42 U.S.C. § 1983

Section 1983 cannot be used to vacate a conviction.

Repotski v. AMS Law PC · filed 2018-01-30

Moreover, to the extent that Repotski is asking the Court to vacate his conviction, a § 1983 complaint is not the proper vehicle for his request.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim attacking a conviction unless the conviction has been reversed, expunged, declared invalid, or otherwise formally called into question.

Creel v. Bowen · filed 2018-03-14

Because Creel’s escape conviction has not been reversed, expunged, declared invalid, or otherwise formally called into question, such a complaint is not cognizable under § 1983.

Section 1983 cannot be used to challenge a state conviction or sentence; the prisoner must seek habeas corpus relief or appropriate state relief.

Sharpfish v. Flemmer · filed 2018-04-30

Plaintiff is seeking to challenge his state court conviction arid sentence. “He must seek federal habeas corpus relief (or appropriate state relief) instead.”

Section 1983 does not permit a claim challenging a conviction unless the conviction has been invalidated.

West v. Enns · filed 2018-05-15

Thus, his claims, including his “claim of lien” against the defendants, are not cognizable in a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim whose success would necessarily imply the invalidity of a conviction or sentence that has not been invalidated.

Floyd v. Love · filed 2018-05-22

This Court agrees with the magistrate judge that the plaintiff has no chance of success in this civil action because a decision favorable to the plaintiff “would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence.”

Section 1983 does not provide a vehicle to challenge a state conviction and seek removal from sex offender registration based on that conviction; that claim is treated as a habeas petition.

Fulbright v. Biltort · filed 2018-08-27

Mr. Fulbright filed this action as a § 1983 civil rights complaint. However, because the complaint challenges his 2014 state criminal conviction and requests removal from KORA registration, that portion of the complaint is properly considered as a petition for writ of habeas corpus.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim whose success would necessarily imply that a conviction is unlawful unless the conviction has been invalidated.

Mount v. Wakefield · filed 2018-09-14

Because Mount failed to allege or demonstrate that his convictions have “been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into question by a federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus,” Heck, 512 U.S. at 487, his claims were not cognizable under § 1983, and the district court did not err in dismissing his complaint as frivolous, see Hamilton v. Lyons, 74 F.3d 99, 103 (5th Cir. 1996).

Section 1983 cannot be used to challenge the validity of a state conviction barred by Heck.

Murphy v. Willmore · filed 2018-11-05

More specifically, we agree with the district court that: (1) the doctrines of judicial and prosecutorial immunity preclude Murphy’s claims against the state court judge and prosecutors, see Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11 (1991) (discussing judicial immunity); Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 424 (1976) (discussing prosecutorial immunity); (2) the Supreme Court’s decision in Heck prevents Murphy from challenging the validity of his state court conviction by way of a § 1983 action; and (3) Murphy’s challenge to the validity of his arrest was untimely, see Garza v. Burnett, 672 F.3d 1217, 1219 (10th Cir. 1995) (applying Utah’s four-year residual statute of limitations to claim brought under § 1983).

Section 1983 claims for injunctive relief are barred when success would necessarily demonstrate the invalidity of a conviction that has not been overturned or otherwise called into question.

Blankumsee v. Washington County Circuit Ct. · filed 2018-12-13

Upon review, we conclude that these claims are barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1994). See Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 82 (2005) (holding that “a state prisoner’s § 1983 action is barred (absent prior invalidation)—no matter the relief sought (damages or equitable relief), no matter the target of the prisoner’s suit (state conduct leading to conviction or internal prison proceedings)—if success in that action would necessarily demonstrate the invalidity of confinement or its duration”).

Section 1983 does not provide relief overturning a conviction; that relief must be sought through habeas corpus.

Larry Bell, Sr. v. Conard · filed 2019-01-30

Nor was he entitled to have his conviction overturned, as he has requested, because this relief is only available by filing a petition for a writ of habeas corpus.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim that would necessarily imply the invalidity of a conviction unless the conviction or sentence has been overturned.

Krocka v. Hillsborough County Sheriff's Office · filed 2019-02-06

Because, in this instance, a judgment in Mr. Krocka’s favor “would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence,” Heck, 512 U.S. 487, and Mr. Krocka’s conviction and sentence have not yet been overturned, he cannot seek or obtain relief at this time.

Section 1983 does not allow a prisoner to challenge the validity of his conviction indirectly.

Peay v. J. Fisher · filed 2019-02-12

First, insofar as Peay argues in his brief to this Court that he is innocent of the crime for which he is currently imprisoned, he may not challenge the validity of his conviction indirectly through § 1983.

Section 1983 claims challenging a prison disciplinary conviction that cost good-time credit cannot proceed unless the conviction has been reversed, expunged, declared invalid, or called into question by a federal court.

Williamson v. Walters · filed 2019-03-01

Citing Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), the Magistrate recommends that Plaintiff’s other claims be dismissed without prejudice because Plaintiff has not alleged that his disciplinary conviction has been reversed, expunged, declared invalid, or called into question by a federal court. ... The report and recommendation is otherwise proper, contains no clear error, and is ADOPTED IN ITS ENTIRETY.

Section 1983 does not permit a prisoner to challenge the validity of a conviction or sentence unless it has first been invalidated.

Titus v. Frakes · filed 2019-06-04

Because Titus’s conviction and sentence have not been set aside or otherwise held invalid, no cognizable claim is stated under § 1983, and this action must be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.

Section 1983 does not permit a damages claim that would undermine a conviction unless the conviction has been invalidated.

Allen v. Hutchison · filed 2019-06-04

Allen’s claims call into question the validity of his convictions, which have not been reversed, expunged, declared invalid, or otherwise called into question. Allen’s claims therefore are not cognizable under § 1983.

Section 1983 cannot be used to obtain relief that would imply a criminal conviction is invalid unless the conviction has first been overturned or otherwise called into question.

Longs v. McManaman · filed 2019-06-28

Absent such a favorable disposition of the charges or conviction, a plaintiff may not use 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to cast doubt on the legality of his conviction or confinement. ... Therefore, to the extent judgment in favor of Plaintiff on any of his claims would render his criminal conviction invalid, his claims for relief are barred by Heck v. Humphrey.

Section 1983 does not provide a way to challenge the validity of a state sentence; that claim must be brought in habeas corpus.

