42 U.S.C. § 1983

Section 1983 does not permit a suit against a police department as an entity.

Cox v. Walz · filed 2019-11-26

However, a police department is not an entity subject to suit under § 1983.

A municipal police department is not a separate legal entity subject to suit under Section 1983.

Santiago v. Hamden CT Police Dep't · filed 2019-12-03

However, a municipal police department is not an independent legal entity and, therefore, is not subject to suit under section 1983.

Section 1983 permits suits against municipalities but not their departments or other subunits.

WARDEN v. PHILLIPS · filed 2019-12-10

Thus, while a municipality may be liable under § 1983, subunits of the municipality, may not.

Section 1983 does not permit a separate suit against a police department that is merely a subpart of a city.

Caraffa v. Tempe Police Department · filed 2019-12-16

Because Defendant Tempe Police Department is not a separate entity, it is not capable of being separately sued. Thus, the Court will dismiss Defendant Tempe Police Department.

A municipal police department is not an entity subject to suit under § 1983.

Hernandez v. Cooper · filed 2019-12-16

A municipal police department is not an entity that is subject to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

A municipal police department cannot be sued independently of the municipality under Section 1983.

Harris v. Stephens · filed 2019-12-31

CPD cannot be held liable independent of the City of Columbus.

A police or sheriff’s department is not an entity capable of being sued under Section 1983.

Calloway-Armstrong v. Clarksville Police Department · filed 2020-01-06

However, a police or sheriff’s department is not an entity capable of being sued under 42 U.S.C § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit suits against municipal police departments because they are subdivisions of city government.

Seegrist v. Rapid City Police Department · filed 2020-01-09

Municipal police departments are not suable entities in a § 1983 action.

Section 1983 does not permit suit against City departments that are not separate entities amenable to suit.

PRATER v. CITY OF PHILADELPHIA · filed 2020-01-14

Another defect is that Prater has named as Defendants certain departments of the City, which are not themselves amenable to suit under § 1983, see 53 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 16257; Philadelphia Entm’t & Dev. Partners, L.P. v. City of Philadelphia, 939 A.2d 290, 292 n.1 (Pa. 2007), and she has also named individual Defendants without alleging facts supporting any claim against them.

A police department that is a municipal subunit is not a proper defendant under § 1983.

MILLER v. CHESTER POLICE DEPARTMENT · filed 2020-01-15

Therefore, to the extent that Miller intended to name it as a Defendant, the Chester Police Department would not be a proper defendant in this case under § 1983 and is dismissed.

Section 1983 permits suits against municipalities, but a police department that is merely a municipal sub-unit is not a proper defendant.

HOWARD v. RIHL · filed 2020-01-15

Thus, while a municipality may be liable under § 1983, a police department, as a mere sub-unit of the municipality, may not.

Section 1983 does not permit suit against a city police department that is not separate from the city.

YOUNG v. PHILADELPHIA POLICE DEPT. · filed 2020-01-23

Thus, the Philadelphia Police Department is not a separate entity from the City of Philadelphia and is not a “person” subject to suit under section 1983.

A municipal police department is not subject to suit under Section 1983.

Holliday v. Newington Police Department · filed 2020-01-31

Thus, a municipal police department is not subject to suit under section 1983.

A municipal police department that lacks separate capacity to be sued under state law cannot be a defendant in a § 1983 action.

Mercado v. New Windsor NY P.D. 12553 · filed 2020-02-18

Plaintiff’s claims against the NWPD must be dismissed because municipal agencies or departments do not have the capacity to be sued under New York law.

Section 1983 does not permit a municipal police department to be sued as a defendant.

Evans v. Madera Police Department · filed 2020-03-03

As to Plaintiff’s claims against “Madera County Police Department,” as stated above, municipal departments are not appropriate defendants in a § 1983 suit.

A municipal police department cannot be sued separately under § 1983 because it is a sub-unit of the municipality.

PEREZ-CINTRON v. MILLCREEK TOWNSHIP · filed 2020-03-25

Thus, while a municipality may be liable under §1983, a police department, as a mere sub-unit of the municipality, may not.

A municipal police department has no separate legal existence and cannot be sued under Section 1983.

Martin v. Noble County Sheriff's Dept · filed 2019-12-17

The FWPD correctly points out that the law “holds that a municipal police department is not a suable entity under Section 1983.” ... The Plaintiffs did not respond to this argument by the FWPD, which provides another basis for the granting of the Department’s motion for summary judgment.

A New York municipal police department cannot be sued under § 1983 because it lacks separate capacity to be sued.

Jackson v. City of Peekskill Police Department · filed 2020-01-10

Plaintiff’s claims against the City of Peekskill Police Department must be dismissed because city agencies or departments do not have the capacity to be sued under New York law.

Section 1983 does not permit suit against a police department that is not a legal entity subject to suit.

Wright v. Bella Vista Police Department · filed 2020-04-03

The Bella Vista Police Department is TERMINATED as a Defendant, as it is not subject to suit under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit suit against a municipal police department that lacks independent legal existence.

Mason v. Lax · filed 2020-04-22

However, a municipal police department is not an independent legal entity and, therefore, is not subject to suit under Section 1983.

Section 1983 does not allow a suit against a city police department that is not a separate suable entity.

Jones v. Noga · filed 2020-04-23

The Metropolitan Police Department is a department of the City of St. Louis, and not itself an entity that can be sued under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim against a municipal police department because the department is not a person subject to suit.

Smith v. City of Grand Island · filed 2020-05-05

Plaintiff’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims against the Grand Island Police Department are dismissed without prejudice because the Department is not a person within the meaning of § 1983 and is thus not amenable to suit.

Section 1983 does not permit a suit against a municipal police department that is merely an administrative arm of its municipality.

BROWN v. LEIS · filed 2020-05-12

We therefore conclude that a Section 1983 action cannot be maintained against the Upper Merion Township Police, as it is an administrative arm of the Township of Upper Merion, not a separate legal entity.

