42 U.S.C. § 1983

Section 1983 permits a prisoner’s retaliatory-discipline claim even when the alleged discipline did not independently violate due process.

Williams v. Manternach · filed 2002-03-15

It is not enough to dispose of a “retaliation” claim — in this case, a claim of retaliation for jailhouse lawyering activities— that there was no underlying due process or other constitutional violation.

A prisoner’s retaliation claim under § 1983 requires a specific constitutional right, retaliatory intent, an adverse act, and causation; the claim fails if no constitutionally protected right was violated.

Toppins v. Day · filed 2003-06-26

“To state a valid claim for retaliation under section 1983, a prisoner must allege: (1) a specific constitutional right, (2) the defendant's intent to retaliate against the prisoner for his or her exercise of that right, (3) a retaliatory adverse act, and (4) causation.” Jones v. Greninger, 188 F.3d 322, 324-25 (5th Cir. 1999). If a prisoner fails to establish that a constitutionally-protected right has been violated, the retaliation claim must fail. Id. at 325. Because we have already determined that Toppins’ claims of constitutionally-protected dreadlocks fail, so also must his claim of retaliation.

Section 1983 permits a prisoner to challenge a discretionary parole decision made in retaliation for exercising constitutional rights.

Burkett v. Frank · filed 2004-01-30

To the extent that Burkett’s petition can be construed as attempting to state a claim against Frank and/or Muller for retaliation, although parole is discretionary, a prisoner may properly state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 if a discretionary decision is made by reason of a prisoner’s exercise of his constitutional rights.

Section 1983 allows a person to sue for retaliation after exercising a constitutionally protected right, even if the retaliatory act would otherwise have been proper.

Rollie v. Kemna · filed 2005-02-25

We also conclude that Rollie stated a retaliation claim against Denzer, Tolle, Grant, and Short (sued in both their individual and official capacities), as Rollie alleged that these defendants took retaliatory measures against him after he complained about double-celling. See Madewell v. Roberts, 909 F.2d 1203, 1206 (8th Cir. 1990) (act in retaliation for exercising constitutionally protected right is actionable under § 1983 even if act, when taken for another reason, would have been proper); cf. Burgess v. Moore, 39 F.3d 216, 218 (8th Cir. 1994) (threat of retaliation is sufficient injury if made in retaliation for inmate’s use of prison grievance procedure).

Section 1983 provides a civil action for retaliation against a person exercising a constitutionally protected right.

Kaylor v. Rankin · filed 2005-03-04

It is well established that “ ‘[a]n act taken in retaliation for the exercise of a constitutionally protected right is actionable under § 1983 even if the act, when taken for. a different reason, would have been proper.’ ”

Section 1983 provides a damages action for retaliation against the exercise of a constitutionally protected right.

Howland v. William Kilquist and Gene Truitt · filed 1987-11-09

“[I]t is well established that an act in retaliation for the exercise of a constitutionally protected right is actionable under Section 1983 even if the act, when taken for different reasons, would have been proper.”

An inmate bringing a retaliation claim under § 1983 need not have an independent liberty interest in the privilege denied.

Yount v. Pennsylvania Department of Corrections · filed 2005-11-17

An inmate litigating a claim for retaliation against prison officials pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 need not prove that he had an independent liberty interest in the privilege he was denied.

Section 1983 does not permit a retaliation claim based on an alleged Equal Protection violation.

Sizemore v. City of Dallas · filed 2006-08-09

Based upon the reasoning provided in these decisions, this court concludes that plaintiff is precluded from bringing a retaliation claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 based on alleged violations of his Equal Protection rights.

Section 1983 permits a prisoner to bring a retaliation claim when state officials take an adverse action because the prisoner exercised a constitutional right.

Bibbs v. Early · filed 2008-08-12

To state a valid claim for retaliation under section 1983, a prisoner must allege (1) a specific constitutional right, (2) the defendant’s intent to retaliate against the prisoner for his or her exercise of that right, (3) a retaliatory adverse act, and (4) causation.

Section 1983 permits a claim for retaliation against someone who exercises a constitutional right, even if the same act would otherwise be proper.

McFarland v. Timothy F. Todd, Richard Clark, James E. Aikens · filed 1993-05-10

"[I]t is well established that an act in retaliation for the exercise of a constitutionally protected right is actionable under Section 1983 even if the act, when taken for different reasons, would have been proper."

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for workplace retaliation claimed under the Equal Protection Clause; Title VII provides the remedy.

Lewis v. State of Delaware Department of Public Instruction · filed 1997-11-20

Persuaded by this line of authority, the Court holds that Lewis’ § 1983 retaliation action is not actionable under the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Instead, this claim is more properly remedied through Title VII.

Section 1983 permits a retaliation claim for constitutional rights violations, but filing a disciplinary charge that can be defended against is insufficient when it would not deter a person of ordinary firmness.

Starr v. Dube · filed 2009-06-24

On the facts here, we cannot say that a reasonable fact-finder could conclude that inmates of "ordinary firmness" would be deterred from continuing to exercise their constitutional rights merely because of the filing of a disciplinary charge carrying potentially severe sanctions.

Section 1983 permits liability for retaliation against protected speech even when a private actor ultimately carries out the retaliation.

Pendleton v. Baker · filed 1999-06-02

Our cases have held, however, that retaliation against protected speech can result in section 1983 liability even if it ultimately is carried out by a private actor.

Section 1983 requires a prisoner bringing a retaliation claim to show more than a de minimis adverse impact on the exercise of constitutional rights.

Ballance v. Young · filed 2000-10-12

Moreover, to sustain a cognizable retaliation claim under § 1983, Ballance must demonstrate that he suffered more than a de minimis adverse impact on the exercise of his constitutional rights.

A prisoner bringing a retaliation claim under Section 1983 must show that the challenged action would not have occurred but for the defendant’s retaliatory motive.

Haralson v. Campuzano · filed 2009-12-15

The plaintiff must establish that “but for the retaliatory motive the complained of incident . . . would not have occurred.” Woods, 60 F.3d at 1166.

Section 1983 permits an inmate to sue a prison officer for filing a disciplinary report in retaliation for the inmate’s grievance, even if the inmate receives no punitive sentence.

Haynes v. Stephenson · filed 2009-12-16

Cornell does not, as Stephenson argues, hold that an inmate can prevail on a retaliatory discipline claim only if he receives a punitive sentence; nor does it undermine our holding in Sprouse that the mere filing of a disciplinary report is actionable if done in retaliation for an inmate’s exercise of the right to file a grievance.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff bringing a retaliation claim to show that the defendant took adverse action against him.

