42 U.S.C. § 1983

A § 1983 abuse-of-process claim requires proof that the defendant acted with malice to obtain a collateral objective outside the legitimate ends of the process.

Selinger v. City of New York · filed 2011-12-23

Selinger’s § 1983 claim for abuse of process requires him to prove that Greene acted with malice, i.e., “with intent to do harm without excuse [or] justification, and . . . in order to obtain a collateral objective that is outside the legitimate ends of the process.” Savino v. City of New York, 331 F.3d 63, 70 (2d Cir. 2003) (internal quotation marks omitted). On this record, there is no proof that Greene acted with such intent.

A § 1983 malicious abuse of criminal process claim requires an objective collateral to the prosecution; filing additional charges to prevail in the same prosecution does not suffice, even if intended to pressure the accused.

Hoffman v. Town of Southampton · filed 2012-09-28

In sum, construing the allegations in the light most favorable to plaintiffs, issuing two additional informations charging violations of the same Town Code section for the same alleged violation occurring on the same date — all in an effort to prevail in the prosecution — does not constitute a collateral objective, even if done with a motive to exert pressure on the litigant to resolve the case.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim for abuse of process separate from a claim that an arrest or prosecution lacked probable cause.

Fagnan v. City of Lino Lakes · filed 2012-11-26

“abuse of process — as a claim separate from a claim that there was no probable cause to make the arrest or institute the prosecution — is not cognizable as a civil rights violation under § 1983.” ... The court finds the reasoning of Santiago persuasive and determines that summary judgment on the abuse of process claim is warranted.

Section 1983 permits an adequately pleaded claim for malicious abuse of criminal process because it alleges a deprivation of a federal right.

Hoffman v. Town of Southampton · filed 2013-04-29

A claim for malicious abuse of criminal process—assuming it is adequately pled—therefore alleges a deprivation of a federal right and may be asserted under section 1983.

Section 1983 does not support a claim for abuse of civil process.

Demartino v. New York State Department of Labor · filed 2016-03-01

Accordingly, plaintiffs’ claim under § 1983 for an abuse of civil process must be dismissed.

Section 1983 does not provide an abuse of process claim when state law provides a remedy for abuse of process.

Dix v. Edelman Financial Services, LLC · filed 2018-08-14

Therefore, Plaintiff's abuse of process claim is not cognizable under § 1983.

Section 1983 permits a malicious abuse of criminal process claim when officers use arrest and search procedures to obtain information unrelated to a parolee’s supervision.

Ficklin v. Rusinko · filed 2019-01-08

Plaintiff has alleged that P.O. Rusinko and P.O Jason utilized their authority to arrest Plaintiff and to search his person to cause Plaintiff emotional and physical trauma in order to secure information about crimes unrelated to Plaintiff's parole status. While admittedly a close call, at least at the motion to dismiss stage of this proceeding, and particularly with no opposition by Defendants addressed to these claims under § 1983, the Court finds that Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged a cause of action for malicious abuse of criminal process.

Section 1983 abuse of process liability requires criminal process; school disciplinary proceedings do not qualify.

Edmond v. Longwood Central School District · filed 2019-09-30

Plaintiffs’ Section 1983 abuse of process claim fails as a matter of law because the discipline of David including the referral to the Central Hearing Office did not involve criminal process.

Section 1983 does not recognize an abuse of process claim separate from a claim that an arrest or prosecution lacked probable cause.

O'Brien v. Mulligan · filed 2020-03-03

Leaving aside the serious question of whether the Complaint supports a plausible inference that Judge Mulligan “caused” Plaintiffs’ indictments, this claim fails as a matter of law because “abuse of process—as a claim separate from a claim that there was no probable cause to make the arrest or institute the prosecution—is not cognizable as a civil rights violation under § 1983.” Santiago v. Fenton, 891 F.2d 373, 388 (1st Cir. 1989).

Section 1983 does not provide a claim for abuse of process.

JULIUS v. MARION COUNTY SHERIFF · filed 2020-03-16

The Court agrees that the federal claim fails as a matter of law, however, it fails because there is no federal claim for abuse of process under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit an abuse-of-process claim based on civil proceedings.

Keller v. Schoharie County Department of Social Services · filed 2020-03-27

Since civil proceedings cannot be the basis of a § 1983 abuse of process claim, the Court grants Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s third cause of action.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim for abuse of civil process by state actors because that conduct does not itself deprive a person of a federal right.

Frederick v. State of New York, Office of Mental Health, Rochester Psychiatric Center · filed 2020-03-27

Defendants correctly note that allegations that state actors abused some form of civil process do not allege a deprivation of a federal right, and thus are not actionable under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim for malicious prosecution or abuse of process alone; the conduct must violate a constitutional right.

Morgan v. Freshour · filed 2020-08-07

We agree with defendants that malicious prosecution and abuse of process are torts, not constitutional violations. The facts underlying these tort allegations may constitute unconstitutional searches, seizures, or violations of due process. But that does not convert the common ... law tort into a violation of the Constitution. Accordingly, we hold that defendants are entitled to qualified immunity against those claims.

Section 1983 malicious abuse of criminal process claims use the elements of applicable state law.

Pal v. Cipolla · filed 2020-11-23

In a § 1983 claim alleging malicious abuse of criminal process, the elements are drawn from applicable state law.

Section 1983 permits a constructive discharge allegation as a predicate to a claim for deprivation of federal rights.

Meyers v. City of Cincinnati · filed 1990-01-04

As a threshold matter, the Court finds that plaintiff is not barred from alleging a constructive discharge in order to establish his claims under § 1983.

Section 1983 permits a person constructively discharged under color of state law to seek relief for deprivation of protected constitutional interests.

Bailey v. Kirk · filed 1985-11-14

Further, in agreement with the opinions cited, we hold that such a constructive discharge claim may be the basis for relief under Sec. 1983.

A public employee’s constructive discharge can support a § 1983 claim, but resigning after notice of a proposed termination and an opportunity to respond does not establish constructive discharge.

Caldwell v. Lozano · filed 2017-05-12

This court has “recognized that constructive discharge may be an appropriate basis for a section 1983 action.” ... The letter gave him notice of Trevino’s intent to terminate him as well as an opportunity to explain why Trevino should not do so. By resigning under these circumstances, Caldwell does not allege a constructive discharge.

Section 1983 survival claims brought by an estate do not permit damages for surviving family members’ loss of consortium.

Estate of James Strong Jr., The v. Schlenker · filed 2019-07-24

However, the only remaining claim in this lawsuit is a § 1983 survival claim against Defendant brought by the Estate of Strong. ... Familial loss of consortium is not an available remedy under this cause of action.

Section 1983 does not reach a spouse’s state-law loss-of-consortium claim when the spouse suffered no deprivation of his own federal rights.

Stallworth v. City of Cleveland · filed 1990-01-11

The statute provides redress to a party suffering injuries from a deprivation of any rights, privileges or immunities secured by federal law. It is Mrs. Stallworth who has allegedly suffered injuries based on such a deprivation. Mr. Stallworth’s loss of consortium claim does not represent an injury based on a deprivation of his rights, privileges or immunities. Therefore, the text of the statute does not reach his claim.

Section 1983 does not permit a spouse to bring an ancillary claim for loss of consortium based on an alleged federal civil rights violation against the other spouse.