Municipal departments are not proper defendants in a Section 1983 suit.

Hopton v. Fresno County Health Human · filed 2020-06-05

As explained in the first screening order, municipal departments are not proper defendants in a § 1983 suit.

Section 1983 does not permit a civil rights claim against a police department because it is not a person subject to suit.

Mincey v. Starling · filed 2020-06-11

First, he continues to name the Eustis Police Department as a Defendant, despite the Court informing him the police department is not a “person” subject to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit a suit against a municipal police department because the department is not a person under the statute.

MOORE v. HAMILTON TOWNSHIP POLICE DEPARTMENT · filed 2020-06-18

Therefore, Plaintiff’s Complaint against Defendant must be dismissed for failure to state a claim, because a municipal police department is not a “person” capable of being sued as part of a Section 1983 claim.

A sheriff’s office is not a suable person under § 1983 because municipal departments cannot be sued under the section.

Parker v. Nichols · filed 2020-06-26

Defendant “The Christian County Sheriffs Office” is not a “person” subject to suit under § 1983 because municipal departments are not suable under § 1983.

A county sheriff’s department may be sued as a separate legal entity under § 1983.

Tennyson v. County of Sacramento · filed 2020-07-20

Next, addressing defendants’ contention the Sheriff’s Department is essentially synonymous with the County itself under § 1983, the court finds the Sheriff’s Department is a properly named defendant.

Section 1983 does not permit a suit against a municipal department because the department is not a person under the statute.

Keavney v. County of San Diego · filed 2020-07-21

Departments of municipal entities are not “persons” subject to suit under § 1983; therefore, a local law enforcement agency, like the SDSD, is not a proper party.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim against a municipal police department that lacks legal capacity separate from its municipality.

Thomas v. Brasher-Cunningham · filed 2020-07-27

As a result, Mr. Thomas has not and cannot allege a colorable claim under Section 1983 against the Guilford Police Department.

Section 1983 does not permit suit against a municipal police department that is merely an administrative arm of the municipality.

Maroney v. Village of Norwood · filed 2020-07-27

It is well established that a municipal police department is not amenable to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because it is merely an administrative arm of a municipality and does not have a separate legal identity from that of the municipality itself.

Under Arkansas law, municipal police departments cannot be sued under § 1983 because they are subdivisions of municipalities.

Ledbetter v. Oller · filed 2020-08-19

The HPD correctly notes that, under Arkansas law,1 municipal police departments are not subject to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because they are merely administrative subdivisions of municipalities.

A county jail that is an administrative arm of the county cannot be sued under Section 1983; the county may be named instead.

Lee v. Orange County Jail (Administration) · filed 2020-08-25

Plaintiff sues the “Orange County Jail (Administration),” which appears to be an agency and, therefore, an arm of the County of Orange. Thus, it cannot be sued.

Section 1983 does not permit a separate claim against a municipal police department when it is treated as part of the municipality.

Gomes v. County of Kauai · filed 2020-08-26

Claims against a municipality and its respective police department are treated as claims against the municipality and thus not subject to suit under § 1983.

Section 1983 permits suits against municipalities, but a police department cannot be sued separately as a sub-unit of its municipality.

JACKSON v. ROSEN · filed 2020-08-28

Thus, while a municipality may be liable under § 1983, a police department, as a mere sub-unit of the municipality, may not. ... Therefore, the Marple Township Police Department is not a proper defendant in this case and is dismissed.

A police department that is not a separate legal entity from its city may not be sued under § 1983.

Smith v. City of Memphis · filed 2020-09-08

Lastly, the R. & R. found that the MPD is not a separate legal entity from the City of Memphis and thus, may not be sued under § 1983. ... The Court agrees and adopts the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation to dismiss all claims against the City, Director Rallings, and the MPD.

A municipal police department is not a separate suable entity under § 1983.

Mondragon v. Gould · filed 2020-10-26

The Clovis Police Department is not a suable entity under § 1983 and the Complaint does not state any claim for relief against the Clovis Police Department.

Section 1983 does not permit suits against municipal departments because they are not persons subject to suit under the statute.

Wagner v. Shasta County · filed 2020-11-03

Although municipalities, such as cities and counties, are amenable to suit under Monell, departments of municipal entities are not “persons” subject to suit under § 1983; therefore, the Sheriff’s Department—a local law enforcement department—is not a proper party.

Section 1983 permits claims against municipalities, but a police department that is merely a municipal sub-unit is not a proper defendant.

YOUST v. LANCASTER CITY BUREAU POLICE DEPT. · filed 2020-11-09

Thus, while a municipality may be liable under § 1983, a police department, as a mere sub-unit of the municipality, may not.

A New York city police department cannot be sued separately in a § 1983 action because it lacks capacity to be sued under state law.

Van Orden v. City of Port Jervis - PD · filed 2020-11-19

Plaintiff’s claims against the Port Jervis Police Department must be dismissed because under New York law, city agencies or departments lack the capacity to be sued.

Section 1983 permits suits against municipalities but not police departments that are merely municipal sub-units.

MILAN v. DEVER · filed 2020-11-20

Thus, while a municipality may be liable under § 1983, a police department, as a mere sub-unit of the municipality, may not.

Section 1983 permits claims against a municipality, but its police department cannot be sued separately when it is merely a sub-unit of the municipality.

SIMMONS v. MCBRIDE · filed 2020-12-02

Thus, while a municipality may be liable under § 1983, a police department, as a mere sub-unit of the municipality, may not. ... Accordingly, the Linwood Police Department is not a proper Defendant in this § 1983 action.

Section 1983 permits suits against municipalities, but a police department that is merely a municipal sub-unit is not a proper defendant.

SIMMONS v. TAYLOR · filed 2020-12-02

Thus, while a municipality may be liable under § 1983, a police department, as a mere sub-unit of the municipality, may not.

A Mississippi police department cannot be sued separately under § 1983 because it is an extension of the city.