Marez v. Bassett · filed 2010-02-18

The second prong of a section 1983 claim requires plaintiff to show that he was the object of adverse action.

Section 1983 permits a prisoner’s retaliation claim to proceed when the pleadings show protected conduct, an adverse action that could deter a person of ordinary firmness, and a substantial or motivating link between the two.

Jerry v. Beard · filed 2011-03-22

To prevail on a § 1983 retaliation claim, the prisoner must prove: (1) that the conduct leading to the alleged retaliation was constitutionally protected; (2) that he suffered an adverse action sufficient to deter a person of ordinary firmness from exercising his constitutional rights; and (3) that his protected conduct was a substantial or motivating factor in the decision to discipline him. ... Based on the pleadings, we conclude that Jerry made out a prima facie case of retaliation; dismissal was therefore inappropriate.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff alleging retaliation to show that protected activity caused the defendant’s retaliatory conduct.

ABDUR-RAHEEM v. Selsky · filed 2011-07-27

To state a retaliation claim under § 1983, “a plaintiff must show that: (1) his actions were protected by the Constitution or federal law; and (2) the defendant’s conduct complained of was in response to that protected activity.”

Section 1983 provides a remedy for First Amendment retaliation based on filing an EEOC charge or civil rights lawsuit, but Title VII alone cannot support a retaliatory discharge claim under the section.

Delgado-O'neil v. City of Minneapolis · filed 2011-08-25

We affirm, pausing only to reiterate that, even though Title VII may not be the basis for a retaliatory discharge claim in a § 1983 action, § 1983 provides a vehicle for redressing Delgado-O'Neil's claims of retaliation on the basis of the First Amendment because the filing of an EEOC charge and a civil rights lawsuit are activities protected by the First Amendment.

Section 1983 permits a prisoner to claim retaliation when protected conduct substantially motivates an adverse action that would deter a person of ordinary firmness from exercising constitutional rights.

Crosby v. Piazza · filed 2012-02-29

To prevail on a section 1983 retaliation claim, the prisoner must prove: (1) that the conduct leading to the alleged retaliation was constitutionally protected; (2) that he suffered an adverse action sufficient to deter a person of ordinary firmness from exercising his constitutional rights; and (3) that his protected conduct was a substantial or motivating factor in the decision to discipline him.

Section 1983 employment retaliation claims follow the same three-step burden-shifting framework as Title VII retaliation claims.

Cummings-Fowler v. Suffolk County Community College · filed 2013-11-04

Both a Title VII claim and a § 1983 claim for retaliation are analyzed pursuant to the familiar three-step burden-shifting framework established in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. at 802, 93 S.Ct. 1817, and thus both claims will be assessed simultaneously.

Section 1983 may provide a remedy when prison officials file a disciplinary complaint in retaliation for a prisoner’s complaints about another officer.

Oguntodu v. William Stephens, Director · filed 2014-03-14

Oguntodu’s retaliation claim is potentially cognizable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 retaliation claims require a prisoner to allege a constitutional right, retaliatory intent, an adverse act, and causation.

Lewis v. Guillot · filed 2014-10-20

“To state a valid claim for retaliation under section 1983, a prisoner must allege (1) a specific constitutional right, (2) the defendant’s intent to retaliate against the prisoner for his or her exercise of that right, (3) a retaliatory adverse act, and (4) causation.”

Section 1983 allows a retaliation claim based on invoking constitutional rights and suffering retaliation as a direct consequence, without alleging that those rights were actually violated.

Fantone v. Latini · filed 2015-02-18

We note that under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Fantone did not need to allege that his constitutional rights actually were violated—he needed only to claim that he invoked them and suffered as a direct consequence.

Section 1983 supports a prisoner’s retaliation claim when the prisoner is transferred to a more dangerous prison for exercising a constitutional right.

Bennie Ward v. Marshall Fisher · filed 2015-06-10

On the third element, a claim that an inmate was transferred to a more dangerous prison in retaliation for an exercise of a constitutional right will support a Section 1983 claim.

A § 1983 retaliation claim requires protected activity, an adverse action that would chill a person of ordinary firmness, and a motive tied at least in part to the protected activity.

Joe Bell, Jr. v. Andrews · filed 2015-07-01

A § 1983 retaliation claim requires the plaintiff to “show (1) he engaged in a protected activity, (2) the government official took adverse action against him that would chill a person of ordinary firmness from continuing the activity, and (3) the adverse action was motivated at least in part by the exercise of the protected activity.”

Section 1983 allows a state employee to sue a supervisor acting under color of law for retaliation against opposition to employment discrimination.

Vega v. Hempstead Union Free School District · filed 2015-09-02

Accordingly, we hold that a state employee may bring a retaliation claim under § 1983 against a supervisor who, acting under color of law, retaliates against him for opposing discrimination in the terms of his employment.

Section 1983 requires a prisoner asserting a First Amendment retaliation claim to show protected activity, adverse action, and a causal connection between them.

Washington v. Donahue · filed 2015-11-30

In order to prove a First Amendment retaliation claim under Section 1983, a prisoner must show that: (1) he engaged in protected speech or activity; (2) the defendant took adverse action against him; and (3) there was a causal connection between the protected speech or activity and the adverse action.

Section 1983 permits a person to pursue a retaliation claim when protected activity prompts a government official's adverse action.

Luh v. Fulton State Hospital · filed 2016-01-11

This court holds, however, that Luh successfully stated two claims. Luh stated a retaliation claim based on his allegations that defendants Lyskowski, Brown, Putt, Oney, Salmons, Olsen, Sailor, Pearson, Bucklew, Groves, Graham, Poettgen, Maddox, Thackeray, Harry, DeTremp, Morales, Hamilton, Wright, and Wilson, in retaliation for Luh’s complaints, grievances, and lawsuits, (1) directed other patients to assault him; (2) falsely accused him of rule violations and placed him in seclusion; (3) intentionally denied him or interfered with his necessary medical treatment; and (4) prevented him from going to his job so he could not earn money to support his litigation activities. Cf. Santiago v. Blair, 707 F.3d 984, 991-92 (8th Cir. 2013) (to establish § 1983 retaliation claim, prisoner must establish that he engaged in protected activity, that government official took adverse action against him that would chill a person of ordinary firmness from continuing the protected activity, and that the adverse action was motivated at least in part by the exercise of the protected activity).