Sena v. Commonwealth · filed 1994-03-10

As to the claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, “[t]he spouse of an alleged federal civil rights victim is not permitted an ancillary cause of action for loss of consortium.”

Section 1983 does not allow a spouse to recover loss of consortium when state action was directed solely at the injured person.

Hegarty v. Somerset County · filed 1994-03-23

Plaintiff was not the subject of the officers’ actions. The Court, therefore, GRANTS Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment as it relates to Plaintiffs loss of consortium claims under § 1983.

Section 1983 provides only a personal right of action and does not support a derivative loss-of-consortium claim.

Verde v. City of Philadelphia · filed 1994-08-25

None of the statutes on which the other counts are based — Title VII, the PHRA, and section 1983 — allow other than a personal right of action.

Section 1983 does not give children a loss-of-companionship claim based solely on a constitutional deprivation suffered by their parent.

Broadnax v. Webb · filed 1995-07-12

In sum, the court finds that a loss of companionship claim by the children of a parent who has suffered a constitutional deprivation is not cognizable under section 1983.

Section 1983 does not allow a spouse to recover for loss of consortium derived from the other spouse’s civil rights injury.

Wiers v. Barnes · filed 1996-05-03

Accordingly, the Court declines to allow Tammy Wiers’ loss of consortium claim deriving from Wiers’ action under section 1983.

A state-law loss of parental consortium claim may proceed when it derives from a viable § 1983 claim.

Robinson v. Johnson · filed 1996-10-25

Instead, Defendant relies solely on the argument, which the Court rejects, that as a matter of law a plaintiff cannot bring a loss of consortium claim derived from a § 1983 cause of action.

Section 1983 does not permit a relative to recover personally for loss of companionship resulting from the injured person’s death.

Kelly v. Wehrum · filed 1997-03-10

No claim under § 1983 survives as to a relative’s loss of companionship resulting from the death of the deeedent.

Section 1983 does not support a derivative claim for loss of consortium.

Pritzker v. City of Hudson · filed 1998-10-30

Second, section 1983 does not support a derivative claim for loss of consortium.

Section 1983 permits a husband’s derivative loss-of-consortium claim when state law allows it and his wife’s constitutional injury causes her personal injury.

Hayes v. Vessey · filed 1984-02-08

The Court concludes that this state rule concerning the availability of a derivative action for loss of consortium should be applied by virtue of § 1988, to a § 1983 action brought by the husband of the person whose constitutional rights were violated in such a manner as to cause her personal injury.

Section 1983 does not allow a spouse to recover loss-of-consortium damages based solely on a violation of the injured spouse’s constitutional rights.

Winton v. Board of Com'rs of Tulsa County, Okl. · filed 2000-02-22

Mrs. Winton may not recover any damages under § 1983 for the alleged violation of her husband’s constitutional rights and she has not alleged the violation of a constitutional right personal to her.

Section 1983 does not permit a spouse to recover for a derivative loss of consortium based on a violation of the other spouse’s constitutional rights.

Maudsley v. State · filed 2003-02-27

We are persuaded that per quod claims for loss of consortium, purely derivative under New Jersey law, are not cognizable under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not preempt a spouse’s state-law loss-of-consortium claim arising from the same injury; the claim may accompany a § 1983 action.

Kinzer v. Metropolitan Government of Nashville · filed 2006-09-11

For the reasons set forth above, the Court concludes that Ms. Kinzer has adequately pleaded a pendent state-law claim for loss of consortium, regardless of the fact that the cause of action to which it is appended is brought under § 1983. Ms. Kinzer’s claim is not brought under § 1983, nor is it preempted by § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit loss of consortium claims derived from a § 1983 claim.

Gutin v. Washington Township Board of Education · filed 2006-12-21

Because loss of consortium claims are not cognizable in § 1983 suits, ... summary judgment on Count V will be granted insofar as the claim derives from the § 1983 claims.

Section 1983 does not permit relatives of a civil rights victim to recover for loss of consortium based on the federal civil rights violation.

Kennedy v. Town of Billerica · filed 2007-03-26

Relatives of a federal civil rights victim are not permitted to raise a claim for loss of consortium based upon the federal civil rights violation under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit a loss of consortium claim based on a deprivation of another person’s constitutional rights.

Fleming v. Sharma · filed 2009-03-31

Plaintiffs claim for loss of consortium may not be brought pursuant to § 1983 because the claim is not based upon a deprivation of her constitutional rights.

Section 1983 does not recognize loss of consortium as a constitutional deprivation.

Doe I v. Kane County · filed 2018-04-11

Loss of consortium claims, however, are not recognized as constitutional deprivations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit an estate administrator to recover the decedent’s children’s loss of consortium as part of the decedent’s claim.

Jenkins v. Obion County Sheriff's Department · filed 2020-09-28

This Court adopts the well-reasoned analysis in Robinson and finds that Defendant Orsborne is entitled to the dismissal of Plaintiff’s § 1983 claim for loss of consortium on behalf of the minor children.

Section 1983 authorizes a court to require each liable party to pay its share of the cost of a remedy when it can.

Missouri v. Jenkins · filed 1990-04-18

To the contrary, 42 U. S. C. § 1983, on which respondents’ complaint is based, is authority enough to require each tortfeasor to pay its share of the cost of the remedy if it can, and apportionment of the cost is part of the equitable power of the District Court.

Section 1983 permits courts to apportion remedial costs among liable parties according to their capacity to pay.

Jenkins v. Missouri · filed 1991-08-30

The Supreme Court further stated that 42 U.S.C. § 1983, on which the Jenkins claim is based, "is authority enough to require each tortfeasor to pay its share of the cost of the remedy if it can, and apportionment of the cost is part of the equitable power of the District Court." ... The State ignores the requirement of a reasonable limit on the levy rate and the fact that it is obligated to "pay any required sums which are beyond the capacity of the school district."

Section 1983 does not make an adverse judicial ruling actionable merely because a litigant dislikes it.

Sindram v. Nissan Motor Corporation in U.S.A. · filed 1990-06-04

The mere fact that a particular court's ruling is not to the litigant's liking, however, does not convert that court's ruling to a claim actionable under Sec. 1983.

A § 1983 action remains available after state court relief only if it seeks to vindicate a constitutional right that the state action did not adequately vindicate.

Braley v. City of Pontiac, Stanley Helgemo, Sergeant Arthur Rouse and Roland Garcia, Officers · filed 1990-06-19

Appellant’s § 1983 action remains alive after he has obtained relief on the underlying substantive claims in state court only if he now seeks to vindicate a constitutional right in federal court that was not adequately vindicated in the state action.

A Section 1983 suit gives issues litigated in state court the same preclusive effect they would receive in that state’s courts.

Phillipe Dell Fargo v. Robert Borg, Warden · filed 1992-08-06

Issues that were litigated in a state court proceeding are entitled to the same preclusive effect in a subsequent federal section 1983 suit as they enjoy in the courts of the state where the judgment was rendered.

Section 1983 cannot be used to set aside a state court judgment; a prisoner challenging custody after that judgment must pursue habeas relief after exhausting state remedies.

Jackson v. Page · filed 1996-01-24

If Jackson believes that the Indiana court improperly rejected a meritorious claim for post-conviction relief out of some punitive or retaliatory motive and that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution, his remedy is not a § 1983 suit to set aside the state court judgment; rather, after exhausting his state court remedies, he may file a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in federal court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254.

