statutes.

Section 1983 does not permit individuals to enforce the highway funding program’s DBE provisions because those provisions confer no specific benefit or service on an identifiable individual.

Indianapolis Minority Contractors Association, Incorporated v. Wiley · filed 1999-10-13

Therefore, because the statutes and regulations do not guarantee any specific benefit or service to any identifiable individual, we hold that the plaintiffs are unable to satisfy the first prong of the enforceable rights inquiry set out in Blessing.

Section 1983 does not let health care providers enforce the Medicaid Act’s third party liability provisions because those provisions confer no federal right on them.

Wesley Health Care Center, Inc. v. DeBuono · filed 2001-03-22

The third party liability provisions of the Medicaid Act were not intended to benefit health care providers and thus will not support a private cause of action for health care providers under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 permits individuals to enforce rights created by the EPA’s Title VI disparate impact regulations against state officials.

South Camden Citizens in Action v. New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection · filed 2001-05-10

For the reasons set forth above, I conclude that Plaintiffs may enforce the disparate impact regulations promulgated by the EPA pursuant to § 602 of Title VI under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not enforce an asserted equal-access right when the underlying statute creates no such federal right.

Kissimmee River Valley Sportsman Association v. City of Lakeland · filed 2001-05-22

Thus, we hold that the right of equal access that the Plaintiff wishes to enforce under § 1983 is not a federal right so enforceable.

Section 1983 allows a holder of federal vessel documentation licenses to assert the rights those licenses confer through a Supremacy Clause claim.

Waste Management Holdings, Inc. v. Gilmore · filed 2001-06-11

As the holder of such licenses, Hale has standing to assert its Supremacy Clause claim under § 1983.

Section 1983 permits a claim to enforce a federal right secured by a federal regulation with the force and effect of law.

Conti v. Ferguson, 99-5109 (2001) · filed 2001-07-05

This Court finds that the plaintiffs have demonstrated that they have been deprived of a federal right secured by a federal regulation which has the "force and effect of law." The Court is satisfied that this right has been identified by plaintiffs and properly falls under the ambits of § 1983.

Section 1983 permits a foreign national to pursue a civil claim for violation of the Vienna Convention right to consular notification.

Standt v. City of New York · filed 2001-07-19

As the Vienna Convention confers a private right of action on persons in Standt’s situation, which may be pursued in the United States through the vehicle of § 1983 “in conformity with the laws” of the United States, VCCR, art. 36(2), defendants’ motion for summary judgment on this claim is denied.

Section 1983 allows covered Medicaid enrollees to enforce the medical care advisory committee requirement.

Rosen v. Tennessee Commissioner of Finance & Administration · filed 2001-10-24

Thus, the Court concludes that an implied right of action exists under the Med...icaid statues and regulations for covered enrollees to enforce the MCAC requirement under § 1983.

Section 1983 permits a claim to enforce rights created by Title VI’s disparate-impact regulation, 34 C.F.R. § 100.3(b)(2).

White v. Engler · filed 2001-11-19

In this Court’s opinion, 34 C.F.R. § 100.3(b)(2) sets forth an enforceable right under § 1983. Accordingly, Plaintiffs have met their burden in alleging a proper § 1983 claim.

Section 1983 provides a cause of action for violations of federal rights, but not for violations of a state constitution.

Byars v. City of Waterbury · filed 2001-11-19

This statute provides the basis for the plaintiffs’ causes of action based on alleged violations of rights secured by the constitution of the United States. It does not create a right of action for the claimed violation of provisions of the state constitution.

Section 1983 cannot enforce a right created by a federal regulation alone unless that right is already found in the statute the regulation implements.

South Camden Citizens v. New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection · filed 2001-12-17

Accordingly, we hold that a federal regulation alone may not create a right enforceable through section 1983 not already found in the enforcing statute.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for rights created under Title VII.

Schroeder, Tommy R. v. Hamilton School Dist · filed 2002-03-11

Furthermore, even if Title VII provided a private right of action based on sexual orientation discrimination, sec. 1983 does not provide a remedy for rights created under Title VII.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for rights created under Title VII.

Schroeder v. Hamilton School District · filed 2002-03-11

Furthermore, even if Title VII provided a private right of action based on sexual orientation discrimination, § 1983 does not provide a remedy for rights created under Title VII.

Section 1983 does not let Medicaid providers enforce the Medicaid Act’s single state agency requirement because that requirement creates no individual right for them.

Ass'n v. Connell · filed 2002-04-17

On the merits, because we hold that the single state agency requirement does not establish a right that the remaining Plaintiffs can enforce under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, we reverse the district court’s summary judgments.

Section 1983 does not let Medicaid providers enforce the single state agency requirement because that requirement gives them no individual right.

Ass'n v. Connell · filed 2002-04-17

We conclude that the district court erred in holding that Plaintiffs can maintain an action under § 1983 to enforce compliance with the single state agency requirement.

Section 1983 requires an individually enforceable right; a federal funding condition that gives individuals no right to compel a hearing cannot support a claim.

Reid L. v. Illinois State Board of Education · filed 2002-05-13

Notably, the section says nothing about the right of either schoolchildren or their teachers to compel anyone to hold such hearings; it merely creates a precondition for the state to receive funds. Without such a right, any sec. 1983 claim is a nonstarter.

Section 1983 permits private enforcement of rights created by Title XIX of the Social Security Act.

Oklahoma Chapter of the American Academy of Pediatrics v. Fogarty · filed 2002-05-21

It is well settled that Title XIX of the Social Security Act creates rights which are enforceable in a private action brought under section 1983.