Meredith (ID 84581) v. Parr · filed 2019-07-16

The Court also found that any claim challenging Plaintiff’s state sentence is not cognizable in a § 1983 action.

Section 1983 bars a claim when success would necessarily imply that an underlying conviction is invalid, unless that conviction has been invalidated.

Todd v. United States Federal Corp. · filed 2019-07-17

Thus, any claim based on alleged vigilantism is precisely the kind of claim that is barred under Heck: to grant relief to Todd on the basis that he was falsely accused would necessarily cast doubt on the validity of his underlying conviction or convictions.

Section 1983 bars a prisoner’s suit when success would necessarily invalidate a conviction or sentence that has not previously been invalidated.

Stallworth v. Collins · filed 2019-07-22

Here, Stallworth is challenging the merits of his conviction and sentence, but he has not shown that either was previously invalidated. Thus, his § 1983 action is ... barred.

Section 1983 cannot provide injunctive relief that would necessarily imply the invalidity of a prisoner’s sentence unless the sentence has already been invalidated.

Goley v. Loudon County Sheriff's Department · filed 2019-07-25

The Heck rule extends to claims for injunctive relief where a favorable judgment would necessarily imply the invalidity of a prisoner’s sentence.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim challenging the validity of a state sentence; that challenge must be brought in habeas corpus.

Benson v. Kansas, State of · filed 2019-07-26

Therefore, any claim challenging his state sentence is not cognizable in a § 1983 action.

Section 1983 does not allow a claim that would imply a conviction is invalid unless the conviction has already been invalidated.

Morgan v. Hiwassee Mental Health · filed 2019-08-07

Specifically, in Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486 (1994), the Supreme Court held that if a judgment for plaintiff necessarily implies the invalidity of an underlying criminal conviction, the action must be dismissed unless the plaintiff can show the conviction has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state court, or called into question by a federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus. ... As such, to the extent that Plaintiff seeks relief from his underlying conviction based upon the allegations in the complaint, those allegations fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit a damages claim that necessarily challenges an outstanding criminal conviction.

Dorsey v. District of Columbia · filed 2019-08-08

Because Mr. Dorsey’s claims were not timely raised and necessarily challenge the evidence behind his criminal conviction, this § 1983 civil action cannot proceed.

Section 1983 cannot be used to overturn a state criminal conviction; that challenge must proceed through habeas corpus.

Moore v. State of Wisconsin · filed 2019-08-16

As a preliminary matter, Plaintiff may not seek to have his conviction overturned under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 cannot be used to challenge the validity of a conviction.

Bossio v. Graham (INMATE 2) · filed 2019-08-26

Plaintiff cannot use a § 1983 action to challenge the validity of a conviction.

Section 1983 does not allow a prisoner to seek release based on a conviction that has not been invalidated.

(PC) Sanders v. Grimes · filed 2019-08-26

This action was dismissed because Plaintiff seeks release, but did not show that his conviction has been reversed, expunged, declared invalid, or called into question such to be allowed to proceed under § 1983 -- which is barred under Heck.

Section 1983 does not permit a prisoner to bring a claim that would invalidate a conviction or sentence unless it has already been invalidated.

ELLIS v. THOMAS COUNTY GEORGIA · filed 2019-08-26

Heck thus prevents a prisoner from bringing a § 1983 action that would invalidate a sentence or conviction unless the sentence or conviction in question has previously been invalidated.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim that would call a conviction into question unless the conviction has first been invalidated.

Spencer 753452 v. Grand Rapids, City of · filed 2019-08-30

Plaintiff’s allegations clearly call into question the validity of his conviction. Therefore, his action is barred under Heck unless and until his criminal conviction has been invalidated.

Section 1983 does not permit a prisoner to seek relief that would imply the invalidity of a disciplinary conviction unless that conviction has been overturned.

Roscoe v. Mullins · filed 2019-09-10

Nonetheless, Mullins argues that prisoners may not bring suit under § 1983 for relief that, if granted, would imply the invalidity of the prisoner’s disciplinary offense conviction, unless the conviction has been overturned. ... Here, Roscoe is challenging the validity of his disciplinary offense convictions. The undisputed evidence before the court is that these disciplinary offense convictions were upheld on appeal and have not been overturned. Based on the above, I find no genuine dispute of material fact and that the defendant is entitled to entry of summary judgment in his favor.

Section 1983 does not permit a prisoner to challenge a prison disciplinary conviction; the prisoner must seek relief under state law and, if necessary, through habeas.

Sublett v. Howard · filed 2019-09-23

While it is true that this issue is non- grievable as it relates to a prison disciplinary matter, neither is cognizable in a § 1983 action. Rather, to challenge his disciplinary conviction, Sublett must first pursue relief under state law and then, if necessary, file a habeas action.

Section 1983 does not permit a prisoner’s claim when success would necessarily invalidate the prisoner’s conviction or sentence.

Garcia v. Law Offices of the Public Defender · filed 2019-09-23

Because a favorable ruling on Garcia’s claims would require treating his sentence in D-911-CR-2008-00078 as invalid, all of his civil rights claims in the Complaint must be dismissed under the Heck doctrine.

Section 1983 bars a challenge to a conviction or confinement when success would necessarily undermine a conviction that has not been set aside.

McGriggs v. Dunavant · filed 2019-10-01

Because success in this action would “necessarily demonstrate the invalidity of [his] confinement or its duration,” and because McGriggs’s conviction has not been set aside,3 his § 1983 action is barred in its entirety and must be dismissed.

Section 1983 does not permit a plaintiff to challenge the validity of a conviction; that challenge must be pursued through habeas corpus.

KEMP v. HILL · filed 2019-10-04

It is well-established that a plaintiff cannot pursue a § 1983 action to challenge the validity of his conviction, and instead must pursue a writ of habeas corpus to do so.

Section 1983 bars a claim whose success would necessarily imply the invalidity of convictions or sentences that have not been invalidated.

Greenough v. Fletcher · filed 2019-10-11

A judgment in favor of Plaintiff in this case would “necessarily imply the invalidity” of these convictions and sentences. Heck, 512 U.S. at 487. Plaintiff’s case is therefore still barred by Heck.

A Section 1983 claim that necessarily calls a conviction’s validity into question cannot proceed unless the conviction has already been invalidated.

