42 U.S.C. § 1983

Section 1983 does not provide a claim for violation of a regulation alone; the plaintiff must identify a violation of statutory law.

Brinkley v. Hill · filed 1997-10-15

It is a violation of statutory law which is required. The regulations are meant to “fine tune” the statutes in question and are not the sort of laws violation of which give rise to individually enforceable rights under § 1983.

Section 1983 provides a remedy for enforcing individual rights secured by federal law when the deprivation is committed under color of state law.

Grammer v. John J. Kane Regional Centers-Glen Hazel · filed 2009-06-30

Hence, we hold that the statutory provisions which Grammer seeks to enforce under § 1983 satisfy both Gonzaga Univ.’s insistence on rights-creating language as evidence of Congressional intent and Blessing’s remaining factors.

Section 1983 cannot enforce a federal statute that benefits a plaintiff but gives it no individual right.

AlohaCare v. Hawaii, Department of Human Services · filed 2009-07-14

Although FQHCoperated entities may benefit from the programs authorized under § 1396b(m), that section does not create any rights in FQHCs or FQHC-controlled entities such as AlohaCare that may be enforced under § 1983.

Section 1983 permits enforcement of a federal statute only when it confers an individual right; § 1396b(m) gives FQHCs no enforceable right to contract eligibility.

Alohacare v. State of Hawaii, Department Of · filed 2009-07-14

Although FQHC- operated entities may benefit from the programs authorized under § 1396b(m), that section does not create any rights in FQHCs or FQHC-controlled entities such as AlohaCare that may be enforced under § 1983.

Section 1983 permits plaintiffs to enforce the NHRA right to specialized services.

Rolland v. Cellucci · filed 2002-05-03

In essence, the court found that section 1983 was an appropriate vehicle for Plaintiffs to vindicate their NHRA-based right to specialized services.

Section 1983 does not provide a cause of action to enforce statutory provisions that do not confer individual rights.

HOBBS EX. REL. HOBBS v. Zenderman · filed 2009-09-01

We hold that the statutory provisions upon which Hobbs relies do not confer private rights enforceable under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide a damages remedy for violations of 47 U.S.C. § 253 because that provision creates no private right enforceable through Section 1983.

Coastal Communications Service, Inc. v. City of New York · filed 2009-09-30

During the Court’s consideration of the instant motions, the Second Circuit ruled definitively that § 253 does not create a private right of action for damages that can be vindicated through a § 1983 action. ... The Court, therefore, grants summary judgment in favor of the City with respect to plaintiffs’ money damage claims under § 253.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for alleged violations of the Older Americans Act provisions addressed here because those provisions do not confer enforceable individual rights.

Puerto Rico Office of the Ombudsman for the Elderly Ex Rel. Leon v. Rico · filed 2009-10-22

Accordingly, we find that PROOE has failed to show that pursuant to the OAA it has an enforceable right under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not allow enforcement of municipal housing code requirements that do not establish a federally secured right.

Delgado v. New York City Housing Authority · filed 2009-10-29

Nor may petitioners enforce the Housing Maintenance Code through- 42 USC § 1983.

Section 1983 provides a remedy for deprivation of rights secured by the Constitution and laws, but only when the underlying federal law clearly confers enforceable personal rights.

MINNESOTA PHARMACISTS ASS'N v. Pawlenty · filed 2010-02-10

This Court respectfully concludes that the reasoning supporting the decision in Reynolds simply can no longer stand in the wake of the Supreme Court’s clarification in Gonzaga of the narrowed scope of rights enforceable under Section 1983. ... In any event, by dictating that State agencies develop plans that balance such competing interests, Subsection (30)(A) creates at most rights too vague and amorphous for judicial enforcement. ... A court may review only the question of whether the overall plan satisfies Subsection (30)(A), not whether any discrete factor satisfies a particular litigant’s independent self-interest.

Section 1983 does not permit private enforcement of the Medicaid Act’s estate recovery provisions because they do not create individual federal rights.

Jones v. District of Columbia · filed 2010-06-24

For the reasons that follow, we conclude that the portions of the Medicaid Act that the plaintiffs have invoked in this litigation do not create private rights enforceable under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide a damages remedy for violations of 18 U.S.C. § 926A because that provision creates no enforceable individual federal right.

Torraco v. Port Authority of New York & New Jersey · filed 2010-06-30

The district court concluded that a violation of Section 926A cannot be enforced though Section 1983, and we affirm.

Section 1983 permits eligible children to enforce the individual rights conferred by Medicaid’s EPSDT provision, 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(43).

Salazar v. District of Columbia · filed 2010-08-05

Gonzaga requires that, in order to find a federal right enforceable under § 1983, that right must have been “unambiguously” conferred. ... In sum, the Court concludes that § 1396a(a)(43) does “unambiguously” confer a private right of action as required by Gonzaga.

Section 1983 does not provide national banks or lending institutions a private cause of action under the National Bank Act.

Chase Bank USA, N.A. v. City of Cleveland · filed 2010-08-05

The Court finds this authority persuasive and likewise holds that the National Bank Act does not confer a private cause of action under § 1983 for national banks and lending institutions.

Section 1983 provides foster parents a remedy to enforce their Child Welfare Act right to maintenance payments covering specified foster care costs.

CALIFORNIA STATE FOSTER PARENT ASS'N v. Wagner · filed 2010-10-27

We therefore hold that Foster Parents have access to a remedy under § 1983 to enforce their federal right.

Section 1983 provides relief for violations of federal rights, but a statute that creates no individual right cannot be enforced through it.

Mason and Dixon Lines, Inc. v. STEUDLE · filed 2011-01-13

This Court agrees with that reasoning and finds that 49 U.S.C. § 14501(c)(1) does not create a private right of action that can be enforced through section 1983.

Section 1983 remains available to enforce foster children’s rights under § 671(a)(16) when a prior ruling recognizing that cause of action remains law of the case.

L.J. v. Baltimore City Department of Social Services · filed 2011-01-26

The fact that Suter found no private right of action under § 671(a)(15) and § 671(a)(9) does not void our holding in L.J. II that the rights asserted by plaintiffs under § 671(a)(16) are privately enforce- able under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide injunctive relief for violation of a regulation unless the right is rooted in the Constitution or federal law.