Section 1983 provides a remedy for a railroad’s right under 49 U.S.C. § 10501(b) to be free from state and local regulation.

Boston & Maine Corp. v. Town of Ayer · filed 2002-06-10

It follows, therefore, that § 10501(b) creates a right not to be regulated, enforceable through § 1983.

Section 1983 allows plaintiffs to enforce a federal right to Medicaid early and periodic screening, diagnosis, and treatment services.

Pediatric Speciality Care, Inc. v. Arkansas Department of Human Services · filed 2002-06-10

Therefore, we hold that the plaintiffs have an federal right to EPSDT services that is enforceable in a § 1983 action.

Section 1983 provides an action to enforce the federally protected right created by 48 U.S.C. § 1401a.

Equivest St. Thomas, Inc. v. Government of the Virgin Islands · filed 2002-06-18

Relying on my analysis in Berne, I also find that Equivest has a valid section 1983 action.

Section 1983 permits enforcement of a federal statute only when Congress unambiguously confers an individual right.

Gonzaga University v. Doe · filed 2002-06-20

We now reject the notion that our cases permit anything short of an unambiguously conferred right to support a cause of action brought under §1983. Section 1983 provides a remedy only for the deprivation of “rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws” of the United States.

Section 1983 cannot enforce Title VI implementing regulations that create a right not conferred by Title VI itself.

Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc. v. State · filed 2002-06-25

Section 602 of title VI, codified at 42 USC § 2000d-l, only authorizes federal agencies to “effectuate the provisions of section 2000d of this title * * * by issuing rules, regulations, or orders of general applicability,” not to create new rights, and accordingly, the implementing regulations, standing alone, do not create a federal “right” upon which a claim can be brought under section 1983 (see, Sandoval, 532 US at 286-291).

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for violations of FERPA’s nondisclosure provisions.

Cudjoe v. Independent School District No. 12 · filed 2002-07-23

The Supreme Court subsequently has held, however, that FERPA’s nondisclosure provisions “create no rights enforceable under § 1983.” ... Accordingly, we affirm judgment for Appellees on the FERPA claim, although on a different ground than relied upon below.

Section 1983 provides a method to vindicate federal rights conferred elsewhere; it does not create rights on its own.

Johnson v. Ward · filed 2002-07-31

Section 1983 is not self-executing, but merely provides a “method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.”

A finding that federal law preempts local regulation does not itself establish a right enforceable under § 1983; the court must separately determine whether the statute creates a federal right.

Qwest Corp. v. City of Globe, Arizona · filed 2002-08-15

This Court does not agree with Plaintiffs assertion that the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation of preemption in the Auburn case forecloses a Blessing analysis of whether a federal right exists, as the issue of whether of federal right exists for purposes of § 1983 liability was not decided by the Auburn court.

Section 1983 permits eligible individuals to enforce Section 13(A)’s right to comment on Medicaid reimbursement rates and Medicaid service providers to enforce Section 30(A)’s reimbursement rights.

American Society of Consultant Pharmacists v. Concannon · filed 2002-08-19

The Court therefore concludes that the language of Section 13(A) supports a cause of action pursuant to Section 1983 by those individuals. ... At present, Section 30(A) creates a right in Medicaid service providers to rates of reimbursement that are consistent with the goals of economy, efficiency, quality of care and equal access, enforceable via Section 1983 actions.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim based solely on an agency regulation when the authorizing statute confers no enforceable right.

Wright v. Fred Hutchinson Cancer Research Center · filed 2002-08-28

Only Congress can create new rights enforceable under § 1983: agency regulations cannot give rise to a private cause of action where the authorizing statute does not confer such a right.

Section 1983 allows eligible children to enforce the Medicaid Act’s right to reasonably prompt residential treatment placement.

Alexander A. v. Novello · filed 2002-09-12

Accordingly, plaintiffs have a federal right to reasonably prompt placement in RTFs which they can enforce under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 provides a cause of action to enforce Medicaid’s reasonable promptness requirement for eligible individuals seeking available slots in an approved waiver plan.

Bryson v. New Hampshire · filed 2002-10-15

In sum, we find that there is a § 1983 cause of action arising from the "reasonable promptness" provision of 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(8) under the state model waiver plan as approved.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim to enforce Title VI § 602 disparate-impact regulations because they do not create federal rights.

Gulino v. Board of Education of the City School District of New York · filed 2002-11-25

The only court in this district to consider the question has held that “the regulation at issue in this case does not create federal rights for the purposes of § 1983.... ” ... The court sees no reason to disagree with Judge McKenna’s well reasoned opinion in that case.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for retaliation based solely on filing employment discrimination charges without a constitutional deprivation.

Blunt v. McKinstry · filed 2002-12-16

A retaliation claim may, therefore, be brought only under Title VII or another applicable discrimination statute; it may not be brought under § 1983, which provides a remedy only for the deprivation of constitutional rights.

Section 1983 allows covered TennCare enrollees to enforce the Medicaid regulations governing the medical care advisory committee and due process.

Rosen v. Tennessee Commissioner of Finance & Administration · filed 2002-12-19

Thus, the Court concludes that an implied right of action exists under the Medicaid statutes and regulations for covered enrollees to' enforce the MCAC and Medicaid’s other due process regulations in this § 1983 action.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for violations of FERPA’s record-access provisions because those provisions do not confer the required personal right.