Section 1983 permits an inmate to bring a retaliation claim when prison officials transfer the inmate for exercising a constitutional right.

Matson v. State · filed 2016-09-02

If an inmate is transferred to another prison facility based on his or her exercise of a constitutionally protected activity, the inmate may bring a retaliation claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 cannot be used to enforce an ADA retaliation claim because the ADA provides a comprehensive remedial scheme.

Tate v. Dart · filed 2019-03-14

So invoking § 1983 to add individual liability for ADA retaliation indeed would be a step beyond the remedies provided by the ADA. More importantly, Tate provides no reason to believe that the ADA’s comprehensive remedial scheme leaves room for enforcement of the ADA via § 1983.

Section 1983 retaliation claims require but-for causation.

Bailey v. Mount Vernon City School District · filed 2020-03-30

Moreover, each of these cases applied a more relaxed “mixed motives” standard (rather than but-for causation)—either because the claims were brought under Title VII, or because they were decided prior to the decisive Supreme Court and Second Circuit decisions requiring “but-for” causation in § 1983 and retaliation cases.

Section 1983 provides a separate civil action for a prisoner’s First Amendment retaliation claim that is unrelated to the propriety of his custody.

Brooks v. Wolcott · filed 2020-06-11

If he wishes to pursue these claims, Brooks must seek relief in a separate suit under Section 1983.

Section 1983 provides no remedy for retaliation based on activity protected by Title VII.

Jibson v. Northeast Illinois Regional Commuter Railroad Corporation, The · filed 2020-09-08

As defendants note, to the extent that plaintiff is alleging that she was retaliated against for activity protected by statute (Title VII), § 1983 provides no remedy.

In a § 1983 suit over unconstitutional jail conditions, state law determines which governmental actors have custodial responsibility; both state and county officials may bear that responsibility.

Alberti v. The Sheriff of Harris County, Texas, Defendants-Third Party in Re Ann Richards, the Governor of T · filed 1991-07-25

Whenever a plaintiff alleges a cause of action under § 1983, a federal court must ask three questions. ... Finally, who is the state actor responsible for the violation? Unlike the first two questions, the third question turns exclusively on state law. ... Our conclusion that state law imposes responsibilities on both the state and the county does not end our inquiry.

Section 1983 conspiracy liability requires an agreement or meeting of the minds to violate the plaintiff’s constitutional rights.

Waybrant v. Bernstein · filed 1992-01-13

To prove conspiracy under section 1983, an agreement or meeting of the minds to violate the plaintiff's constitutional rights must be shown.

A § 1983 claim alleging a conspiracy with state actors fails when the allegations of conspiracy are conclusory.

Krain v. Kahn · filed 1992-12-01

The district court properly dismissed plaintiff's claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because plaintiff's allegations of a conspiracy between defendants and state actors are conclusory. It is so highly unlikely that plaintiff can plead specific facts to support this claim that it was not necessary to grant leave to amend.

Private parties who conspire with state actors may be liable under § 1983, but a conspiracy must be alleged with factual specificity.

Mark E. Ramage Julia A. Ramage v. Watson Villines Ralph J. Blagg Carol Harbison Charles W. Sharp Carol Simons · filed 1993-05-11

Although we acknowledge that private parties who conspire with state actors may be held liable under section 1983, we conclude that the Ramages did not allege a conspiracy with the requisite factual specificity.

Private actors can be liable for a § 1983 conspiracy only if state actors participate.

Commercial Energies, Inc. v. United Airlines, Inc. · filed 1994-06-10

In order for the private actors to be responsible for a Sec. 1983 conspiracy, there has to be participation of state actors.

Section 1983 conspiracy claims against private parties require more than vague allegations that a state agent joined the conspiracy.

Srubar v. Rudd, Rosenberg, Mitofsky & Hollender · filed 1994-12-09

However, as the Magistrate Judge noted, § 1983 conspiracy claims must contain more than vague allegations regarding a conspiring state agent in order to survive a motion to dismiss.

Section 1983 permits a conspiracy claim against private parties when facts show they specifically agreed with state actors to commit acts leading to an unlawful arrest.

Beazley v. County of Orange · filed 1997-04-24

Here, the Beazleys alleged in their complaint that the private party defendants conspired with the Tustin City defendants to cause Dwight Beazley's ("Beazley) arrest by filing false charges and a false declaration to secure an arrest warrant from a state court judge. Although these allegations are conclusory, Beazley may be able to amend the complaint to allege sufficient facts demonstrating that defendants specifically agreed to commit the overt acts that eventually led to his unlawful arrest.

A Section 1983 conspiracy claim requires specific facts showing an agreement to violate the plaintiff’s rights; a conclusory allegation of a meeting of the minds is insufficient.

Hey v. Irving · filed 1998-10-05

Here, plaintiffs’ bare conclusory allegation that “[a]ll three defendants demonstrated a meeting of the mind” absent any specific facts showing that the defendants reached an agreement to violate their rights, is not sufficient to plead a § 1983 conspiracy.

A Section 1983 conspiracy claim against private legal aid defendants requires facts showing an agreement with governmental actors; conclusory and vague allegations are insufficient.

Warren v. Fischl · filed 1999-01-09

Under the standard enunciated above, the Court finds that the plaintiffs allegations of conspiracy between the Legal Aid Society, Muraskin, and Berkowitz and the other defendants remaining in the Second Amended Complaint are conclusory and vague and fail to plead facts which demonstrate that the private actors entered into agreements, explicit or tacit, with governmental actors.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff alleging a conspiracy with city officials to show that the private party reached an understanding with them and willingly joined their activity to violate constitutional rights.

McMenemy v. City of Rochester · filed 1999-09-14

The plaintiff contends that in addition to the contracts, Abrams is liable under § 1983 because she conspired with the City defendants to deprive McMenemy of his Constitutional rights. However, it is well settled that to prevail under this theory, the plaintiff must show that Abrams reached an understanding with City officials and was a willing participant in joint activity with them to violate the plaintiffs Constitutional rights.

Section 1983 conspiracy liability requires an agreement between private and public defendants to commit an illegal act and an actual deprivation of constitutional rights.

Weingarten Realty Investors v. Albertson's, Inc. · filed 1999-09-24

To prevail on a § 1983 conspiracy claim, the plaintiff must show “1) an agreement between the private and public defendants to commit an illegal act, and 2) an actual deprivation of constitutional rights.”

Section 1983 does not impose liability on defendants who are not state actors.