Section 1983 permits federal courts to enjoin state court proceedings, subject to principles of equity, comity, and federalism.

Miller v. Silbermann · filed 1997-01-22

A contrary result is not warranted simply because plaintiffs assert their claims pursuant to Section 1983. Although Section 1983 authorizes a federal court to issue injunctions aimed at state court proceedings, the Supreme Court has emphasized that Section 1983 does not “question or qualify in any way the principles of equity, comity, and federalism that must restrain a federal court when asked to enjoin a state court proceeding.” O’Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. at 499, 94 S.Ct. at 678 (quoting Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 243, 92 S.Ct. 2151, 2162, 32 L.Ed.2d 705 (1972)).

A prior state-court judgment has the preclusive effect given by state law in a federal § 1983 action.

Wilkinson v. Pitkin County Board of County Commissioners · filed 1998-05-04

The preclusive effect of a state-court decision in a § 1983 action filed in federal court is a matter of state law.

Section 1983 does not itself enforce state court decisions; courts must independently assess whether the challenged conduct violates a constitutional right.

George v. Maul · filed 2000-06-05

In a §1983 case, we are obligated to assess independently whether the state's conduct violated a constitutional right. State court decisions, like the decisions of other federal lower courts, are relevant and often persuasive. Yet, we are in no way obliged to enforce them.

Section 1983 permits injunctive relief against state court proceedings, subject to equity and comity when relief would disrupt pending trials.

Bradley v. JUDGES OF SUPERIOR CT. FOR CTY. OF LOS ANGELES · filed 1974-02-25

It is well established that action by a state in arbitrarily depriving a person of the opportunity to serve on a jury is a violation of a right secured by the United States Constitution and that federal courts have jurisdiction to grant relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ... Nonetheless, I am unable to conclude that this court is obliged to, or should, entertain the present action. Juries are being drawn daily in the courts of the Central District; the injunctive relief requested by the plaintiffs would seriously disrupt the orderly process of pending trial; and the jurisdiction to grant such relief does not foreclose giving careful consideration to the principles of equity and comity that are so important in the relationships between federal and state courts.

In a § 1983 action, the preclusive effect of a prior state court judgment is determined by the law of the state that rendered the judgment.

South Ridge Baptist Church v. Industrial Commission · filed 1987-12-28

In actions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the preclusive effect of a prior state court judgment is to be determined by reference to the law of the state where the judgment was rendered.

In a § 1983 action, a federal court must give a state court judgment the same preclusive effect it would receive under state law, including as to claims that could have been raised earlier.

Golkin v. Abrams · filed 1986-10-06

Migra, supra, established that a federal court must in an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 accord the same preclusive effect to a state court judgment as the state itself would give to its judgment, even when the precluded issue was not raised in the state court but could have been. Since the plaintiffs here could have raised their constitutional claims in the state court proceeding and New York law is settled that they are precluded from raising in a subsequent proceeding any issue they could have raised in the prior one, see, e.g., In re Reilly v. Reid, 45 N.Y.2d 24, 379 N.E.2d 172, 407 N.Y.S.2d 645 (1978), they are foreclosed from raising their constitutional claims in the present action.

Section 1983 provides an exception to the federal bar on injunctions interfering with state court proceedings, but equity, comity, and federalism still limit that relief.

Glatzer v. Barone · filed 2009-05-20

Though Glatzer correctly notes that in § 1983 Congress carved out an exception to the strict prohibition mandated by § 2283 against federal interference with state court proceedings by means of injunctive relief, the application of that exception nonetheless remains circumscribed by the same basic principles that warranted the anti-injunction policy from its inception.

Equity, comity, and federalism restrain federal courts from using Section 1983 to intrude on ongoing state-court proceedings.

Johnson v. State of Illinois Court of Cl · filed 2016-02-03

The district court, however, properly invoked the principles of equity, comity, and federalism that restrain federal courts in a § 1983 action from intruding on state-court proceedings.

In a § 1983 claim against a creditor that seized property under a presumptively valid state statute, good-faith reliance requires both a sincere belief and reasonable conduct under the circumstances.

Underwood v. Foremost Financial Services · filed 1990-06-20

An evidentiary hearing should have been held, and Foremost's claim of good-faith reliance on a presumptively-valid statute should have been considered in light of not only the sincerity in its belief that it was acting properly, but the reasonableness of its actions under the circumstances.

Section 1983 does not authorize federal courts to enjoin or invalidate state laws solely because they conflict with other state laws or legislative intent.

McQUILLION v. SCHWARZENEGGER · filed 2004-05-19

Section 1983 does not vest federal courts with the authority to enjoin the administration of, or to declare invalid, state laws on the grounds that they are incompatible with other state laws, much less to rule that state laws are contrary to the state legislature's intent.

Section 1983 does not make one contracting entity liable for deprivations to another entity’s employees resulting from cancellation of the contract between the entities.

Holloman v. Northeast Georgia Area Development Commission · filed 1990-06-28

The court does not believe that section 1983 was meant to extend so far as to hold A liable for deprivations to B’s employees resulting from the cancellation of a contract between A and B.

Section 1983 permits entity liability when a final policymaker acts with deliberate indifference to a subordinate’s retaliatory motive, but a mere failure to investigate does not establish that indifference.

San Filippo v. Bongiovanni · filed 1994-08-18

Our use of a "deliberate indifference" standard does not make the University liable for the Board's mere failure to investigate--that is, the University would not be liable if, oblivious to the motivation behind the decision to charge San Filippo and to initiate dismissal proceedings, the Board had decided to dismiss San Filippo for wholly legitimate reasons.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on an entity through respondeat superior.

Brammer-Hoelter v. Twin Peaks Charter Academy · filed 2007-07-12

It is true that § 1983 liability for an entity cannot be predicated on respondeat superior.

Section 1983 does not impose entity liability based on respondeat superior.

Dillon v. Twin Peaks Charter · filed 2007-07-12

It is true that § 1983 liability for an entity cannot be predicated on respondeat superior.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a prison operator for its policy when no one violated the prisoner’s constitutional rights.

Bowman v. Corr Corp of Amer · filed 2003-11-21

However, on the basis of City of Los Angeles v. Heller, 475 U.S. 796, 799 (1986), and our subsequent decision in Hancock v. Dodson, 958 F.2d 1367, 1376 (6th Cir. 1992), the district court held that without a constitutional violation of Anthony’s Eighth Amendment right by Dr. Coble or Warden Myers, CCA cannot be held liable for its policy, even if it were to encourage deliberate indifference. We agree.

Section 1983 requires proof of a pattern of civil rights violations or withholding of exculpatory evidence by the sheriff’s office as an entity to establish its liability.

Burge v. Northwestern National Insurance Co. of Milwaukee · filed 2009-06-03

In order to prove liability of the STPSO, a pattern of civil rights violations and/or withholding of exculpatory evidence by the STPSO as an entity pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, must be proven.

Section 1983 does not permit entity liability based on respondeat superior.

Parker v. Gosmanova · filed 2009-07-02

But we also note that the Medical Center cannot be held liable under § 1983 based on the doctrine of respondeat superior.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff suing an entity to allege that its policy or practice caused the constitutional violation.