Taylor v. Vermont Department of Education · filed 2002-12-20

Although Gonzaga’s discussion does appear to be limited to the § 1232g(b) non-disclosure provisions, we need not determine whether Gonzaga’s express holding applies to § 1232g in its entirety because, applying the analysis set forth in Gonzaga, we conclude that plaintiff does not have the personal right required for a § 1983 claim under § 1232g(a).

Section 1983 cannot be used to enforce FERPA's records-access provisions because they do not create a personal right.

Taylor v. Vermont Department Of Education · filed 2002-12-20

Accordingly, because we find that Gonzaga compels the conclusion that FERPA's records-access provisions, § 1232(g)(a)(1), do not create a personal right enforceable under § 1983, we overrule Fay v. South Colonie Central School District, 802 F.2d 21 (2d Cir.1986), to the extent that our holding today contradicts it.

Section 1983 cannot be used to enforce PRB-1 because that FCC ruling creates no individual rights in amateur radio operators.

Bosscher v. Township of Algoma · filed 2003-01-03

Neither does the structure of PRB-1 support plaintiffs argument that it creates rights enforceable under section 1983. The regulation does not create any rights in amateur radio operators.

Section 1983 permits foster care institutions to enforce their federal right to reimbursement under the Child Welfare Act.

Missouri Child Care Ass'n v. Martin · filed 2003-01-13

The CWA, like the Medicaid statute in Wilder, explicitly confers monetary entitlements on the foster care institutional providers and evidences Congress’ intent to permit those foster care institutions to enforce their rights in federal court using § 1983.

Section 1983 permits a claim based on federal preemption only when the preempting statute creates a federal right.

Northern Natural Gas Co. v. Munns · filed 2003-02-28

The availability of a § 1983 claim based upon the Supremacy Clause depends upon whether the federal statute that preempts state law creates a federal right.

Section 1983 permits a plaintiff to enforce a federal provision only if it creates an enforceable individual right for that plaintiff.

Belen Consolidated Schools v. Otten · filed 2003-04-21

Although Plaintiffs have alleged violations of certain federal statutory and regulatory provisions, none of these provisions creates enforceable rights in Plaintiffs. Accordingly, none of these provisions provides a basis for Plaintiffs’ action under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not support a claim based on a preemption interest that lacks a judicially manageable standard.

Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Boutris · filed 2003-05-09

Only the third element is decided since Plaintiffs’ assertion of preemption interests in this case conflates WFHMI’s federal interests with the state obligations WFHMI had as a California licensee in a manner that causes Plaintiffs’ federal interests to lack a judicially manageable standard.

Section 1983 enforces individual rights conferred by statute; an agency regulation cannot independently create an enforceable right.

Save Our Valley v. Sound Transit · filed 2003-07-10

Plaintiffs suing under § 1983 must demonstrate that a statute— not a regulation — confers an individual right.

A federal regulation cannot itself create a right enforceable through § 1983.

Honeywell, Inc. v. San Francisco Housing Authority · filed 2003-08-01

But we recently held that only statutes, not regulations, may create enforceable rights, see Save Our Valley v. Sound Transit, 335 F.3d 932, 942—43 (9th Cir.2003), and so reliance on this regulation is misplaced.

Section 1983 permits enforcement of a Medicaid Act provision only when it unambiguously confers an individual right.

M.A.C. v. Betit · filed 2003-08-26

The authorizing provision of the Medicaid Act does not contain rights-creating language unequivocally conferring an individual right to support a cause of action under § 1983.

Section 1983 cannot be used to enforce Title VI § 602 when § 602 itself creates no private cause of action.

Franks v. Ross · filed 2003-11-19

As Congress did not intend for § 602 to create a private cause of action and the Supreme Court has held that no such cause of action exists, this Court finds that Plaintiffs may not assert a claim for relief under § 602. This Court will not allow Plaintiffs to use § 1983 to enforce a statute that does not alone create a private cause of action.

Section 1983 permits private enforcement of federal funding provisions only when Congress unambiguously confers individual rights; the cited lead abatement provisions and regulations did not.

Mair v. CITY OF ALBANY, NEW YORK · filed 2004-01-22

The Supreme Court has made cléar “that unless Congress speaks with a clear voice, and manifests an unambiguous intent to confer individual rights, federal funding provisions provide no basis for private enforcement by § 1983.” ... Such a clear intent has not been manifested in the statutory provisions and regulations cited by plaintiff as the basis for a Section 1983 action in the second amended complaint.

FERPA’s nondisclosure provisions create no rights enforceable under § 1983.

Curto v. Roth · filed 2004-02-12

In light of the Supreme Court’s recent holding that the nondisclosure provisions of FERPA “create no rights enforceable under § 1983,” Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 290-91, 122 S.Ct. 2268, 153 L.Ed.2d 309 (2002), we affirm the dismissal of Curto’s claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and FERPA against Nelson Roth, Valerie Cross, Cornell University, Donald Smith, the New York State College of Veterinary Medicine, Susan Stevens Suarez, Linda Allen Mizer, Hunter Rawlings III, Katherine Edmondson, and Lisa Clark.

FERPA’s nondisclosure provisions create no rights enforceable under § 1983.

Doe v. Anonymous Unnamed School Employees & Officials of Cornell University College of Veterinary Medicine · filed 2004-02-12

In light of the Supreme Court’s recent holding that FERPA’s nondisclosure provisions “create no rights enforceable under § 1983,” Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 290-91, 122 S.Ct. 2268, 153 L.Ed.2d 309 (2002), we affirm the dismissal of Curto’s claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and FERPA against the College, Cornell University, Donald Smith, Katherine Edmondson, Hunter Rawlings III, and Wendy Tarlow (collectively, the “Cornell Defendants”) and the dismissal of similar claims by Curto against the United States Department of Education, Rod Paige, and Leroy Rooker.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim based solely on regulatory provisions.