Wilson v. Fullwood · filed 2011-03-28

Therefore, where such right is rooted in a mere regulation promulgated by the Executive, injunctive relief for the deprivation thereof cannot be had under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide injunctive relief for a claimed right arising solely from an executive regulation.

Wilson v. Fulwood · filed 2011-03-28

Therefore, where such right is rooted in a mere regulation promulgated by the Executive, injunctive relief for the deprivation thereof cannot be had under § 1983.

Section 1983 permits a private action to enforce Medicaid's freedom-of-choice provision.

Planned Parenthood v. COMMISSIONER OF IND. · filed 2011-06-24

The Court respectfully disagrees, and finds that a private right of action exists under § 1983 in order to enforce the "freedom of choice" provision.

Section 1983 provides a remedy for violations of federal constitutional or statutory rights, but does not enforce a common law presumption of innocence.

Foster v. City of St. Paul · filed 2011-08-17

To the contrary, Supreme Court precedent strongly suggests that § 1983 provides a remedy only for violations of the federal constitution or statutes. ... The Court concludes that Foster cannot sue to enforce his right to the presumption of innocence under § 1983.

Section 1983 permits Medicaid recipients to enforce the rights provided by § 1396a(a)(10).

Bontrager v. Indiana Family & Social Services Administration · filed 2011-11-04

A person bringing a viable § 1983 claim must first allege a violation of a federal statutory or constitutional right — not merely a violation of a federal law. ... Thus, given Miller and the abundance of other decisions in agreement, I can hardly reach any other conclusion but that a private right of action exists under 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10).

Section 1983 covers rights secured by the Constitution or federal law, so a D.C. Human Rights Act violation alone cannot support a claim.

Shaw v. District of Columbia · filed 2011-11-18

Plaintiff’s amended complaint also refers to the alleged violations of the D.C. Human Rights Act as grounds for her § 1983 claim (see Am. Compl. ¶ 94), but § 1983 applies only to “a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States.”

A Section 1983 claim based on an IDEA violation requires exceptional circumstances, a municipal custom or practice that caused the violation, and inadequate IDEA remedies.

Jackson v. District of Columbia · filed 2011-11-28

Ms. Jackson does not allege facts from which the court can infer that DCPS has a custom or practice that was the “moving force behind the alleged IDEA violation,” that “exceptional circumstances” exist, or that the “normal remedies offered under the IDEA” are “inadequate to compensate” AJP for the harm that he has allegedly suffered.

Section 1983 does not let Medicaid providers enforce the requirement that a state obtain federal approval before implementing a plan amendment because that requirement confers no unambiguous individual right on them.

Developmental Services Network v. Douglas · filed 2011-11-30

In fine, the Providers have not shown that they have an unambiguously conferred right to bring a § 1983 action.

Section 1983 permits enforcement of a federal statute only when that statute confers an individual right; 29 U.S.C. § 722 did not confer such a right here.

Campbell v. Miller · filed 2011-12-07

Since Campbell has not demonstrated that the statute confers an individual right, she does not have a right enforceable through § 1983.

Section 1983 provides a claim for violations of federal rights, not rights under a state constitution.

Friends of Roeding Park v. City of Fresno · filed 2012-01-31

As a threshold matter, Plaintiffs cannot base their section 1983 claim upon an alleged violation of a provision of the California Constitution.

Section 1983 enforces individual federal rights, but Section 3608 of the Fair Housing Act creates no right enforceable through it.

Mhany Management Inc. v. County of Nassau · filed 2012-02-15

Having conducted its own analysis, as set forth below, the Court agrees with the Thomas and Framingham decisions and concludes that Section 3608 does not give rise to rights enforceable against state actors under Section 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide a private action to enforce Medicaid Section 13(A) because that provision does not unambiguously confer an individual right.

Arizona Hospital & Healthcare Ass'n v. Betlach · filed 2012-03-23

The Court concludes that there is no private right of action under § 1983 for a Section 13(A) violation.

Section 1983 cannot be used to enforce ADA rights because the ADA has its own enforcement scheme.

EC v. County of Suffolk · filed 2012-03-30

Thus, plaintiffs’ ADA claim against the County defendants may not be brought under § 1983 and County defendants’ motion for summary judgment on that claim is granted and it is dismissed.

Section 1983 allows plaintiffs to enforce the Medicaid Act provisions cited in their complaint.

Hughes v. Colbert · filed 2012-05-29

This Court finds the statutes cited by Plaintiffs confer enforceable rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 permits enforcement of individual treatment rights created by 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396a(a)(31) and 1396d(d) and their implementing regulations.

Thrower v. Pennsylvania · filed 2012-05-31

Plaintiff has satisfied her burden of establishing that the statutory provisions in question create federally enforceable rights through § 1983.

Section 1983 permits suits to enforce individual federal rights, but the Medicaid balance billing provision confers no such right.

Martes v. Chief Executive Officer of South Broward Hospital District · filed 2012-06-15

Upon concluding that 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(25)(C) does not confer upon Plaintiffs-Appellants a federal right enforceable under § 1983, we AFFIRM the district court’s decision to dismiss the amended complaint.

Section 1983 does not provide a separate route to enforce Title VII rights.

Finch v. City of Indianapolis · filed 2012-08-10

The court will evaluate the plaintiffs’ Title VII claims only under Title VII — and only against the City of Indianapolis as the employer — and not with reference to section 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide a means to enforce FERPA provisions that create no individual rights.

Fuller v. Schoolcraft College · filed 2012-11-13

FERPA’s nondisclosure provisions contain no rights-creating language, they have an aggregate, not individual, focus, and they serve primarily to direct the Secretary of Education’s distribution of public funds to educational institutions. They therefore create no rights enforceable under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim for violations of a state constitution.

Beste v. Lewin · filed 2012-11-20

First, § 1983 claims can only be brought to enforce rights of the United States Constitution and not those of the California Constitution.

Section 1983 allows a private action to enforce the Medicaid fair hearing right, including its 90-day deadline for final agency action.

Konstantinov v. Daines · filed 2012-12-20

The 90-day deadline set forth in the regulation defines the scope of the section 1983 cause of action to enforce 42 USC § 1396a (a) (3) by “flesh[ing] out” the content of the right to a hearing (see Shakhnes, 689 F3d at 254).

