42 U.S.C. § 1983

Section 1983 does not permit a claim that a conviction was procured through falsified documents while that conviction remains valid.

McCartney v. Stridder · filed 1997-01-07

Because McCartney’s conviction has not been invalidated, his claim is not cognizable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit an ineffective-assistance claim when a ruling on it might affect the validity of the plaintiff’s conviction.

Fred C. Proctor, Also Known as Fred C. Hutchinson and Rodney P. Hernandez v. Nichols · filed 1997-02-10

However, a claim that counsel provided ineffective assistance would not be cognizable here, as a ruling on it might affect the validity of Proctor's conviction.

Section 1983 bars a claim that would necessarily imply the invalidity of a sentence unless the sentence has been invalidated.

Johnson v. J.S. Calabrett, Justice Wm. Friedman, Justice J.F. Falo, Justice Several Unknown · filed 1997-02-21

Since Johnson has not alleged that the challenged sentences were invalidated, and an award based on the defendants' lack of subject matter jurisdiction in the criminal proceedings would "necessarily imply the invalidity" of his sentences, this action is barred under Heck.

Section 1983 does not permit a damages claim that would undermine an outstanding criminal conviction unless the conviction has been invalidated, even if the plaintiff is no longer incarcerated.

Benjamin M. Anderson, and David M. Kahn v. County of Montgomery, State of Illinois, Kelly D. Long, Boatmen's National Ba · filed 1997-04-04

The fact that a plaintiff is no longer incarcerated has no bearing on the applicability of Heck. And because Anderson admits that his state court conviction has not been reversed, expunged, invalidated, or otherwise impugned, he has failed to state a § 1983 claim regarding anything involving a challenge to his conviction.

A § 1983 damages claim challenging the validity of a conviction does not arise until that conviction has been invalidated.

Thomas v. Esquivel · filed 1997-04-16

Indeed, a federal claim under § 1983 does not even arise until his conviction has been invalidated.

Section 1983 does not permit claims that call into question the validity of a plaintiff’s conviction or sentence.

Reyes v. Saxon · filed 1997-04-24

His allegations concerning the state judge who presided over his guilty plea call into question the validity of his conviction and sentence and may not be considered in a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action.

Section 1983 damages claims that necessarily imply the invalidity of a conviction are barred unless the conviction has been invalidated.

McGee v. Norm Maleng Regina Cahan Mark Larson Dave Young · filed 1997-04-24

We agree with the district court that McGee's claim for damages is barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 114 S.Ct. 2364 (1994), because his allegations against the prosecutors necessarily imply the invalidity of his murder conviction, and he has not shown that his conviction has been invalidated.

Section 1983 does not permit claims implicating the validity of a conviction until the conviction has been invalidated or called into question by a grant of habeas corpus.

Mathonican v. State of Texas · filed 1997-05-05

He may not pursue his claims in an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 until his conviction has been invalidated or called into question by a grant of a writ of habeas corpus.

Section 1983 does not permit a challenge to prison disciplinary hearing procedures that would necessarily imply the invalidity of a disciplinary conviction until that conviction has been invalidated.

Kerr v. Orellana · filed 1997-07-07

Accordingly, the court FINDS that plaintiffs claim is not cognizable under section 1983 until plaintiff can show that his conviction has been invalidated.

Section 1983 claims seeking relief based on an outstanding conviction are barred under Heck v. Humphrey.

Martinez v. Obermeyer · filed 1997-07-14

To the extent that Mr. Martinez is ... proceeding under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the claims are obviously barred by the rule announced in Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1994).

Section 1983 does not provide declaratory relief in federal court to attack a state criminal conviction.

Venet v. Josephine County Circuit Court · filed 1997-09-04

Insofar as Venet contends that his First and Fourteenth Rights were violated and that his claim is actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, we reject this contention.

Section 1983 permits a claim about procedural error in a collateral challenge to a conviction when the requested relief would invalidate only the result of that challenge, not the conviction itself.

Turner v. Daniel E. Lungren, Attorney General Sanjay T. Kumar, Deputy Attorney General · filed 1997-10-24

Turner contends that the remedy he seeks, the reinstatement and reconsideration of his habeas petition, is different from release. This contention has merit. Unlike a procedural error at trial, a procedural error in a collateral challenge to a conviction does not imply the invalidity of the conviction, but only the invalidity of the result of the collateral challenge.

Section 1983 cannot be used to invalidate a death sentence when a judgment for the prisoner would necessarily imply that the sentence is invalid.

Williams v. Hopkins · filed 1997-11-21

Accordingly, Williams cannot use section 1983 as a vehicle to invalidate his death sentence.

Section 1983 procedural due process claims barred by Edwards are not yet cognizable and should be dismissed without prejudice.

Diaz v. Daniel R. McBride Wait Moore, Brenda Koker, and E. Huff · filed 1998-03-03

Thus, the Edwards bar applies here to Diaz's procedural due process claims. These claims are not yet cognizable under § 1983 and should have been dismissed without prejudice.

Section 1983 does not permit a challenge to a prison disciplinary conviction that would necessarily imply its invalidity unless the conviction has first been invalidated.

Mahotep v. DeLuca · filed 1998-05-01

He may not assert these claims pursuant to § 1983 because, to date, the disciplinary hearing ‘conviction’ has not been invalidated.

A § 1983 action cannot proceed when its claims necessarily imply the invalidity of a conviction that has not been invalidated.

Harmon v. Sherman Block, in Official Capacity as Sheriff County of Los Angeles J. Cohee Georgia Sullivan-Huerta · filed 1998-05-20

The district court properly dismissed Harmon's action because his claims necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction and Harmon has not demonstrated that his conviction has been invalidated.

Section 1983 does not permit a prisoner’s facial challenge to a disciplinary rule when success would necessarily imply the invalidity of a punishment affecting good-time credits, unless the disciplinary conviction has first been invalidated.

Clarke v. Stalder · filed 1998-09-01

Therefore, Clarke’s request that the “no threats of legal redress” portion of Rule 3 be declared facially unconstitutional is so intertwined with his requests for restoration of lost good-time credits and damages that resolution of the issues necessary to determine whether the “no threats of legal redress” portion of Rule 3 violates the First Amendment would, in effect, if favorable, automatically entitle Clarke to reinstatement of his lost good-time credits.

Section 1983 does not permit a prisoner’s facial challenge to a disciplinary rule when success would necessarily imply the invalidity of a disciplinary conviction that has not been reversed, expunged, or otherwise declared invalid.

Clarke v. Stalder · filed 1998-10-13

Accordingly, because Clarke has not had his “conviction” reversed, expunged or otherwise declared invalid,3 his claim that the “no threats of legal redress” portion of Rule 3 is facially unconstitutional is not yet cognizable in a § 1983 action.