Green v. Denning · filed 2012-03-09

To succeed on a § 1983 claim against an entity, a plaintiff must allege that the entity had a policy or practice that lead to the claimed constitutional violation.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff suing an entity for constitutional violations to show that the deprivation resulted from an official policy, practice, or custom.

Jones v. Corrections Corp. of America · filed 2015-04-28

The district court properly granted summary judgment on Jones’s failure to protect claims because, even assuming that a constitutional deprivation occurred, Jones failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether any constitutional deprivation resulted from an official policy, practice, or custom of CCA.

Section 1983 requires facts showing that an entity’s official policy, practice, or custom caused a constitutional deprivation.

Pullano v. Brammer · filed 2017-03-21

The district court properly dismissed Pullano’s deliberate indifference claims against defendant NaphCare, Inc., because Pullano failed to allege facts sufficient to show that a constitutional deprivation resulted from an official policy, practice, or custom.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff suing an entity to show that its policies or customs caused the alleged harm.

Cabrera v. Neville · filed 2017-04-25

The district court properly granted summary judgment for defendant NaphCare, Inc. on Cabrera’s deliberate indifference claim because Cabrera failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether NaphCare, Inc.’s policies or customs caused the alleged inadequate treatment.

Section 1983 claims against an entity require allegations that the violation occurred pursuant to its policy, practice, or custom.

Black v. Corvel Enterprises Comp Inc. · filed 2018-12-17

Although Appellants Brayshaw and Viola alleged injury to a property right, their § 1983 claims fail because they did not sufficiently allege that Appellees’ violations were committed pursuant to “a policy, practice or custom of the entity.”

Section 1983 does not impose respondeat superior liability on an entity; the entity’s policy or custom must cause the constitutional violation.

Skidgel v. Geo Group Inc. · filed 2019-11-08

However, § 1983 does not authorize respondeat superior liability for an entity based on the actions of its subordinates. ... Because no such allegations exist, the Complaint fails to state a § 1983 claim against GEO.

Section 1983 permits liability for a prison medical company’s policy only when that policy causes a proven constitutional violation.

Holman v. Tilden · filed 2019-11-26

But that claim required proof that he suffered a constitutional violation caused by an express or de facto policy of Wexford’s that Dr. Tilden implemented. Because Holman could not prove any underlying constitutional violation, Wexford cannot be liable.

Section 1983 permits liability against a private medical provider only when a policy or custom causes the constitutional deprivation.

BURGOS v. NUTTER · filed 2020-02-11

Corizon can only be held liable under § 1983 based on policy or custom.

Section 1983 permits liability against a prison medical provider when its policy causes the denial of appropriate treatment.

SLOPPY v. CENTURION OF FLORIDA LLC · filed 2020-03-03

An employing entity like Centurion can be held liable if the refusal to provide appropriate treatment stems from the entity’s policy.

Section 1983 permits a claim against an entity only when its custom or policy causes a violation of federal rights.

Doe v. DeWees · filed 2020-03-23

Likewise, an entity such as CONMED may be held liable under § 1983 only to the extent that it has a custom or policy that causes a violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States, such as a policy of deliberate indifference to serious medical needs. See Austin v. Paramount Parks, Inc., 195 F.3d 715, 727–28 (4th Cir. 1999); Monell, 436 U.S. at 690-91. Here, where the allegations against CONMED personnel relate to the unique situation in which Doe refused to identify herself at all, the Amended Complaint does not provide sufficient facts to support that CONMED had, or was exercising, any particular custom or policy.

Section 1983 provides no damages for a possible future use of statements obtained in a treatment program when the plaintiffs do not allege physical or mental coercion to speak.

Allison v. Donald N. Snyder, Jr., Mark S. Carich, and Michael L. Holmes · filed 2003-06-19

So no matter what one makes of the risk that some day Illinois will use against a detainee evidence gathered in its treatment program, no damages remedy is available. Plaintiffs would be free to ask the court to suppress evidence offered against them; they are entitled to no more than that option.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim for police refusal to honor a suspect’s Miranda rights when that refusal does not violate the Fifth Amendment.

Cooper v. Dupnik · filed 1991-02-06

Because it was not a Fifth Amendment violation to refuse to honor Cooper's invocation of his Miranda rights, Cooper cannot bring a 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 action on this ground.

Section 1983 does not provide a civil remedy for an alleged Miranda violation; the remedy is exclusion of compelled self-incrimination from evidence.

Brock v. Logan County Sheriff's Department of Arkansas · filed 1993-09-07

The remedy for the alleged Miranda violation is the exclusion from evidence of any compelled self-incrimination, not a civil rights action.

In § 1983 actions, state administrative determinations of facts and issues receive preclusive effect when state law provides fair procedures for litigating them.

Featherstone v. Columbus Public Schools · filed 1999-03-04

There is little question that where state law provides for fair procedures for the litigation of federal claims such as § 1983 claims, state administrative agency determinations concerning the facts and issues involved in such claims are entitled to preclu-sive effect.

Section 1983 claims may be precluded by a final state administrative decision when the plaintiff fails to seek available judicial review through administrative mandamus.

Briggs v. City of Rolling Hills Estates · filed 1995-11-28

Plaintiffs contend this doctrine may not be invoked, because their action is under the federal Civil Rights Act; they are wrong. ... That is not analogous to the case here, where plaintiffs allowed administrative action to become final by failing to seek judicial review by administrative mandamus to set it aside.

In a § 1983 action, a state administrative hearing can preclude relitigation of factual issues when the agency acted judicially and the parties had a full and fair opportunity to litigate.

Johnson v. City of Tarpon Springs · filed 1991-03-19

In this Court, Plaintiff is barred from relitigating issues of fact determined by a state administrative hearing, when it is acting in a judicial capacity to resolve issues of fact properly before it and the parties have a full and fair opportunity to litigate.

In a § 1983 action, a federal court gives state agency factfinding the preclusive effect it would receive in state court when the agency acted judicially, resolved properly presented factual disputes, and gave the parties an adequate opportunity to litigate.

Layne v. Campbell County Department of Social Services Cilla P. Brown Judith E. Gilchrist, and County of Campb · filed 1991-08-12

A federal court does not have the authority to review the factfinding of the administrative panel merely because Layne is dissatisfied with the results. Since the administrative panel was acting in a judicial capacity, resolving issues of fact properly before it which the parties had an adequate opportunity to litigate, the district court was correct in holding it was precluded from reviewing the panel’s findings of fact, the same as a Virginia court would be precluded.

Section 1983 claims are subject to the same preclusive effect that the rendering state’s courts would give an earlier state judgment.

Treister v. City of Miami · filed 1992-08-13

As discussed above, generally speaking, “issues actually litigated in a state court proceeding are entitled to the same preclusive effect in a subsequent federal § 1983 suit as they enjoy in the courts of the State where the judgment was rendered.”

Section 1983 claims may be precluded by unreviewed state administrative findings when the state would give them preclusive effect and the proceeding met minimum fairness requirements.

Miller v. County of Santa Cruz · filed 1994-12-27

Nonetheless, as a matter of federal common law, federal courts give preclusive effect to the findings of state administrative tribunals in subsequent actions under § 1983.

In a § 1983 action, factual findings from a state agency acting judicially receive the same preclusive effect they would receive in state court when the parties had an adequate opportunity to litigate.