Section 1983 allows Medicaid beneficiaries to enforce their right to choose a qualified provider under § 1396a(a)(23).

Planned Parenthood Arizona, Inc. v. Betlach · filed 2013-02-08

Individuals who are eligible for Medicaid thus have a right to receive medical assistance from the qualified provider of their choice under § 1396a(a)(23), and can enforce that right through a § 1983 cause of action.

Section 1983 does not provide a cause of action based solely on the Full Faith and Credit Clause.

Blackwell v. Haslam · filed 2013-06-28

Therefore, we reject Mr. Blackwell’s argument that a claim for declaratory relief under the Full Faith and Credit Clause is, by itself, cognizable under Section 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit a suit to enforce provisions of the Housing Act, LBPPPA, or RLBPHRA that confer no private right.

McField ex rel. Ray v. Philadelphia Housing Authority · filed 2014-01-17

Unpersuaded by plaintiffs arguments to the contrary, we thus find that the provisions of the Housing Act, LBPPPA, and RLBPHRA that we consider here do not confer a private right, and plaintiff therefore may not sue the PHA under § 1983 to redress alleged violations of these provisions.

Section 1983 provides a remedy for rights conferred by federal statutes or the Constitution, but cannot enforce statutory provisions that confer no individual rights.

Clear Sky Car Wash LLC v. City of Chesapeake, Virginia · filed 2014-02-21

Because we conclude that 42 U.S.C. §§ 4651 and 4655 do not confer individual rights enforceable by Clear Sky, we also conclude that Clear Sky cannot enforce those sections under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 cannot be used to enforce the DPPA because Congress foreclosed that remedy.

Bass v. Anoka County · filed 2014-02-21

As a result, Bass may not expand the spectrum of remedies available under the DPPA by enforcement through § 1983, and dismissal is warranted.

Section 1983 provides a remedy for violations of rights secured by the Full Faith and Credit Clause.

Henry v. Himes · filed 2014-04-14

The Supreme Court has employed a three-part test, articulated in Golden State Transit Corp., 493 U.S. at 106, 110 S.Ct. 444, to determine whether a constitutional provision creates a right actionable under § 1983: whether the provision 1) "creates obligations binding on the governmental unit,” 2) that are sufficiently concrete and specific as to be judicially enforced, and 3) were “intended to benefit the putative plaintiff.” Dennis v. Higgins, 498 U.S. 439, 449, 111 S.Ct. 865, 112 L.Ed.2d 969 (1991) (internal quotations and citations omitted). The Full Faith and Credit Clause explicitly creates obligations binding on the states, is concrete and judicially recognizable, and was intended to protect the rights of individuals to require respect across state lines for judgments in their favor.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim for deprivation of a state statutory right alone.

Wilkins v. County of Alameda · filed 2014-04-30

We thus conclude that Wilkins’s claim concerns the alleged deprivation of a state statutory right, which is not actionable in a suit under § 1983.

Section 1983 provides a claim for deprivation of a federal right, but rights asserted under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights do not qualify.

Moore v. McLaughlin · filed 2014-06-13

The rights secured by the UNDHR are not federal rights. See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 734, 124 S.Ct. 2739, 2767, (2004) (“[The UDHR] does not of its own force impose obligations as a matter of international law.”). Accordingly, Moore could not base his § 1983 action on the violation of UNDHR rights.

Section 1983 permits enforcement of a federal statute only when it confers an individual right; the CWA foster care maintenance provisions confer no such right.

New York State Citizens' Coalition for Children v. Carrion · filed 2014-07-17

Ruling on Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, the Court declines Plaintiffs invitation and holds that 42 U.S.C. §§ 672(a) and 674(5)(A), provisions of the Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act 'of 1980, do not provide a private right of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 requires an individual federal right; a Supremacy Clause preemption claim alone does not support a Section 1983 action.

BP America Inc. v. Chustz · filed 2014-07-21

The plaintiffs’ Supremacy Clause claim alone provides neither a Section 1983 action nor the potential for attorney’s fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988. ... The Court finds that the relevant laws and statutory schemes in the present matter do not satisfy these requirements so as to provide a Section 1983 claim and the concomitant claim for attorney’s fees. Accordingly, this Court must dismiss the plaintiffs’ Section 1983 claims.

Section 1983 does not enforce rights that the underlying federal statute does not create.

Charles B. Davis, Sr. v. Sellas · filed 2014-10-21

Furthermore, because a private right of action cannot be implied, the statute confers no rights enforceable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for a tenant to sue a private landlord.

Section 1983 permits a private plaintiff to bring First, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendment claims challenging a local ordinance.

SWEPI, LP v. Mora County · filed 2015-01-19

In contrast, SWEPI, LP can bring First, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendment actions under § 1983 to challenge the Ordinance.

Section 1983 requires a violation of a constitutional or federal statutory right; a violation of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 30(e)(2) alone cannot support a claim.

Westbrook v. Barclay Court Reporters · filed 2015-02-17

Westbrook’s claim of a violation of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 30(e)(2)—a rule established by the Supreme Court allowing deponents 30 days to review their deposition transcripts—cannot provide a basis for a § 1983 claim.

Section 1983 provides a remedy for a violation of a federal statute only when the statute unambiguously confers the specific individual right asserted.

Duberry v. District of Columbia · filed 2015-05-28

Because Plaintiffs’ asserted right to classification as retired “law enforcement officers” consistent with section 3(c)(2) of LEOSA is not a right enforceable under § 1983, the Court grants the motion to dismiss the remaining claims against the District.

Section 1983 requires a violation of a federal right; SEVIS regulations give nonimmigrant students no right enforceable through it.

Hollingsworth v. State of Minnesota · filed 2015-08-17

A party must assert the violation of a federal right, not merely a federal law, to maintain a section-1983 claim. ... The regulations do not provide to any clear right of enforcement to a nonimmigrant student, and we conclude that the SEVIS regulations do not provide Hollingsworth a section-1983 claim.

Section 1983 permits enforcement of a federal statute only when the statute confers an individual federal right.

Fiers v. La Crosse County · filed 2015-09-18

The court concludes that the FNHRA does not confer federal rights and, accordingly, cannot support a cause of action under section 1983.

Section 1983 provides a remedy for violations of federal rights, not state statutory rights.