McDonald v. City of Meridian Police Department · filed 2020-12-07

In Mississippi, a police department is not a separate legal entity which may be sued, rather it is an extension of the city.

Section 1983 does not permit suit against an Ohio police department because the department is not a separate legal entity capable of being sued.

Hughey v. Creston Police Department · filed 2020-12-10

As an initial matter, the Creston Police Department is not a proper defendant. Police departments are not sui juris, meaning they are not separate legal entities under Ohio law that are capable of suing or being sued.

Section 1983 claims cannot proceed against a municipal police department that has no legal identity separate from the municipality.

Houston v. Nassau County Police Department · filed 2020-12-23

As a preliminary matter, the Court concludes that plaintiff’s complaint cannot proceed because the only named defendant, the Nassau County Police Department, is not a proper defendant under plaintiff’s Section 1983 claim.

A municipal police department that is an administrative arm of the municipality cannot be sued separately under Section 1983.

EL BOMANI v. BARAKA · filed 2020-12-30

The Third Circuit has recognized that, as “an administrative arm” of a municipality, a police department cannot be sued under Section 1983 as an entity separate from that municipality. ... Therefore, the claims against the Newark Police Department are dismissed.

Section 1983 permits a municipality to be sued, but its police department is not a separate defendant when it is merely a sub-unit of the municipality.

BREWER v. THE CITY OF PHILADELPHIA · filed 2021-01-13

Thus, while a municipality may be liable under § 1983, a police department, as a mere sub-unit of the municipality, may not.

Section 1983 does not permit a police department to be sued because it is not a person subject to suit under the section.

Walker v. Ware · filed 2021-01-25

A police department is not considered a person subject to suit under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on police officers for perjured testimony because they are immune from such claims.

McSherry v. City of Long Beach · filed 2009-03-30

This claim is foreclosed by Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325, 326 (1983) (holding that police officers are immune from liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for perjured testimony).

Section 1983 does not permit a damages claim against witnesses for conspiring to give perjured testimony to secure a criminal conviction because absolute witness immunity extends to such conspiracies.

Miller v. Glanz · filed 1991-11-18

We agree with the Sixth and Seventh Circuits, and we hold that Miller fails to state a conspiracy claim because defendants are absolutely immune from civil liability.

Section 1983 does not allow civil damages against witnesses for conspiring to present perjured testimony to obtain a criminal conviction because they have absolute immunity.

Miller v. Glanz · filed 1991-11-18

In short, we conclude that the extension of absolute immunity from civil liability to those who allegedly conspire to present peijured testimony in furtherance of a criminal conviction serves the same important purposes of immunity to witnesses themselves.

Section 1983 encompasses a claim that failure to continue full public assistance benefits during administrative review violates federal due process.

Thomasel v. Perales · filed 1991-11-26

One of her Federal claims was that the failure of the State and City DSS "to provide continuation of petitioner’s full benefits during the pendency of her administrative review [was] arbitrary, capricious and violative of the due process clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution”. This claim is encompassed by section 1983 and can therefore serve as the basis for an attorney’s fee award under section 1988.

When a legal § 1983 claim and an equitable Title VII claim are tried together, the jury’s verdict binds the judge, who need not make separate factual findings.

Bruno v. City of Crown Point · filed 1991-11-27

However, when, as in this case, a “legal” § 1983 claim and an “equitable" Title VII claim are tried together, the jury’s verdict binds the judge and he is not required to make separate factual findings.

Section 1983 does not give county commissioners absolute legislative immunity for an individualized funding decision that does not establish general policy.

Hughes v. Tarrant County Texas, Hon. Roy English, Dionne Bagsby, Bob Hampton, J.D. Johnson, O.L. Watson, Tim C · filed 1991-11-29

Even though the decision concerned the allocation of county monies, it was not based on legislative facts; it was not based on general facts regarding any policy, but instead, it was based on specific facts of an individual situation related to the district court clerk. Furthermore, the action did not purport to establish a general policy; it was particular to Hughes. Because we find that the challenged conduct was not legislative, we hold that the commissioners are not entitled to absolute legislative immunity.

Section 1983 treats state officials sued in their individual capacities as persons subject to suit.

Feldon Jackson, Jr. v. Central New Mexico Correctional Facility Steve Saavedra New Mexico Corrections Academy Robert Ten · filed 1992-09-21

"[S]tate officials, sued in their individual capacities, are 'persons' within the meaning of § 1983," Hafer v. Melo, --- U.S. ----, 112 S.Ct. 358, 365 (1991), and thus are subject to suit.

Section 1983 permits relief against an individual state official whose personal involvement caused a constitutional discrimination injury.

Hicks v. St. Mary's Honor Center · filed 1992-07-23

It is undisputed that Long was personally involved in demoting and terminating plaintiff and that his acts were causally connected to plaintiffs demotion and termination. ... Thus, under the circumstances of this case, to the extent plaintiff prevails on his Title VII claim against St. Mary’s, he is equally entitled to relief against Long under § 1983.

Section 1983 permits a former official sued in his individual capacity to remain a defendant after his successor takes over the official-capacity role.

Desalle v. Kevin W. Wright, Jere E. Fridheim, M.D., Arvid K. Goyal, M.D., Nikki M. Zollar · filed 1992-07-16

Nonetheless, DeSalle sued Wright in his individual capacity as well as his official capacity. Thus Wright is still a proper defendant in this case.

Section 1983 permits personal liability for state officials based on actions taken in their official roles; the official nature of the acts alone does not make an individual capacity claim groundless.

Pulaski County Republican Committee v. Pulaski County Board of Election Commissioners · filed 1992-02-04

The imposition of fees and costs under Rule 11 and section 1988 based on the holding that a section 1983 personal liability claim is groundless because the complained-of actions were committed by a state actor while in his official position is an abuse of discretion and must be reversed.

Section 1983 permits an individual-capacity damages suit against a state officer for conduct performed as part of the officer’s official duties.