Kleenwell Biohazard Waste And General Ecology Consultants, Inc. v. Nelson · filed 1995-02-09

when a state agency "acting in its judicial capacity ... resolves disputed issues of fact properly before it which the parties have had an adequate opportunity to litigate," federal courts must give the agency's factfinding the same preclusive effect to which it would be entitled in the State's courts. ... Because the WUTC hearing met the requirements of Elliott and Shoemaker, we hold that the district court did not err in giving the WUTC's factual findings preclusive effect.

In a § 1983 action, a state agency’s judicial factfinding receives the same preclusive effect it would receive in state court when the parties had an adequate opportunity to litigate the facts.

Kleenwell Biohazard Waste & General Ecology Consultants, Inc. v. Nelson · filed 1995-02-09

Kleenwell asserts that we should not reach the merits of the district court’s decision on the ground that the court erred in giving preclusive effect to the factual findings of the WUTC administrative proceeding. Kleenwell thus asserts that we should reverse the district court’s decision and remand for further factual inquiry. We disagree. ... In ruling upon a section 1983 claim, the Court held that- ... when a state agency “acting in its judicial capacity ... resolves disputed issues of fact properly before it which the parties have had an adequate opportunity to litigate,” federal courts must give the agency’s factfinding the same preclusive effect to which it would be entitled in the State’s courts.

A prior state habeas corpus proceeding can preclude a Section 1983 action for compensatory damages even though damages were unavailable in habeas.

Tristan v. James Gomez, Department of Corrections Charles D. Marshall, Warden D. J. Helsel N. Reynolds · filed 1995-07-20

Tristan contends that his prior state habeas corpus proceeding does not have a preclusive effect on his current section 1983 action because he is seeking compensatory damages which were not available in the prior habeas proceeding. This contention lacks merit.

In § 1983 actions, unreviewed state administrative factfinding receives preclusive effect only when the agency acted in a judicial capacity and the parties had an adequate opportunity to litigate the issue.

Thornquest v. King · filed 1995-08-17

In § 1983 actions, federal courts must afford the same preclusive effect to unreviewed state administrative agency factfinding to which it would be entitled in the state's courts, provided the state agency was "acting in a judicial capacity," and "resolve[d] disputed issues of fact properly before it which the parties ... had an adequate opportunity to litigate." ... Moreover, the issue of whether Brady's actual discharge was in retaliation for exercising his first amendment rights could not have been "properly before" the Board, nor could the parties have had "an adequate opportunity to litigate" this issue before the Board, because it was the Board which in fact discharged Brady.

Section 1983 actions may be subject to issue preclusion from unreviewed state administrative decisions when the proceedings meet federal fairness requirements and state preclusion rules.

Kolander v. Weeks · filed 1996-01-26

Although Section 1738 does not apply to cases involving unreviewed decisions of a state administrative board or similar body, federal courts give preclusive effect to the findings of state administrative tribunals in subsequent actions brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 as a matter of federal common law. ... Because the Oregon requirements for preclusion are met, an Oregon court would give preclusive effect to the state agency’s determination. Accordingly, this court must also do so.

In a § 1983 action, federal courts give state agency factual findings the same preclusive effect they would receive in state court.

Hearn v. Regina S. Veasy Shirley McClain Cynthia A. Gardner · filed 1996-04-18

In actions filed under § 1983, federal courts must give a state agency's factual findings the same preclusive effect that the state courts would give them.

In a § 1983 action, unreviewed state administrative factfinding receives the same preclusive effect it would receive in state court if the agency acted in a judicial capacity and the parties had an adequate opportunity to litigate the properly presented issues.

Thornquest v. King · filed 1996-05-09

In § 1983 actions, federal courts must afford the same preclusive effect to unre-viewed state administrative agency factfind-ing to which it would be entitled in the state’s courts, provided the state agency was “acting in a judicial capacity,” and “resolve[d] disputed issues of fact properly before it which the parties ... had an adequate opportunity to litigate.”

In a § 1983 challenge to a Section 8 benefit termination, courts defer to a housing authority hearing officer’s factfinding but must ensure that the findings are supported by substantial evidence.

Clark v. Alexander · filed 1996-05-30

The sole issue before the Court regarding the factfinding is the issue preclusive impact or degree of deference it may be afforded by courts in subsequent litigation, including cases brought under section 1983. ... Nevertheless, this Court concludes that deference must be shown to the factfinding of local housing authorities. ... Accordingly, to insure compliance with federal law, the reviewing court must be satisfied that the hearing officer's conclusions are supported by substantial evidence.

An unreviewed state agency decision can preclude a § 1983 suit even though § 1983 does not require exhaustion of administrative remedies.

San Remo Hotel v. City of San Francisco · filed 1998-06-03

Thus, an unreviewed agency decision against a federal plaintiff can preclude a § 1983 suit in federal court, even though § 1983 does not have an exhaustion requirement.

An administrative agency’s decision can preclude issues in a Section 1983 claim only if the agency acted in a judicial capacity, the party had an adequate opportunity to litigate, and the agency resolved disputed facts properly before it.

Cosey v. City of Chicago · filed 1999-02-02

Specifically, with respect to a Section 1983 claim, to determine if preclusive effect can be given to an administrative agency decision, the court must determine: (1) whether the administrative agency acted in a “judicial capacity”; (2) whether the party had an adequate opportunity to litigate the issues before the agency; and (3) whether the agency resolved disputed issues of fact properly before it.

A state administrative decision cannot preclude a § 1983 claim when judicial review of that decision was unavailable.

Wehrli v. County of Orange · filed 1999-04-27

There is no doubt that, as a general matter, a state administrative decision can have preclusive effect upon a federal § 1983 claim. ... We conclude, therefore, that neither federal nor California law would give preclusive effect, under the doctrines of res judicata or collateral estoppel, to a state administrative proceeding not subject to judicial review.

Federal courts give state administrative factual findings the preclusive effect they would receive in state court in a subsequent § 1983 action.

Klein, Barbara v. Perry, Sidney · filed 2000-06-08

As did the district court, we accord preclusive effect to the SEAC’s factual findings. Federal courts give preclusive effect to the findings of state administrative tribunals in subsequent actions under § 1983.

A plaintiff bringing a Section 1983 claim may be barred from relitigating a state administrative finding when an available appeal offered a full opportunity to contest it.

Crow v. City of Springfield · filed 2001-07-12

Instead, the district court correctly held that the question whether Crow’s property constituted a public nuisance has been fully and finally litigated by Crow’s failing to avail himself of a right of appeal to a hearing which would have provided a full opportunity to litigate that question.

State administrative findings have the same preclusive effect in § 1983 claims as they would in the forum state.

Hicks v. Floyd County Board of Education · filed 2004-05-14

We need not reach that question in this case, because state administrative findings do have the same preclusive effect as in the forum state as to claims brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Unreviewed administrative findings cannot preclude a § 1983 claim unless the administrative process gave the claimant a full and fair opportunity to litigate.

Hooper v. North Carolina · filed 2005-04-13

Unreviewed administrative findings may have a preclusive effect in federal court only when the administrative process provides a full and fair opportunity to litigate a claim. ... However, dismissal is inappropriate because Plaintiff has alleged facts sufficient to undermine the adequacy of the opportunity afforded her to litigate her claims through NCCU’s grievance process. ... Accordingly, the court will deny Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiffs claims asserted under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Title IX.