Hood v. Shaw · filed 2000-02-16

Defendants Paschal, Barfield, and Norris are not state actors subject to liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 permits a conspiracy claim against a private individual when the individual reaches an understanding with a state official to deprive the plaintiff of constitutional rights and willfully participates in joint activity with the state or its agents.

Hanania, Ray v. Torshen, Spreyer · filed 2000-05-05

Establishing sec. 1983 liability through a conspiracy theory requires a plaintiff to demonstrate that (1) the private individual and a state official reached an understanding to deprive the plaintiff of her constitutional rights and (2) the private individual was a willful participant in joint activity with the state or its agents.

Section 1983 treats a statutory insurance guaranty association as a state actor when it pursues state objectives and is controlled by the state.

Sotack v. PENNSYLVANIA PROPERTY & CAS. INS. GUAR. ASS'N. · filed 2000-06-28

Because PPCIGA (1) was created by special statute, (2) was created for the purpose of pursuing state objectives, and (3) is controlled by the state, PPCIGA is a government entity under Lebron, 513 U.S. at 400, 115 S.Ct. 961. [13] Defendants' motion for summary judgment on the basis that PPCIGA does not qualify as a state actor is denied.

For § 1983 purposes, an insurance guaranty association created by statute to pursue state objectives and controlled by the state is a government entity whose operatives are state actors.

Sotack v. Pennsylvania Property & Casualty Insurance Guaranty Ass'n · filed 2000-06-28

Although the parties address only these state action analyses in their submissions, I have concluded that it is the government entity test in Lebrón that requires a finding that PPCIGA is an instrumentality of the state and that its operatives are state actors.

An attorney’s acts within the scope of representation do not by themselves rule out state actor status under Section 1983.

Gross v. Harris County Clerk · filed 2002-02-20

Peckham has failed to show that attorneys cannot be state actors under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 based on acts taken in the scope of representation.

Section 1983 imposes liability only on state actors.

Brown v. Holdener · filed 2003-05-27

First, none of the defendants are state actors subject to liability under § 1983.

In a § 1983 action, state law determines which governmental actor is responsible for a constitutional violation by assigning the relevant government functions.

Coggin v. Sch · filed 2003-07-07

This court’s standard analysis for determining who is the state actor responsible for a constitutional violation in an action arising under § 1983 reaches the same result. ... That is, in order to identify the responsible state actor, we must determine how state law distributes government functions. ... Thus, under the responsible state actor analysis we conclude that the LISD is the state actor responsible for the violation in this case.

Section 1983 identifies the state actor responsible for a violation by looking to how state law assigns authority over the action that caused it.

Coggin v. Sch · filed 2003-07-23

This court’s standard analysis for determining who is the state actor responsible for a constitutional violation in an action arising under § 1983 reaches the same result. ... Thus, under the responsible state actor analysis we conclude that the LISD is the state actor responsible for the violation in this case.

Section 1983 permits a claim against a park district for suspending a commissioner under color of state law because the district is a state actor.

Nelson v. Crystal Lake Park District · filed 2003-08-27

To plead this element, plaintiff alleged that defendant was a municipal corporation that suspended her under the color of state law. Defendant does not challenge the legal sufficiency of those allegations, as a park district is clearly a state actor.

Section 1983 conspiracy liability for a private party requires an understanding with state officials to deprive someone of constitutional rights.

Shelton v. Bump · filed 2004-11-12

To establish § 1983 liability on a conspiracy theory, Dr. Shelton must demonstrate that the private party ACMC defendants reached an understanding with state officials to deprive her of her constitutional rights.

Section 1983 applies to civil rights claims against state actors, not federal actors.

Conard v. Evans · filed 2006-08-22

At the outset, we note that although Conard indicated in his complaint that his civil rights claim fell under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, section 1983 is reserved for claims made against state actors.

Section 1983 provides a remedy against only state actors.

Jones v. Zenk · filed 2007-07-24

Here, Petitioner could not seek relief under § 1983, however, because that statute provides a remedy against only state actors.

Section 1983 permits a person to sue for a deprivation of federal rights caused by someone acting under color of state law.

Robertson v. County of Ventura · filed 2008-04-22

Finally, the § 1983 claim was properly dismissed as to Drs. Harold Amer, Neil Kaufman, and Kenneth Wright because these doctors are not state actors.

A § 1983 conspiracy claim against a private party requires facts supporting an agreement or meeting of minds with a state actor to violate constitutional rights; conclusory allegations are insufficient.

Walters v. Seattle School District No. 1 · filed 2008-09-15

Besides using the words “conspired,” “conspiracy” and “conspiratorial” the complaint does nothing to inform the court regarding any agreement or meeting of the minds between the School District and the Seattle Times or any of the other defendants to violate Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights. Additionally, the three paragraphs, 48, 80 and 89, cited by Plaintiffs at oral argument to support the conspiracy claim are not sufficient to state a § 1983 conspiracy claim against the Seattle Times.

Section 1983 permits a civil action against a person acting under color of state law who deprives another of federal rights.

Wilson v. County of Gloucester · filed 2009-03-30

Under both § 1983 and the New Jersey Civil Rights Act, plaintiffs must also prove that Defendants are state actors.

Section 1983 applies only to state actors.

United States v. Miller · filed 2009-11-19

The judge suggested a suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, but as that statute applies only to state actors the judge surely meant a suit under the Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(a)(2), 1491.

Section 1983 does not permit a suit against defendants who are not state actors.

Bridgeforth v. TD Bank NA · filed 2011-02-15

As the District Court concluded, Bridgeforth could not sue the defendants under § 1983 because they are not state actors.

Section 1983 claims require a state actor; merely private conduct is outside the statute.

Peterson v. Ramirez · filed 2011-06-02

Section 1983 claims can only be asserted against state actors.

Section 1983 imposes liability on persons who, under color of state law, deprive others of federal rights.

Estiverne v. Esernio-Jenssen · filed 2011-12-23

A private party is liable under § 1983 if it is a “willful participant in joint activity with the State or its agents.” ... Rather, to prove joint activity, a plaintiff must show: “(1) an agreement between ... a state actor and a private entity; (2) to act in concert to inflict an unconstitutional injury; and (3) an overt act done in furtherance of that goal causing damages.”

Section 1983 provides a cause of action only against state actors.

Smalls v. Stermer · filed 2012-01-10

Although Smalls asserted these claims against Richardson under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, that statute only provides a cause of action against state actors.