Nelson v. Penn, Cso Marshall, Cso · filed 1991-12-16

While it is true that strip searches were part of the defendants' official functions, "under § 1983, a plaintiff may sue a state officer in his individual capacity for alleged wrongs committed by the officer in his official capacity." Price v. Akaka, 928 F.2d 824, 828 (9th Cir.1990). The capacity in which a defendant is sued "need not coincide" with the capacity in which the defendant was acting when the alleged improper conduct occurred. Id. Therefore, the appellees' reliance on Will is misplaced; Nelson properly named the officers as defendants for purposes of his section 1983 suit.

State officials sued in their individual capacities are persons under § 1983 and are not absolutely immune from personal liability solely because their acts were official.

Trout v. Bennett · filed 1992-04-09

We hold that under the United States Supreme Court decision in Hafer, Andrea Bennett, State Auditor and Commissioner of Insurance of Montana was sued by Trout in her individual capacity and as a result can be classified as a “person” within the meaning of § 1983, and that as such a state officer, Andrea Bennett is not absolutely immune from personal liability under § 1983 solely by virtue of the “official” nature of her acts.

Section 1983 does not permit a refund claim against a state tax administrator acting in his official capacity because the state is not a person under the statute.

Seibert v. Clark · filed 1993-02-05

It is well settled that an action under § 1983 will not lie against the state or state officials acting within their official capacities, because the state is not a “person” within the meaning of that statute’s provisions.

A state official sued in an official capacity is not a “person” subject to liability under § 1983.

Thomas v. Collins · filed 1993-04-01

Furthermore, in suing Collins, appellant relied on 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ... The United State Supreme Court has held, however, that neither a state nor its officials acting in their official capacities are “persons” who may be liable under this act. ... Therefore, appellant’s action against Collins in his official capacity is not maintainable for this reason as well.

Section 1983 permits personal damages against state officials for acts taken in their official capacities only when they are sued in their individual capacities.

O'MALLEY v. Sheriff of Worcester County · filed 1993-05-04

Thus, the rule, properly stated, is that State officials may be held personally liable for damages because of actions taken in their official capacities only if they are sued in their individual capacities.

Section 1983 permits personal-capacity liability for state agents, including a hospital physician exercising authority over an employee’s return to work.

Raiser v. O'SHAUGHNESSY · filed 1993-08-13

In any event, quite apart from Schiappa’s potential liability under Title VII, there is no dispute that he, like all other agents of the state, may be held liable in his personal capacity under § 1983.

When a § 1983 damages complaint names one state official in an individual capacity but does not specify the capacity of other officials in its body, the caption controls whether those other officials are sued individually.

Shoshone-Bannock Tribes v. Fish & Game Commission · filed 1994-12-16

Since the Tribes explicitly named one of the officials in his individual capacity, those officials as to whom the caption was silent could assume that they were not being sued in their individual capacities. Under these circumstances, where the plaintiff fails to specify in the body of the complaint the capacity in which suit is brought against the defendants, we hold that what is, and is not, expressly stated in the caption controls.

Section 1983 does not allow a claim for back pay against state officers acting in their official capacities; the exception for such claims applies to prospective relief.

Gaines v. New York State Division for Youth · filed 1995-03-16

In Will v Michigan Dept. of State Police (491 US 58), the United States Supreme Court held that State officers, acting in their official capacities, may not be held liable pursuant to 42 USC § 1983 (supra, at 71) unless the relief sought, by the petitioner is prospective in nature (supra, at 71, n 10). The relief requested in the case at bar is back pay; therefore, petitioner’s civil rights claim under 42 USC § 1983 and her derivative claim for counsel fees pursuant to 42 USC § 1988 must fail (see, supra; Maine v Thiboutot, 448 US 1).

Section 1983 requires individual wrongdoing by state officials sued in their individual capacities for damages.

Stoner v. Wisconsin Department of Agriculture, Trade & Consumer Protection · filed 1995-03-23

He can sue Kohl and Steinhoff as individuals, but to survive summary judgment on the merits and obtain a damages remedy he will have to demonstrate individual wrongdoing on their part.

Section 1983 does not treat a state or a state official sued in an official capacity as a person subject to liability.

Caffey v. Johnson · filed 1995-03-29

In Will v. Michigan Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 70, 109 S.Ct. 2304, 2312, 105 L.Ed.2d 45 (1989), the Supreme Court held that neither the state nor a state official is a “person” for purposes of liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Thus, the claim against defendant Collins should be dismissed.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on state officials sued in their official capacities because they are not persons under the statute.

Turageon v. Goodnow · filed 1995-07-11

Moreover, in Will v. Michigan Dept, of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989), the Supreme Court held that both a State and its officials "acting in their official capacities" are outside the class of "persons" subject to liability under § 1983. For this reason as well, the court dismisses the suit against Goodnow in his official capacity as Clerk of the Strafford County Superior Court.

Section 1983 does not permit damages claims against state officials sued in their official capacities.

Freedom from Religion Foundation, Inc. v. Romer · filed 1996-06-27

Thus, damages claims against the governor, attorney general, state treasurer, and directors of state agencies, boards, and departments, to the extent that they are sued in their official capacity, must be dismissed.

Section 1983 allows damages claims against state officials in their individual capacities, but state officials sued in their official capacities are not persons under the statute.

'Abdullah v. Secretary of Public Safety · filed 1997-03-28

‘Abdullah’s claims for damages against the defendants must be viewed as against them only in their individual capacities. “State officials sued for damages in their official capacity are not ‘persons’ under § 1983 because the law treats the action as [one] against the official’s office and hence against the State.”

In a § 1983 damages complaint naming state officials without specifying capacity, the officials are presumed sued in their individual capacities.

Lee v. Regents of the University of Nevada Dwaine Knight Jim Higgins · filed 1997-05-05

Although Lee did not explicitly state in the complaint that Knight and Higgins were being sued in their individual capacities, "[w]here state officials are named in a complaint which seeks damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, it is presumed that the officials are being sued in their individual capacities." Shoshone-Bannock Tribes v. Fish & Game Comm'n, 42 F.3d 1278, 1284 (9th Cir.1994).