Azer v. Connell · filed 2004-02-13

Doctor’s Medical Laboratory’s (“DML”) claim based on regulatory provisions alone is not cognizable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 can be used to enforce the individual right to transitional medical assistance conferred by 42 U.S.C. § 1396r-6.

Rabin v. Wilson-Coker · filed 2004-03-26

Because all of the language of Section 1396r-6 except the “plan requirements” language, reflects Congress’s intention to confer a right to TMA upon persons who meet the various eligibility requirements, we find that Section 1396r-6 can support a Section 1983 claim.

Section 1983 does not provide a cause of action for every state violation of a state-created right.

Dennis and Susan Derheim v. Hennepin County Welfare Board, Department of Community Services · filed 1982-09-13

Finally, there is the suggestion in both the appellants’ briefs and at oral argument, that any violation by a state of a state-created right — such as Mr. Derheim’s rights under North Dakota juvenile law which were discussed by the administrative agency — creates a right of action under § 1983. We find this suggestion so clearly without merit as to warrant no discussion.

Section 1983 does not allow Medicaid providers to enforce § 1396a(a)(30)(A), which is intended to benefit Medicaid recipients.

In Re NYAHSA Litigation · filed 2004-05-20

Adopted is the position of the First, Third, and Fifth Circuits that this language was intended to benefit Medicaid recipients, not providers, and that providers therefore cannot use § 1983 to enforce any rights contained in § 1396a(a)(30)(A).

Section 1983 does not support a claim based on federal housing and lead-paint provisions that do not confer enforceable individual rights.

Johnson v. City of Detroit · filed 2004-05-24

Counts I and II fail to state a claim because the statute and regulations cited do not create enforceable rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 requires the deprivation of a constitutional or federal statutory right; housing policy statements that create no enforceable tenant rights cannot support a claim.

Perry v. Housing Authority Of The City Of Charleston · filed 1981-11-24

Section 1983 applies to deprivations of rights created by the United States Constitution or statutes under color of state law. ... Assuming arguendo that HACC and its officials acted under color of state law to bring about the situation at George Legare Homes, the § 1983 claim must fail because there is no violation either of the Constitution or of a federal statute.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for violations of rights created by Title VII alone.

Gray v. Lacke · filed 1989-11-03

Section 1983 provides a remedy for deprivation of constitutional rights. It supplies no remedy for violations of rights created by Title VII.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim for delayed or incomplete payment of IDEA administrative attorney’s fees when the asserted right is only the right to seek a discretionary fee award in court.

Kaseman v. District of Columbia · filed 2004-07-07

Viewed in this light, it cannot be argued that DCPS has violated a right within the meaning of section 1983 by failing to fully and timely reimburse plaintiffs for the fees incurred during administrative proceedings.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for violations of rights created by the ADA.

Svendgard v. Department of Licensing · filed 2004-07-26

But Svendgard cannot recover for violations of ADA rights under § 1983.

Section 1983 permits suits to vindicate IDEA-protected rights.

Roe Ex Rel. Preschooler II v. Nevada · filed 2004-08-10

The Court disagrees and is persuaded by the reasoning of the Central and Northern Districts of California that Congress expressly authorized section 1983 suits to vindicate violations of IDEA-protected rights.

Section 1983 provides no remedy for a violation of 47 U.S.C. § 253 because that provision creates no federal right.

Qwest Corporation v. City of Santa Fe · filed 2004-08-24

Instead, it is the lack of any clear manifestation of congressional intent to create a federal right which leads to the conclusion that § 1983 is not available.

Section 1983 permits enforcement of the HAVA right to cast a provisional ballot in federal elections.

Sandusky County Democratic Party v. Blackwell · filed 2004-10-23

Upon consideration of the briefs of parties and Amici, we AFFIRM the district court’s rulings that (1) the right created by 42 U.S.C. § 15482(a) to cast a provisional ballot in federal elections is enforceable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983; (2) at least one of the Plaintiffs-Appellees has granding to enforce that right in the district court; and (3) Directive 2004-33 violates HAVA insofar as it fails to ensure that any individual affirming that he or she “is a registered voter in the jurisdiction in which the individual desires to vote and that the individual is eligible to vote in an election for Federal office ... shall be permitted to cast a provisional ballot.”

Section 1983 permits an eligible child to enforce the Medicaid Act’s individual right to medically necessary EPSDT services, including prescribed incontinence supplies.

S.D. Ex Rel. Dickson v. Hood · filed 2004-11-16

Accordingly, the federal statutory right asserted by the plaintiff is enforceable under § 1983.

Section 1983 permits enforcement of a federal statutory provision only when Congress intended it to confer an individual right.

Olivia Y. Ex Rel. Johnson v. Barbour · filed 2004-11-18

The court, in accordance not only with Suter but with pre-Suter case law, must look to the substance of the plan’s requirements, to determine whether Congress intended to create a right enforceable via § 1983.

Section 1983 does not allow housing residents to enforce the LPPPA because it does not confer enforceable rights on them.

LB III v. Housing Authority of Louisville · filed 2004-11-18

Considering this unmistakable focus on the HUD Secretary rather than HUD residents, as well as the absence of rights-creating language in favor of the residents, the LPPPA fails to create rights enforceable under § 1983.