SIERRA v. DANERI · filed 2019-10-30

Moreover, even if Plaintiff is seeking monetary damages or some other form of relief not available through habeas corpus proceedings, his §1983 action is still barred under the holding of Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), inasmuch as the nature of Plaintiffs’ §1983 claims necessarily calls into question the validity of his underlying state court conviction.

Section 1983 does not permit claims that would call the validity of a prisoner’s confinement into question unless the conviction or sentence has been invalidated.

Mills v. McLeod · filed 2019-11-15

Further, the plaintiff’s claims are not cognizable under § 1983 in any case. His claims are not cognizable insofar as a ruling on them would affect the validity of his confinement unless he shows that his convictions or sentence were reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal, or called into question by the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.

Section 1983 does not provide a way to challenge a conviction; such a claim may be raised in a habeas petition.

Harris v. Bullard · filed 2019-11-27

Moreover, if a plaintiff wishes to challenge his conviction, such a claim is not raised in a Section 1983 action.

Section 1983 bars a prisoner's claim that would necessarily imply the invalidity of a conviction or sentence unless the prisoner has first successfully challenged it.

Shanklin v. State of Tennessee · filed 2019-12-05

Were Shanklin successful in his challenges, it would necessarily call into question the validity of his confinement and sentence. He is therefore barred from raising his claims under § 1983 unless and until he successfully challenges his conviction and sentence in a direct or collateral appeal.

Section 1983 cannot be used to challenge a conviction or sentence while it remains valid.

Castaneda v. Dart · filed 2019-12-09

But the Court cannot entertain those challenges in the context of this First Amendment civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit a damages claim that calls a conviction or sentence into question unless it has already been invalidated.

Miller v. State of Ohio, Stark County Prosecutors Office · filed 2019-12-09

A claim for damages calling into question the validity of conviction or sentence that has not been invalidated is not cognizable under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit damages claims that would undermine the validity of a criminal conviction unless the conviction is reversed.

Gray v. The Attorney General of the State of Maryland · filed 2019-12-10

To the extent that the complaint may be construed as one appropriately filed under § 1983, the claims asserted are barred by the holding in Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1994) (42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims impugning the legality of criminal conviction not cognizable unless conviction is reversed).

Section 1983 does not permit a claim whose success would imply that a conviction or sentence is invalid unless the conviction or sentence has already been set aside.

Swain v. Director of Corrections · filed 2019-12-20

Moreover, as the Court previously explained, a plaintiff cannot bring a civil rights action for damages or equitable relief for a wrongful conviction or imprisonment, or for other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence invalid, unless that conviction or sentence already has been determined to be wrongful.

Section 1983 does not provide a way to challenge the validity of a criminal conviction; that challenge must be pursued through habeas corpus.

Robinson v. State of Nebraska · filed 2020-01-03

Robinson’s opposition to the court’s consideration of his Complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 does not change the court’s conclusion that dismissal was proper based on Robinson’s failure to set forth sufficient factual allegations of fraud that would entitle him to relief under Rule 60(d)(1) or (3)3 and that Robinson’s challenges to his criminal convictions must be pursued in a habeas action according to the dictates of Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994).

Section 1983 does not permit a claim challenging the validity of a conviction unless the conviction has been invalidated.

Gravelle v. Green · filed 2020-01-07

However, even if Plaintiff has been ... unfairly denied state habeas corpus relief, he cannot pursue a claim for constitutional violations under § 1983 when his conviction has not been invalidated.

A prisoner cannot recover damages under § 1983 for a claim that would necessarily imply the invalidity of a conviction or sentence unless it has already been invalidated.

Ervin v. 34th Judicial Circuit Court · filed 2020-01-13

Thus, when a state prisoner seeks damages pursuant to § 1983, the district court has to consider whether a judgment for the plaintiff would “necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence.” Jd. at 488. If it would, the district court must dismiss the complaint unless the plaintiff can show that the conviction or sentence has already been invalidated.

Section 1983 cannot be used to challenge a state conviction and sentence; that relief must be sought through habeas corpus.

Haywood v. The County of Westchester · filed 2020-01-24

The proper federal vehicle for that relief, however, is not action brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, but rather a petition for a writ of habeas corpus.

Section 1983 claims that would imply the invalidity of a conviction or sentence are barred unless the conviction or sentence has been invalidated.

Kinstle v. Allen County, Ohio · filed 2020-02-21

Additionally, any § 1983 claims the plaintiff purports to assert challenging his state criminal convictions or sentences are barred by the Supreme Court’s decision in Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994).

Section 1983 claims seeking to invalidate a conviction or sentence are barred until that conviction or sentence has been invalidated.

Walley v. Jackson County, Mississippi · filed 2020-03-05

Because Plaintiff’s pleadings do not establish that his state convictions and sentences have been invalidated, see Pl.’s Am. Compl. [8] at 1—8, his § 1983 claims seeking a determination that his convictions ... and sentences are illegal are precluded by Heck.

Section 1983 cannot be used to challenge a criminal conviction while bypassing the authorization required for a second or successive motion under § 2255.

Nieuwsma v. United States Government · filed 2020-03-31

He cannot bypass the requirement that he obtain authorization to file a second or successive motion to vacate under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 by challenging his conviction under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim challenging the validity of a criminal conviction when Heck bars that challenge.

Crabtree v. Wanker · filed 2020-04-02

Moreover, the the Court agrees with Judge Baldwin that his case is Heck-barred. Thus, the Court will accept and adopt in full the R&R.

Section 1983 does not permit a damages claim that would imply the invalidity of a criminal sentence unless the sentence has been invalidated.

McKenzie, Britton v. Jefferson County · filed 2020-04-07

Plaintiff cannot bring any claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 challenging his sentence because such claims are barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 487 (1994).

Section 1983 does not provide release from custody, and a damages claim that would imply a conviction is invalid cannot proceed until the conviction or sentence is invalidated.

Kingston v. Clark(c)TM · filed 2020-04-16

Because Kingston challenges the duration of confinement and seeks release from custody, such relief is not available via § 1983. Furthermore, to the extent that Kingston seeks damages, a favorable outcome on the damages claim would necessarily imply the invalidity of his criminal conviction. Consequently, Kingston’s § 1983 claim cannot proceed until his conviction and sentence are invalidated through a habeas corpus action or some other appropriate means.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim challenging the legality of a conviction or the duration of a sentence.

(PC) Oscar A. Aguilar v. Superior Court of California, County of San Bernardino · filed 2020-04-24

This type of challenge does not state a claim under Section 1983.