State officials sued in their individual capacities are persons under § 1983 and are not entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity.

Lawry v. State of California Employment Development Department Marshall E. Conner Gerald Leonardo · filed 1997-05-28

Because state officials sued in their individual capacity are persons for purposes of § 1983 and are not entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity, see Hafer, 502 U.S. at 31, the district court erred by dismissing Lawry's claims against Conner and Leonardo on these grounds.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim for retrospective damages against a state governor sued in his official capacity because an official sued in that capacity is not a person under the section.

Pontbriand v. Sundlun · filed 1997-08-15

The Court therefore held that “neither a State nor its officials acting in their official capacities are ‘persons’ under § 1983.” 491 U.S. at 71, 109 S.Ct. at 2312, 105 L.Ed.2d at 58. We are bound by Will’s authoritative construction of § 1983. Since the depositors have sued the Governor in his official capacity that portion of the depositors’ complaint based upon 42 U.S.C. § 1983 was properly denied by summary judgment.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim against a state official sued in an official capacity because that official is not a “person” under the section.

Hart v. Miller · filed 2000-04-19

Precedent establishes that state officials sued in their official capacities are not “persons” within the ambit of § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit claims against state employees sued in their official capacity.

Palmer v. Ohio State University · filed 2002-09-18

The district court properly held that it did not have jurisdiction over Palmer’s claims against a state agency and that the defendants were not amenable to suit under § 1983 insofar as they were sued in their official capacity as state employees.

Section 1983 permits claims against state officers in their individual capacities even when claims against them in their official capacities are barred.

Johnson v. Wolgemuth · filed 2003-03-10

What this means is that only Johnson’s Fourth Cause of Action, for deprivation of his civil rights, actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, stated as to Wolgemuth and Weaver (and as-of-yet-unnamed John Doe Defendants), remains viable, and only to the extent they have been named in their individual capacities.

Section 1983 is the exclusive federal remedy for a Section 1981 violation by a state actor sued in an individual capacity.

McCormick v. Miami University · filed 2012-09-10

Whether the violation of §1981 is committed by a municipality through its policies or custom, or individuals acting under the color of state law, §1983 contains an express clause permitting an aggrieved person to sue the state actor for money damages. Section 1983’s express clause permitting these suits obviates the need to imply the same right under the general provisions of § 1981.

Section 1983 claims against state officers in their individual capacities are not barred by Eleventh Amendment immunity when they allege personal constitutional violations.

Freeman v. The Board of Trustees of the University of Illinois · filed 2018-01-29

In this matter, Freeman alleges that Lubin personally violated his constitutional rights. Thus, the individual liability claim brought against Lubin is not barred by the Eleventh Amendment.

Section 1983 does not permit money damages against state officers sued in their official capacities because they are not persons subject to suit under the section.

Cisco v. Myers · filed 2020-03-03

Thus, because Plaintiff seeks money damages from state officers or employees in their official capacities, he fails to allege cognizable claims under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim against a state corrections agency, including a claim against one of its officers in an official capacity.

Seeber v. Payton · filed 2020-04-24

The additional claims were dismissed upon initial review of the Complaint because a claim against a state officer is actually a claim directly against the state agency and KDOC cannot be subject to suit under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit punitive damages against municipal defendants.

Falk v. County of Suffolk · filed 1991-12-24

However, the court, on its own motion, dismisses the claims for punitive damages under Section 1983 against the municipal defendants. Such relief is unavailable.

Municipalities are immune from punitive damages under § 1983.

East Coast Novelty Co., Inc. v. City of New York · filed 1992-01-02

To the extent that East Coast seeks punitive damages from the City under § 1983, those claims are thereby dismissed.

Section 1983 does not allow punitive damages against a municipality.

City of West Haven v. Hartford Insurance · filed 1992-02-11

The United States Supreme Court has made it clear that a municipality is immune from punitive damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ... The trial court therefore correctly concluded that if West Haven is to be held vicariously liable for punitive damages, it must be found liable under a statutory basis.

A municipality is immune from punitive damages under § 1983.

Rowson v. County of Arlington, Va. · filed 1992-03-19

Defendant also argues that Plaintiff’s claims for punitive damages should be dismissed because a municipality is not liable for punitive damages under § 1983. The court agrees. In City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 271, 101 S.Ct. 2748, 2762, 69 L.Ed.2d 616 (1981), the Supreme Court held that a municipality is immune from punitive damages under § 1983. Thus, the claim for punitive damages against Arlington County must be dismissed.

Punitive damages are not recoverable against a municipality under § 1983.

Holder v. City of Allentown · filed 1993-08-18

However, the language demanding punitive damages against Allentown under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 shall be stricken, as this Court has previously held in this case that plaintiff may not recover punitive damages against a municipality under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit punitive damages against a governmental entity.

Kubany v. School Board of Pinellas County · filed 1993-11-20

On the issue of damages, as Defendant School Board points out, punitive damages are not available under § 1983 from a governmental entity. ... Therefore, Plaintiffs damages under this Count will be limited to compensatory damages.

Section 1983 does not permit punitive damages against a municipality.

Provident Mutual Life Insurance v. City of Atlanta · filed 1994-06-27

The awarding of punitive damages against a municipality is against public policy and impermissible as a matter of law.

Section 1983 generally bars punitive damages against municipalities unless federal or state law waives that immunity.

Doe v. City of Chicago · filed 1994-11-16

Punitive damages are not generally available under § 1983 against municipalities unless waived by federal or state law.

Section 1983 does not permit punitive damages against a county board or county commissioners sued in their official capacities.

Malone v. Chambers County Board of Commissioners · filed 1994-12-21

Accordingly, the court finds that the motion of the Board and the Commissioners to dismiss Malone’s request for punitive damages under his Section 1983 claims against them in their official capacities is due to be GRANTED.

Section 1983 does not allow punitive damages against a municipality.