Section 1983 cannot be used to challenge a conviction or sentence unless the plaintiff shows it has been invalidated.

Bishop v. Romer · filed 1999-02-03

Accordingly, we agree with the district court that Mr. Bishop failed to show an invalidation of his conviction or sentence, requiring dismissal of his § 1983 complaint.

Section 1983 does not support a challenge to a prison disciplinary conviction when the prisoner alleges neither that the conviction was invalidated nor that he exhausted available state remedies.

White v. Iowa Prisons Indus. · filed 1999-10-01

To the extent White challenged a disciplinary conviction, he did not allege that the conviction had been invalidated or that he had exhausted available state remedies.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim that necessarily implies the invalidity of a conviction unless that conviction has been invalidated.

Miley v. Rylander · filed 2000-02-16

The claim is not cognizable in a § 1983 action unless the challenged conviction has been invalidated because the action necessarily implies the invalidity of the conviction.

Section 1983 does not permit damages or declaratory relief that would necessarily imply a conviction’s invalidity unless the conviction has been invalidated.

Brown v. State of RI · filed 2000-03-31

The claims for declaratory relief and damages also must be dismissed because the judgment plaintiff seeks "would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction," and he has not demonstrated that the conviction has been invalidated by any proper state authority or tribunal, nor has he obtained a federal writ of habeas corpus.

Section 1983 bars a challenge to lost good-time credits unless the underlying disciplinary conviction has been reversed, expunged, or otherwise declared invalid.

Yerger v. Fox · filed 2000-04-12

Moreover, he failed to make a showing in the district court that his “conviction” at the disciplinary proceeding was reversed, expunged, or otherwise declared invalid. Any § 1983 challenge to the loss of his good-time credits therefore is barred.

Section 1983 claims challenging a conviction cannot be raised until the conviction has been invalidated.

Reyna v. Stwart · filed 2000-04-17

In addition, the claims may not be raised until Reyna’s burglary conviction has been invalidated.

Section 1983 cannot be used to challenge the legality of a conviction.

Johnson v. Rhodes · filed 2000-06-14

Further, the district court properly dismissed Johnson’s § 1983 claim because a § 1983 action may not be used to challenge the legality of a conviction.

Section 1983 does not permit damages for an allegedly unconstitutional conviction unless the conviction has first been invalidated.

Mitchell v. Lanehart · filed 2000-08-24

Because Mitchell has not shown that his robbery conviction has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal, or called into question by a federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, Mitchell is precluded from filing a § 1983 action to recover damages for the allegedly unconstitutional conviction by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1994).

Section 1983 claims challenging the validity of a conviction are barred by Heck.

Clay v. Bowles · filed 2001-01-22

Moreover, any challenge to the validity of Lichtenstern’s conviction is barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994).

Section 1983 does not permit a prisoner to challenge a sentence enhancement unless the conviction or sentence has been invalidated.

Aranda v. Key · filed 2001-02-14

Aranda’s claim that his sentence was improperly enhanced is not cognizable because neither his conviction nor his sentence has been invalidated.

Section 1983 claims attacking a state-court conviction are barred under Heck.

Barnett v. Justices of the California Supreme Court · filed 2001-02-21

The district court properly dismissed Barnett’s claims attacking his state court conviction, see Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 487, 114 S.Ct. 2364, 129 L.Ed.2d 383 (1994), including but not limited to Barnett’s claims regarding self-representation in his state criminal trial; the alleged conflict of interest of the California Supreme Court justices; and the alleged misdeeds of his appointed defense attorney.

Section 1983 does not provide a way for a prisoner to challenge the use of earlier plea agreements under a three-strikes sentencing law.

Smith v. California · filed 2001-03-29

We review de novo, ... and affirm the district court’s conclusion that these claims may not be pursued as part of a section 1983 action, ... (1973).

Section 1983 bars a prisoner’s civil claim for damages or declaratory relief based on a wrongful conviction unless the conviction has been reversed, expunged, or otherwise declared invalid.

Hanes v. Baird · filed 2001-04-10

A prisoner may not bring a civil action seeking damages or declaratory relief based upon a wrongful conviction unless the conviction has been reversed, expunged, or otherwise declared invalid.

Section 1983 bars claims that would necessarily imply the invalidity of a state conviction or sentence until that conviction or sentence has been set aside.

Scott v. Sutker-Dermer · filed 2001-04-26

By now it is well established that a § 1983 plaintiff may not raise claims that, if correct, would necessarily imply the invalidity of a state conviction or sentence unless and until that conviction or sentence has been set aside.

Section 1983 does not provide a cognizable claim when success would necessarily invalidate a state prisoner's conviction or sentence.

Dunning v. Yuetter · filed 2001-05-11

A state prisoner does not have a cognizable claim under § 1983 if a ruling on his claim would necessarily render his sentence or conviction invalid.

Section 1983 bars a damages claim that calls a conviction into question unless the conviction has first been set aside.

Nelson v. City of Burleson · filed 2001-07-09

The district court correctly held that Nelson’s allegations of due process or other constitutional violations in his prosecutions for traffic offenses called his convictions into question and were barred by Heck.

Section 1983 does not allow a damages claim challenging the validity of a conviction unless that conviction has been reversed, expunged, or otherwise invalidated.

Ott v. Mitchell · filed 2001-08-14

Pursuant to Heck, neither Ott nor anyone else can sue defendants for monetary relief under § 1983 based on the alleged unconstitutionality of the arrest and conviction unless the conviction obtained thereunder has been appealed and reversed, or otherwise expunged or invalidated.

Section 1983 does not permit damages or declaratory relief challenging prison disciplinary procedures when success would necessarily imply the invalidity of the disciplinary conviction or length of confinement, unless the conviction has been overturned or otherwise declared invalid.

Wilson v. Rabalais · filed 2001-08-23

Wilson may not seek damages or declaratory relief based on the procedures used in the disciplinary hearing in a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action unless he can show that his “conviction” has been overturned or otherwise declared invalid because such relief, if granted, would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction and the length of his confinement.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim when a favorable judgment would necessarily imply the invalidity of a prison disciplinary conviction that has not been overturned.

Knapp v. Martin · filed 2001-12-04

As a decision addressing the merits of the prison disciplinary process could create doubt as to the validity of the decision, Knapp’s claims are not cognizable under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide relief for a challenge to a state conviction.

Rowls v. Weaver · filed 2001-12-07

In this case, the district court properly concluded that, to the extent Rowls is challenging his 1997 state court conviction, he cannot pursue such relief under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim that would undermine a conviction unless the conviction has been invalidated.