In a § 1983 action, state administrative fact-finding receives the same preclusive effect it would receive in state court when the parties had a full and fair opportunity to litigate.

Burkybile v. Board Of Education Of The Hastings-On-Hudson Union Free School District · filed 2005-06-15

Nonetheless, in federal actions based on 42 U.S.C. § 1983, state administrative fact-finding is given the same preclusive effect as it would receive in courts of the same state. Elliott, 478 U.S. at 799, 106 S.Ct. 3220. ... Instead, we hold that because the Section 3020-a hearing was an administrative adjudication, we must give its findings preclusive effect.

In a § 1983 claim, state administrative findings do not preclude litigation when the hearing officer’s findings are not final and the agency’s final order did not decide an identical issue.

Goodwin, Audrey v. Bd Trustees Univ IL · filed 2006-03-31

Although the issue of whether the evidence “supported and sustained the charges of the Employer” is similar to the issues addressed in the McDonnell Douglas pretext argument and the hearing officer’s findings of fact, they are not identical, as required for collateral estoppel to apply. Therefore, collateral estoppel stemming from either stage of the Merit Board proceedings is inappropriate, and Goodwin’s argument fails.

A § 1983 plaintiff is not bound by administrative findings if the plaintiff lacked a full and fair opportunity to litigate before a neutral arbitrator.

Locurto v. Giuliani · filed 2006-04-27

We note, moreover, that a § 1983 plaintiff is not bound by the findings of an administrative hearing if he is “deprived of the opportunity to litigate his claim fully and fairly before a neutral arbitrator.” Colon v. Coughlin, 58 F.3d 865, 871 (2d Cir.1995) (emphasis added). ... As such, the plaintiffs did not receive hearings before neutral arbitrators, and collateral estoppel does not attach to the findings of those hearings.

A § 1983 plaintiff who knowingly forgoes an opportunity to raise a constitutional claim in state administrative proceedings may be bound by the resulting state determinations in a federal civil rights suit.

Taylor v. New York City Transit Authority · filed 1970-01-06

Having knowingly failed to take advantage of state procedural opportunities, he cannot now assert that no opportunity to make his constitutional claim was afforded, and that this Court should refuse to accept the findings of the State's courts and quasi-judicial administrative agencies. ... The requirements of comity should not be violated in the context of a civil rights suit such as this one.

Administrative decisions may preclude issues in a § 1983 claim only when the agency acted in a judicial capacity and the parties had a fair opportunity to litigate them.

Fonville v. District of Columbia · filed 2006-08-22

Unlike Title VII claims, administrative agency decisions have preclusive effect for employment discrimination claims raised pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ... Administrative agency determinations are given preclusive effect when 1) the agency is acting in a judicial capacity, and 2) the litigants had a fair opportunity to litigate all the issues. ... In sum, the issue of whether the Commander position was “at-will” has not been fully litigated, and the OEA’s decision does not preclude litigation of plaintiffs claims before this Court.

Section 1983 claims may be subject to the preclusive effect of state administrative factfinding from judicial proceedings.

Van Wulfen v. County of Montmorency · filed 2011-06-20

Thus, even assuming for the sake of argument that the lake-level proceedings can be categorized as state administrative agency proceedings, there is no reason to believe that they cannot have preclusive effect, especially considering that they were clearly judicial in nature.

Unreviewed final administrative decisions can have res judicata and collateral estoppel effect in Section 1983 actions.

Oxnard Hospitality Enterprises v. City of Los Angeles CA2/8 · filed 2015-09-30

Unreviewed final administrative decisions are entitled to res judicata and collateral estoppel effect in actions under 42 U.S.C. §1983.

A Section 1983 claim challenging an administrative decision is not precluded by that decision when the agency did not consider the same issue.

AIDS Healthcare Foundation, Inc. v. City & County of San Francisco · filed 2016-09-26

Here, it is improper to give preclusive effect to the Planning Commission’s administrative decision with regard to the AHF’s application for conditional use authorization. First, the Planning Commission did not consider the same issue as the one that is currently before the Court.

A state court probable cause finding does not preclude a § 1983 claim challenging the integrity of the evidence used to obtain that finding.

HURT v. VANTLIN · filed 2020-07-23

It would also go against Seventh Circuit precedent holding that when a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 related to probable cause "is more accurately characterized as a challenge to the integrity of the evidence than to its sufficiency," the probable cause finding has no preclusive effect.

A state administrative decision can bar a § 1983 claim when the decision is entitled to preclusive effect and the claim falls within its scope.

Rose Freeman v. City of Port Hueneme · filed 2020-04-09

The district court also correctly concluded that Freeman’s § 1983 claim falls within the claim-preclusive scope of the administrative decision upholding her termination.

Section 1983 claims barred by Heck because the underlying convictions have not been overturned must be dismissed without prejudice.

McNally v. Colorado State Patrol · filed 2001-07-03

The court correctly held that these claims could not be brought under § 1983 until plaintiff could prove that the underlying convictions had been overturned by a competent state authority. ... In this situation, and contrary to the treatment by the district court, claims barred by Heck are to be dismissed without prejudice.

Claims under § 1983 barred by Heck v. Humphrey must be dismissed without prejudice.

Coffman v. Blake · filed 2005-11-17

Following de novo review, see Moore v. Sims, 200 F.3d 1170, 1171 (8th Cir. 2000) (per curiam), we affirm, see 8th Cir. R. 47B, but we modify the dismissal to be without prejudice as to any claims Coffman raised that were barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1994).

Section 1983 claims barred by Heck v. Humphrey should be dismissed without prejudice.

McGary v. Culpepper · filed 2009-04-15

The parties have agreed that the claims dismissed under Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 114 S.Ct. 2364, 129 L.Ed.2d 383 (1994), should have been dismissed explicitly without prejudice. On remand, the district court should so indicate.

Section 1983 claims barred by Heck v. Humphrey should be dismissed without prejudice.

Bryner v. County Of Salt Lake · filed 2011-07-08

Mr. Bryner is correct, however, in arguing that claims dismissed on Heck v. Humphrey grounds should be dismissed without prejudice.

Section 1983 does not support broad judicial oversight of a state Title IV-D child support program when the requested relief would duplicate the federal audit and corrective action process.

Carelli v. Howser · filed 1991-04-09

We conclude that the nature of the relief sought by plaintiffs here would cause a federal court to carry out an oversight function beyond that intended by Congress, given the comprehensiveness of the remedial scheme provided in the statute. We find it unnecessary to decide whether section 1983 can ever be used as a means of securing relief for an alleged statutory violation of Title IV-D.

Section 1983 permits prospective injunctive relief against officials but not a retroactive award payable from a state treasury.

Johnston v. Shaw · filed 1982-12-21

In a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action, a federal court’s remedial power is necessarily limited to prospective injunctive relief, Ex Parte Young, supra, and may not include a retroactive award which requires the payment of funds from the state treasury.

A § 1983 claim for declaratory relief that was fully addressed through Colorado zoning review did not independently entitle the plaintiffs to a jury trial.

Higby v. Board of County Commissioners · filed 1984-03-08

Plaintiffs sought only declaratory relief, not money damages, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and the trial court properly determined that they were not entitled to a jury trial, finding, in essence, that those claims were merged in the C.R.C.P. 106 claim. We agree. The issues raised by the plaintiffs in the C.R.C.P. 106 claim were fully briefed, argued, and determined, and thus, an adequate remedy was provided.