McClam v. City of Norfolk Police Dept. · filed 1995-02-03

Punitive damages are not available against a municipality in a § 1983 action.

Section 1983 does not permit punitive damages against a municipality.

Mauzy v. Mexico School Dist. No. 59 · filed 1995-02-28

However, the Court will strike plaintiff's request for punitive damages against the School District. Punitive damages are not available from a municipality under § 1983.

Section 1983 bars punitive damages against a sheriff in his official capacity because the sheriff’s department is treated like a municipality for that remedy.

Colvin v. McDougall · filed 1995-08-31

We hold that Newport’’s reasoning applies equally to a Sheriffs Department, thus barring a punitive damage award against Sheriff McDougall in his official capacity.

Section 1983 allows compensatory damages against municipalities but bars punitive damages against them.

Shabazz v. Dupnik · filed 1995-09-28

Although a municipality may be liable for compensatory damages in § 1983 actions, it is immune from punitive damages under the statute.

Section 1983 bars punitive damages against municipal officers sued in their official capacities because those awards run against the municipality.

Mitchell v. Dupnik · filed 1995-09-28

Although a municipality may be liable for compensatory damages in Sec. 1983 actions, it is immune from punitive damages under the statute. ... The district court's award of $100,000 in punitive damages against Dupnik, Bosman and Fimbers in their official capacities is in reality an assessment against the county, which is immune from such damages.

Municipalities are immune from punitive damages in actions under § 1983.

Lyons v. City of Lewiston · filed 1995-10-19

A municipality is immune from punitive damages in a section 1983 action.

Section 1983 does not permit punitive damages against a municipality.

Barnes Foundation v. Township of Lower Merion · filed 1996-06-03

The Township's motion to strike the punitive damages claim is granted. See Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 271, 101 S.Ct. 2748, 2762, 69 L.Ed.2d 616 (1981) ("a municipality is immune from punitive damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983").

Section 1983 does not permit punitive damages against a municipal housing authority.

Dumas v. Chicago Housing Authority · filed 1996-06-11

Accordingly the Court held that “a municipality is immune from punitive damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.” ... Accordingly, the CHA’s motion to strike all Plaintiffs prayers for punitive damages is granted with prejudice.

Section 1983 does not allow punitive damages against a municipality.

Ferguson v. City of Phoenix · filed 1996-07-17

Finally, with respect to their § 1983 claim, the City is correct that plaintiffs are precluded from recovering punitive damages.

Section 1983 does not permit punitive damages against municipalities.

Robey v. Chester County · filed 1996-09-12

A municipality is immune from punitive damages under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit punitive damages against the estate of a deceased defendant.

Blissett v. Eisensmidt · filed 1996-09-18

The court grants JMOL in favor of the estate of Daniel Casey because, as will be explained herein, the court concludes that punitive damages are not recoverable against the estate in this section 1983 action.

Punitive damages are unavailable under § 1983 against a municipality.

Storm v. Town of Woodstock, NY · filed 1996-10-31

Finally, plaintiffs’ claim for punitive damages is dismissed sua sponte on the ground that the Town is the sole remaining defendant in this action, and punitive damages are not available under § 1983 against a municipality.

Section 1983 does not permit punitive damages against municipalities.

Sintra, Inc. v. City of Seattle · filed 1997-04-17

Because municipalities are immune from punitive damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 101 S.Ct. 2748, 69 L.Ed.2d 616 (1981), the only issue is whether the trial court erred with respect to the individual Defendants (Holly Miller and Ovid Thompson) for their post-July 15, 1986 conduct.

Section 1983 does not allow punitive damages against a local agency.

McLaughlin v. Rose Tree Media School District · filed 1998-04-22

Punitive damages are not available against a local agency for plaintiffs federal claims under Title VII and § 1983.

Municipalities are immune from punitive damages under § 1983.

Satterfield v. Borough of Schuylkill Haven · filed 1998-07-07

We will grant the Defendants’ Motion regarding punitive damages in part, dismissing all punitive damages claims against the Defendant Borough which may arise under § 1983 or state law.

Section 1983 does not permit punitive damages against a local government.

Wells v. Dallas Independent School District · filed 1983-12-14

A body of local government such as the DISD is immune from punitive damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because a municipality can have no malice independent of the malice of its officials.

Section 1983 permits a claim against a municipality to proceed even when only nominal damages are available.

Amato v. City of Saratoga Springs · filed 1999-03-15

Precisely because nominal damages afford a litigant vindication of the deprivation of his constitutional rights, the decision to dismiss a plaintiffs claim against a municipality because only nominal damages are at stake is error.

Section 1983 does not permit punitive damages against a governmental entity.

Aristil v. HOUSING AUTHORITY OF CITY OF TAMPA · filed 1999-06-08

Plaintiffs respond to the Housing Authority’s Motion to Strike by conceding that punitive damages are not recoverable against a governmental entity under section 1983. Therefore, the Court will strike Plaintiffs’ claims for punitive damages from Counts I and II of Plaintiffs’ Complaint.

Section 1983 does not allow punitive damages against a municipality merely because an unconstitutional act followed an official municipal policy.

Ciraolo v. City of New York · filed 2000-06-15

As a result, the fact that Ciraolo’s strip search occurred because of an established City policy in no way distinguishes her case from other § 1983 cases in which municipal liability is established, and cannot suffice to place this case within the seemingly narrow exception carved out by footnote 29.

Section 1983 does not permit punitive damages against a municipality.

Burton v. City of Philadelphia · filed 2000-10-25

The law is clear that punitive damages are not available against a municipality under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not allow punitive damages against municipalities or other state and local government entities.

Doe v. County Of Centre · filed 2001-03-05

As to § 1983, City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., stands for the proposition that municipalities, and more broadly, state and local governments entities, are immune from punitive damages under that statute.

Section 1983 bars punitive damages against a municipality except in an extreme situation where taxpayers are directlyly responsible for an outrageous abuse of constitutional rights.