Scheib v. Grand Rapids Sheriff's Department · filed 2001-12-11

Since Scheib’s loss of liberty seems to be his only claim of injury, and the loss of liberty is a result of his conviction and sentence, Scheib’s § 1983 action is not cognizable until he can show that his conviction has been invalidated.

Section 1983 does not provide a cognizable claim for challenges to a conviction barred by Heck v. Humphrey.

Ramsey v. Cleveland Plce Dept · filed 2001-12-13

Ramsey's remaining claims are barred by the doctrine of Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), and are not cognizable in this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action.

Section 1983 does not permit a due process claim whose success would necessarily imply the invalidity of a disciplinary conviction.

Fuller v. Calvin · filed 2002-01-04

However, Fuller may not pursue his due process claim because a ruling on his claim would necessarily imply the invalidity of his disciplinary conviction, and is thus not cognizable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit injunctive relief that necessarily implies the invalidity of a conviction that has not been invalidated.

Harvey v. Horan · filed 2002-01-23

While Heck dealt with a § 1983 claim for damages, the Court did not limit its holding to such claims. And we see no reason why its rationale would not apply in a situation where a criminal defendant seeks injunctive relief that necessarily implies the invalidity of his conviction.

Section 1983 does not provide a cognizable claim when success would necessarily invalidate the plaintiff’s conviction.

McKinney v. Baca · filed 2002-02-25

Because McKinney’s claim that deputy sheriffs prevented him from being present in the courtroom for all the proceedings in his state criminal trial would, if successful, necessarily invalidate his conviction, his section 1983 complaint is not cognizable.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim challenging the revocation of good-time credits until the underlying institutional conviction is vacated.

Alexander v. Gilmore · filed 2002-04-30

Alexander claims that the Defendants violated his federal constitutional rights to due process when they revoked his good-time credits for being under the influence of drugs or intoxicants without providing a confirmation drug test. Such a claim is not cognizable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 until Alexander succeeds in vacating his institutional conviction.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim that implies a conviction is invalid unless the conviction has been reversed, expunged, declared invalid, or called into question by a federal writ of habeas corpus.

Turner v. City of Scottsville · filed 2002-06-17

Turner’s allegations that the defendants violated his constitutional rights during his prosecution imply that his conviction is invalid. Thus, he cannot bring a § 1983 claim because his conviction has not been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal, or called into question by a federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.

Section 1983 cannot be used to collaterally attack a state criminal conviction.

Corcoran v. Bucher · filed 2002-07-24

Although his petition purports to seek relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Corcoran cannot use a civil rights suit to challenge his state conviction.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim when a judgment for the plaintiff would necessarily imply that a prison disciplinary conviction and its sanction are invalid.

Fitts v. Monroe · filed 2002-09-25

A claim is not cognizable under § 1983 where a judgment in the plaintiff’s favor would necessarily imply the invalidity of a prison disciplinary conviction and the resulting sanction.

Section 1983 does not allow a state prisoner to challenge a conviction if success would necessarily imply its invalidity, unless the conviction has first been invalidated.

Adams v. Jones · filed 2002-12-11

A state prisoner does not state a cognizable claim under § 1983 if a ruling on his claim would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction and confinement, until the conviction has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal, or has been called into question by a federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim challenging the validity of a criminal conviction unless and until the conviction is reversed on direct appeal or through habeas corpus.

Wayne v. Alexander · filed 2003-02-13

The district court also properly dismissed Wayne’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim challenging the validity of his criminal conviction because Wayne may not bring such an action unless and until his conviction is reversed through a direct appeal or writ of habeas corpus.

Section 1983 does not permit a plaintiff to attack the validity of a criminal conviction unless the conviction has been reversed, expunged, declared invalid, or called into question by a federal writ of habeas corpus.

Butler v. Butierres · filed 2003-02-27

As the district court noted, Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), prohibits a plaintiff from attacking the validity of a criminal conviction under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 unless that conviction has been “reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into question by a federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.” Id. at 486-87. Because Plaintiff has satisfied none of these criteria, we AFFIRM the district court’s dismissal of this claim.

Section 1983 does not permit a civil rights action alleging that a conviction is invalid unless the conviction has been reversed.

Dixon v. Oisten · filed 2003-05-01

The district court properly concluded that Dixon could not file a civil rights action alleging that his conviction was invalid, as it has not been reversed.

A § 1983 action challenging a conviction may be refiled if the conviction is overturned or called into question by the appropriate court, so dismissal is without prejudice.

Billups v. Beck · filed 2003-05-20

Because Billups may refile his action if his conviction ever is overturned or called into question by the appropriate court, we modify the judgment to be a dismissal without prejudice.

Section 1983 bars a claim that indirectly challenges a criminal conviction or sentence.

Cordoba v. Bacarisse · filed 2001-12-11

The district court’s dismissal was proper because the true nature of Cordoba’s complaint was an indirect challenge to his ... conviction and sentence. As such, it is barred. See Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 487 (1994).

Section 1983 cannot be used to raise claims concerning waiver of appointed counsel, ineffective counsel, or an unlawfully obtained guilty plea when those claims relate to a criminal conviction.

Conklin v. Walters · filed 2003-07-07

Claims which involve his alleged waiver of appointed defense counsel, the ineffectiveness of appointed defense counsel, and an unlawfully obtained guilty plea all relate to Conklin’s criminal conviction and cannot be raised in a § 1983 action.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim for declaratory relief invalidating a conviction, even when the sentence has expired.

Celestine v. 27th Judicial District Court · filed 2003-07-25

Furthermore, he has failed to state a cognizable claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Celestine’s complaint falls within the purview of Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486- 87 (1994), even though his sentence has expired and he is not seeking damages.

Section 1983 claims challenging a conviction are barred unless the plaintiff shows that the conviction has been invalidated.

Carter v. Coconino County · filed 2003-07-29

The district court construed Carter’s prolix complaint as alleging that he was convicted of the false charges and concluded that the complaint was barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486, 114 S.Ct. 2364, 129 L,Ed.2d 383 (1994). The district court properly dismissed Carter’s action because he did not show that his conviction had been invalidated.

Section 1983 provides no cause of action for a claim that would imply a conviction is invalid unless the conviction has already been invalidated.

