42 U.S.C. § 1983

Section 1983 does not require a certificate of merit for a medical deliberate indifference claim.

Ornstein v. Cessna · filed 2020-01-29

As to the federal constitutional claim against the Moving Defendants, the Court must also deny the motion because there is no requirement under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 that a plaintiff provide a certificate of merit for a medical deliberate indifference claim under U.S. Constitution.

Paying a fine does not, by itself, waive the right to bring a Section 1983 claim.

Muladzhanov v. The City of New York · filed 2020-03-16

The voluntary payment doctrine does not relinquish Plaintiffs’ right to bring a claim under Section 1983.

In this official-capacity claim for prospective relief, the court required a Tennessee policy or custom that caused the alleged constitutional violation.

Wood v. State of Tennessee(PSLC1) · filed 2020-03-27

Notably, Defendant State of Tennessee may only be liable for these claims if its custom or policy caused a violation of Plaintiff’s constitutional rights.

Section 1983 does not permit a governmental entity to be held vicariously liable for its officers’ actions under respondeat superior.

Kaswatuka v. DFW Airport Police · filed 2020-04-29

First, § 1983 does not allow a governmental entity to be held vicariously liable for the actions of its officers under a theory of respondeat superior. ... Because plaintiff's § 1983 claims against a unit of government rely on respondeat superior, such claims should be dismissed.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff seeking to hold a governmental entity liable for a constitutional deprivation to allege that its policy, custom, or official with final policymaking authority caused the deprivation.

McQueary v. State of Florida Child Support Enforcement · filed 2020-05-04

To the extent she is suing the Florida child support enforcement agencies for allowing child support to accrue above $100,000, she has not presented a valid constitutional or § 1983 claim because she has not alleged that any of the agencies’ policies, customs, or officials with final policymaking authorities caused the deprivation of her constitutional rights.

An official-capacity claim under § 1983 requires a government policy or custom that caused the plaintiff’s injury.

Broach v. Colorado Department of Corrections · filed 2020-05-08

Rather, to establish a prima facie § 1983 claim against a governmental entity, a plaintiff must produce sufficient evidence to show (1) the existence of a government policy or custom, which (2) directly caused an injury to the plaintiff.

Section 1983 does not make an entity liable solely because its employees acted.

Borden-Vasallo (ID 108165) v. Miami County Sheriff's Office · filed 2020-06-18

Further, an entity is not liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 simply because its employees took certain actions.

An entity acting under color of state law may face a Section 1983 claim when its policy or custom caused an agent’s constitutional violation.

Smith-Bey v. Warden · filed 2020-08-06

The Court will also allow the claim to proceed as to Wexford, since, construing Plaintiff's pleadings liberally at this early stage, the Court determines he has alleged a Wexford policy, practice, or custom of denying or delaying necessary treatment.

Section 1983 allows claims against government entities, but an entity cannot be liable when none of its officers committed an underlying constitutional violation.

Asprey v. Northern Wyoming Community · filed 2020-08-11

NWCCD is a “person” subject to § 1983 liability. See Monell, 436 U.S. at 690. Under § 1983, a government entity “may not be held liable where there was no underlying constitutional violation by any of its officers.” Donahue, 948 F.3d at 1199 ... (internal quotation marks omitted). “Without an underlying constitutional violation” by Trebby, NWCCD “cannot be liable.” Id.

Section 1983 requires a claim against an entity to allege an official policy that directly caused the constitutional violation.

Dunn v. NENMDF · filed 2020-08-20

And, to the extent the Amended Complaint raises claims against GEO Group, there are no allegations demonstrating GEO Group “had an ‘official . . . policy of some nature . . . that was the direct cause or moving force behind the constitutional violations.” Dubbs v. Head Start, Inc., 336 F.3d 1194, 1216 (10th Cir. 2003).

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff suing an entity that provides prison healthcare to allege that the entity’s policy or custom caused the constitutional violation.

PAGLIAROLI v. NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS · filed 2020-09-18

Here, Plaintiff would need to provide facts showing that UCHC and/or Rutgers had a relevant policy or custom, and that the policy or custom caused the constitutional violation he alleges.

Section 1983 permits liability against an entity only when its custom or policy causes a violation of federal law.

Baker v. Trinity Services Group · filed 2021-01-08

Moreover, where Baker has asserted this claim only against Trinity and CCS and not an individual correctional or medical staff member, such an entity may be held liable under § 1983 only to the extent that it has a custom or policy that causes a violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States, such as a policy of deliberate indifference to serious medical needs. See Austin v. Paramount Parks, Inc., 195 F.3d 715, 727-28 (4th Cir. 1999); Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of the City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 690-91 (1978). Here, the Complaint does not allege, and does not provide sufficient facts to show, that CCS has such a custom or policy.