Section 1983 permits enforcement of a federal statute only when the statute confers a privately enforceable right, rather than merely a benefit.

Hurt v. Philadelphia Housing Authority · filed 2005-01-20

Thus, in order for a person to proceed with a section 1983 action, a statute must confer a privately enforceable civil right, not just a benefit.

Section 1983 allows eligible Medicaid recipients to enforce their individual rights to intermediate care services provided with reasonable promptness.

Michelle P. Ex Rel. Deisenroth v. Holsinger · filed 2005-02-11

Agreeing with the reasoning provided by our sister circuit, the Court finds that the provisions of the Medicaid Act requiring states to provide medical services in an intermediate care facility for persons with mental retardation with reasonable promptness, unambiguously confer individual federal rights enforceable under § 1983.

Section 1983 permits eligible children to enforce their right under the Medicaid Act to requested EPSDT services.

Westside Mothers v. Olszewski · filed 2005-04-22

Given that the Wilder decision remains good law as discussed above, the court finds that § 1396a(a)(43) creates individual rights enforceable under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for violations of 47 U.S.C. § 253(a) because that provision creates no individually enforceable right.

Sprint Telephony PCS, L.P. v. County of San Diego · filed 2005-07-08

Accordingly, the Court holds that section 253(a) cannot be enforced through section 1983, regardless of whether subsection (c) is potentially implicated.

Section 1983 provides a private action to enforce individual rights under the Food Stamp Act to apply for food stamps and receive benefits on time.

Williston v. Eggleston · filed 2005-07-27

The regulations at issue in this action define enforceable statutory rights that are themselves enforceable rights through § 1983.

Section 1983 cannot supply a private right of action to enforce a statute that gives the claimant no individual entitlement.

McCready, Kenneth A. v. White, Jesse · filed 2005-08-02

Section 2721(b) does not confer entitlements on identified beneficiaries. Because McCready is no different from any other member of the public, so far as §2721(b) is concerned, he can’t use §1983 to supply the private right of action missing from §2724(a).

Section 1983 permits a plaintiff to enforce an individually conferred federal right, but not a federal law, benefit, or interest that confers no such right.

Sanchez v. Johnson · filed 2005-08-02

After Gonzaga, there can be no doubt that, to satisfy the Blessing test, a plaintiff seeking redress under § 1983 must assert the violation of an individually enforceable right conferred specifically upon him, not merely a violation of federal law or the denial of a benefit or interest, no matter how unambiguously conferred.

Section 1983 cannot be used to enforce a federal regulation when no specific statute confers the right asserted.

Caswell v. City of Detroit Housing Commission Taylor C. Segue Iii, Interim Executive Director · filed 2005-08-15

Because neither we nor Caswell can point to a specific statutory provision in the Housing Act that confers a right relevant to DHC’s alleged violation of 24 C.F.R. § 982.311(b), Caswell cannot pursue his claim under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not allow a person to enforce a federal regulation unless the underlying statute creates a personal right.

Holocheck v. Luzerne County Head Start, Inc. · filed 2005-08-30

Holocheck does not point to any statutory provision that confers a personal right to continued employment in the Head Start Program. Under these circumstances, the regulation in question does not confer upon her a right protected by § 1983.

Section 1983 provides a means to enforce existing federal constitutional or statutory rights but creates no rights of its own.

Wang v. Pataki · filed 2005-10-25

However, section 1983 creates no rights, but rather is merely a procedural vehicle for enforcing existing federal constitutional or statutory rights.

Section 1983 provides a federal lawsuit to enforce rights secured by the Constitution or federal statutes, rather than generalized interests or benefits.

Sylvia's Haven, Inc. v. Massachusetts Development Finance Agency · filed 2005-10-26

Section 1983 permits a party to sue in federal court only to protect “rights” granted by statute, not for the more amorphous concept of “interests” or “benefits”.

Section 1983 does not provide Medicaid service providers a cause of action to enforce the cited Medicaid plan provisions because those provisions do not confer individually enforceable rights.

Bio-Medical Applications of North Carolina, Inc. v. Electronic Data Systems Corp. · filed 2006-01-20

Based on the Supreme Court’s rulings in these cases, and the lack of controlling or persuasive authority to the contrary, the undersigned concludes, therefore, that the Medicaid Act provisions cited by plaintiffs do not set forth individual rights intended by Congress to be enforceable by a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 allows individuals to enforce the right created by 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10), but § 1396a(a)(17) creates no right enforceable under Section 1983.

Watson v. Weeks · filed 2006-02-07

Plaintiffs have a private right of action under section 1983 to enforce section 1396a(a)(10). They do not have a section 1983 right under section 1396a(a)(17).

Section 1983 permits enforcement of a federal statute only if the statute unambiguously confers an individually enforceable right; this requirement is not limited to statutes enacted under Congress’ spending power.

Asylum Hill Problem Solving Revitalization Ass'n v. King · filed 2006-02-21

The defendant claims that, in Gonzaga University v. Doe, supra, 282-83, the Supreme Court clarified the Blessing test to require an unambiguously conferred right and that this standard controls all § 1983 claims. The defendant contends that, applying the Gonzaga University analysis, § 3608 (d) does not create the unambiguous right required. We agree with the defendant that the standard set forth under Gonzaga University controls and that the plaintiffs cannot meet that standard.

Section 1983 does not protect state law rights, and a claim based on a federal statute must identify the specific federal right allegedly violated.