Section 1983 cannot be used to obtain review of a district court’s dismissal of a habeas petition.

Robinson v. Johnson · filed 2001-04-12

To the extent that Robinson is asking us to review the judgment of the district court dismissing his habeas petition as time-barred, he cannot do so via his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 suit.

Section 1983 does not authorize a court to micromanage a state’s execution procedures.

Evans v. Saar · filed 2006-02-01

Section 1983 does not empower this Court to “micromanage” Maryland’s execution procedures. What might be done to improve the three-drug protocol is not the appropriate inquiry.

Section 1983 permits relief to restore a child to classroom placement pending a due process hearing, but not for relief governed by the EAHCA’s administrative procedures.

Agrippa Hymes, by His Next Friend and Guardian Ad Litem, Eunice Hymes v. Harnett County Board of Education · filed 1981-11-17

Our review satisfies us that the learned and able district judge correctly cut the Gordian Knot, when he decided that § 1988 would be available to the extent jurisdiction to obtain relief under § 1983 was available, but no more. The sole § 1983 relief was the accomplishment of return to the classroom placement, pending a due process hearing.

Section 1983 does not provide relief for violations of a state court’s interpretation of the United States Constitution.

Rubin v. City of Lancaster · filed 2011-07-13

But 42 U.S.C. § 1983, pursuant to which the federal claim is brought, does not provide relief for "violations” of a state court’s interpretation of the United States Constitution.

Section 1983 does not provide damages against a state or redress rights protected only by a state constitution.

Zullo v. State of Vermont · filed 2019-01-04

A § 1983 action for monetary damages cannot be maintained against a state, a state agency, or state officials sued in their official capacity. ... Accordingly, we do not find § 1983 to be an adequate alternative remedy in this case.

Section 1983 permits a damages claim and can be used to enforce a state IDEA administrative decision.

Jeremy H. Ex Rel. Hunter v. Mount Lebanon School District · filed 1996-09-12

The Hunters' section 1983 claim does have substantive content, as it can form the basis of a claim for damages, and as section 1983 is an instrument by which the Hunters may compel MLSD to comply with a decision of the state administrative process.

Section 1983 allows parents who prevailed before an IDEA hearing officer to seek federal court enforcement of the officer’s order when the IDEA’s own review provision gives them no remedy.

GRACE B. v. Lexington School Committee · filed 1991-04-10

Although this court lacks jurisdiction under the Act, it does have jurisdiction under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to enforce the Hearing Officer’s Order.

Section 1983 provides a way to enforce a favorable special-education administrative order when a school district allegedly fails to comply with it.

Reid v. BOARD OF EDUC., LINCOLNSHIRE-PRAIRIE VIEW · filed 1991-06-14

They are not disputing the merits of the order itself, rather, they seek to enforce it. In other words, the Reids claim that the district is depriving them of rights secured to them under the laws of the United States. That is a question more appropriately addressed in a § 1983 action.

Section 1983 does not provide a separate action to enforce education rights created by the IDEA.

Eirschele Ex Rel. Eirschele v. Craven County Board of Education · filed 1998-05-20

Furthermore, the IDEA is the exclusive statutory remedy for deprivations of the education rights created by the act, and plaintiffs are not entitled to enforce these rights through a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action.

Section 1983 can be used to enforce the IDEA’s individual right to a free appropriate public education.

Schmelzer Ex Rel. Schmelzer v. New York · filed 2003-10-01

Having found such a right, a presumption of enforceability is applied by Section 1983. Accordingly, Defendants’ argument that Section 1983 cannot be used to sue for a violation of the IDEA is denied.

Section 1983 cannot be used to enforce IDEA rights because the IDEA’s comprehensive enforcement scheme precludes that remedy.

Alex G. Ex Rel. Stephen G. v. Board of Trustees of Davis Joint Unified School District · filed 2004-07-30

Plaintiffs’ § 1983 claim based upon the IDEA is DISMISSED with prejudice because the IDEA’S comprehensive enforcement scheme is incompatible with its enforcement through § 1983.

Section 1983 permits plaintiffs to enforce IDEA rights, including the right to a free appropriate public education, and seek damages for violations.

Smith v. Guilford Board of Education · filed 2007-06-14

It is well-settled that, while the IDEA itself does not provide for monetary damages, plaintiffs may sue pursuant to § 1983 to enforce its provisions — including the right to a FAPE — and to obtain damages for violations of such provisions.

Section 1983 permits suits to enforce IDEA rights after administrative remedies are exhausted.

L.C. v. Utah State Board of Education · filed 1999-07-27

However, this analysis contradicts the holdings of the Tenth Circuit, which have held that IDEA violations may be challenged through a § 1983 suit, as long as administrative remedies are exhausted before suit is brought. ... The court finds that IDEA permits plaintiffs to bring an enforcement suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide a separate claim for an alleged IDEA violation when the parents received a due process hearing and identified no independent constitutional or statutory basis for the claim.

School Bd. of Manatee County, Fla. v. Lh · filed 2009-09-30

Similarly, L.H's parents have alleged only violations of the IDEA as the basis for their § 1983 claim. Moreover, the violation of L.H.'s or the parents' rights for which they seek redress pursuant to § 1983 are subsumed by the School Board's appeal and will be determined after the Court makes a ruling on the merits of the School Board's claims. Accordingly, the parents have failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

Section 1983 does not provide a cause of action to enforce IDEA rights; plaintiffs must sue directly under the IDEA.

DL v. District of Columbia · filed 2010-08-10

Plaintiffs do not have a right to sue under § 1983 to enforce the IDEA. Rather, plaintiffs must sue directly under the IDEA.

Section 1983 cannot be used to remedy a statutory violation of an individual child’s right to appropriate services under the IDEA.

Brown v. District 299-Chicago Public Schools · filed 2010-12-27

The holding of Anderson v. Thompson, 658 F.2d 1205, 1214-17 (7th Cir.1981), that § 1983 may ... not be used to remedy a statutory violation of an individual child’s right to appropriate services under the IDEA, is unchanged by later law and is consistent with decisions by the Fourth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits.

Section 1983 allows parents to enforce a favorable IDEA hearing officer decision without first pursuing a separate state complaint process.

K.W. v. District of Columbia · filed 2019-05-07

This Court concludes that Plaintiffs were not required to engage in OSSE’s collateral process before filing the immediate § 1983 claim for enforcement of the favorable March 2018 HOD decision.

Section 1983 permits a party to seek enforcement of an IDEA hearing officer’s decision when the IDEA provides no remedy for that claim.

Benoit v. District of Columbia · filed 2019-08-01

In line with the multiple courts to have already found so, the Court concludes that Plaintiffs here are able to seek enforcement of the HOD through a § 1983 action.

Section 1983 allows damages for an involuntary confession obtained through psychological or physical coercion, though a claim implicating a conviction may not proceed before exhaustion of state remedies.

Bennie Wicker, Jr. v. John Campbell, Police Captain · filed 1991-05-06

Extraction of an involuntary confession by coercion is actionable under Sec. 1983 for damages "notwithstanding the coercion is psychological rather than physical." Rex v. Teeples, 753 F.2d 840, 843 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 967 (1985), cited with approval in Gray v. Spillman, 925 F.2d 90 (4th Cir.1991). Wicker's damage claim that Campbell coerced his confession by improper threats and promises is actionable under this authority although, because it implicates the validity of his conviction, it may not proceed prior to exhaustion of state remedies.