Section 1983 applies to claims against state actors; claims against federal actors are brought under Bivens.

Ruiz v. Fed Bureau of Prisons · filed 2012-05-02

Although Ruiz sought relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 as well as Bivens, his suit is properly construed as an action under Bivens, not § 1983, because it is against federal (and alleged federal) actors, not state actors.

A § 1983 conspiracy claim against private actors requires sufficient allegations that they reached a meeting of the minds with a state actor.

Brancato v. Heimos · filed 2012-05-03

Upon de novo review, see Levy v. Ohl, 477 F.3d 988, 991 (8th Cir. 2007), we conclude Brancato did not sufficiently allege that the private-actor defendants reached a meeting of the minds with any state actor, and therefore he failed to state a conspiracy claim under section 1983.

Section 1983 applies only to state actors, so it does not provide a claim against federal defendants.

Cohea v. United States of America · filed 2012-09-28

Since by its terms § 1983 applies only to state actors, which the named defendants are not, ... this case will be dismissed.

A private actor may be liable under § 1983 for conspiring with state actors to deprive someone of federally protected rights.

Nelms v. Wellington Way Apartments, LLC · filed 2013-02-04

Although she is a private actor, Lagos nevertheless may be liable under § 1983 if she conspired with state actors to deprive Nelms of his federally-secured rights.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a public defender’s office or appointed counsel who are not state actors.

Perkins v. Chatham · filed 2013-08-15

The public defender’s office and appointed counsel have no liability under § 1983 as they are not state actors. See Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 325 (1981).

A court-appointed defense attorney is not a state actor under § 1983 merely because of the appointment.

Coudriet v. Vardaro · filed 2013-11-18

In particular, Coudriet’s claims against Gary Alizzeo, his court-appointed attorney, fail under § 1983 because he is not a state actor.

Section 1983 applies to state actors, not federal defendants.

Fisch v. United States Government · filed 2013-12-20

By its terrns, section 1983 applies only to state actors, not the federal defendants named here.

A § 1983 claim fails when neither pleading names a state actor.

Michelfelder v. McGee · filed 2014-09-29

First, we agree with the District Court that Michelfelder’s constitutional claims fail to state a cognizable § 1983 claim because neither of her pleadings named a state actor.

Section 1983 allows claims against persons whose conduct is fairly attributable to the state.

TinleySparks, Inc. v. Village of Tinley Park · filed 2015-05-11

In light of these allegations, I cannot say as a matter of law that Ellen Clark was a private actor who falls outside the ambit of Section 1983.

A § 1983 conspiracy claim against a private party requires facts suggesting an agreement with a state actor to commit an illegal act and an actual deprivation of constitutional rights.

Avdeef v. Royal Bank of Scotland, P.L.C. · filed 2015-06-08

To support § 1983 liability on a theory of conspiracy, the plaintiff “must allege facts that suggest: 1) an agreement between the private and public defendants to commit an illegal act and 2) an actual deprivation of constitutional rights.” Id. (citations omitted).

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to allege that the defendants are state actors to state a claim.

Ware v. Transport Drivers Inc · filed 2015-09-08

Ware also does not state a claim under § 1983 because he ... does not allege that the defendants are state actors.

Section 1983 does not treat law guardians acting as attorneys for children as state actors.

Milan v. Wertheimer · filed 2015-12-22

Accordingly, we hold that law guardians who act as “attorney[s] for the child” are not state actors for the purposes of suits filed pursuant to § 1983.

Section 1983 requires the defendant to have acted as a state actor.

Jones v. Luthi · filed 2008-06-09

He does not, however, address the Magistrate Judge’s determination that Plaintiff failed to show any of the Defendants were state actors. ... To the extent Plaintiff objects to this recommendation, the objection is thus without merit.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to allege a constitutional violation by a state actor.

Mays v. Tulsa County Public Defender's Office · filed 2009-11-25

Nevertheless, we have considered Mr. Mays’s argument that the district court erred in holding that his public defender and the Tulsa County Public Defender’s Office were not state actors for purposes of his § 1983 claims. We find no abuse of discretion in the denial of Mr. Mays’s Rule 60(b) motion for substantially the reasons stated in the district court’s opinion and order dated April 27, 2009.

Section 1983 does not treat defense attorneys as state actors when they represent a criminal defendant.

Dannon Sellers v. Haney · filed 2016-05-06

The district court properly concluded that Sellers’s defense attorneys were not state actors. See Polk Cnty. v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 317-18 (1981).

Section 1983 conspiracy claims require evidence of an agreement or willful participation between a private individual and state officials to violate civil rights.

Melton v. Abston · filed 2016-11-18

To establish a prima facie case of a conspiracy under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Melton must show evidence of an understanding or “willful participation” between Dr. Fowler and jail officials or Nurse Ray to violate Melton’s civil rights and there must be more than a “mere scintilla of evidence” of a conspiracy to survive summary judgment.

Section 1983 applies only to state actors.

Cohea v. United States · filed 2016-12-12

As the district court correctly determined, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by its own terms applies only to state actors, and, even liberally construed, the complaint provides no basis for individual liability under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 91 S.Ct. 1999, 29 L.Ed.2d 619 (1971).

Section 1983 permits a civil rights claim against a person who acts under color of state law, including a private party who willfully participates in joint activity with a state actor.

William Himchak, III v. Dye · filed 2017-04-07

The District Court did not err in concluding that several Appellees are not state actors for the purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48-49 (1988) (conduct complained of must be committed by person acting under color of state law). The attorneys with the “Women in Need” organization who purportedly violated Himchak’s constitutional rights by coercing his wife into filing for a Protection From Abuse order are not state actors.

Section 1983 does not treat an attorney or law firm as a state actor merely because they provide legal services to a public school board.

Dyer v. MD State Board of Education · filed 2017-04-21

A law firm and attorney who represent a public school board, like the law firm Defendants did here, do not become state actors under § 1983 by providing legal services to the board, a power not possessed by virtue of state law.

A § 1983 conspiracy claim against a private landlord cannot rest solely on conclusory allegations that he owned or operated the business involved.

Sager v. City of Buffalo · filed 2017-06-30

With respect to defendants NHJB, Habib and Miranda, plaintiff alleged that each was liable for damages pursuant to 42 USC § 1983 for conspiracy to deprive decedent of his civil rights and for wrongful death. ... The conclusory allegations in the complaint alleging liability on the same grounds as those alleged against the NHJB defendants based upon the alleged ownership or partnership interest in the operation of Molly’s Pub are insufficient to state a cause of action against him.