Section 1983 bars a damages claim that would call an outstanding criminal conviction into question unless the conviction has been invalidated.

Armstrong v. State of Nevada District Attorney Office · filed 2020-05-01

In order to recover monetary damages under a §1983 claim, as Plaintiff here seeks, he must demonstrate that the conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by an executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make that determination, or called into question by federal court’s issuance of writ of habeas corpus.

Section 1983 cannot be used to challenge the validity of a conviction or sentence; the federal remedy is habeas corpus.

Ealy v. Brea Griffin · filed 2020-05-04

But in so arguing Ealy is contesting the validity of his convictions and sentence, so his sole federal remedy is a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, not a § 1983 action.

A § 1983 claim that would necessarily imply the invalidity of a conviction or sentence must be dismissed unless that conviction or sentence has already been invalidated.

Hall v. State of Wisconsin · filed 2020-05-05

In cases such as these brought under § 1983, “the district court must consider whether a judgment in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence.” Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 487 (1994). If it does, “the complaint must be dismissed unless the plaintiff can demonstrate that the conviction or sentence has already been invalidated.” Id. ... Here, if I found that plaintiff’s constitutional rights were violated when he was charged with the alleged assault of his daughter, my judgment would undoubtedly imply the invalidity of plaintiff’s conviction. In fact, that is precisely what plaintiff is seeking to accomplish with this lawsuit. As such, his complaint must be dismissed under Heck.

Section 1983 cannot be used to challenge a state conviction unless the conviction has been reversed or otherwise invalidated.

Kelly v. City of New Philadelphia, Ohio · filed 2020-05-05

Section 1983 may not be used to challenge a state conviction unless the conviction has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal, or called into question by a federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy to vacate a criminal conviction.

Willis v. State of Oregon · filed 2020-05-05

To the extent Plaintiff asks the Court to vacate his conviction, such a request is not cognizable under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy to vacate a criminal conviction.

Davis v. Commissioner Social Security Administration · filed 2020-05-05

To the extent Plaintiff asks the Court to vacate his conviction, such a request is not cognizable under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide a way to challenge a criminal conviction or assert innocence; those claims must be brought through habeas relief.

Lynn (ID 64377) v. Cline · filed 2020-05-08

Plaintiff’s arguments regarding his twenty-four-year-old conviction must be (and have been)2 brought pursuant to a petition for habeas relief and are not properly before the Court in his current civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 cannot be used to challenge a conviction or sentence when success would necessarily imply its invalidity, unless the conviction or sentence has been invalidated.

Bettencourt v. Spencer · filed 2020-05-12

The district court properly dismissed Bettencourt’s action as barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), because success would necessarily imply the invalidity of Bettencourt’s conviction or sentence, and Bettencourt failed to allege facts sufficient to show that his conviction or sentence has been invalidated.

Section 1983 is not the proper vehicle for a state prisoner’s petition challenging his conviction; the petition is properly treated as one under Section 2254.

Green v. Morgan · filed 2020-05-13

The petition was erroneously docketed as a civil rights complaint filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. It is more properly construed as a petition brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254.

Section 1983 cannot be used to challenge a state conviction unless the conviction has been reversed, expunged, declared invalid, or called into question by a federal habeas writ.

Brooks v. Rothgery · filed 2020-05-19

Section 1983 may not be used to challenge a state conviction unless the conviction has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal, or called into question by a federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus. Heck, 512 U.S. at 486-87. Plaintiff does not allege or infer that his state court conviction has been resolved in his favor or invalidated in any of the ways articulated in Heck. Thus, Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims are barred by Heck.

Section 1983 cannot be used to vacate a conviction; the federal remedy for that relief is habeas corpus.

Sierra v. Daneri · filed 2020-05-20

First, as the District Court explained, to the extent that Sierra sought to vacate his underlying conviction on the ground that it is not recognized by Pennsylvania law, his sole federal remedy is a writ of habeas corpus, not a § 1983 action.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim whose success would necessarily imply that a conviction or sentence is invalid unless the conviction or sentence has been invalidated.

Cruz v. Karapetian · filed 2020-06-05

Dismissal of Cruz’s action was proper because the action is barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 52 U.S. 477 (1994), as success in this action would necessarily imply the invalidity of Cruz’s conviction or sentence, and Cruz failed to allege facts sufficient to show that his conviction or sentence has been invalidated.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim challenging the validity or duration of a conviction, sentence, or probation or parole revocation unless the plaintiff has prevailed in a habeas corpus proceeding challenging it.

Werner, Patrick v. Snyder-Spaar, Rose · filed 2020-06-19

Plaintiff cannot bring any claim challenging the validity or duration of a criminal conviction, sentence or revocation of probation and parole in an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 unless he has prevailed in a habeas corpus proceeding challenging the conviction, sentence or revocation.

A Section 1983 action challenging a conviction cannot proceed until the conviction has been overturned, expunged, or otherwise set aside.

Ealy v. Evans · filed 2020-06-22

ORDERED that the above-styled civil action is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE as frivolous until Plaintiff can show that the conviction that he challenges has been overturned, expunged, or otherwise set aside.

Section 1983 does not provide a cause of action for claims whose success would necessarily imply the invalidity of an outstanding conviction or sentence.

Mims v. Ivey (INMATE 1) · filed 2020-06-24

Since success on Mims’ claims challenging the validity of his convictions and the sentence on which he is now incarcerated would necessarily imply the invalidity of his confinement, these claims are not cognizable in a 42 U..S.C. § 1983 action at this time and summary dismissal of this case was therefore appropriate.

A § 1983 damages claim that would necessarily imply the invalidity of a conviction or sentence must be dismissed unless the conviction or sentence has already been invalidated.

White v. Lumpkin · filed 2020-06-29

When judgment for a plaintiff in a § 1983 suit “would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence, . . . the complaint must be dismissed unless the plaintiff can demonstrate that the conviction or sentence has already been invalidated.” Id. As shown below, Plaintiff has not shown his conviction or sentence is invalid.

Section 1983 does not permit a prisoner to seek damages for alleged defects in a criminal proceeding when success would undermine a conviction that has not been invalidated.

Maldonado v. Sixth Judicial District Court · filed 2020-06-30

Heck v. Humphrey therefore bars S. Maldonado’s civil rights claims stemming from defects in his state criminal proceedings as a matter of law.