Watkins v. Stout · filed 2003-07-30

As to the counts on which Watkins was convicted, any injunction restraining the district attorney from proceeding with the case due to improprieties in the prosecution would “necessarily imply the invalidity of [Watkins’s] conviction.” Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 487, 114 S.Ct. 2364, 129 L.Ed.2d 383 (1994). Under Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 93 S.Ct. 1827, 36 L.Ed.2d 439 (1973), and its progeny, including Heck v. Humphrey, there is no cause of action under § 1983 for such claims unless Watkins “can demonstrate that the conviction ... has already been invalidated,” whether on appeal, by the grant of a writ of habeas corpus, or by other extraordinary means.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim challenging a conviction unless the conviction has been invalidated.

Green v. City of Eugene · filed 2003-08-01

A conviction that has not been invalidated is not cognizable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 bars a claim that would necessarily imply the invalidity of a conviction or sentence unless it has been reversed, expunged, or otherwise invalidated.

Carbin v. State of MS · filed 2003-08-19

Carbin’s challenge to the dismissal pursuant to Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 487, 489 (1994), of his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims is frivolous. Relief on Carbin’s claims would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence, and Carbin has not shown that his conviction or sentence has been reversed, expunged, or otherwise invalidated.

Section 1983 claims challenging the constitutionality of a conviction are barred under Heck when the conviction has not been reversed or called into question on direct appeal or in habeas proceedings.

Kingery v. Hale · filed 2003-08-26

Kingery’s claims that his attorney conspired with the prosecutor and provided ineffective assistance of counsel challenge the constitutionality of Kingery’s conviction, which has not been reversed or called into question on direct appeal or in a habeas proceeding. The claim is barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1994).

Section 1983 claims that directly challenge a criminal conviction are construed as habeas petitions.

Brewer v. State of MS · filed 2003-10-20

The district court did not err in construing Brewer’s complaint as a 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition as Brewer’s claims clearly challenged his possession-of- explosives conviction.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim whose success would necessarily imply that an unreversed prison misconduct conviction is invalid.

Herndon v. Crowley · filed 2003-12-09

The district court properly found that Herndon could not litigate this claim in his civil rights case, as he was convicted of a major misconduct violation regarding the alleged incident and had not shown that this conviction was reversed or overturned by an appropriate tribunal.

Section 1983 cannot be used to invalidate a state conviction and end the resulting custody; that relief requires a collateral attack under § 2254.

Kanz v. Wisconsin · filed 2003-12-18

Kanz wants the termination of his parole, something that can be achieved only through a collateral attack under § 2254. Although the line between civil litigation under § 1983 and collateral attack under § 2254 can be hazy, there is no uncertainty about its application to a claim that denial of counsel makes a conviction and all ensuing custody “void.”

Section 1983 claims challenging a conviction or sentence are subject to dismissal under Heck when the conviction has not been successfully challenged or overturned.

Fuller v. Saar · filed 2004-02-18

However, because Fuller did not make any showing that his conviction has been successfully challenged or overturned, his § 1983 complaint was subject to dismissal pursuant to Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1994).

Section 1983 does not permit a prisoner to challenge a disciplinary conviction or its underlying conduct when success would imply that the conviction is invalid.

Jennings v. Mitchell · filed 2004-03-12

A prisoner found guilty in a prison disciplinary hearing cannot use § 1983 to collaterally attack the hearing’s validity or the conduct underlying the disciplinary conviction.

A prisoner cannot bring a § 1983 suit that would undermine a still-valid disciplinary conviction if successful.

Hall-Bey v. Hanks · filed 2004-03-25

Under Heck and Edwards a prisoner may not bring a § 1983 suit that, if successful, would undermine a still-valid disciplinary conviction.

Section 1983 does not permit a prisoner to challenge misconduct convictions unless they have been overturned.

Trussel v. Bouchard · filed 2004-06-18

Turning to Truss-El’s attack on his misconduct charges, he cannot challenge the charges in a § 1983 action because he did not demonstrate that the convictions had been overturned.

Section 1983 claims must be dismissed when success would necessarily imply the invalidity of a conviction that has not been invalidated.

Murphy v. Martin · filed 2004-07-28

The Court further agrees with the Magistrate Judge that Plaintiffs claims necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction and should be dismissed.

Section 1983 does not permit a prisoner to challenge a conviction that has not been invalidated.

Poindexter v. Overton · filed 2004-09-17

Poindexter has not successfully challenged the validity of his underlying convictions. Therefore, his claim is not cognizable in this § 1983 action.

Section 1983 does not permit a prisoner to challenge a conviction or sentence unless the underlying conviction has been found invalid.

Ramsey v. State of Mississippi · filed 2004-10-14

Ramsey may not challenge his conviction and sentence in a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 complaint unless his underlying criminal conviction has been found invalid.

Section 1983 does not permit damages for an allegedly unlawful conviction unless the conviction has been invalidated.

Prieto v. USA · filed 2004-12-17

Prieto is challenging the validity of his conviction, and he has not demonstrated that his conviction has been reversed, questioned, or declared invalid.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim that impugns the validity of a conviction that has not been set aside on appeal or through proper post-conviction relief.

Spooner v. Marioneaux · filed 2005-01-11

This claim is barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1994), because it impugns the validity of a conviction that has not been set aside on appeal or through other proper channels of post-conviction relief.

A prisoner cannot seek damages under § 1983 for a disciplinary conviction whose invalidity the claim would imply until that conviction is expunged, reversed, or otherwise set aside.

Williams v. Cleer · filed 2005-01-25

Because a favorable judgment as to Williams’s claims would necessarily imply the invalidity of Williams’s disciplinary conviction at which he was sentenced, inter alia, to loss of 750 days good time credit, Williams cannot bring a section 1983 action attacking his disciplinary proceeding and seeking damages until his conviction in those proceedings has been expunged, reversed, or otherwise set aside.

Section 1983 cannot be used to challenge a state court conviction when habeas corpus is the exclusive federal remedy.

Gonzalez v. Doe · filed 2005-04-04

The district court did not err in denying Gonzalez’s leave to proceed in forma pauperis because, in his complaint, Gonzalez seeks to challenge his state court conviction, for which his exclusive federal remedy is a writ of habeas corpus.

A § 1983 claim that would necessarily imply a conviction or sentence is invalid must be dismissed unless the conviction or sentence has been invalidated.

Bush v. City of Philadelphia · filed 2005-04-07

If judgment in Bush’s favor in the present case would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence, then the complaint must be dismissed, because Bush’s allegedly unconstitutional conviction has not been reversed, expunged, declared invalid, or called into question by a writ of habeas corpus.

Section 1983 bars damages and declaratory relief claims that would necessarily imply the invalidity of a conviction that has not been invalidated.

Koger v. State of Florida · filed 2005-05-03

Thus, a plaintiff may not obtain damages under § 1983 if a judgment in his favor “would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence.” Id. ... Koger’s claims for damages and declaratory relief based on these constitutional violations, therefore, were barred under Heck.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim that would necessarily demonstrate the invalidity of a criminal conviction while that conviction remains intact.