Section 1983 applies only to state and local actors.

Scott v. United States of America · filed 2017-08-29

But Section 1983 applies only to state and local actors.

Defense attorneys are not state actors for purposes of Section 1983.

Swaggerty v. Trevarthen · filed 2018-03-20

As the district court correctly noted, defense attorneys are not “state actors” for purposes of § 1983.

Section 1983 treats an authority organized under Pennsylvania's Municipal Authorities Act as a state actor.

Pomicter v. Luzerne Cnty. Convention Ctr. Auth. · filed 2018-04-10

There is no dispute that the Authority qualifies as a state actor for purposes of § 1983, as it is organized pursuant to the Municipal Authorities Act of Pennsylvania.

Section 1983 applies only to state actors, so a complaint naming none does not state a claim under it.

Coulter v. Blaze Tatananni · filed 2018-06-12

Although Coulter repeatedly invoked 42 U.S.C. § 1983, that law applies only to state actors, see Morrow v. Balaski, 719 F.3d 160, 165-66 (3d Cir. 2013), and none were named as defendants.

Section 1983 does not apply to defendants who are not state actors.

Brown v. R.R. Grp. Ltd. Liab. Co. · filed 2018-11-02

Plaintiff also asserts that he is bringing his claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. That provision is not applicable here because Defendants are not state actors.

Section 1983 ordinarily does not impose liability on private citizens for their presence during a search warrant’s execution because they are not state actors.

Advanced Building & Fabricatio v. Ayers · filed 2019-03-13

In fact, his liability under § 1983 is premised on this very distinction: private citizens (like reporters) are not ordinarily liable under § 1983 for their presence during the execution of a search warrant because they are not state actors.

Section 1983 concerns conduct by state actors, not federal actors.

Philippeaux v. United States of America · filed 2019-05-13

Plaintiff also refers to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, but that statute concerns the conduct of state actors, not federal actors.

Section 1983 treats a municipal hospital corporation, its hospitals, and its employees as state actors.

McNair v. Doe · filed 2019-05-17

As a municipal corporation, H+H, its hospitals, and employees are state actors for the purposes of § 1983.

Section 1983 permits claims only against state actors.

Randall (ID 33680) v. Hutchinson Police Department · filed 2019-09-04

The only proper defendants in an action under § 1983 are state actors.

Private parties may be liable under § 1983 if they conspire with a state official to violate someone’s rights.

Harcrow v. Harcrow · filed 2019-09-16

The Court agrees with the Magistrate Judge that Plaintiff’s factual allegations in her other filings, accepted as true at this stage, demonstrate what Longmire and Richardson each allegedly did to violate Plaintiff’s asserted constitutional rights and are sufficient to allow the Court to reasonably infer that Longmire and Richardson shared in the conspiratorial objective to violate Plaintiff's rights.

Section 1983 requires a defendant to have acted under color of state law.

CHARLES v. HOPE CAFFAE/COFFEE SHOP · filed 2019-11-06

None of the named Defendants against whom Charles makes substantive allegations appear to be “state actors” subject to liability under § 1983.

Section 1983 claims require a defendant acting under color of state law; purely private conduct does not qualify.

Head v. Harris County Jail · filed 2020-02-21

Thus, section 1983 claims must be brought against state actors, not private citizens.

Section 1983 claims may be brought against state actors, but not federal actors.

Zareck v. Corrections Corp. of Am. · filed 2020-04-14

The district court here correctly identified that § 1983 claims may be brought against only state, not federal, actors.

Section 1983 applies to state actors; claims against federal actors arise under Bivens.

Hope v. Department of Health and Human Services · filed 2020-05-18

Section 1983 applies to state actors and Bivens applies to federal actors.

Section 1983 permits an individual to sue a state actor for deprivation of constitutional rights.

LOVE v. PRESTEL · filed 2020-06-15

Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, an individual may bring a lawsuit to redress deprivations of constitutional rights by state actors. ... The undisputed evidence proves that Defendant Matthew Prestel was a state actor at all times relevant to Plaintiff Tony Lionel Love's claims.

Section 1983 applies to state actors rather than federal actors.

Salzer v. Cavasos · filed 2020-08-24

The Court construes the complaint ... rather than under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 applies to claims against state actors.

Parker v. Maloney · filed 2020-09-03

Although Plaintiff purported to bring his action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, that provision is applicable only to actions filed against state actors.

A § 1983 conspiracy claim against private parties requires factual allegations that they acted in concert with a state actor; speculation about a corrupt agreement is insufficient.

Butcher v. Wendt · filed 2020-09-22

We agree with the District Court that Butcher’s allegations of a corrupt agreement, which rest on rank speculation, are inadequate to support his conspiracy claims under RICO and § 1983.

Section 1983 covers claims against state or local jail officials by a federal pretrial detainee when the officials are not federal agents.

Grady v. Aragona · filed 2020-12-04

Both defendants appear to be state or local actors, and Plaintiff points to no contract between the federal government and local jail that transforms the defendants into federal agents. Therefore, the case will be analyzed under Section 1983 at this stage.

Section 1983 requires a state actor; alleging that a defendant is a police officer’s son does not establish that requirement.

PATTERSON v. BUTLER · filed 2020-12-15

While Patterson asserts that Butler is the son of a Chester police officer, there is no allegation that Butler is a “state actor” as that term is used in 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the vehicle by which a citizen may bring constitutional claims in federal court.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim against an entity that is not a state actor.

Engel v. Missouri Bar Association · filed 2020-12-16

Additionally, there is no indication that the Missouri Bar Association can be sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 as they are not a state actor.

Section 1983 permits an unincorporated association to bring a claim if it satisfies associational standing requirements.

Gay-Straight Alliance of Okeechobee High School v. School Board · filed 2007-03-13

To hold that it (and other unincorporated associations) do not have standing to bring Section 1983 claims runs counter to the legislative history of the statute and would be contrary to public policy.

Section 1983 permits an unincorporated association to be held liable for authorized conduct without proof that every member ratified it.

Jund v. The Town of Hempstead the Town of Hempstead Republican Committee the Nassau County Republican Committee · filed 1991-07-26

Predicating liability on the theory of authorization will punish the entities responsible for the violations and effectuate the goals of section 1983 while a requirement of membership ratification would permit unincorporated associations to escape liability.

A property owner must use available and adequate state compensation remedies before maintaining a § 1983 takings action in federal court.