Section 1983 claims whose success would necessarily imply invalid confinement are barred unless the conviction or sentence has already been invalidated.

Stone v. Clarke · filed 2020-07-16

Because success on his claims necessarily implies invalid confinement, under the second prong of the Heck analysis, Stone must demonstrate a successful challenge to his current conviction.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for a prisoner challenging the validity of a state sentence; that claim must be brought in habeas corpus.

Johnson (ID 79020) v. Schmidt · filed 2020-07-24

Therefore, any claim challenging his state sentence is not cognizable in a § 1983 action.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim for lost credit time unless the disciplinary convictions causing the loss have been vacated.

CAUDLE v. BROWN · filed 2020-08-20

As explained before, Mr. Caudle cannot bring an action under § 1983 for this claim unless his disciplinary convictions have been vacated.

Section 1983 does not provide a cognizable claim when success would undermine the validity of an outstanding criminal conviction.

Ervin v. Collins · filed 2020-08-28

The Magistrate Judge correctly found that Plaintiff challenges his underlying state criminal convictions through his civil rights complaint, and thus “[b]ecause Plaintiffs’ claims would undermine the validity of his convictions in state court, he fails to state any claim that would be cognizable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.”

A Section 1983 challenge to a conviction cannot proceed until the conviction has been overturned, expunged, or otherwise set aside.

Brown v. Rusk County Prosecutor · filed 2020-09-03

The above-styled civil action is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE as frivolous until such time as the Plaintiff can show that the conviction which he challenges has been overturned, expunged, or otherwise set aside.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for a prisoner seeking to challenge a state conviction or sentence; the prisoner must seek habeas relief.

Ward v. State of Ohio · filed 2020-09-11

First, the complaint challenges the propriety of a sentence imposed on him in a state criminal case. In Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475 (1973), the Supreme Court held that a civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is not an appropriate vehicle for a prisoner to challenge a state conviction or sentence. ... Accordingly, the plaintiff’s complaint fails to state a plausible federal civil rights claim.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim whose success would necessarily imply the invalidity of the plaintiff’s conviction.

Bradley v. Nash · filed 2020-09-14

Bradley cannot maintain his § 1983 action because judgment in his favor would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction. See Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 487 (1994).

Section 1983 does not permit a claim that would undermine a conviction unless that conviction has been overturned or set aside.

Shell v. Boyd · filed 2020-09-17

Claims of this nature, which essentially challenge the fact of the plaintiff’s convictions, are not actionable under § 1983 unless the judgment imposing the convictions at issue has been overturned or set aside.

Section 1983 does not permit a damages claim that would necessarily invalidate a disciplinary conviction extending confinement unless that conviction has been invalidated.

Lucas v. Board of County Commissioners of the County for Larimer County Colorado, The · filed 2020-09-22

The conduct Lucas challenges relates to her disciplinary conviction, not her original state court conviction, and therefore her § 1983 action threatens the validity of her disciplinary conviction.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim that would call an outstanding conviction into question unless the conviction has been invalidated.

Thomas Edward Burke, Jr v. People of the State of Kentucky · filed 2020-09-30

In that case, the Court dismissed Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims as barred by both Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1994), and the applicable statute of limitations. The same reasoning for dismissal applies here.

A § 1983 claim that would imply the invalidity of a conviction cannot proceed unless the conviction has been overturned.

Dinkins v. State of MO · filed 2020-10-01

Nonetheless, a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 — and by extension, Bivens — cannot be brought if it implies the invalidity of a conviction and sentence that has not been overturned.

A § 1983 damages claim that necessarily implies the invalidity of a conviction or sentence cannot proceed until that conviction or sentence has been invalidated.

Walker v. Kansas, State of · filed 2020-10-05

The Court found in the MOSC that before Plaintiff may proceed in a federal civil action for monetary damages based upon an invalid conviction or sentence, he must show that his conviction or sentence has been overturned, reversed, or otherwise called into question. ... Plaintiff has not alleged that the conviction or sentence has been invalidated. ... IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED THAT this matter is dismissed for failure to state a claim.

Section 1983 bars a challenge to a prison disciplinary conviction when success would necessarily imply its invalidity and the conviction has not been invalidated.

Love v. Lassiter · filed 2020-10-13

Success on the merits of the present claim would necessarily imply the invalidity of Plaintiff’s disciplinary conviction. ... Plaintiff, however, has not alleged that the disciplinary conviction has been reversed or otherwise invalidated. Therefore, this claim appears to be barred, and it will be dismissed without prejudice.

Section 1983 does not provide relief to a state prisoner for a claim that would necessarily imply the invalidity of a conviction or sentence that has not been invalidated.

Payton v. Ballinger · filed 2020-10-14

Under the Heck doctrine, a state prisoner cannot pursue § 1983 relief premised on the invalidity or duration of the prisoner’s confinement.

Section 1983 cannot be used to challenge a current conviction when success would necessarily imply that the conviction or sentence is invalid.

Poores v. Marshall (INMATE 1) · filed 2020-10-30

The Supreme Court’s decision in Heck and its progeny prohibit the use of a § 1983 action to challenge the constitutionality of a conviction on which the inmate is currently incarcerated where a ruling in the inmate’s favor would necessarily imply the invalidity of the conviction or sentence.

A § 1983 damages claim challenging a conviction or sentence cannot proceed unless the plaintiff demonstrates that it is invalid.

White v. Lumpkin · filed 2020-11-18

Upon initial screening, the district court dismissed the action as frivolous because Mr. White could not demonstrate that his conviction or sentence was invalid. See Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486–87 (1994). We agree.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim that would necessarily imply a conviction is invalid unless the conviction or sentence has already been invalidated.

DAVIS v. BLUE · filed 2020-12-01

Such claims would be barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), which prohibits a plaintiff from bringing a § 1983 claim that would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction “unless the plaintiff can demonstrate that the conviction or sentence has already been invalidated.” 512 U.S. at 487.

Section 1983 cannot be used to challenge the validity of a criminal conviction.

Harris v. Warden · filed 2020-12-04

Harris’s constitutional challenges to his convictions are not properly brought in a § 1983 proceeding.

Section 1983 does not permit a prisoner to pursue a claim whose success would necessarily show that his conviction is invalid unless the conviction has first been invalidated.