Section 1983 does not require physical violence for a claim based on a coerced confession.

Duncan v. Nelson · filed 1972-10-10

Although physical violence would ordinarily make damages greater and more easily ascertainable, we see no reason in either logic or experience to require the presence of physical violence as a necessary prerequisite to suit under § 1983.

Section 1983 can provide redress for arbitrary police interference with and harassment of a business in appropriate circumstances.

Patterson v. Butler · filed 1991-07-01

In appropriate circumstances, 42 USC § 1983 allows redress for arbitrary interference in, and harassment of, a business by the police.

A Section 1983 claim for retaliation through an adverse employment action requires an employment relationship with the defendants.

Scully v. Town of Mamaroneck · filed 2020-08-12

While retaliation claims alleging an adverse employment action because of a complaint of discrimination are actionable under 42 USC § 1983 ( see Vega v Hempstead Union Free School Dist. , 801 F3d 72, 80 [2d Cir]), the plaintiff has no employment relationship with the defendants and the statute does not apply in this context.

Section 1983 can cover retaliation that worsens an inmate’s working conditions when the action is sufficiently adverse.

Lewis v. Margaret Jacks Marie Linzy · filed 2007-05-11

Retaliatory action that worsens an inmate’s working conditions can be sufficiently adverse to be actionable under § 1983.

Section 1983 permits a prisoner to claim that officials disciplined him for filing grievances, even if the discipline would otherwise have been proper.

Lekas, Christopher v. Briley, Kenneth · filed 2005-04-25

“An act taken in retaliation for the exercise of a constitutionally protected right is actionable under § 1983 even if the act, when taken for a different reason, would have been proper.”

A § 1983 retaliation claim requires a specific constitutional right, retaliatory intent, an adverse act, and causation.

Freeman v. Texas Department of Criminal Justice · filed 2004-05-07

To sustain a § 1983 retaliation claim, Freeman must establish: (1) the existence of a specific constitutional right; (2) the defendant’s intent to retaliate for the exercise of that right; (3) a retaliatory adverse act; and (4) causation.

Section 1983 does not provide a separate cause of action for retaliation that does not independently violate federal law.

Ross v. Ed Hinton, Jr. · filed 1991-07-09

We also hold that Ross' claim for retaliation, since it does not state an independent violation of federal law, does not state separate cause of action under section 1983.

Section 1983 permits a prisoner retaliation claim when official action responds to protected activity, even if the resulting harm does not itself affect a constitutionally protected interest.

Schroeder v. McDonald · filed 1992-12-03

While a plaintiff in a § 1983 retaliation claim must allege that the action taken against him was taken in retaliation for the exercise of a constitutionally protected interest, the plaintiff need not allege that the resulting damage affected a constitutionally protected interest.

A § 1983 retaliation claim does not require the retaliatory act itself to amount to a constitutional violation.

Williams v. Kling · filed 1994-04-21

Unlike other § 1983 claims, in order to state a viable retaliation claim, Plaintiff need not prove that defendant’s actions amounted to a constitutional violation.

Section 1983 makes retaliation for exercising a constitutionally protected right actionable even when the same act would have been proper for a different reason.

Orrin S. Reed v. Richards · filed 1994-06-13

An act taken in retaliation for the exercise of a constitutionally protected right is actionable under Section 1983 even if the act, when taken for a different reason, would have been proper.

Section 1983 does not require a prisoner to defeat a disciplinary charge before bringing a retaliation claim based on that charge.

Riley v. Kurtz · filed 1995-06-06

... it does not follow that the federal courts should make a “no cause” in a disciplinary action a precondition to a § 1983 claim for retaliation.

Section 1983 permits a retaliation claim when an official penalizes the exercise of a constitutional right, even if the same act would otherwise have been proper.

Roddy v. Daniel R. McBride Marcia Metzcus, Walter Cisela · filed 1995-06-23

"[A]n act in retaliation for the exercise of a constitutionally protected right is actionable under Section 1983 even if the act, when taken for different reasons, would have been proper."

Section 1983 does not require a prisoner to obtain a favorable termination of disciplinary proceedings before bringing a claim that prison officials retaliated against the prisoner for exercising a constitutional right.

Woods v. Smith · filed 1995-08-15

We are not persuaded. Under this circuit’s controlling precedents, favorable termination is not a requisite of a retaliatory interference claim.

Section 1983 does not provide a workplace retaliation claim under the Equal Protection Clause when Title VII supplies the remedy.

Lewis v. STATE OF DEL. DEPT. OF PUBLIC INSTRUCTION · filed 1997-11-20

Persuaded by this line of authority, the Court holds that Lewis' § 1983 retaliation action is not actionable under the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Instead, this claim is more properly remedied through Title VII.

Section 1983 permits a prisoner to bring a retaliation claim against prison officials.

Beaty v. Berry · filed 1998-05-18

Beaty's claim that he suffered retaliation at the hands of prison officials, while cognizable under § 1983, is meritless because he has failed to present evidence sufficiently linking the exercise of a constitutional right and any alleged retaliation.

Section 1983 permits a retaliation claim when an act is motivated by the exercise of a constitutional right, even if the act would have been proper for other reasons.

Arce v. Walker · filed 1999-07-06

“An act in retaliation for the exercise of a constitutional right is actionable under section 1983 even if the act when taken for different reasons would have been proper.” ... Thus, even though Defendants’ alleged actions cannot be construed as a violation of Arce’s right of access to court, since they did not impair his access, they could still be actionable, if they were retaliatory.

Section 1983 permits a retaliation claim when the government takes negative action because a person exercised rights protected by the Constitution or federal law.

Friedl v. City of New York · filed 2000-04-04

In general, a section 1983 claim will lie where the government takes negative action against an individual because of his exercise of rights guaranteed by the Constitution or federal laws.

A prisoner bringing a § 1983 retaliation claim must show that protected conduct substantially motivated the decision to discipline him.

Gayle v. Lucas · filed 2001-03-01

To prevail on a § 1983 retaliation claim, an inmate plaintiff bears the burden of showing (1) that he engaged in constitutionally protected conduct and (2) that the protected conduct was a substantial motivating factor in the prison officials’ decision to discipline the plaintiff.

Section 1983 uses the Mt. Healthy burden-shifting framework for retaliatory termination claims.

Mullinax v. Sch · filed 2001-04-03

Both Section 1983 and Texas’s Whistleblower Act12 incorporate the Mt. Healthy13 burden-shifting framework for proving termination in retaliation for protected activity.

A prisoner pleading a § 1983 retaliation claim must allege specific facts that raise a likelihood of a valid claim.

Johnson v. Eggersdorf · filed 2001-05-17

Given the heightened pleading requirements for prisoner retaliation claims, Johnson must allege specific facts that raise a likelihood that his allegations will lead to a valid retaliation claim.

Section 1983 permits a claim when prison disciplinary charges are filed in retaliation for exercising the constitutional right of access to the courts.

Gary Bernard Sanders, 76973 v. Jimmie L. Jones - Concurring · filed 2001-12-04

We believe the filing of disciplinary charges is actionable under § 1983 if filed in retaliation for exercising the constitutional right of access to the courts.