Bradley v. City of Stanford, Kentucky · filed 1991-08-05

Put differently, unless a plaintiff can show that state remedies are unavailable or inadequate, the exhaustion of those remedies is a jurisdictional prerequisite to the maintenance of a Sec. 1983 action in federal court.

Section 1983 permits claims for unconstitutional takings of property.

McKenzie v. City of White Hall · filed 1997-04-23

Takings claims are cognizable under § 1983.

Section 1983 permits a property owner to plead a takings claim alongside a state inverse condemnation claim; the court should defer ruling on dismissal of the § 1983 claim until the state claim is adjudicated.

Benton v. Savannah Airport Commission · filed 1999-11-16

In this situation, the trial court should defer a ruling on the motion to dismiss until the state inverse condemnation claim is adjudicated, thus allowing the plaintiff to proceed with both claims in the same lawsuit. Once the inverse condemnation claim has been disposed of, the trial court can consider the § 1983 claim on its merits.

A section 1983 takings claim is unripe when the claimant has not pursued a potentially available state remedy for compensation.

Deniz v. Municipality of Guaynabo · filed 2002-04-08

It is the claimant's burden to prove that the potential state remedy is unavailable, and uncertainty prevents him from carrying that burden. Consequently, his section 1983 takings claims are unripe.

A Takings Clause claimant must first seek compensation in state court before bringing a § 1983 claim for the alleged loss.

Wos v. Sheahan · filed 2002-12-17

But he must first seek compensation in state court for his alleged losses before he can bring a § 1983 claim based upon the Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause, Daniels v. Area Plan Comm’n, 306 F.3d 445, 453-54 (7th Cir.2002), and so the district court properly dismissed this claim.

A § 1983 takings claim cannot be brought in federal court until the plaintiff has used available state procedures to seek just compensation.

Sandy Creek Investors, Ltd. v. City of Jonestown · filed 2003-03-27

We further note that Sandy Creek's § 1983 claim also was not properly before the district court: "Because a violation of the Takings Clause does not occur until just compensation has been denied, . . . Appellants must use available state procedures to seek such compensation before they may bring a § 1983 takings claim to federal court." John Corp., 214 F.3d at 581 (citation omitted).

Section 1983 permits claims alleging unconstitutional takings by state actors.

Aaron v. Target Corp. · filed 2003-07-03

As a result, takings claims are cognizable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

A § 1983 takings claimant who lets the time to seek compensation through available state procedures expire forfeits the federal claim.

Pascoag Reservoir & Dam, LLC v. Rhode Island · filed 2003-07-28

If it had done so and the state had denied a remedy in violation of the Constitution, then a § 1983 claim would have ripened at the time of the denial. ... By failing to bring its state claim within the statute of limitations period, Pascoag forfeited its federal claim.

A property owner must seek redress through available state procedures before bringing a takings claim under Section 1983.

Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Jefferson County · filed 1989-09-23

Even if theoretically there could be a “taking” under the circumstances alleged here, any such claim is not yet “ripe,” because Williamson County Regional Planning Commission v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City, 473 U.S. 172, 105 S.Ct. 3108, 87 L.Ed.2d 126 (1985), requires a property owner to seek legal redress through available state procedures before invoking 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 takings damages require the property owner first to pursue an inverse condemnation claim for the alleged taking.

Leeper Electric Services, Inc. v. City of Carmel · filed 2006-05-15

But because Leeper never brought an inverse condemnation claim against Carmel with respect to its refusal to enact his proposed rezoning ordinance, it is not now entitled to seek section 1983 damages.

Section 1983 generally does not require exhaustion of administrative remedies, but a takings claim must be ripe, which can require the owner to pursue an available variance or similar relief.

Bauknight v. Monroe County · filed 2008-09-17

It is true, as the owners argue, that there is no general requirement to exhaust administrative remedies prior to bringing a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Williamson, 473 U.S. at 192, 105 S.Ct. 3108; Patsy v. Bd. of Regents, 457 U.S. 496, 516, 102 S.Ct. 2557, 73 L.Ed.2d 172 (1982). However, Williamson requires an owner to pursue such remedies as a variance.

Section 1983 requires a takings plaintiff to seek available state compensation before bringing the federal action.

Jama Construction v. City of Los Angeles · filed 1991-07-15

We find this second requirement to be dispositive here. Jama did not seek compensation through California procedures before bringing its federal action. Because Jama’s action is not ripe for decision, we dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

Section 1983 affords a remedy when a city acting under color of state law violates a property owner’s constitutional right against an uncompensated taking.

Goss v. City of Little Rock, Arkansas, Charles Goss v. City of Little Rock, Arkansas · filed 1998-10-01

Goss proved that Little Rock, a state actor, violated his constitutional right not to have his property taken without just compensation. Section 1983 therefore afforded him a remedy.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff challenging the process behind an alleged taking to seek compensation through available state procedures before suing.

Stardust Mobile Estates LLC v. City of San Buenaventura · filed 2005-07-29

Stardust must seek compensation through available state procedures before bringing a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim attacking the decision-making process that allegedly resulted in an unlawful taking.

Section 1983 permits a property owner to bring a federal takings claim only after using an adequate state procedure to seek compensation and being denied it.

Melrose Credit Union v. City of New York · filed 2017-03-30

But it knows of no authority to support the conclusion that the Credit Union Plaintiffs’ particular Article 78 action—an action that sought no monetary damages—satisfies the “sought compensation” prong of Williamson County. See Williamson Cty., 473 U.S. at 194 n.13, 105 S.Ct. 3108 (distinguishing between “the procedures provided for review of [the state’s regulatory] actions, such as those for obtaining a declaratory judgement,” with “procedures that allow a property owner to obtain compensation for a taking” and emphasizing that because “no constitutional violation occurs until just compensation has been denied,” a property owner must “utilize procedure for obtaining compensation before bringing a” § 1983 action”) (emphasis added).

Section 1983 allows a property owner to sue a local government for an uncompensated taking without first seeking compensation in state court.

Knick v. Township of Scott · filed 2019-06-21

The state-litigation requirement of Williamson County is overruled. A property owner may bring a takings claim under §1983 upon the taking of his property without just compensation by a local government.

Section 1983 lets property owners bring a federal takings claim against a local government that takes their property without just compensation.

Winter Quarters Hunting & Fishing Club L L C v. Fifth Louisiana Levee District · filed 2020-11-06

A property owner may bring a “takings” claim under § 1983 in federal court upon the taking of his property without just compensation by a local government.

Section 1983 permits federal takings claims.