Winters v. Lepley · filed 2005-05-12

Because success on Winters’ claims, which attack the validity of his criminal conviction in state court, would necessarily demonstrate the invalidity of his confinement, they are not properly raised at this time in a § 1983 action.

Section 1983 bars claims whose success would necessarily imply the invalidity of a conviction.

Hudson v. Coxon · filed 2005-09-21

Additionally, to the extent that Hudson’s claims attempt to challenge the process leading to and the validity of his conviction, he cannot raise a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit claims that would implicate the validity of a conviction unless the conviction’s validity has been cast into doubt.

Spence v. Hood · filed 2006-03-27

These claims are not cognizable under § 1983 because Spence has not established that the validity of his conviction has been cast into doubt.

A prisoner’s § 1983 claim that collaterally challenges a disciplinary conviction is not cognizable unless the conviction has previously been invalidated.

Harper v. Clarke · filed 2006-04-11

As noted by the district court with regard to Harper, a Tecumseh State Correctional Institution inmate, we note that a Nebraska State Penitentiary inmate’s civil rights claim filed under § 1983 which is a collateral challenge to an underlying disciplinary action is not cognizable under § 1983 unless the prisoner can demonstrate that the disciplinary conviction has previously been invalidated. ... We hold that this rule applies to Harper and to inmates of any DCS penitentiary.

Section 1983 does not permit claims that would imply the invalidity of an outstanding conviction.

Propes v. Collin County District Attorney · filed 2006-08-28

Propes’s allegations, if proven, would implicate the validity of his murder conviction. The claims thus are not cognizable under § 1983.

A § 1983 complaint that would necessarily imply the invalidity of a conviction or sentence must be dismissed unless the conviction or sentence has already been invalidated.

Collins v. State of Oklahoma · filed 2006-10-17

Most notably, we agree that a judgment in Collin’s favor on his § 1983 suit “would necessarily imply the invalidity of his [state] conviction[s] [and] sentence . . . .” Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 487 (1994). Thus, Supreme Court precedent requires that his complaint be dismissed until he “can demonstrate that the conviction[s] or sentence ha[ve] already been invalidated.” Id. (applying rule in § 1983 suit seeking damages); Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641, 648 (1997) (applying rule in § 1983 suit seeking declaratory relief).

Section 1983 damages claims that would necessarily imply the invalidity of a conviction or sentence must be dismissed unless the conviction or sentence has already been invalidated.

McBride v. Secretary for the Department of Corrections · filed 2006-11-28

If this type of § 1983 action is brought before the challenged conviction or sentence is invalidated, it must be dismissed.

Section 1983 bars a challenge to a prison disciplinary conviction that caused the loss of good-time credits unless the conviction has been overturned.

Ali v. Dretke · filed 2006-12-19

Because Ali’s challenge calls into question the validity of his disciplinary conviction, and because Ali lost good-time credits as a result of that conviction, his challenges are barred because he has not shown that the disciplinary conviction has been overturned.

Section 1983 claims that would necessarily imply the invalidity of a conviction are barred unless the conviction has already been invalidated.

Esensoy v. H. W. Bucky McMillan · filed 2007-01-31

Because Appellant’s § 1983 claim would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction and because Appellant cannot demonstrate that his conviction already has been invalidated, Appellant’s claims are barred under Heck.

Claims challenging a criminal conviction are not cognizable under § 1983 unless the conviction has been reversed, expunged, declared invalid by a state court, or called into question by a federal habeas writ.

Poston v. Shappert · filed 2007-03-30

Because Poston has made no showing that his conviction has been reversed, expunged, declared invalid by a state court, or called into question by a federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, we find that his claims are not cognizable under § 1983 or under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (2000).

Section 1983 does not permit a challenge that would necessarily invalidate an existing sentence; the plaintiff must seek habeas relief.

Lawrence v. McCall · filed 2007-07-26

By finding the sentencing procedures used by Oklahoma here unconstitutional, we would invalidate the plaintiffs’ prior sentences. Heck does not allow us to so act.

Section 1983 claims challenging a prison disciplinary conviction may be dismissed under Heck v. Humphrey.

Grant v. Howell · filed 2007-08-14

Finally, Grant’s disciplinary conviction claims are dismissed pursuant to Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994).

Section 1983 cannot be used to vacate a state criminal conviction; that relief must be sought through habeas corpus.

Hansen v. Schmidt · filed 2007-10-23

We also agree with the district court that Hansen’s complaint fails because Hansen seeks to vacate a state criminal conviction, and such actions must be brought through a petition for a writ of habeas corpus rather than a section 1983 complaint.

Section 1983 bars a challenge to a prison disciplinary conviction unless that conviction has been expunged or reversed.

Harrell v. Mooneyham · filed 2007-10-24

The district court properly held that Harrell’s lawsuit was barred because he had not shown that his disciplinary conviction ... had been expunged or reversed.

Section 1983 cannot be used to challenge the validity of a conviction that has not already been invalidated.

Alexander v. Lucas · filed 2007-12-21

If Mr. Alexander’s suit is meant to directly attack the validity of his conviction, then we must dismiss the suit as an improper use of Section 1983. ... Moreover, Mr. Alexander has never demonstrated that his conviction has already been invalidated. As such, Mr. Alexander’s suit, construed in this way, has no proper basis as a Section 1983 claim.

Section 1983 does not permit a prisoner to challenge a conviction or sentence unless it has been invalidated through specified appellate, executive, state tribunal, or federal habeas proceedings.

Lopez v. United States Sentencing Commision · filed 2008-02-20

Mr. Lopez may not challenge his conviction and sentence in a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action without first establishing that they have been “reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into question by a federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.”

Section 1983 bars a claim challenging a conviction or imprisonment when the conviction has not been reversed, expunged, or otherwise called into question.

Veasey v. Criminal District Court No. 2 · filed 2008-04-04

Additionally, Veasey’s complaint challenged his conviction and imprisonment without alleging that his conviction had been reversed, expunged, or otherwise called into question. Accordingly, it was barred.

Section 1983 does not allow a prisoner to challenge the constitutionality of a conviction; that challenge must be brought through habeas corpus.

Fuller v. ACKLMAN · filed 2009-04-21

In a § 1983 action, a prisoner may not challenge the constitutionality of his or her conviction.

Section 1983 damages suits must be dismissed or stayed when deciding them would require a ruling on the validity of a state conviction and the prisoner has not exhausted available state remedies.