Section 1983 protects against constitutional violations; a violation of police department policy alone does not establish liability.

MITCHELL v. CITY OF INDIANAPOLIS · filed 2020-03-31

However, the Seventh Circuit “has consistently held that ‘42 U.S.C. § 1983 protects plaintiffs from constitutional violations, not violations of … departmental regulations and police practices.” Thompson v. City of Chicago, 472 F.3d 444, 454 (7th Cir. 2006) (quoting Scott, 346 F.3d at 760). While the IMPD’s policies are not completely irrelevant to our analysis, they are not determinative of the Fourth Amendment reasonableness inquiry here.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim for violations of a government agency’s internal policies alone.

Phillips v. Baxter · filed 2020-05-06

Accordingly, any violation of the IDHS policy is not actionable under Section 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for violating police policy unless the conduct also violates a constitutional right.

Rizk v. City of New York · filed 2020-05-22

Accordingly, an act or omission that violates police policy but does not also violate constitutional rights is not actionable under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim for a violation of a state corrections policy alone.

Maddux v. Metzger · filed 2020-11-16

Defendants’ alleged failure to follow DOC Policy 8.60 is not itself a violation subject to § 1983.

Section 1983 permits a claim against a court reporter who intentionally alters a transcript to deny a litigant due process; an alleged inaccuracy alone does not establish intentional alteration.

Johnson v. Piontek · filed 2020-04-01

Further, although court reporters can be liable if they intentionally modify transcripts to deny a litigant due process, Loubser v. Thacker, 440 F.3d 439, 442 (7th Cir. 2006), nothing in Johnson’s allegation that the transcript did not appear “word for word,” nor his assertion on appeal that the transcript “did not coincide with prior proceedings of what was stated on record,” plausibly suggests that Piontek intentionally altered the transcript.

Section 1983 does not provide medical parole as injunctive relief for inadequate medical care.

McGiboney v. Corizon · filed 2020-04-03

The Court agreed with Defendants that medical parole was not available injunctive relief in an action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and denied the Motion to the extent it requested such remedy.

A prevailing defendant in a § 1983 action may recover taxable costs without showing that the plaintiff’s action was frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation.

(PC) Barker v. Osemwingie · filed 2020-04-21

However, unlike with claims brought under the ADA, this same standard does not apply to the award of costs to a defendant prevailing on a § 1983 claim.

Section 1983 does not provide a freestanding claim of actual innocence, even when that claim is unavailable in habeas corpus.

Walker v. Cuomo · filed 2020-05-18

His inability to assert a freestanding claim for actual innocence in a habeas corpus petition does not create a legal right for him to assert such a claim in a Section 1983 action.

Section 1983 cannot be used to expunge a criminal record.

Luster v. Cahokia Police Department · filed 2020-07-10

Finally, Plaintiff cannot use Section 1983 or the FTCA to expunge his criminal record. If he seeks to challenge a sentence or conviction, he should do so in a direct appeal, post-conviction petition, or habeas action.

Section 1983 does not allow a plaintiff to seek another person’s prosecution or an investigation of jail administration.

Chambers v. Carter County Jail · filed 2020-07-16

However, Plaintiff “lacks a judicially cognizable interest in the prosecution or nonprosecution of another.” Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 619 (1973). Thus, these claims are not cognizable under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not let a plaintiff obtain an order directing another person's criminal prosecution.

WARE v. SANCHEZ-BERMUDEZ · filed 2020-11-05

Courts “have long held that a civil rights plaintiff may not seek relief in civil litigation in the form of an order directing the criminal prosecution of some third parties,” finding that those plaintiffs lack standing or that such relief is simply unavailable in a civil suit.

Section 1983 does not allow bystanders to recover for emotional harm from witnessing police conduct when they were neither the objects of that conduct nor physically injured by it.

Crane v. City of Arlington Texas · filed 2020-07-16

Because Plaintiffs failed to plead facts showing that Jefferson, Johnson, or Z.C. were the object of Roper’s conduct or physically harmed by that conduct, the Court finds that they are bystanders of this incident and therefore do not have a § 1983 claim.

The alternate dispute resolution procedure requested by the plaintiff is unavailable in a Section 1983 action.

Logan v. Meeker · filed 2020-10-20

Plaintiff files [6], a letter and [7], a motion, each requesting alternate dispute resolution. This procedure is not available to Plaintiff in a § 1983 action.