Boisseau v. Town of Walls · filed 2015-10-08

Making this issue even more clear, plaintiff seeks to assert his First Amendment retaliation claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and this statute exists to vindicate federal, not state law.

Section 1983 allows Medicaid recipients to enforce their right to choose a qualified and willing provider.

Planned Parenthood Southeast, Inc. v. Bentley · filed 2015-10-28

Doe, as a recipient of Medicaid benefits and a patient of PPSE, has pleaded a viable cause of action. She is entitled to bring an enforcement action under § 1983 to vindicate her right to receive care from any qualified (and willing) provider under the free-choice-of-provider provision.

Section 1983 provides a remedy for violations of constitutional and federal statutory rights but creates no substantive rights of its own.

Long v. District of Columbia Housing Authority · filed 2016-02-29

Rather, as the Court explains, infra, § 1983 simply provides a remedy for violations of rights secured by the U.S. Constitution and federal laws. The Court therefore reads the Complaint as bringing claims under § 1983 for alleged violations of constitutional and statutory rights.

Section 1983 permits individual enforcement of the statutory right created by the Federal Relations Act.

Wal-Mart Puerto Rico, Inc. v. Zaragoza-Gomez · filed 2016-03-28

To be clear, the court finds that the Federal Relations Act creates a statutory right that can be individually enforced under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide a private right of action to enforce Medicaid’s Section 30(A).

California Medical Ass'n v. Douglas · filed 2012-01-31

While plaintiffs lack a private right of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, see Develop. Servs. Network v. Douglas, 666 F.3d 540 (9th Cir.2011), Ninth Circuit case law establishes that Section 30(A) is enforceable by private parties under the Supremacy Clause.

Section 1983 provides a remedy for deprivation of the individual concealed-carry right created by the Law Enforcement Officers Safety Act.

Duberry v. District of Columbia · filed 2016-06-03

Understood as an individual right defined by federal law, the LEOSA concealed-carry right that appellants allege Congress intended for them to have is remediable under Section 1983.

Section 1983 permits a claim to enforce a sufficiently definite NLRA right to complete the collective-bargaining process.

Georgia State AFL-CIO v. Olens · filed 2016-07-07

With respect to rights conferred by the statute, precedent clearly suggests that plaintiffs’ right to complete the collective-bargaining process is sufficiently definite to permit a § 1983 claim.

Section 1983 permits enforcement of a statutory provision only if it unambiguously confers an individual federal right.

Health Science Funding, LLC v. New Jersey Department of Health & Human Services · filed 2016-07-25

“In order to seek redress through § 1983 . . . a plaintiff must assert the violation of a federal right, not merely a violation of federal law.” Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329, 340 (1997). ... Section 1396a(a)(54) therefore does not convey “an unambiguous articulation and conferral of [a] right[] by Congress,” Sabree, 367 F.3d at 188, and “entirely lack[s] the sort of ‘rights-creating’ language critical to showing the requisite congressional intent to create new rights,” as the District Court correctly held, Gonzaga Univ., 536 U.S. at 287 (citations omitted).

Section 1983 does not let healthcare providers enforce Medicaid network adequacy provisions that confer no individual rights on them; regulations under those provisions cannot independently create such rights.

Appalachian Regional Healthcare, Inc. v. Coventry Health & Life Insurance Co. · filed 2016-09-30

Because neither statute at issue here confers healthcare providers with rights that are enforceable under § 1983, “the federal regulations promulgated pursuant to these statutes are likewise incapable of independently conferring such rights.”

Section 1983 does not provide a claim for NLRA preemption based solely on a local government’s regulation of an area reserved to federal law.

International Union of Operating Engineers, Local 399 v. Village of Lincolnshire · filed 2017-01-07

Instead, the Unions argue that Lincolnshire has attempted to regulate an area otherwise reserved to the federal government through the NLRA. ... The Court therefore dismisses the Unions’ claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 allows a plaintiff to vindicate federal constitutional and statutory rights, but a common law claim alone is insufficient.

City of Lakewood v. Safety National Casualty Corp. · filed 2017-03-09

The statute allows a plaintiff to vindicate rights conferred under the Federal Constitution and federal statutes, not under the common law.

The Supremacy Clause does not create rights enforceable under Section 1983.

R.G. Rega v. PA DOC · filed 2018-01-31

With respect to Count 3, asserting a Supremacy Clause violation,19 the United States Supreme Court has held that the Supremacy Clause “does not create rights ... enforceable under [42 U.S.C.] § 1983.”20 Golden State Transit Corp. v. City of Los Angeles, 493 U.S. 103, 107-08 (1989). Thus, we sustain Respondents’ preliminary objection and dismiss Count 3 of the Amended Petition.

Section 1983 provides a private right of action to enforce the reimbursement rights that § 1396a(bb) confers on federally qualified health centers.

Legacy Community Health Services, Inc. v. Smith · filed 2018-01-31

Accordingly, Legacy has a private right of action, under § 1983, to enforce § 1396a(bb).

Section 1983 enforces federal rights, not rights created solely by state law.

Odeh v. City of Baton Rouge/Parish · filed 2018-04-24

The section 1983 claims alleging misappropriation and conversion fail for a reason even more fundamental than the one the district court cited: they are rights created under state law, but section 1983 is only a vehicle for enforcing rights “secured by the Constitution and laws” of the United States.

Section 1983 allows SNAP recipients to enforce statutory rights to timely benefit processing and recertification notices.

Garnett v. Zeilinger · filed 2018-08-23

So, like the statutes in Wright and Wilder, the relevant provisions in the SNAP Act create rights enforceable under section 1983.

Section 1983 provides a cause of action for deprivations of federal rights, but not state rights.

Morton v. Cnty. of Erie · filed 2018-09-26

Section 1983 provides a cause of action for deprivations of federal, and not state, rights.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for rights created by Title VII.

Logan v. City Of Chicago · filed 2018-10-24

Schroeder establishes that § 1983 does not provide a remedy for Title VII rights and that is sufficient.

Section 1983 cannot be used to enforce Section 6409 because Section 6409 does not confer an individual right on applicants.