Matos v. Quealy · filed 1981-02-17

The reasoning and policy of Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 93 S.Ct. 1827, 36 L.Ed.2d 439 (1973), as well as the considerations of comity underlying Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 91 S.Ct. 746, 27 L.Ed.2d 669 (1971) and Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U.S. 66, 91 S.Ct. 764, 27 L.Ed.2d 688 (1971), require that a federal district court dismiss or stay a state prisoner’s civil rights suit for damages, especially one brought during the pendency of a state proceeding for review of the conviction, when its disposition would require the federal court to rule on the validity of the state conviction and the prisoner has not exhausted available state remedies.

Section 1983 does not provide a damages claim that implies the invalidity of an assault conviction unless that conviction has previously been set aside.

Ruiz v. Hofbauer · filed 2009-05-20

So, because Ruiz’s suit attacks the validity of his assault conviction and that conviction has not been previously set aside, he does not have a cognizable claim under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit a prisoner to pursue a claim that would imply the invalidity of his sentence unless the conviction or sentence has already been reversed, expunged, or invalidated.

Price v. McNeil · filed 2009-08-07

To the extent that Price’s claim was a challenge to the legality of his confinement, it was barred under the Heck doctrine. Because a judgment in favor of Price finding that the DOC lacked authority to confine him without a signed, certified judgment of conviction would necessarily call into question the validity of his sentence, Price was required to show that his conviction or sentence had been reversed, expunged, or invalidated.

A state prisoner cannot bring a Section 1983 claim whose success would necessarily demonstrate the invalidity of a conviction that has not been invalidated.

Perez v. Georgelis · filed 2009-11-13

A state prisoner’s section 1983 action is barred, no matter the relief sought, if success in that action would necessarily demonstrate the invalidity of his conviction.

Section 1983 does not permit a prisoner to challenge an existing disciplinary conviction when success in the suit would imply that the conviction is invalid.

Phillips v. Castillo · filed 2009-12-08

Because Phillips’s disciplinary conviction is still extant, and because success on the instant suit would imply that this conviction was invalid, the district court did not err in determining that Phillips’s suit is barred by Edwards and Heck.

Section 1983 bars an action when a judgment for the plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of a conviction that has not been invalidated.

Ramey v. County of Fresno · filed 2009-12-14

The district court properly dismissed the action because a judgment in Ramey’s favor would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction, and the conviction has not been invalidated.

Section 1983 does not permit a due process claim challenging a prison disciplinary hearing when success would necessarily imply the invalidity of revoked good-time credits.

Daniels v. Ruan · filed 2010-03-08

The district court properly dismissed the due process claim challenging several aspects of the disciplinary hearing because success on this claim would necessarily imply the invalidity of the revocation of Daniels’s good-time credits.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim whose success would necessarily imply the invalidity of a sentence unless that sentence has been invalidated.

Mccright v. Schwarzenegger · filed 2010-04-20

The district court properly dismissed the action because a judgment in McCright’s favor would necessarily imply the invalidity of his sentence, and his sentence has not been invalidated.

Section 1983 permits a prisoner’s claim when success would not necessarily invalidate the prisoner’s sentence or conviction.

Fisher v. Director of CDC · filed 2010-06-22

However, a decision in Fisher’s favor ... would not necessarily imply the invalidity of his sentence or conviction.

Section 1983 is not a vehicle for a prisoner to challenge the validity of a conviction or sentence.

Griffin vs Jeffrey R. Levenson, Alfred J. Horowitz · filed 2010-10-14

If the district court had found in favor of Griffin, then his conviction would have been invalidated.

Section 1983 does not provide a civil rights action to challenge the validity of a conviction; such a challenge belongs in habeas corpus.

Grenier v. Clerk of the Court · filed 2010-11-05

The district court is unassailably correct that Mr. Grenier’s claims sound in habeas as a challenge to his conviction, not a § 1983 civil rights action.

Section 1983 does not permit a prisoner to seek damages or declaratory relief based on a disciplinary conviction that has not been invalidated if success would necessarily imply the conviction's invalidity.

Martinez v. Guitierrez · filed 2010-11-10

A prisoner may not seek monetary damages or declaratory relief under § 1983 based on the procedures used in a disciplinary conviction until that disciplinary conviction has been reversed, expunged, or otherwise declared invalid if a favorable judgment would necessarily imply the invalidity of the disciplinary conviction.

Section 1983 does not allow a damages claim based on a conviction or sentence that has not been invalidated.

O'Dell Hall, Jr. v. Santa Rosa Correctional · filed 2010-11-24

Accordingly, because a claim for damages based on a conviction or sentence that has not been invalidated is not cognizable under § 1983, Hall’s challenges to various aspects of his criminal proceedings and his sentence are not properly before us.

Section 1983 bars a challenge to a conviction or sentence that has not been invalidated through habeas corpus, direct appeal, or executive order.

Knox v. State of Oregon · filed 2011-01-25

The district court properly dismissed Knox’s challenge to his original life sentence and the decision to defer his parole date as barred under Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1994). See id. (section 1983 action barred if it challenges conduct that is also the basis of a criminal conviction or sentence that has not been otherwise invalidated or expunged via writ of habeas corpus, direct appeal, or executive order).

Section 1983 bars a claim that calls a conviction’s validity into question unless the conviction or sentence has first been invalidated.

Davis v. County of Allegheny · filed 2011-02-11

A plaintiff may not pursue a claim under § 1983 that calls into question the validity of his conviction unless he demonstrates that the “conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into question by a federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.” Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1994). As the District Court reasoned, to the extent that Davis’s challenge to the Allegheny County District Attorney’s policy calls into question the validity of his conviction, Heck bars Davis’s claims.

Section 1983 does not permit damages for a challenge to a sentence that has not been invalidated.

Williams v. Danberg · filed 2011-05-03

As the sentence has not been invalidated—indeed, as observed above, his sentence has recently been upheld—he cannot pursue monetary relief under § 1983.

Section 1983 bars a claim that implicates the validity of a conviction that has not been invalidated.

Wicklund v. Ada County · filed 2011-05-09

To the extent that Wicklund is arguing that Ada County suppressed materially exculpatory evidence, his claim is barred because it implicates the validity of his underlying conviction, which has not been invalidated.

Section 1983 cannot be used to seek damages for an allegedly unlawful conviction or sentence unless that conviction or sentence has been invalidated.

Johnson v. Rick Thaler, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division · filed 2011-05-12

And a civil tort action for violation of federal constitutional rights is not an appropriate vehicle “for challenging the validity of outstanding criminal judgments,” which is essentially the basis of Johnson’s complaint here, although he does not explicitly state that his federal constitutional claims are brought under § 1983.