Hart v. Westchester County Department of Social Services · filed 2001-03-30

Punitive damages are not available in a section 1983 action against a municipality except in an “extreme situation where the taxpayers are directly responsible for perpetrating an outrageous abuse of constitutional rights.”

Section 1983 bars punitive damages against municipalities.

Mitros v. Borough of Glenolden · filed 2001-07-24

With respect to the Borough of Glenolden, punitive damages claims are barred against municipalities under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit punitive damages against municipalities or officials sued in their official capacities.

Watson v. City of Kansas City · filed 2001-11-21

Accordingly, the court finds neither the municipal defendant, nor the individual defendants acting in their official capacity, are subject to punitive damages, either under the plaintiffs’ § 1983 claims or under the state law claims.

Section 1983 does not permit punitive damages against a public school district as a municipal entity.

Schultzen v. Woodbury Central Community School District · filed 2002-02-22

The court agrees with the parties that an award of punitive damages is not available against the school district under either section 1983 or Chapter 216.

Section 1983 does not permit punitive damages against municipalities.

Grimm v. Borough of Norristown · filed 2002-03-11

Moreover, it is clear that municipal entities are immune from punitive damages under Section 1983.

Municipalities are immune from punitive damages in § 1983 suits, and an award entered without a timely objection may be vacated on plain error review.

Chestnut v. City of Lowell · filed 2002-09-20

The main hitch with the plain error doctrine is that City of Newport described the protection against punitive damages as an “immunity,” rather than as a “rule” forbidding punitive damages. ... The judgment insofar as it awards punitive damages against the City is vacated and the matter is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.

Section 1983 does not permit punitive damages against a municipality.

Center v. City of West Carrollton · filed 2002-09-27

In light of the longstanding precedent that punitive damages are unavailable against municipalities, Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment on Plaintiffs claim for punitive damages under § 1983 is SUSTAINED.

Section 1983 does not allow punitive damages against a municipality or municipal officers sued in their official capacities.

Lakits v. York · filed 2003-04-23

With respect to Plaintiffs claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Count I of the Complaint), the United States Supreme Court has unambiguously held that punitive damages may not be recovered against a municipal defendant. ... Nor can punitive damages be recovered against York and Brownmiller, in their official capacities, with respect to Plaintiffs § 1983 claims. ... Thus, York and Brownmiller, in them capacities as officers of the Borough, are immune from Plaintiffs § 1983 punitive damages claims.

Section 1983 does not permit punitive damages against municipalities.

Radloff v. City of Oelwein · filed 2003-05-19

The court agrees with the parties that an award of punitive damages is not available against the city of Oelwein under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not authorize punitive damages against a municipality.

Krohn v. New York City Police Department · filed 2003-08-25

As the parties agree, neither 42 U.S.C. § 1983 nor N.Y. Exec. Law § 290 authorizes the award of punitive damages against a municipality.

Section 1983 permits punitive damages against individual defendants in appropriate circumstances.

Lifton v. Board of Educ. of City of Chicago · filed 2003-11-10

That case did not hold, however, that individuals are immune from punitive damages in section 1983 suits. To the contrary, the Court noted that section 1983 permits punitive damages against individual defendants in appropriate circumstances.

Section 1983 does not permit punitive damages against municipalities.

Roskos v. Sugarloaf Township · filed 2003-11-26

Therefore, we conclude that Defendants Sugarloaf Township, Sugarloaf Township Police Department and Sugar-loaf Township Supervisors are not liable for punitive damages under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit punitive damages against municipalities.

Feirson v. District of Columbia · filed 2004-03-30

It is well established that, under § 1983, municipalities are immune from punitive damages.

Section 1983 does not permit punitive damages against municipalities.

Nash v. City of Oakwood · filed 1982-03-25

However, the Supreme Court has emphatically indicated that municipalities are not liable for punitive damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ... Thus, since punitive damages cannot be recovered against the City of Oak-wood, the fact that they have been requested does not detract from the propriety of class certification.

Section 1983 does not permit punitive damages against a municipality.

Miller v. City Of Mission · filed 1983-04-11

In City of Newport, decided after the trial of this case, the Supreme Court concluded that "a municipality is immune from punitive damages under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983." 453 U.S. at 271, 101 S.Ct. at 2762. ... Consequently, we reverse the punitive damages award against the City.

Punitive damages against officers in a Section 1983 action may be reduced when the award is grossly excessive in light of their conduct.

Kerr v. Quinn · filed 1982-03-15

Under these circumstances, an assessment that $20,000 be awarded for punitive damages constitutes a verdict so grossly excessive “that it would be a miscarriage of justice to permit it to stand.”

Punitive damages under § 1983 require malicious conduct or callous or reckless indifference to protected rights.

Oldfather v. Ohio Department of Transportation · filed 1986-09-30

Defendants Smith and Tipton did not act maliciously or with callous or reckless indifference to Plaintiff’s constitutional rights in depriving Plaintiff of her equal protection of the laws, and so are not liable for punitive damages for their violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 supports punitive damages for a constitutional-rights violation, subject to federal review for excessiveness.

McGee v. Hester · filed 1987-04-06

In his complaint, McGee requested $250,000 in punitive damages for violation of his constitutional rights under section 1983 and $250,000 in punitive damages for intentional interferences with his business under state law. The jury awarded $50,000 in punitive damages, but did not attach this award to either action. We therefore review Hester’s claim that the jury’s punitive damage award was excessive under both federal and Arkansas law. ... Although the amount may seem large, we do not believe that it shocks the conscience. ... We thus uphold the jury’s punitive damage award of $50,000.

Section 1983 allows actual damages against a municipality but does not authorize punitive damages against it.

Davis v. City of Kinloch · filed 1988-05-24

In reversing the directed verdict on Count I we limit the holding to plaintiff’s claim against the city for actual damages. Punitive damages against municipalities are not authorized.

Section 1983 does not permit punitive damages against municipal officials sued only in their official capacities.