Terry v. Memphis Housing Authority · filed 2006-03-21

Because § 1983 affords no protection for state rights and because Plaintiffs complaint does not allege with any specificity what, if any, specific federal statutory rights have been violated through this action, Plaintiff has failed to establish a deprivation sufficient to support a claim under § 1983 on these allegations of statutory violations.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to allege a violation of a federal right to obtain relief for an alleged Supremacy Clause violation.

Equal Access for El Paso, Inc. v. Hawkins · filed 2006-03-30

Therefore, to the extent Plaintiffs seek to remedy the alleged Supremacy Clause violation through § 1983, Plaintiffs must allege violations of a federal right.

Section 1983 permits enforcement of rights arising from the 1994 Hyde Amendment against conflicting state regulations.

Orr v. Nelson · filed 1995-10-04

Rather the state officials argue that the attorney fees award should be reversed because a claim under the Supremacy Clause cannot be brought through Sec. 1983. They also argue that the 1994 Hyde Amendment did not create the type of unambiguous obligation that creates a federal right enforceable under Sec. 1983, and thus an attorney fees award is inappropriate. ... The same arguments do not have any greater persuasive force in this context, and they do not provide us with a basis to reverse the judgment of the District Court awarding attorney fees.

Section 1983 cannot be used to enforce § 14501(c)(1) because that provision does not create individual rights.

Loyal Tire & Auto Center, Inc. v. Town Of Woodbury · filed 2006-04-12

Instead, it forbids certain state and local legislation. Moreover, because the statute focuses on the regulated actors (state and local authorities), it has an aggregate, rather than an individual, focus. We therefore hold that § 14501(c)(1) may not be enforced via § 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide a damages remedy for a claim based on a violation of 47 U.S.C. § 253(a).

Pacific Bell Telephone Co. v. City of Walnut Creek · filed 2006-04-13

Whether AT & T should be permitted to amend its § 1983 claim, to the extent such claim is based on a violation of the TCA, depends on whether a private right of action exists under the TCA. ... This Court, having reviewed the above-referenced opinions, finds particularly persuasive the reasoning set forth in Qwest Communications Corp. v. City of Berkeley, 202 F.Supp.2d 1085 (N.D.Cal.2001), a case decided, by a court in this district, following both an exhaustive discussion and thorough consideration of the issue. Accordingly, AT & T’s § 1983 claim, to the extent such claim is based on a violation of the TCA, will be DISMISSED with prejudice.

Section 1983 does not permit a plaintiff to enforce regulations that confer no individual right on that plaintiff.

Morningside Supermarket Corp. v. New York State Department of Health · filed 2006-05-18

Because the text and structure of the Regulations provide no indication that the Secretary of Agriculture intended to confer new rights upon WIC vendors, Morningside cannot bring suit under Section 1983 to force defendants to comply with them.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim for an alleged violation of the Higher Education Act.

Shevtsov v. Los Angeles Community College District · filed 2006-06-19

The district court also properly concluded that Vladimir Shevtsov could not bring a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim based on an alleged violation of the Higher Education Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1070 et seq.

Section 1983 does not allow Medicaid recipients or providers to enforce § 1396a(a)(30) because that provision creates no individual right.

Westside Mothers v. Olszewski · filed 2006-07-17

Because the text of § 1396a(a)(30) does not focus on individual entitlements, nor is the "broad and nonspecific" language of this provision amendable to judicial remedy, we are not persuaded that Congress has, with a clear voice, intended to create an individual right that either Medicaid recipients or providers would be able to enforce under § 1983. Without such unambiguous intent, plaintiffs cannot satisfy the first requirement of the Blessing test. We therefore hold that § 1396a(a)(30) does not confer enforceable rights and affirm the district court's dismissal of plaintiffs' § 1396a(a)(30) claim.

Section 1983 cannot enforce a statutory provision that confers no federal right on an identifiable class of beneficiaries.

Mandy R. Ex Rel. Mr. & Mrs. R. v. Owens · filed 2006-09-21

In sum, because the provision does not confer enforceable federal rights on identified beneficiaries, Gonzaga precludes interpreting subsection (30)(A ) to create a federal right enforceable under §1983.

Section 1983 does not allow Medicaid recipients or providers to enforce § 1396a(a)(30)(A) because that provision creates no federal right for an identifiable class of beneficiaries.

Mandy R. v. Owens · filed 2006-09-21

We join the First, Sixth, and Ninth Circuits in concluding that subsection (30)(A) does not create a federal right enforceable under § 1983.

Section 1983 provides a remedy for violations of the individual privacy rights created by the DPPA.

Collier v. Fred O. Dickinson, III · filed 2007-02-12

We have no hesitancy in finding that the plain language of the DPPA clearly satisfies all three conditions to make it enforceable under Section 1983.

Section 1983 does not allow a supplemental educational services provider to enforce the No Child Left Behind Act against a school district because the Act does not unambiguously give providers an individual right.

Alliance for Children, Inc. v. City of Detroit Public Schools · filed 2007-02-15

However, the Court does not find that this mandatory language unambiguously creates in the service provider a clear right to enforce claims against a school district. Mandatory language-in this case “shall ... arrange for the provision of supplemental educational services”; and “shall enter into an agreement with such provider” — is not enough. The statute also must be directed at a class of individual beneficiaries.

A federal regulation alone cannot create a right enforceable under Section 1983.

Wilson v. Wilkinson · filed 2007-03-06

Plaintiffs Title VI disparate impact claim must fail. The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit has unambiguously held that a federal regulation alone cannot create a right enforceable through Section 1983.

Section 1983 cannot be used to enforce 47 U.S.C. § 253(a) because that provision does not confer an individual right on telecommunications providers.