Extenet Sys., Inc. v. Vill. of Pelham · filed 2019-03-27

Section 6409 fails the first prong of the test: it is not "phrased in terms of the persons benefited." ... Rather, it is phrased in terms of what the state or municipality may not and must do. Thus, it may not be enforced via § 1983.

Section 1983 provides a remedy for a LEOSA right even before a retired officer obtains the identification required to exercise that right.

Duberry v. Dist. of Columbia · filed 2019-05-21

While each requirement is a precondition to exercising concealed carry, neither defines this right. Accordingly, we once again state that LEOSA creates an individual right to carry that is remediable under Section 1983.

Section 1983 allows nursing home residents to enforce FNHRA’s right to appeal a transfer or discharge, including an opportunity for state-provided redress.

Anderson v. Wilkening · filed 2019-07-18

In sum, we have not been presented with any indication, express or implied, that Congress intended to foreclose a § 1983 remedy for enforcement of the right to an appeal under FNHRA, a right that includes the opportunity for some form of state enforcement of the result of the appeal.

Section 1983 cannot enforce a claimed statutory right against state officials when the statute imposes no binding obligation on the states.

Bowles v. Ron Desantis, Governor · filed 2019-08-19

Because Bowles seeks to enforce a right under § 1983 that Congress did not make enforceable against the states, he has not shown a substantial likelihood of success on the merits of his § 1983 claim before the district court.

Section 1983 does not support a claim under the Housing Act or 24 C.F.R. § 5.703 because neither creates an enforceable federal right.

Weaver v. The New York City Housing Authority · filed 2019-12-20

Courts within this Circuit have held that neither the Housing Act, nor 24 C.F.R. § 5.703 creates a federal right that is enforceable under § 1983. ... Accordingly, the Court dismisses Plaintiffs’ § 1983 claims under the Housing Act or 24 C.F.R. § 5.703 for failure to state a claim on which relief may be granted.

Section 1983 provides a remedy for violations of federal rights, but a statute that creates no individual right cannot support a claim under it.

Williams v. Day · filed 2020-01-27

In order to seek redress through § 1983, “a plaintiff must assert the violation of a federal right not merely a violation of federal law.” ... Thus, Williams’ allegation that he suffered a PREA violation does not state a claim.

Section 1983 does not provide a cause of action to enforce the Full Faith and Credit Clause.

Brown v. City of Chicago · filed 2020-01-30

Given that Section 1983 does not give rise to a private right of action under the Full Faith and Credit Clause, the Court dismisses Count I with prejudice.

Section 1983 cannot be used to enforce a federal statute that confers no unambiguous individual right.

Matter of Churches United for Fair Hous., Inc. v. De Blasio · filed 2020-02-20

Because there is no private right of action for enforcement of Section 3608 — let alone any "unambiguously conferred right" — petitioners may not use 42 USC § 1983 as a mechanism to sue for enforcement of section 3608 ( Gonzaga Univ. v Doe , 536 US 273, 283 [2002]; accord Matter of George v Bloomberg , 2 AD3d 294, 294 [1st Dept 2003], lv denied 2 NY3d 707 [2004]; see MHANY , 843 F Supp 2d at 336-337; South Middlesex Opportunity Council, Inc. v Town of Framingham , 2008 WL 4595369, at *17, 2008 US Dist LEXIS 85764, at *51-52 [D Mass 2008]).

Section 1983 does not provide a claim for violations of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights because its rights are not enforceable under federal law.

Freeze v. Sawyer · filed 2020-04-03

Accordingly, Freeze could not state a § 1983 claim based on the alleged violations of the UDHR.

Section 1983 does not make rights created solely by agency regulations individually enforceable.

Dreyer v. Idaho Department of Health and Welfare · filed 2020-04-20

The Ninth Circuit has expressly held “an agency regulation cannot create individual rights enforceable through § 1983.” ... The Court relies on that reasoning here.

Section 1983 permits a civil rights action against state officials for violations of the Interstate Agreement on Detainers.

Bosse v. Blades · filed 2020-05-01

Because the IAD is a compact among the states sanctioned by Congress under Art. 1, § 10, cl. 3 of the United States Constitution, a violation of the terms of the IAD can be the basis for a civil rights lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 provides a cause of action for violations of federal constitutional or statutory rights, not violations of state criminal laws alone.

Jones v. Wichita, Kansas, City of · filed 2020-06-19

And to the extent Plaintiff attempts to raise these claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, they also fail because that statute only provides a cause of action for federal constitutional or statutory violations.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for violations of the Florida Constitution or the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

Johnson v. Tampa Police Department · filed 2020-07-29

Those claims are not cognizable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and are again dismissed.

Section 1983 cannot sustain a claim under the ADA or HIPAA for the release of health and medical information.

Dalessio v. University of Washington · filed 2020-08-10

With respect to the release of Dalessio’s health and medical information, a § 1983 claim cannot be sustained under the ADA or HIPAA.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for breach of a settlement agreement that creates no federal right.

Bennett v. The City of Montgomery (CONSENT) · filed 2020-08-31

Accordingly, Plaintiff’s claim fails as a matter of law because the Agreement did not establish a federal right which is enforceable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

The Supremacy Clause does not create rights enforceable under § 1983.

Sherwood v. PA DOC · filed 2020-09-09

However, the United States Supreme Court has held that the Supremacy Clause “does not create rights enforceable under [42 U.S.C.] § 1983.”21 Golden State Transit Corp. v. City of Los Angeles, 493 U.S. 103, 107-08 (1989). Therefore, it “appear[s] with certainty that the law will not permit recovery” on this claim, Neely, 838 A.2d at 19 n.4, and we sustain Respondents’ preliminary objections and dismiss Count 3 of the Amended Petition.

Section 1983 allows suits to vindicate constitutional rights and, in some circumstances, federal statutory rights.

LANGE v. HOUSTON COUNTY, GEORGIA · filed 2020-10-30

The vast majority of § 1983 suits brought in this Court allege deprivations of constitutional rights, but § 1983 also allows, in rare circumstances, for plaintiffs to sue to vindicate statutory rights.

Section 1983 cannot be used to pursue violations of Title VII, the Lilly Ledbetter Act, the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, the ADA, or the FMLA.

McKinney v. Cleveland County Board of Education · filed 2020-11-19

The Court first finds that Plaintiff may not maintain a claim against any of the named Defendants under Section 1983 for violations of Title VII, the Lilly Ledbetter Act, the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, the ADA, or the FMLA.