Section 1983 claims challenging a conviction or sentence are not cognizable unless the conviction or sentence has been invalidated.

Fitch v. Gonzales · filed 2011-06-02

These claims are not cognizable in a § 1983 action because his conviction or sentence has not been “reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into question by a federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.”

Section 1983 does not permit a claim whose success would necessarily imply the invalidity of a conviction or sentence that has not been invalidated.

Torrence v. Thompson · filed 2011-06-03

In addition, Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), precludes section 1983 claims like Torrence’s whose success “would necessarily imply the invalidity” of a conviction or sentence that has not already been reversed, expunged, declared invalid, or “called into question by a federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus[.]” Id. at 487.

Section 1983 does not permit claims that necessarily impinge upon the validity of an outstanding criminal conviction.

Garcia v. Sanchez · filed 2011-06-20

... those claims are barred by the Supreme Court’s holding in Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 114 S.Ct. 2364, 129 L.Ed.2d 383 (1994), because such claims necessarily impinge upon the validity of plaintiffs capital murder conviction and are, therefore, not cognizable in this action for relief pursuant to Section 1983.

A prisoner’s § 1983 due process challenge to a disciplinary conviction is barred when the conviction has not been reversed or expunged.

Anthony Moore, Jr. v. Rick Thaler · filed 2011-08-05

Because Moore has failed to show that the disciplinary conviction had been reversed or expunged, the magistrate judge correctly determined that those claims were barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1994).

Section 1983 does not permit a claim whose success would necessarily imply the invalidity of the plaintiff’s conviction.

Lopez v. Skagit County Jail · filed 2011-08-16

The district court properly dismissed Lopez’s claim alleging denial of access to the courts because a judgment in Lopez’s favor would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction.

Section 1983 cannot be used to overturn a state conviction; a prisoner must seek that relief through habeas corpus.

Darby v. Geiger · filed 2011-08-17

To the extent that Darby sought to overturn in a § 1983 action his state court convictions, he may not do so. He may obtain that relief in federal court only by way of a habeas petition.

Section 1983 does not permit a prisoner to seek expungement of a disciplinary proceeding when expungement would restore good time credits.

Evans v. Baker · filed 2011-09-20

The district court did not err in determining that his § 1983 complaint is barred, as expungement of his disciplinary proceeding would result in restoration of his good time credits.

Section 1983 claims that would necessarily imply the invalidity of a conviction or sentence must be dismissed without prejudice unless the conviction or sentence has already been invalidated.

Burkeybile v. Zach Young · filed 2011-11-01

The district court properly dismissed the action because Burkeybile’s claims are barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994). See Heck, 512 U.S. at 487 (“[W]hen a state prisoner seeks damages in a § 1983 suit, the district court must consider whether a judgment in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence; if it would, the complaint must be dismissed unless the plaintiff can demonstrate that the conviction or sentence has already been invalidated.”). However, we vacate the judgment to the extent that the court dismissed the action with prejudice, and remand for entry of dismissal without prejudice.

Section 1983 claims based on alleged misconduct in a criminal proceeding cannot proceed if success would undermine an existing conviction.

Hawkins v. United States · filed 2012-05-02

Moreover, claims under § 1983 based on allegedly unconstitutional conduct in a criminal proceeding that, if meritorious, would undermine an extant conviction cannot be maintained.

Section 1983 claims that would challenge the validity of a conviction cannot proceed unless the conviction has been overturned or called into question; dismissal of those claims is without prejudice.

Ewing v. Silvious · filed 2012-06-04

To the extent Ewing raised claims challenging the validity of his conviction, the district court properly denied relief because Ewing has not shown that his conviction has been overturned or called into question. See Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1994). Because Ewing may refile those claims if his conviction is invalidated by an appropriate court, we modify the dismissal to be without prejudice and affirm as modified.

Section 1983 does not permit claims that necessarily imply the invalidity of a conviction that has not been set aside.

Green v. Justices of Texas Court of Criminal Appeals · filed 2012-06-28

Because Green’s claims necessarily imply the invalidity of his murder conviction, which has not been set aside, they are not cognizable under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim challenging police reports whose validity would undermine an outstanding conviction.

De Contreras v. City of Rialto · filed 2012-09-25

Furthermore, as De Contreras was convicted on the charges alleged in the police reports (see April 9, 2012 Minute Order Granting Motion to Dismiss at 7 (Doc. No. 42)), he cannot now challenge the validity of those police reports under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit a direct challenge to a conviction or sentence.

Taylor v. Graves · filed 2013-02-21

To the extent that Taylor challenges his sentence and conviction directly, those claims are foreclosed in a § 1983 action.

Section 1983 bars a challenge to parole conditions and the underlying indictment when the plaintiff has not shown that the conviction or sentence has been overturned.

Praileau v. Fischer · filed 2013-03-08

As a result, the Court adopts the Report-Recommendation in its entirety for the reasons stated therein. ... Plaintiffs attacks on both the conditions of his supervised release and on the underlying indictment are barred under § 1983 because he has fails to show that this conviction or sentence has been overturned.

Section 1983 cannot be used to challenge a conviction when success on the claim would necessarily imply that the conviction is invalid.

Frederick Levin Waterfield, Jr. v. Laboda · filed 2013-05-01

Waterfield’s contention that the state courts lacked jurisdiction over his criminal proceedings would necessarily imply the invalidity of his criminal conviction, and § 1983 therefore was not an appropriate vehicle for his argument.

Section 1983 claims that necessarily challenge a conviction or sentence are barred until it is invalidated or called into question.

Ventris v. State of Kansas · filed 2013-06-11

Heck bars 42 U.S.C. § 1983 causes of action which necessarily challenge the validity of a conviction or sentence until that conviction or sentence is invalidated or called into question.

Section 1983 does not allow a prisoner to challenge a criminal conviction.

Spencer v. Bob Riley · filed 2013-07-25

The problem for Mr. Spencer is that a challenge to a criminal conviction cannot be brought under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim challenging a conviction that has not been favorably terminated.

Wilson v. City of Dayton · filed 2014-01-06

Fourth, Plaintiff may not pursue a § 1983 claim for an unconstitutional conviction because he pled guilty or was found guilty in the four state criminal cases here at issue.

Section 1983 provides no remedy for a claim seeking to invalidate a criminal conviction; the claimant must exhaust state remedies and seek habeas relief.

Corsini v. Bloomberg · filed 2014-05-15

To the extent that Defendant argues that the First Amendment, as incorporated to, the states by the Fourteenth Amendment, renders the New York Penal Code as applied to him in his December 19, 2013, conviction invalid, he has no remedy under section 1983. Rather, to challenge the conviction in the District Court, he must exhaust state remedies and file a petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254.