Sprint Telephony PCS, L.P. v. County of San Diego · filed 2007-03-13

We thus agree with the Tenth Circuit that § 253(a) does not create a right enforceable under § 1983.

Section 1983 requires a federal statute to confer an enforceable right before a plaintiff can use the section to enforce that right.

Great Lakes Consortium v. Michigan · filed 2007-03-27

Because the Court has determined that Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that Congress intended to create an enforceable federal right under the Cort v. Ash standard, it necessarily has failed to demonstrate a right enforceable under § 1983. As a consequence, amendment of the complaint to add a federal due process claim under § 1983 would be futile.

Section 1983 permits claims based on violations of Fourteenth Amendment due process rights.

Cleanmaster Industries, Inc. v. Shewry · filed 2007-04-04

As the Court made clear in its Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss (docket no. 26), the plaintiff has properly brought its claims under § 1983 because they concern violations of the plaintiffs due process rights guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment.

Section 1983 is unavailable to remedy violations of rights created by the IDEA or Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act because those statutes provide their own judicial remedies.

A.W. v. Jersey City Public Schools · filed 2007-05-24

Given this comprehensive scheme, Congress did not intend § 1983 to be available to remedy violations of the IDEA such as those alleged by A.W. ... Accordingly, we conclude that § 1983 is not available to provide a remedy for defendants’ alleged violations of A.W.’s rights under Section 504.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for violations of 47 U.S.C. § 253(a) because that provision confers no individually enforceable right on telecommunications providers.

Sprint Telephony Pcs, L.P. v. County Of San Diego · filed 2007-06-13

We thus agree with the Tenth Circuit that § 253(a) does not create a right enforceable under § 1983.

Section 1983 permits enforcement of rights under the Commerce Clause.

East West Resort Transportation, LLC v. Binz · filed 2007-07-05

There is no question that rights under the Commerce Clause maybe enforced under § 1983.

Section 1983 allows Native Hawaiian beneficiaries to sue trustees to enforce their individual rights under the Admission Act’s § 5(f) trust.

Day v. Apoliona · filed 2007-08-06

We thus reaffirm what we have already held and reaf- firmed: that each Native Hawaiian plaintiff, as a beneficiary of the trust created by § 5(f), has an individual right to have the trust terms complied with, and therefore can sue under § 1983 for violation of that right.

Section 1983 does not permit Medicaid recipients to enforce the Medicaid Act’s Equal Access provision because that provision confers no individual right.

Equal Access for El Paso, Inc. v. Hawkins · filed 2007-12-10

Applying the foregoing principles, we conclude that the Medicaid Act’s Equal Access provision, 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(30)(A), does not confer individual private rights that are enforceable under § 1983.

Section 1983 permits claims based on violations of the Contracts Clause or the Due Process Clause.

Matsuda v. City and County of Honolulu · filed 2008-01-14

Nevertheless, both the Contracts Clause and the Due Process Clause may give rise to a claim under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not give telecommunications providers a damages action for violations of 47 U.S.C. § 253.

NextG Networks of NY, Inc. v. City of New York · filed 2008-01-15

Specifically, we conclude that a telecommunications provider may not bring a cause of action for damages under Section 1983 for violations of Section 253 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996.

Section 1983 does not provide an action to enforce regulations promulgated under § 602 of Title VI.

Wilson v. Collins · filed 2008-02-22

We therefore reject his contention that Johnson is not controlling and that he can maintain a § 1983 action to enforce regulations promulgated pursuant to § 602 of Title VI.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for violations of rights under the IDEA or Section 504 because those statutes provide express private remedies; the court applies the same reasoning to analogous ADA claims.

Travis G. v. New Hope-Solebury School District · filed 2008-03-13

Specifically, the Court reasoned, thanks to guidance provided by the Supreme Court’s decision in City of Rancho Palos Verdes v. Abrams, 544 U.S. 113, 125 S.Ct. 1453, 161 L.Ed.2d 316 (2005), that because the IDEA and § 504 both create express, private means of redress, a § 1983 action is not available to remedy violations of the rights created by those statutes. ... For these reasons, Courts have treated the two claims as analogous and we consequently now find that the plaintiffs cannot maintain their claims against these defendants for compensatory and punitive damages under any of the foregoing statutes.

Section 1983 permits a claim based on a federal statute only when that statute gives the plaintiff an individually enforceable right.

Galaxy Gaming of Oregon, LLC v. Burdick · filed 2008-03-13

A plaintiff may bring a § 1983 claim pursuant to a federal statute only if the statute confers individually enforceable rights onto a class of beneficiaries to which the plaintiff belongs. ... The mail fraud statute does not confer individually enforceable rights onto a class of beneficiaries to which the plaintiffs belong.

Section 1983 does not provide a damages remedy for violations of 18 U.S.C. § 926A because its transport terms are too vague and amorphous to support such a claim.

Torraco v. Port Authority of New York & New Jersey · filed 2008-03-17

Second, although this Court’s holding that § 1983 does not provide a damages remedy for a violation of § 926A would not preclude declaratory and injunctive relief to enjoin future violations of the statute, see Loyal Tire, 445 F.3d at 149, the determination that plaintiffs’ rights were not violated precludes such relief.

Section 1983 provides a damages cause of action for a violation of a right secured by federal law when the claimant has an enforceable individual right.