Adams v. Galyon · filed 2020-12-09

However, as nothing in the record suggests that any such conviction has been invalidated, even liberally construing the complaint in favor of Plaintiff, it fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted under § 1983 as to any Defendant.

Section 1983 does not permit a damages claim that would imply the invalidity of a sentence unless the sentence has already been invalidated.

Robinson v. Strickland-Saffold · filed 2020-12-11

Because the allegations in Plaintiff’s Complaint do not suggest that the state sentences he challenges have been reversed on appeal or called into question in any of the ways articulated by Heck, Plaintiff cannot proceed with a damages action challenging his sentence.

Section 1983 does not permit a damages claim that would imply the invalidity of a conviction unless the conviction or sentence has already been invalidated.

Patterson v. The People Of The State Of New York · filed 2020-12-23

Because plaintiff has not demonstrated that his conviction or sentence has in any way been invalidated, his claims for monetary damages are barred by Heck v. Humphrey.

Section 1983 does not provide a way to relitigate a state criminal case.

Olausen v. Second Judicial District Court · filed 2020-12-30

Insofar as Plaintiff is currently asking to re-litigate his criminal case, the Court is without power to grant that relief under a § 1983 civil rights action.

Section 1983 cannot be used to challenge the validity of a conviction; that claim must be brought, if at all, in a habeas petition.

(PC) Kanongataa v. Jones · filed 2021-01-04

This claim may be brought, if at all, in a habeas petition.

Section 1983 claims that would necessarily imply the invalidity of a conviction cannot proceed unless the conviction has already been invalidated.

Rosa v. Satz · filed 2021-01-08

If the plaintiff cannot demonstrate the invalidity of her outstanding criminal judgment, then the Section 1983 action cannot proceed.

Section 1983 bars a prisoner's damages claim that would necessarily imply the invalidity of a conviction or sentence unless it has already been invalidated.

Hill 068563 v. Arizona Department of Corrections · filed 2021-01-21

A prisoner’s claim for damages cannot be brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 if “a judgment in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence,” unless the prisoner demonstrates that the conviction or sentence has previously been reversed, expunged, or otherwise invalidated.

Section 1983 does not support a claim based only on speculation that defendants may deprive the plaintiff of civil rights in the future.

Charles E. Gunter Mike C. Gunter v. Al Schmutzer, Jr. Lonnie Hood Don Watson Tommy McClanahan Angie McClanahan · filed 1989-02-22

Examination of the record reveals, however, that plaintiffs have at best articulated a claim that defendants may deprive plaintiffs of some civil rights in the future. This claim is highly speculative and cannot serve as the basis of a suit under Sec. 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide a cognizable claim based on speculation that information in a prison file may lead to a future parole denial.

Gallardo v. Fletcher · filed 2002-04-16

To the extent that Gallardo is speculating that he may be denied parole on the basis of the information in his prison file, this does not state a cognizable claim under section 1983.

A court-appointed receiver has derivative judicial immunity from a § 1983 claim for receiving and managing assets within the appointing court’s subject matter jurisdiction.

New Alaska Development Corp. v. Guetschow · filed 1989-03-09

As noted, lack of personal jurisdiction is insufficient to pierce judicial immunity. Furthermore, as a court-appointed receiver, Guetschow acted as an agent of the court and properly functioned pursuant to the court’s subject matter jurisdiction by receiving and managing New Alaska’s assets.

Judicial immunity bars § 1983 claims against court-appointed custody evaluators and professionals who assist them when their work is integral to the judicial process.

Peter J. Hughes, Jr. v. Lynn E. Long Kathleen Lacey Patrick J. McHugh · filed 2001-02-27

In sum, Long’s and McHugh’s duties were similar to those of a guardian ad litem or court-appointed psychiatrist or doctor, both of whom are “agents” or “arms” of the court. Therefore, we will affirm the District Court’s grant of summary judgment with respect to appellant’s §§ 1983 and 1985 claims on the basis of judicial immunity.

A court-appointed receiver is immune from individual-capacity § 1983 liability for acts within the authority granted by the appointing court.

Murray v. Gilmore · filed 2002-09-30

Plaintiffs claims against defendant Gilmore in his individual capacity must fail because Gilmore is absolutely immune from civil liability for acts taken within the scope of his position as a court-appointed receiver for the agency.

A court-appointed receiver is immune from a Section 1983 suit for actions taken in carrying out the receiver’s duties.

Huszar v. Zeleny · filed 2003-06-28

As such, because the allegations in the amended complaint relate to Parlatore’s actions with his duties as receiver, Parlatore is immune from suit.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a court-summoned physician for statements made or submitted in a commitment proceeding.

Williams v. Westbrook Psychiatric Hospital · filed 1976-09-21

The same rationale, that of recognizing a public policy which encourages the free exercise of professional discretion in the discharge of obligations by quasi-judicial officers, applies to court-appointed physicians. ... The statements made and submitted by Dr. Cotts in that proceeding are absolutely privileged and immune from both state torts claims and claims brought under the Civil Rights Act..

Court personnel performing judicial functions are protected by judicial immunity from § 1983 claims arising from those acts.

Mays v. Shealy · filed 2020-12-17

Because Plaintiff’s allegations concern actions taken in Defendant Shealy’s capacity as a judicial officer, Defendant Shealy is protected by judicial immunity and the action against her should be summarily dismissed.

In § 1983 actions, a district court must give leave to amend before dismissing a complaint after a defendant moves to dismiss, unless amendment would be inequitable or futile.

Ryle v. Fuh · filed 2020-07-13

Indeed, in § 1983 actions, a district court must give leave to amend before dismissing the complaint after a defendant moves to dismiss it, “unless amendment would be inequitable or futile.”

A pro se Section 1983 plaintiff must receive notice and an opportunity to amend curable pleading deficiencies before dismissal.

Clark v. Wood · filed 1998-02-13

Because these deficiencies could be cured by amendment, the district court erred by dismissing these claims without providing Clark with notice of the deficiencies and an opportunity to amend.

Leave to amend a § 1983 complaint is warranted when the plaintiff may be able to spell out a claim.

Van Mathis v. Hickman · filed 2002-05-28

Because Mathis may be able to spell out a claim, we reverse the district court’s denial of leave to amend, and also vacate the district court’s determination on qualified immunity.

A prisoner’s § 1983 complaint may be dismissed after one chance to plead only if amendment or elaboration could not produce a viable claim.