Section 1983 does not allow a plaintiff to challenge an outstanding conviction or seek damages that would necessarily impugn it.

Cannon v. Newport · filed 2014-07-24

Moreover, so long as those convictions stand, Cannon may not challenge them in a civil-rights suit, ... or pursue claims for damages that necessarily would, impugn his convictions, see Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87, 114 S.Ct. 2364, 129 L.Ed.2d 383 (1994); Gilbert v. Cook, 512 F.3d 899, 900 (7th Cir.2008).

A § 1983 claim that challenges the validity of a conviction cannot proceed unless the conviction has been invalidated.

Hunter v. City of New York · filed 2014-08-11

As a result, unless Plaintiff can show that his conviction has been reversed, declared invalid, or called into question by the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, Plaintiff cannot assert a § 1983 claim against Giuca or King.

Section 1983 cannot be used to attack a criminal conviction by seeking prospective relief from the trial judge’s rulings.

Beauclair v. Dowd · filed 2014-10-23

And insofar as Mr. Beauclair is seeking prospective relief by challenging Judge Dowd’s rulings, the only possible purpose for the challenge is as a means to attack his conviction, and § 1983 is not the proper vehicle for that purpose.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim for declaratory or injunctive relief that would necessarily invalidate a conviction unless the conviction has already been invalidated.

Ewing v. Superior Court · filed 2015-03-11

The FAC must therefore be dismissed under Heck because Plaintiff cannot demonstrate the conviction has been reversed, expunged, declared invalid or called into question.

Section 1983 claims challenging a conviction are barred unless the conviction has been overturned or called into question.

Ewing v. Silvious · filed 2015-03-16

As we recognized in Ewing’s prior appeal, his claims are barred because he has not shown that his convictions have been overturned or called into question.

Section 1983 does not permit a prisoner to challenge a disciplinary conviction that revoked good time credits unless the conviction has been overturned.

Dilworth v. Corpening · filed 2015-09-01

The district court properly dismissed the claim because it was not cognizable under § 1983 in the absence of a showing that the disciplinary conviction supporting the revocation of good time credits has been overturned.

Section 1983 cannot be used to vacate a state conviction or sentence; that relief must be sought under 28 U.S.C. § 2254.

Smith v. United States of America · filed 2015-09-09

He brings this civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and asks this court to “construe pro-se 1983 as 28 U.S.C. § 2255 and vacate and set aside” the judgment of conviction. Comp]. at 4. “[I]t is well-settled that a [person] seeking relief from his conviction or sentence may not bring [actions for injunctive and declaratory relief].” Williams v. Hill, 74 F.3d 1339, 1340 (DC. Cir. 1996) (per curiam) (citations omitted). Rather, such relief must be pursued under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 in an appropriate court designated under 28 U.S.C. § 2241(d).

Section 1983 does not permit claims that challenge the fact of a conviction and fall within the core of habeas corpus.

Meaux v. United States Government · filed 2016-05-13

Because Meaux’s claims effectively challenge “the fact of his conviction,” and thus “fall within the ‘core’ of habeas corpus,” they are not cognizable under § 1983.

Section 1983 claims that would necessarily invalidate a sentence cannot proceed unless the sentence has already been invalidated.

Hills v. Lynch · filed 2016-06-29

Because plaintiffs success would necessarily invalidate his sentence, his claims are not "cognizable unless and until he meets the requirements of Heck" by having the sentence invalidated via direct appeal or habeas corpus, or declared void by an authorized tribunal.

Section 1983 does not allow a claim that would necessarily imply the invalidity of a disciplinary conviction that deprived an inmate of good-time credits.

Wilks v. Rymarkiewicz · filed 2016-07-22

Under Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641, 646–48 (1997), a claim is not cognizable under § 1983 if it necessarily implies that a conviction depriving an inmate of good-time credits was invalid.

Section 1983 cannot be used to challenge a criminal conviction.

Glover v. Dickey · filed 2016-08-17

To the extent that Dickey challenges the district court’s denial of his motion related to his underlying state convictions, Glover cannot use § 1983 as a means of challenging his ... convictions.

Section 1983 does not permit a damages claim challenging a conviction that has not been overturned.

Wongus v. City of Philadelphia · filed 2016-10-13

If plaintiff is seeking damages based on allegations that he is currently imprisoned pursuant to false convictions, his claims are not cognizable because the complaint and the public docket indicate that his convictions have not yet been overturned.

Section 1983 requires dismissal of a claim whose success would imply that a conviction is invalid unless the conviction has already been invalidated.

Key v. Does · filed 2016-11-17

This is because such relief would necessarily imply the invalidity of Key’s state conviction, and a section 1983 action “must be dismissed unless the plaintiff can demonstrate that the conviction or sentence has already been invalidated.”

Section 1983 is not the proper avenue for a prisoner to challenge his conviction; habeas corpus is.

Trevino v. State · filed 2017-05-04

If Trevino seeks to challenge his conviction, habeas corpus, and not § 1983, is the proper avenue.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim challenging a criminal conviction unless the conviction has been reversed, expunged, declared invalid, or called into question by a writ of habeas corpus.

Bacilio v. Blake Burns · filed 2017-05-11

The district court did not err in dismissing in light of the fact that Bacilio’s claims regarding his state criminal conviction are barred under Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486–87 (1994), because the conviction was not reversed, expunged, declared invalid, or called into question by the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.

Section 1983 cannot be used to challenge the validity of a criminal conviction or sentence.

Ickes v. Grassmyer · filed 2017-07-28

However, he cannot raise those claims here — both because he did not present them in the District Court, see, e.g., Eid v. Thompson, 740 F.3d 118, 125 (3d Cir. 2014), and because a civil-rights action is not an appropriate vehicle to challenge his conviction and sentence, see Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1994); Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 500 (1973).

Section 1983 does not permit a claim that would undermine the validity of an outstanding conviction or guilty plea.

L. Brown v. York County Prison · filed 2017-10-16

Here, Brown’s underlying legal claim is the post-conviction proceeding. To establish that this legal claim had arguable merit, Brown would have to demonstrate that the medical records would have proven that his guilty plea was legally invalid because it was not entered knowingly or intelligently. However, the United States Supreme Court has held that a section 1983 claim cannot be used for this purpose – that is, to collaterally attack, attempt to invalidate, or otherwise undermine the legal basis for a conviction.

Section 1983 cannot be used to challenge the validity of a guilty plea that has not been invalidated.

Fields v. City of Pittsburgh · filed 2017-10-26

Moreover, even if Fields had included the affidavit, a § 1983 claim is an improper vehicle for challenging the validity of his guilty plea.