Mora v. People of State of New York · filed 2008-04-24

For the reasons stated above, we conclude that the obligation of detaining authorities to inform an alien of the consular notification and access requirements set forth in Article 36(l)(b)(third) of the Vienna Convention does not authorize an individual to vindicate in an action for damages a violation of Article 36(l)(b)(third) pursuant to § 1983, ATS, or directly under the Convention.

Section 1983 cannot be used to enforce rights under the Uniform Relocation Assistance Act.

Dalton v. City of Las Vegas · filed 2008-06-12

Further, § 1983 cannot be used as the jurisdictional vehicle to enforce rights under the URA.

Section 1983 cannot be used to enforce 12 U.S.C. § 484 because that provision grants national banks no federal rights.

Capital One Bank (USA), N.A. v. McGraw · filed 2008-06-26

I therefore FIND that § 484 of the NBA does not provide national banks with rights enforceable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 permits eligible children to enforce the Medicaid Act’s EPSDT provisions because those provisions confer an unambiguous right to screening and treatment services.

Parents League for Effective Autism Services v. Jones-Kelley · filed 2008-06-30

The scattered statutory sections relating to EPSDT services, including 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10) and(43), § 1396d(a)(4)(B) and (r) (hereinafter collectively referred to as the “EPSDT provisions”) confer an unambiguous right on Plaintiffs that is enforceable through a § 1983 claim.

Section 1983 does not provide an action to enforce Medicaid managed-care provisions that do not confer individual rights.

Hawaii Coalition for Health v. Hawaii · filed 2008-09-04

Rather, read as a whole, § 1396u-2(a) addresses a state’s ability to limit the choice of providers that program participants might otherwise have, and does not create rights actionable through 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 permits enforcement of rights conferred by federal statutes, but agency regulations cannot independently create enforceable rights.

Guzman v. Shewry · filed 2008-09-23

As we have stated in the past, “the Supreme Court’s Sandoval and Gonzaga decisions, taken together, compel the conclusion ... that agency regulations cannot independently create rights enforceable through § 1983.”

Section 1983 cannot be used to enforce the Airline Deregulation Act’s express preemption provision because that provision creates no federal right.

Med-Trans Corp. v. Benton · filed 2008-09-26

The court finds that the express preemption provision of the ADA does not create a federal right enforceable under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy under the cited weatherization provisions because they do not confer an individual federal right.

Houston v. Williams · filed 2008-11-05

Accordingly, we hold that 42 U.S.C. §§ 6861(b) and 6863(a) do not create a federal right enforceable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and affirm the district court’s order granting summary judgment to the defendants.

Section 1983 lets federally qualified health centers sue to enforce their right to properly calculated Medicaid wraparound payments.

Concilio De Salud Integral De Loiza, Inc. v. Pérez-Perdomo · filed 2008-12-15

A cause of action exists under § 1983 for the relief sought here.

Section 1983 cannot be used to enforce FERPA’s confidentiality provisions.

Woodruff v. Hamilton Township Public Schools · filed 2009-01-15

Finally, we agree with the District Court that the retaliation count, to the extent that it is not subsumed within the NJLAD count, is barred under the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (“FERPA”), 20 U.S.C. § 1232g, because there is no private cause of action under FERPA’s confidentiality provisions, Gonzaga University v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 287 (2002), and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is not a vehicle for a FERPA claim, id. at 288.

Section 1983 cannot enforce a right supplied solely by an agency regulation when no federal statute creates that right.

Guzman v. Shewry · filed 2009-01-15

Thus, whatever the effect of HHS’s decision to retain the implementing regula- tion after the repeal of the statute, Guzman cannot contend that such regulation entitles him to a right enforceable in the § 1983 claim he has brought here.

Section 1983 does not provide a cause of action to enforce 49 U.S.C. § 2210’s requirement that federally assisted airports give written assurances of fair and nondiscriminatory public use.

Rocky Mountain Airways, Inc. v. County of Pitkin · filed 1987-11-25

Therefore, since 49 U.S.C. § 2210 is not “the kind” of statute that creates rights enforceable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, defendants’ motion to dismiss, with respect to the third claim for relief, will be granted.

Section 1983 provides a remedy for violations of individual rights created by Medicaid’s reimbursement, anti-lien, and anti-recovery provisions.

Tristani Ex Rel. Karnes v. Richman · filed 2009-03-25

The court holds that violations of the rights contained in §§ 1396k(b), 1396p(a)(l) and 1396p(b)(l) are actionable under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not make supervisory standards for law enforcement conduct independently enforceable rights.

Tunnell v. Wiley · filed 1974-01-02

While it is appropriate for appellate courts to promulgate such standards in its supervisory power, those standards are not per se rights encompassed within 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim for violations of section 16 of the Urban Mass Transportation Act or section 165(b) of the Federal-Aid Highway Act because those provisions create no substantive rights enforceable through it.

Rhea Dopico v. Neil E. Goldschmidt, Disabled in Action v. Neil E. Goldschmidt · filed 1982-09-02

The Court also concluded that 42 U.S.C. § 1983 did not authorize suit for violation of these provisions ...because neither section 16 nor section 165(b), each of them only one part of a complex funding statute, created substantive “rights” enforceable through section 1983. ... We affirm these aspects of the District Court’s decision, substantially for the reasons elaborated in Judge Weinfeld’s opinion.

Section 1983 permits enforcement of a federal statute only when that statute creates a personal right.

Three Rivers Center for Independent Living, Inc. v. Housing Authority · filed 2004-08-30

Critically, the inquiry whether there is a personal right under implied right of ... action analysis and the question whether ... there is a personal “enforceable right” ... under Section 1983 are the same.