Section 1983 cannot be used to enforce rights created by Title II of the ADA because Title II has its own comprehensive remedial scheme.

Langworthy v. Whatcom County Superior Court · filed 2020-12-04

Therefore, a plaintiff cannot bring an action under 1983 to enforce rights created by the ADA.

Section 1983 permits enforcement of Medicaid’s freedom of choice provision because that provision creates an individual right.

Roll v. Howard · filed 2020-12-11

We find this analysis persuasive and agree with the majority of courts that have considered the question whether § 1396n(c)(2)(C) creates an individual right that can be enforced under § 1983.

Section 1983 claims against a New York municipal police department and its officers in their official capacities are dismissed because the department cannot be sued and official-capacity claims are treated as claims against the municipality.

Griffith v. Clarkstown Police Dept. · filed 2021-01-14

The Court must dismiss Plaintiff’s claims against the CPD as well as his claims against Papenmeyer and Sgt. John Doe in their official capacities as members of the CPD. Municipal agencies or departments, like the CPD, do not have the capacity to be sued under New York law.

Section 1983 claims against a municipal police department properly lie against the city.

Coburn v. City of Sacramento · filed 2020-12-18

Plaintiff’s claims against the Police Department properly lie against the City, and the City’s statement of non-opposition is therefore ... sufficient.

Police and sheriff’s departments that are not distinct legal entities cannot be sued under § 1983.

Simmons v. Warren, City of · filed 2020-11-20

The Court therefore finds that the parties have waived further review of the Magistrate Judge’s Report and accepts her recommendations as follows (see ECF No. 46), granting in part the Macomb Defendants’ motion for judgment on the pleadings (ECF No. 31) and granting in part the Warren Defendants’ motion to dismiss (ECF No. 33): ... All claims against the Warren Police Department and the Macomb County Sheriff’s Department are DISMISSED because neither department is a distinct legal entity subject to a civil action; ... Plaintiff’s motions to amend complaint (ECF No. 37, 38) are DENIED as futile.

Section 1983 permits a local law enforcement agency to be sued as a separate entity when state law allows it.

Silva v. San Pablo Police Department · filed 2020-03-09

The Ninth Circuit has squarely held that, depending on state law, a local law enforcement agency can be a separately suable entity. ... The district court erred in holding otherwise without analysis of state law.

Section 1983 does not permit suit against a municipal department because it is not a person under the statute.

Shepard v. San Diego Sheriff Department · filed 2019-11-18

Departments of municipal entities are not “persons” subject to suit under § 1983; therefore, a local law enforcement agency, like the SDSD, its medical staff, or its food services sub-division, are not proper parties.

Section 1983 does not permit suit against a police department that is not a distinct legal entity.

Longs v. Wherry · filed 2019-06-27

As an initial matter, Plaintiff cannot maintain his § 1983 action against the Lincoln Police Department because it is not a distinct legal entity amenable to suit under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit a police department to be sued because it is not a person under the statute.

Curran v. City of Boston · filed 1991-11-14

For purposes of a Section 1983 action, a police department is considered a non-person.

A municipal department has no status independent of its municipality and cannot be held separately liable for damages under § 1983.

Walls v. City of Detroit · filed 1993-05-14

Plaintiff also named the City of Detroit Police Department as a defendant. This is not proper, for municipal departments enjoy no status independent of the municipality itself and therefore cannot be held separately liable for § 1983 damages.

A municipal police department is not a person subject to liability under § 1983.

PBA Local No. 38 v. Woodbridge Police Department · filed 1993-09-09

The Woodbridge defendants next contend that the Woodbridge Police Department is not a “person” under § 1983 and that, therefore, plaintiffs’ § 1983 claims must be dismissed as to it. Defendants are correct. ... Accordingly, plaintiffs’ § 1983 claims will be dismissed as to the Woodbridge Police Department.

A sheriff's department that is not susceptible to suit under North Carolina law cannot be sued under Section 1983.

Saul, A/K/A Paul Melvin Detmer v. Perquimans Sheriff Department James R. Logan · filed 1993-09-17

The district court properly entered judgment in favor of the Sheriff's Department, which is not susceptible to suit under North Carolina law, and that part of its decision is affirmed.

A municipal police department that is merely a subunit of the municipality is not a separate person subject to suit under § 1983.

Johnson v. City of Erie, Pa. · filed 1993-10-07

The numerous courts that have considered the question of whether a municipal police department is a proper defendant in a section 1983 action have unanimously reached the conclusion that it is not. ... As a sub-unit of the City of Erie government, we find the police department an improper and unnecessary party to this action and will grant the motion to dismiss the department.

A county correctional department is not a separate defendant from the county in a Section 1983 action.

Sherman v. Sullivan County · filed 1995-08-23

Since SCHOC is not a separate entity from Sullivan County for the purposes of this section 1983 action, the court herewith grants defendants' motion for summary judgment as to Count IV.

A Florida police department that lacks separate legal status is not subject to suit under § 1983.

Pierre v. Schlemmer · filed 1996-07-01

A police department, which is not a registered entity with the State of Florida, is not subject to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

A municipal department may be sued separately under § 1983 only if it has authority to sue and be sued in its own name or otherwise has a separate legal existence.

Kujawski v. Board of Commissioners · filed 1998-03-26

In light of the Court’s opinion in Brandon and federal courts applying its analysis, we believe that a municipal department is not an entity separately suable under § 1983 from the municipality unless there is a clear grant of authority for that department to sue and be sued in its own name or some other clear indication of separate legal existence from the municipality.

A police department that is merely an administrative arm of a municipality cannot be sued alongside the municipality under § 1983.

Russoli v. Salisbury Township · filed 2000-10-20

In Section 1983 actions, police departments cannot be sued in conjunction with municipalities, because the police department is merely an administrative arm of the local municipality, not a separate judicial entity.

Section 1983 does not permit a police department to be sued alongside its municipality when the department is merely an administrative arm of that municipality.

DeBellis v. Kulp · filed 2001-09-10

In Section 1983 actions, police departments cannot be sued in conjunction with municipalities, because the police department is merely an administrative arm of the local municipality, and is not a separate judicial entity.