Shaw v. Waller · filed 2004-01-29

Such a dismissal is appropriate only when the plaintiff has pleaded his best case such that allowing him to amend his complaint or elaborate on his claims would still not produce a viable 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim.

Denial of a motion to add a § 1983 claim is harmless when the admitted evidence would be insufficient to overcome an immunity defense to that claim.

Evans-Reid v. District of Columbia · filed 2007-07-12

Appellant also argues that the court should have granted her motion to amend the complaint to add a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which she filed upon receiving from the District the reports of the MPD's Internal Affairs Division. As we conclude that the reports were properly excluded, any error in denying the motion to amend the complaint would have been harmless. As the evidence admitted is insufficient to overcome the defense of privilege to a claim of assault and battery, it would be similarly insufficient in the context of an immunity defense to a constitutional claim.

A prisoner’s § 1983 complaint may be dismissed for deficiencies only when it is absolutely clear that amendment could not cure them.

Broughton v. Cutter Laboratories Hospital Staff of Arizona State Prison Dr. Clements Dr. Hyde · filed 1980-07-01

However, dismissal is proper only if it is absolutely clear that the deficiencies of the complaint could not be cured by amendment.

A plaintiff may amend a complaint to invoke § 1983 when omitting the citation was a technical pleading mistake and amendment would cause little prejudice.

Texas Indigenous Council v. Simpkins · filed 2013-05-21

Diaz’s failure to specifically cite § 1983 was at best an unintentional, technical pleading mistake, which the officers did not raise until after it was too late for Diaz to cure the defect. ... Because that is not the case here, leave to amend to allege a First Amendment violation under § 1983 should have been granted.

Section 1983 claims dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6) must generally be allowed to be amended unless amendment would be inequitable or futile.

Phillips v. County of Allegheny · filed 2008-02-05

As we indicated above, if a complaint is subject to a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal, a district court must permit a curative amendment unless such an amendment would be inequitable or futile. ... Moreover, we have instructed that a district court must provide the plaintiff with this opportunity even if the plaintiff does not seek leave to amend.

Section 1983 does not impose liability for a violation of prison policy alone.

Maday v. Dooley · filed 2019-09-30

“A violation of prison policy alone does not give rise to section 1983 liability.”

Section 1983 does not provide a claim for violations of jail policy alone.

Stephens v. New River Valley Regional Jail · filed 2019-09-12

As an initial matter, Stephens has no § 1983 claim based on alleged violations of jail policy.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim for violating jail policies alone.

Chennault v. Mitchell · filed 2013-02-07

But a violation of jail policies alone fails to provide a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim for a violation of prison policy alone.

Martin v. Donaghue · filed 2006-01-09

The violation of prison policy does not state a claim under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide a cause of action for a violation of prison rules or regulations without a constitutional violation.

Lyle v. Beard · filed 1998-02-19

The violation of TDCJ rules or regulations, without more, does not amount to a constitutional violation and does not give rise to a § 1983 cause of action.

Section 1983 does not support a claim based solely on a violation of prison department rules.

DiRose v. McClennan · filed 1998-10-29

There is no evidence in this record that he was subjected to cruel and unusual punishment, and although prison officials did improperly open privileged mail out of plaintiffs presence, a deviation from the department’s rules is an insufficient basis for a § 1983 claim.

Section 1983 does not make a failure to follow prison regulations actionable unless it also violates a constitutional provision.

Spurlock v. Simmons · filed 2000-02-15

To be actionable under Section 1983, defendants’ failure to follow these regulations must therefore have violated some constitutional provision.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim for a violation of prison rules that is not of constitutional dimension.

Washington v. Parker · filed 2000-04-12

To the extent that Washington argues that the defendants’ disciplinary action violated prison rules, the argument is not of a constitutional dimension and thus fails to state a claim under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide a constitutional claim for a violation of prison regulations alone.

Garrett v. Gomez · filed 2000-08-23

Failure to follow prison regulations alone does not give rise to a constitutional claim under § 1983.

Section 1983 requires an inmate seeking federal relief for a violation of state prison rules to allege a federal constitutional violation.

Doctor v. Wall · filed 2001-04-24

The long and short of it is that an inmate at the ACI, who claims that the Morris Rules were violated by personnel at the ACI, must make an allegation of a federal constitutional violation and bring an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in order to be heard in this Court.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim based on a violation of prison procedural rules.

Ketzel v. Trevino · filed 2001-06-21

His argument that his suspension violated prison procedural rules is not cognizable in a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 lawsuit.

Section 1983 does not provide a cause of action for a violation of prison rules or regulations without more.

Caldwell v. Prasifka · filed 2002-03-28

Violations of prison rules or regulations, without more, do not give rise to a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 cause of action.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim based solely on a failure to follow prison procedures or regulations.

Lerma v. Cook · filed 2008-01-30

The defendants’ alleged failure to follow TDCJ procedures and regulations is insufficient to establish a violation cognizable under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not make a violation of prison rules alone actionable without a constitutional violation.

Scheidel v. Secretary of Public Safety & Corrections · filed 2014-04-09

His contention that the searches violated prison policies and regulations likewise did not state a claim for relief because violations of prison rules do not alone rise to the level of constitutional violations and, therefore, such claims are not actionable under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim based solely on a prison official’s failure to follow a regulation, directive or policy statement.

Pitts v. Naji · filed 2016-09-06

“Further, an inmate does not have a viable claim under [Section 1983] based solely on a prison official’s failure to adhere to a regulation, directive or policy statement.”

Section 1983 does not provide a claim for a violation of jail rules alone.

Jackson v. Duran · filed 2017-12-14

Even if Plaintiff's confinement in a cell that lacked water violated jail rules, a civil rights action under Section 1983 must be based on a constitutional violation.

Section 1983 does not provide relief for violations of prison rules and regulations alone.

Harris v. State of Mississippi · filed 2018-03-14

Violations of prison rules and regulations do not support a claim for relief under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim based solely on a failure to follow prison directives.

Burroughs v. Mitchell · filed 2018-09-06

Failure to follow a DOCCS' Directive does not give rise to a § 1983 claim.

Section 1983 provides a cause of action for violations of federal law; a departure from prison regulations alone does not establish liability.