Singh v. Superintending School Comm. of Portland · filed 1985-01-30

Since the school committee members are municipal officials sued only in their official capacities, see Report of Preliminary Pretrial Conference (Sept. 8,1983), it is clear that punitive damages would not be available if they were sought under section 1983.

Section 1983 permits punitive damages when the defendant acts with evil motive or intent or with reckless or callous indifference to federally protected rights.

Royal v. Brandt · filed 2004-07-15

A factfinder may assess punitive damages in a section 1983 action when a “defendant’s conduct is shown to be motivated by evil motive or intent, or when it involves reckless or callous indifference to the federally protected rights of others.”

In a § 1983 action, a defendant seeking to reduce punitive damages based on limited financial resources bears the burden of presenting evidence of those limits.

Tapalian v. Town of Seekonk · filed 2004-07-23

The present argument ignores the principle that it is the defendant's burden – not the plaintiff's – to adduce evidence of the defendant's lack of financial resources, ... and Tusino concededly failed to meet that burden.

Local government entities are immune from punitive damages in actions brought under Section 1983.

Shaw v. Coosa County Commission · filed 2004-08-04

Moreover, it is well-settled that local government entities are immune from punitive damages in action brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Punitive damages are unavailable on a § 1983 claim against a defendant in his official capacity.

Surprenant v. Rivas, et al. · filed 2004-08-17

Although Surprenant was awarded only nominal damages on his successful claim against O’Mara, punitive damages were not available because the claim was brought against O’Mara in his official capacity.

Section 1983 does not permit punitive damages against a municipality.

Hershell Gill Consulting Engineers, Inc. v. Miami-Dade County · filed 2004-08-24

Punitive damages are not available under § 1983 against a municipality, and the plaintiffs cannot try to get around this reality by seeking a sum so high that only the County could pay it.

Section 1983 does not permit punitive damages against a municipality.

Farmer v. Police Department of Carrboro · filed 2004-09-14

The court properly noted that Farmer’s complaint was filed in the wrong district and he could not seek punitive damages against a municipality under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000).

Section 1983 permits punitive damages when a defendant acts with evil motive or intent, or with reckless or callous indifference to federally protected rights.

Royal v. Kautzky · filed 2004-09-14

A factfinder may assess punitive damages in a section 1983 action when a "defendant's conduct is shown to be motivated by evil motive or intent, or when it involves reckless or callous indifference to the federally protected rights of others." Wade, 461 U.S. at 56, 103 S.Ct. 1625.

Section 1983 does not permit punitive damages against municipalities.

Sheaffer v. County of Chatham · filed 2004-09-17

Because punitive damages are not available against a municipality, Plaintiffs claim for punitive damages under § 1983 will be dismissed.

Section 1983 does not allow punitive damages against a municipality, including a municipal agency.

Farmer v. Wilson Housing Authority · filed 2004-10-06

A municipali ... ty (including a municipal agency) is immune from punitive damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 permits punitive damages when a defendant acts with evil motive or intent, or with reckless or callous indifference to federally protected rights.

Fiordalisi v. Zubek · filed 2004-10-27

A jury may assess punitive damages in a section 1983 action if it finds that the defendant’s conduct was motivated by “evil motive or intent” or involved “reckless or callous indifference to the federally protected rights of others.”

A willfulness allegation is sufficient to plead punitive damages on a § 1983 claim.

Halstead v. Township of Cumru · filed 1986-11-07

The allegation of willfulness is sufficient to state a claim for punitive damages in the complaint.

Section 1983 does not permit punitive damages against a municipality.

Brantley v. City of MacOn · filed 2005-05-09

As Defendants argue, punitive damages are not recoverable against a municipality under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ... Accordingly Plaintiff is not entitled to receive punitive damages against Defendant City of Macon in the event she prevails on either claim, and summary judgment is due to be GRANTED in this respect.

Section 1983 bars punitive damages against a port authority when the cost of a judgment would likely be passed on to the public.

Petchem, Inc. v. Canaveral Port Authority · filed 2005-05-13

Based on this reasoning, the Court joins at least one other court in this district in extending the scope of immunity from punitive damages claims to non- or quasi-municipal entities like the Port Authority.

Section 1983 permits punitive damages when a defendant acts with evil motive or reckless or callous indifference to federally protected rights.

Robinson v. Fetterman · filed 2005-07-19

Such damages may be awarded in a § 1983 action “when the defendant’s conduct is shown to be motivated by evil motive or intent, or when it involves reckless or callous indifference to the federally protected rights of others.” ... Defendants’ misconduct caused him real injury and involved reckless or callous indifference to his federally protected rights. ... We will award Robinson punitive damages against each defendant in the amount of $2,000.

Section 1983 permits punitive damages for intentional violations of federal law or conduct motivated by evil intent or reckless or callous indifference to federally protected rights.

Luessenhop v. Clinton County, NY · filed 2005-07-20

Punitive damages will be awarded when “the defendant’s violation of federal law was intentional, ... or when the defendant’s conduct is shown to be motivated by evil motive or intent, or when it involves reckless or callous indifference to the federally protected rights of others[.]”

Section 1983 does not permit punitive damages against government entities.

Lee v. Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority · filed 2005-08-05

Punitive damages may not be awarded against SEPTA or other government entities under § 1983.

Punitive damages for reckless indifference under § 1983 require proof that the defendant knew or recognized a risk that the conduct would violate federal rights.

Swipies v. Kofka · filed 2005-08-12

To establish that punitive damages were appropriate on the basis of reckless indifference, Mr. Swipies needed to show that Deputy Kofka knew that he was violating Mr. Swipies's federal rights or recognized that he might be doing so.

Section 1983 permits punitive damages for oppressive conduct; when evidence supports that theory, the court must instruct the jury on it.

Dang v. Cross · filed 2005-08-22

In light of our conclusion that oppressive conduct is a proper predicate for punitive damages under § 1983, we must consider whether the instructions here adequately covered the concept of oppression.