A police department cannot be sued under § 1983 alongside its municipality because it is not a separate entity.

Toth v. Bristol Township · filed 2002-08-13

Moreover, a police department cannot be sued under § 1983 in conjunction with a municipality as it is a local arm, not a separate entity, of the municipality.

Section 1983 does not allow monetary damages against a state because a state is not a person subject to that liability.

Merton E. Bond v. Larry D. Raikes, Judge Commonwealth of Kentucky · filed 1989-10-16

Bond cannot maintain suit against the state of Kentucky because the state is not a "person" which can be held liable for monetary damages under Section 1983. Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 109 S.Ct. 2304, 2312 (1989).

States may not be sued under Section 1983 because they are not persons within the meaning of the statute.

Ventura Group Ventures, Inc. v. California · filed 2005-09-16

And states may not be sued under § 1983 because they are not “persons” within the meaning of the statute.

Section 1983 does not permit suit against a municipal department that has no separate legal identity from the city.

Van Deelen v. City of Kansas City, Missouri · filed 2006-01-30

Therefore, the Human Resources Board is a mere Department of the City and is not a separate legal entity subject to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not authorize an action against a State in state court.

People Ex Rel. Dept. of Transp. v. COOK DEV. CO. · filed 1995-07-11

In the instant case, the Immunity Act, in barring actions against the State, does not conflict with the purposes of section 1983 because Congress did not intend to create a cause of action against States which could be brought in state court.

Section 1983 does not allow damages suits against a state in state or federal court.

Bailey v. Montgomery · filed 2006-06-05

The law is well-settled that, unlike a local government, a state cannot be sued for damages under § 1983 in either state or federal court.

Section 1983 does not permit money damages against a State because a State is not a person under the statute.

Crawford v. Kemp · filed 2006-07-14

The superior court thus correctly found that all § 1983 claims must be dismissed to the extent that they seek money damages from the State, and we leave this decision undisturbed.

A state is not a “person” that may be sued under § 1983.

Marcello v. Maine · filed 2006-12-13

This is because a state is not a “person” for purposes of § 1983.

A state is not a person that can be sued for damages under § 1983.

Andreola, Daniel v. State of Wisconsin · filed 2006-12-18

Andreola seeks monetary relief in this suit, but the State of Wisconsin is not a “person” that can be sued for damages under § 1983.

A state is not a person subject to liability under Section 1983.

Marcello v. Maine · filed 2007-01-08

These additional allegations do not take the claims asserted against the state outside the scope of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine nor do they provide a basis to allege a waiver of the state’s sovereign immunity or a reason to consider the state a person so as to render it potentially liable under section 1983.

A state is not a proper defendant in an action under § 1983.

Davis v. Pennsylvania · filed 2007-04-17

We agree with the District Court that the Commonwealth is not a proper defendant in an action under § 1983, see Will v. Michigan Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989), and the suit is barred by the Eleventh Amendment, see Laskaris v. Thornburgh, 661 F.2d 23, 25 (3d Cir. 1981).

Section 1983 does not permit a suit against a state because a state is not a person under the statute.

Pina v. Lantz · filed 2007-07-06

The Court grants summary judgment to the State on Ms. McCardle's gender-based equal protection claim since a state may not be sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

A city police department is a subsidiary of city government and cannot be sued directly under § 1983.

Biehl v. Salina Police Department · filed 2007-11-29

Mr. Biehl’s claim against the Salina Police Department likewise fails because the Police Department is a subsidiary of the city government and not directly subject to suit.

Section 1983 permits suit against a municipality, but its police or sheriff’s department is not a proper separate defendant.

Garcia v. City of Merced · filed 2008-01-10

Municipal departments, here Merced County Sheriffs Department and City of Merced Police Department, are not appropriate Defendants.

Section 1983 does not permit claims against a municipal police department because it is neither a municipality nor a person within the meaning of the statute.

Petaway v. City of New Haven Police Department · filed 2008-03-31

Because a municipal police department is not considered to be a municipality or a person within the meaning of section 1983, the claims against the New Haven Police Department are dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.

Section 1983 does not permit a suit against a Florida police department that lacks capacity to be sued under state law.

Williams v. The Miami-Dade Police Dept. · filed 2008-10-29

Next, the district court properly dismissed the MDPD as a party to Williams’s § 1983 action because the MDPD is not a legal entity subject to suit.

A police department with no legal existence apart from its municipality is not a proper defendant in a § 1983 action.

Dull v. WEST MANCHESTER TP. POLICE DEPT. · filed 2009-03-31

As an initial matter, police departments possess no legal existence apart from their chartering municipalities and therefore are not proper defendants in a § 1983 action.

Section 1983 does not permit direct claims against municipal departments that have no legal identity separate from the municipality or county.

Stump v. Gates · filed 1991-10-31

I conclude that the Greenwood Village Police Department and the Arapahoe County Coroner’s Office are not “persons” for purposes of § 1983. Accordingly, to the extent that the plaintiffs seek to impose § 1983 liability directly on those named defendants, their § 1983 claims must be dismissed.

A police department that is not a legal entity cannot be sued under Section 1983.

Ragusa v. Streator Police Department · filed 1981-12-31

Of course the Department is not a legal entity, and this action is subject to dismissal as to it on that ground alone.

Section 1983 does not permit a suit against a municipal police department because the department is not a proper defendant.

Nichols v. Brown · filed 2012-05-07

Although Plaintiff does not specifically allege what he believes the City of Redondo Beach Police Department, as a unit, did to violate his constitutional rights, it is clear that as a department of the City of Redondo Beach, the Police Department is not a proper defendant in Plaintiffs section 1983 action.

Section 1983 does not permit suit against a police department that is merely a subdivision of a municipality and lacks separate juridical status.

Pitts v. City of Cuba · filed 2012-12-19

This Court, likewise, finds that as the CPD is not a juridical entity suable under § 1983, Count XXI will be dismissed.

Section 1983 does not permit a police department to be sued alongside its municipality when the department is merely an administrative arm of the municipality.

Benjamin v. East Orange Police Department · filed 2013-03-28

Because the EOPD is merely an administrative arm of the City of East Orange, the EOPD is not a proper defendant for purposes of Plaintiffs Section 1983 claims.

Section 1983 claims against a municipal police department are treated as claims against the city when the department is not an independent suable entity.