Markham v. Rios · filed 2019-08-27

To the extent Plaintiff attempts to base liability on Defendant Rios’ alleged departure from prison regulations, that attempt must fail, as “§ 1983 provides a cause of action only for violations of federal law.” ... Consequently, the Court adopts Judge Mitchell’s recommendation to dismiss Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claim against Defendant Rios.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim merely because correctional staff violated prison policies or regulations.

El-Massri v. New Haven Correctional Center · filed 2019-10-08

In addition, Plaintiff has brought a federal action for violation of his constitutional rights, and whether Defendants followed all relevant DOC policies and regulations in their treatment of El- Massri during the dates in question does not provide a basis for a § 1983 claim.

Section 1983 provides no redress for a prison official’s violation of state prison regulations alone.

(PC) Lake v. Weiss · filed 2019-10-31

Section 1983 provides no redress for prison officials’ violation of state prison regulations.

Section 1983 does not provide relief for a prison official’s violation of prison regulations or administrative directives alone.

Whitaker v. CRCC Mail Room · filed 2019-12-09

However, the defendants’ failure to comply with prison regulations or administrative directives does not constitute a basis for relief under Section 1983 because “a prison official’s violation of a prison regulation or policy does not establish that the official has violated the Constitution or is liable to a prisoner under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.” Fine v. UConn Med., No. 3:18-CV-530 (JAM), 2019 WL 236726, at *9 (D. Conn. Jan. 16, 2019) (citation omitted).

Section 1983 does not provide a claim based solely on corrections staff failing to follow prison regulations.

Bryant v. Miller · filed 2020-01-31

Furthermore, it is well established that claims that corrections staff “failed to follow prison regulations . . . are not cognizable under § 1983.” Hyman v. Holder, No. 96-CV-7748, 2001 WL 262665, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 15, 2001); see also A’gard v. Perez, 919 F. Supp. 2d 394, 403 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (“Any alleged violations of prison directives or regulations do not give rise to a federal claim . . . .” (citation and quotation marks omitted)).

Section 1983 does not provide a private cause of action for violations of prison rules or administrative directives.

Dorlette v. Melendez · filed 2020-02-26

Mr. Dorlette argues that Defendants failed to follow Administrative Directive 9.5; prison rules and regulations, however, do not create private causes of action under Section 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim for violations of prison regulations alone.

Morris v. Nelson · filed 2020-03-23

Morris does not cite a particular regulation that he claims Nelson violated; but even if he had, a violation of prison regulations is insufficient to state a claim under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide relief for a violation of a prison administrative directive unless the conduct also violates a federal right.

Jones v. Rodi · filed 2020-04-10

Furthermore, a violation of or failure to follow an administrative directive does not state a claim of a violation of a federal or constitutionally protected right.

A prison official’s violation of a prison regulation or policy alone does not establish liability under § 1983.

Lawrence v. Agramonte · filed 2020-05-08

However, “a prison official’s violation of a prison regulation or policy does not establish that the official has violated the Constitution or is liable to a prisoner under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.” ... Accordingly, his § 1983 claim based on a violation of an administrative directive will be dismissed under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1).

Section 1983 does not provide a claim for a prison official’s failure to follow a state correctional rule alone.

Coleman v. Metzger · filed 2020-06-24

Defendants’ alleged failure to follow Rule 4.2 is not itself a violation subject to § 1983. Therefore, the claim will be dismissed.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim for violations of state statutes, administrative regulations, or prison rules without a constitutional violation.

Disser v. Heitt · filed 2020-07-06

Nevertheless, even if Warden Heitt had violated a prison policy, that would not state a claim because 42 U.S.C. § 1983 protects plaintiffs from constitutional violations, not violations of state statutes, administrative regulations or prison rules.

Section 1983 provides a cause of action for violations of federal rights, but a violation of prison regulations alone does not support a claim.

Sanders v. Starling · filed 2020-08-27

Section 1983 provides a cause of action for the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution or federal law, not for violations of prison regulations.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim for violations of state statutes, administrative regulations, or prison rules alone.

Bennett v. Wexford of Indiana · filed 2020-09-21

Though the complaint alleges the absence of an on duty nurse area violated prison policies, that doesn’t state a claim because 42 U.S.C. § 1983 protects plaintiffs from federal constitutional violations, not violations of state statutes, administrative regulations or prison rules.

Section 1983 does not give every plaintiff an automatic right to join a municipality at any stage of litigation.

Patch v. Clarke · filed 1989-04-13

Brandon does not, however, stand for the proposition that every section 1983 plaintiff may join a municipality as a matter of right at any stage of the litigation.

Section 1983 does not impose liability for abuse of process alone.

Santiago v. Paul J. Fenton, Etc. · filed 1989-12-11

However, we hold that proof of abuse of process alone cannot support a finding of liability under § 1983.

Section 1983 requires an abuse-of-process claim to allege a constitutional injury beyond the elements of the common law tort.

Kleiss v. Short · filed 1992-11-04

In short, a plaintiff pursuing a sec tion 1983 action that is also the common law tort of abuse of process must allege more than would be necessary to state a claim for abuse of process.

A § 1983 abuse-of-process claim may proceed despite an intact conviction when the claim does not necessarily call the conviction into question.

Duamutef v. Morris · filed 1997-01-29

Indeed, a plaintiff may proceed with a claim for abuse of process even where a related conviction remains valid and intact.

Section 1983 permits a federal claim for malicious abuse of process.

Coleman v. City of New York · filed 2001-05-03

Malicious abuse of process is actionable as a federal claim under § 1983 as well as a state common law claim.

Section 1983 permits a claim for abuse of process.

Estate of Smith v. Marasco · filed 2002-01-11

We reject defendants’ suggestion that an abuse of process claim cannot serve as the basis for a Section 1983 claim.

Section 1983 abuse of process claims require the defendant to have employed regularly issued legal process to pursue an improper collateral objective.

Finigan v. Marshall · filed 2007-02-09

The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits, and § 1983 makes actionable, the use of legal processes for wrongful purposes. As with the false arrest claim, the elements of common law abuse of process are substantially similar to those of the § 1983 claim, thus federal courts look to the applicable state law. To prove the elements of abuse of process under New York law, the plaintiff must show that (1) the defendant employed regularly issued legal process, (2) with intent to do harm without excuse or justification, (3) in order to obtain a collateral objective outside the legitimate ends of the process. ... In this case, the undisputed facts show that defendant never issued any legal process against plaintiff. ... Therefore, defendant’s motion for summary judgment on plaintiffs abuse of process claim will be granted.