Watkins v. Lawrence County, Arkansas · filed 2020-11-19

The Court’s opinion and order is clear that plaintiffs’ federal takings claims are cognizable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Dkt. No. 108, at 15).

Section 1983 does not recognize a claim based solely on allegations of mental suffering.

Johnson v. Bruce · filed 1991-08-09

Finally, to the extent plaintiff bases his claim for relief on his allegations of mental suffering, he fails to state a claim cognizable under § 1983.

Section 1983 permits Medicaid recipients and providers to enforce the federal right conferred by the Medicaid equal access provision, 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(30)(A).

Arkansas Medical Society, Inc. v. Reynolds · filed 1993-09-10

Therefore, the second step has been satisfied as well, and the equal access provision may be enforced by Medicaid recipients and providers using 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983.

Section 1983 permits Medicaid recipients to enforce their right to corrective payments without first exhausting state administrative or judicial remedies, and Medicaid fair hearings do not foreclose that remedy.

Greenstein, Ex Rel. Horowitz v. Bane · filed 1993-10-05

Applying the three-part Wilder test, and following the guidelines set out in Suter, this Court finds that plaintiffs have an enforceable right under § 1983. ... Likewise, in this action, the right to a fair hearing does not furnish plaintiffs with an elaborate and comprehensive enforcement mechanism. ... Moreover, § 1983 relief is not foreclosed by the failure to exhaust state administrative and judicial remedies. ... Therefore, defendants have failed to meet them burden of demonstrating that Congress has foreclosed plaintiffs from bringing a § 1983 action.

Section 1983 provides a procedural vehicle for a Medicare provider to seek payment from a state for services to dual eligibles and qualified Medicare beneficiaries when state law prevents federally required payment.

Senior Life Management, Inc. v. Dowling · filed 1995-03-13

The appropriate procedural vehicle to accomplish that result is not an article 78 proceeding, but an action pursuant to 42 USC § 1983 (Rehabilitation Assn. v Kozlowski, supra; New York City Health & Hosps. Corp. v Perales, supra).

Section 1983 allows health care providers to enforce the former Boren Amendment’s requirement that state Medicaid plans take the cost of rehabilitative services into account.

Concourse Rehabilitation & Nursing Center Inc. v. Whalen · filed 2001-05-04

We therefore find that this provision of the Boren Amendment confers on the plaintiffs the right to have the cost of rehabilitative services “taken into account” and that this right is enforceable under section 1983.

Section 1983 lets Medicaid providers challenge a state's compliance with the required reimbursement rate findings procedure.

Volk v. State ex rel. Department of Human Resources · filed 1990-10-17

We understand the Wilder majority opinion to say that a provider may, under section 1983, challenge in court the substance of the state’s findings as well as the procedural requirement for findings.

Section 1983 lets Medicaid providers enforce the federal funding obligation for abortions arising from rape or incest under Title XIX as modified by the 1994 Hyde Amendment.

Orr v. Nelson · filed 1995-01-25

Accordingly, I find that there is no impediment in the statute to section 1983 enforcement of Plaintiffs’ claims.

Section 1983 provides a damages action for an employer whose NLRA rights against municipal interference with collective bargaining are violated.

Glenwood Bridge, Inc. v. City of Minneapolis John Doe John Smith Other Known Entities and Individuals · filed 1991-10-31

Golden State II clearly establishes that Glenwood Bridge’s complaint in this case states a valid cause of action for money damages.

Section 1983 allows Medicaid providers to enforce statutory reimbursement rights defined and implemented by the public notice regulation.

Oklahoma Nursing Home Ass'n v. Demps · filed 1992-02-28

The public notice regulation is sufficiently grounded in the recognized statutory rights of health care providers under the Medicaid Act to state a cause of action under Section 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide an action to enforce a federal provision against state officials when that provision imposes no binding obligation on the state.

Stowell v. Ives · filed 1992-03-16

The Court has carefully examined the above cases and finds that they do not support Plaintiffs’ argument that there exists a private right of action for them to enforce section 1396a(c)(l) against the State. ... Under the plain language of section 1396a(c)(l) there is no “ ‘binding obligation’ on the States.”

Section 1983 does not permit enforcement of a federal statute that imposes obligations exclusively on federal officials rather than state actors.

Christine Stowell, Etc. v. H. Rollin Ives, Etc. · filed 1992-09-28

A statute does not create rights redressable under section 1983 when it is essentially administrative in nature and imposes an obligation exclusively upon federal officials, not upon state actors.

Section 1983 provides a cause of action to remedy a deprivation of an employee’s federal right to engage in collective bargaining under the NLRA.

Livadas v. Lloyd Aubry, in His Official Capacity as Labor Commissioner for the State of California · filed 1993-03-08

We conclude that Livadas has a cause of action under § 1983. Federal law gives her a right to engage in collective bargaining, and § 1983 therefore provides a remedy for a deprivation of that right.

Section 1983 permits a suit for violation of a federal statute only if the statute creates an enforceable right, privilege, or immunity and Congress has not foreclosed that enforcement.

Board of Education v. Leininger · filed 1993-03-29

The court agrees with the magistrate judge’s conclusion that the funding statutes at issue do not provide plaintiffs with a cause of action under § 1983. A plaintiff may sue for a violation of a federal statute under § 1983 provided the statute creates an enforceable right, privilege or immunity within the meaning of § 1983, and Congress has not foreclosed such enforcement in enacting the statute.

Section 1983 may be used to remedy infringement of rights guaranteed by the NLRA.

McCollum v. Roberts · filed 1994-03-02

An action under Section 1983 is an appropriate' vehicle for remedying infringement of rights guaranteed by the NLRA.

Section 1983 does not provide damages to a developer who had no right to a municipal contract or to have the proposed project proceed.

Gemtel Corporation Gemtel Wdch Hotel Associates v. Community Redevelopment Agency of the City of Los Angeles County of L · filed 1994-05-10

Gemtel has not alleged an injury that is compensable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ... Gemtel failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted because it had no right of which it was deprived.

Section 1983 permits private parties to enforce rights created by an FCC regulation protecting the use of receive-only satellite antennas against local zoning restrictions.

Ronald Loschiavo and Donna Loschiavo v. City of Dearborn · filed 1994-09-08

Because we believe that the Loschiavos are entitled to bring a Section 1983 action against the City of Dearborn to enforce their right to install a receive-only satellite antenna for private viewing of satellite programming, we conclude that the district court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of the City on this claim.