Alves v. City of Gloucester · filed 2019-01-18

Finally, with respect to plaintiffs’ claims against the GPD, defendants assert these claims should be dismissed because the GPD is not a “suable entity,” as it is a municipal department of the City of Gloucester rather than an independent legal entity. Defendants are correct, and the court will treat plaintiffs’ claims against the GPD as claims against the City of Gloucester.

A city department that lacks capacity to be sued under New York law cannot be a defendant in a § 1983 action.

Handy v. City of New York · filed 2019-06-20

Plaintiff’s claims against the New York City Department of Correction must be dismissed because city agencies or departments do not have the capacity to be sued under New York law.

Section 1983 permits a claim against a California sheriff's department acting on behalf of its county.

Estate of Osuna v. Cnty. of Stanislaus · filed 2019-06-24

More recently, the Ninth Circuit has permitted an action under § 1983 to proceed against a California sheriff's department notwithstanding the department's contention that it is not a "person" within the meaning of § 1983. ... The undersigned concludes that these binding decisions control resolution of this issue, and therefore will deny defendants' motion to dismiss the Stanislaus County Sheriff's Department as a defendant in this action.

An Indiana city’s police department is not a suable entity under § 1983.

WILLIAMS v. CITY OF INDIANAPOLIS · filed 2019-07-01

Under Indiana law, a city’s police department is not a municipal entity capable of suing or being sued. ... Plaintiffs do not dispute that IMPD is not a suable entity. Therefore, Defendants’ Partial Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ claim against IMPD is granted.

Section 1983 does not allow a claim against a police department that lacks a legal identity separate from its municipality.

Benson v. Topeka Police Department, City of · filed 2019-07-16

In addition, the Topeka Police Department is not a proper defendant, as “‘police departments . . . are not suable entities under § 1983, because they lack legal identities apart from the municipality.’” Young v. City of Albuquerque, 77 F. Supp. 3d 1154, 1186 (D. N.M. 2014) (quoting Ketchum v. Albuquerque Police Dep’t, 958 F.2d 381, 1992 WL 51481, at *2 (10th Cir. March 12, 1992)).

A police department that is a subdivision of a city is not a suable defendant under § 1983.

Grap v. LaVista Police Department · filed 2019-08-05

plaintiff sued only the La Vista Police Department, which is not a suable entity.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim against the Tulsa Police Department because it is not a person within the statute’s meaning.

Payne v. Sultzer · filed 2019-08-13

First, the Tulsa Police Department, it is not a proper defendant because it is not a “person” within the meaning of § 1983.

Section 1983 does not allow a sheriff’s office to be sued as a separate municipal department.

Gregory v. Coomes · filed 2019-08-16

The MCSO is not a “person” subject to suit under § 1983 because municipal departments, such as police departments, are not suable under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit a separate suit against a municipal department that is merely an administrative arm of the municipality.

ST. FLEUR v. CITY OF LINDEN, NEW JERSEY · filed 2019-08-30

The Linden Police Department and Linden Law Department are merely administrative arms of the municipality. Accordingly, the Linden Law Department and Linden Police Department are not proper parties in this action amenable to suit.

A sheriff’s department without jural authority cannot be sued under § 1983.

Nickson v. Polk County · filed 2019-09-06

Thus, the Polk County Sheriff’s Department is not a legal entity capable of being sued.

A New York city police department cannot be sued under § 1983 because it lacks the legal capacity to be sued.

Lockett v. City of Middletown · filed 2019-09-20

Plaintiff's claims against the City of Middletown Police Department must be dismissed because city agencies or departments do not have the capacity to be sued under New York law.

Section 1983 does not permit a city police department to be sued as a separate municipal entity.

MESADIEU v. CITY OF ELIZABETH · filed 2019-10-04

A police department, however, is not a distinct municipal entity that may be sued for alleged civil rights violations. ... The Court will therefore terminate EPD as a standalone party and dismiss with prejudice all federal civil rights claims asserted against EPD.

A police department that is a subdivision of a municipality is not a separate defendant under § 1983.

CLINKSCALE v. TEMPLE UNIVERSITY · filed 2019-10-07

Therefore, the Philadelphia Police Department is not a proper defendant in this case under Section 1983 and is dismissed with prejudice.

A police department is not a person that can be sued under § 1983.

Vinson v. DeBruin · filed 2019-10-08

But he cannot sue the Racine Police Department because it is not a “person” under § 1983.

A police department that is a division of city government is not an entity subject to suit under § 1983.

Little v. Memphis Police Department · filed 2019-10-30

But the MPD is a division of city government. It is not an entity subject to suit under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not categorically bar a claim against a California police department.

Woods v. City of Hayward · filed 2019-11-06

Although all of Woods’s § 1983 claims, including claims against the Hayward Police Department, are dismissed with leave to amend for the reasons discussed above, the Court finds no basis to dismiss claims against the Hayward Police Department with prejudice.

Section 1983 does not permit a police department to be sued as an entity.

Cox v. Grammer · filed 2019-11-15

However, a police department is not an entity subject to suit under § 1983.

A police department that is not a separate juridical entity cannot be sued under Section 1983.

Roberson v. Velda City Police Department · filed 2019-11-20

With regard to the claim against the Velda City Police Department, plaintiff’s claim fails because a police department is not a juridical entity, suable as such.

Section 1983 does not permit suit against a police department as a separate entity.

Cox v. Hulsey · filed 2019-11-21

However, a police department is not an entity subject to suit under § 1983.

A police department that is not a separate legal entity is not a person subject to suit or liability under § 1983.

Jones v. Salisbury City Police Department · filed 2019-11-22

There is no legal entity named Salisbury City Police Department and as such, Salisbury City Police Department is not a Aperson@ subject to suit or liability under ' 1983.

A city police department is not a person subject to suit under Section 1983 because it is not distinct from the municipality.

YOUNG v. PHILADELPHIA POLICE DEPT. · filed 2019-11-25

Because the Department is not a “person” amenable to suit under section 1983, the court must dismiss with prejudice Young’s section 1983 claims against it because he cannot cure the defect with those claims.

A police department is not an entity subject to suit under § 1983.

Cox v. Hartman · filed 2019-11-26

However, a police department is not an entity subject to suit under § 1983.